(278) 01-07-2022-to-01-13-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
(279) 01-21-2022-to-01-27-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
(280) 01-28-2022-to-02-03-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
------------------------------------------------
WAR - OH SH*T, HERE WE GO (Douglas Macgregor) NATO/Russia
https://thesaker.is/oh-sht-here-we-go-douglas-macgregor/ RT 20:32 posted from Redacted View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NyNA9f6kPcU Overnight night the head of NATO said that that Russia is mobilizing an additional 200,000 troops readying a massive offensive. Poland is ready to send...
www.timebomb2000.com
ALERT - RUSSIA INVADES UKRAINE - Consolidated Thread
I've never heard of the distinction. What immediately comes to mind is cannon stabilization. This might be a subtle way of saying the German tank cannons can remain stable while moving, i.e. can fire while rolling. The Brits might be lacking in that department, and can fire accurately only...
www.timebomb2000.com
BRKG - Suspected Chinese spy balloon found over northern U.S. - Shot Down on Saturday 2/4/23
Someone breaks into your house. The burglar gets shot. Was he shot just inside the closed front door? Or was he shot after he climbed out the window with the family jewels? Just a rhetorical question.
www.timebomb2000.com
WAR - Mike Yon--"Heart dump from the Front Lines--sans edit" We are at WAR.
https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/3459818/heart-dump-from-the-frontlines Heart Dump From the Frontlines 02 February 2023 Panama invasion corridor Heart Dump, Sans edit I made this video at Puerto Limon in Darien Gap as this group emerged. Most are military aged males. Every day I am...
www.timebomb2000.com
ALERT - The Winds of War Blow in Korea and The Far East
Japan gunning for strategic independence from US Gabriel Honrada Japan plans to spend big on long-range standoff weapons and asymmetric capabilities, signaling a potential change in longstanding notions of deterrence and military doctrine. The Japanese Ministry of Defense...
www.timebomb2000.com
WAR - Main Persian Gulf Trouble thread
Yes yes you did well we will see if this goes anywhere
www.timebomb2000.com
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Posted for fair use.....
Seoul’s Nuclear Temptations and the U.S.-South Korean Alliance - War on the Rocks
Amid drastic negative changes to its security environment and fundamental questions about the long-term reliability of the United States, South Korea is
warontherocks.com
SEOUL’S NUCLEAR TEMPTATIONS AND THE U.S.-SOUTH KOREAN ALLIANCE
ANKIT PANDAFEBRUARY 3, 2023
COMMENTARY
Amid drastic negative changes to its security environment and fundamental questions about the long-term reliability of the United States, South Korea is drawn — as it once was in the 1970s — to nuclear weapons. On Jan. 11, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, a conservative who has been outspoken about North Korea’s nuclear threats, voiced the possibility that Seoul could “acquire our own nuke.” Alluding to his country’s advanced scientific prowess, delivery systems, and long-acknowledged nuclear latency, Yoon noted that, should such a decision be made, Seoul’s advanced “science and technology” would ensure that the time required to build such a capability would be short. Yoon’s words have made global headlines and jolted alliance hands in Washington.
Yoon’s remarks, while concerning, do not represent the result of a considered policy planning process or indicate that a decision to procure nuclear weapons will be soon made in South Korea. Instead, the South Korean president alluded to the possibility of pursuing nuclear weapons in a wide-ranging set of remarks to South Korean foreign and defense officials. According to one unofficial translation of a released Korean transcript, Yoon premised the possibility of nuclear weapons acquisition on a conditional: “if problems become more serious,
[South Korea] could deploy tactical nuclear weapons here, or we could acquire our own nuke as well.” He concluded this section of his remarks by reverting to the status quo, noting that the “realistically possible” option, “for now,” was the alliance with the United States. In the days since his remarks went public, Yoon has tried to manage perceptions: for instance, Yoon publicly noted that South Korea’s “realistic and rational option is to fully respect the [Non-Proliferation Treaty] regime” and that he remained “fully confident about the U.S.’s extended deterrence.”
South Korea faces difficult choices amid an objectively worsening threat environment, but a drastic shift away from the status quo of robust conventional deterrence backstopped by U.S. nuclear guarantees in pursuit of an independent nuclear deterrent will not solve South Korea’s security challenges. Beyond the normative, economic, and other costs Seoul would face for abrogating its non-proliferation commitments, it is far from clear that South Korean nuclear weapons will help solve tensions with North Korea. As anxieties remain high, Washington and Seoul should refocus their efforts on adapting their military plans to a shifting North Korean threat while exploring new forms of trust-building within the existing alliance structure. This will require coordinating views on what North Korean behaviors can be deterred and through what means and working together to assuage South Korean concern about U.S. security guarantees.
Inter-Korean Crises and Proliferation Concerns
Given how rare publicly expressed statements of nuclear weapons acquisition intent are by U.S. extended deterrence recipients in the post-Cold War era, Yoon’s comments are unlikely to be ignored in Washington. The comments represent an expression of a view that is deeply held by many in South Korea, including among officials within the current government. Many prominent advisors in the Yoon administration served in the Lee Myung-bak administration, including during the turbulent years of 2008 to 2010, when Pyongyang became exceptionally risk acceptant. Inter-Korean tensions crescendoed with the twin crises of 2010, when North Korea sunk the ROKS Cheonan, a South Korean Navy corvette, and later shelled Yeonpyeong Island across the Northern Limit Line. Between civilians and military, 50 South Koreans lost their lives. South Korea was prepared for war, but the Obama administration discouraged disproportionate escalation by Seoul in the pursuit of vengeance, fearing uncontrollable consequences. These experiences have informed the approach of some in the Yoon administration today who are determined to never allow for a 2010-style crisis to repeat itself and see nuclear weapons as an instrumental component of deterring a range of undesirable actions by North Korea.
2010 was a dramatic reminder that the kind of risk-acceptant behavior North Korea exhibited in the post-Korean War period under Kim Il Sung — as seen in prominent crises throughout the 1960s and 1970s — was not a relic of the past. In the pre-democracy period, South Korea, under Park Chung-hee, considered developing nuclear weapons once and was coerced away from that path and into the then-nascent non-proliferation regime by the United States. Since Kim Jong Un’s assumption of power in the final days of 2011, the Korean Peninsula has been spared serious skirmishes, but as the final days of 2022 demonstrate, Pyongyang continues to surprise with behavior that could precipitate unintentional escalation. Kim Jong Un, meanwhile, continues to oversee a massive project of quantitative nuclear force expansion and qualitative modernization. Seoul’s threat perceptions are well-placed and should not be dismissed: In fact, insofar as a state’s security environment can drive an interest in nuclear weapons acquisition, the South Korean case should not be a surprise.
Continued.....