ECON What Does Senator Bunning Know, And, More Relevantly, What Does The Just Disclosed...

[Ben Sunday]

What Does Senator Bunning Know, And, More Relevantly, What Does The Just Disclosed Fed Whistleblower Know?
Tyler Durden on 01/26/2010 19:59 -0500

First, watch the below video. Note Senator Bunning's agreement with Zero Hedge on who the proposed head of the Fed should be (John Taylor). But that's irrelevant. What is - at 5:40 Bunning says that "Geithner will be fired by the President for his inability to handle his job as Secretary of the Treasury." True. What is even more relevant, and hints at a potential smoking gun, begins at 8:00 "[Bernanke's] staff did not agree with him [on bailing out AIG]...I am talking about an email that he sent his staff, after his staff recommended that the Federal Reserve not touch AIG, just like Lehman Brothers."

Ok fine, so Bernanke steamrolled opposition: that's nothing new - whoever thought the Fed is any more democratic than the country it is supposed to serve, surely is naive. Here is HuffPo's Ryan Grim on the matter:

A Republican senator said Tuesday that documents showing Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernake covered up the fact that his staff recommended he not bailout AIG are being kept from the public. And a House Republican charged that a whistleblower had alerted Congress to specific documents provide "troubling details" of Bernanke's role in the AIG bailout.
Sen. Jim Bunning (R-Ky.), a Bernanke critic, said on CNBC that he has seen documents showing that Bernanke overruled such a recommendation. If that's the case, it raises questions about whether bailing out AIG was actually necessary, and what Bernanke's motives were.

And as we type, Harry Reid has noted that he wants to get a reconfirmation vote on Bernanke on Thursday - presumably before all the rot that will soon be uncovered about yet another Bernanke fiasco is made public. Hopefully the man who owns roughly $3 million in commercial real estate and is thus a direct beneficiary of a Bernanke reconfirmation, has done his math on senatorial support. A key question however is: shouldn't the debt ceiling issue be resolved first - after all the fact that our national debt "ceiling" is nothing but a joke these days, is a direct consequence of Fed policies to pile bail out upon bail out. It also leaves the question open of what additional information has to still be presented.

[snip]
Darrell Issa identifies the specific documents that need to be disclosed (see below) and has requested from Edolphus Towns that these be made public, as the "Board's staff did not return calls" in an attempt to procure these documents directly.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/25877786/ISSA-BUNNING

The take home message: the Fed has finally produced a whistleblower. Could this be the catalytic event that brings the house of cards down."

http://www.zerohedge.com/article/what-does-senator-bunning-know

 

[Y2kO]

As I understand it, per Bob Chapman, they used taxpayer money to pay AIG's (derivative) debt to Goldman Sachs (which is why they 'bailed' it out), paying 100 cents on the dollar (when it was worth about 10 cents on the dollar) and that info was kept hidden from Congress and discussed in the memo. Geithner and all of them formerly worked for Goldman Sachs (and still do) and they are looting the USA and covering it up. Geithner may lose his job over it when all the details come out (and should go to prison). Certainly, Bernanke should be kicked out on the street.

From The International Forecaster:
“Questions have been raised as to whether the Federal Reserve intentionally structured the AIG counterparty payments to benefit AIG’s counterparties,” Barofsky wrote. “Geithner and the New York Fed’s general counsel deny that this was a relevant consideration for the AIG transactions.”

U.S. Representative Darrell Issa, the ranking member of the House oversight panel that called Geithner to testify this week, has described the rescue of New York-based AIG as a “backdoor bailout” of banks.

 

[Y2kO]

http://www.infowars.com/geithner-told-to-quit-after-e-mails-reveal-involvement-in-aig-cover-up/

Geithner Told To Quit After E Mails Reveal Involvement In AIG Cover-up
Paul Joseph Watson
Prison Planet.com
Wednesday, January 27, 2010

Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s denial that he played any role in the AIG cover-up is contradicted by emails which confirm that both Geithner and the New York Federal Reserve were both intimately involved in keeping details about payments to banks including Goldman Sachs from the public.

Geithner told lawmakers today that he had no involvement in withholding information about the bailout of AIG, much to the chagrin of House Oversight Committee Ranking Member Darrell Issa, who wasn’t buying it for a second.

“He has asserted complete ignorance of the Fed’s efforts to cover up the bailout details,” said Issa, R-Calif. “Many Americans, including members of this Committee, have a hard time believing that Secretary Geithner entered an absolute cone of silence on the day that his nomination was announced.”

John Mica of Florida went further, calling for Geithner to quit as a result of the scandal.

“Why shouldn’t we ask for your resignation?” Mica asked Geithner. “We’re not getting the whole story, we’re getting the blame story. You’re either incompetent on the job or you knew what was taking place and you tried to conceal it, and I think that’s grounds for your review.”

Mica characterized Geithner’s denials as “lame excuses” as the Treasury Secretary became visibly angry.

In November and December 2008, The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, headed up by Geithner, instructed the bailed out AIG to hide from the public details regarding payments the insurance giant made to banks, including Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Societe Generale SA.

Using Fed secured taxpayer bailout money, AIG paid several banks 100 percent of the face value of credit-default swaps, as other financial institutions were negotiating deep discounts for the unregulated paper assets that do not have to be backed by cash.

The decision to pay the banks in full may have cost AIG, and therefore taxpayers, at least $13 billion over the odds.

The “backdoor bailout” of the banks, as it has been dubbed was exposed in March 2009 after the SEC challenged AIG’s filing, however, e-mails obtained by Representative Darrell Issa, ranking member of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, reignited the situation after they conclusively exposed a collusion between AIG and the Fed to deceive the public.

The e-mails between company and regulator show that The New York Fed crossed out reference to the payments and that AIG also omitted the details when the Securities and Exchange Commission filing was made public on Dec. 24, 2008.

The emails, the content of which are highlighted in this Bloomberg News article, also show that the Fed wanted numerous other details about the AIG bailout withheld or delayed from public oversight.

“It appears that the New York Fed deliberately pressured AIG to restrict and delay the disclosure of important information,” said Issa, adding that taxpayers “deserve full and complete disclosure under our nation’s securities laws, not the withholding of politically inconvenient information.”

Geithner’s denial that he, even as President of the New York Fed, had no involvement with the AIG case is contradicted by fresh revelations this week in a new report issued by Issa that show Geithner was “at a minimum, engaged personally in reviewing what information about the AIG bailout would be revealed to Congress and the public.”

On November 6, 2008 Geithner received an email from Sarah Dahlgren, the FRBNY’s lead staff member in AIG’s operations, seeking Geithner’s approval for a proposed statement regarding AIG’s upcoming equity capital raise. The fact that Geithner’s approval had to be obtained merely for putting out statements concerning AIG clearly indicates that he was deeply involved in the matter.

On November 13, Geithner was sent a report on AIG’s restructuring that would be sent to Congress. Sophia Allison, a staff member of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors, asked that Geithner point out any information that he believed should not be “publicly disclosed”.

In addition, records of who Geithner met with during his tenure as President of the FRBNY “show that he was regularly engaged with top AIG officials and the FRBNY officials directly responsible for AIG’s disclosures to the SEC. Geithner’s schedule shows that he had at least six formal meetings with top FRBNY staff members about AIG-related issues between November 4, 2008, and November 21, 2008.”

Watch the clip from today’s hearings where Mica demands Geithner’s resignation. (at link)

 

[Ben Sunday]

Chapman is a sharp guy. I have interviewed him on the radio several times in the past few months.

Fwiw, I heard the 100 cents on the dollar story this afternoon the CBS Radio network. Others got something like 2 to 10 cents (sorry...drawing a blank on names at the moment).

Geithner is a screwup and crook. He MUST go, preferably to prison.

 

[Publius]

Well, I found this over on Huffington Post and they have some how got ahold of a list showing just who got paid and how much, the web site is running a little slow so give it time. Here go's I hope this works.
http://WWW.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/27/revealed-see-who-paid_n_438933.html

 

[LONEWOLF]

Publius, that's sooome tasty article you've linked us to. Thanks.

 

[Troke]

Gee! All this time I thought the whole purpose of the 'bailout' was to buy that financial junk at face value rather than market value. Because to sell at market value would have caused the entire system to crash. And nobody wanted that.

I miss something here?

 

[Publius]

Publius, that's sooome tasty article you've linked us to. Thanks.

Your welcome, the thing is I cannot down load that list and post it here as I'm not a member of that system. Yes, it has the names of the banks and people that got our money. We also now know Gunther bought a lot of worthless Notes at full price then asked that we the tax payer pay him 2 1/2 to 3 times the amount of what he paid for it.

 

[Dozdoats]

I miss something here?

Nah, Troke, just one more elephant in the living room. Go back to sleep.

dd

 

[summerthyme]

Fair use, and all:

Revealed: See Who Was Paid Off In The AIG Bailout
First Posted: 01-27-10 02:47 PM | Updated: 01-27-10 09:05 PM



Read More: Aig, Big Banks, Darrell Issa, Issa AIG, Tim Geithner, Business News
This story has been updated.

A key question at the heart of the controversial bailout of AIG is just how much money the government lost. The Federal Reserve and Treasury Department have worked to keep that number secret and to conceal who was on the winning end.

An unredacted document obtained by the Huffington Post list the damage in detail. Goldman Sachs alone, for instance, got $14 billion in government money for assets worth $6 billion at the time -- a de facto $8 billion subsidy, courtesy of taxpayers.

The list was produced as part of a congressional investigation led by the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee into the federal bailout of AIG.

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, then led by now-Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, purchased a slew of souring assets from the world's biggest banks for 100 cents on the dollar in November and December 2008. A scathing report by a government watchdog held Geithner responsible for the overpayments.

The New York Fed initially pressured AIG to keep the list hidden from investors, regulators and the public. When it was eventually filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the SEC allowed the Fed and AIG to keep the details secret. A heavily-redacted version was made public last March.

The document is part of 250,000 pages of internal documents on the AIG deliberations subpoenaed by the oversight committee. It lists the toxic mortgage bonds that banks insured through AIG.

Those insurance contracts, called credit default swaps, are what the New York Fed ultimately took off AIG's books, paying the banks 100 cents on the dollar for toxic mortgage bonds -- home mortgages that were bundled together and securitized. The banks could never have gotten anywhere near such a generous deal on the open market, so the move served essentially as a direct subsidy to those banks from taxpayers.

Up until now, taxpayers had no way to know exactly what they owned. They knew they owned a certain amount of assets, but none of the details: which bundles of mortgages it purchased from AIG; how the banks were valuing those mortgages; how much collateral they had demanded from AIG on those securities; or which bank bundled those mortgages into securities.

Rep. Darrell Issa of California, the top ranking Republican on the oversight committee, told HuffPost that he was not persuaded by government and Fed arguments that the transactions should be kept secret.

"Just because the government happens to own the bonds, which means--by the way, they don't have to be sold at all until they are worth what we want them to be worth -- that somehow they have to be kept a secret," Issa said during a break in the today's AIG oversight hearing, where Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner testified about his role in the bailout as then-head of the New York Fed.

The troubled insurer tried to publicly disclose these details in December 2008 before being thwarted by the Geithner-led New York Fed. A month later Geithner left to head the Treasury Department.

Issa said that the public had a right to see the document. "I mean, think about it: What the government owns it can keep as long as it wants. It would be like saying you can't appraise federal land. Why? It is one of those things that's outrageous. We know we paid a hundred percent for them. We know who got the money. This document shows who ultimately were the beneficiaries. And we believe since that they've asked to have it locked up until 2018 -- and nobody today defended that -- that it's time to release that," Issa said.

A government audit this month found that as of Sept. 30, 2009, the Treasury Department was expecting a $30 billion loss on its TARP-related AIG investment. The value of the securities could ultimately rise, though.

"The way the AIG bailout was engineered was to specifically benefit Goldman Sachs and its trading partners," said Janet Tavakoli, a Chicago-based derivatives expert and founder of Tavakoli Structured Finance. "Goldman's past and present officers used crony capitalism to put their own interests ahead of the public."

The nation's fifth-largest bank by assets ultimately got $14 billion through what members of Congress are calling a "backdoor bailout" of the world's biggest banks.

"The suppression of the details of the [credit default swap] trades protected Goldman Sachs and its trading partners," said Tavakoli, who's examined Goldman's credit default swap arrangements with AIG. "The $182 billion bailout overall kept AIG alive, and its trading partners, including Goldman Sachs, benefited from the funds made available to the securities lending transactions and other subsequent trading transactions."

At the time the document was prepared, Goldman's $14 billion in souring derivatives had a market value of just $6 billion. Goldman had more than $8 billion in collateral from AIG to protect it from losses, meaning it was still about $6 billion short.

But more than $2 billion of those collateral payments came from AIG after it was bailed out on Sept. 16 of that year, according to a Nov. 2008 presentation prepared for the New York Fed that was released this week. So that $2 billion was made possible partly due to taxpayer assistance.

Combined with the $6 billion deficit it faced in the face value of those securities, Goldman Sachs ultimately received about $8 billion from taxpayers via AIG. Goldman posted a $1.3 billion profit for 2008.

Goldman's bonds -- now owned by taxpayers -- are presently worth just 75 cents on the dollar, according to calculations by Zero Hedge.

Despite the Fed's protestations that full disclosure would harm AIG -- and thus the taxpayer -- some blogs have largely pieced together many of the key details using public sources.

HuffPost published the unredacted document at 2:47 p.m. ET. One minute earlier AIG shares were trading at about $24.59. It closed the day at $24.91.


The document also includes detailed information about the transactions involved. The document, a Schedule A Shortfall Agreement, can be viewed here:

(this is a PDF doc. I'll try to copy the relevant tables, and post them... but I don't think I'll be able to...)

Summerthyme

 

[summerthyme]

I think the formatting is going to be all screwed up, but here's what that PDF contains:


CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT List of Derivative Transactions Schedule A
to Schedule A to Amended Shortfall Agreement Shortfall Agreement
CUSIP / ISIN of I Counterparty Tranche Name Notional Value Total Collateral Posted Negative Mark to Market
Underlying CDO Issue I
Assets Included in 12/18/2008 and 12/22/2008 Closing
5 ' &Ac I5 Deutsche Bank (LEAFS 2QI)2-lA AlC I $844,492,0471 $106,999,907 $103.217,346
577734AA4 Deutsche Bank MAX 2007-1 A-1 $2,096,537,000 $1,567,311,089 $972,583,514
577734AP1 Deutsche Bank MAX 2008-1 A-1 $5,403,463,000 $4,039,474,369 $2,506,666,486
86331YAL8 I Deutsche Bank STRIPS III 2003-1 AFILT I $35,8836091 $0 $1,953,612
USG26810AB04 GEORGE QUAY DVSQ 2003-1 A-1MT A $89,034,985 $0 $40,937,631
23910PAF2 WACHOVIA DVSQ 2004-2A A-1A MT $66,273,252 $8,149,109 $29,566,558
23910PAG0 WACHOVIA DVSQ 2004-2A A-1B MT $112,636,182 $21,456,667 $50,250,502
23910PBA2 WACHOVIA DVSQ 2004-2A A-1E MM $514,371,900 $58,416,800 $229,477,294
23910PAK1 WACHOVIA DVSQ 2004-2A A-1A MM $70,397,614 $10,755,208 $31,406,564
23910PAJ4 1WACHOVIA DVSQ 2004-2A A-1D MT $0 $35,538,194 $0
G8860MAA4 WACHOVIA TIAA Real Estate CDO 2003-1 A-1MM $162,656,785 $30,281,628 $63,317,543
264403AA4 CALYON JUKEF 2004-7A Al $113,041,931 $113,041,929 $75,776,522
014684AA2 Rabobank International ALEXP 2004-1A Al $58,476,926 $23,390,770 $35,812,822
896008AB5 GSI TRIAX 2006-2AAlB1 $624,552,683 $268,873,344 $210,699,218
352186AB0 GSI VESTC 2006-1A Al B 41JUO,TJUU,UUU $202,058,400 $226,450,058
442454AA2 GSI Hout Bay 2006-1 Class A Trust Certificates $747,122,522 $442,543,147 $460,110,142
JSG00857AA38 SOCGEN kDROC 2005-1 A Al LT $45,394,684 $22,345,127 $18,818,326
JSGO0929AA08 SOCGEN ODROC 2005-2A AiLT $51,454,053 $24,439,104 $22,935,202
JSG8088EAB68 SOCGEN OkLTS 2005-1A ALTA $71,127,697 $33,738,803 $32,364,142
JSGO959TAA63 SOCGEN -3 LHV 2004-1A Al ST $26,985,490 $19,895,992 $15,456,181
JSG26818AB30 SOCGEN DVSQ 2006-6A AlA $24,808,142 $19,791,598 $19,220,827
JSG2861GAA97 SOCGEN DUKEF 2005-HG1A AlLT $209,276,408 $119,758,421 $105,356,614
JSG4161FAB25 SOCGEN GSFIN 2005-1A AlA $63,591,021 $32,670,309 $30,349,861
36293XAB3 SOCGEN GSFIN 2005-1A A1A $83,497,778 $42,897,537 $39,850,687
36293XAC1 SOCGEN GSFIN 2005-1A CP $958,259,397 $480,929,134 $460,408,727
JSG53500AA53 SOCGEN I.GNA 2004-1A AIST $24,806,916i $17,237,018 $10,014,009
JSG5814LAA91 SOCGEN VGATE 2004-1A AlS $124,378,1551 $37,442,178 $54,070,824
JSG81230AB35 SOCGEN MADRE 2004-1A AlA $24,514,5211 $12,306,026 $9,876,695
JSG9725LAA91 SOCGEN WITH2004-1AA1 $166,729,812 $91,034,477 $88,162,400
147276AA7 ML CASF 2004-1A A1 $179,360,155 $57,819,432 $80,857,962
68936RAN7 ML 'MRCY2004-1AA1VB $177,090,112 $58,623,523 $84,112,692
640699AA2 ML NEPTN 2004-1A Al LA $101,95o,80g $56,375,710 $66,152,162
34069RAA2 ML NEPTN 2005-2A Al $148,707,002 $101,506,317 $111,605,440
34129VAA9 ML SCF 5AAl $106,521,790 $3,086,130 $40,031,923
36258PAA0 ML STRAG 2004-2A Al $94,150,454- $941,505 $41,044,472
563286AA8 ML :3TRVL 2004-1 A Al $431,629,325 $149,051,969 $182,564,841
26440VAA2 I ML DUKEF 2005-8A Al S $300,222,144 $178,080,031 $207,052,265
348667AA4 ML FISHR 2005-1A Al $199,732,740 $114,621,550 $117,701,962
37638XAA7 ML 3LCR 2005-3A A1 $83,637,994 $35,484,845 $54,979,557
8205YAA5 ML dPTR 2005-2A A1 $539,208,535 $261,797,590 $281,901,277
Page 1 of 6
CONFIDENTIAL FRBNY-TOWNS-R1-045769
List of Derivative Transactions Schedule A
to
Shortfall Agreement
cusIP I ISIN of Counterparty Tranche Name Notional Value Total Collateral Posted Negative Mark to Market
Underlying CDO Issue
5121OVAA8 ] ML LAKES 2004-lA Al $90,913,8981 $25,069,690 $35,779,434
891088AA4 ML TORO 2005-1AA $409,122,6681 $225,211,624 $223,865,950
R1741TAA2 ML SCF 4A A1 $34,676,854 $391,375 $10,127,010
Totals -Assets included In 12/18/2008 and 12/22/2008 Closing $16,010,588,994 $9,150,847,576 $7,482,887,252
Assets Included In 11125/2008 Closing
1007019AH5 SOCGEN iADROC 2005-1A CP $919,521,441 $452,626,198 $387,220,455
007019AAO SOCGEN ADROC 2005-1 AA LT S97,465,057 $47,976,302 $40,404,053
007022AF3 SOCGEN ADROC 2005-2A CP S1,049,861,004 $498,651,911 $471,068,590
007022AA4 SOCGEN ADROC 2005-2A Al LT $113,150,489 $53,743,026 $50,435,858
02149RAB4 SOCGEN ALTS 2005-1A ALTA $147,821,908 $70,118,034 $67,261,129
02149RAC2 SOCGEN ALTS 2005-1A ALTB-1 $1,228,360,968 $582,662,324 $558,922,199
078446AA9 SOCGEN BLHV 2004-1A A1ST $238,243,324 $175,653,183 $136,456,001
078446AG6 SOCGEN BLHV 2004-1A A1SB1 $397,843,791 $293,324,182 $227,445,076
05539MAA8 SOCGEN BFCGE 2006-1A AlLA $172,995,268 $167,113,429 $148,073,822
USG17751AB79 SOGGEN CAMBR 3A A1 $335,470,948 $261,367,097 $209,656,079
23910PAJ4 SOCGEN DVSQ 2004-2A A1 D $234,658,713 $80,934,224 $104,688,546
23910TAG2 SOCGEN DVSQ 2005-4A CP $882,943,929 $578,333,542 $442,832,922
23910TAB3 SOCGEN DVSQ 2005-4A Al LT $359,683,474 $235,594,822 $174,381,986
23910VAB8 SOCGEN DVSQ 2006-6A Al A $247,089,090 $197,124,315 $191,439,438
23910VAD4 SOCGEN DVSQ 2006-6A CP $1,157,051,725 $923,080,090 $899,120,465
26441EAA9 SOCGEN DU KEF 2005-HG 1A A1LT $418,552,835 $239,516,853 $210,713,237
26441EAL5 SOCGEN DIJ KEF 2005-HG1A AlB1 $1,464,245,678 $837,914,564 $735,743,629
507161AA5 SOCGEN LGNA 2004-1A AlST $393,536,914 $273,448,054 $158,862,234
507161AD9 SOCGEN LGNA 2004-1A Al SB1 $627,515,745 $436,027,608 $253,374,074
56659NAA3 SOCGEN MGATE 2004-1A AlS $472,636,987 $142,280,275 $205,469,130
55312WAA4 SOCGEN MKP 5AA1 $407,755,039 $419,028,143 $319,083,014
82639RAA5 SOCGEN MADRE 2004-1A CP $926,649,164 $436,975,668 $372,981,606
82639RAB3 SOCGEN MADRE 2004-IA A1A $367,717,922 $184,590,394 $148,150,428
87337UAA2 SOCGEN TABS 2005-4A A $248,823,841 $244,396,282 $178,656,421
97741 PAL8 SOCGEN WITH 2004-1A A 1lA CP $477,958,813 $260,965,512 $252,732,223
97741PAA2 SOCGEN WITH 2004-1A Al $38,109,671 $20.807.880 $20,151,406
014684AA2 SOCGEN ALEXP 2004-1A Al $60.523,619 $41,307,370 $37,066,271
51210VAA8 SOCGEN LAKES 2004-1A A1 $81,822,507 $23,145,132 $32,201,491
553121AA2 SOCGEN MKP 4A A1 $77,084,595 $52,610,236 $42,041,626
640699AA2 SOCGEN NEPTN 2004-lA Al LA $101,950,809 $66,369,976 $66,152,162
746869AP1 SOCGEN PTNM 2002-1A A-1 LT-d $167,280,752 $45,892,416 $59,078,412
746869AR7 SOCGEN PTNM 2002-1A A-1 LT-e $167,280,752 $45,892,416 S59,078,412
746869BE5 SOCGEN PTNM 2002-1 A A-1LT-j $167.280,752 $45,892,416 $59,078,412
83743TAA2 SOCGEN SCF 4A A1 $15.762,207 $842,411 $4,603,187
82437RAA9 SOCGEN SHERW 2004-1A Al $152,520,850 $129,728,384 $102,866,289
Page 2 of 5
CONFIDENTIAL FRBNY-TOWNS-R1-045770
List of Derivative Transactions Schedule A
to
Shortfall Agreement
CUSIP I ISIN of Counterparty Tranche Name Notional Value Total Collateral Posted Negative Mark to Market
Underlying COO Issue
863286AA6 SOCGEN STRVL 2004-1A Al $132,809,022 $48,160,739 $56,173,797
264403AJ5 GSCM DUKEF 2004-7A 1A2 $101,776,98 $50,492,887 $68,225,181
264403AK2 GSCM DUKEF 2004-7A 1A2V S78,501 $0 $52,622
55311TAA2 GSCM MKP 3A A1 $7,573,118 $923,883 $665,816
02149WAA5 GSI ALTS 2005-2A A1 $1,075,774,844 $584,568,581 $500,275,432
112021AC4 GSI BROD 2005-1A Al B1 $457,805,266 $298,284,736 $283,156,079
112021ABB GSI BROD 2005-1AAlNA $334,622,61E $218,024,620 $206,992,431
112021AAB GSI BROD 2005-1AA1V $235,96; $0 $145,975
216444AA7 GSI COOL 2005-1A Al $190,351.82 $115.271,719 $96,722,078
26545QAQ2 GSI DUNHL 2004-1A A1NV $152,147,155 $85,798,709 $83,162,838
26545QAA7 GSI DUNHL 2004-1A A1VA $116.268 $0 S70,411
34958CAA2 GSI FORTS 2006-1A A1 $325,935,452 $222,869,594 $212,511,490
37638VAG8 GSI GLCR 2004-2A A1 NV $143,005,791 $61.657.090 $66,296,857
37638VAA1 GSI GLCR 2004-2A AIV $44,029 $0 $20,412
446279AA9 GS1 HUNTN 2005-1A AlA $355,590.663i $187,540.421 $156,709,556
446279AC5 GS1 HIUNTN 2005-lA AlB $218,690 -- _----$0 $96,377
46426RAA7 GS1 ICM 2005-2A AlA $176,951,173 $130,474,880 $126,871,563
46426RAB5 GS1 ICM 2005-2A A1B $41,392,087 $30,520,440 $29,630,985
48206AAG3 GS1 JPTR 2005-3A Al NV $1.178,880,487 $809,568,470 $609,154,082
48206AAA6 GSI JPTR 2005-3A AIVA $226,795 $0 $117,190
498588AC6 GS1 KLROS 2006-2A A1 NV $791.093,942 $449,293,893 $374.795.471
498588AAC GS1 KLROS 2006-2A A1V $227,457 $0 $107,762
52902TAC0 GS1 LEXN 2005-1A Al AN $135,535.567 $101.906,122 $97,359,120
52902TAE6 GS1 LEXN 2005-1A A1 B $169,844 r $0 $124,476
58936RAB3 GS1 MRCY 2004-1A A1NV $160,883,690 $75,735,434 $76,415,109
58936RAA5 GSI MRCY 2004-1A AlVA $53,652. $0 $25,483
68571UAA7 GS1 ORCHD 2005-2A A1 $61,173,384. $41,264,742 $39,528,951
68619MAJO I GS1 ORPT 2005-1A A1V $246,985 $0 $184,182
68619MAQ4 GS1 ORPT 2005-1A A1VB $641,913.250 $460,605,880 $478.690,272
68619MAL5 GS1 ORPT 2005-1A A1VF $639,443,403 $458,833,637 $453,607,536
76112CAB4 GS1 RE SF 2004-1A A1NV $292.713,39 $171,276,411 $162,392,426
76112CAA6 GSI RESF 2004-1A A1V $78,099 SO $43,328
768277AA3 GS1 RIVER 2005-1A Al $127,184,116 $79,645,207 $74,738,350
80410RAA4 GS1 SATV 2005-1A A1 $99,236,194 $54,177,256 $50,073,599
83743YAS2 GS1 SCF 7A AlAN $442.192,152 $321,400,704 $305,994,347
83743YAB9 GS1 SCF 7A Al B $142,919 $0 $98,899
83743LAA9 GS1 SCF 8A A1AV $192,080 $0 $154,905
83743LAC5 GSI SCF 8A Al NV $264,686,822 $202,220,037 $213,459,472
a2437XAA6 GSI SHERW 2005-2A Al $296,485,30T $228,425,707 $235,372,418
896008AB5 GSI TRIAX 2006-2A Al B1 $367,518,173 $158,218,582 $123,986,004
896008AC3 GSI TRIAX 2006-2A A1 B2 $1,499,850,000 $640,669,927 $770,828,810
Page 3 of 5
CONFIDENTIAL FRBNY-TOWNS-R1-045771
List of Derivative Transactions Schedule A
to
Shortfall Agreement
CUSIP / ISIN of Counterparty Tranche Name Notional Value Total Collateral Posted Negative Mark to Market
Underlying CDO Issue
952186AA2 GSI WESTC 2006-1A AlA $1,05.5726T 964 $671,530,476 $532,232,980
952186AB0 !GSI WESTC 2006-IA AlB $887,850,000 $597,991,835 $670,178,948
085558AA2 ML BNLI 2006-1A A1A $496,409,791 $439,196,451 $299,769,860
26440VAA2 ML DUKEF 2005-BA AlS $292,917,469 $173,747,183 $202,014,497
348667AA4 ML FTSHR 2005-1A Al $526,577,136 $302,189,253 $310,310,479
37638XAA7 ML GLCR 2005-3A A1 $148,697,630 $63,163,024 $97,863,612
48205YAA5 ML JPTR 2005-2A Al $190,796,866 $92,636,070 $99,749,683
498587AA2 ML KLROS 2005-1A Al $342,362,711 $125,541,830 $160,018,879
51210VAA8 ML LAKES 2004-1A A1 $536,391,992 $147,911,174 $211,098,660
83743TAA2 ML SCF 4A Al $23,643,310 $266,846 $6,904,780
891088AA4 ML TORO 2005-1A A $436,466,860 $240,263,906 $238,828,293
45377TAA4 ML INDE6 6A A1 $255,238,556 $181,229,550 $168,981,769
612180AA7 ML MNPT 2006-1A Al $77,392,822 $76,189,575 $65,473,989
23910RAF8 CALYON DVSQ 2004-3A CP $939,586,876 $461,098,970 $438,295,314
23910RAB7 CALYON DVSQ 2004-3A AILT $316,640,772 $155,390,351 $146,230,930
239156AG7 CALYON DVSQ 2005-5A AlA $1,658,783,429 $1,326,923,069 $1,071,242,581
610891AB9 CALYON MONRO 2005-1A Al B $344,966,536 $285,323,118 $181,606,138
610891AA1 CALYON MONRO 2005-1A A1A $950,618,011 $786,259,727 $500,448,734
264408AC9 BGI DUKEF 2004-6B Al S2 $121,768,970 $37,410,000 $89,680,169
589368AA7 BOA MRCY 2005-2A Al $772.111,117 $267,404,090 $396,835,377
553121AA2 RBS MKP 4A A1 $63.069,214 $45,547,103 $34,397,694
1B55582 RBS BNLI 2006-1AA1A $364,337,461 $256,047,257 $220,014,576
t RBS XK RClS 20'i-I A Al $340 75 4741] $123,116,090 $159,267,616
612180AA7 HSBC BANK USA MNPT 2006-1A A1 $155,675,217 $149,724,900 $131,700,553
724911173 Rabobank SHERW 2004-1A Al $TFz.2,3oLkb $102,448,390 $95,925,777
264403AA4 Rabobank DUKEF 2004-7A A1 $180,553,082 $126,387,158 $121,031,943
55311 TAA2 Rabobank MKP 3A A1 $4,111,121 $822,224 $361,443
696399AA2 Rabobank PALLS 2004-1A AlA $171,405,353 $53,873,765 $74,869,617
84129VAA9 Rabobank SCF 5A Al $92,813,892 $29,697,892 $34,880,362
25454VAA7 CORAL Purchasing (Ireland) Limited DGCDO 2005-1A Al $201,073,213 $123.056.806 $143447393
36868AAC6 CORAL Purchasing (Ireland) Limited GEMST 2005-3A A2 $114,927,319 $62,152,694 $66,825,913
36868BAA8 CORAL Purchasing (Ireland) Limited GEMST 2005-4A A1 $281,773,877 $196,959,940 $199,519,096
45377TAA4 CORAL Purchasing (Ireland) Limited INDE6 6A Al $175,476,508 $110,987,307 $116,174,967
48205MAA1 CORAL Purchasing (Ireland) Limited JPTR 2004-1A AlA $126,231,914 $20,171,860 $57,953,725
722694AA4 CORAL Purchasing (Ireland) Limited PINEM 2005-A Al $199,847,062 $131,899,061 $135,370,991
,8E 005AA3.-- CORAL Purchasing (Ireland) Limited TRIAX 2006-1A A1 $347 159 130 $82,320,000 $125,330,250
896008AA7 CORAL Purchasing (Ireland) 2 Limited TRIAX 2006-2A AlA $348,638,446 $90,720,000 $148,397,513
ME = DI PALLS 2004-1X AIA I I $137 981 3101 $1,556,254 $60,270.042
USG9O64WAA48 REMO FINANCE INC - Dresdner TRIAX 2006-2A AIA $398,443,938 $0 $169,597,157
IuBs ICM Z W-)KQIA15 I I $99 44§ 9(J $473,053,700 $674.152,572
Page 4 of 5
CONFIDENTIAL FRBNY-TOWNS-Rl-045772
List of Derivative Transactions Schedule A
to
Shortfall Agreement
CUSIP I ISIN of Counterparty Tranche Name Notional Value Total Collateral Posted Negative Mark to Market
Underlying CDO Issue
54266TAB8 ,UBS LHILL 2006-1A AlS $125,000,000 $118,074,381 $111,827,623
866244AA4 UBS SRCDO 2005-1 A Al S $234,186,750 $69,388,893 $152,277,584
92534EAA9 UBS VERT 2005-1A Al $233,655,485 $127,696,596 $176,560,809
96254FAA5 UBS WHTL 2004-1A AlA $153,738,206 $53,541,617 $93,184,672
56659NAA3 UBS MGATE 2004-1 A Al S $203,980,173 $70,633,071 $88,676,151
896005AA3 UBS TRIAX 2006-1A Al - AIG SS $1,884,578,135 $394,250,000 $680,364,214
05473WAA4 BARCLAYS AYRES 2005-1A AlA $92,345,803 $63,283,537 $54,956,922
86565RAA4 BARCLAYS SMSTR 2005-HG1A Al - AIG SS $696,872,765 $415,029,663 $449,655,578
923367AA4 BARCLAYS VERDE 2005-1A Al - AIG SS $626,262,698 $373,431,839 $381,727,284
09622WAF5 BMO BGRS 2004-2AA1TB $107,085,475 $10,010,178 $56,745,033
09622WAE8 BMO BGRS 2004-2A A1TA I $46,424,339 $4,996,315 $24,644,888
239104AE2 BMO DVSQ 2003-1A A1B $171,392,346 $98,187,317 $78,804,939
239104AH5 BMO DVSQ 2003-1A A1 C $171,392,346 $98,164,080 $78,804,939
239104AL6 BMO OVSQ 2003-1A A1D $171,392,346 $98,122,648 $78,804,939
746869AA4 BMO PTNM 2002-lA A-IMT-A $167,280,752 $61,966,502 $59,078,412
746869AB2 BMO PTNM 2002-1A A-1 MT-B $167,280,752 $61,924,311 $59,078,412
746869AC0 BMO PTNM 2002-1A A-1 MT-C $167,280,752 $62,035,245 $59,078,412
264408AD7 BMO DUKEF 2004-6B AlS3 $202,948284 $8,312,933 $149,466,948
Totals - Assets Included 11/25/2008 Closing $46,119,130,493 $25,854,602,616 $25,060,896,305
1Overall Totals $62,129,719,487 I $35,005,450,192 $32,543,783,557
Page 5 of 5
CONFIDENTIAL FRBNY-TOWNS-Rl-045773

 

[LONEWOLF]

And there's The List. Good job! Before it all disappears....

 

[Publius]

And there's The List. Good job! Before it all disappears....

That was my thoughts too!!!! Now how best to get after them?

 

[Hfcomms]

I also posted the other day that I watched Bunning being interviewed live on CNBC about the Bernanke reappointment and Bunning said that they had to get rid of Bernanke or there would be hyperinflation in the near future. I nearly fell out of my chair that a U.S. Senator would say that on live tv. But of course the bubbleheads just skipped right by that little comment.

 

[Troke]

"..Gee! All this time I thought the whole purpose of the 'bailout' was to buy that financial junk at face value rather than market value. Because to sell at market value would have caused the entire system to crash. And nobody wanted that.

I miss something here?

Nah, Troke, just one more elephant in the living room. Go back to sleep..."

Tell me I'm wrong. I'll believe you. Of course, then you will have to explain what it was they were really supposed to do.

 

[LONEWOLF]

Troke, your conclusion oversimplifies what's going on here and ignores scores and scores of iffy decisions and blatant lies all done under the color of authority. Secrecy and Lies = Corruption Troke. I think that's a huge point, in China officials have been tried and shot for far less. Bernanke and Geithner are not honest in the least, and we're all left summizing their real motives for what they say, don't say, do, and not do. What both are doing, with GW's & Obama's blessing, are *not* in the best interests of the US Public. All FOUR should be in prison if not something else.....

 

[Troke]

Is the argument then that maybe they did what they were supposed to do but because they didn't tell anybody what they were doing, it necessarily follows they were doing something corrupt?

Hmmm! Actually a pretty good argument but getting to it was like pulling teeth.

I can see one reason for the secrecy. So as to not alarm the Lesser Classes in the finance world as to how bad things were at the time (and may still be.)

 

[LONEWOLF]

Troke,

Weeell, not exactly in the way you're phrasing. Hard to boil it down into fifteen words or less. I don't see the situation the same way you do. Oh wells. Keep watching the news, this won't be going away soon....