WAR Wash Post: U.S. rethinking its Afghanistan plans - Troops may be needed there for years

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.durangoherald.com/article/20160126/NEWS03/160129639

U.S. rethinking its Afghanistan plans

Troops may be needed there for years

By Greg Jaffe and Missy Ryan
© 2016, The Washington Post
Article Last Updated: Tuesday, January 26, 2016 9:19pm

U.S. military officials say it could take years to train Afghan security forces so they can defend their country and combat terrorist groups without U.S. support.

WASHINGTON – Top U.S. military commanders, who only a few months ago were planning to pull the last American troops out of Afghanistan by year’s end, are now quietly talking about an American commitment that could keep thousands of troops in the country for decades.

The shift in mindset, made possible by President Barack Obama’s decision last fall to cancel withdrawal plans, reflects the Afghan government’s vulnerability to continued militant assaults and concern that terror groups like al-Qaida continue to build training camps whose effects could be felt far beyond the region, said senior military officials.

The military outlook mirrors arguments made by many Republican and Democrat foreign policy advisers, looking beyond the Obama presidency, for a significant long-term American presence.

“This is not a region you want to abandon,” said Michèle Flournoy, a former Pentagon official who would likely be considered a top candidate for secretary of defense in a Hillary Clinton administration. “So the question is what do we need going forward given our interests?”

Senior American commanders have been surprised by al-Qaida’s resilience and ability to find a haven in the Afghan countryside as well as the Taliban’s repeated seizure of large tracts of contested territory.

In November, the U.S. military sent a company of elite U.S. Rangers to southeastern Afghanistan to help Afghan counter-terrorism forces destroy an al-Qaida training camp in a “fierce fight” that lasted for several days.

The training camp was “absolutely massive,” said Brig. Gen. Wilson Shoffner, a military spokesman in Afghanistan.

“No matter what happens in the next couple of years Afghanistan is going to have wide ungoverned spaces that violent extremist organizations can take advantage of,” Shoffner said. “The camp that developed in southeastern Kandahar is an example of what can happen.”

In Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, U.S. officials said they have a willing and reliable partner who can provide bases to attack terror groups not just in Afghanistan but also throughout South Asia for as long as the threat in the chronically unstable region persists.

The new American mindset also marks a striking change for Obama, who campaigned on a promise to bring American troops home and has said repeatedly that he doesn’t support the “idea of endless war.” And it highlights a major shift for the American military, which has spent much of the last decade racing to hit milestones as part of its broader “exit strategy” from Afghanistan and Iraq. These days, that phrase has largely disappeared from the military’s lexicon.

In its place, there’s a broad recognition in the Pentagon that building an effective Afghan army and police force will take a generation’s commitment, including billions of dollars a year in outside funding and constant support from thousands of foreign advisers on the ground.

“What we’ve learned is that you can’t really leave,” said a senior Pentagon official with extensive experience in Afghanistan and Iraq. “The local forces need air support, intelligence and help with logistics. They are not going to be ready in three years or five years. You have to be there for a very long time.”

There are now 9,800 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, some of them advising local forces and some focused on hunting down al-Qaida and other hardline militants. Current plans call for Obama to halve that force by the time he leaves office, but he could defer the decision to the next president.

The U.S. military’s current thinking reflects its painful experience in Iraq, where Iraqi Army forces collapsed less than three years after American forces left in 2011. Senior American commanders who spent nearly a decade and hundreds of billions of dollars of taxpayer money building the Iraqi Army have been shocked at how little of that force remains today.

“The speed and extent of the withdrawal in Iraq is a cautionary tale,” said Flournoy, who now heads the Center for a New American Security.

In Helmand Province, for example, where American troops suffered the heaviest losses of the war, Afghan units have struggled to hold onto territory taken by American forces from the Taliban in 2011 and 2012. “There’s a real will-to-fight issue there,” said a senior military official in Kabul.

Senior American commanders said that the Afghan troops in the province have lacked effective leaders as well as the necessary weapons and ammunition to hold off persistent Taliban attacks. Some Afghan soldiers in Helmand have been fighting in tough conditions for years without a break to see their family, leading to poor morale and high desertion rates.

Gen. John Campbell, the top American commander, has sent special operations forces to the province to help direct American airstrikes and provide help with planning. An American soldier was killed and two others were wounded earlier this month fighting alongside the Afghans.

In addition, about 300 U.S. troops in Helmand are advising Afghan commanders at the corps level, well removed from the front lines.

The American support is designed to arrest the immediate losses, but building an effective and sustainable fighting force that can manage contested areas such as Helmand Province, will take many years, said U.S. military officials.

The Afghan units lack effective mid-level officers and sergeants, foreign officials say, who can lead troops in combat and aren’t captive of patronage networks that dominate the country and sap soldier morale. Seeding the force with mid-level officers often requires bringing in young leaders from outside of the current system and training them from scratch.

“I think a generational approach has value,” Shoffner said.

Senior American officials point to improvements in areas such as evacuating wounded troops from the battlefield. As recently as 2013 it took the Afghan army 24 hours on average to get medical assistance to wounded troops. Now help usually arrives in four hours, still longer than desired. But other critical areas, such as building an effective resupply system for the country or a capable air force, can’t be accomplished in a few years. Many of the American pilots flying close air support missions for the Afghan military have 10 to 15 years of experience.

“How long does it take to grow a 15-year pilot? It takes about 15 years,” Shoffner said. “We’re starting a little late with the Air Force.”

Senior U.S. military officials and some former Obama administration officials increasingly compare U.S. plans for Afghanistan with its approach to South Korea, where the United States has maintained tens of thousands of troops for decades. Other top officials cite the example of Colombia where the United States has long provided training, money and contractors.

“Our presence right now helps serve as a significant bulwark against instability, and at a cost that I think is reasonable to bear,” said Daniel Feldman, who until recently served as the Obama administration’s special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan “Particularly if we’re not proposing a significant combat role, I think the American people would be open to the argument of sticking with Afghanistan.”?

The difference between Afghanistan and other long-term American commitments in Korea and Colombia is that Afghanistan remains a far more dangerous and unstable place for American personnel. Even though Afghan troops have assumed the lead combat role throughout the country with U.S. troops in an advisory role, Americans still face real dangers and have taken recent casualties there.

In some cases, senior U.S. officials have been surprised by the Taliban comeback in the last year. Emboldened by the departure of most foreign forces, Taliban fighters have seized district centers, inflicted heavy losses on government forces, and temporarily overran a provincial capital last fall. Now, Afghan forces must also grapple with an aggressive local branch of the Islamic State.

Some officials hold out hope that a long-term military presence might be unnecessary, if hoped-for peace talks with the Taliban make progress. The Afghan government has asked Pakistan, home to many Taliban leaders, to push the militants into talks.

A generational U.S. footprint “doesn’t need to be the case,” said Jeff Eggers, a former senior White House official with long experience working on Afghanistan and Pakistan. “The Korea model is not necessary if the peace process moves forward -- that’s the preferred path for all parties.”

The obstacles to peace talks, though, are huge. Senior officials in Kabul and Islamabad are riven by suspicion and the Taliban remains deeply fractured following the revelation that its long time leader Mullah Omar has been dead for several years.
 

Dozdoats

On TB every waking moment
I outprocessed an old SF friend of mine for retirement through my organization while I was still working. He had been helping train the Afghan army (ANA) for several years at that point.

I've been retired for ten years... ... ... if they ain't trained now, they ain't never gonna be.

Herding cats...
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
I outprocessed an old SF friend of mine for retirement through my organization while I was still working. He had been helping train the Afghan army (ANA) for several years at that point.

I've been retired for ten years... ... ... if they ain't trained now, they ain't never gonna be.

Herding cats...

Heck, even cats can focus on a common goal and or threat...whether they be a pride of lions or a clowder/glaring of alley cats.

The knuckleheads in Afghanistan (and for that matter in Iraq) can't see the forest for the trees or the threat from opportunities for graft, theft, general corruption and petty political activities.

And all of that doesn't even touch on the roles Pakistan and its interactions with the rest of the neighborhood play into this.
 

Richard

TB Fanatic
OK Afghanistan will never be stable, you can never train "Govt" troops to control the place, so my policy is "ringfencing" and "containment".
 

Be Well

may all be well
I outprocessed an old SF friend of mine for retirement through my organization while I was still working. He had been helping train the Afghan army (ANA) for several years at that point.

I've been retired for ten years... ... ... if they ain't trained now, they ain't never gonna be.

Herding cats...

They'll die of old age if they live to old age and still won't be trained. Get our mil out NOW. And who knows how many "good" Afghans and how many "bad" Afghans among them, anyway? Let NATO freaking train them.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
They'll die of old age if they live to old age and still won't be trained. Get our mil out NOW. And who knows how many "good" Afghans and how many "bad" Afghans among them, anyway? Let NATO freaking train them.

Most of the "good" Afghans, as well as Pakistanis, upon getting an opportunity to get the heck out of Dodge did so years ago. Those that may be left are going to be hard pressed just to literally keep their heads, never mind do more to influence the situation.

As to NATO, considering the ramifications of the "migrant crisis" have their own hands full.

As to why we went in there to start with, besides AQ and the Taliban, there's the fact that the whole hot mess is sitting upon a literal treasure trove of mineral wealth. (It's interesting that what mining operations that are ongoing being run by the Chinese seem to be immune from attack; "doh figure"...) The other is "location, location, location".

So the big question, if you're not willing to "really fight" the bad guys, but instead "manage the threat" is the game worth the ante and the table stakes?
 

Dozdoats

On TB every waking moment
It's interesting that what mining operations that are ongoing being run by the Chinese seem to be immune from attack

Someone I know who spent several years all over A'stan used to talk about the big Chinese run copper mine he saw often in his travels.

It was 'guarded' by one Chinese equivalent of a rentacop with a revolver and a clipboard.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.vox.com/2016/1/27/10834882/vanda-felbab-brown-interview

"They are riding a tiger that they cannot control”: Pakistan and the future of Afghanistan

Updated by Jennifer Williams on January 27, 2016, 8:30 a.m. ET @jenn_ruth jennifer@vox.com

This is part three of our three-part series on the war in Afghanistan. Part one explained why 2016 could be a very bad year for the country. Part two discussed the emergence of ISIS in Afghanistan.

2016 is shaping up to be a potentially critical year for Afghanistan. ISIS is rising there, the Taliban is gaining ground, the stability of the Afghan government is deteriorating by the day, and national elections are coming in October. The US, China, Pakistan, and the Afghan government are currently holding talks aimed at bringing the Taliban to the table to try negotiate an end to the war.

Of those countries, it's Pakistan that is the most significant. Pakistan has probably the most influence of anyone over whether those talks will succeed in getting the Taliban to agree to sit down and negotiate a peace agreement with the Afghan government. But there's a lot more going on with the peace talks that are perhaps the country's best or only remaining hope.

To understand how this works and why it matters, I spoke to Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow in the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the Brookings Institution and an expert on Afghanistan. What follows is a transcript of our conversation, lightly edited for clarity and length.

Jennifer Williams: Could you start by just explaining how Pakistan has been involved in the conflict between the Taliban and Afghanistan historically?

Vanda Felbab-Brown: That goes back to the creation of independent Pakistan, with issues having to do with the Pashtun minority in Pakistan, which is also the majority population of Afghanistan, and irredentist claims by Afghan Pashtun politicians, as well as the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States, who at different times supported either Pakistan or Afghanistan and played the two against each other.

Then you have the Taliban emerging in the 1990s, and Pakistan fully supports the Taliban: They help equip it, they provide intelligence, advisers, and during the Taliban era when they ruled country, Pakistan is one of only three countries that recognize the Taliban regime.

They continued supporting the Taliban throughout the past decade, and US-Pakistan relations became very fraught and complicated. It's never been easy. Pakistanis sometimes use the expression that the United States treats Pakistan like a condom: uses it when they need it then discards it when they are finished with it. It's a fairly common saying in Pakistan, especially in the military. So there is a sense of betrayal on the part of the United States, untrustworthiness, that it's an exploitative relationship on the part of the US toward Pakistan.

I should also say that Pakistan has long supported many Islamic extremist groups as part of its asymmetric policy toward India, and some of these groups have now mutated, or they slipped Pakistan's full control.

Even with respect to the Afghan Taliban, there is a lot of support from the Pakistani state intelligence services and military to the Afghan Taliban. At the same time, Pakistan has been under enormous US and international pressure to act against them, and so they will take the occasional action against the Afghan Taliban as well. But those actions are mostly seen as halfhearted, incomplete window dressing.

JW: So what role is Pakistan playing today? I know that they just had the four-party talks and that Pakistan has been insisting that these talks take place in Pakistan. Are they trying to speak for the Taliban?

VFB: I'm not sure that it's a fair characterization that they are speaking for the Taliban. Certainly the Afghan government, including in the latest talks, often insinuates or alleges that Pakistan speaks for the Taliban. But they clearly do not.

The relationship between the Taliban and Pakistan is hardly smooth and perfect. Many members of the Afghan Taliban deeply resent the level of Pakistani interference, even as the group has been supported by Pakistan. There is a lot of Afghan Pashtun nationalism also among the Taliban that deeply resents the influence and attempts at control by the Pakistani state.

Part of the key issue in the relationship is that although Pakistan supports the Afghan Taliban, and although it has historically supported other extremist groups, it does not have perfect control. And arguably, its control is diminishing. And so they posture, they do their double game. They want to appear strong, and so they posture that they have much greater control than they have, but at the same time they deny that they have any nefarious role.

In reality, they are playing both sides against the middle, and they often have much less capacity to control and rein in the extremist groups, including the Afghan Taliban, than many assume. The widespread criticism of Pakistan is one of its duplicity and its nefarious activity and its lack of willingness to act against the Afghan Taliban. Those are true, but they are also coupled with limits to their capacity. They are riding a tiger that they cannot control fully.

So they have been hosting these four-way talks that involve them, the US government, the Afghan government, and the Chinese government. The Afghan government is desperate to achieve some sort of negotiated deal with the Taliban. It feels under tremendous pressure, the military is taking a pounding from the Taliban, and the government lacks legitimacy.

The US has similar views on the notion that the way out of the predicament in Afghanistan is a negotiated deal. The Chinese also like the idea. They have their own influence in Pakistan. China would very much like to say that they finally achieved what the US failed to do over the past decade, that they will bring peace to Afghanistan, and that they will do it by enabling the negotiations.

Pakistan is responsive to China. Their relationship with China is much stronger than their relationship with the United States. They often tell the US that China is their old friend, that China is the country that hasn't betrayed them, unlike the United States. China has promised massive economic development in Pakistan at $40 billion. The Pakistanis often say to the US that the Pakistan-China relationship is "greater than the Himalayas and deeper than the ocean." Very flowery.

JW: What's the relationship like between the Afghan government and Pakistan today?

VFB: The crucial man there really is the Pakistani chief of the army staff Raheel Sharif; no relation to [Prime Minister] Nawaz Sharif. I think that there is sort of goodwill and motivation right now, even on the army staff — but that is juxtaposed with, again, the limits of control even the chief has. With almost clockwork regularity you have a round of negotiations in Pakistan or you have a meeting between Raheel Sharif and [Afghan President Ashraf] Ghani, and the next day a bomb goes off in Kabul and people die, or the Indian consulate is attacked.

All those ploys are meant to destroy any beginning of a more positive relationship and have been very effective in subverting the process. The same goes on between Pakistan and India. Meanwhile, Ghani is taking an enormously risky strategy with respect to the negotiations. It's vastly unpopular in Afghanistan, and many, many Afghans hate Pakistan and blame it for all of their troubles.

They use Pakistan as the explanation of everything that ever goes wrong in Afghanistan. And the Pakistanis are responsible for a lot, but there's much, much blame and responsibility that lies on Afghan politicians and Afghan people.

So Ghani's outreach and engagement with Pakistan is extremely unpopular. He's spending an extreme amount of political capital, and does not have support from his partner in the government, Abdullah Abdullah, and the northern Tajik factions that hate Pakistan with great vitriol. So the more Pakistan is unable to deliver things like the Haqqani network, reducing or stopping its attacks in Kabul, the more politically impossible for Ghani the process will be.

JW: So what does that mean in terms of the stability of Afghanistan's unity government?

VFB: The unity government is extremely strained. "Unity" it isn't. The Pakistani negotiation angle is just too big for the strain. It might be strategically important. It might be a very significant element in getting any negotiation going, but it's also extremely politically costly, and the longer it doesn't produce anything, the more politically costly and unsustainable it will be.

In October, there are supposed to be parliamentary elections and district elections in Afghanistan, and, more important, this loya jirga [a national assembly of Afghan elders]. And unless there is some sort of major breakthrough by the summer, a lot of the negotiations and political process with both the Taliban and Pakistan will be put on ice, because it will just be politically impossible in the context of the loya jirga and the elections.

So they really have until the summer to make some sort of breakthrough, and then you will have months of morass and extreme political instability in Afghanistan, but it will also not be conducive in any way to improving either the relationship with Pakistan or the negotiations.

JW: How does Pakistan fit into the rise of ISIS in Afghanistan? What's the relationship there? And how might this affect the peace negotiations?

VFB: The rise of ISIS-Khorasan is one of the most interesting developments. It complicates the negotiations for the Taliban. They oppose the negotiations, and they're a big problem for Mullah Mansour and those who want to negotiate. They enable defections, make them easy, and make them costly.

At the same time, it is interesting because ISIS does not have the same linkages to Pakistan that the Afghan Taliban had, even though ISIS includes many defectors from the Taliban. They quite specifically reject what they call the "yoke" that Pakistan has put on the Afghan Taliban, and they call the Afghan Taliban leadership traitors because of the close relationship with Pakistan.

Moreover, ISIS-Khorasan also has quite a few members of various Pakistani extremist groups like Lashkar-e Taiba and members of TTP [Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan]. So there is also a lot of resentment and hostility toward Pakistan.

I think the rise of ISIS might make Pakistan be cooperative to some extent, but on the other hand, I think it will also reinforce in the mind of many Pakistan security controllers that it's important to cultivate the Afghan Taliban as friends against the bigger danger of ISIS.

JW: Now that ISIS-Khorasan has directly targeted Pakistan, the consulate in Jalalabad, do you think Pakistan will take action?

VFB: I think they'll take action against ISIS and groups like Tehrik-e Taliban. I don't think it will produce more resolve to go after the Afghan Taliban. That's my view. Others are hoping that they will finally accept the realities and really believe that they have to fight all of the insurgents, all of the terrorists, and that they cannot differentiate among them. I am not persuaded that that will, in fact, happen.

JW: So what does this all mean for the prospects for peace? Are you hopeful at all?

VFB: I think the peace negotiations are important, but I am skeptical that anything will happen quickly.

I think that if by summer the Taliban has been willing to join the negotiating table, that will be an important breakthrough, but nothing will be agreed. The summer will be very bloody, and then there will be the political [wrangling] associated with the loya jirga and the elections.

In my view, even if the Taliban comes to the negotiating table, we are looking at years of negotiations, and certainly no breakthrough before 2017 and likely much longer.

And so the question is whether we, the United States, are prepared to stand by with Afghanistan for that long and whether the Afghans will have the resolve. So it's really important that the military and the police fight as hard as they can, because the weaker they fight, the more they defect, the more intimidated they are, the more brain drain that flows from Afghanistan, the stronger the Taliban is viewed and the more intransigent they will be in the negotiations. Now the negotiations will be very much about the military battlefield as much as they will about what's happening at the table for a long time.
 
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