ALERT The Winds of War Blow in Korea and The Far East

jward

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North Korea says it flew 150 warplanes in response to US-ROK naval drills | NK News​



DPRK says exercise took place Saturday, in what experts call rare flight activity that sought to test allies’ response

North Korea's large-scale combined air-attack drill, Oct. 2022 | Image: KCNA (Oct. 10, 2022)
North Korea on Monday revealed that over 150 warplanes conducted airstrike drills last week, including in a previously unreported flight on Saturday.
The ROK military reportedly knew about the Oct. 8 flights in North Korea involving 150 airplanes and scrambled F-35As to respond. But unlike when the North conducted a similar drill on Thursday, South Korea did not disclose these moves to the public because the DPRK kept the planes north of a “special reconnaissance line.”

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jward

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EndGameWW3
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8h
Update: The White House National Security Strategy: China is the Only Competitor With an Intent to Reshape the International Order.
 

Housecarl

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Update: The White House National Security Strategy: China is the Only Competitor With an Intent to Reshape the International Order.
I then have to wonder what they then consider Putin's actions represent, never mind others nawing on the edges?
 

Housecarl

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North Korea says it flew 150 warplanes in response to US-ROK naval drills | NK News​



DPRK says exercise took place Saturday, in what experts call rare flight activity that sought to test allies’ response

North Korea's large-scale combined air-attack drill, Oct. 2022 | Image: KCNA (Oct. 10, 2022)
North Korea on Monday revealed that over 150 warplanes conducted airstrike drills last week, including in a previously unreported flight on Saturday.
The ROK military reportedly knew about the Oct. 8 flights in North Korea involving 150 airplanes and scrambled F-35As to respond. But unlike when the North conducted a similar drill on Thursday, South Korea did not disclose these moves to the public because the DPRK kept the planes north of a “special reconnaissance line.”

Recent Stories​

I have to wonder how much of a dent that put into their maintenance schedules and spares inventories?
 

jward

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Global: MilitaryInfo
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49m

South Korea detected 10 North Korean military aircraft flying South of the special reconnaissance line - in response, South Korea scrambled F-35As.

Steve Herman
@W7VOA
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#ROK military says it scrambles jets in response to #DPRK military planes near the inter-Korean air boundary.



NK NEWS
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BREAKING: North Korea launched a missile towards the East Sea, South Korea’s Joint Chief of Staff said per Yonhap:

-Fired in early hours of Friday (alert after 2AM)
-Second late night missile test in less than a week
-Follows late night DPRK jet exercise


More soon @nknewsorg
 

jward

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:shr:

Josh Smith
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BREAKING: Just minutes after reported ballistic missile launch, North Korea's military says it took "strong countermeasures" to South Korea artillery fire, via KCNAm
:shr:
 

somewherepress

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North Korea Says It Has Tested And Deployed ‘Tactical Nuke’ Cruise Missiles​

AFP
October 13, 2022 6:03 am
North Korea Says It Has Tested And Deployed 'Tactical Nuke' Cruise Missiles
Source: Pixabay
Kim Jong Un supervised the launch of two long-range cruise missiles, state media said Thursday, adding that the weapons had already been deployed to “tactical nuke” units of the North Korean army.

Kim has overseen a blitz of ballistic missile launches in recent weeks, which Pyongyang has described as tactical nuclear drills that simulated taking out airports and military facilities across South Korea.

The Wednesday test of the two cruise missiles aimed at “enhancing the combat efficiency” of the weapons, which were “deployed at the units of the Korean People’s Army for the operation of tactical nukes,” KCNA reported.

The cruise missiles — which travel at lower altitudes than ballistic missiles, making them harder to detect and intercept — flew 2,000 kilometres (1,240 miles) over the sea before hitting their targets, the Korean Central News Agency said.

Kim expressed “great satisfaction” with the tests, which he said showed the country’s nuclear combat forces were at “full preparedness for actual war” and sent a “clear warning to the enemies,” KCNA said.

With talks long stalled, and Ukraine-linked gridlock at the United Nations stymying the chance of fresh sanctions, Kim has doubled down on developing and testing his banned nuclear arsenal.

Officials in Seoul and Washington have been warning for months that Pyongyang is ready to conduct another nuclear test — which would be the country’s seventh.

Kim said North Korea will “focus all efforts on the endless and accelerating development of the national nuclear combat armed forces,” KCNA reported Thursday.

Pyongyang is not technically banned by the UN from testing cruise missiles, but all ballistic missile launches violate sanctions and are typically flagged by Seoul or Tokyo. Neither had alerted the Wednesday test.

Kim made acquiring tactical nukes — smaller, lighter weapons designed for battlefield use — a top priority at a key party congress in January 2021.

“The latest test means the North is operating tactical nuclear capability on cruise missiles, which are harder to detect for their low-altitude flight,” Hong Min of the Korea Institute for National Unification told AFP.

“It is a testament to Pyongyang’s capability to mount nuclear warheads,” he said, adding that cruise missiles can also have irregular flight paths making them harder to intercept.

North Korea revised its nuclear laws last month to allow preemptive strikes, with Kim declaring North Korea an “irreversible” nuclear power — effectively ending the possibility of negotiations over its arsenal.

Since then, Seoul, Tokyo and Washington have ramped up combined military exercises, including deploying a nuclear-powered US aircraft carrier to the area twice, infuriating Pyongyang, which sees such drills as rehearsals for invasion.

In response, North Korea organised drills that it said earlier this week had gamed out hitting South Korea’s ports, airports and military command facilities with tactical nukes.

North Korea has tested “strategic” cruise missiles before but this is the first time it has said they have a nuclear role and are operational — although analysts question Pyongyang’s claims, saying it has not shown it can actually make nuclear warheads small enough.

“North Korea’s cruise missiles, air force, and tactical nuclear devices are probably much less capable than propaganda suggests,” said Leif-Eric Easley, a professor at Ewha University in Seoul.

“The Kim regime is sometimes surprisingly transparent about weapons development goals, but it also tends to exaggerate strength and capabilities,” he added.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
From the BBC.....

Posted for fair use......

North Korea tests new long-range cruise missile​

    • Published
      13 September 2021
The Academy of National Defense Science conducts long-range cruise missile tests in North Korea, as pictured in this combination of undated photos supplied by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on 13 September 2021
IMAGE SOURCE,KCNA
Image caption,
North Korean state media released these images of the new cruise missile
North Korea has tested a new long-range cruise missile capable of hitting much of Japan, state media said on Monday.

The weekend tests saw missiles travelling up to 1,500km (930 miles), the official KCNA news agency said.
It suggests North Korea is still capable of developing weapons despite food shortages and an economic crisis.

The US military said the latest tests posed threats to the international community, and neighbouring Japan said it had "significant concerns".

A picture in the North Korean Rodong Sinmun newspaper showed a missile being fired from a launch vehicle, while another could be seen in horizontal flight.

The missiles are a "strategic weapon of great significance", the KCNA agency said.

The tests were carried out on Saturday and Sunday, it added, with the missiles hitting their targets before falling into North Korea's territorial waters.

It is the country's first long-range cruise missile that could possibly carry a nuclear warhead, according to North Korea analyst Ankit Panda.

UN Security Council sanctions forbid North Korea from testing ballistic missiles, but not cruise missiles such as these.

The council considers ballistic missiles to be more threatening than cruise missiles because they can carry bigger and more powerful payloads, have a much longer range, and can fly faster.

A ballistic missile is powered by a rocket and follows an arc-like trajectory, while a cruise missile is powered by a jet engine and flies at a lower height.

Joseph Dempsey, defence researcher at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, says the development of a cruise missile is still of concern.

"The development of a long-range cruise missile could pose additional challenges for South Korea's missile defences.

"A cruise missile doesn't have to follow a straight trajectory. Its flight plan may be programmed to avoid defences or use terrain to reduce detection, but we still don't know exactly how the North Korean version navigates."
Presentational grey line

North Korea's weapons developers keep busy​

Analysis box by Laura Bicker, Seoul correspondent

So is this a big deal? Yes and no.

The reason some may shrug this missile test off is because it was a cruise missile. This type of missile isn't subject to UN Security Council sanctions which are in place to curb North Korea's nuclear programme.

Some may view this as a low-level provocation from Pyongyang - perhaps testing the waters to see what reaction it gets. It certainly didn't make the top headline in South Korea, nor did it make the front page of North Korea's state newspaper.

The problem is that North Korea is once again proving that it can develop new and dangerous weapons despite being subject to strict international sanctions.

These cruise missiles fly low and are difficult to detect, and a range of 1,500km would put much of Japan in range.
State media also describe these missiles as "strategic" which usually means that the regime hopes to attach a nuclear warhead.

Analysts aren't sure yet if North Korea can miniaturise a nuclear warhead to fit on a cruise missile. However given how many advances the secretive state has made so far, no one would bet against it.

Pyongyang may have been quiet since talks between former US President Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un broke down in Hanoi in 2019.

But that doesn't mean their weapons developers have not been busy.
Presentational grey line

Japan's chief cabinet secretary Katsunobu Kato said the country had "significant concerns" and was working with the US and South Korea to monitor the situation.

The US military said the test showed North Korea's "continuing focus on developing its military programme", adding that its commitment to defending allies South Korea and Japan remained "ironclad".

Top-level officials from the three countries are due to meet this week to discuss North Korea's denuclearisation process.

South Korea's military is also doing an in-depth analysis of the launches with US intelligence authorities, the news agency Yonhap reports.

The US has been calling for North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons, and Pyongyang's relationship with President Joe Biden's administration has so far been fraught with tension.

Japan and North Korea also have enduring tensions rooted in Japan's 35-year colonisation of Korea, Pyongyang's pursuit of nuclear and missile programmes, and the North's past abduction of Japanese citizens.
Graphic: North Korean Missiles

white space

The latest launch comes just days after a scaled-down military parade was held in Pyongyang to mark the communist state's 73rd founding anniversary.

It did not display any major ballistic missiles, however it did feature workers in hazmat suits which may have been a sign that a special force has been created to help prevent the spread of Covid-19.

North Korea has spent more than a year in isolation. It cut off most trade with its closest ally China during the pandemic, and its economy is thought to be in a dire state.
In March, the country defied sanctions and tested ballistic missiles, which triggered a strong rebuke from the US, Japan and South Korea.

And last month the UN atomic agency said North Korea appeared to have restarted a reactor which could produce plutonium for nuclear weapons, calling it a "deeply troubling" development.

Media caption,
Why does North Korea keep launching missiles?
 

jward

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BREAKING: South Korea sent a notice to North Korea through a military hotline that the DPRK’s artillery drills overnight were “a breach” of the 2018 inter-Korean military agreement, according to Seoul’s defense ministry.
 

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WLVN Analysis
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Report: All US citizens working in Chinese semiconductor industries have resigned enmasse, paralyzing China's semiconductor plants.
 

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4h

South Korea has placed its forces in a heightened state of readiness as North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un pressed on with a series of military maneuvers including missile tests and aircraft flights near the heavily fortified border between the two rival nations. (Newsweek)
 

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North Korea fires hundreds of artillery rounds in latest drills near border: JCS | NK News
View more articles by Ifang Bremer
1 minute

Seoul says DPRK breached 2018 military deal after detecting artillery fire on east and west coasts

North Korea fires hundreds of artillery rounds in latest drills near border: JCS

A North Korean artillery drill on Nov. 6, 2021 | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Nov. 7, 2021)

The North Korean military fired hundreds of rounds of artillery near the inter-Korean border on the east and west coasts late Friday afternoon, according the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), in what it called the latest DPRK drills to violate an inter-Korean military drill after similar exercises earlier in the day.

ROK forces detected around 90 rounds of artillery fire into the East Sea from Changjon in North Korea’s Kangwon Province from 5 to 6:30 p.m. KST, JCS said.
 

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N Korea tests put Seoul and Tokyo on a narrow bridge​


Daniel Sneider​






North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, perhaps emboldened by his embrace of Russia’s war in Ukraine, has unleashed a wave of missile tests with a possible nuclear test to come. The Pyongyang regime claims to be developing tactical nuclear weapons and to be responding to recent joint military exercises by the US, South Korea and Japan.
Ironically, the most immediate impact of North Korea’s relentless pace of missile testing, highlighted by the flight of an intermediate-range missile over Japan on October 4, has been to draw Japan and South Korea closer and to give life to entreaties by the US to its two allies to join in closer trilateral security cooperation. The most significant sign of this shift was visible two days later in the waters between Korea and Japan.

In those seas, two American guided-missile ships were joined by two Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyers and the Korean navy’s most advanced destroyer in carrying out a first-ever trilateral ballistic missile defense exercise. During the same week, the three countries carried out joint air exercises as well.
This was a highly symbolic move toward, as the US Indo-Pacific Command put it, “the interoperability of our collective forces.” The exercise involved the detection, tracking and interception of potential incoming missiles, with almost instantaneous sharing of information among the three navies.
This kind of quiet cooperation on missile defense has been going on for several years, with Korea providing tracking data on North Korean launches to the de facto joint US-Japan Air Defense Command set up at Yokota airbase outside Tokyo.
“North Korea’s unprecedented series of ballistic missile tests, its newly legislated nuclear doctrine and threats to carry out preemptive nuclear attacks and the prospect of a seventh nuclear test (and more to come) have served as a powerful reminder to Tokyo and Seoul of the common danger they face,” observes former senior US State Department official Evans Revere.

North Korean weapons of mass destruction on parade. Photo: RAND Corp
“That danger has encouraged the ROK [Republic of Korea] and Japan to work together, and with the United States, to confront their shared threat by strengthening defenses, increasing readiness, and enhancing bilateral and trilateral security cooperation.”
The creation of a more formal trilateral missile defense structure is the logical next step, though it faces considerable political hurdles in both Korea and Japan. This possibility has alarmed not only the North Koreans but also the progressive opposition in South Korea.
The leader of Korea’s Democratic Party, Lee Jae-myung, made headlines by denouncing the trilateral drill as a “pro-Japanese act” that was heading toward the creation of a military alliance.
“We cannot imagine the day when the Japanese military invades the Korean Peninsula and the Rising Sun Flag again hangs over the peninsula, but it could come true,” railed Lee, who narrowly lost the presidential election earlier this year to conservative Yoon Suk-yeol.

The ruling People Power Party (PPP) quickly denounced Lee’s inflammatory remarks as “a frivolous take on history.” But President Yoon is struggling with sagging popularity ratings that make him vulnerable to the Democratic Party, which continues to control the National Assembly and is sharply critical of the President.
“The Korean public is generally supportive of improved relations with the US, cautious regarding China, generally supportive about Japan,” says Scott Snyder, who heads the Korea program at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Overall Yoon is doing what South Koreans want to see in foreign policy – but increasingly he is in danger of not getting credit for it and is in danger because of his own unpopularity.”
Despite those problems, Yoon’s efforts to make a breakthrough with Tokyo have broad backing in Korea. In their recently published annual poll of Japanese and South Korean opinion, Japan’s Genron NPO and the Korean East Asian Institute found a significant shift in positive views toward each other.
It was the largest improvement since the survey began a decade ago, with the most marked change in South Korea. In particular, the Genron-EAI poll showed a growing fear of China in Korea, beginning to echo what has been the case in Japan

Solving the forced labor problem

Trilateral security cooperation, even with the North Korean threat to propel it, still depends on solving the wartime historical issues that arose out of Japan’s colonial rule over Korea. Japanese and Korean officials, and their American counterparts, emphasize the need to look forward – but all also understand that the history problems are a sword of Damocles, always threatening to send Korea-Japan relations back into a deep freeze.
Attempts to resolve the issue of compensation for the Koreans forced to work in Japanese mines and factories during the wartime period remain stalled, with a looming threat by Korean courts to seize the assets of Japanese companies that used that labor.
Publicly, Japanese officials continue to insist that they are waiting for Korea to make a concrete proposal to resolve the forced labor problem. According to multiple Korean official and other sources engaged in this issue, however, a proposal is on the table and is being actively discussed at the director-general level of the two foreign ministries, most recently on Tuesday in Seoul.

Japanese Foreign Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa and Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin, who have a longstanding and friendly personal relationship, have held detailed talks, most recently in New York at the United Nations.
South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin (left) and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi attend a meeting in Tokyo in July. Photo: Pool / JIJI
The Korean proposal emerged out of the advisory group that was formed in the summer under the leadership of Korean Vice Foreign Minister Cho Hyun-dong. The Korean idea is to compensate up to 300 South Korean victims with payments made through an existing fund – the Foundation for Victims of Forced Mobilization by Imperial Japan – set up by the Korean government in 2014.
The fund already has a significant contribution from the Korean steelmaker POSCO, which benefited from Japanese economic assistance provided under the 1965 Japan-Korea Claims Agreement that accompanied the normalization of relations between the two countries.

Using this fund indirectly acknowledges Japan’s insistence that compensation was settled by that 1965 agreement. The amount of money already in the fund is more than sufficient. But the victims who filed suit in Korean courts, and their legal representatives who participated in the advisory committee meetings, insist that the Japanese companies also contribute to this fund.
Park proposed two steps to be taken by Japan, according to a senior Korean official who has been working on this issue for many years. “One is that the Japanese government and the related companies have to express regrets,” he told this writer. “The other is that the Japanese government should allow the private sector to contribute voluntarily to the compensation fund.”
At this moment, the Japanese officials involved in the talks have not ruled out this solution. “The Japanese side does not show a negative attitude toward the voluntary contribution of Japanese firms,” says Ambassador Wi Sung-lac, a former senior foreign ministry official and a foreign policy advisor to Democratic party leader Lee. To that degree, “bilateral consultation is moving forward,” says Wi, who is actively involved in these efforts.

Korean officials are concerned about the lack of apparent readiness on the part of Prime Minister Kishida and his advisors to grasp this moment. For the Korean government to be able to sell this proposal within Korea, where it will undoubtedly face fierce attack by the progressives, it is essential that Japan take a step forward.
“Money itself is not a problem,” says the senior Korean official. “Rather it is a matter of pride and emotion. But the Japanese government seems to be very reluctant to agree on a deal to resolve the issue.” The Japanese have yet to budge from their standing position that this issue was settled by the 1965 agreement and are reluctant to reopen it in any way.
The largest obstacle to this agreement remains the domestic politics of both countries. “The political weakness of Yoon and Kishida is a factor that influences the process,” says Professor Park Cheol-hee, one of the most influential Korean scholars on Japan and a close advisor to the Yoon government.
The opposition Democrats in Korea are poised to oppose this bargain. Wi has proposed the creation of a bipartisan group that might include Democratic party leaders who back the deal and has been publicly urging Yoon to take this approach.

But it is equally crucial for Prime Minister Kishida to be prepared to offer the kind of gestures that might make it possible to garner broad public support in Korea. Japan needs to go beyond its overly legalistic stance, argues US Korea expert Snyder. “The Koreans need some kind of reciprocating gesture from the Japanese side in order to make it sustainable.”
Unfortunately, Kishida remains imprisoned by the right wing of the Liberal Democratic Party, which deeply distrusts the Koreans. And that is compounded by his own political weakness, which increasingly mirrors that of Yoon.
South Korean protesters hold a sign during a weekly anti-Japanese demonstration supporting comfort women who served as sex slaves for Japanese soldiers during World War II, near the Japanese embassy in Seoul on July 24, 2019. Photo: AFP / Jung Yeon-je
Domestic politics, not the absence of a viable compromise proposal, is the real obstacle on this narrow pathway to restoring normal ties between Japan and Korea.
“Going forward, Yoon and Kishida are likely to move slowly to avoid getting out too far ahead of the respective publics,” says Revere, who has long experience as an American diplomat in both countries. But the window of opportunity may not be open long – the Japanese and Korean officials now holding talks are looking to make a deal by the end of the year.

In that timeframe, Revere says, “North Korea can be counted on to remind Seoul and Tokyo that they have a strong common interest in working together.”
Daniel Sneider is a lecturer on international policy at Stanford University and a former Christian Science Monitor foreign correspondent.
This article originally appeared in The Oriental Economist and is
 

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North Korea trapped in an endless end-game​


Andrew Salmon​




SEOUL – Japanese and South Korean forces resumed naval exercises today with the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier strike group in the Sea of Japan – exercises moves that are certain to furrow already angry brows in Pyongyang.
The trilateral drills are just the latest knight’s move in a high-speed cycle of action and reaction, response and retaliation, that has elevated tensions across the region in recent days. It is a cycle that looks to be self-perpetrating.
At dawn on Thursday, North Korea had test-fired two short-range ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan, in what state media called a response to prior South Korea-US drills in the region.

On Wednesday, South Korean and US forces had conducted aerial and missile drills, and announced the redeployment of the USS Ronald Reagan carrier strike group to the area. Those drills, and that redeployment announcment, followed North Korea’s test-firing of an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), which flew through space over Japan on Tuesday.
Tuesday’s North Korean IRBM test, in turn, was seen as a response to drills conducted a week earlier by the Japanese and South Korean navies, in concert with the US carrier strike group which has today been conducting anti-missile drills with its two allies.
And so on and so forth, ad infinitum.

Despite their impressive flex of military muscle, South Korea, Japan and the US have few levers to pull on Kim Jong Un, the third generation of his family to head what is a virtual fortress state.
UN Security Council resolutions and sanctions have failed to halt North Korea’s build-out of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Making bad matters worse, the prior unity in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has collapsed.
In May, and once again Wednesday, the UNSC failed to reach an agreement over North Korea’s missile tests. Riven by the war in Ukraine and China-US decoupling, the UNSC going forward looks set to be ever more ineffectual.
Moreover, given North Korea’s isolation, there is minimal economic leverage that the US and its allies can applied. And with Pyongyang nuclear-capable since 2006, military action is off the table.
But while this situation may frustrate politicians, diplomats, generals and wonks in Japan, South Korea and the US, their competitor is also in a cul de sac.

Though it plays its one card in the game of nuclear poker with great skill, Pyongyang suffers from both a weak hand and the limitation of the game’s contours.
North Korea went critical in 2006 and showcased a missile capable of reaching the US mainland in 2017. But the urge to up-arm remains. With its national destiny set on a single path – the endless acquisition of ever-more powerful weapons, that suck up ever-more national resources – it is caught in its own mousetrap.
In terms of breaking its international isolation, expanding its economy, acquiring civil technologies and improving its citizens’ quality of life, there is no apparent “Plan B.”
The only possibility that offers Pyongyang a way forward – that the world will bisect into a North American/European-led liberal democratic bloc versus a Chinese-Russian-led authoritarian bloc – cannot be a strategy; it is far beyond the state’s control.

Meantime, today’s drills showcase an irony – that Pyongyang may be contributing to an outcome it greatly fears.
Throughout 2022, a confluence of factors – North Korean belligerence, growing Chinese military power and conservative administrations synching in both Seoul and Tokyo – is driving a long-term Washington goal: Upgraded Japan-South Korean-US military ties.
A warlord with his warriors: North Korean leader Kim Jong Un takes part in the First Workshop of Korean People’s Army Commanders and Political Officers in Pyongyang. Photo: KCNA VIA KNS

The race is on

Thursday morning’s test-firing of two ballistic missiles marked Pyongyang’s sixth missile test in two weeks. Amid the Ukraine war’s actual missile war, this missile test war has struggled to grab global headlines, but Pyongyang’s hefting of an IRBM over Japan did make the world sit up and take new notice.
It also compelled Seoul, Tokyo and Washington, with other like-minded states, to call a meeting of the UNSC – a meeting North Korea’s Foreign Ministry condemned. Moreover, the IRBM test sparked a South Korean-US military reaction.
In a show of force, South Korean and US air forces detonated JDAM bunker-busting munitions on uninhabited islets in the Yellow Sea and fired missiles onto targets in the Sea of Japan.
However, South Korea’s retaliation left its public shaken and its defense officials red-faced. A home-grown South Korean missile veered off-course and detonated inside a military base near the northeastern city of Gangneung late Tuesday night. There were no casualties.

But these are tiny moves. A far bigger arms race is underway across Northeast Asia. China is muscling up in multiple areas – most recently expanding its nuclear force and launching its third heavy aircraft carrier.
Japan is working up two helicopter carriers that are under conversion to F35 carriers, expanding its stealth wing and mulling a “second strike” missile capability.
South Korea is upgrading its domestic submarines and ballistic missiles while beefing up its stealth fighters as it contemplates following Japan down the light-carrier route.
North Korea’s armory is necessarily limited by the paltry size of its economy compared with others in Northeast Asia. However, although its conventional forces lack carriers and stealth jets, its core deterrent – nuclear warheads and missile delivery systems – are hefty enough to grant it a seat at the table.

That seat needs to be maintained with constant saber-rattling, which explains – following the 2019 evaporation of North Korea-US, and collaterally, North Korean-South Korean negotiations – its extensive testing schedule. It is a schedule that has made 2022 the busiest year ever for the state’s missile sector.
Not all of these launches are responses to moves by regional competitors; 2022’s heavy launch schedule predated joint South Korea-US military drills.
With Pyongyang having announced at a party congress in 2021 a vast new armory, including hypersonic and submarine-launched missiles, and tactical and super-large nuclear weapons, it needs to test technologies, systems and manpower.
The last two especially need to conform to the new “first use” doctrine Pyongyang announced in September.
Pedestrians watch a screen displaying news reporting of North Korea’s launch of a ballistic missile in Tokyo, Japan, October 4, 2022. Photo: EPA-EFE / Kimimasa Mayama

Big bang preparations​

Pyongyangologists are currently wondering when North Korea will conduct its seventh nuclear test. Satellite images have, since early this year, shown what appear to be preparations for a detonation at the country’s underground test site. Some expect the big bang after China’s upcoming party congress, which kicks off on October 16.
But while North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests may appear to signal national virility, they mask a wider national impotence, experts say.
North Korea organizes its policies under four domains – military, economic, political and diplomatic – said Go Myong-hyun, a North Korea watcher at Seoul’s Asan Institute think tank. But one is dominant.
“The military sets the pace for policy in all other domains, so all other policies derive from this domain,” Go said. “It is not measured in months – it is measured in years.”
This makes the acquisition of ever-more advanced weaponry the foremost national priority. That priority is based on regime mindset.

“The way they view this is, they see survival through strength and power, and you can never have enough power,” said Daniel Pinkston, a Seoul-resident North Korean watcher with Troy University. “We think in terms of opportunity costs, but the mindset in North Korea is different – they don’t think that way.”
Hence, the massive prioritization of arms acquisitions.
“The state is very capable at squeezing resources out of their society and economy,” Pinkston said. “They see this as necessary in a menacing world that is ‘out to get’ North Korea.”
Go believes that Pyongyang may try to leverage military strength to extract economic concessions from Japan and South Korea. But Pinkston cautions against any likelihood of denuclearization.
“From North Korea’s perspective, you can never have enough power,” he said. “Trading weapons for some kind of security assurance contradicts their world view.”

This turns the acquisition of an advanced armory into an endless end game – one that does not aid their civil economy.
“They live in this echo chamber that reconfirms their prior beliefs, it reinforces itself,” Pinkston, who reads North Korean state media material in Korean, insisted. “But what are you going to do with a nuclear weapon? You can’t eat plutonium.”
Actual nuclear use would be “suicide” for such a small state, Pinkston opined. North Korea lacks strategic depth, meaning a single nuclear-armed US B52 bomber or submarine could obliterate the nation.
And just as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine invigorated his personal bugbear, North Korea’s actions are generating regional blowback.
“Putin was paranoid about NATO coming after him, but in the past year he has done more to strengthen NATO unity than anyone,” said Pinkston. “It’s the same with North Korea and China – international security cooperation is moving forward.”

He cited recent missile defense drills off Hawaii with Japanese, South Korean and US units, as well as the recent – and likely upcoming – trilateral naval drills in the Sea of Japan.
Yet, there could feasibly be a way for North Korea to acquire allies and embed itself into a community of nations.
“North Korea has put all their eggs in the nuclear basket. They did not diversity their national strategy – there is no way out,” Go said. “If it fails, the only Plan B is the division of the world into authoritarian and liberal blocs, which is a potential development.”
But any such global bifurcation cannot be counted upon, Go stressed: “It is only a prospect.”
 

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North Korea’s KJU tells China’s Xi he is willing to seek greater cooperation to safeguard peace and stability - KCNA
In letter, Xi told KJU it’s more important than ever to enhance communication, unity and cooperation between China and NK - KCNA
 

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Indo-Pacific News - Geo-Politics & Military News
@IndoPac_Info
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Biden Is Now All-In on Taking Out #China

Biden has committed to rapid decoupling, whatever the consequences.

Now the United States has gone all-in—wagering like never before and placing its cards on the table for all to see.
 

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Biden Is All-In on Taking Out China, Whatever the Consequences​


Jon Bateman​



The United States has waged low-grade economic warfare against China for at least four years now—firing volley after volley of tariffs, export controls, investment blocks, visa limits, and much more. But Washington’s endgame for this conflict has always been hazy. Does it seek to compel specific changes in Beijing’s behavior, or challenge the Chinese system itself? To protect core security interests, or retain hegemony by any means? To strengthen America, or hobble its chief rival? Donald Trump’s scattershot regulation and erratic public statements offered little clarity to allies, adversaries, and companies around the world. Joe Biden’s actions have been more systematic, but long-term U.S. goals have remained hidden beneath bureaucratic opacity and cautious platitudes.

Last Friday, however, a dense regulatory filing from a little-known federal agency gave the strongest hint yet of U.S. intentions. The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced new extraterritorial limits on the export to China of advanced semiconductors, chip-making equipment, and supercomputer components. The controls, more so than any earlier U.S. action, reveal a single-minded focus on thwarting Chinese capabilities at a broad and fundamental level. Although framed as a national security measure, the primary damage to China will be economic, on a scale well out of proportion to Washington’s cited military and intelligence concerns. The U.S. government imposed the new rules after limited consultation with partner countries and companies, proving that its quest to hobble China ranks well above concerns about the diplomatic or economic repercussions.
In short, America’s restrictionists—zero-sum thinkers who urgently want to accelerate technological decoupling—have won the strategy debate inside the Biden administration. More cautious voices—technocrats and centrists who advocate incremental curbs on select aspects of China’s tech ties—have lost. This shift portends even harsher U.S. measures to come, not only in advanced computing but also in other sectors (like biotech, manufacturing, and finance) deemed strategic. The pace and details are uncertain, but the strategic objective and political commitment are now clearer than ever. China’s technological rise will be slowed at any price.


The United States has waged low-grade economic warfare against China for at least four years now—firing volley after volley of tariffs, export controls, investment blocks, visa limits, and much more. But Washington’s endgame for this conflict has always been hazy. Does it seek to compel specific changes in Beijing’s behavior, or challenge the Chinese system itself? To protect core security interests, or retain hegemony by any means? To strengthen America, or hobble its chief rival? Donald Trump’s scattershot regulation and erratic public statements offered little clarity to allies, adversaries, and companies around the world. Joe Biden’s actions have been more systematic, but long-term U.S. goals have remained hidden beneath bureaucratic opacity and cautious platitudes.

Last Friday, however, a dense regulatory filing from a little-known federal agency gave the strongest hint yet of U.S. intentions. The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced new extraterritorial limits on the export to China of advanced semiconductors, chip-making equipment, and supercomputer components. The controls, more so than any earlier U.S. action, reveal a single-minded focus on thwarting Chinese capabilities at a broad and fundamental level. Although framed as a national security measure, the primary damage to China will be economic, on a scale well out of proportion to Washington’s cited military and intelligence concerns. The U.S. government imposed the new rules after limited consultation with partner countries and companies, proving that its quest to hobble China ranks well above concerns about the diplomatic or economic repercussions.

In short, America’s restrictionists—zero-sum thinkers who urgently want to accelerate technological decoupling—have won the strategy debate inside the Biden administration. More cautious voices—technocrats and centrists who advocate incremental curbs on select aspects of China’s tech ties—have lost. This shift portends even harsher U.S. measures to come, not only in advanced computing but also in other sectors (like biotech, manufacturing, and finance) deemed strategic. The pace and details are uncertain, but the strategic objective and political commitment are now clearer than ever. China’s technological rise will be slowed at any price.
To understand the strategy behind these new controls, it helps to look at what preceded them. A multitude of U.S. measures have limited the flow of technology to and from China in recent years. Chief among these is the Entity List, which bars designated firms from importing U.S. goods without a license. The number of unique Chinese companies on this list quadrupled, from 130 to 532, between 2018 and 2022. Leading Chinese chip companies, supercomputing organizations, and software and hardware vendors have all landed on the list. Even so, BIS exercised its discretion to license large amounts of nonsensitive exports to listed companies.

One Chinese company, Huawei, has faced a unique, supercharged version of the Entity List. BIS targeted Huawei with an expanded form of its “foreign direct product rule,” a powerful regulation that grants U.S. export controls greater extraterritorial reach. U.S. export controls primarily apply to U.S.-origin items, but the foreign direct product rule extends the scope to cover non-U.S. items that were made using U.S. technology. By leveraging America’s centrality in the global chip supply chain, BIS forced semiconductor designers and manufacturers in third countries to limit sales to Huawei. Leading-edge chips were off limits, while less advanced chips were allowed. The controls grievously wounded Huawei.
These earlier restrictions were provocative in their time, but they reflected at least some sense of proportion. The new export controls, however, are different. They effectively bring all of China under the special rule formerly reserved for Huawei. Advanced semiconductors from any country will be presumptively denied to every Chinese company, even firms lacking direct ties to Beijing’s military or intelligence services. Among other consequences, this will hamstring the development and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) throughout the country—hindering Chinese progress in e-commerce, autonomous vehicles, cybersecurity, medical imaging, drug discovery, climate modelling, and much else. China’s own semiconductor sector is incapable of producing the leading-edge chips used in AI applications. And BIS aims to keep things that way: Its controls will block Chinese purchases of even years-old chip-making equipment and prevent American personnel from providing support or know-how.
To justify this dramatic escalation, BIS makes the same old national security arguments. Its filing takes pains to portray Chinese high-end computing as an urgent military threat. Nuclear weapons are invoked 16 times, on the grounds that top-tier processors facilitate their design and may be “inherently radiation hardened.” Artificial intelligence is cited as a surveillance tool. It’s all factually true. Yet BIS never really deals with the fundamental fact that semiconductors and AI are both dual-use, general-purpose tools. Indeed, they are the basic building blocks for an advanced, globally competitive economy. Denying them to China is effectively a form of economic containment.

Granted, the new controls fall short of a total chip embargo. Chinese firms can still import lesser semiconductors for use in cars, toasters, and much else. Moreover, BIS has not yet imposed similarly stringent controls in other technology fields, such as biotech, which may be less amenable to decoupling for technological, economic, or political reasons. But the U.S. government’s latest move reveals a strategic mindset that cannot help but influence future China tech policy. U.S. officials have focused intently on possible threats, imposed disproportionate measures, downplayed the complications, and strong-armed others into compliance. This mindset all but guarantees a continued march toward broad-based technological decoupling. Even U.S. capital flows into China, which Trump worked hard to expand as he simultaneously cracked down on tech ties, are now facing new forms of federal pressure.

Many U.S. policymakers and analysts will cheer a further decoupling. They rightly argue that Beijing’s decades-long strategy of intellectual property theft, hidden subsidies, and stealthy regulatory discrimination has played a large part in Chinese technological advancement. They correctly note that China has used its growing prowess to crush dissenters and minorities, threaten neighbors, prop up foreign autocrats, carry out espionage and influence operations, entrench market dominance, and lay the groundwork for future digital sabotage or coercion. And they can fairly claim that most previous U.S. restrictions—though hardly all—were sensible and successful.

Yet the latest U.S. move may erode some of the very conditions that have enabled earlier successes. Up until now, allies and partners were more or less willing to follow America’s lead, China proved unable to respond forcefully, the private sector adapted well enough, and U.S. technocrats had room to shape key policy details. The next phase of decoupling, however, could be more unpredictable and riskier. The increasing boldness of U.S. unilateral actions, and Washington’s open embrace of a quasi-containment strategy, will draw reactions from many actors. This may finally set in motion forces beyond the control of U.S. national security leaders. Four different groups will define what happens next.
The most important set of players is U.S. allies and partners. They will of course comply with the new export controls, due to the long arm of U.S. law. But Washington can’t afford to settle for begrudging obedience, because export controls are just one part of America’s international technology agenda. The United States sorely needs other nations to coordinate industrial policy, share economic intelligence, harmonize digital regulations, press Beijing on joint concerns, and collectively envision a future economic order. This requires difficult negotiations.

The United States has labored, for example, to launch a “Chip 4” alliance with South Korea, Taiwan and Japan. which together dominate much of the semiconductor industry. But the project has been plagued by internal conflict, and it must now overcome Seoul’s outrage at its companies’ exclusion from a new U.S. electric vehicle tax credit. Washington has also tried to write a human rights code of conduct for export controls alongside Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, though 10 months have passed with no public results. The U.S.-European Union Trade and Technology Council has been more productive. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, less so. Ambitious multilateral efforts, like the U.S. hope of reforming the World Trade Organization, have yet to pick up steam.
 

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America’s latest export controls undermine these dialogues in two ways. By revealing the maximalism of Washington’s campaign against Chinese technology, the move will sharpen debates in allied capitals about whether U.S. aims align with their own political and economic interests. And by flexing unilateral muscles so forcefully, the controls will cast doubt on U.S. willingness to accommodate differing interests. (U.S. officials imposed the new controls while international consultations were still underway, without securing any specific agreements.)

China, of course, will also react. Symmetrical retaliation—for example, blocking U.S. imports of critical minerals or punishing key companies such as Microsoft, Apple, or Tesla—is unlikely. China has much to lose from such actions, and its economy already faces major headwinds. Beijing may instead push back in subtler ways, perhaps slow-rolling regulatory approvals or undermining the recent U.S.-China deal on public company accounting standards. The bigger threat would be Chinese reprisals against U.S. allies and partners—like South Korea, Japan, or Taiwan—that must implement Washington’s controls. China has more leverage against these countries and will want to insert a wedge in America’s economic coalition.


China may also file a WTO complaint. Many U.S. national security officials will roll their eyes at this ponderous and partly broken process, but its long-term consequences should not be dismissed. Much of the edifice of U.S. techno-nationalist policy—from export controls to tariffs to blacklists—runs more or less counter to the WTO’s general bar against country-based discrimination. The United States justifies its actions by expansively interpreting the “national security exception,” but it has wisely avoided testing this argument in formal dispute resolution. A 2019 WTO decision concerning Russia and Ukraine cast real doubt on the U.S. interpretation, both as a general matter and as applied to these new export controls. An adverse ruling would raise concerns among WTO-minded actors such as the European Union and much of the Global South. Moreover, a big U.S. loss could further erode American commitment to the open trading system, ultimately imperiling its viability even as no plan yet exists for what might replace it.

America’s embrace of quasi-containment will come as no surprise to Xi Jinping. But it will certainly help him promote Beijing’s longstanding narrative that a hegemonic United States seeks to stifle China’s normal development. Many countries may be receptive to this argument, judging from the Global South’s lukewarm response to U.S.-led sanctions and trade restrictions against Russia. China can also portray U.S. export controls as stymying progress on shared global challenges. It may cite, for example, the need of Chinese researchers to use supercomputers for vaccine development and climate science. (A recent Biden order defined “advanced clean energy” and “climate adaptation technologies” as “areas affecting U.S. national security” that may warrant restrictive measures.)


The global private sector represents another important set of players. It is well-known that U.S. export controls incentivize firms to escape American jurisdiction by offshoring their operations. Likewise, the foreign direct product rule encourages fuller purging of U.S. technology throughout a global supply chain. This is admittedly hard to pull off. Regardless, private actors will respond to the new export controls’ signal of heightened geopolitical risks. Washington has revealed a clear intent to suppress Chinese technological advances and a willingness to bear growing economic costs to do so. Businesses and investors will realize that decoupling is nowhere near its stopping point. Firms will expect a wide range of follow-on restrictions, not only tougher outbound investment screening and cross-border data rules, but other undefined measures still over the horizon. This will exert a chilling effect on U.S.-China commerce, and perhaps even financial ties, across many sectors.


Some U.S. policymakers may welcome such developments. Figures from Mike Pompeo to Christopher Wray to Mark Warner have exhorted U.S. companies to rethink their China ties in light of intellectual property theft, a possible Taiwan crisis, and other business risks. But Washington could wind up getting more than it bargained for. Many private actors have grown weary of a U.S. policy process that is sometimes opaque, unpredictable, irregular, and even uninformed. In the face of this uncertainty, firms (and academic institutions) may pull back from benign and beneficial areas of U.S.-China engagement. The private sector could ultimately choose to accelerate its own decoupling, which may be broader, faster, and more chaotic than U.S. policymakers have planned for.

U.S. businesses and universities may spurn high-skilled Chinese applicants who pose no real national security risk but would nonetheless face vague and onerous visa screening, “deemed export” controls, or research security requirements. U.S. organizations may slow their adoption of innovative technology (drones, for example) due to the growing risk of bans on Chinese equipment and the dearth of competitive alternatives. U.S. companies may fail to bring new goods to market if China offers the most viable manufacturing site yet there is too much regulatory risk (from possible outbound investment screening, data protection rules, tariffs, and more) to justify long-term investments there. In these and other scenarios, a volatile U.S. policy environment forces private actors to go beyond or move ahead of what policymakers may actually want, harming U.S. interests in the process.


Finally, the new export controls will reverberate within the U.S. political system. Biden probably hopes to fend off Republican attacks that he is weak on China. This may help in the November midterm elections, but in the long run it’s a mug’s game. Anti-China measures have been a one-way ratchet: Each new restriction or sanction simply ups the ante for the next one, empowering hardline voices in the process. There will soon be calls to broaden these export controls and use even more powerful weapons, like the Specially Designated Nationals List, against major Chinese companies.


If Biden is not yet prepared to take these steps, he will find it increasingly hard to explain why. Neither he nor any other U.S. leader has made a serious effort to educate the American people about the costs and risks of decoupling. Rather, popular discourse and political energy overwhelmingly favor the restrictionists. Republicans have made China-bashing central to their brand, and few Democrats are interested in challenging their premises or pointing to possible trade-offs. Many business leaders think differently, but they have lost political sway and they know it. Most choose to keep their head down, offering quiet pleas and technical comments to rulemakings. (The Semiconductor Industry Association said only that it was “assessing the impact of the new export controls,” which were imposed prior to the formal comment period.) In short, not a single prominent political figure has emerged as a major voice of caution on decoupling. So long as that remains true, harsh new controls will only further consolidate the restrictionists’ dominance of mainstream discourse and build momentum for more of the same.


U.S.-led technological decoupling from China has had enormous consequences in just a few short years. It has rewired international relationships, unsettled the global economic order, and transformed technology policymaking and politics in many countries. In this high-stakes game, Washington has been both card player and card dealer, making its own moves while constraining the choices of others. Now the United States has gone all-in—wagering like never before and placing its cards on the table for all to see. The decisive American gamble: to openly block China’s path to become an advanced economic peer, even at significant risk to U.S. and allied interests. Bigger U.S. moves are probably coming in the future. But for now, Washington must wait to see how others play their hands.
Biden Is Now All-In on Taking Out China
 
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