ALERT The Winds of War Blow in Korea and The Far East

jward

passin' thru

EndGameWW3
@EndGameWW3

1m

Update: North Korea appears to have fired cruise missiles: Yonhap News






NK NEWS
@nknewsorg

13m

NEW: North Korea fired two cruise missiles Tuesday morning, a South Korean military official confirmed to NK News: -Pyongyang’s fifth test this month
-ROK-U.S. intelligence is still analyzing the launch
-Last DPRK cruise missile test was in Sept. 2021
 
Last edited:

jward

passin' thru
Don't those things cost $$$
LIM Yun Suk
@yunsukCNA

3h

Here we go again. Defence ministry says North Korea has launched an unidentified missile into the East Sea. #DPRK #missile

ETA our response, because I'd lost count already this year :kat:
~~~~~~~
Josh Smith
@joshjonsmith


U.S. State Dept: "The U.S. condemns the DPRK’s ballistic missile launches. These tests, along with the six other ballistic missile launches this month, are in violation of multiple UNSC Resolutions and pose a threat to the DPRK’s neighbors and the international community."

9:48 PM · Jan 26, 2022·TweetDeck
 
Last edited:

jward

passin' thru
Joseph Dempsey
@JosephHDempsey

Jan 25

Just 25 days in and #NorthKorea on its 5th round of 2022 missile test launches
View: https://twitter.com/JosephHDempsey/status/1485934239640166408?s=20&t=kREkChqzSx0eWaciWD8zcQ

Looks like #NorthKorea conducted the first known test of a second type/variant of Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM), previously shown at October 2021 Defence Exhibition
View: https://twitter.com/JosephHDempsey/status/1486850289571446788?s=20&t=kREkChqzSx0eWaciWD8zcQ

#NorthKorea claims indicate latest cruise missile flew for longer (+26min) and further (+300km) than Sept 2021 tests.

Jan 2021: 9137 seconds (2hr 32min 17 sec)
1800km
=709kph/441mph
Sept 2021: 7580seconds (2hr 6min 20sec)
1500km
=713kph/443mph
View: https://twitter.com/JosephHDempsey/status/1486853885201424396?s=20&t=kREkChqzSx0eWaciWD8zcQ
 

jward

passin' thru




SkyScanWorld
@scan_sky

1h

United Airlines (@united) - 787-9 Dreamliner - #N29985 - #UA837 Being Advised Of The NOTAM After The Possible #NorthKorea Missile Launch.
View: https://twitter.com/scan_sky/status/1487566448071430147?s=20&t=L9tS2g5k1ptSsbRVgkV50A


++++++++++++++++
Jesse Johnson
@jljzen

15m

Japanese govt says missile hit a max altitude of 2,000 km, flew for about 30 min and 800 km. This could be a longer-range weapon.
J-govt says it did not land in Japan EEZ
In 2017, North Korea launched a Hwasong-12 intermediate-range missile in a lofted trajectory of about 2,000 km. If fired at a shallower angle, it would have flown more than 4,800 km, analysts said at the time.
View: https://twitter.com/jljzen/status/1487581761907298307?s=20&t=L9tS2g5k1ptSsbRVgkV50A
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

January 29, 20225:06 PM PSTLast Updated 10 minutes ago
Asia Pacific
N.Korea conducts seventh suspected missile launch in busiest month for tests

By Josh Smith and Cynthia Kim

SEOUL, Jan 30 (Reuters) - North Korea launched at least one suspected ballistic missile into the sea off its east coast on Sunday, governments in the region reported, in what would be the nuclear-armed country's seventh test this month.

South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that a projectile believed to be a single ballistic missile was launched at around 7:52 a.m. (2252 GMT) from North Korea's Jagang Province toward the ocean off its east coast.

The Japanese government also said North Korea had launched a "possible ballistic missile."

Jagang Province was the site of two earlier launches this month of what North Korea said was a "hypersonic missile," which could reach high speeds while flying and maneuvering at relatively low altitudes.

If confirmed, it could make January the busiest ever for North Korea's missile programme, which analysts say is expanding and developing new capabilities despite strict sanctions and United Nations Security Council resolutions that ban the country's ballistic missile tests. read more

Japanese government spokesperson Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirokazu Matsuno told a televised briefing that if the projectile was a standard ballistic missile it is estimated to have reached an altitude of 2,000 km, flown for 30 minutes, to a distance of 800 km.

Analysts said if confirmed, those numbers could indicate one of the largest missile tests by North Kora in years.

North Korea has not tested its longest-range intercontinental ballistic missiles or nuclear weapons since 2017, but the country's rulers suggested this month they could restart those activities.

"All signs suggest this is a big test -- not performing as well as prior North Korean ICBMs, but could have been deliberately flown on a more limited trajectory," Chad O'Carroll, CEO of Korea Risk Group, which monitors North Korea, said on Twitter.

The tests come less than a week before the opening of the Winter Olympics in Beijing, which is North Korea's main political and economic partner. Pyongyang has said it would be skipping the Games because of the COVID-19 pandemic and "hostile forces."

In an address ahead of the New Year, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un called for bolstering the military with cutting edge technology at a time when talks with South Korea and the United States have stalled. read more

Since then, North Korea has conducted a series of launches displaying a dizzying array of weapon types, launch locations, and increasing sophistication. read more

From hypersonic missiles and long-range cruise missiles to missiles launched from railcars and airports, the tests highlight the nuclear-armed state's rapidly expanding and advancing arsenal amid stalled denuclearisation talks.

"The ballistic missile launch and the ones before it are a threat to our country, the region and the international community," Matsuno said. "This series of launches violate U.N. resolutions and we strongly protest this action by North Korea."

The tests appear aimed at modernizing North Korea's military, bolstering national pride ahead of several major North Korean holidays, and sending a message of strength as the country grapples with economic crises caused by sanctions and COVID-19 lockdowns, said Leif-Eric Easley, a professor of international studies at Ewha University in Seoul.

"The Kim regime hears external discussions of its domestic weaknesses and sees South Korea’s growing strength," he said. "So it wants to remind Washington and Seoul that trying to topple it would be too costly."

Its latest launches included a test of two short-range ballistic missiles and their warheads on Thursday, and an update to a long-range cruise missile system was tested on Tuesday.

Pyongyang has defended the launches as its sovereign right of self defence and say they are not directed at any specific country, but accused Washington and Seoul of having "hostile policies."

Kim visited a munitions factory last week, where he called for "an all-out drive" to produce "powerful cutting-edge arms," and its workers touted his devotion to "smashing ... the challenges of the U.S. imperialists and their vassal forces" seeking to violate their right to self-defence, calling it "the harshest-ever adversity."

Reporting by Cynthia Kim and Josh Smith in Seoul; Additional reporting by Tim Kelly in Tokyo; Writing by Josh Smith; Editing by Grant McCool and Daniel Wallis
 

jward

passin' thru




Dr. Jeffrey Lewis
@ArmsControlWonk

40m

It's probably a 4,500 km-range Hwasong-12 IRBM based on the trajectory. Compare: Hwasong-12 test on May 14 2012: 787 km range 2,111.5 km apogee ~30 minute flight time. UI missile test on January 29, 2022 800 km range >2000 km apogee ~30 minute flight time
North Korea has tested a lot missiles recently, but this is a big step. In 2018, Kim announced a moratorium on intermediate- and intercontinental-range ballistic missile launches. North Korea has now broken that moratorium. ICBM tests are almost certain to follow.
I should say: The ROK/GOJ numbers could turn out to be wrong. Or it could be a new missile, like a solid, with a similar range as the Hwasong-12. We won't know until we see pictures tomorrow. So, caveat lector. But for now, it looks like a Hwasong-12.
View: https://twitter.com/ArmsControlWonk/status/1487598101225476096?s=20&t=L9tS2g5k1ptSsbRVgkV50A
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

North Korea says Sunday test was Hwasong-12 missile
Test marks first time the nuclear armed country has launched a weapon of that size since 2017.
A composite of four photogrpahs showing a missile launched from the ground in smoke and flames, and flying through the air as well as images of the moon

A combination image shows what appears to be a Hwasong-12 "intermediate and long-range ballistic missile" test, that state media KCNA says was carried out on Sunday, along with pictures reportedly taken from outer space with a camera at the warhead of the missile [KCNA via Reuters]

Published On 31 Jan 202231 Jan 2022

North Korea has confirmed it fired a Hwasong-12 “mid-range ballistic missile” on Sunday, the first time it has tested a weapon of that size since 2017.

Japan and South Korea both detected the launch of the suspected intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) on Sunday morning, the seventh weapons test this month.

KEEP READING
list of 4 itemslist 1 of 4North Korea test-fires most powerful missile since 2017
list 2 of 4North Korea confirms latest tests as Kim visits weapons factory
list 3 of 4Pyongyang continues launch blitz with two suspected missiles
list 4 of 4North Korea appears to have fired two cruise missiles: Report
end of list

The two countries condemned the test as a threat to regional security with South Korean officials warning the launch could lead to the resumed testing of long-range weapons and nuclear bombs.

“The inspection firing test was conducted for the purpose of selectively inspecting the ground-to-ground mid-range long-range ballistic missile Hwasong-12 and verifying the overall accuracy of this weapon system,” North Korean state news agency KCNA said on Monday.

North Korea has previously said the Hwasong-12 can carry a “large-size heavy nuclear warhead”.

KCNA reported the missile launch was conducted in such a way as to ensure the safety of neighbouring countries, and that the test warhead was fitted with a camera that took photos while it was in space.

Photos released by state media showed space-based images of North Korea and the surrounding areas through a round camera lens. North Korea first took such images in 2017, analysts said.

The United States expressed concern about the escalating tests, with January one of the busiest ever months for Pyongyang’s advancing weapons programme.

It again urged the North to return to denuclearisation talks, which have been stalled since 2019 when a summit between Kim and then US President Donald Trump collapsed over the North’s demands for sanctions relief.

“They are looking to take actions, which we believe are fundamentally destabilising, as a way to increase pressure,” a US official told a briefing of journalists in Washington, DC. “I think that there probably is a component that is also to validate the systems that they’ve developed and further refine them.”

Leader Kim Jong Un was not reported to have attended the latest test.

North Korea has hinted earlier this month it may end a self-imposed moratorium on testing its longest-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and nuclear weapons.

The Hwasong-12, which has an estimated range of 4,500km (2,796 miles) and with the ability to carry a nuclear warhead, was last tested in 2017 with three successful flights and three failures.

In Sunday’s test, North Korea said it fired the missile on an elevated trajectory “in consideration of the safety of neighbouring countries.”

The test “confirmed the accuracy, safety, and operational effectiveness of the produced Hwasong-12 type weapon system,” KCNA said.

The largest and most powerful missile North Korea has tested to date is the Hwasong-15 with an estimated range of 8,500–13,000 km (5282-8,078 miles). It has had one launch – in November 2017 – when Pyongyang declared itself a nuclear power.

The string of launches in 2022 comes at a delicate time in the region, with Kim’s sole major ally China set to host the Winter Olympic Games from Friday and South Korea gearing up for a presidential election in March.

SOURCE: NEWS AGENCIES

RELATED
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

North Korea’s Fifth and Sixth Rounds of January Missile Launches
22-0128-KCNA_MM00289934-300x207.jpg
(Source: KCNA)
Pyongyang launched two land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) on January 25 and two road-mobile KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) on January 27. These two sets of launches were the fifth and sixth North Korea has conducted this month (but not the last, as North Korea conducted an intermediate-range ballistic missile [IRBM] test on January 30; analysis to come). They were described by the North as “updating” the cruise missiles (with a modified propulsion system, it would appear) and “confirming the power” of a conventional warhead on the KN-23.[1] The launches serve to underscore that both missile types will have a role in the North’s missile force, but the cruise missile will help augment a large existing ballistic missile threat that will be incrementally increased by the KN-23.

Land-Attack Cruise Missile Launches
South Korea reported that the North launched two unidentified cruise missiles into the East Sea/Sea of Japan on January 25, to an unspecified range. On January 28, North Korea announced “the test-fire for updating the long-range cruise missile system,” with the two missiles hitting a “target island” 1,800 km away after a flight of over 2.5 hours. According to the announcement, “The practical combat performance of the long-range cruise missile system would hold a reliable share in boosting the war deterrence of the country.”[2]

The accompanying photos showed the launch of a cruise missile from a road-mobile launcher and an explosion on an island.[3] The missile looked very much like the cruise missiles launched by North Korea in September 2021, but with a different paint scheme—more like that of the cruise missile North Korea displayed at the October 2021 “Defence Development Exhibition.”[4] The engine air intake on the missile launched in January also appears different from the September missile; this, along with the January missile demonstrating 300 km more range and 26 minutes more flight time than in September, may mean the “updated” January missile has a modified propulsion system.

Implications. North Korea is continuing to improve the LACM system unveiled last September and apparently intends to add it to bolster its existing ballistic missile “war deterrence.” The increased range/flight time shown in the January tests would mainly be of use in allowing launch units to deploy deeper within North Korea and still hit targets throughout South Korea and Japan, and/or for some more use of evasive flight paths to avoid and complicate air defenses.

Overall, the impact of LACMs is consistent with 38 North’s analysis of the September 2021 launch: assuming they are deployed, they will almost certainly augment rather than supplant the North’s existing, longstanding and extensive ballistic missile force—which is already capable of accomplishing just about any mission a North Korean cruise missile can—and would further diversify and increase the flexibility of the North’s missile force.

Road-Mobile KN-23 Launches
South Korea reported the launch of two probable short-range ballistic missiles by North Korea on January 27, to a range of about 190 km with a 20-km maximum altitude (apogee). The same January 28 North Korean announcement covering the cruise missile also reported “the test-fire for confirming the power of conventional warhead for the surface-to-surface tactical guided missile,” claiming the “missiles precisely hit the target island, proving that the explosive power of the conventional warhead complied with the design requirements.”[5]

The accompanying photos showed a KN-23 solid-propellant SRBM being launched from a road-mobile launcher, an apparent missile reentering just above an island, and an airburst explosion. These were the first known launches of the KN-23 from a road-mobile launcher since 2019; subsequent launches had been from rail-mobile launchers and a test submarine.[6] The latest launches also had the lowest reported KN-23 apogee (previous flights have been to 37-60 km) and the shortest reported range (albeit only 10 km less than the first KN-23 test in May 2019).[7]

Implications. The resumption of launches from road-mobile launchers further suggests that the road-mobile version of the KN-23 is deployed/operational, not just the rail-mobile version that the North claimed in September 2021 had that status. It is unclear whether the reported use of the launches “for confirming the power of conventional warhead” means that the warhead used is a new type or an existing deployed warhead. But this is the first time the North has explicitly attributed a conventional warhead to the KN-23, which is also capable of carrying a nuclear payload.

Use of the lower 20-km apogee would delay radar detection (but not detection by infrared satellites) and reduce the reaction time of missile defense systems, but at the cost of range compared to higher apogees – as well as putting more thermal and aerodynamic stress on the KN-23 missile airframe, which remains attached to the warhead through reentry.[8] The KN-23’s ability to withstand these flight conditions also underscores its versatility, along with the apparent success of all 15 known launches from road-mobile, rail-mobile, and submarine platforms.

As noted previously in 38 North, even if KN-23s are deployed in significant numbers and are sufficiently accurate to be militarily effective with a conventional warhead, they will add only incrementally to the longstanding North Korean short-range ballistic missile threat. In particular, they would subject more US and ROK targets to SRBM attacks (particularly point targets), add to the intensity of attacks, increase opportunities to tailor particular attacks to particular missile systems, and further complicate the task of US and ROK missile defenses.
  1. [1]
    “Academy of Defense Science Conducts Important Weapons Tests,” Rodong Sinmun, January 28, 2022.
  2. [2]
    Ibid.
  3. [3]
    Ibid.
  4. [4]
    “Kim Jong Un Makes Commemorative Speech at Defence Development Exhibition,” Rodong Sinmun, October 12, 2021.
  5. [5]
    “Academy of Defense Science Conducts Important Weapons Tests,” Rodong Sinmun.
  6. [6]
    See: Vann H. Van Diepen, “It’s the Launcher, Not the Missile: Initial Evaluation of North Korea’s Rail-Mobile Missile Launches,” 38 North, September 17, 2021, It’s the Launcher, Not the Missile: Initial Evaluation of North Korea’s Rail-Mobile Missile Launches - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea; Vann H. Van Diepen, “Implications of North Korea’s January 14 and 17 Short-Range Ballistic Missile Launches,” 38 North, January 25, 2022, Implications of North Korea’s January 14 and 17 Short-Range Ballistic Missile Launches - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea; and Vann H. Van Diepen, “North Korea’s ‘New Type Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile’: More Political Than Military Significance,” 38 North, October 22, 2021, North Korea’s “New Type Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile”: More Political Than Military Significance - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea.
  7. [7]
    See: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database - The Nuclear Threat Initiative; and Ankit Panda, Twitter post, January 27, 2022, 4:38 p.m., View: https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/1486815792079462403
    .
  8. [8]
    This 20-km-apogee flight has been referred to as a “depressed trajectory” (see Ankit Panda, Twitter post, January 27, 2022, 4:38 p.m., View: https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/1486815792079462403
    ), which is correct. But it is important to note that any trajectory lower than a minimum-energy one is “depressed,” and thus, most KN-23 (and KN-24) flights have been on “depressed trajectories” even though they had much higher apogees than 20 km.

RELATED ARTICLES
North Korea’s Fifth and Sixth Rounds of January Missile Launches
Vann H. Van Diepen
North Korea’s Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site: Caretaker Status Continues
Jack Liu, Peter Makowsky and Olli Heinonen
Implications of North Korea’s January 14 and 17 Short-Range Ballistic Missile Launches
Vann H. Van Diepen
 

OldArcher

Has No Life - Lives on TB
Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

North Korea’s Fifth and Sixth Rounds of January Missile Launches
22-0128-KCNA_MM00289934-300x207.jpg
(Source: KCNA)
Pyongyang launched two land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) on January 25 and two road-mobile KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) on January 27. These two sets of launches were the fifth and sixth North Korea has conducted this month (but not the last, as North Korea conducted an intermediate-range ballistic missile [IRBM] test on January 30; analysis to come). They were described by the North as “updating” the cruise missiles (with a modified propulsion system, it would appear) and “confirming the power” of a conventional warhead on the KN-23.[1] The launches serve to underscore that both missile types will have a role in the North’s missile force, but the cruise missile will help augment a large existing ballistic missile threat that will be incrementally increased by the KN-23.

Land-Attack Cruise Missile Launches
South Korea reported that the North launched two unidentified cruise missiles into the East Sea/Sea of Japan on January 25, to an unspecified range. On January 28, North Korea announced “the test-fire for updating the long-range cruise missile system,” with the two missiles hitting a “target island” 1,800 km away after a flight of over 2.5 hours. According to the announcement, “The practical combat performance of the long-range cruise missile system would hold a reliable share in boosting the war deterrence of the country.”[2]

The accompanying photos showed the launch of a cruise missile from a road-mobile launcher and an explosion on an island.[3] The missile looked very much like the cruise missiles launched by North Korea in September 2021, but with a different paint scheme—more like that of the cruise missile North Korea displayed at the October 2021 “Defence Development Exhibition.”[4] The engine air intake on the missile launched in January also appears different from the September missile; this, along with the January missile demonstrating 300 km more range and 26 minutes more flight time than in September, may mean the “updated” January missile has a modified propulsion system.

Implications. North Korea is continuing to improve the LACM system unveiled last September and apparently intends to add it to bolster its existing ballistic missile “war deterrence.” The increased range/flight time shown in the January tests would mainly be of use in allowing launch units to deploy deeper within North Korea and still hit targets throughout South Korea and Japan, and/or for some more use of evasive flight paths to avoid and complicate air defenses.

Overall, the impact of LACMs is consistent with 38 North’s analysis of the September 2021 launch: assuming they are deployed, they will almost certainly augment rather than supplant the North’s existing, longstanding and extensive ballistic missile force—which is already capable of accomplishing just about any mission a North Korean cruise missile can—and would further diversify and increase the flexibility of the North’s missile force.

Road-Mobile KN-23 Launches
South Korea reported the launch of two probable short-range ballistic missiles by North Korea on January 27, to a range of about 190 km with a 20-km maximum altitude (apogee). The same January 28 North Korean announcement covering the cruise missile also reported “the test-fire for confirming the power of conventional warhead for the surface-to-surface tactical guided missile,” claiming the “missiles precisely hit the target island, proving that the explosive power of the conventional warhead complied with the design requirements.”[5]

The accompanying photos showed a KN-23 solid-propellant SRBM being launched from a road-mobile launcher, an apparent missile reentering just above an island, and an airburst explosion. These were the first known launches of the KN-23 from a road-mobile launcher since 2019; subsequent launches had been from rail-mobile launchers and a test submarine.[6] The latest launches also had the lowest reported KN-23 apogee (previous flights have been to 37-60 km) and the shortest reported range (albeit only 10 km less than the first KN-23 test in May 2019).[7]

Implications. The resumption of launches from road-mobile launchers further suggests that the road-mobile version of the KN-23 is deployed/operational, not just the rail-mobile version that the North claimed in September 2021 had that status. It is unclear whether the reported use of the launches “for confirming the power of conventional warhead” means that the warhead used is a new type or an existing deployed warhead. But this is the first time the North has explicitly attributed a conventional warhead to the KN-23, which is also capable of carrying a nuclear payload.

Use of the lower 20-km apogee would delay radar detection (but not detection by infrared satellites) and reduce the reaction time of missile defense systems, but at the cost of range compared to higher apogees – as well as putting more thermal and aerodynamic stress on the KN-23 missile airframe, which remains attached to the warhead through reentry.[8] The KN-23’s ability to withstand these flight conditions also underscores its versatility, along with the apparent success of all 15 known launches from road-mobile, rail-mobile, and submarine platforms.

As noted previously in 38 North, even if KN-23s are deployed in significant numbers and are sufficiently accurate to be militarily effective with a conventional warhead, they will add only incrementally to the longstanding North Korean short-range ballistic missile threat. In particular, they would subject more US and ROK targets to SRBM attacks (particularly point targets), add to the intensity of attacks, increase opportunities to tailor particular attacks to particular missile systems, and further complicate the task of US and ROK missile defenses.
  1. [1]
    “Academy of Defense Science Conducts Important Weapons Tests,” Rodong Sinmun, January 28, 2022.
  2. [2]
    Ibid.
  3. [3]
    Ibid.
  4. [4]
    “Kim Jong Un Makes Commemorative Speech at Defence Development Exhibition,” Rodong Sinmun, October 12, 2021.
  5. [5]
    “Academy of Defense Science Conducts Important Weapons Tests,” Rodong Sinmun.
  6. [6]
    See: Vann H. Van Diepen, “It’s the Launcher, Not the Missile: Initial Evaluation of North Korea’s Rail-Mobile Missile Launches,” 38 North, September 17, 2021, It’s the Launcher, Not the Missile: Initial Evaluation of North Korea’s Rail-Mobile Missile Launches - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea; Vann H. Van Diepen, “Implications of North Korea’s January 14 and 17 Short-Range Ballistic Missile Launches,” 38 North, January 25, 2022, Implications of North Korea’s January 14 and 17 Short-Range Ballistic Missile Launches - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea; and Vann H. Van Diepen, “North Korea’s ‘New Type Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile’: More Political Than Military Significance,” 38 North, October 22, 2021, North Korea’s “New Type Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile”: More Political Than Military Significance - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea.
  7. [7]
    See: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database - The Nuclear Threat Initiative; and Ankit Panda, Twitter post, January 27, 2022, 4:38 p.m., View: https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/1486815792079462403
    .
  8. [8]
    This 20-km-apogee flight has been referred to as a “depressed trajectory” (see Ankit Panda, Twitter post, January 27, 2022, 4:38 p.m., View: https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/1486815792079462403
    ), which is correct. But it is important to note that any trajectory lower than a minimum-energy one is “depressed,” and thus, most KN-23 (and KN-24) flights have been on “depressed trajectories” even though they had much higher apogees than 20 km.

RELATED ARTICLES
North Korea’s Fifth and Sixth Rounds of January Missile Launches
Vann H. Van Diepen
North Korea’s Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site: Caretaker Status Continues
Jack Liu, Peter Makowsky and Olli Heinonen
Implications of North Korea’s January 14 and 17 Short-Range Ballistic Missile Launches
Vann H. Van Diepen

Intimidation for the average citizen. For the rest of us, a call to finish preps, check gear, and refresh training, with final range time to check weapons, optics, and abilities. Lock and Load…

OA
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Intimidation for the average citizen. For the rest of us, a call to finish preps, check gear, and refresh training, with final range time to check weapons, optics, and abilities. Lock and Load…

OA

If this keeps up at the pace and magnitude it has, don't be surprised if one of the next "tests" doesn't involve more than just a blivet as payload down range into the central Pacific, if not directly overhead of North Korea.
 

OldArcher

Has No Life - Lives on TB
If this keeps up at the pace and magnitude it has, don't be surprised if one of the next "tests" doesn't involve more than just a blivet as payload down range into the central Pacific, if not directly overhead of North Korea.

If so, HC, folks better remember that bright light to their West, ain’t a sunrise…

OA
 

jward

passin' thru
North Korea Is Preparing to Confront the US in 2022

Kim Jong Un will likely conduct more advanced weapons tests this year in his own version of “maximum pressure.”



By Sang-soo Lee

January 29, 2022
North Korea Is Preparing to Confront the US in 2022

This photo provided by the North Korean government, shows what it says a test launch of a hypersonic missile in North Korea on Jan. 5, 2022.

Credit: Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP, File
Since Pyongyang rejected the Biden administration’s proposal of diplomatic talks as insufficient to entice Kim Jong Un back to the negotiating table, North Korea seems to have recalibrated its strategy in dealing with the United States. While the North’s end of year report conspicuously condensed the outcome of its review on foreign policy and replaced Kim’s New Year’s Day address, it is expected that North Korea will conduct more advanced weapons tests and hold military parades to draw full attention from the U.S. and the international community in the upcoming months. This can be seen as North Korea’s own style of a “maximum pressure” strategy, meant to change the United States’ fundamental policy toward the country – what Pyongyang calls the “hostile policy” – before restoring the talks.

North Korea’s 2022 Security and Foreign Policy

Despite the 10th anniversary of Kim Jong Un’s ascension to power last year, he did not deliver a New Year’s Day address in 2022. While North Korean state media reported the results of the five-day plenary meeting of the Workers’ Party Eighth Central Committee on December 27-31, it is puzzling that Pyongyang did not share details on its foreign policy and strategy for 2022. It just said that the meeting reviewed “principled issues” and relevant strategic directions to cope with the rapidly changing international political situation.

Many experts said the absence of an announcement on North Korea’s foreign policy direction could be seen as providing “strategic flexibility” or room to maneuver in the uncertain external environment. Considering the upcoming events, the Beijing Winter Games in February and the South Korean presidential election in March, there are many uncertainties in the region. The possibility of military conflicts in Ukraine and Taiwan cannot be ruled out this year either. However, those upcoming events will have only a limited impact on determining North Korea’s approach to external affairs. China is likely to turn a blind eye to North Korea’s further missile tests if it stays silent during the Olympics. In addition, whoever the next South Korean president is, the foundation of Seoul’s approach to Pyongyang will not change without Washington’s approval.


As a result, Pyongyang might have already evaluated the impacts of future external affairs and set its direction on the foreign policy by taking a “frontal breakthrough” and “strong to strong” strategy to deal with the U.S. and South Korea. Thus, while it is strategically hidden from public reports, North Korea has already prepared its military action plans, such as a series of future missile and possibly even nuclear tests in response to U.S. sanctions, the upcoming South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises, and the potential victory of South Korean main opposition presidential candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the election.

https://thediplomat.com/subscriptions/

North Korea has already tested its missile capabilities six times this month, signaling Pyongyang’s clear intention to follow through with Kim’s 2021 pledge of strengthening the national military capability. Pyongyang will continue carrying out more missile tests in the coming months to demonstrate advancements in its missile technologies. Kim believes that maximum pressure by demonstrating powerful nuclear and missile weapons might be the only way to push the U.S. to make concessions.

A Full Speed “Frontal Breakthrough”

Amid the deadlocked nuclear talks and the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic, this year is especially important for Kim. He will need to show his strong leadership on the 110th birth anniversary of Kim Il Sung, the country’s founder, and the 80th birth anniversary of Kim Jong Il, Kim’s father, which are coming up in April and February, respectively. At the plenary session in December, Kim mainly focused on delivering his messages on the development of North Korea’s rural and agricultural sector in a bid to revive his country’s crippled economy, which has been worsened by a brutal combination of U.N.-led economic sanctions, extreme anti-pandemic measures, and natural disasters since early 2020. Kim’s hands, however, are tied as to the economy as there is no long-term plan he can follow to tackle the country’s devastating food shortages without undercutting his self-reliance approach, as aggressive anti-pandemic measures have completely cut North Korea off from the world since early 2020. It is believed that the only long-term solution for the regime to improve its economic situation is reopening the border with China or resuming nuclear negotiations with the U.S. to lift existing sanctions.

Given this situation, after two years of a self-imposed border lockdown, two cargo trains from North Korea crossed the border from Sinuiju to Dandong on January 16-17 to receive aid and basic necessities from China. Pyongyang might have decided to restart trade with China to recover its economic situation since disinfection facilities have already been installed on the border area. Furthermore, the resumption of aid from China could make it possible for Pyongyang to push forward its maximal nuclear strategy this year, as it will cushion North Korea against the impact of further sanctions. As the hegemonic race between the two superpowers – the United States and China – is most likely to intensify in the future, North Korea will seek more close cooperation with China to revive its economy by resuming trade, while carrying out “tit-for-tat” responses to U.S. sanctions.

Even if Kim needs negotiations to find a long-term solution for North Korea’s economic difficulties, he will continue focusing on building his strong nuclear power at least until the global pandemic crisis is over. The current situation will prevent North Korean officials from meeting foreign delegations either in the country or abroad. Given the circumstances, therefore, this year is a perfect time for the regime to exert maximum pressure on the U.S. to achieve what it wants prior to restoring talks, as the U.S. is now struggling with Russia in Eastern Europe and with China in East Asia.

Showcase of New Advanced Weapons

Starting off with its first hypersonic missile test of the year on January 5, North Korea has conducted six rounds of missile tests, including hypersonic missiles, cruise missiles, and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMS), this month alone. Among others, the North’s second hypersonic missile test on January 11 proved that it had successfully developed an advanced version of the hypersonic missile it first tested in September of last year. After that, North Korea fired its KN series of SRBMs on January 14 and 18 in the wake of U.S. sanctions over the missile tests. Pyongyang has angrily criticized the U.S. and South Korea for having a “double standard” toward the military activities conducted by the two Koreas. North Korea deems the South Korea-U.S. joint military drills as proof of “hostile intent” that critically threatens the North’s security while reiterating that its missile tests are for its “self-defense,” not for targeting other countries. Pyongyang justifies its missile tests as part of its policy of responding to strength with strength.

As 2022 continues, North Korea will likely show off even more advanced missile weapons in order to fulfil the pledges made during the Eighth Party Congress last year. In this context, North Korea will test new destructive weapons, and they will not be the typical SRBMs the North launched this month. Looking back on the missiles North Korea test-fired before the nuclear talks began in 2018 and the missiles it displayed in a military parade last year, North Korea’s advanced series of “Pukkuksong” missiles are expected to be showcased this year. North Korea will likely test what it has been developing in recent years, including the improved version of its Pukkuksong-2 solid-fuel ballistic missile and the newest Pukkuksong-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

Furthermore, North Korea’s state media recently reported that the country will reconsider Kim’s self-moratorium on testing nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). With this in mind, Pyongyang will also consider proving its strengthened long-range missile capabilities by showing off its miniaturized and multiple nuclear warheads, if necessary. If all these new missile technologies bear fruit, the U.S. missile defense system will be vulnerable to North Korea’s new intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Prospects for Future Negotiations

https://thediplomat.com/subscriptions/

Back in 2019, Kim said he no longer felt bound by his self-moratorium on nuclear and ICBM tests while reiterating that he will never come back to the negotiating table unless the U.S. makes concessions. For North Korea, this means lifting the U.S.-led economic sanctions, withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea, and suspending the joint South Korea-U.S military drills.

In this regard, what the U.S. and South Korea should bear in mind is that it is not the right time to activate their backchannels to restore talks with North Korea and seek a détente. Pyongyang is not ready to return negotiations. Nevertheless, U.S. President Joe Biden must reassess his administration’s strategic patience policy, as just waiting for Pyongyang to return to diplomatic talks runs the risk of North Korea eventually reaching an untouchable level of nuclear capacity. Furthermore, South Korea will also beef up its military capability to deal with nuclear threats from North Korea, in particular as the conservative presidential candidate, Yoon, has claimed the right to conduct a pre-emptive strike on the North. Accordingly, the situation as it stands could push the existing arms race on the Korean Peninsula into a dangerous end game.

The Biden administration has presented an updated nuclear policy that will reduce the importance of nuclear weapons within Washington’s national security strategy. In November 2021, Biden and Xi Jinping agreed during their virtual summit to launch a series of high-level arms control talks. This shows that the Biden presidency is becoming more and more conscious of the value of arms control agreements in restraining global nuclear arms competition. Biden and Kim might be also interested in the establishment of an arms control framework on the Korean Peninsula – an attractive entry point for future negotiations, which can be the basic foundation of the long-term denuclearization process on the Korean Peninsula. In the long term, Washington might benefit a lot from such a framework. Multilateral nuclear arms control measures could prove a useful tool to reduce the arms race between regional actors – namely North Korea, China, South Korea, and Japan – and control the proliferation of nuclear weapons through the reduction of capabilities and assets in the region.

Authors
Guest Author
Sang-soo Lee

Sang-soo Lee is the deputy director of the Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP) and the head of ISDP’s Korea Center.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
North Korea Is Preparing to Confront the US in 2022

Kim Jong Un will likely conduct more advanced weapons tests this year in his own version of “maximum pressure.”



By Sang-soo Lee

January 29, 2022
North Korea Is Preparing to Confront the US in 2022

This photo provided by the North Korean government, shows what it says a test launch of a hypersonic missile in North Korea on Jan. 5, 2022.

Credit: Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP, File
Since Pyongyang rejected the Biden administration’s proposal of diplomatic talks as insufficient to entice Kim Jong Un back to the negotiating table, North Korea seems to have recalibrated its strategy in dealing with the United States. While the North’s end of year report conspicuously condensed the outcome of its review on foreign policy and replaced Kim’s New Year’s Day address, it is expected that North Korea will conduct more advanced weapons tests and hold military parades to draw full attention from the U.S. and the international community in the upcoming months. This can be seen as North Korea’s own style of a “maximum pressure” strategy, meant to change the United States’ fundamental policy toward the country – what Pyongyang calls the “hostile policy” – before restoring the talks.

North Korea’s 2022 Security and Foreign Policy

Despite the 10th anniversary of Kim Jong Un’s ascension to power last year, he did not deliver a New Year’s Day address in 2022. While North Korean state media reported the results of the five-day plenary meeting of the Workers’ Party Eighth Central Committee on December 27-31, it is puzzling that Pyongyang did not share details on its foreign policy and strategy for 2022. It just said that the meeting reviewed “principled issues” and relevant strategic directions to cope with the rapidly changing international political situation.

Many experts said the absence of an announcement on North Korea’s foreign policy direction could be seen as providing “strategic flexibility” or room to maneuver in the uncertain external environment. Considering the upcoming events, the Beijing Winter Games in February and the South Korean presidential election in March, there are many uncertainties in the region. The possibility of military conflicts in Ukraine and Taiwan cannot be ruled out this year either. However, those upcoming events will have only a limited impact on determining North Korea’s approach to external affairs. China is likely to turn a blind eye to North Korea’s further missile tests if it stays silent during the Olympics. In addition, whoever the next South Korean president is, the foundation of Seoul’s approach to Pyongyang will not change without Washington’s approval.


As a result, Pyongyang might have already evaluated the impacts of future external affairs and set its direction on the foreign policy by taking a “frontal breakthrough” and “strong to strong” strategy to deal with the U.S. and South Korea. Thus, while it is strategically hidden from public reports, North Korea has already prepared its military action plans, such as a series of future missile and possibly even nuclear tests in response to U.S. sanctions, the upcoming South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises, and the potential victory of South Korean main opposition presidential candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the election.

https://thediplomat.com/subscriptions/

North Korea has already tested its missile capabilities six times this month, signaling Pyongyang’s clear intention to follow through with Kim’s 2021 pledge of strengthening the national military capability. Pyongyang will continue carrying out more missile tests in the coming months to demonstrate advancements in its missile technologies. Kim believes that maximum pressure by demonstrating powerful nuclear and missile weapons might be the only way to push the U.S. to make concessions.

A Full Speed “Frontal Breakthrough”

Amid the deadlocked nuclear talks and the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic, this year is especially important for Kim. He will need to show his strong leadership on the 110th birth anniversary of Kim Il Sung, the country’s founder, and the 80th birth anniversary of Kim Jong Il, Kim’s father, which are coming up in April and February, respectively. At the plenary session in December, Kim mainly focused on delivering his messages on the development of North Korea’s rural and agricultural sector in a bid to revive his country’s crippled economy, which has been worsened by a brutal combination of U.N.-led economic sanctions, extreme anti-pandemic measures, and natural disasters since early 2020. Kim’s hands, however, are tied as to the economy as there is no long-term plan he can follow to tackle the country’s devastating food shortages without undercutting his self-reliance approach, as aggressive anti-pandemic measures have completely cut North Korea off from the world since early 2020. It is believed that the only long-term solution for the regime to improve its economic situation is reopening the border with China or resuming nuclear negotiations with the U.S. to lift existing sanctions.

Given this situation, after two years of a self-imposed border lockdown, two cargo trains from North Korea crossed the border from Sinuiju to Dandong on January 16-17 to receive aid and basic necessities from China. Pyongyang might have decided to restart trade with China to recover its economic situation since disinfection facilities have already been installed on the border area. Furthermore, the resumption of aid from China could make it possible for Pyongyang to push forward its maximal nuclear strategy this year, as it will cushion North Korea against the impact of further sanctions. As the hegemonic race between the two superpowers – the United States and China – is most likely to intensify in the future, North Korea will seek more close cooperation with China to revive its economy by resuming trade, while carrying out “tit-for-tat” responses to U.S. sanctions.

Even if Kim needs negotiations to find a long-term solution for North Korea’s economic difficulties, he will continue focusing on building his strong nuclear power at least until the global pandemic crisis is over. The current situation will prevent North Korean officials from meeting foreign delegations either in the country or abroad. Given the circumstances, therefore, this year is a perfect time for the regime to exert maximum pressure on the U.S. to achieve what it wants prior to restoring talks, as the U.S. is now struggling with Russia in Eastern Europe and with China in East Asia.

Showcase of New Advanced Weapons

Starting off with its first hypersonic missile test of the year on January 5, North Korea has conducted six rounds of missile tests, including hypersonic missiles, cruise missiles, and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMS), this month alone. Among others, the North’s second hypersonic missile test on January 11 proved that it had successfully developed an advanced version of the hypersonic missile it first tested in September of last year. After that, North Korea fired its KN series of SRBMs on January 14 and 18 in the wake of U.S. sanctions over the missile tests. Pyongyang has angrily criticized the U.S. and South Korea for having a “double standard” toward the military activities conducted by the two Koreas. North Korea deems the South Korea-U.S. joint military drills as proof of “hostile intent” that critically threatens the North’s security while reiterating that its missile tests are for its “self-defense,” not for targeting other countries. Pyongyang justifies its missile tests as part of its policy of responding to strength with strength.

As 2022 continues, North Korea will likely show off even more advanced missile weapons in order to fulfil the pledges made during the Eighth Party Congress last year. In this context, North Korea will test new destructive weapons, and they will not be the typical SRBMs the North launched this month. Looking back on the missiles North Korea test-fired before the nuclear talks began in 2018 and the missiles it displayed in a military parade last year, North Korea’s advanced series of “Pukkuksong” missiles are expected to be showcased this year. North Korea will likely test what it has been developing in recent years, including the improved version of its Pukkuksong-2 solid-fuel ballistic missile and the newest Pukkuksong-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

Furthermore, North Korea’s state media recently reported that the country will reconsider Kim’s self-moratorium on testing nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). With this in mind, Pyongyang will also consider proving its strengthened long-range missile capabilities by showing off its miniaturized and multiple nuclear warheads, if necessary. If all these new missile technologies bear fruit, the U.S. missile defense system will be vulnerable to North Korea’s new intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Prospects for Future Negotiations

https://thediplomat.com/subscriptions/

Back in 2019, Kim said he no longer felt bound by his self-moratorium on nuclear and ICBM tests while reiterating that he will never come back to the negotiating table unless the U.S. makes concessions. For North Korea, this means lifting the U.S.-led economic sanctions, withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea, and suspending the joint South Korea-U.S military drills.

In this regard, what the U.S. and South Korea should bear in mind is that it is not the right time to activate their backchannels to restore talks with North Korea and seek a détente. Pyongyang is not ready to return negotiations. Nevertheless, U.S. President Joe Biden must reassess his administration’s strategic patience policy, as just waiting for Pyongyang to return to diplomatic talks runs the risk of North Korea eventually reaching an untouchable level of nuclear capacity. Furthermore, South Korea will also beef up its military capability to deal with nuclear threats from North Korea, in particular as the conservative presidential candidate, Yoon, has claimed the right to conduct a pre-emptive strike on the North. Accordingly, the situation as it stands could push the existing arms race on the Korean Peninsula into a dangerous end game.

The Biden administration has presented an updated nuclear policy that will reduce the importance of nuclear weapons within Washington’s national security strategy. In November 2021, Biden and Xi Jinping agreed during their virtual summit to launch a series of high-level arms control talks. This shows that the Biden presidency is becoming more and more conscious of the value of arms control agreements in restraining global nuclear arms competition. Biden and Kim might be also interested in the establishment of an arms control framework on the Korean Peninsula – an attractive entry point for future negotiations, which can be the basic foundation of the long-term denuclearization process on the Korean Peninsula. In the long term, Washington might benefit a lot from such a framework. Multilateral nuclear arms control measures could prove a useful tool to reduce the arms race between regional actors – namely North Korea, China, South Korea, and Japan – and control the proliferation of nuclear weapons through the reduction of capabilities and assets in the region.

Authors
Guest Author
Sang-soo Lee

Sang-soo Lee is the deputy director of the Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP) and the head of ISDP’s Korea Center.

Expect something at Super Bowl half time like in 2016 when the "satellite" Pyongyang put up was directly over the stadium....
 

jward

passin' thru
The Revival of Military Rule in South and Southeast Asia
by Amelia Cheatham, Claire Felter and Zachary Laub​

5-6 minutes​


In the 2000s and early 2010s, South and Southeast Asia made significant democratic progress. Countries including Bangladesh, Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Timor-Leste became solid democracies or made transitions in that direction. But in the past decade, South and Southeast Asia have suffered some of the sharpest democratic regressions of any regions.

No one factor has caused South and Southeast Asia's democratic regression, part of a broader global trend of fifteen years of democratic rollback, as the recent coup in Burkina Faso attests. The rise of illiberal populism in South and Southeast Asia has resulted in the election of leaders such as Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte and the subsequent corrosion of democratic institutions and norms. The novel coronavirus pandemic has been a boon to illiberal leaders in the region—and around the world. The exponential growth of social media also has contributed to spreading disinformation and exacerbating polarization.

More on:

Democracy
Myanmar
South Asia
Southeast Asia
Thailand

Yet throughout South and Southeast Asia, the revival (or in some places the continuance) of military meddling in civilian governance has become a factor in democracy's retreat. Just ten years ago, no militaries were fully in control of governments in South or Southeast Asia, and it appeared that civilians would gain greater command of armies even in places where the military still wielded significant domestic influence. Today, two armies, in Myanmar and Thailand, are in direct or de facto control of countries. In states such as Cambodia, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines, armed forces play growing—even dominant—roles in politics again. This regional trend was capped in February 2021, when the Myanmar armed forces seized power. Yet that coup was only the most visible sign of a revival of military political power in the region.


Eyes on Asia
Insights and analysis from CFR fellows on the latest developments across Asia. Monthly.

By entering your email and clicking subscribe, you're agreeing to receive announcements from CFR about our products and services, as well as invitations to CFR events. You are also agreeing to our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use.
This military revival, like the broader global democratic regression, is part of an international trend. Around the world, more coups were attempted in 2021 than in the prior five years combined. Yet the resurgence of military political power is particularly notable in Southeast Asia, because many Southeast Asian states had previously advanced toward becoming consolidated democracies.

The effects of renewed military meddling on democracies, societies, and economies often are devastating. They tend to make it hard for countries to return to democracy, spark significant bloodshed, and create governments that are terrible at ruling or lead to failed states like Myanmar today. They also potentially spark coups in neighboring states and hurt democratization within an entire region. Indeed, military takeovers often lead to sizable and immediate rises in state violence. They also tend to result in an entrenchment of harsher authoritarian rule than what emerges under illiberal populists. Moreover, while some illiberal populist governments have promulgated significant public policy reforms—Thailand's early 2000s populist government oversaw groundbreaking new social welfare programs, for instance—nearly all military regimes have proven incompetent at governing and often prioritize self-enrichment. Overall, the return of military involvement in governing in the region will set back democracy by years, foster violence, and likely impede development. Worse, coups and other military involvement have been met by a weak and ineffective response from major global and regional powers.

This paper was made possible by the generous support of the Henry Luce Foundation.
Professors: To request an exam copy, contact publications@cfr.org. Please include your university and course name.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

HOW A RUSSIAN-LED ALLIANCE KEEPS A LID ON CENTRAL ASIA
POLINA BELIAKOVA
FEBRUARY 4, 2022
COMMENTARY

On Jan. 6, 2022, a military alliance that most Americans had never heard of materialized out of the sky as Russian airborne troops landed in Kazakhstan. They arrived in response to Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s call for the Collective Security Treaty Organization to aid his government in retaining control over a country that had slipped — briefly, as it turns out — into turmoil. Threatened with state-wide violent protests, Tokayev invited the members of this alliance — Russia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia — to “assist Kazakhstan in overcoming this terrorist threat.” This event marks the first deployment of the organization’s military forces to resolve an intrastate crisis in one of its member states.

Established in 2002 as a security component of Russia’s regional integration effort, this alliance (known by its initials, CSTO) had a limited effect on politics, shunning away from regional political crises. Thus, for a long time, the question “what is the CSTO good for?” had a rather straightforward answer: not much. In the past, experts and politicians dismissed it as a meaningless organization suffering from commitment issues, internal divisions, and the lack of joint political interests. The CSTO deployment in Kazakhstan broke a long-lasting tradition of passivity in the face of intrastate crises in its member states. This development requires the re-evaluation of previous conclusions about the organization’s impotence. It also warrants a closer examination of its utility in advancing Russia’s security interests in the region. The case of Kazakhstan indicates that the alliance could become a useful tool for fortifying CSTO governments against coups and protests, deepening Sino-Russian cooperation, and increasing Moscow’s role as a security provider in Central Asia.

What Is the CSTO?

In 2002, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan formed the CSTO based on a treaty signed back in 1992. This move from a treaty to an organization launched the development of the alliance’s military capabilities. Joint CSTO forces include the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (approximately 18,000 troops), the Peacekeeping Forces (about 3600 troops), and the Collective Air Force (numbers unspecified). Article 4 of the Collective Security Treaty stipulates collective defense provisions similar to the NATO Charter’s Article 5: an act of aggression against one of the member states will be considered as aggression against all. Upon the request of the attacked, other allies will send necessary help, including military force. The treaty defines aggression as “an armed attack threatening security, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty.”

The CSTO is a Moscow-led organization advancing the Kremlin’s security interests in Russia’s near abroad. This should come as no surprise since Russia is the only CSTO member that has security interests in all three regions where the alliance can operate — Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus. This balance of interests is also reflected in financial burden-sharing within the organization — Russia covers half of the budget while other member states contribute 10 percent each. The deployment of this alliance in Kazakhstan also reflected Russia’s dominance and disproportionate commitment. According to conservative estimates, CSTO sent about 2500 troops to Kazakhstan. About 100 came from Armenia, 200 from Belarus, 150 from Kyrgyzstan, and 200 from Tajikistan. While the exact number of Russian troops is not publicly available, the above estimates suggest that Moscow sent about 1850 troops, constituting almost 75 percent of the deployed force. Overall, the CSTO is an overwhelmingly Russian project from the political, financial, and military points of view.

If the contribution of its allies to collective security is so minimal, why does Russia even need the CSTO? Some observers assume that the alliance is a Russian attempt to balance NATO. However, the alliance organization’s leadership denied this interpretation long ago, explicitly stating that allied forces are not a counterbalance to NATO since they address crises in (but not between) CSTO countries without pursuing a global role. In addition, the CSTO does not have the military capabilities or financial resources to counterbalance NATO even if it wanted to. However, the alliance has proved useful for more modest goals and tasks. From a practical standpoint, the CSTO has been instrumental in tackling current regional security threats, including smuggling, human trafficking, illegal migration, and cyber crimes. In political terms, the CSTO allows Russia to increase its influence in its near abroad at least in two ways. First, Article 1 of the treaty precludes member states from joining alliances participating in activities hostile to one of the member states. In practice this means that as long as the Kremlin considers NATO a hostile organization, CSTO countries would be prohibited from cooperating with this alliance. At the same time, engagement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in which Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are founding members (along with China), would be desired and supported by the CSTO. Second, article 7 of the treaty allows Russia to expand its military infrastructure into the territories of other member states. These provisions open additional avenues for Russian influence in other member states foreign policy.

Previous Limitations in Solving Regional Conflicts

Surprisingly, despite the available forces and developed legal basis, for almost twenty years the CSTO abstained from military interventions in support of its member states. On multiple occasions, CSTO leadership insisted that the definition of an “act of aggression” under the treaty should involve an external armed attack. Since no purely external threats presented themselves in the region, it rendered the organization obsolete in most political crises that its members experienced — until today.

For instance, during the 2010 ethnic clashes in south Kyrgyzstan between Kyrgyz and Uzbek rioters, the head of the interim government, Roza Itunbayeva, asked for CSTO assistance. Despite her request, the organization decided not to intervene militarily. The CSTO secretary general claimed that the alliance could not use force to resolve an intrastate political crisis. The 2010 Kyrgyz precedent exposed the alliance’s commitment issues and cast doubt on the organization’s utility as a regional security actor. Since then, and until January 2022, no member state has requested CSTO military intervention, as most of the threats that they have faced have originated from within their state borders.

In fact, the alliance did not stand up for its members even when an external threat was present. During the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Armenia acted as a party in the conflict, introduced martial law and announced a general mobilization of troops. Nevertheless, Russian President Vladimir Putin made clear that the CSTO would not support Armenia in this war. Instead, the Kremlin preferred to serve as a broker between Armenia and Turkey-backed Azerbaijan. The sides reached an agreement in which Azerbaijan gained control over two-thirds of Nagorno-Karabakh, and Russia deployed its peacekeeping forces in the remaining third. This arrangement resulted in political crisis in Armenia, further strengthened Russia’s influence in the region, and exposed the limited utility of the CSTO once again. It happened because Russia’s commitment to the alliance contradicted its broader political interests in the region.

Continued.....
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Continued.....

Political tensions and ethnic divisions within the CSTO also make the use of the alliance problematic in regional conflicts. In particular, an unresolved border dispute between two CSTO allies, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, remains a persistent source of tension in the region. In April 2021, it escalated to border troops of both states shooting at each other and at local civilians. Kyrgyzstan reported 36 dead and 189 wounded. The CSTO abstained from interfering, as its forces cannot be used to manage conflicts between its member states. To complicate the situation further, three out of the six CSTO states — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan — also participate in Turkish-led regional integration efforts in Central Asia through the Economic Cooperation Organization and the Organization of Turkic States. The use of force by these three states in support of their CSTO ally Armenia against Turkey-backed Azerbaijan in the case of a future war would be problematic at best. In addition, Belarus has no political interests in Central Asia, while Central Asian states have little interest in the security of Belarus. These internal divisions made galvanizing the political will to use CSTO forces a challenging task for Russia.

What Can We Learn from What Happened in Kazakhstan?

With the CSTO of the past being paralyzed by commitment issues, internal tensions, and Russia’s political preferences, what does its forces’ deployment in Kazakhstan communicate about the alliance’s potential in the face of future threats?

To understand the reasons behind the CSTO intervention in Kazakhstan, it is important to look at how Russia, its core funding member, is striving to reconfigure its position in international security. The recent buildup of Russian forces on the borders of Ukraine and the subsequent unrealistic demands for security guarantees from the United States signal that Moscow is ready to take its international game to the next level. Driven by the persistent pursuit of primacy in its near abroad and the need for peer recognition as a great power entitled to a sphere of influence, Russia uses political divisions in Europe and the U.S. Afghanistan withdrawal to assert its role as a security provider in regions where it has interests. In light of these shifts, the Kremlin’s demand to have a say in European security, Russia’s further integration with Belarus, and the CSTO’s military intervention in Central Asia are all components of the same process — the expansion of Russia’s international security profile.

From this perspective, the deployment of 2,500 CSTO troops in a country as big as Kazakhstan has to be considered as a symbolic move. Practically speaking, the CSTO’s first military intervention was rather limited in its scope. Russian airborne troops assisted their Kazakh counterparts in retaking the Almaty International Airport (facing no resistance) and helped to guard government buildings. A week later, CSTO troops started to withdraw from Kazakhstan in contradiction of U.S. Secretary of State Tony Blinken’s grim observation that “once Russians are in your house, it’s sometimes very difficult to get them to leave.” Despite the brief and limited deployment, the long-term impact of this intervention can be found in what it communicates to local, regional, and international players.

On the regional level, the CSTO military intervention in Kazakhstan suggests that Russia is changing its security posture in Central Asia. For a long time, the alliance’s primary mission was to tackle the threats of “international terrorism and extremism, drug trafficking, illegal migration, and human trafficking,” many of which involve Afghanistan and destabilize Russia’s allies in Central Asia. Nevertheless, up until now the CSTO did not intervene militarily to advance these security priorities. With the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and growing instability in Central Asia, the alliance’s deployment in Kazakhstan should communicate to local powers that Russia is willing to fill the vacuum and use military force in the region if necessary.

Some might expect that the increased CSTO profile might result in Sino-Russian competition in Central Asia. However, as of today the evidence suggests that the situation is more nuanced. China has an extensive economic presence in the region, with its investments in the Kazakh economy being almost $20 billion, plus $24.5 billion in infrastructure. With China taking a pragmatic approach to local politics, Beijing and Moscow have shared security interests in Central Asia, as both powers benefit from stability. Reacting to events in Kazakhstan, Chinese leader Xi Jinping commended Tokayev for taking decisive measures to restore order in the country. The Chinese Foreign Ministry praised the CSTO intervention in Kazakhstan as a stabilizing measure. Overall, the deployment showed that Russia could be an effective guardian of Chinese investment in Central Asia. While strengthening Russia’s influence in the region’s security, this development also reinforces long-pursued cooperation between Moscow and Beijing, as well as between the CSTO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

On a state level, CSTO forces’ deployment in Kazakhstan shows that the organization’s intervention can deter coups, prevent security forces’ defections, and limit the success of popular protests in Russia’s sphere of influence. The fact that Russia sent some of its best-trained and most experienced military personnel to deal with the crisis in Kazakhstan could alter the cost-benefit calculations of the conspirators. The role of the security services in facilitating violent protests in Kazakhstan is still unclear. However, on Jan. 7, 2022, a former adviser of Kazakhstan’s long-term ruler Nursultan Nazarbayev called the situation a “coup attempt and armed mutiny” and claimed that the conspiracy and betrayal of top security service officials was the reason for the political crisis. In particular, he said that 40 minutes before the protestors attacked the Almaty International Airport on Jan. 5, the security forces received an order to completely remove the security cordon. The subsequent removal of key security officials in Kazakhstan and numerous suicides by members of the security forces increase the plausibility of these accusations. In the future, the prospect of fighting Russian troops with combat experience in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria could serve as a coup-proofing mechanism in other CSTO countries by undermining the local security forces’ ability and willingness to overthrow their regimes.

Moreover, existing research indicates that security force defections constitute a major component of the success of popular protests in bringing political change. Examples include the end of Slobodan Milosevic’s rule in Serbia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and the toppling of Askar Akayev (2005) and Kurmanbek Bakiyev (2010) in Kyrgyzstan. The chances that CSTO joint troops, including Russian personnel, will deploy in support of the regime introduce additional costs to a decision by the military and security forces to side with the protesters. Thus, Russia’s demonstrated resolve and capability to send its airborne troops to Kazakhstan on short notice could decrease the chances that popular protests against CSTO governments will succeed if they threaten the Kremlin’s political interests. Relying on the CSTO intervention mechanism for regime reinforcement, as Tokayev did in Kazakhstan, would decrease governments’ vulnerability to pressure from their populations at the cost of increasing dependence on Russia.

From an international perspective, since the CSTO can deploy its troops only against external threats, we could expect the false externalization of domestic tensions in the member states. For instance, to justify the request for the CSTO military assistance, Tokayev had to frame the threat to his government as external. Despite the lack of evidence of any international involvement in this domestic crisis, Tokayev claimed that Kazakhstan experienced “an armed act of aggression well prepared and coordinated by perpetrators and terrorist groups trained outside the country.” This sets a dangerous precedent in which CSTO states would have to launch a geopolitical witch-hunt blaming the West, international terrorist networks, or other external actors to receive CSTO military assistance in domestic disputes. With Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Armenia currently maintaining close relations both with Russia and the West, artificially externalizing local conflicts to receive CSTO assistance could distance these states from their western partners. Blinken’s reaction to Kazakhstan inviting CSTO intervention provides the first example of this dynamic.

The case of Kazakhstan suggests that it is time to re-evaluate the previous limitations associated with the CSTO’s role as a regional security actor. First, deploying Russian airborne troops in Kazakhstan as part of the CSTO peacekeeping force demonstrated the new level of Moscow’s commitment to the alliance. This gesture becomes even more salient given that the Kremlin is currently engaged in political-military tensions with the West over Ukraine and European security architecture. In addition, despite the lack of evidence that the Kazakh crisis was indeed externally coordinated, the CSTO deployment in Kazakhstan shows a new flexibility in the alliance’s readiness to intervene militarily. The deployment on such short notice by all member states (even in symbolic numbers) points to the Kremlin’s ability to overcome the internal divisions within the CSTO if necessary. These developments increase Russia’s influence among the CSTO states and up its game in Central Asia, especially after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. In addition, the potential of CSTO interventions to deter coups and defections could increase the dependence of member states with volatile control over their security forces (e.g., Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan) on the Kremlin. Overall, overcoming previous limitations and capitalizing on new opportunities to use the CSTO for regional security could advance Russian-led integration of the former Soviet space, provide Moscow with an additional mechanism to shape the political reality in the region, and contribute to Russia’s growing role in international security.



BECOME A MEMBER


Polina Beliakova (@Beliakova_P) is a Ph.D. candidate and a research fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies at the Fletcher School, Tufts University. Her research focuses on international security, governance, and civil-military relations in Russia, Ukraine, and Israel. She has published on the erosion of civilian control in democracies, insurgency and terrorism, and corruption in the Russian defense sector.
 

jward

passin' thru
Boosting maritime law enforcement in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea

4 Feb 2022|Michael Heazle

SHARE

Print This Post
GettyImages-491119345.jpg

Five and a half years on from the international arbitral tribunal’s rejection of China’s expansive South China Sea claims in July 2016, the international maritime order in East Asia clearly is in trouble. China is continuing to consolidate its control over the Paracel Islands and most of the Spratleys group and is increasing its encroachments on the recognised exclusive economic zones of most of the South China Sea’s littoral states with relative impunity. The Philippines and Vietnam in particular have suffered numerous Chinese incursions, and Indonesia’s Natuna Islands and more recently Malaysia’s EEZ have been targeted in China’s bid to control the southern waters of the first island chain.


The region’s maritime order under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is central to the rules-based order that Australia, India, Japan, the US and other likeminded states hold to be central to regional security and prosperity. Yet China’s grey-zone tactics are continuing apace, weakening the authority and relevance of UNCLOS in the absence of a coordinated and unified regional stance supporting its rules and authority both in principle and in practice.


The wider regional implications of China continuing to unilaterally impose its own maritime laws on other states, denying them fishing and other maritime rights, provide compelling reasons for the Quad states, and others, to work harder to ensure that the rights and entitlements of all South China Sea littoral states under UNCLOS are protected. The threats include not only the further erosion of the rules-based order’s authority and legitimacy, perhaps to an irreparable degree, but also a major increase in Beijing’s political and economic leverage over the many Southeast Asian states that continue to depend on the fishing, energy and other sovereign rights China seeks to control.


Allowing Beijing to further expand its already significant presence and influence in the South China Sea would make it much more difficult for Australia, Japan and the US to build regional diplomatic support against China’s actions in the South China Sea and elsewhere, making great-power military conflict in the region more likely.


ASEAN’s role in the disputes remains hamstrung by internal divisions over its responsibility as a regional institution for protecting individual state maritime rights, despite its various statements affirming UNCLOS as the basis for resolving maritime entitlement disputes. Many in ASEAN are fearful of the consequences of being forced to choose between the US and China, of ASEAN becoming marginalised by great-power politics in its own backyard, and of the region becoming more militarised and conflict prone.


The lack of a unified ASEAN stance and response on China’s claims is also explained by fence-sitting among member states that are not directly affected by the South China Sea disputes or whose political and business elites prioritise the benefits of not antagonising Beijing. The fact that rival maritime claimants in ASEAN hold conflicting interpretations of UNCLOS’s provisions has been an additional obstacle to developing a common ASEAN position.


But signs of greater willingness to cooperate on maritime law enforcement and other maritime issues, encouraged by Beijing’s aggressive behaviour, are beginning to appear among the littoral ASEAN states. An agreement between Indonesia and the Philippines on their overlapping EEZs in the Celebes Sea was ratified by both governments in 2014. Vietnam and Malaysia are planning to sign a memorandum of understanding on maritime security cooperation addressing several problem areas, including illegal Vietnamese fishing in Malaysian waters. Vietnam and Indonesia, meanwhile, are continuing negotiations to establish provisional boundaries in overlapping areas of their claimed EEZs in the North Natuna Sea; in December last year the two nations signed a memorandum pledging improved cooperation on maritime security and safety.


These bilateral agreements should be read as both an assertion of the parties’ maritime rights and a clear rejection of China’s illegal ‘nine-dash line’ claims.


Beijing’s deployment of militia vessels for maritime fishing exposes them to suspicion of illegal fishing and thus also to legitimate maritime law enforcement action under UNCLOS. The longstanding problem of Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the South China Sea therefore may present an important opportunity for the South China Sea states most at threat from China’s illegal maritime claims—the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia—to collectively develop, with greater capacity-building and regulatory support from the Quad states, a UNCLOS based, non-military means of pushing back against China’s claims and grey-zone tactics.


Doing so will ensure that regional, rather than external, actors take the lead in upholding and affirming maritime rights. It will also provide a broad and unambiguous affirmation of UNCLOS’s authority and relevance and place the onus for any military escalation on China by imposing grey-zone dilemmas on China’s leadership, especially in terms of its own conflict threshold calculations.


Aside from the geostrategic threat that a Chinese takeover of the South China Sea poses, the alternative to cooperative EEZ regulation and better maritime law enforcement is a Chinese-controlled South China Sea. That would extinguish the resource and freedom-of-navigation rights of all other states and make any plans for cooperative or multilateral management (such as through a regional fisheries management organisation) of those resources and rights redundant. The risk of a catastrophic collapse of the region’s biggest fisheries resource due to Chinese mismanagement, intensifying competition and conflict, or both, would significantly increase. Such an outcome would very likely mean more illegal fishing in Southeast Asia’s already depleted waters, and in the EEZs of other states, including Australia and Japan.


By collectively supporting the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia in their efforts to more effectively regulate and police fishing and other maritime activities, the Quad states can indirectly push back on China’s grey-zone encroachments while also helping the coastal states to better manage a longstanding threat to the region’s socioeconomic security and future prosperity.

 

jward

passin' thru
Michael Kofman
@KofmanMichael


Folks should read the Joint Statement. Russia got visible support from Beijing for its positions, and using Moscow's preferred FP frameworks. You can debate how much this matters, but I'm seeing takes that don't align well with what is in the text.










Igor Denisov
@Igor_Denisov

9m

Replying to
@KofmanMichael
The question is how this will translate into practical policy. China's rhetorical opposition to NATO expansion had no effect on the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and respect for Russian sovereignty on the position on Crimea.
In the same way with Russia, we can talk about coincidence or close positions on global and regional issues, but the positions on the South China Sea are not the same. Moreover, Beijing's attempts to "pull Russia closer" to its SCS policy are met with irritation by Moscow.

Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development
February 4, 2022

At the invitation of President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir V. Putin visited China on 4 February 2022. The Heads of State held talks in Beijing and took part in the opening ceremony of the XXIV Olympic Winter Games.
The Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, hereinafter referred to as the sides, state as follows.
Today, the world is going through momentous changes, and humanity is entering a new era of rapid development and profound transformation. It sees the development of such processes and phenomena as multipolarity, economic globalization, the advent of information society, cultural diversity, transformation of the global governance architecture and world order; there is increasing interrelation and interdependence between the States; a trend has emerged towards redistribution of power in the world; and the international community is showing a growing demand for the leadership aiming at peaceful and gradual development. At the same time, as the pandemic of the new coronavirus infection continues, the international and regional security situation is complicating and the number of global challenges and threats is growing from day to day. Some actors representing but the minority on the international scale continue to advocate unilateral approaches to addressing international issues and resort to force; they interfere in the internal affairs of other states, infringing their legitimate rights and interests, and incite contradictions, differences and confrontation, thus hampering the development and progress of mankind, against the opposition from the international community.
The sides call on all States to pursue well-being for all and, with these ends, to build dialogue and mutual trust, strengthen mutual understanding, champion such universal human values as peace, development, equality, justice, democracy and freedom, respect the rights of peoples to independently determine the development paths of their countries and the sovereignty and the security and development interests of States, to protect the United Nations-driven international architecture and the international law-based world order, seek genuine multipolarity with the United Nations and its Security Council playing a central and coordinating role, promote more democratic international relations, and ensure peace, stability and sustainable development across the world.
I
The sides share the understanding that democracy is a universal human value, rather than a privilege of a limited number of States, and that its promotion and protection is a common responsibility of the entire world community.
The sides believe that democracy is a means of citizens' participation in the government of their country with the view to improving the well-being of population and implementing the principle of popular government. Democracy is exercised in all spheres of public life as part of a nation-wide process and reflects the interests of all the people, its will, guarantees its rights, meets its needs and protects its interests. There is no one-size-fits-all template to guide countries in establishing democracy. A nation can choose such forms and methods of implementing democracy that would best suit its particular state, based on its social and political system, its historical background, traditions and unique cultural characteristics. It is only up to the people of the country to decide whether their State is a democratic one.
The sides note that Russia and China as world powers with rich cultural and historical heritage have long-standing traditions of democracy, which rely on thousand-years of experience of development, broad popular support and consideration of the needs and interests of citizens. Russia and China guarantee their people the right to take part through various means and in various forms in the administration of the State and public life in accordance with the law. The people of both countries are certain of the way they have chosen and respect the democratic systems and traditions of other States.
The sides note that democratic principles are implemented at the global level, as well as in administration of State. Certain States' attempts to impose their own ”democratic standards“ on other countries, to monopolize the right to assess the level of compliance with democratic criteria, to draw dividing lines based on the grounds of ideology, including by establishing exclusive blocs and alliances of convenience, prove to be nothing but flouting of democracy and go against the spirit and true values of democracy. Such attempts at hegemony pose serious threats to global and regional peace and stability and undermine the stability of the world order.
The sides believe that the advocacy of democracy and human rights must not be used to put pressure on other countries. They oppose the abuse of democratic values and interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states under the pretext of protecting democracy and human rights, and any attempts to incite divisions and confrontation in the world. The sides call on the international community to respect cultural and civilizational diversity and the rights of peoples of different countries to self-determination. They stand ready to work together with all the interested partners to promote genuine democracy.
The sides note that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights set noble goals in the area of universal human rights, set forth fundamental principles, which all the States must comply with and observe in deeds. At the same time, as every nation has its own unique national features, history, culture, social system and level of social and economic development, universal nature of human rights should be seen through the prism of the real situation in every particular country, and human rights should be protected in accordance with the specific situation in each country and the needs of its population. Promotion and protection of human rights is a shared responsibility of the international community. The states should equally prioritize all categories of human rights and promote them in a systemic manner. The international human rights cooperation should be carried out as a dialogue between the equals involving all countries. All States must have equal access to the right to development. Interaction and cooperation on human rights matters should be based on the principle of equality of all countries and mutual respect for the sake of strengthening the international human rights architecture.
II
The sides believe that peace, development and cooperation lie at the core of the modern international system. Development is a key driver in ensuring the prosperity of the nations. The ongoing pandemic of the new coronavirus infection poses a serious challenge to the fulfilment of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It is vital to enhance partnership relations for the sake of global development and make sure that the new stage of global development is defined by balance, harmony and inclusiveness.
The sides are seeking to advance their work to link the development plans for the Eurasian Economic Union and the Belt and Road Initiative with a view to intensifying practical cooperation between the EAEU and China in various areas and promoting greater interconnectedness between the Asia Pacific and Eurasian regions. The sides reaffirm their focus on building the Greater Eurasian Partnership in parallel and in coordination with the Belt and Road construction to foster the development of regional associations as well as bilateral and multilateral integration processes for the benefit of the peoples on the Eurasian continent.
The sides agreed to continue consistently intensifying practical cooperation for the sustainable development of the Arctic.
The sides will strengthen cooperation within multilateral mechanisms, including the United Nations, and encourage the international community to prioritize development issues in the global macro-policy coordination. They call on the developed countries to implement in good faith their formal commitments on development assistance, provide more resources to developing countries, address the uneven development of States, work to offset such imbalances within States, and advance global and international development cooperation. The Russian side confirms its readiness to continue working on the China-proposed Global Development Initiative, including participation in the activities of the Group of Friends of the Global Development Initiative under the UN auspices. In order to accelerate the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the sides call on the international community to take practical steps in key areas of cooperation such as poverty reduction, food security, vaccines and epidemics control, financing for development, climate change, sustainable development, including green development, industrialization, digital economy, and infrastructure connectivity.
The sides call on the international community to create open, equal, fair and non-discriminatory conditions for scientific and technological development, to step up practical implementation of scientific and technological advances in order to identify new drivers of economic growth.
The sides call upon all countries to strengthen cooperation in sustainable transport, actively build contacts and share knowledge in the construction of transport facilities, including smart transport and sustainable transport, development and use of Arctic routes, as well as to develop other areas to support global post-epidemic recovery.
The sides are taking serious action and making an important contribution to the fight against climate change. Jointly celebrating the 30th anniversary of the adoption of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, they reaffirm their commitment to this Convention as well as to the goals, principles and provisions of the Paris Agreement, including the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. The sides work together to ensure the full and effective implementation of the Paris Agreement, remain committed to fulfilling the obligations they have undertaken and expect that developed countries will actually ensure the annual provision of $100 billion of climate finance to developing states. The sides oppose setting up new barriers in international trade under the pretext of fighting climate change.
The sides strongly support the development of international cooperation and exchanges in the field of biological diversity, actively participating in the relevant global governance process, and intend to jointly promote the harmonious development of humankind and nature as well as green transformation to ensure sustainable global development.
The Heads of State positively assess the effective interaction between Russia and China in the bilateral and multilateral formats focusing on the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, protection of life and health of the population of the two countries and the peoples of the world. They will further increase cooperation in the development and manufacture of vaccines against the new coronavirus infection, as well as medical drugs for its treatment, and enhance collaboration in public health and modern medicine. The sides plan to strengthen coordination on epidemiological measures to ensure strong protection of health, safety and order in contacts between citizens of the two countries. The sides have commended the work of the competent authorities and regions of the two countries on implementing quarantine measures in the border areas and ensuring the stable operation of the border crossing points, and intend to consider establishing a joint mechanism for epidemic control and prevention in the border areas to jointly plan anti-epidemic measures to be taken at the border checkpoints, share information, build infrastructure and improve the efficiency of customs clearance of goods.
The sides emphasize that ascertaining the origin of the new coronavirus infection is a matter of science. Research on this topic must be based on global knowledge, and that requires cooperation among scientists from all over the world. The sides oppose politicization of this issue. The Russian side welcomes the work carried out jointly by China and WHO to identify the source of the new coronavirus infection and supports the China – WHO joint report on the matter. The sides call on the global community to jointly promote a serious scientific approach to the study of the coronavirus origin.
The Russian side supports a successful hosting by the Chinese side of the Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games in Beijing in 2022.
The sides highly appreciate the level of bilateral cooperation in sports and the Olympic movement and express their readiness to contribute to its further progressive development.
III
The sides are gravely concerned about serious international security challenges and believe that the fates of all nations are interconnected. No State can or should ensure its own security separately from the security of the rest of the world and at the expense of the security of other States. The international community should actively engage in global governance to ensure universal, comprehensive, indivisible and lasting security.
The sides reaffirm their strong mutual support for the protection of their core interests, state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and oppose interference by external forces in their internal affairs.
The Russian side reaffirms its support for the One-China principle, confirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, and opposes any forms of independence of Taiwan.
Russia and China stand against attempts by external forces to undermine security and stability in their common adjacent regions, intend to counter interference by outside forces in the internal affairs of sovereign countries under any pretext, oppose colour revolutions, and will increase cooperation in the aforementioned areas.
The sides condemn terrorism in all its manifestations, promote the idea of creating a single global anti-terrorism front, with the United Nations playing a central role, advocate stronger political coordination and constructive engagement in multilateral counterterrorism efforts. The sides oppose politicization of the issues of combating terrorism and their use as instruments of policy of double standards, condemn the practice of interference in the internal affairs of other States for geopolitical purposes through the use of terrorist and extremist groups as well as under the guise of combating international terrorism and extremism.
The sides believe that certain States, military and political alliances and coalitions seek to obtain, directly or indirectly, unilateral military advantages to the detriment of the security of others, including by employing unfair competition practices, intensify geopolitical rivalry, fuel antagonism and confrontation, and seriously undermine the international security order and global strategic stability. The sides oppose further enlargement of NATO and call on the North Atlantic Alliance to abandon its ideologized cold war approaches, to respect the sovereignty, security and interests of other countries, the diversity of their civilizational, cultural and historical backgrounds, and to exercise a fair and objective attitude towards the peaceful development of other States. The sides stand against the formation of closed bloc structures and opposing camps in the Asia-Pacific region and remain highly vigilant about the negative impact of the United States' Indo-Pacific strategy on peace and stability in the region. Russia and China have made consistent efforts to build an equitable, open and inclusive security system in the Asia-Pacific Region (APR) that is not directed against third countries and that promotes peace, stability and prosperity.
The sides welcome the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapons States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races and believe that all nuclear-weapons States should abandon the cold war mentality and zero-sum games, reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policies, withdraw nuclear weapons deployed abroad, eliminate the unrestricted development of global anti-ballistic missile defense (ABM) system, and take effective steps to reduce the risks of nuclear wars and any armed conflicts between countries with military nuclear capabilities.
The sides reaffirm that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone of the international disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation system, an important part of the post-war international security system, and plays an indispensable role in world peace and development. The international community should promote the balanced implementation of the three pillars of the Treaty and work together to protect the credibility, effectiveness and the universal nature of the instrument.
 

jward

passin' thru
continued

Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development
February 4, 2022

The sides are seriously concerned about the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom (AUKUS), which provides for deeper cooperation between its members in areas involving strategic stability, in particular their decision to initiate cooperation in the field of nuclear-powered submarines. Russia and China believe that such actions are contrary to the objectives of security and sustainable development of the Asia-Pacific region, increase the danger of an arms race in the region, and pose serious risks of nuclear proliferation. The sides strongly condemn such moves and call on AUKUS participants to fulfil their nuclear and missile non-proliferation commitments in good faith and to work together to safeguard peace, stability, and development in the region.
Japan's plans to release nuclear contaminated water from the destroyed Fukushima nuclear plant into the ocean and the potential environmental impact of such actions are of deep concern to the sides. The sides emphasize that the disposal of nuclear contaminated water should be handled with responsibility and carried out in a proper manner based on arrangements between the Japanese side and neighbouring States, other interested parties, and relevant international agencies while ensuring transparency, scientific reasoning, and in accordance with international law.
The sides believe that the U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the acceleration of research and the development of intermediate-range and shorter-range ground-based missiles and the desire to deploy them in the Asia-Pacific and European regions, as well as their transfer to the allies, entail an increase in tension and distrust, increase risks to international and regional security, lead to the weakening of international non-proliferation and arms control system, undermining global strategic stability. The sided call on the United States to respond positively to the Russian initiative and abandon its plans to deploy intermediate-range and shorter-range ground-based missiles in the Asia-Pacific region and Europe. The sides will continue to maintain contacts and strengthen coordination on this issue.
The Chinese side is sympathetic to and supports the proposals put forward by the Russian Federation to create long-term legally binding security guarantees in Europe.
The sides note that the denunciation by the United States of a number of important international arms control agreements has an extremely negative impact on international and regional security and stability. The sides express concern over the advancement of U.S. plans to develop global missile defence and deploy its elements in various regions of the world, combined with capacity building of high-precision non-nuclear weapons for disarming strikes and other strategic objectives. The sides stress the importance of the peaceful uses of outer space, strongly support the central role of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in promoting international cooperation, maintaining and developing international space law and regulation in the field of space activities. Russia and China will continue to increase cooperation on such matters of mutual interest as the long-term sustainability of space activities and the development and use of space resources. The sides oppose attempts by some States to turn outer space into an arena of armed confrontation and reiterate their intention to make all necessary efforts to prevent the weaponization of space and an arms race in outer space. They will counteract activities aimed at achieving military superiority in space and using it for combat operations. The sides affirm the need for the early launch of negotiations to conclude a legally binding multilateral instrument based on the Russian-Chinese draft treaty on the prevention of placement of weapons in outer space and the use or threat of force against space objects that would provide fundamental and reliable guarantees against an arms race and the weaponization of outer space.
Russia and China emphasize that appropriate transparency and confidence-building measures, including an international initiative/political commitment not to be the first to place weapons in space, can also contribute to the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space, but such measures should complement and not substitute the effective legally binding regime governing space activities.
The sides reaffirm their belief that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) is an essential pillar of international peace and security. Russia and China underscore their determination to preserve the credibility and effectiveness of the Convention.
The sides affirm the need to fully respect and further strengthen the BWC, including by institutionalizing it, strengthening its mechanisms, and adopting a legally binding Protocol to the Convention with an effective verification mechanism, as well as through regular consultation and cooperation in addressing any issues related to the implementation of the Convention.
The sides emphasize that domestic and foreign bioweapons activities by the United States and its allies raise serious concerns and questions for the international community regarding their compliance with the BWC. The sides share the view that such activities pose a serious threat to the national security of the Russian Federation and China and are detrimental to the security of the respective regions. The sides call on the U.S. and its allies to act in an open, transparent, and responsible manner by properly reporting on their military biological activities conducted overseas and on their national territory, and by supporting the resumption of negotiations on a legally binding BWC Protocol with an effective verification mechanism.
The sides, reaffirming their commitment to the goal of a world free of chemical weapons, call upon all parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention to work together to uphold its credibility and effectiveness. Russia and China are deeply concerned about the politicization of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and call on all of its members to strengthen solidarity and cooperation and protect the tradition of consensual decision-making. Russia and China insist that the United States, as the sole State Party to the Convention that has not yet completed the process of eliminating chemical weapons, accelerate the elimination of its stockpiles of chemical weapons. The sides emphasize the importance of balancing the non-proliferation obligations of states with the interests of legitimate international cooperation in the use of advanced technology and related materials and equipment for peaceful purposes. The sides note the resolution entitled ”Promoting international Cooperation on Peaceful Uses in the Context of International Security“ adopted at the 76th session of the UN General Assembly on the initiative of China and co‑sponsored by Russia, and look forward to its consistent implementation in accordance with the goals set forth therein.
The sides attach great importance to the issues of governance in the field of artificial intelligence. The sides are ready to strengthen dialogue and contacts on artificial intelligence.
The sides reiterate their readiness to deepen cooperation in the field of international information security and to contribute to building an open, secure, sustainable and accessible ICT environment. The sides emphasize that the principles of the non-use of force, respect for national sovereignty and fundamental human rights and freedoms, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States, as enshrined in the UN Charter, are applicable to the information space. Russia and China reaffirm the key role of the UN in responding to threats to international information security and express their support for the Organization in developing new norms of conduct of states in this area.
The sides welcome the implementation of the global negotiation process on international information security within a single mechanism and support in this context the work of the UN Open-ended Working Group on security of and in the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) 2021–2025 (OEWG) and express their willingness to speak with one voice within it. The sides consider it necessary to consolidate the efforts of the international community to develop new norms of responsible behaviour of States, including legal ones, as well as a universal international legal instrument regulating the activities of States in the field of ICT. The sides believe that the Global Initiative on Data Security, proposed by the Chinese side and supported, in principle, by the Russian side, provides a basis for the Working Group to discuss and elaborate responses to data security threats and other threats to international information security.
The sides reiterate their support of United Nations General Assembly resolutions 74/247 and 75/282, support the work of the relevant Ad Hoc Committee of Governmental Experts, facilitate the negotiations within the United Nations for the elaboration of an international convention on countering the use of ICTs for criminal purposes. The sides encourage constructive participation of all sides in the negotiations in order to agree as soon as possible on a credible, universal, and comprehensive convention and provide it to the United Nations General Assembly at its 78th session in strict compliance with resolution 75/282. For these purposes, Russia and China have presented a joint draft convention as a basis for negotiations.
The sides support the internationalization of Internet governance, advocate equal rights to its governance, believe that any attempts to limit their sovereign right to regulate national segments of the Internet and ensure their security are unacceptable, are interested in greater participation of the International Telecommunication Union in addressing these issues.
The sides intend to deepen bilateral cooperation in international information security on the basis of the relevant 2015 intergovernmental agreement. To this end, the sides have agreed to adopt in the near future a plan for cooperation between Russia and China in this area.
IV
The sides underline that Russia and China, as world powers and permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, intend to firmly adhere to moral principles and accept their responsibility, strongly advocate the international system with the central coordinating role of the United Nations in international affairs, defend the world order based on international law, including the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, advance multipolarity and promote the democratization of international relations, together create an even more prospering, stable, and just world, jointly build international relations of a new type.
The Russian side notes the significance of the concept of constructing a ”community of common destiny for mankind“ proposed by the Chinese side to ensure greater solidarity of the international community and consolidation of efforts in responding to common challenges. The Chinese side notes the significance of the efforts taken by the Russian side to establish a just multipolar system of international relations.
The sides intend to strongly uphold the outcomes of the Second World War and the existing post-war world order, defend the authority of the United Nations and justice in international relations, resist attempts to deny, distort, and falsify the history of the Second World War.
In order to prevent the recurrence of the tragedy of the world war, the sides will strongly condemn actions aimed at denying the responsibility for atrocities of Nazi aggressors, militarist invaders, and their accomplices, besmirch and tarnish the honour of the victorious countries.
The sides call for the establishment of a new kind of relationships between world powers on the basis of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation. They reaffirm that the new inter-State relations between Russia and China are superior to political and military alliances of the Cold War era. Friendship between the two States has no limits, there are no ”forbidden“ areas of cooperation, strengthening of bilateral strategic cooperation is neither aimed against third countries nor affected by the changing international environment and circumstantial changes in third countries.
The sides reiterate the need for consolidation, not division of the international community, the need for cooperation, not confrontation. The sides oppose the return of international relations to the state of confrontation between major powers, when the weak fall prey to the strong. The sides intend to resist attempts to substitute universally recognized formats and mechanisms that are consistent with international law for rules elaborated in private by certain nations or blocs of nations, and are against addressing international problems indirectly and without consensus, oppose power politics, bullying, unilateral sanctions, and extraterritorial application of jurisdiction, as well as the abuse of export control policies, and support trade facilitation in line with the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The sides reaffirmed their intention to strengthen foreign policy coordination, pursue true multilateralism, strengthen cooperation on multilateral platforms, defend common interests, support the international and regional balance of power, and improve global governance.
The sides support and defend the multilateral trade system based on the central role of the World Trade Organization (WTO), take an active part in the WTO reform, opposing unilateral approaches and protectionism. The sides are ready to strengthen dialogue between partners and coordinate positions on trade and economic issues of common concern, contribute to ensuring the sustainable and stable operation of global and regional value chains, promote a more open, inclusive, transparent, non-discriminatory system of international trade and economic rules.
The sides support the G20 format as an important forum for discussing international economic cooperation issues and anti-crisis response measures, jointly promote the invigorated spirit of solidarity and cooperation within the G20, support the leading role of the association in such areas as the international fight against epidemics, world economic recovery, inclusive sustainable development, improving the global economic governance system in a fair and rational manner to collectively address global challenges.
The sides support the deepened strategic partnership within BRICS, promote the expanded cooperation in three main areas: politics and security, economy and finance, and humanitarian exchanges. In particular, Russia and China intend to encourage interaction in the fields of public health, digital economy, science, innovation and technology, including artificial intelligence technologies, as well as the increased coordination between BRICS countries on international platforms. The sides strive to further strengthen the BRICS Plus/Outreach format as an effective mechanism of dialogue with regional integration associations and organizations of developing countries and States with emerging markets.
The Russian side will fully support the Chinese side chairing the association in 2022, and assist in the fruitful holding of the XIV BRICS summit.
Russia and China aim to comprehensively strengthen the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and further enhance its role in shaping a polycentric world order based on the universally recognized principles of international law, multilateralism, equal, joint, indivisible, comprehensive and sustainable security.
They consider it important to consistently implement the agreements on improved mechanisms to counter challenges and threats to the security of SCO member states and, in the context of addressing this task, advocate expanded functionality of the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure.
The sides will contribute to imparting a new quality and dynamics to the economic interaction between the SCO member States in the fields of trade, manufacturing, transport, energy, finance, investment, agriculture, customs, telecommunications, innovation and other areas of mutual interest, including through the use of advanced, resource-saving, energy efficient and ”green“ technologies.
The sides note the fruitful interaction within the SCO under the 2009 Agreement between the Governments of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member States on cooperation in the field of international information security, as well as within the specialized Group of Experts. In this context, they welcome the adoption of the SCO Joint Action Plan on Ensuring International Information Security for 2022–2023 by the Council of Heads of State of SCO Member States on September 17, 2021 in Dushanbe.
Russia and China proceed from the ever-increasing importance of cultural and humanitarian cooperation for the progressive development of the SCO. In order to strengthen mutual understanding between the people of the SCO member States, they will continue to effectively foster interaction in such areas as cultural ties, education, science and technology, healthcare, environmental protection, tourism, people-to-people contacts, sports.
Russia and China will continue to work to strengthen the role of APEC as the leading platform for multilateral dialogue on economic issues in the Asia-Pacific region. The sides intend to step up coordinated action to successfully implement the ”Putrajaya guidelines for the development of APEC until 2040“ with a focus on creating a free, open, fair, non-discriminatory, transparent and predictable trade and investment environment in the region. Particular emphasis will be placed on the fight against the novel coronavirus infection pandemic and economic recovery, digitalization of a wide range of different spheres of life, economic growth in remote territories and the establishment of interaction between APEC and other regional multilateral associations with a similar agenda.
The sides intend to develop cooperation within the ”Russia-India-China“ format, as well as to strengthen interaction on such venues as the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum on Security, Meeting of Defense Ministers of the ASEAN Member States and Dialogue Partners. Russia and China support ASEAN's central role in developing cooperation in East Asia, continue to increase coordination on deepened cooperation with ASEAN, and jointly promote cooperation in the areas of public health, sustainable development, combating terrorism and countering transnational crime. The sides intend to continue to work in the interest of a strengthened role of ASEAN as a key element of the regional architecture.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

Understated but Still Important: North Korea’s First IRBM Test Since 2017

(Source: KCTV via Martyn Williams)

On January 30, North Korea conducted its seventh round of missile testing this year and its first launch of the Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) since 2017. It deliberately understated the recent launch by not overflying Japan; it also emphasized the technical and operational aspects of the test in its state media reporting rather than engaging in threatening political messaging, unlike the two 2017 launches. Nonetheless, the launch is important for North Korea’s missile force in two key ways. First, the continued success in Hwasong-12 launches and the North’s characterization of the missile as being on the cusp of, if not already at series production and operational deployment, underscore that IRBMs are a solid and enduring part of the North Korean ballistic missile threat landscape. Second, the resumption of IRBM launches makes it more likely that the first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch in over four years will be occurring soon, reflecting a likely North Korean judgment that the benefits from resuming ICBM launches have increased and the costs are bearable.

Information to Date
South Korea and Japan reported that North Korea launched an IRBM on January 30, flying into the East Sea/Sea of Japan on a highly-lofted trajectory with a range of 800 km and an altitude/apogee of 2,000 km. The next day, a North Korean media report confirmed the state had conducted an “evaluation test-fire of Hwasong 12-type ground-to-ground intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile.”According to the report, “The test-fire was aimed to selectively evaluate the missile being produced and deployed and to verify the overall accuracy of the weapon system,” and the launch “was conducted by the highest-angle launch system…in consideration of the security of neighboring countries.” The launch reportedly “confirmed the accuracy, security and effectiveness of the operation of the Hwasong 12-type weapon system under production.” The statement was accompanied by photographs of a Hwasong-12 IRBM lifting off from a road-mobile launcher, the missile in the early boost phase and four photos said to be from “the earth image data taken from space by a camera installed at the missile warhead.”[1]

Analysis
This is the first launch of the Hwasong-12 since September 2017 and the seventh overall since the system’s first known flight in April 2017. This launch also is the fourth consecutive apparently successful launch of the system after the first three launches failed at various points in flight. Some key points to take away from this test include:
  • Missile is apparently unchanged. There are no apparent visible differences between the missile in the photos from the latest launch and photos of the Hwasong-12 from 2017.The North Koreans did not mention any modifications, or anything about the “ampoulization” of the Hwasong-12 booster, as they had for the three “hypersonic missiles” tested in September 2021 and January 2022 that used a scaled-down Hwasong-12 booster. (“Ampoulization” apparently refers to preloading the missiles with liquid propellants at the factory and maintaining the fueled missile as a sealed unit for loading into the launcher.) Whether the Hwasong-12 is “ampoulized” or not, it uses the same storable liquid propellants as the “hypersonic missiles” (and the North’s liquid-propellant ICBMs) that inherently permit such missiles to be maintained pre-fueled and launch-ready for years.
  • Lofted trajectory shows longer range. The trajectory flown in the latest launch is very similar to that in the May 2017 test, which prevented the missile from overflying Japan—presumably one of the “neighboring countries” the North said it took into consideration in choosing that flight path. In its two previous flights in August and September 2017, the missile overflew Japan to ranges of 2,700 and 3,700 km, respectively. These flights were the only launches of a North Korean IRBM or ICBM on an operationally realistic trajectory; all others—including all ICBMs—have been highly lofted. Based on the missile’s performance on January 30, it is estimated the Hwasong-12 could have flown on a lower trajectory to a range of some 4,300 to 4,500 km, making it able to reach Guam (as well as all of Taiwan and the Philippines, and of course, all of Japan and South Korea) from any point in North Korea. From northeast North Korea, the IRBM could reach the southwest end of the Aleutian Islands, including the missile tracking radar on Shemya Island.
  • Series production and deployment ready or ongoing. North Korea’s characterization of the January 30 launch as an “evaluation test-fire…to selectively evaluate the missile being produced and deployed and to verify the overall accuracy” implies that the Hwasong-12 is already deployed/operational or is in the process of being deployed, and that the missile is in series production or just ready to begin such production. Interestingly, North Korea did not portray the launch as troop training for an operationally deployed unit, as it did for the January 14 launch of two rail-mobile KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles.
  • Another technical, not political, announcement. The North Korean statement on the Hwasong-12 launch was devoid of policy/political content, sticking instead to technical matters. While this is very different from the North’s reporting of the 2017 IRBM launches, which were pointedly directed at the US threat, it is consistent with North Korean reporting of the other six missile launches conducted this year.
Implications
The January 30 Hwasong-12 launch has two important direct implications for North Korea’s ballistic missile force:
  • North Korean IRBMs an enduring part of the force. The apparent success of the January 30 launch and its reported deployment status underscore that IRBMs are a solid and enduring part of the North Korean ballistic missile threat landscape. No longer being portrayed as a political messaging tool, the Hwasong-12 has a compelling military reason to exist: posing a deterrent threat to US territory and having the ability to disrupt bases in Guam (as well as the Philippines and farther-flung reaches of Japan) that could support US operations against North Korea. Moreover, the North is likely to continue to improve its IRBMs in the future. The Hwasong-12 poses a nuclear threat for now, but North Korea may at some point improve its missile guidance technology sufficiently to permit a viable conventional capability at IRBM range as well, allowing it to disrupt US operations on Guam during the conventional phase of a war. The North might even decide to develop the ability to deploy a few IRBMs with maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs) to help suppress US missile defenses on Guam or even the Shemya radar. The Hwasong-12 also is a good candidate for rail-mobile deployment, with which the North is gaining experience using the KN-23, and a future solid-propellant IRBM would provide operational advantages.
  • ICBM testing is more likely. A case can be made either way that launching an IRBM (as opposed to an ICBM) breached the limits on long-range missile flights Pyongyang imposed on itself in April 2018, and that it renounced in December 2019 and “reconsidered” breaching on January 19, 2022.[2] Whether that Rubicon has already been crossed or not, the resumption of IRBM launches after over four years increases the likelihood that an ICBM launch will be occurring soon.
After over four years, and as underscored by the IRBM launch, the North probably now sees refraining from ICBM testing as imposing greater costs and providing fewer benefits than it has in recent years.
  • North Korea probably regarded the two successful Hwasong-14 and one successful Hwasong-15 tests in 2017 as yielding an ICBM threat sufficiently credible and reliable to meet its objectives without further flight testing for some time. After four years without flight-testing, however, the credibility of that threat has objectively declined. North Korea’s push since the fall of 2021 to demonstrate that its missile force is technically capable and operationally credible is consistent with likely a desire to resume also fuels a desire to resume ICBM testing.
  • Moreover, resumed flight testing is necessary to realize a number of follow-on ICBM developments that North Korea has revealed or committed itself to, including the new large road-mobile ICBM it paraded in October 2020, the solid-propellant ICBMs Kim Jong Un sought to “push ahead with the development of” in his report to the January 2021 Eighth Party Congress, and ICBMs with multiple warheads (highlighted in that same report) or even “hypersonic” payloads like the North has been testing on medium-range ballistic missiles.[3]
  • The US attitude toward North Korea has worsened since the advent of the launch hiatus, with no near-term prospect of improving, and US and UN sanctions have persisted. Having survived almost five years of US “maximum pressure,” as well as two years of self-imposed isolation due to the COVID pandemic, Pyongyang may not see resumed ICBM launches as resulting in appreciable additional economic costs. It also may regard worsening US relations with China and Russia over the past few years as reducing the likelihood those countries would permit the substantial increases in UN sanctions needed meaningfully to add to the already “maximum” pressure from US unilateral sanctions.
  1. [1]
    “Test-fire of Hwasong 12-type Ground-to-ground Intermediate- and Long-range Ballistic Missile Held,” Rodong Sinmun, January 31, 2022.
  2. [2]
    “6th Political Bureau Meeting of 8th C.C., WPK Held,” Korean Central News Agency, January 20, 2022.
  3. [3]
    “On Report Made by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un at 8th Party Congress of WPK,” Korean Central News Agency, January 9, 2021.
 

jward

passin' thru
U.S. approves $100 million sale for Taiwan missile upgrades
Reuters



2 minute read
Flags of Taiwan and U.S. are placed for a meeting in Taipei, Taiwan March 27, 2018. REUTERS/Tyrone Siu/File Photo

Flags of Taiwan and U.S. are placed for a meeting in Taipei, Taiwan March 27, 2018. REUTERS/Tyrone Siu/File Photo
Register now for FREE unlimited access to Reuters.com
WASHINGTON, Feb 7 (Reuters) - The United States has approved a possible $100 million sale of equipment and services to Taiwan to "sustain, maintain, and improve" the Patriot missile defense system used by the self-ruled island claimed by China, the Pentagon said on Monday.

A statement from the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency said it had delivered the required certification notifying Congress following State Department approval for the sale, which was requested by Taiwan's de facto embassy in Washington.


Upgrades to the Patriot Air Defense System would "help improve the security of the recipient and assist in maintaining political stability, military balance, economic and progress in the region," the DSCA said in a statement.

"This proposed sale serves U.S. national, economic, and security interests by supporting the recipient's continuing efforts to modernize its armed forces and to maintain a credible defensive capability," the agency said.


The main contractors would be Raytheon Technologies (RTX.N) and Lockheed Martin (LMT.N), it said.

Taiwan's Foreign Ministry said it "highly welcomed" the decision.

"In the face of China's continued military expansion and provocative actions, our country will maintain its national security with a solid defense, and continue to deepen the close security partnership between Taiwan and the United States," it said in a statement.


Taiwan's Defense Ministry has said the decision to obtain newer Patriot missiles was made during a 2019 meeting with U.S. officials in the administration of President Donald Trump. read more

The ministry said the deal was expected to "come into effect" within one month.

The democratically governed island has complained of repeated missions by China's air force in its air defense zone, part of what Washington sees as Beijing's effort to pressure Taipei into accepting its sovereignty.

The United States, like most countries, does not have official relations with Taiwan, but Washington is its biggest backer and is bound by law to provide it with means to defend itself.

U.S. officials have been pushing Taiwan to modernize its military so it can become a "porcupine," hard for China to attack, and such arms sales always anger China.

China's ambassador to the United States said last month that the two super powers could end up in a military conflict if Washington encourages Taiwan's independence. read more

 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

N.Korea boasts of 'shaking the world' by testing missiles that can strike U.S.
U.S. and South Korean officials have said they fear the launch of the Hwasong-12 on Jan. 30 could be a step toward fully resuming N.Korea suggests it may resume nuclear, missile tests; slams 'hostile' U.S. tests of North Korea's ICBMs or nuclear weapons.
Reuters | Updated: 09-02-2022 03:42 IST | Created: 09-02-2022 03:42 IST

North Korea boasted on Tuesday that it is one of only a handful of countries in the world to field nuclear weapons and advanced missiles and the only one standing up to the United States by "shaking the world" with missile tests. Analysis: With seven tests in a month, North Korea calls for world to accept its missiles International tension has been rising over a recent series of North Korean ballistic missile tests, actions long banned by the U.N. Security Council. January was a record month of such tests, with at least seven launches, including a new type of "hypersonic missile" able to manoeuvre at high speed.

Also among the tests was the first firing since 2017 of a Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missile, capable of striking U.S. territories in the Pacific Ocean. A statement from North Korea's Foreign Ministry said a series of tests since New Year represented "remarkable achievements" that strengthened North Korea's "war deterrence."

It also cited the Hwasong-15, the longest-range intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) ever launched by North Korea, which hasn't been fired since its first test in 2017, and is believed to have the range to deliver a nuclear warhead anywhere in the United States. "In today's world where many countries waste time dealing with the United States with submission and blind obedience, there’s only our country on this planet that can shake the world by firing a missile with the U.S. mainland in its range," it said.

"There are more than 200 countries in the world, but only a few have hydrogen bombs, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and hypersonic missiles," it said. Asked to comment, the U.S. State Department repeated past statements that it harboured no hostile intent towards North Korea and urging a return to dialogue, calls Pyongyang has persistently ignored.

A State Department spokesperson also called North Korea a threat to international peace and security and global nonproliferation efforts. "The United States has a vital interest in deterring (North Korea), defending against its provocations or uses of force, limiting the reach of its most dangerous weapons programs, and above all keeping the American people, our deployed forces, and our allies safe," the spokesperson said.

Jenny Town, director of 38 North, a Washington-based North Korea program, said the fact that North Korea's statement came from its foreign ministry probably made the statement less threatening than if might appear. "The formulation is very passive. Not that they will do it, but that they can," she said. North Korea celebrated the anniversary of the founding of its army on Tuesday, a holiday that has occasionally featured major military parades with missiles and other weapons in previous years.

There were no reports of a parade this year, however, and state media said the day was marked by senior military leaders visiting the mausoleum of the country's former rulers, among other events. U.S. and South Korean officials have said they fear the launch of the Hwasong-12 on Jan. 30 could be a step toward fully resuming N.Korea suggests it may resume nuclear, missile tests; slams 'hostile' U.S. tests of North Korea's ICBMs or nuclear weapons. North Korea has not conducted a nuclear test or fired an ICBM since 2017.

The United States called on North Korea on Monday to defund U.S. urges N.Korea to focus on needs of its people, not missiles its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and prioritize the needs of its own people. A Washington think tank said on Monday it has identified a military base close to North Korea's border with China that is likely intended for stationing ICBMs.

Talks to persuade Pyongyang to give up or limit its arsenal in return for sanctions relief have been stalled since 2019.

(This story has not been edited by Devdiscourse staff and is auto-generated from a syndicated feed.)
 

jward

passin' thru




Lyle Goldstein
@lylegoldstein

11m

"There is only one China in the world and Taiwan is an inseparable part of Chinese territory... [US arms sales to Taiwan] will bring about serious consequences for US-China mil relations and for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait" Min of Def, CCTV7, Junshi Baodao, 9Feb.

Global Times
@globaltimesnews


China state-affiliated media

China firmly opposes and severely condemns US' latest $100 million arms sale to the island of Taiwan. China will take proper, powerful measures to safeguard its own sovereignty and security interests: FM
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....




S.Korea, US, Japan commit to close coordination against N.Korean missile threats
Defense chiefs agree to hold first in-person trilateral talks under Biden administration

By Ji Da-gyum

Published : Feb 10, 2022 - 14:42 Updated : Feb 10, 2022 - 18:02

The defense chiefs of South Korea, the US, and Japan on Thursday committed to “closely cooperate” against North Korean threats and hold an in-person ministerial meeting during a trilateral phone call, South Korea’s Defense Ministry announced.

South Korean Defense Minister Suh Wook had a 30-minute phone discussion with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi that started at 7:45 a.m.

The three defense chiefs “shared an assessment on the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in the region” and saw eye to eye on close trilateral coordination in countering the growing menace from Pyongyang, the South Korean Defense Ministry said in a press statement.

“(The ministers) committed to the three countries’ close cooperation in the face of North Korean missile threats and to continue efforts at achieving denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”

During the phone call, Suh emphasized the “recent series of missile test launches by North Korea including an intermediate-range ballistic missile are a direct and grave threat” to South Korea.

The South Korean defense minister went on to say that a spate of missile launches “incurs instability to the regional situation and is a challenge against United Nations Security Council resolutions.”

What appears to be the first and unprecedented trilateral phone discussion among the South Korean, US, and Japanese defense chiefs came conspicuously after North Korea’s record-breaking flurry of missile launches.

Pyongyang fired off nine ballistic missiles and two land-attack cruise missiles (LACM) in seven discrete launches in January alone. Recently launched missiles by North Korea, including a KN-23, KN-24, and Maneuverable Reentry Vehicle (MaRV), have notably enhanced survivability and maneuverability.

Suh also reiterated that South Korea has “deterred and responded to North Korea’s mounting nuclear and missile threats with independent available capabilities including the military’s nuclear-WMD Response System and based on the ironclad South Korea-US alliance.”

The minister also pledged to further reinforce the military capabilities and alliance coordination.

Sending coordinate message
The US Defense Department on Wednesday (local time) said the three defense chiefs reaffirmed the “importance of trilateral security cooperation in addressing global security challenges and threats posed” by North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and missile programs.

The Pentagon also reiterated that the leaders committed to “close trilateral coordination in the face of the DPRK’s missile launches,” confirming that the “US commitment to the defense of Japan and the ROK is ironclad.”

A South Korean official, who wished to remain anonymous, emphasized that the primary goal of the first phone discussion was for the South Korean, US, and Japanese defense chiefs to “send a coordinated message” in responding to successive missile launches by North Korea.

The meeting was a signal to Pyongyang that they had a coordinated response, rather than one where they discussed any detailed agenda on other issues.

Pushing for trilateral defense ministerial talks
The three defense chiefs also committed to “hold an in-person trilateral defense ministerial meeting on a mutually determined future date,” according to the respective announcements by Seoul and Washington.

A three-way defense ministerial meeting has yet to take place under the Biden administration.

Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo last held in-person trilateral defense ministerial talks in Bangkok in November 2019 on the occasion of the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus.

A trilateral meeting, which had been scheduled to be held in January in Hawaii, was canceled due to the rapid spread of the omicron variant.

The South Korean official said the three leaders commonly saw the necessity of holding in-person talks “at the earliest possible time” to have a detailed and substantial discussion on North Korea’s missile and nuclear threats.

The date and place have not yet been confirmed, but there are apparently high chances of a trilateral defense ministerial meeting to be held in March in Hawaii, at the request of the US.

Trilateral coordination on North Korea has been further reinforced recently with the Biden administration’s initiative.

The move comes especially after Pyongyang launched a Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missile, which is the longest-range missile the country has fired in more than four years, and suggested its possible intent to renounce the self-imposed moratorium on testing nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

South Korean, US, and Japanese diplomats will also have consecutive meetings in Hawaii this week. Chief nuclear envoys are set to discuss North Korea-related issues on Thursday in Honolulu, Hawaii, ahead of the trilateral foreign ministers meeting scheduled on Saturday.

By Ji Da-gyum (dagyumji@heraldcorp.com)
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

Amid Rising Tensions, Kim Jong Un Plans to Follow His Missile Barrage With a Military Parade
By Jeong-Ho Lee / Bloomberg

February 10, 2022 1:22 AM EST

North Korea is stepping up preparations for military parade that could come as soon as next week, ratcheting up tensions after a January barrage of missile tests forced Kim Jong Un’s nuclear arsenal back on the Biden administration’s agenda.

Commercial satellite imagery of North Korea’s parade training ground taken last weekend showed several hundred personnel in formation, likely signaling a forthcoming celebration, U.S.-based specialist service 38 North reported. In a separate report from NK News, information from satellite imagery and informed sources on the ground in Pyongyang indicated plans to hold a parade for one or more upcoming holidays.

Two big events on the North Korean calendar are the Feb. 16 holiday for what would have been the 80th birthday of former leader Kim Jong Il, and the April 15 holiday to mark what would have been the 110th birthday of state founder Kim Il Sung.

Kim Jong Un—the son and grandson of the two former leaders—has used parades to show off the state’s missiles designed to deliver nuclear weapons to the U.S. mainland and America’s allies in Asia. The lack of vehicle activity at the training ground indicates that if there’s a parade next week, he likely won’t be rolling out any major weaponry then, the two reports said.

But the event where soldiers march through central Pyongyang would be used to rally support at home, where the state is battling one of its worst food shortages in years. It would come after the foreign ministers from the U.S., South Korea and Japan meet this weekend in Hawaii to discuss a record monthly barrage of missile tests in January under the North Korean leader of nuclear-capable rockets designed to evade U.S.-operated interceptors.

Martyn Williams, a fellow at the Stimson Center who co-authored the 38 North article, said a parade next week for the Kim Jong Il holiday is possible.

“North Korea does do big parades that consist mostly of people marching. They don’t get as much publicity, but this could be one of those,” he said. “If I was to guess between the two, I’d say the April 15 holiday for Kim Il Sung is more likely to see a major parade.”

So far the Biden administration hasn’t budged to North Korea’s demands that it ease up on sanctions choking its economy. While Washington has said the door is open for Kim to return to nuclear disarmament talks stalled for about three years, publicly it has offered nothing new to entice him back to negotiations.

South Korean President Moon Jae-in believes President Joe Biden and Kim Jong Un will meet eventually to discuss Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program, Yonhap News Agency reported Thursday, citing a joint written interview.

Kim hasn’t shown interest in returning to talks with the U.S. while Biden hasn’t indicated his inclination for a meeting with the North Korean leader. Kim met former President Donald Trump three times, but their talks didn’t lead to any concrete steps to wind down North Korea’s nuclear arsenal — which grew in strength while their discussions sputtered.

North Korea has held off on missiles tests while its neighbor and biggest benefactor China host the Beijing Olympics.
 

jward

passin' thru
Jennifer Hansler
@jmhansler

2h

.@SecBlinken, speaking alongside Australian PM Morrison & Quad counterparts, says he does not believe confrontation with China in Indo-Pacific is inevitable but notes "China has been acting more repressively at home and more aggressively in the region & indeed potentially beyond"
 

OldArcher

Has No Life - Lives on TB
Never forget the Malignant Dwarf of the Norks, and his father and grandfather, who were Hellbent on destroying the US and it’s allies. It could be used by China and/or Russia, to light the fuse that is Asia.

OA
 

jward

passin' thru
Trapped In IMF Debt, Argentina Turns To Russia And Joins China's Belt & Road
Tyler Durden's Photo

by Tyler Durden
Friday, Feb 11, 2022 - 06:00 PM
Authored by Benjamin Norton via Multipolarista.com,
Argentina is trapped in $44 billion of IMF odious debt taken on by corrupt right-wing regimes. Seeking alternatives to US hegemony, President Alberto Fernández traveled to Russia and China, forming an alliance with the Eurasian powers, joining the Belt and Road Initiative.



Argentina's President Alberto Fernández meets with Russia's President Vladimir Putin and China's President Xi Jinping in February 2022
The United States constantly intervenes in the internal affairs of Latin America, organizing coups d’etat, destabilizing independent governments, trapping nations in debt, and imposing sanctions. Washington sees the region as its own property, with President Joe Biden referring to it this January as “America’s front yard.”
Seeking alternatives to US hegemony, progressive governments in Latin America have increasingly looked across the ocean to form alliances with China and Russia.

Argentina’s President Alberto Fernández did exactly that this February, taking historic trips to Beijing and Moscow to meet with his counterparts Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.
Fernández signed a series of strategic agreements, officially incorporating Argentina into Beijing’s international Belt and Road Initiative, while expanding economic partnerships with the Eurasian powers and telling Moscow that Argentina “should be the door to enter” Latin America.

China offered $23.7 billion in funding for infrastructure projects and investments in Argentina’s economy.
In the meetings, Fernández also asked for Argentina to join the BRICS framework, alongside Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Xi and Putin reportedly both agreed.
“I am consistently working to rid Argentina of this dependence on the IMF and the US,” Fernández explained. “I want Argentina to open up new opportunities.”
The Argentine president’s comments and meetings with Putin and Xi reportedly angered the US government.

Argentina is trapped in odious debt with the US-controlled IMF
Argentina is a Latin American powerhouse, with significant natural resources and the third-largest economy in the region (after Brazil and Mexico, both of which have significantly larger populations).
But Argentina’s development has often been weighed down by debt traps imposed from abroad, resulting in frequent economic crises, cycles of high inflation, and currency devaluations.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) – a de facto economic arm of the United States, over which Washington alone has veto power – has significant control over Argentina, having trapped the nation in huge sums of odious debt.
In 2018, Argentina’s right-wing President Mauricio Macri requested the largest loan in the history of the IMF: a staggering $57.1 billion bailout.
Macri was notorious for his corruption, and this was no secret at the time. By agreeing to give such an enormous sum of money to Macri’s scandal-plagued government, the IMF knew it was ensnaring Argentina in debt it would not be able to pay off. But this was far from the first time the US-dominated financial instrument had trapped Argentina in odious debt.
In December 2021, the IMF published an internal report admitting that the 2018 bailout completely failed to stabilize Argentina’s economy.
But when Argentina’s center-left President Alberto Fernández entered office in December 2019, his country was ensnared in $44.5 billion in debt from this bailout that the IMF itself admitted was a total failure. ($44.5 billion of the $57.1 billion loan had already been disbursed, and Fernández cancelled the rest.)
The Argentine government has tried to renegotiate the debt, but in order to do so the IMF has imposed conditions that severely restrict the nation’s sovereignty – such as appointing a British economist who “will virtually be the new economic minister,” acting as a kind of “co-government,” warned prominent diplomat Alicia Castro.
Seeking ways around these US debt traps, Fernández decided this February to turn to the two rising Eurasian superpowers.

Argentine President Fernández travels to Russia to meet with Putin
On February 3, Argentine President Alberto Fernández travelled to Russia to meet with President Vladimir Putin.
“I’m certain Argentina has to stop being so dependent on the [International Monetary] Fund and the United States, and has to open up to other places, and that is where it seems to me that Russia has a very important place,” Fernández said, explaining his motivation for the trip.
| "Estamos dando un paso importante para que la Argentina y Rusia profundicen sus lazos", expresó el presidente @alferdez en una declaración conjunta que brindó junto a su par Vladímir Putin. #GiraPresidencial

@KremlinRussia_Ehttps://t.co/aHl8tOuPZy pic.twitter.com/APoQR6VHtU
— Casa Rosada (@CasaRosada) February 3, 2022
Fernández added that, for Russia, Argentina “should be the door to enter” the region, telling Putin, “We could be a venue for the development of your cooperation with Latin American nations.”
The two leaders discussed Russian investment in the Argentine economy, trade, railroad construction, and energy technology.
Fernández also thanked Moscow for collaborating with his country in the production of its Sputnik V covid-19 vaccine. Argentina was the first country in the western hemisphere to do so.
The Argentine president even pointed out in their meeting that he has received three doses of the Sputnik V vaccine. Putin added, “Me too.”
Putin said the two countries agree on many issues, calling Argentina “one of Russia’s key partners in Latin America.”
Es un honor haberme reunido con Vladímir Putin, presidente de Rusia.

Tuvimos la oportunidad de intercambiar ideas sobre cómo podemos complementar mucho más el vínculo entre nuestras naciones. pic.twitter.com/ntmDGn6jtD
— Alberto Fernández (@alferdez) February 3, 2022
Argentine President Fernández travels to China to meet with Xi
Just three days after meeting with Putin, President Alberto Fernández travelled to China on February 6 to meet with President Xi Jinping.
In this historic trip, Argentina officially joined Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, a massive global infrastructure program.
Fernández and other top Argentine officials signed agreements for $23.7 billion in Chinese financing, including investments and infrastructure projects.
The funding will be disbursed in two parts: one, which is already approved, will provide Argentina with $14 billion for 10 infrastructure projects; the second, for $9.7 billion, will finance the South American nation’s integration into the Belt and Road.
There are three joint Chinese-Argentine projects that were reportedly at the top of Fernández’s list: creating 5G networks, developing Argentina’s lithium industry, and building the Atucha III nuclear power plant.
Tuve una cordial, amistosa y fructífera reunión con Xi Jinping, presidente de China. Acordamos la incorporación de Argentina a la Franja y la Ruta de la Seda.

Es una excelente noticia. Nuestro país obtendrá más de US$ 23 mil millones de inversiones chinas para obras y proyectos. pic.twitter.com/LGyIJ6zWdG
— Alberto Fernández (@alferdez) February 6, 2022
Fernández also discussed plans for Argentina to produce China’s Sinopharm covid-19 vaccine, in addition to Russia’s Sputnik V.
Argentina and China signed a comprehensive memorandum of understanding, including 13 documents for cooperation in areas such as green energy, technology, education, agriculture, communication, and nuclear energy.
Fernández and Xi discussed ways to “strengthen relations of political, commercial, economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation between both countries,” according to an Argentine government readout of the meeting.
The two leaders apparently hit it off very well, with Fernández telling Xi, “If you were Argentine, you would be a Peronist.”
| El presidente @alferdez mantuvo reuniones sobre el proyecto de producir en Argentina la vacuna de Sinopharm, participó de la inauguración de los JJOO de Invierno #Beijing2022 y visitó el Museo de la Historia del Partido Comunista. #GiraPresidencialhttps://t.co/acSH9rvpM7 pic.twitter.com/Edz7hHRLE8
— Casa Rosada (@CasaRosada) February 4, 2022
Argentina’s incorporation into the Belt and Road comes mere weeks after Nicaragua joined the initiative in January, and Cuba in December.
Latin America’s growing links with China and Russia show how the increasingly multipolar international system offers countries in the Global South new potential allies who can serve as bulwarks against and alternatives to Washington’s hegemony.
While right-wing leaders in Latin America keep looking north to the United States as their political compass, progressive governments are reaching across the ocean to the Eurasian powers of China, Russia, and Iran, building new international alliances that weaken Washington’s geopolitical grip over a region that the US president still insists is its “front yard.”
 

jward

passin' thru
FACT SHEET: Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States
February 11, 2022 • Speeches and Remarks






Read the full strategy here

“We envision an Indo-Pacific that is open, connected, prosperous, resilient, and secure—and we are ready to work together with each of you to achieve it.”
President Joe Biden
East Asia Summit
October 27, 2021

The Biden-Harris Administration has made historic strides to restore American leadership in the Indo-Pacific and adapt its role for the 21st century. In the last year, the United States has modernized its longstanding alliances, strengthened emerging partnerships, and forged innovative links among them to meet urgent challenges, from competition with China to climate change to the pandemic. It has done so at a time when allies and partners around the world are increasingly enhancing their own engagement in the Indo-Pacific; and when there is broad, bipartisan agreement in the U.S. Congress that the United States must, too. This convergence in commitment to the region, across oceans and across political-party lines, reflects an undeniable reality: the Indo-Pacific is the most dynamic region in the world, and its future affects people everywhere.

That reality is the basis of the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States. This strategy outlines President Biden’s vision to more firmly anchor the United States in the Indo-Pacific and strengthen the region in the process. Its central focus is sustained and creative collaboration with allies, partners, and institutions, within the region and beyond it.

The United States will pursue an Indo-Pacific region that is:
  1. FREE AND OPEN
Our vital interests and those of our closest partners require a free and open Indo-Pacific, and a free and open Indo-Pacific requires that governments can make their own choices and that shared domains are governed lawfully. Our strategy begins with strengthening resilience, both within individual countries, as we have done in the United States, and among them. We will advance a free and open region, including by:
  • Investing in democratic institutions, a free press, and a vibrant civil society
  • Improving fiscal transparency in the Indo-Pacific to expose corruption and drive reform
  • Ensuring the region’s seas and skies are governed and used according to international law
  • Advancing common approaches to critical and emerging technologies, the internet, and cyber space
2. CONNECTED
A free and open Indo-Pacific can only be achieved if we build collective capacity for a new age. The alliances, organizations, and rules that the United States and its partners have helped to build must be adapted. We will build collective capacity within and beyond the region, including by:
  • Deepening our five regional treaty alliances with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Philippines, and Thailand
  • Strengthening relationships with leading regional partners, including India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Singapore, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Pacific Islands
  • Contributing to an empowered and unified ASEAN
  • Strengthening the Quad and delivering on its commitments
  • Supporting India’s continued rise and regional leadership
  • Partnering to build resilience in the Pacific Islands
  • Forging connections between the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic
  • Expanding U.S. diplomatic presence in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands
3. PROSPEROUS
The prosperity of everyday Americans is linked to the Indo-Pacific. That fact requires investments to encourage innovation, strengthen economic competitiveness, produce good-paying jobs, rebuild supply chains, and expand economic opportunities for middle-class families: 1.5 billion people in the Indo-Pacific will join the global middle class this decade. We will drive Indo-Pacific prosperity, including by:
  • Proposing an Indo-Pacific economic framework, through which we will:
    • Develop new approaches to trade that meet high labor and environmental standards
    • Govern our digital economies and cross-border data flows according to open principles, including through a new digital economy framework
    • Advance resilient and secure supply chains that are diverse, open, and predictable
    • Make shared investments in decarbonization and clean energy
  • Promoting free, fair, and open trade and investment through the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), including in our 2023 host year
  • Closing the region’s infrastructure gap through Build Back Better World with G7 partners
4. SECURE
For 75 years, the United States has maintained a strong and consistent defense presence necessary to support regional peace, security, stability, and prosperity. We are extending and modernizing that role and enhancing our capabilities to defend our interests and to deter aggression against U.S. territory and against our allies and partners. We will bolster Indo-Pacific security, drawing on all instruments of power to deter aggression and to counter coercion, including by:
  • Advancing integrated deterrence
  • Deepening cooperation and enhancing interoperability with allies and partners
  • Maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait
  • Innovating to operate in rapidly evolving threat environments, including space, cyberspace, and critical- and emerging-technology areas
  • Strengthening extended deterrence and coordination with our ROK and Japanese allies and pursuing the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
  • Continuing to deliver on AUKUS
  • Expanding U.S. Coast Guard presence and cooperation against other transnational threats
  • Working with Congress to fund the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and the Maritime Security Initiative
5. RESILIENT
The Indo-Pacific faces major transnational challenges. Climate change is growing ever-more severe as South Asia’s glaciers melt and the Pacific Islands battle existential rises in sea levels. The COVID-19 pandemic continues to inflict a painful human and economic toll across the region. And Indo-Pacific governments grapple with natural disasters, resource scarcity, internal conflict, and governance challenges. Left unchecked, these forces threaten to destabilize the region. We will build regional resilience to 21st-century transnational threats, including by:
  • Working with allies and partners to develop 2030 and 2050 targets, strategies, plans, and policies consistent with limiting global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius
  • Reducing regional vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation
  • Ending the COVID-19 pandemic and bolstering global health security
###
 
Top