ALERT The Winds of War Blow in Korea and The Far East

jward

passin' thru
Yeah, if i'm following the discussions, the ideas that they (US) was surprised by this, and/or doesn't know what to do to counter it is all "state hyperbole"
:shr:
A modern version of a Sprint ABM would probably have a shot as would a stearable rail gun projectle or a high energy laser (we've already been shooting down drones, artillery shells and rockets with them). But that's all at the final layer of defense of the target.

It all comes down to how much you want to spend and on what. The "easier" option from a technical point would be to re-MIRV all of the ICBMs and do so with more "usable"/low yield warheads. That would definitely up the MAD level. All we'd have to do then is convince them that we'd actually use them.....
 

northern watch

TB Fanatic
Chinese & Russian Warships Jointly Sail Through Chokepoint Off Japan's Mainland For 1st Time

BY TYLER DURDEN
ZERO HEDGE
MONDAY, OCT 18, 2021 - 11:00 PM

In an unprecedented maneuver amid joint naval drills that just wrapped up in the region, a large group of Chinese PLA and Russian warships sailed through a key chokepoint very close to Japan's mainland for the first time ever on Monday.

Ten naval vessels belonging to China and Russia passed through the northern Tsugaru Strait, Tokyo's Defense Ministry said soon after the pass through. It comes after the two militaries just wrapped up four days of joint naval exercises, dubbed 'Maritime Interaction 2021', in the Sea of Japan from Oct.14 through 17.

1634636943143.png
Russian MoD image of the weekend drills.

It also comes after in recent months Japan has made it clear that it sides with Washington's controversial Taiwan pro-independence stance, inviting the wrath and muscle-flexing of Beijing.

Nikkei Asia reported that "The warships sailed eastward toward the Pacific Ocean, likely as part of Naval Interaction 2021, a joint maritime exercise the two navies are conducting this month."

The maritime monitoring site Naval News described the weekend Russia-China drills as follows:

12 planes and helicopters of the Pacific Fleet’s air arm and the Chinese Navy were also involved in the maneuvers.
During the joint maneuvers, the crews of the warships from both countries practiced joint tactical maneuvering, mine countermeasures, artillery live-firing against seaborne targets. They also searched for and blocked a simulated enemy’s submarine in the assigned area.

Russia's military released footage showing the large-scale joint drills...

On Friday Russia's Ministry of Defense had blasted the behavior of a US destroyer in the Sea of Japan, charging that the USS Chafee had come dangerously close to a Russian vessel while intruding on Russia's territorial waters. Russian media reports said the two ships came within 60 meters of each other.

The US Navy later in the day refuted the claims, saying its ship was conducting legal "routine operations" in international waters while blaming the Russian warship for making an aggressive approach.



The Kremlin said the Russian Navy "chased" the US destroyer out of the area, with the two contradictory narratives still unsettled. Further the region has seen Russia and Japan locked in an island dispute that goes back to WWII. Over the past couple of years, there's been a handful of encounters between US and Russian ships, given neither the US nor its ally Japan recognize the extent of what Russia claims as territorial waters.


Chinese & Russian Warships Jointly Sail Through Chokepoint Off Japan's Mainland For 1st Time | ZeroHedge
 
Last edited:

northern watch

TB Fanatic
China, Russia navy ships jointly sail through Japan strait
Reuters
October 18, 202111:47 PM PDT
Last Updated 4 hours ago

Russian Navy's Steregushchiy-class corvette No.335 sails on the sea near Japan, in this handout photo taken by Japan Self-Defense Forces on October 18, 2021 and released by the Joint Staff Office of the Defense Ministry of Japan. Joint Staff Office of the Defense Ministry of Japan/Handout via REUTERS ATTENTION EDITORS - THIS IMAGE WAS PROVIDED BY A THIRD PARTY. MANDATORY CREDIT. REFILE - CORRECTING TYPE OF SHIP

Russian Navy's Steregushchiy-class corvette No.335 sails on the sea near Japan, in this handout photo taken by Japan Self-Defense Forces on October 18, 2021 and released by the Joint Staff Office of the Defense Ministry of Japan. Joint Staff Office of the Defense Ministry of Japan/Handout via REUTERS ATTENTION EDITORS - THIS IMAGE WAS PROVIDED BY A THIRD PARTY. MANDATORY CREDIT. REFILE - CORRECTING TYPE OF SHIP


Chinese Navy's Kunming-class destroyer No.172 sails on the sea near Japan, in this handout photo taken by Japan Self-Defense Forces on October 18, 2021 and released by the Joint Staff Office of the Defense Ministry of Japan. Joint Staff Office of the Defense Ministry of Japan/Handout via REUTERS

Chinese Navy's Kunming-class destroyer No.172 sails on the sea near Japan, in this handout photo taken by Japan Self-Defense Forces on October 18, 2021 and released by the Joint Staff Office of the Defense Ministry of Japan. Joint Staff Office of the Defense Ministry of Japan/Handout via REUTERS


Russian Navy's Marshal Nedelin-class missile range instrumentation ship No.331 sails on the sea near Japan, in this handout photo taken by Japan Self-Defense Forces on October 18, 2021 and released by the Joint Staff Office of the Defense Ministry of Japan.  Joint Staff Office of the Defense Ministry of Japan/Handout via REUTERS ATTENTION EDITORS - THIS IMAGE WAS PROVIDED BY A THIRD PARTY. MANDATORY CREDIT. REFILE - CORRECTING NAME OF SHIP CLASS

Russian Navy's Marshal Nedelin-class missile range instrumentation ship No.331 sails on the sea near Japan, in this handout photo taken by Japan Self-Defense Forces on October 18, 2021 and released by the Joint Staff Office of the Defense Ministry of Japan. Joint Staff Office of the Defense Ministry of Japan/Handout via REUTERS ATTENTION EDITORS - THIS IMAGE WAS PROVIDED BY A THIRD PARTY. MANDATORY CREDIT. REFILE - CORRECTING NAME OF SHIP CLASS

TOKYO, Oct 19 2021 (Reuters) - A group of 10 naval vessels from China and Russia sailed through a strait separating Japan's main island and its northern island of Hokkaido on Monday, the Japanese government said, adding that it is closely watching such activities.

It was the first time Japan has confirmed the passage of Chinese and Russian naval vessels sailing together through the Tsugaru Strait, which separates the Sea of Japan from the Pacific.

While the strait is regarded as international waters, Japan's ties with China have long been plagued by conflicting claims over a group of tiny East China Sea islets. Tokyo has a territorial dispute with Moscow, as well.

"The government is closely watching Chinese and Russian naval vessels' activities around Japan like this one with high interest," Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihiko Isozaki told a regular news conference on Tuesday.


"We will continue to do our utmost in our surveillance activity in waters and airspace around Japan."

A Japanese Defence Ministry spokesperson said there had been no violation of Japanese territorial waters and no international rules were broken by the passage of the vessels.

Russia and China held joint naval drills in the Sea of Japan as part of naval cooperation between the two countries from Oct. 14-17 involving warships and support vessels from Russia's Pacific Fleet.

Moscow and Beijing have cultivated closer military and diplomatic ties in recent years at a time when their relations with the West have soured.

Reporting by Kiyoshi Takenaka; editing by Richard Pullin

China, Russia navy ships jointly sail through Japan strait | Reuters
 

jward

passin' thru




Will Ripley
@willripleyCNN

5h

#urgent Still awaiting North Korean state media confirmation of what may be a test of a submarine launched ballistic missile. This comes amid a flurry of launches -- including what Pyongyang calls a hypersonic missile and a long range missile in recent months.
View: https://twitter.com/willripleyCNN/status/1450417518770855940?s=20

@NewDay
@JohnBerman



Dr. Jeffrey Lewis
@ArmsControlWonk

47m

Not now. JFC.

Yonhap News Agency
@YonhapNews


(URGENT) N. Korea fires unidentified projectile towards East Sea: JCS
View: https://twitter.com/YonhapNews/status/1450270939803893763?s=20


___________________________________
Doge
@IntelDoge
1m

Breaking: North Korea fires projectile off its Eastern coast.

William Gallo
@GalloVOA

2m

North Korea has conducted a projectile launch into the sea off its east coast, South Korea's military says in an alert.
 

jward

passin' thru
China demands US explain USS Connecticut’s collision with ‘unknown object,’ questions intentions behind cover-up

By Global Times Published: Oct 19, 2021 08:13 PM


South China Sea Photo: VCG



China is seriously concerned about the USS Connecticut’s collision with an "unknown object" in international waters in the South China Sea, and said the US is obligated to explain the incident in detail, China’s Ministry of National Defense said on Tuesday.

“For a long time, under the slogan of ‘freedom of navigation and overflight,’ the US has frequently dispatched advanced weapons platforms such as aircraft carriers, strategic bombers, and nuclear submarines in the South China Sea to show off its force and stir up trouble, seriously threatening regional national security and increasing regional tensions,” said Tan Kefei, spokesperson of China’s Ministry of National Defense in a statement.

On October 8, media reported that a US nuclear-powered submarine, the USS Connecticut, struck an underwater object in the South China Sea on October 2.

The US Navy confirmed the accident by saying it is unclear what the Seawolf-class submarine may have hit while it was submerged, adding that the submarine remains in a safe and stable condition, with its nuclear propulsion plant and spaces unaffected, but it did not explain the details of the accident.

Tan pointed out that the US Navy has deliberately delayed and concealed the details of the accident.

“It took the US Navy five days after the accident took place to make a short and unclear statement,” Tan said. “Such an irresponsible approach and cover-up lack transparency and can easily lead to misunderstandings and misjudgments. China and the neighboring countries in the South China Sea have to question the truth of the incident and the intentions behind it.”

This incident also shows that the recent establishment of a trilateral security partnership between the US, UK and Australia (AUKUS) to carry out nuclear submarine cooperation has brought a huge risk of nuclear proliferation, seriously violated the spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, undermined the construction of a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia, and brought severe challenges to regional peace and security, Tan said.

“We believe that the actions of the US will affect the safety of navigation in the South China Sea, arouse serious concerns and unrest among the countries in the region, and pose a serious threat and a major risk to regional peace and stability,” Tan said.

Tan urged that the US should stop reconnaissance and deployment of military forces against China in the adjacent sea and airspace of China’s South China Sea, and stop the so-called freedom of navigation in the waters.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry also expressed grave concern about the accident and urged the US to clarify more details, including its purpose of cruising in the area, and whether it has caused a nuclear leak that has damaged the local marine environment.

"I want to stress that the root cause of the incident, which also poses a serious threat and significant risks to regional peace and stability, is the US' constant stirring up of trouble in the South China Sea over a long period of time," said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian on October 8.

Experts reached by the Global Times said previously that the US nuclear submarines normally cruise in the South China Sea at depths of over 100 meters. If it collided with a reef or another submarine, the resulting damage would likely be serious. Some believed the "unknown object" is more likely an artificial fish reef rather than a breeding cage.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

N. Korea fires SLBM amid efforts to resume nuclear talks
Posted October. 20, 2021 07:31,
Updated October. 20, 2021 07:31

616f47582592d2738245.jpg


North Korea fired a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) into the East Sea on Tuesday. The missile launch, which was the seventh this year, was carried out on the day when intelligence chiefs and nuclear envoys of South Korea, the U.S. and Japan met in Seoul and Washington, respectively. The latest provocation came amid efforts from South Korea and the U.S. to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table through discussions on end-of-war declaration and humanitarian aid to the North.

According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on Tuesday, an SLBM was launched from waters east of Sinpo at 10:17 a.m. and flew 590 kilometers, hitting an altitude of 60 kilometers. The JCS suspects that a new mini-SLBM, which had never been launched before, was launched from a submarine. “It is likely that an SLBM was fired from an existing submarine since a 3,000-ton submarine newly built at Sinpo shipyard has not been launched yet,” a JCS official said. Last Tuesday, North Korea unveiled a small SLBM for the first time at the Self-Defence-2021 exhibition in Pyongyang.

Unlike the Pukguksong-3 with an estimated flight range of over 2,000 kilometers that was launched from a barge in October 2019, the North’s latest short-range ballistic missile does not target the U.S. mainland. It is a new strategic weapon capable of striking South Korea by carrying tactical nuclear weapons.

During an emergency meeting of the National Security Council, Cheong Wa Dae said it is deeply regrettable that the missile launch took place when active discussions are under way among major countries, including South Korea, the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia to advance the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. The South Korean presidential office called SLBM a “short-range ballistic missile” and did not use the term “provocation.”

“The U.S. condemns these actions and calls on North Korea to refrain from any further destabilizing acts,” the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said in a statement.


tree624@donga.com
 

jward

passin' thru
Japan’s prime minister: Attack capability on enemy bases an option
• Japan News • October 20, 2021



North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and other officials watch a ballistic missile launch in this undated photo from the state-run Korean Central News Agency.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and other officials watch a ballistic missile launch in this undated photo from the state-run Korean Central News Agency. (KCNA)



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TOKYO — In response to North Korea's latest missile launch, the Japanese National Security Council (NSC) on Tuesday confirmed that it would consider measures to strengthen national defense that include having the capability to attack enemy bases based on the right of self-defense.

The Japanese government is becoming increasingly concerned about North Korea's improved missile technology as Pyongyang continues to launch missiles with irregular trajectories that are difficult to intercept. If its submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) become deployable, it will pose a serious threat to Japan, the United States and other allies.

"We confirmed that we will consider all options, including having the capability to attack enemy bases. We will work to drastically strengthen our defense capabilities," Prime Minister Fumio Kishida told reporters after the meeting at the office of the NSC, in which he met with the defense and foreign ministers and the chief cabinet secretary.

Such capabilities would enable attacks on enemy military facilities such as missile launch sites, with the aim of deterring an enemy from launching missiles.

In 2020, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's administration, faced with the difficulty of intercepting a missile on an irregular trajectory using current technology and equipment, began considering gaining the capability to attack enemy bases, but the idea was shelved by the Cabinet of his successor, Yoshihide Suga.

If North Korea becomes able to deploy SLBMs along with high-performance submarines, it will be difficult to detect launches in advance and intercept missiles. That would make it possible for North Korea to conduct surprise attacks on Japan and the United States from nearby waters.


This is significant in that it also gives Pyongyang the ability to strike back from the sea if its land-based missiles are destroyed. If the latest missiles were confirmed to be SLBMs, it will mark their first launch by North Korea since October 2019. The Defense Ministry said that if the missile's trajectory is irregular, it is likely a new type.

North Korea had a successful underwater launch of a missile in 2015, and has since continued test launches of its Pukguksong SLBMs. At its military development exhibition that started Oct. 11, North Korea unveiled a "mini SLBM" similar to the Russian short-range ballistic missile Iskander, which flies on an irregular trajectory.

North Korea has been repeatedly launching missiles since mid-September. It is believed the latest launch of what appears to be SLBMs is aimed at increasing the level of provocation against the United States, and making it a bargaining chip in bilateral talks with the United States over nuclear development and other issues.

However, the Japanese government believes the antisubmarine defenses of Japan and the United States are sufficient to cope with the situation, with a senior Self-Defense Forces official saying, "It is easy to detect navigation sounds of North Korean submarines and their cruising ranges are short." The government will continue to improve its ability to deal with submarines.

previous coverage
related stories
 

jward

passin' thru
:: shrug :: a counterargument was the drones o'er the thaad battery sites last year. . .




Ankit Panda
@nktpnd


What—and I cannot emphasize this enough—the hell?
View: https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/1450998176161349635?s=20


I'm at a loss for words.
So, here's the thing: Iron Dome is absolutely and utterly incapable of handling any realistic missile threats to Guam. Unless the PLAN has mermen armed with mortars/short-range rockets that we don't know about.
So, this is nominally about cruise missile defense, but a) Iron Dome probably isn't going to cut it for many cruise missiles and b) there aren't really existing PRC cruise missile threats to Guam*.
View: https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/1450999449216593929?s=20

* By the time Chinese cruise missiles are going to be heading to Guam in a crisis/conflict, you can bet your hat that DF-26s will have already arrived.

Folks can cite the CJ-10 or whatever to justify this, but this seems more compelling. View: https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/1451001008918773764?s=20
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
:: shrug :: a counterargument was the drones o'er the thaad battery sites last year. . .




Ankit Panda
@nktpnd


What—and I cannot emphasize this enough—the hell?
View: https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/1450998176161349635?s=20


I'm at a loss for words.
So, here's the thing: Iron Dome is absolutely and utterly incapable of handling any realistic missile threats to Guam. Unless the PLAN has mermen armed with mortars/short-range rockets that we don't know about.
So, this is nominally about cruise missile defense, but a) Iron Dome probably isn't going to cut it for many cruise missiles and b) there aren't really existing PRC cruise missile threats to Guam*.
View: https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/1450999449216593929?s=20

* By the time Chinese cruise missiles are going to be heading to Guam in a crisis/conflict, you can bet your hat that DF-26s will have already arrived.

Folks can cite the CJ-10 or whatever to justify this, but this seems more compelling. View: https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/1451001008918773764?s=20

I've got to wonder if it is more a case of operational environmental testing of the system in the heat and sea air environment of Guam with an eye to similar conditions on Taiwan and other near by locals?....
 

jward

passin' thru

ProfTalmadge
@ProfTalmadge


What are we to make of all these recent revelations about emerging Chinese nuclear capabilities? Is China about to lob a nuclear weapon at the US? No. But context is everything, and the context here is worrisome. THREAD 1/6

China has been engaging in both quantitative nuclear expansion (e.g., new silos) as well as qualitative improvements (e.g., being able to deliver nuclear across more diversified platforms). Not surprising given PRC power. More surprising it hadn’t already happened, actually. 2/

BUT improvements to China’s nuclear arsenal today come against a backdrop of worsening relationship with US and other powers, threatening behavior toward neighbors esp Taiwan, and tremendous growth in Chinese conventional forces. 3/

China is not gearing up for some kind of bolt from the blue nuclear strike against US. But it looks a lot like China wants to be sure that US can’t use nuclear weapons to coerce China in a conventional crisis or war that China might start or stumble into. 4/

China is working to entrench US in a deeper state of mutual nuclear vulnerability, which is a concern if China then challenges the status quo at the CONVENTIONAL level. 5/

Under deep nuclear stalemate, the conventional balance of power & balance of resolve will determine outcomes. And those prob favor China in future conflict. Hence, China does not have to be plotting to lob a nuke at LA for recent developments to be concerning & consequential. 6/6
 

jward

passin' thru
Jonathan McDowell
@planet4589


The new @FT story by @dimi https://ft.com/content/c7139a23-1271-43ae-975b-9b632330130b
suggests that the `Chinese FOBS' launch date was Jul 27; I will update the launch date for 2021-U01 accordingly.

The story also talks about a second 'hypersonic test' on Aug 13, but doesn't say it was also a FOBS test or indeed exoatmospheric, so I am not including that one in my catalog
View: https://twitter.com/planet4589/status/1451348183012028416?s=20
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.......

Posted for fair use.....

Learning to manage the China threat

20 Oct 2021| Shlomo Ben-Ami

When US President Bill Clinton backed China’s accession to the World Trade Organization, he suggested that the move would spark profound changes ‘from the inside out’. By joining the WTO, China would not simply be agreeing to import more American products; it would be ‘agreeing to import one of democracy’s most cherished values, economic freedom’. And ‘the more China liberalizes its economy,’ Clinton predicted, ‘the more fully it will liberate the potential of its people.’

Reality has turned out to be far more complicated.

The notion that free trade leads inexorably to democracy didn’t begin with Clinton. His predecessor, George H.W. Bush, operated under the same assumption: ‘No nation on Earth has discovered a way to import the world’s goods and services while stopping foreign ideas at the border.’

Two decades after China’s WTO accession in 2001, its economy has reached the expected milestones. But it is nowhere near becoming a democracy, and American leaders have not only lost confidence in the presumed relationship between economic and political freedom, but now fear that Western democracy is vulnerable to Chinese influence.

As US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo warned last year, the free world should ‘change China, or China will change us’. Likewise, following last summer’s G7 summit, US President Joe Biden defined the struggle between Western democracies, led by the US, and China as ‘a contest with autocratic governments around the world’. In an echo of Cold War logic, the assumption now seems to be that there’s room for only one political system in town.

To some extent, China seems to subscribe to a similar worldview. It sees Western efforts to uphold human rights as a direct threat to its domestic political stability. China’s national sovereignty and ‘national dignity’ come first.

In any case, the US should be careful what it wishes for. China is a global power, with an economy that has fuelled growth and prosperity worldwide. If it were to experience a profound political transformation, the process might not be particularly peaceful, in which case the consequences would reverberate globally.

Of course, such a transformation will never come if the Chinese Communist Party can help it. The CCP has obliterated all such efforts, including the New Citizens’ Movement, headed by figures like the late intellectual Liu Xiaobo, who won the Nobel Peace Prize while in prison for promoting a pro-democracy charter. In 1989, Liu famously kept vigil to protect protesters at Tiananmen Square from another CCP action aimed at crushing a pro-democracy movement.

As uncomfortable as it may be for Westerners to admit, the CCP has successfully led China through one crisis after another: the 2002–03 SARS epidemic, the 2008 global financial meltdown and the Covid-19 pandemic. Of course, other Asian states that are not authoritarian also managed these crises well. Still, given China’s size and economic weight, these episodes could have been far more destabilising than they were.

This is not to say that no changes to China’s political system would be positive. Nor is it to suggest that the CCP will always manage to prevent change, or manage a crisis well (as its mishandling of the start of the Covid-19 pandemic suggests). Still, political systems are inherently dynamic and open to evolution. China’s economic success—which belies Max Weber’s assessment that Confucian cultures were incompatible with capitalism—is proof of that.

So far, the CPC has managed to build a version of capitalism that aligns with—and advances—its priorities, including the persistence of its political monopoly. Economic growth and development have given the one-party regime what the late political scientist Samuel Huntington called ‘performance legitimacy’. But this could turn out to be the CCP’s downfall, if China faces a sharp enough economic slump.

Even continued economic success could prove problematic for the CCP. Clinton and Bush were not totally off base in their belief that economic liberalisation can weaken a dictatorship: that’s what happened to Francisco Franco’s regime in Spain. Increased prosperity and exposure to the outside world can breed resentment in authoritarian countries.

That is why the CCP continues to resist full liberalisation and protect the state sector, despite high costs. It’s also a major reason why the party has ramped up its investment in internal security, with annual spending more than tripling since 2007. In 2017, China’s spending on internal security stood at ¥1.24 trillion (US$196 billion), higher by about ¥20 billion than its spending on military defence.

All this investment makes a revolution highly unlikely. Even dictatorships without such resources—think of Cuba or Iran—have often proved highly resilient. And even if, say, an internal coup occurred in China, there’s little reason to think that it would bring anything close to Western-style democracy.

Russia didn’t become such a democracy after the collapse of the Soviet Union; on the contrary, President Vladimir Putin’s tenure has proven that authoritarian forces can easily survive ‘democratic transitions’. Russia’s experience (and enduring imperial ambitions) also puts the lie to the notion that regime change would spur China to stop challenging the US and its allies.

That challenge must be taken seriously. By advancing his imperial designs in East Asia, Chinese President Xi Jinping has virtually abandoned China’s long-touted promise of a ‘peaceful rise’. He has also established a personality-driven neo-Maoist dictatorship. Attempts to force Xi’s regime to fulfill its human rights obligations could probably spur even more dangerous antagonism.

What the US doesn’t do to mitigate the security threat posed by China is as important as what it does. The Biden administration should continue building on recent progress in creating collective security arrangements, such as the AUKUS pact with the United Kingdom and Australia and the so-called Quad with Australia, India and Japan. What it should not do is perpetuate a Cold War–style zero-sum game aimed at forcing regime change in China.

AUTHOR
Shlomo Ben-Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister, is vice president of the Toledo International Center for Peace. He is the author of Scars of war, wounds of peace: the Israeli–Arab tragedy. This article is presented in partnership with Project Syndicate © 2021. Image: Lintao Zhang/Getty Images.
 

Zagdid

Veteran Member

Chinese ‘Forces’ Can Now Shoot Down Intruders – Be It At Himalayan LAC Or In South China Sea
By Jayanta Kalita October 25, 2021

China’s new law to strengthen border security is hardly any surprise given that Beijing came out with a similar legal mechanism to protect its maritime boundaries earlier this year.

Both pieces of legislation have one thing in common – they provide the country’s law enforcement agencies with a license to kill “intruders” – be it in the Himalayas or the South China Sea.

On October 23, Beijing passed a law to boost border protection that allows the use of blockades and “police apparatus and weapons” against intruders. Coming amid a protracted standoff with India along the LAC, this development sends ominous signals.

The militaries of the two nuclear-armed neighbors had a bloody faceoff along the disputed border in eastern Ladakh’s Galwan Valley in June last year, resulting in 24 casualties. Despite multiple rounds of military and diplomatic-level talks, there is no easy solution to this impasse in sight.

Earlier this year, on February 1, China’s new Coast Guard law took effect even as Beijing continues to resort to what is called ‘grey zone tactics’ to assert its claims over the South and East China seas.

This law allows Coast Guard fleets to use lethal force on foreign ships operating in China’s waters, including the disputed waters claimed by the communist country.

This essentially means that what Chinese ‘maritime militias’ have been doing all these years – to scare away fishermen, people, or entities belonging to other claimants from these disputed waters – may soon be replaced with an aggressive push-back policy against other littoral states.

China Loves Border Disputes
China shares land borders with 14 countries including India, Russia, and North Korea. The People’s Liberation Army and the People’s Armed Police Force are tasked with guarding the border against any “invasion, encroachment, infiltration, provocation”.

It also shares maritime boundaries with many Southeast Asian nations. Needless to say, Beijing loves boundary disputes. One of the hallmarks of expansionist China is to first alter its land and maritime boundaries based on some “historic” claims and then get embroiled in prolonged negotiations.

The latter is just a ploy to buy time so that it can make constitutional/legal amendments in order to protect occupied territories.

The latest land border legislation seems to be an exercise in that direction. This is the first time that the People’s Republic of China, founded 72 years ago, has a dedicated law specifying how it governs and guards its 22,000-km land border shared with 14 countries, according to Reuters.

Pertinent to note that the 13th round of military commander-level border talks between India and China ended in a stalemate on October 10, following which the two sides blamed each other.

Lessons from Chinese history have confirmed that Beijing will not shy away from military confrontation with India, a Chinese political analyst had said after the deadly Galwan Valley clashes in June 2020.

As China faces heightened tensions with the US in both the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, political analysts believe that India decided to take a more aggressive stance on the border because New Delhi thinks Beijing will make compromises to avoid military confrontations on different fronts.

However, Chinese political analysts argued that history has shown that Chinese rulers have not usually shied away from military conflicts on different fronts because they needed to project a strong image for the domestic audience to protect the legitimacy of their rule.

“When facing domestic rebellions, the Chinese rulers would have to prove legitimacy of its rule. That is why when facing foreign enemies, they would have to take a firm stance and prove that they are the legitimate guardian of the country. That is why they can not make compromises when facing a foreign enemy like India. That is how they can maintain their domestic rule,” Ni Lexiong, a military expert at the University of Politics and Law in Shanghai, had told Sputnik last year.
This argument seems to hold water if one looks at the timing of China’s new law to strengthen security at its frontiers. How India reacts to this development in terms of its own border security mechanism is yet to be seen.
 

jward

passin' thru
Home» News»China’s Massive New Aircraft Carrier Is As Big As It Can Be

Chinese aircraft carrier in dry dock satellite image
Click to Enlarge. The new dry dock on Hainan in the South China Sea is only just large enough for the Type-003 aircraft carrier. This suggests that future carriers will be the same size.

China’s Massive New Aircraft Carrier Is As Big As It Can Be
Aircraft carriers are at the vanguard of China's incredible naval expansion A new, larger super-carrier is being built near Shanghai. Analysis of radar satellite imagery shows that it is as large as China's new bases allow.
H I Sutton 27 Oct 2021​

The growth of the Chinese Navy has been incredible. The PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) is barely recognizable from itself twenty years ago. Among the most important developments have been aircraft carriers.

Defense analysts have been trawling open source intelligence (OSINT) to keep up with developments. But like much of China, the shipyard building the latest carrier is protected from traditional satellite observation by impenetrable cloud. A new commercial satellite has provided Naval News with a way to see through this cloud.

Seeing In The Dark Or Through Cloud
Using SAR (Synthetic Aperture Radar) satellites owned by Capella Space we have checked progress on the carrier. This radar imagery can see through the clouds, and at night.

Starting from 10 years ago with imported Russian technology, the latest design is starting to match the U.S. Navy’s super carriers. The PLAN now has two of the Russian-based carriers in service. And the third, the Type-003, is under construction near Shanghai. It is roughly comparable to the U.S. Navy’s Ford Class.

The SAR imagery picks out the three deck catapults, a major change from the Russian based carriers. Those rely on a ski-jump bow to launch aircraft. That works for the J-15 Flanker fighters but does not permit the KJ-600 AWE&C (airborne early warning and control) aircraft to operate. This new twin-prop plane closely resembles the E-2 Hawkeye and is seen as generally comparable to the latest models.

The new carrier as EMALS (electro-magnetic aircraft launch system), like catapults. This is the same technology tat the U.S. Navy is introducing with the Ford Class. It means that the KJ-600 can be operated. And it should improve the endurance of carrier borne fighters. In particular, a new stealthier carrier fighter is expected.
Chinese-Navy-Aircraft-Carrier-under-construction-1024x576.jpg
The Type-003 aircraft carrier is visible in this recent radar satellite (SAR) image from Capella Space.
Progress appears steady at the Shanghai yard. Another ship which was recently in the same dry dock, but nearer the river, has been moved. This was blocking the entrance of the dry dock so is a necessary step before the carrier is launched.

We do not believe that launch of the carrier is imminent however. This is because sections of a container ship have been moved into the dock behind the carrier. Two massive holes providing access to the inner workings. This is normal for aircraft carrier construction and the same can be seen on U.S. ships.

Analysis of the imagery also reveals insights on other warship programs. A number of the large hovercraft intended for amphibious ships are still present in the basin, along with other naval vessels.
Of particular interest however, the unique ‘Sailless’ submarine does not appear to be present. Analysts will be watching this submarine closely for signs of it entering operational service, or being moved to a research unit.

Size Matters
1,900 km (1,200 miles) further south, at Sanya on Hainan, work is continuing on a gigantic dry dock for the carriers. The facility is strategically located for access to the South China Sea. One carrier, the Type-002 Shandong, is already based there, together with most of China’s nuclear submarine fleet.

A large cofferdam was built in 2016-17 to keep the sea out while construction took place. The docks are now clearly visible in the SAR imagery. Measurements confirm that the new Type-003 aircraft carrier will be able to fit it. However it’s tight beam suggests that China does not have plans for substantially larger carriers.
Chinese-Navy-Aircraft-Carriers-Compared-1024x576.jpg
The Type-003 carrier (left) is wider and loner tan the first two carriers, such as the Type-002 (left). Catapults replace the ski-jump allowing more types of aircraft to be operated.
Importantly, the largest new dock is only about 80 meters (268 feet) wide, which is the same as the docket where the Type-003 is being built. The Type-003 itself is also approximately 80m wide (our earlier estimates were slightly narrow as it turned out). This suggests that a) the Type-003 will fit inside the new dock, b) any new carrier cannot be any wider if it too is to fit.

Therefore it seems likely that the Type-003 represents the ‘full size’ Chinese aircraft carrier for the foreseeable future. The next ones may be longer, or greater displacement, but not wider. If they are, yet more infrastructure may need to be built.

The new aircraft carriers represent a significant increase in capabilities for the Chinese Navy. And also part of their emergence as a true blue-water force.

 

jward

passin' thru
Navy Not Sure What USS Connecticut Struck in the South China Sea, Beijing Accuses U.S. of Cover-Up

By: Sam LaGrone


October 27, 2021 4:43 PM



USS Connecticut (SSN-22) arrives at Fleet Activities Yokosuka for a scheduled port visit, July 31, 2021. US Navy Photo
The U.S. Navy still isn’t positive what one of its most powerful attack submarines hit in the South China Sea, as repair assessments continue in Guam, four sources familiar with the results of the preliminary investigations told USNI News this week.

As of Tuesday afternoon, the undersea object that damaged the forward section of USS Connecticut (SSN-22) had not been definitively determined as part of several investigations into the Oct. 2 incident, the sources said.
Early indications were Connecticut hit a seamount in the South China Sea, two defense officials familiar with the Navy’s examination of the submarines told USNI News, but that has not been confirmed by investigators. Politico first reported earlier this month that the boat may have hit an undersea feature.
Cmdr. Cindy Fields, a spokesperson with Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, told USNI News the command had nothing to add to its initial statement on what the submarine hit. She said two investigations – a safety investigation board convened by COMSUBPAC and a command investigation overseen by the Japan-based U.S. 7th Fleet – are currently looking into the incident.

Connecticut struck an object while submerged on the afternoon of Oct. 2, while operating in international waters in the Indo-Pacific region,” PACFLEET said on Oct. 7.
The impact to the forward part of the attack submarine damaged the submarine’s forward ballast tanks and forced the boat to make a week-long trip on the surface to Guam, two defense officials told USNI News this week.
The four sources confirmed the Navy’s public statement that the reactor compartment of the submarine was undamaged from when the boat hit the object.
Since returning to Guam, the boat is still under evaluation for the scope of repairs by Naval Sea Systems Command, personnel from the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and submarine tender USS Emory S. Land (AS-39), Fields told USNI News on Tuesday.

The teams will first determine what repairs Connecticut needs to leave Guam safely and then follow-on repairs, Fields said. The closest dry dock for major submarine maintenance is in Hawaii. The Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, which is near the attack boat’s homeport in Bremerton, Wash., is the second closest dry dock.
While repairs and several investigations continue, Chinese officials have accused the U.S. of concealing details of the incident from Beijing.
“The Chinese side has repeatedly expressed grave concerns over the matter and asked the U.S. side to make clarifications,” Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said on Tuesday.
“We have seen nothing but a brief and vague statement issued by the U.S. military with procrastination, and a confirmation by a so-called informant that the incident did happen in the South China Sea. Such an irresponsible, cagey practice gives regional countries and the international community every reason to question the truth of the incident and the intention of the U.S.”

Connecticut is one of three Seawolf-class attack submarines. The boat left in May for a deployment to the Western Pacific and has made at least two port calls to Japan.
Pentagon spokesman John Kirby earlier this month dismissed China’s accusation that the U.S. was engaging in a coverup of the incident.
“It’s an odd way of covering something up when you put out a press release about it,” Kirby told reporters when asked about China’s allegation.
 

jward

passin' thru
(3rd LD) N.K. leader loses 20 kilograms, has no health issues: Seoul's spy agency | Yonhap News Agency
이해아

3-4 minutes


(ATTN: UPDATES with more details in paras 9-11)
By Lee Haye-ah

SEOUL, Oct. 28 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has lost around 20 kilograms after previously weighing about 140 kg, but he appears to have no health issues, South Korea's spy agency was quoted as saying Thursday.
The National Intelligence Service (NIS) gave the briefing during a closed-door parliamentary session, rejecting rumors that the communist regime was using a stand-in for Kim during recent public appearances, Rep. Kim Byung-kee of the ruling Democratic Party told reporters.

The NIS made the assessment after conducting a detailed study of the North Korean leader's health using artificial intelligence and other scientific methods, the lawmaker said.
Kim's health has been a frequent subject of speculation due to the political implications in the event that he is unable to perform his duties. No known successor has been appointed.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un delivers a congratulatory speech during a visit to a defense development exhibition, Self-Defence-2021, in Pyongyang on Oct. 11, 2021, in this file photo released by the Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un delivers a congratulatory speech during a visit to a defense development exhibition, Self-Defence-2021, in Pyongyang on Oct. 11, 2021, in this file photo released by the Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
Kim carried out public activities on 71 days this year, which is 45 percent more than during the same period last year, the NIS said.

He has also removed portraits of his father and grandfather, former leaders Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-sung, from the backdrop of official meetings, indicating a departure from the shadow of his predecessors.
Internally, the term "Kim Jong-un-ism" is being used, the agency said.
The leader's sister, Kim Yo-jong, has conducted public activities on 34 occasions this year, double the number last year, and oversees the regime's relations with South Korea and the United States while also making undisclosed trips to the provinces to check on people's livelihoods and report her findings to her brother.
The NIS said it detected signs that a 5-megawatt nuclear reactor at North Korea's Yongbyon complex was recently reactivated, with its reprocessing facilities also appearing to have been in operation for seven months from February.
The NIS believes North Korea could have reprocessed spent nuclear fuel rods during the period to harvest weapons-grade plutonium and bolster its nuclear capabilities, thus highlighting the strategic value of the Yongbyon complex.
Last month's launch of a new hypersonic missile was the first test of the weapon, meaning it will require additional tests, according to the agency.

On the North's economic difficulties, the NIS said cross-border trade with China came to US$185 million during the first nine months of this year, which is a third of the level during the same period last year, Rep. Ha Tae-keung of the main opposition People Power Party told reporters.
The North's central bank has struggled to print money due to shortages of paper and ink and a scarcity of medicines has led to the spread of infectious diseases.
The North Korean leader has said he feels like he is walking on thin ice due to the economic situation and ordered "all who eat to go help farming villages," Kim, the lawmaker, quoted the NIS as saying.
 

jward

passin' thru
Casus Belli
@CasusBellii



| L'Inde a testé le 27 Octobre un ICBM "Agni-5", capable de porter une tête nucléaire, avec une portée allant jusqu'à 5000 kilomètres. Le MoD indien a annoncé que le missile Agni-5 a été tiré depuis l'île Abdul Kalam, à l'est des côtes indiennes, le soir.
1635595645813.png1635595669505.png
 

northern watch

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From Bloomberg Balance of Power October 30 2021

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India Deploys U.S. Weapons to Fortify Disputed Border With China
India has deployed recently acquired U.S.-made weaponry along its border with China, part of a new offensive force to bolster its capabilities as the countries remain deadlocked over disputed territory in the Himalayas, Sudhi Ranjan Sen reports.

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jward

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China Will Pay To Build A New Military Base On Tajikistan's Border With Afghanistan
Chinese-supported border security bases in Tajikistan are just one part of a changing geopolitical environment across the region.
By Joseph Trevithick October 28, 2021


Chinese troops march in review during an exercise in Tajikistan in 2019.
China Military Online

Tajikistan's parliament had approved a plan to establish a new border security base with Chinese funding. This news comes amid other reports that Tajik authorities have offered to turn over control of a separate base in their country entirely to the Chinese government. All of this would seem to reflect a broader response from Beijing to the newly emerging security situation following the Taliban's takeover of neighboring Afghanistan and the U.S. military's controversial withdrawal from that country. There are particular fears that Al Qaeda, ISIS, and other terrorist organizations will be able to exploit the current situation to step up activities inside Afghanistan, as well as the surrounding region and elsewhere around the world.

The lower house of Tajikistan's Supreme Assembly signed off on the proposed base construction, which is part of a larger deal between the country's Interior Ministry and China’s Public Security Ministry, on Oct. 27, 2021. Tajik First Deputy Interior Minister Abdurahmon Alamshozoda said that the facility would be situated in the village of Vakhon in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province, according to the U.S. government-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's (RFE/RL) Tajik Service. Gorno-Badakhshan lies to the north of Afghanistan's narrow Wakhan Corridor, which is wedged in between Tajikistan, China, and Pakistan.

Tajik lawmaker Tolibkhon Azimzoda also said that it would cost around $10 million in total to build the base, but it's not clear how much of that will be paid for by the Chinese government, RFE/RL reported. However, Tajik authorities have said that, at least officially, Chinese troops will not be stationed there. Elements of Tajikistan's Rapid Reaction Group, a specialized paramilitary force assigned to the Ministry of Interior, is expected to be the main tenant, while regular Tajik military forces will also make use of the facility.

Satellite Imagery Contradicts Reports Of Foreign Aircraft At Bagram Air Base In Afghanistan (Updated) By Tyler Rogoway Posted in The War Zone

Al Qaeda Kingpin Resurfaces In Afghanistan Surrounded By Taliban Security By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone

Huge Taliban Parade Features Throngs Of U.S.-Bought Vehicles And A Black Hawk Helicopter By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone

Tracking China's Sudden Airpower Expansion On Its Western Border By detresfa_By Sim TackBy The Intel LabBy Tyler Rogoway Posted in The War Zone

Dozens Of U.S.-Bought Afghan Air Force Aircraft Are Now Orphaned At An Uzbek Airfield By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone


"The exact function of the new base is unknown, although lawmakers said it would carry out policing duties focused on combating organized crime," according to RFE/RL. "The facility would have 'special equipment for the Interpol information system' installed from China."
However, “the construction comes amid the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan and growing security threats along the country's border,” Tajik parliamentarian Azimzoda made clear in a statement to RFE/RL. By every indication, China shares many of Tajikistan's concerns — and has for some time.

Though authorities in Dushanbe and Beijing have repeatedly denied it, there is significant evidence the two countries have been running a separate joint border security base near the village of Shaymak, which is also in Gorno-Badakhshan, since at least 2016. Prior to the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban in August, rotating contingents of Afghan government forces were reportedly stationed there, as well. Over the years, Chinese authorities have also repeatedly denied reports that they had deployed troops into the Wakhan Corridor itself, or were planning to do so. Afghan authorities had previously said that China had offered to train their troops and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has publicly conducted training exercises with Tajik forces.



message-editor%2F1635455770666-tajikistan-afghanistan-map.jpg

Google Maps

A map with Tajikistan's Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province highlighted. Immediately to the south is Afghanistan's Wakhan Corridor and to the east is China. Both the planned base at Vakhon and the existing one near Shaymak are extremely close to the Afghan-Tajik border along the northern edge of the Wakhan Corridor.


RFE/RL's Tajik Service reported yesterday that documents it had seen said officials in Tajikistan have now proposed turning over the facility south of Shaymak to Chinese forces entirely. It's unclear if authorities in Beijing accepted the offer or were otherwise warm to the idea.

A separate report from RFE/RL earlier this month had said that there were indications that work was being done to expand this base and that there had been an uptick in activities emanating from it, including unmanned aircraft flights. Satellite imagery of this site from Planet Labs and other sources that The War Zone has reviewed appear to show only limited expansion of the facilities there in the past two years or so, though the initial construction work was significant. It also has no runway, meaning any unmanned aircraft would have to be launched via other means. This could suggest what residents have reportedly been hearing flying overhead are smaller types used for more localized surveillance and reconnaissance missions. These might use catapults to get airborne, take off and land vertically, or might even be hand-launched.

They are signs that China’s security presence in Central Asia is growing. Since the Taliban's dramatic takeover in Afghanistan, Beijing's security focus has been increasingly turning to the region. pic.twitter.com/C6ZhpxkReA
— Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (@RFERL) October 14, 2021

Whatever the exact state of China's cooperation with Tajikistan on regional security issues might be, a more robust ability to monitor activity in the region would certainly be in the interests of both countries.
In particular, China has long used the threat posed by Islamist terrorist groups to justify its increasingly brutal crackdown on ethnic Uyghurs in the country's far-western Xinjiang semi-autonomous region. Beijing has been seeking to engage with the Taliban directly, with so far unsubstantiated reports that it might be looking to establish bases inside Afghanistan. That group has expressed a willingness to try to clamp down on militant organizations like the Uyghur-founded East Turkestan Islamic Movement. At the same time, it's not hard to see why China would want its own robust security presence in the region to gather intelligence and provide a staging point to take more direct action, should it decide that is necessary.

The Chinese government has broader concerns about terrorist threats in the region, as well, which are only now magnified by the potential for various groups to exploit the current situation in Afghanistan, where the Taliban is still working to solidify its control. In July, before the collapse of the preceding Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, nine Chinese engineers had already been killed in a suicide bombing targeting a bus in Pakistan. Though Pakistani officials sought to blame the governments of India and Afghanistan for that attack, local media reports linked it to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known simply as the Pakistani Taliban, which has links to its counterpart in Afghanistan.


Something like this didn't happen under Ghani regime. This is only happening following Taliban takeover in Afghanistan. TTP is now X10 more confident - and that's why they're boasting about their leadership being able to roam about openly. TTP says this trip lasted for a week. pic.twitter.com/BiXfTIXeQJ
— FJ (@Natsecjeff) October 28, 2021


There was a report over the weekend from CNN that the U.S. government was nearing an agreement with Pakistan for use of its airspace to conduct missions in Afghanistan, but not to base forces in that country. In September, the U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe had also said that America would help Tajikistan improve its border security apparatus.
All told, the new security deals between Tajikistan and China appear to reflect significant geopolitical shifts in the region, both with regard to Afghanistan specifically and the Chinese government's interest in expanding its influence substantially abroad.
Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com

Please see source for additional videos
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Housecarl

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Xi Hasn’t Left China in 21 Months. Covid May Be Only Part of the Reason.
October 30, 2021
in News


When the presidents and prime ministers of the Group of 20 nations meet in Rome this weekend, China’s leader, Xi Jinping, won’t be among them. Nor is he expected at the climate talks next week in Glasgow, where China’s commitment to curbing carbon emissions is seen as crucial to helping blunt the dire consequences of climate change. He has yet to meet President Biden in person and seems unlikely to any time soon.

Mr. Xi has not left China in 21 months — and counting.


The ostensible reason for Mr. Xi’s lack of foreign travel is Covid-19, though officials have not said so explicitly. It is also a calculation that has reinforced a deeper shift in China’s foreign and domestic policy.

China, under Mr. Xi, no longer feels compelled to cooperate — or at least be seen as cooperating — with the United States and its allies on anything other than its own terms.

Still, Mr. Xi’s recent absence from the global stage has complicated China’s ambition to position itself as an alternative to American leadership. And it has coincided with, some say contributed to, a sharp deterioration in the country’s relations with much of the rest of the world.

Instead, China has turned inward, with officials preoccupied with protecting Mr. Xi’s health and internal political machinations, including a Communist Party congress next year where he is expected to claim another five years as the country’s leader. As a result, face-to-face diplomacy is a lower priority than it was in Mr. Xi’s first years in office.

“There is a bunker mentality in China right now,” said Noah Barkin, who follows China for the research firm Rhodium Group.


Mr. Xi’s retreat has deprived him of the chance to personally counter a steady decline in the country’s reputation, even as it faces rising tensions on trade, Taiwan and other issues.

Less than a year ago, Mr. Xi made concessions to seal an investment agreement with the European Union, partly to blunt the United States, only to have the deal scuttled by frictions over political sanctions. Since then, Beijing has not taken up an invitation for Mr. Xi to meet E.U. leaders in Europe this year.

“It eliminates or reduces opportunities for engagements at the top leadership level,” Helena Legarda, a senior analyst with the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin, said of Mr. Xi’s lack of travels. “Diplomatically speaking,” she added, in-person meetings are “very often fundamental to try and overcome leftover obstacles in any sort of agreement or to try to reduce tensions.”

Mr. Xi’s absence has also dampened hopes that the gatherings in Rome and Glasgow can make meaningful progress on two of the most pressing issues facing the world today: the post-pandemic recovery and the fight against global warming.

President Biden, who is attending both, had sought to meet Mr. Xi on the sidelines, in keeping with his strategy to work with China on issues like climate change, even as the two countries clash on others. Instead, the two leaders have agreed to hold a “virtual summit” before the end of the year, though no date has been announced yet.

“The inability of President Biden and President Xi to meet in person does carry costs,” said Ryan Hass, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution who was the director for China at the National Security Council under President Barack Obama.

Only five years ago, in a speech at the annual World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Mr. Xi cast himself as a guardian of a multinational order, while President Donald J. Trump pulled the United States into an “America first” retreat. It is difficult to play that role while hunkered down within China’s borders, which remain largely closed as protection against the pandemic.

“If Xi were to leave China, he would either need to adhere to Covid protocols upon return to Beijing or risk criticism for placing himself above the rules that apply to everyone else,” Mr. Hass said.

Mr. Xi’s government has not abandoned diplomacy. China, along with Russia, has taken a leading role in negotiating with the Taliban after its return to power in Afghanistan. Mr. Xi has also held several conference calls with European leaders, including Germany’s departing chancellor, Angela Merkel; and, this week, President Emmanuel Macron of France and Prime Minister Boris Johnson of Britain. China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, will attend the meetings in Rome, and Mr. Xi will dial in and deliver what a spokeswoman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hua Chunying, said on Friday would be an “important speech.”

While President Biden has spoke of forging an “alliance of democracies” to counter China’s challenge, Mr. Xi has sought to build his own partnerships, including with Russia and developing countries, to oppose what he views as Western sanctimony.

“In terms of diplomacy with the developing world — most countries in the world — I think Xi Jinping’s lack of travel has not been a great disadvantage,” said Neil Thomas, an analyst with the Eurasia Group. He noted Mr. Xi’s phone diplomacy this week with the prime minister of Papua New Guinea, James Marape.

“That’s a whole lot more face time than the prime minister of Papua New Guinea is getting with Joe Biden,” Mr. Thomas said.

Still, Mr. Xi’s halt in international travel has been conspicuous, especially compared with the frenetic pace he once maintained. The last time he left China was January 2020, on a visit to Myanmar only days before he ordered the lockdown of Wuhan, the city where the coronavirus emerged.

Nor has Mr. Xi played host to many foreign officials. In the weeks after the lockdown, he met with the director of the World Health Organization and the leaders of Cambodia and Mongolia, but his last known meeting with a foreign official took place in Beijing in March 2020, with President Arif Alvi of Pakistan.

Chinese leaders have long made a selling point of their busy schedule of trips abroad, especially their willingness to visit poorer countries. Before Covid, Mr. Xi became the first to outpace his American counterpart in the annual average number of visits to foreign countries, according to research by Mr. Thomas.

In the years before Covid, Mr. Xi visited an average of 14 countries annually, spending around 34 days abroad, Mr. Thomas estimated. That notably surpassed Mr. Obama’s average (25 days of foreign travel), and Mr. Trump’s (23).

“President Xi’s diplomatic footsteps cover every part of the world,” said an article shared by Communist Party media outlets in late 2019.

Mr. Xi has made his mark on the world by jettisoning the idea that China should be a modest player on the international stage — “hiding our strength and biding our time,” in the dictum of his predecessor Deng Xiaoping. Now, though, he finds himself trying to project China’s new image of confident ambition over video meetings.

He is doing so while facing international scrutiny over many of China’s policies, the origins of the coronavirus, mounting rights abuses in Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang, and its increasingly ominous warnings to Taiwan.

Surveys have shown that views of China have deteriorated sharply in many major countries over the last two years.

Victor Shih, professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego, said that Mr. Xi’s limited travel coincided with an increasingly nationalist tone at home that seems to preclude significant cooperation or compromise.

“He no longer feels that he needs international support because he has so much domestic support, or domestic control,” Mr. Shih said. “This general effort to court America and also the European countries is less today than it was during his first term.”

The timing of the meetings in Rome and Glasgow also conflicted with preparations for a meeting at home that has clearly taken precedence. From Nov. 8 to 11, the country’s Communist elite will gather in Beijing for a behind-closed-doors session that will be a major step toward Mr. Xi’s next phase in power.

Mr. Xi’s absence in Rome and Glasgow could be a missed opportunity for countries to unite around a stronger, unified global effort on climate or economic recovery. It seems unlikely that the Chinese delegations will have the authority on their own to negotiate significant compromises.

“These are issue areas where there was some hope for cooperation and some hope for positive outcomes,” Ms. Legarda, the China analyst at the Mercator Institute, said of the climate summit in Glasgow. “With Xi Jinping not attending, it is, first of all, unclear if they will manage to get there. Second, I guess the question is, is this not a priority for Beijing, in many leaders’ minds?”

The post Xi Hasn’t Left China in 21 Months. Covid May Be Only Part of the Reason. appeared first on New York Times.
 

Housecarl

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‘LIGHTNING CARRIERS’ COULD BE LIGHTWEIGHTS IN AN ASIAN WAR
JOHN BRADFORD AND OLLI PEKKA SUORSA
OCTOBER 29, 2021
COMMENTARY

6872864 (1)


Earlier this month, U.S. Marine Corps F-35B Lightning II fighters embarked on the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force ship JS Izumo as a capability validation. The event marked an important step in the Izumo’s metamorphosis from a flat-deck helicopter carrier (called a “helicopter destroyer” in Japanese nomenclature) into a light aircraft carrier operating advanced fifth-generation short take-off and vertical landing fighters. This is a landmark event for the Japanese navy and Japan’s defense posture more generally, giving Tokyo an aircraft carrier for the first time since World War II. It is also a milestone on a path that is establishing smaller aircraft carriers equipped with the F-35B Lightning II, or “Lightning carriers,” as the new capital ships of Asia.

The U.S. Navy forward-deployed its own Lightning carrier, the USS America, to Sasebo, Japan in 2019. In 2021, the United Kingdom dispatched HMS Queen Elizabeth to the Indo-Pacific on her maiden voyage. South Korea also plans to launch a Lightning carrier by the end of this decade. Procurement of F-35 variants also cracks the door for Singapore or Australia to similarly appoint their large-deck ship programs with carrier-aviation capabilities should they choose to do so. Asia’s Lightning carriers will boost national prestige, but will also come at high cost.

The new capital ships will certainly provide significant additional capabilities for the invested navies, as each navy’s Lightning carriers will have unique roles and configurations that address each nation’s requirements. Resourcing these large ships, state-of-the-art aircraft, and the training and maintenance programs needed to reliably deploy carrier-based aviation capabilities also represents a huge strategic investment by each of the nations involved. Therefore, these procurement decisions signify a strong rebuke of the increasing skepticism regarding the value of aircraft carriers in an age where they face long-range precision strike capabilities and increasingly capable submarines. Examining the Lightning carriers within the context of national defense postures, strategies, and operational doctrines suggests what roles these platforms will likely play in regional naval dynamics.

Despite their power, the Lightning carriers are unlikely to change the anticipated operational outcomes of the combat scenarios envisioned around hotspots like the Korean Peninsula, the Senkaku islands, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea. As a result, they are unlikely to shift the balance of naval power driving deterrence calculations. Should a war break out in and around the confined waters of the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan, Lightning carriers will offer a marginal additional capability that comes at high cost in comparison to what could be created through investments in long-range land-based aircraft and the development of more flexible, resilient, and distributed land-basing options. In a South China Sea conflict, carriers give both South Korea and Japan new options should they be drawn into the fracas, since those waters are beyond the range within which those nations can assemble combat power. However, if they did make such a decision they would have to run a gauntlet of Chinese anti-access/area-denial capabilities to reach the operational theater. The British carriers will likely be far away, so their value could be understood as assets that augment the U.S. Navy’s global pool of 11 supercarriers and two Lightning carriers.

The key driver behind the emergence of the new light carriers is the F-35B aircraft. The F-35B offers a remarkable advancement in capability over the previous generation of short take-off and vertical landing aircraft, primarily the venerable AV-8B Harrier II, which it replaces in the American and British inventories. The F-35’s low-observable design, highly capable electronic warfare and attack capabilities, and enormous data fusion and sharing functions will give the new light carriers cutting-edge warfighting capabilities. The F-35 can act as a data-sharing hub and use its own sensors to extend the “eyes and ears” of the mother ship, acting as an organic airborne intelligence-gathering and limited early-warning asset. The aircraft offers significant independent “Day 1” offensive options before opponents’ air defenses are diminished, as well as defensive options for a commander.

The first of the new Lightning carriers in the region was the USS America. This 45,000-ton vessel is equipped with a 257-meter flight deck and a large aircraft hangar that can carry about twenty F-35B fighters alongside MV-22B Osprey tiltrotors and conventional helicopters. The USS America is designated as a Landing Helicopter Assault ship and serves as the flagship of Expeditionary Strike Group Seven, an amphibious warfare task group configured to embark more than 2,000 marines and their equipment, and is escorted by destroyers and submarines as necessary.

In this role, the America has been quite active in the region, conducting exercises and presence operations. For example, in 2020, USS America conducted operations regarded as a show of force in the vicinity of Chinese vessels, which were interfering with the operations of Malaysia’s petroleum drillship West Capella. While a conventional big-deck amphibious ship could have done this mission with its less-capable air element, neither the political message nor the military implications would have been as sharp. At the time, the U.S. Navy’s sole forward-deployed supercarrier, USS Ronald Reagan, was undergoing maintenance in Japan while the USS Theodore Roosevelt, another carrier deployed at the time, was hamstrung in Guam by a COVID-19 outbreak. Hence the America provided the Seventh Fleet with bench depth with its organic fifth-generation fighter force.

Going forward, USS America is likely to be frequently “subbed in” for peacetime missions normally assigned to the supercarriers. However, without the integrated organic capabilities for surveillance, mission control, and refueling found in a full-fledged carrier air wing, it should not be considered a substitute, not even a “substitute-lite”, in combat scenarios. The America’s lack of true 360-degree coverage airborne early warning and control and aerial refueling capabilities limit the ship’s overall independent combat value. However, the U.S. Marine Corps has considered various solutions to these capability gaps, including considering aerial refueller and airborne early-warning variants of the trusted MV-22. While these solutions offer benefits, the platform itself is not survivable in contested environments and could thus only operate close to the mother ship.

The Royal Navy’s Queen Elizabeth is a larger and more capable ship than the America, displacing 65,000 tons and featuring a 280-meter flight deck. Unlike USS America, the Queen Elizabeth is fitted with a “ski-jump” ramp, allowing its Lightning IIs to launch with heavier payloads. The ship will typically deploy with around two dozen F-35Bs. Along with her sister-ship, HMS Prince of Wales, the Queen Elizabeth will serve as the vanguard of the Royal Navy’s support to London’s “Global Britain” foreign policy aspirations. As impressive “ambassadors” of defense diplomacy, the carrier strike groups centered around these vessels will demonstrate the United Kingdom’s renewed maritime vigor and help to build global partnerships. This utilization is reflected in the bold decision to set the carrier strike group’s maiden deployment destination as the Indo-Pacific, a high-profile symbol of the United Kingdom’s “tilt” toward the region outlined in its latest policy documents, including the 2021 integrated review and Defence in a Competitive Age.

The Queen Elizabeth’s July transit through the Singapore Strait likely put American strategic planners slightly more at ease with their decision to redeploy the Japan-based Ronald Reagan from the Pacific to support America’s military withdrawal from Afghanistan. While the U.S. Navy will likely appreciate a more globally orientated Britain, questions remain about the sustainability of resources for the United Kingdom’s newly acquired Indo-Pacific aspiration. The carriers themselves are tremendously expensive and complex. So will be recreating the United Kingdom’s carrier aviation training and maintenance programs, though the Royal Air Force is reducing those costs by exclusively purchasing the short take-off and vertical landing-capable F-35Bs rather than going with a mixed force of F-35As and F-35Bs. Moreover, the Royal Navy lacks enough ships to reliably source sufficient escorts without leaning on allies and partners, as was evident during the carrier’s maiden deployment this year. The carrier strike group’s surface escort force was composed of warships from the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Netherlands.

The rule of thumb for surface ships force generation states that investing two parts in training and maintenance yields one part deployable time. Therefore, one carrier deployment to the Indo-Pacific every three years would require the Royal Navy to devote roughly half of its capital ships to that mission. Furthermore, carrier readiness must align with cycles for aircraft and surface escorts, both of which have tasks that will compete with strike group workup and deployment periods. Given the growing concern over a resurgent Russia and other alliance commitments, the Royal Navy will likely be stretched thin. As a result, the Royal Navy’s two carriers may sail to the Indo-Pacific less often than many would hope. We can also expect the British Lightning carrier employment to tie the United Kingdom’s global force posture more deeply to the United States and other allies. While acting in the British national interest, the carriers’ combat operations will most likely take place within coalition contexts.

Continued.....
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Continued.....

Like the United Kingdom, Japan is in the process of adding two light carriers to its fleet. JS Izumo and her sister-ship, JS Kaga, are much smaller than the Queen Elizabeth, only about 20,000 tons with 248-meter flat flight decks. These ships are expected to operate around a dozen F-35Bs with a surge capacity to double that. Although the U.S. Marine Corps F-35 demonstrated the Izumo‘s ability to support F-35B operations, it is not expected to reach full operational capability until 2028. Before then, the ship will undergo another industrial refit period and wait for the Japan Air Self Defense Force to introduce the F-35B into service, with the initial operational capability expected only by March 2024.

Like their British counterparts, the Izumo and the Kaga should be considered as assets of both their nation and a tight alliance with the United States. However, the Japanese navy does not share the Royal Navy’s global operational ambitions, despite possessing a much larger fleet. We can expect to see these ships mostly operating closer to home, deterring the potential aggression of immediate neighbors. They will also continue service, along with unconverted flat-deck “helicopter destroyers,” in the rotation of flagships leading the annual “Indo-Pacific Deployments” engaging in presence operations and defense diplomacy in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. The Japanese Lightning carriers’ most likely operational role in a conflict would be to provide mobile airfields for conducting combat around Japan’s southwestern islands. This will certainly be a useful option for planners seeking to conduct distributed operations while contending with the conundrum of having many of their land bases within the range of China’s long-range precision-strike capabilities that hold an overwhelming quantitative advantage over Japanese defenses.

Japan’s economy is about twice the size of that of the United Kingdom and they have elected for carriers that are more modest in terms of size, capabilities, and strategic aspiration. Japanese voters have been generally supportive and the ruling political party has vowed the budget growth need to support this project among other expensive priorities, but there are still questions about its fiscal merits. Japan has not had a fixed-wing carrier aviation program since World War II, so it must go through the costly process of developing training, doctrine, and tactics from the scratch. Surely, like the United Kingdom, Japan will receive a lot of assistance from the United States, but this is still a huge cost for a force facing increasingly severe economic pressures associated with a stagnant economy, shrinking national population, and recruiting challenges.

Japan had other options to achieve similar operational capabilities at lower cost. Japan’s Ryukyu Islands are home to two dozen airfields suitable for operating both the F-35A and F-35B. Moreover, the F-35B helps to turn any smaller commercial airfield into a potential forward base. While the airfields lack a carrier’s inherent mobility and their static location makes them vulnerable to enemy targeting, their quantity and operating units’ inherent ability to rapidly move between them has a meaningful value. Furthermore, unlike a ship, a damaged runway can be repaired and recommence air operations relatively quickly. Japan and its partners regularly rehearse rapid runway repair. For example, during the 2020 COPE North exercise, a combined U.S.-Japanese-Australian force removed 1,200 pieces of unexploded ordnance from 5,000 feet of runway in 2 hours 17 minutes. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that an adversary could keep all useable runways continually out of action. Further investments in distributed and resilient operational posture could arguably offer an alternative to the Japanese light carriers in the First Island Chain. While the use of “immobile aircraft carriers” does not sit well with the U.S. Navy’s outlook, an investment in dozens of “unsinkable aircraft carriers” and highly mobile and distributed force structure makes a lot of sense given Japan’s unique geography and the nature of the threats that it faces.

The other Asian navy with a defined Lightning carrier program is South Korea. Seoul originally planned for its Lightning carriers to be part of its amphibious force, but its revised plan involves a bigger ship, dubbed the CVX program, of 30,000-40,000 tons with a 265-meter flight deck. Of all the nations set to operate light carriers in the Indo-Pacific, South Korea’s strategic rationale seems least clear. Certainly, a cadre within the South Korean navy envisions an active blue-water force commensurate with the country’s status as a major trading nation and one of the world’s top three shipbuilders. However, those strategists also recognize that South Korea’s most immediate threat remains North Korea.

A South Korean carrier’s near- to mid-term operational function would be focused on providing a highly survivable airfield that could also provide an additional axis of attack to strike targets well within North Korea. However, given the Korean Peninsula’s constrained geography, options like improving airbase defenses and resilience and investing in larger payload and longer endurance-strike aircraft could do the same at significantly lower cost. Recognizing these trade-offs, South Korea’s maritime strategists may be more focused on the CVX as a preparation for an increasingly competitive future where both China and Japan are operating carrier forces. While this decision certainly reflects some element of prestige-oriented contests, it also makes sense that South Korea wants to develop similar capabilities to the larger states that surround it.

Just two years ago, only two aircraft carriers, USS Ronald Reagan and China’s Liaoning, were permanently based in East Asia. Today, the Chinese navy operates two carriers and plans to add another two full-sized carriers and develop a class of light carriers of its own. By the end of the decade, three Lightning carriers, USS America, JS Izumo, and JS Kaga, will operate from Japan. South Korea plans to field one light carrier sometime in the early 2030s. The region will also receive visits from the Royal Navy’s two Lightning carriers. This is an incredible plus-up in terms of resource investments and a double-down in these states’ navalist visions. They are powerful symbols of intent that will deliver new capabilities to national governments seeking to influence the region’s strategic direction. Relative to their huge costs, however, they will do little to change the anticipated outcomes of the region’s most likely maritime combat scenarios.

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John Frederick Bradford is senior fellow in the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Bradford holds a master’s in in strategic studies from RSIS and a bachelor’s (magna cum laude) in Asian studies from Cornell University. He retired from the U.S. Navy with the rank of commander. His U.S. Navy assignments included service as the deputy director of the 7th Fleet Maritime Headquarters, as country director for Japan in the Office of the Secretary of Defense-Policy, and as commanding officer of a ballistic missile defense-capable Aegis destroyer forward deployed to Japan.
Olli Pekka Suorsa, Ph.D., is an assistant professor at Rabdan Academy in the United Arab Emirates. Before joining Rabdan, Suorsa worked as a research fellow in the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore. Dr Suorsa received his Ph.D. from the City University of Hong Kong, master’s from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and bachelor’s from the Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia.

Image: U.S. Marine Corps (Photo by Lance Cpl. Tyler Harmon)

COMMENTARY
 

jward

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Japan’s Ruling Party Keeps Majority in Election
Peter Landers

6-8 minutes


TOKYO—Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party won a clear majority in national elections, giving new Prime Minister Fumio Kishida a solid foundation to build a long-lasting government and tackle security threats from China and North Korea.
Based on official results, the LDP won 261 seats in the 465-seat lower house of the Diet, or parliament, public broadcaster NHK said, slightly down from the 276 seats it held before the election.
Polls in the final days before the election as well as NHK’s exit polls suggested the LDP was headed for a tighter race, but its candidates pulled out close elections across the nation. Voters opted for the familiar stability of a party that has governed Japan for all but a few years since its founding in 1955.

“We have been accepted by the people,” said Mr. Kishida in brief remarks after his victory became clear. He said he would head shortly to Glasgow, Scotland, for the global climate summit.

The victory means Mr. Kishida, who took office Oct. 4, will stay on as head of government and has a greater chance of building a long-lasting administration along the lines of Shinzo Abe, Japan’s prime minister from 2012 to 2020. The country is on the front lines of rising tensions in East Asia, including China’s threats to take control of the self-governed island of Taiwan by force and North Korea’s recent missile tests.

Mr. Abe used his long term in office backed by substantial parliamentary majorities to build closer ties to the U.S. and push through legislation enabling the Japanese military to take a bigger role in regional conflicts. Mr. Abe also raised Japan’s profile on the world stage and championed the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement when the U.S. pulled out.

im-426557

Sunday’s election was the first in four years for the Diet’s lower house, the more powerful of the legislature’s two chambers.
Photo: Buddhika Weerasinghe/Bloomberg News

After Mr. Abe resigned last year over health issues, his successor, Yoshihide Suga, struggled to deal with the coronavirus pandemic and lasted only a year.

Sunday’s election was the first in four years for the Diet’s lower house, which is the more powerful of the legislature’s two chambers because it can choose the prime minister and pass the budget on its own.

Despite the LDP’s overall victory, several former cabinet ministers and the party’s secretary-general, former trade minister Akira Amari, lost races in their districts. Opposition parties cooperated more extensively than usual to field unified candidates who could capture most of the anti-LDP vote.

In his final campaign push, Mr. Kishida touted the LDP government’s record in keeping a lid on the coronavirus despite the summer surge. After a slow start, more than 70% of the population is fully vaccinated. On Saturday and Sunday, fewer than 300 new Covid-19 cases were reported nationwide each day.

Mr. Kishida also stressed that many of the unified opposition candidates enjoyed backing from Japan’s Communist Party.

LDP supporters said they trusted the party to keep stability in the country, which enjoys peace, low crime and relative social harmony in an era where many other nations have struggled with social divisions. They said they doubted opposition parties would deal effectively with military challenges such a recent joint exercise in which Chinese and Russian vessels circumnavigated Japan’s main island.

im-426579

Prime Minister Fumio Kishida points to successful candidates’ names on a board at party headquarters Sunday.
Photo: behrouz mehri/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

LDP voter Arisa Hanakawa, 24 years old, said she hoped Mr. Kishida would emulate Mr. Abe’s long-lived government. “In diplomacy, it’s better to have stability than to be changing all the time,” Ms. Hanakawa said.

Opposition parties played up a drumbeat of scandals during the Abe administration. But they lacked effective arguments against the current government on policy, especially after the vaccination campaign helped virtually eliminate Covid-19, at least temporarily, in the weeks ahead of the election.

Soichiro Teramoto, 57, said he chose the opposition because he believed the LDP was trying to brush scandals under the rug, such as the suicide of a Ministry of Finance official who said he was compelled to falsify records of a land deal. “Everything gets rushed to a conclusion without any attempt to pursue the truth,” said Mr. Teramoto.

He said Japan’s democracy would be healthier if the LDP and opposition traded power more often, and he objected to the LDP’s decision to go ahead with the Tokyo Olympics during one of the pandemic’s worst spells.

In its campaign platform, the LDP said it would keep in mind the idea of doubling military spending to roughly 2% of Japan’s gross domestic product—a measure of the economy’s size—from around 1% currently, equivalent to about $50 billion. However, it didn’t commit to any figure.

“Japan today willing to go from 1% to 2% is a sea change in thinking,” said Rahm Emanuel, the Biden administration’s nominee for U.S. ambassador to Japan, in Senate testimony in October. “It’s a reflection that they know they have a greater role to play and they have greater threats.” Mr. Emanuel said greater spending would be “essential for our partnership.”
 

jward

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China's 'two-headed dragon' may make its debut in skies next month
Stealth fighters another area where US and China going at it ‘head to head'

4387


By Liam Gibson, Taiwan News, Staff Writer
2021/10/31 18:09

An artistic rendition of China's J-20 Weillong fighters (Weibo, @航空EXIA image)


An artistic rendition of China's J-20 Weillong fighters (Weibo, @航空EXIA image)

TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — China’s J-20 Weilong twin-seater stealth fighter might make its maiden flight on Nov. 11 to mark the People's Liberation Army Air Force’s 72nd anniversary, per an anonymous Chinese military source.

The fighter jet, whose name means “Great Dragon,” is rumored to be the world’s first stealth fighter that can hold two pilots, according to a report by the South China Morning Post (SCMP).

Experts frame the new aircraft as Beijing’s answer to Washington’s much-touted strategic concept of “next-generation air dominance” (NGAD). NGAD aims to keep American superiority in the air going well into the 2030s by building out overlapping systems that feature advanced fighters, sensors, and autonomous drones all battling in tandem, per SCMP.

For its part, the U.S. Air Force has already test flown a new generation stealth fighter that operates with a human pilot and an AI-based computerized co-pilot, according to a National Interest report released in July.

“You may need a human in the aircraft and not when the threat dictates otherwise, and use AI to relay human mission level tasking to unmanned autonomous vehicles,” Jason Clark, director at Raytheon, a fighter jet manufacturer, was quoted as saying.

It’s unknown if the Chinese designs will also have this optionality, but it seems the added human intelligence in the form of another pilot will be highly valuable nonetheless.

“The extra human brain could help profoundly in making sense of information — that is coming in hard and fast — as well as maintaining situational awareness, which are so critical in aerial operations, especially air-to-air combat which the J-20 is primarily designed for,” Ben Ho, a researcher Singapore’s S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told SCMP.

The two-seater may also indicate that, like the U.S, China plans to operate drones in a supportive role with its frontline fighters.

“A second crew member in the cockpit could relieve the pilot of managing these additional aircraft while operating in what is sure to be a complex and rapidly shifting air combat environment,” according to John A. Tirpak of Air Force Magazine.

“The back-seater could reduce the pilot’s workload substantially in this application, at the cost of some reduced range due to the extra weight of a second crew station,” he said.

China's 'two-headed dragon' may make its debut in skies next month | Taiwan News | 2021-10-31 18:09:00
 

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AUKUS Provides More Opportunity Than Just Nukes


Lincoln Parker
Lincoln Parker

October 28, 2021 Updated: October 29, 2021



Commentary
Since World War II, there has not been a time Australia, the Indo-Pacific, and the free world has been at more risk than we are now as China is engaged in the most significant and most rapid expansion of military power in “peacetime” history, with the world’s largest navy, army, and a formidable missile and air force.

In his recent Lowy Institute report “Australia and the Growing Reach of China’s Military,” Thomas Shugart noted: “Based on its scope, scale, and the specific capabilities being developed, this build-up appears to be designed to, first, threaten the United States with ejection from the western Pacific, and then to achieve dominance in the Indo-Pacific.”
The Australia, United Kingdom, United States (AUKUS) trilateral security partnership is a reflection of this heightened risk driven by the aggressive actions and policies of the People’s Republic of China.
Understandably the focus on the AUKUS partnership has been all about Australia acquiring a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines. However, this is but just one aspect of the collaboration and certainly not a capability that will be operational any time soon.
The immediate benefit AUKUS provides comes from collaborative military technology development across cyber domains, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and undersea warfare capabilities.
For instance, advanced neuromorphic event-based cameras being deployed to the International Space Station in December 2021 are assisting researchers in looking for a class of high altitude phenomena or transient luminous events, also known as upside-down lightning or sprites.

Instead of firing down to the ground, this is lightning that travels upwards to the upper atmosphere.
Sprites are almost impossible to detect and could be very damaging to satellites, missiles, aircraft, communications, or anything travelling via the upper atmosphere, including SpaceX or other spacecraft.
The Australian industry will share and collaborate with both the UK and the U.S. (and possibly other allies) on this and many more technologies, which is essential given that China has made significant, long-term investments in weapons designed to jam or destroy satellites as they seek to narrow the gap in space technology with western nations.
Epoch Times Photo A handout image supplied by the European Space Agency (ESA) shows a view of Dubai as the SpaceX Dragon spacecraft passes, taken from the International Space Station on April 10, 2016. (Tim Peake/ ESA/NASA via Getty Images)
A move China signalled in 2007 when it threw down the gauntlet to the Western nations after launching a ballistic missile with a kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) to destroy one of its own satellites and create more than 3,000 pieces of space debris.
This means that the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) constellation of 31 satellites is at significant risk, with military planners broadly agreeing that GPS will be one of the first targets in any conflict.

GPS (and similar positioning systems) enables positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) accurately, determining a location and orientation, current and desired position, and accurate and precise time.
It has become an integral part of everyday life and business. To name just a few, it is relied upon by our pilots, farmers, delivery drivers, financial institutions, fishermen, emergency services, and of course, militaries.
Epoch Times Photo U.S. Army soldiers conduct the annual exercise in Paju, near the border with North Korea, Friday, April 1, 2016. North Korea fired a short-range missile into the sea on Friday, Seoul officials said, hours after the U.S., South Korean, and Japanese leaders pledged to work closer together to prevent North Korea from advancing its nuclear and missile programs. (AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon)
If the GPS system is destroyed or disabled, both civilian and military activities will be severely disrupted.
Enter Australian quantum technologies enabling PNT in GPS-denied environments, with world-leading physicists like Professor John Close at the Australian National University (ANU).

Close is developing precision measurement of gravity, gravity gradients, and magnetic scalar gradients with ultra-cold atoms for quantum augmented inertial navigation.
Likewise, James Rabeau, the newly appointed Director of Quantum Technologies at Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), will deliver a prototype diamond magnetometer for navigation in 2022.
The aim is to provide our militaries, industry, and civilian societies with technologies that can provide effective PNT capability in GPS-denied environments. This could mean navigation (and targeting) for high dynamic platforms like missiles, ships, vehicles, or soldiers.
It will also be something that Australia could share with the UK and U.S., which would assist our civilian economies to continue to operate with the least amount of disruption and enable national efforts to fight and win any conflict.
So working in partnership with U.S. and UK defence innovation communities will definitely enable greater outcomes for our countries collaboratively than what is possible separately.

Further, the access to data sets and research from different expertise across various disciplines will provide our three nations defence capability industry with the jump-start it needs to overcome the usual slow and tiring process, that is, if the United States can overcome its mandated bureaucratic protections.
In particular, the U.S will need to address its controls around the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) policy.
ITAR essentially regulates the information and material pertaining to defence and military-related technologies, allowing them only to be shared with U.S. citizens unless authorization from the Department of State is received or a special exemption is used.
If permission is not received then, individuals and organizations can face heavy fines if they share or provide access to ITAR-protected defence articles, services or technical data.
So, while there has been no lack of American interest, and indeed direct project sponsorship with Australian defence innovation unless ITAR is changed, the true collaboration will continue to be slow and overly bureaucratic.
AUKUS was designed to change this dynamic, with the door left open to possibly include other allies. But if ITAR is not reformed, it will be more AUK than anything else, and that will be just awkward.
Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.


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