USA Pilot May Have Put Plane Into Deadly Plunge - UPDATE, post #34

[Fisher]

Fair use
http://abcnews.go.com/Travel/story?id=6904840&page=1

Pilot May Have Put Plane Into Deadly Plunge
Investigators Say They Were Surprised Pilot Would Pitch Nose of Turboprop Upward
By LISA STARK
Feb. 18, 2009

ABC News has learned that the pilot of the Continental Express commuter plane that crashed in Buffalo, N.Y. Feb. 12 may have put the plane into its deadly plunge.

Experts are baffled why a commuter plane with 49 people on board plummeted out of the sky so suddenly that the pilot didn't even have time to broadcast a Mayday alert.

A source close to the investigation says information from the flight data recorder indicated that the pilot's control column, essentially the device he uses to steer the plane, moved sharply backward, pitching the nose of the turboprop upward.

Investigators say they were surprised that a pilot would take that action so they want to make sure there isn't some other explanation for the movement of the plane's controls.

The violent pitch up occurred just after the pilots received a warning in the cockpit that the plane was about to stall. A stall occurs when the airflow has been disrupted over the wings or tail and the plane can no longer stay aloft. Icing may still have been a factor, contaminating the wing or tail and making a stall more likely. In airplane lingo, a stall doesn't mean the engines stopped running -- the National Transportation Safety Board has said the plane's engines were at full power. Instead, the stall in this case refers to a lack of upward lift on the wing or tail, causing the aircraft to fall.

The normal stall recovery procedure for wing icing is to push the nose down and add engine power. A tail stall recovery calls for the opposite action, pulling the nose up and reducing power. In this case, the pilot appeared to have pulled up, but also increased engine power to its maximum setting.

After the sharp pitch-up, the plane's nose went down 31 degrees. It rolled to the left, then far to the right, partly upside down.

Investigators are now looking carefully at the training the pilot received, as they do with any accident. The captain, Marvin Renslow, 47, was new to this type of airplane, with 110 hours at the controls.

 

[Fleataxi]

Fisher: Any further background on the pilot?

Seems that the Airline is trying to blame the pilot. At 2300 feet, your options are virtually zero. Your average commuter doesn't have enough thrust to escape a bad stall, and radical pitch changes make a bad situation worse.

Sometimes I wish the ATC people would just close airports when conditions get like that, and divert planes - profits be damned.

Fleataxi

 

[ainitfunny]

Ye God. ORIGINAL AMATEUR HOUR PILOTS. This ABSOLUTELY bespeaks the reason EXPERIENCE, EXPERIENCE EXPERIENCE is ALL important.

What they FAILED to do is KILL the normal human
NONPILOT reaction to that situation. They AUTOMATICALLY DID WHAT SOMEONE WHO DOESN'T KNOW HOW TO FLY WOULD DO. Pull UP. That GUARANTEED their crash.
OLD pilots are far better than young new pilots. It is not training but thousands of hours of experience that succeeds in forcing people to do what is AGAINST gut instinct, but correct procedure.

What a shame. And what a shame we have nurtured a culture that worships youth and peak physical condition to the dismissal of the CRITICAL role that age and extensive experience plays in handing off the duties of one generation to another.

They SHOULD make an inexperienced pilot fly as COPILOT for years with a seasoned pilot in command before allowing him the chief pilot seat and EVEN THEN not give a new chief pilot a totally green copilot. Totally green co-pilots should ONLY go with the seasoned pilots. Apparantly nobody flying the plane had much experience either as a pilot OR in that particular aircraft. Criminal pilot scheduling.

 

[Hfcomms]

Deploying the flaps always results in a degree of 'pitch up' although in normal operating speeds it's a rather mild pitch and when the flaps are nursed down in degrees it's so mild the passengers don't even feel it. However when carrying a load of ice the weight of the aircraft is a lot more, the weight and balance is now off and the characteristics of the airfoil has been modified by the ice on the leading edge. When deploying significant flaps in this situation can result in a pronounced pitch up and if the flight crew isn't extremely quick it can result in an accelerated stall and being that low to the ground there is not time to recover from it yet alone getting off a radio message.

My guess is the NTSB is going to lay a lot of this on pilot error and no small part might of the blame might be the pilots lack of experience in type especially in severe icing conditions. With only 110 hours as PIC in this aircraft this might of been the first time he's experienced a heavy icing situation in this type of aircraft. What I would be interested in is what the checklists for this model require in shooting approaches in such a situation. In an icing situation (depending on length and condition of the runway) I would be extremely cautious about using the flaps and I would put on an extra 20 or 30 knots running down my final approach.

The aircraft won't react normally with the weight and balance being off with the additional weight forward of the center of gravity (I'm surmising) and the stall speed will be greater as well as compromised handling characteristics. I would want the extra speed just in case.

 

[Grantbo]

Ye God. ORIGINAL AMATEUR HOUR PILOTS. This ABSOLUTELY bespeaks the reason EXPERIENCE, EXPERIENCE EXPERIENCE is ALL important.

You are on to something. I don't know about the pilot but I do know about the co-pilot. The local news told all about her (complete with grieving family) since she lived here in Central WA. She was 22 years old. Just got out of pilot school here at CWU (Central WA Univ.).

 

[pops88]

She was 22 years old. Just got out of pilot school here at CWU (Central WA Univ.).

My husband flies for a living, and I'm also a pilot. We could easily rant all day. I'll spare you.

 

[LA Woman]

The horizontal stab, it is an inverted planeform to produce a downward lift on the tail. In ice that downward force is degraded as the wing shape is degraded by the ice. Thus, the plane is trimmed more nose up by the autopilot. The incident started as the F/O selected landing flaps. This gives a nose up pitching moment and if the plane is trimmed full nose up as it possibly was, the autopilot could not retrim the plane quickly enough to keep the plane level, thus the 31 degree pitch up. At that point the airspeed would decrease extremely rapidly, far more than normal, the stick shaker would activate kicking off the autopilot, the stick PUSHER would activate driving the nose down. The captain must have grabbed the controls, and added to the pitch down command. The plane was stalled at some point, and as the plane fell off to the left, he overcompensated to the right. This is a low time pilot with probably no aerobatic experience or upset training. He overcompensated on the roll past vertical so that when he pulled back on the yoke to get or keep the nose up, it had the OPPOSITE effect of pulling the nose DOWN. He probably saw the ground just before he hit, and got it level with the nose level, but just because the nose is up does NOT mean you will overcome the inertia and be going up.

 

[BoatGuy]

I am a boat captain, and a pretty good one. I am also a pilot, although I would hesitate before saying that I am a better pilot than captain. I can tell you this... There are very good captains out there, with less experience than I. There are also very poor pilots out there, with more experience than I. Age and experience are not always the end all to be all, and without knowing what happened up there, what the conditions were, and everything else that can and does happen in the captains chair, be it boat or airplane, I think I'll withhold judgement on whether or not this person was a good or bad pilot.

 

[LA Woman]

I would also like to add that after reviewing all the wx conditions, ATC recordings and known CVR data, that I have come to a completely different opinion on the icing conditions and the PIC’s use of autopilot. There is nothing to indicate that the icing conditions were severe enough to handfly. Pro’s fly auto through icing everyday and the gradient levels of icing to indicate severity are somewhat subjective. The only report on ATC was Cactus/USAir flying through rime for 20 minutes, certainly not “severe” by any known standards, and the deicing gear for this particular aircraft would well be able to compensate if working properly. I don’t feel this pilot acted in a hazardous manner in any way, and his decision to engage his deicing gear shortly after takeoff shows he was probably very conservative and conscious of icing hazards.

Could have been a malfunctioning boot or severe unknown microclimate, but most likely not pilot error. I know the media wants to fry this PIC, but lets reserve judgement until NTSB has a change to examine his gear. An underperforming boot on his horizontal stab could have been enough to cause the subsequent events, and I know of few pilots who could have recovered from a tail stall, due to ice deformation, at that altitude.

 

[LA Woman]

I am a boat captain, and a pretty good one. I am also a pilot, although I would hesitate before saying that I am a better pilot than captain. I can tell you this... There are very good captains out there, with less experience than I. There are also very poor pilots out there, with more experience than I. Age and experience are not always the end all to be all, and without knowing what happened up there, what the conditions were, and everything else that can and does happen in the captains chair, be it boat or airplane, I think I'll withhold judgement on whether or not this person was a good or bad pilot.

I agree completely. Just because you a low timer in type, doesn't mean you are a bad pilot.

 

[Fleataxi]

LAW: Like I said, at 2300 feet under those conditions, the pilot was out of options. At 30K, that's recoverable. At that altitude in a full stall, all you're doing is deciding where you're going to go SPLAT if you have any control over the aircraft left.

Fleataxi

 

[LA Woman]

LAW: Like I said, at 2300 feet under those conditions, the pilot was out of options. At 30K, that's recoverable. At that altitude in a full stall, all you're doing is deciding where you're going to go SPLAT if you have any control over the aircraft left.

Fleataxi

He was still working on it all the way down, bless him, they were attempting to retract gear 1 second before impact. He got her straight and level, he just ran out of sky. Of course it was not recoverable, but the media will rip apart any of his actions leading up to the stall. I had an initial knee jerk reaction, in the beginning, but after examining all the public data, op specs and gear, I don't see any error in his actions.

 

[LA Woman]

Would also like to add the posted article is rife with misinformation. NTSB has already provided sequence of events from the recorders that explain all the hype in the article. It is blatant propaganda, most likely by a future litigant or defendant.

 

[bw]

I'll wait for the accident report to decide who's at fault. But as the son of a commercial pilot who died in an accident with 38 others, I'll tell you that there is no worse torture than hearing that your parent might have been the cause of it all. My dad had about this much time to recover from unbalanced flaps, and was too close to the ground to make it. A mechanic failed to safety a cable.

 

[Fleataxi]

LAW:

Wouldn't surprise me if the "reporter's" source was an Airline Rep - trying damage control to head off a lawsuit, but forgetting THEY trained and certified the pilot. Oops!

I used to love to fly, but lately, if I can't drive, I stay home - it's just not worth the hassle.

Fleataxi

 

[BillyT]

I am a boat captain, and a pretty good one. I am also a pilot, although I would hesitate before saying that I am a better pilot than captain. I can tell you this... There are very good captains out there, with less experience than I. There are also very poor pilots out there, with more experience than I. Age and experience are not always the end all to be all, and without knowing what happened up there, what the conditions were, and everything else that can and does happen in the captains chair, be it boat or airplane, I think I'll withhold judgement on whether or not this person was a good or bad pilot.

Awesome response. I was an F/O on a similar type and made Captain on it at age 32. At the time I had about 1000 hours in type. The first trip I made as Captain, I was just off of IOE and had about 35 hours in the left seat. Everybody has to make their first Captain trip and it takes a while to have experience as a Captain. The only way to get to "Sully" stage is to start out at newbie stage. During my time there as an F/O and as a Captain I flew with other pilots all around the age and experience continuum. I will take high skill/low experience and willing to learn any day over high experience/low skill. I am now an F/O on a narrowbody jet. Again, I have flown with 28 year old Captains that I would trust with my life all day long and 50 year old Captains that make me wonder. It is a combination of skill and experience that makes a truly exceptional pilot, but even truly exceptional pilots have died in accidents.

 

[LA Woman]

LAW:

Wouldn't surprise me if the "reporter's" source was an Airline Rep - trying damage control to head off a lawsuit, but forgetting THEY trained and certified the pilot. Oops!

I used to love to fly, but lately, if I can't drive, I stay home - it's just not worth the hassle.

Fleataxi

That's what I'm thinking. There was also a severely biased program on television blaming the PIC's use of autopilot in icing conditions, also rife with propaganda. Someone is spending a lot of money to divert blame here. As far as I can see, this PIC was flying in accordance to all op specs, rules and regulations, wx parameters, so we might therein find the real culprit.

 

[inynmn]

She was 22 years old. Just got out of pilot school here at CWU (Central WA Univ.).

I read many times that Rebecca Shaw was 24 years old, may she rest in peace.
I also read that Ms. Shaw had more experience (hours) flying the Q400 - despite her youth - it appears she had more experience than Capt. Marvin Renslow in that particular jet.

A few other planes landed in the same weather conditions at approximately the same time (one a commuter, I believe) - doesn't mean I don't believe the "ice" theory is a possibility (or contributor) to the tragedy.

Truth is we will never know for sure what truly happened, the only people who can tell us are now deceased.

 

[kytom]

commuters are dangerous to your health.

 

[LA Woman]

She was 22 years old. Just got out of pilot school here at CWU (Central WA Univ.).

I read many times that Rebecca Shaw was 24 years old, may she rest in peace.
I also read that Ms. Shaw had more experience (hours) flying the Q400 - despite her youth - it appears she had more experience than Capt. Marvin Renslow in that particular jet.

A few other planes landed in the same weather conditions at approximately the same time - doesn't mean I don't believe the "ice" theory is a possibility (or contributor) to the tragedy.

Truth is we will never know for sure what truly happened, the only people who can tell us are now deceased.

"Captain Renslow had 3,379 total hours of flight experience and was Airline Transport Pilot rated, which is the highest level of certification available," read the airline's statement. "That rating, combined with 172 hours of formal training on the Q400 aircraft, qualified him fully in accordance with all applicable Federal Aviation Regulations."

He was completely qualified to fly that bird. They don't hand out ATP ratings in boxes of cracker jacks you know.

 

[inynmn]

I was not implying that Capt Renslow was not qualified to fly the Q400.

 

[LA Woman]

I was not implying that Capt Renslow was not qualified to fly the Q400.

Sorry, I misunderstood your meaning.

My apologies.

 

[BoatGuy]

I'll wait for the accident report to decide who's at fault. But as the son of a commercial pilot who died in an accident with 38 others, I'll tell you that there is no worse torture than hearing that your parent might have been the cause of it all. My dad had about this much time to recover from unbalanced flaps, and was too close to the ground to make it. A mechanic failed to safety a cable.

The worst fear that any captain has, is that they won't have the ability to protect their passengers and crew. Every captain deals with that fear, every time they leave the terminal, or leave the dock. No captain, worth a dang, has ever left, knowing that he was risking his life and the lives of others. Unfortunately, sometimes it is the mistakes of others that bring us down, and that person will LIVE with his or her mistake for the rest of their life. My condolences on the death of your father. I'm sure that he was a fine captain.

 

[Hfcomms]

FWIW...this is an interesting blog and comments..

February 15, 2009
3407 in Buffalo: FAA Better Pray It's Not Icing


By Paul Bertorelli




In covering the Continental Connection Flight 3407 crash in Buffalo, we skimmed dozens of web sites to see who was reporting what. Typically, these sweeps reveal reporting of various detail and quality, some of which is painful to read. I clipped this clinker from an AP report: "If a midair de-icing system is not working, guidelines from the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association Air Safety Foundation say that pilots can take a number of steps, including changing speed, pulling the nose up or down, or trying a 180-degree turn to rid the plane of ice."

That's the sort of sentence that's in the right hemisphere, but about 60 degrees off course. Not that I'm bashing my colleagues in the work-a-day press. You try reporting on a subject you know nothing about and writing to a 10-minute deadline. I'm quite certain I've made similar misinterpretations when I've reported on subjects outside my expertise, which all journalists must occasionally do.

But another comment from one of the leading lights in the industry, ABC's aviation expert, John Nance, caught my eye. ABC's site quoted him as saying he would be surprised if icing caused the crash. Icing, said Nance, "is usually something that this type of aircraft can handle very well…and it's a brand new aircraft."

It's too soon to say if icing was the probable cause of this crash, but Nance's comment struck me as myopic and rooted in the not entirely unreasonable notion that FAR Part 25 certificated aircraft are capable of flying in known icing conditions. After all, they do it every day, day in and day out. Except when they don't.

Before the Roselawn ATR crash in 1994 and the Detroit Comair/Delta Connection crash in 1997—-an Embraer EMB-120RT--I would have shared Nance's view that this type of aircraft can handle icing. And by "type," I'm thinking more of market type: pneumatic-boot equipped turboprops. Because of the routes they fly and the markets they serve, these airplanes spend a lot of time slogging around in bad weather. On a scuzzy, icy northeastern winter day, a crew might see three or four approaches to minimums before lunch. If there's the kind of large droplet icing out there that brought down the Roselawn ATR, they're likely to find it.

The NTSB revealed on Friday that Flight 3407—a Dash 8 Q400—experienced wild pitch and roll excursions immediately after the flaps were extended. This sort of departure at a configuration change is strongly suggestive of wing or tailplane icing, which, according to the CVR, the crew had discussed. However, reports seem to indicate a pitch up after autopilot disengagement, which isn't consistent with a tail stall. Further, the wreckage was contained in a small area and the aircraft appears to have impacted in a flat attitude 180 degrees off its inbound course for the ILS 23 at Buffalo. That's another fingerprint of a stall mush or spin and a further suspicion of icing-induced stall issues. Reports over the weekend indicated that the FDR showed stick shaker activation, so I'm sure the NTSB will look at a garden variety stall not related to icing. CG could be an issue, too.

Nothing of substance is known now, of course, but I think of lot of people in the industry are starting to place their bets. If it turns out to be icing, the FAA will have hell to pay. For years and following the Detroit crash, the NTSB has faulted the agency for not doing more to improve ice protection requirements and crew training, such as disseminating approach speed and configuration charts for approaches in known icing conditions. If icing is implicated here, I predict the NTSB will announce a preliminary conclusion sooner rather than later. And it will ratchet up the pressure on the FAA to respond, as well it should.

Meanwhile, I'll part company with John Nance. I'll be surprised if this crash doesn't have icing all over it. And by the way, for any regional pilots reading this blog, let us know if your training included a review of the Detroit Comair accident.


Comments

Thirty years ago I was flying a commuter aircraft and landed with heavy ice build-up. We had another leg and were short on time and I de-iced the left wing entirely, but left a little on the right. The truck was out of de-icer. It was such a small amount, the weather was cold but clear, and I knew I had flown into the airport with much more ice on both wings. Upon takeoff the aircraft began to roll and it took full aileron deflection to keep it level. A teensey bit more and it would have been all over. The ice on one wing and the clean other wing produced differential lift, and this was so strong it took full aileron deflection to bring the aircraft around for an emergency landing. When I hear this aircraft began an uncontrollable turn and roll, I think about differential lift secondary to an ice-compromised airfoil.

It is a real shame we still have to learn from things like these. I used to fly for a commuter in the Northeast which lost a Jetstream 41 due to exactly this...autopilot remained engaged during an approach while accumulating ice. We changed our SOP's to say that the autopilot would not be used if ice is being encountered. I wonder what their SOP's dictated during icing conditions regarding autopilot use?

http://www.avweb.com/blogs/insider/AvWebInsider_Flight3407AndIcing_199779-1.html

 

[Hfcomms]

Nothing of substance is known now, of course, but I think of lot of people in the industry are starting to place their bets. If it turns out to be icing, the FAA will have hell to pay. For years and following the Detroit crash, the NTSB has faulted the agency for not doing more to improve ice protection requirements and crew training, such as disseminating approach speed and configuration charts for approaches in known icing conditions. If icing is implicated here, I predict the NTSB will announce a preliminary conclusion sooner rather than later. And it will ratchet up the pressure on the FAA to respond, as well it should.

This is the part that amazes me to no end. I've never had an ATP ticket. Just multi engine land and instrument here and I've never flown a turbine. But I can't believe that these aircraft certified to part 121 don't have specific type rated checklists in icing situations for approach speeds, flap configuration, ect. Do they leave flap and slat configuration up to the individual pilot in such situations? Heck there are checklists for everything else why not this hazardous condition? I've only been in significant icing a few times but the 2 axis autopilot was turned off and I hand flew it all the way in. There is no way I would trust the autopilot in such a situation. It handled like a truck, wasn't responsive and certainly felt funny. I carried a quite a bit of extra speed on final, no flaps and landed hot. I certainly was on pins and needles and most glad to be back on the ground in one piece!!

 

[changed]

She was a chick. Prolly saw a mourning dove in the flight path.

 

[LA Woman]

This is the part that amazes me to no end. I've never had an ATP ticket. Just multi engine land and instrument here and I've never flown a turbine. But I can't believe that these aircraft certified to part 121 don't have specific type rated checklists in icing situations for approach speeds, flap configuration, ect. Do they leave flap and slat configuration up to the individual pilot in such situations? Heck there are checklists for everything else why not this hazardous condition? I've only been in significant icing a few times but the 2 axis autopilot was turned off and I hand flew it all the way in. There is no way I would trust the autopilot in such a situation. It handled like a truck, wasn't responsive and certainly felt funny. I carried a quite a bit of extra speed on final, no flaps and landed hot. I certainly was on pins and needles and most glad to be back on the ground in one piece!!

They do have specific checklists for icing, each according to the op specs for the specific craft. The problem is, these checklists are written with the needs of commercial aviation in mind, moreso than what is the prime operating parameters for the craft. You follow? Even so, 10 degrees of flaps won't give you a 30 degree pitch unless your autopilot has trimmed you to compensate for airfoil degredation. The autopilot was on until the shaker/pusher activated.

 

[et2]

Ye God. ORIGINAL AMATEUR HOUR PILOTS. This ABSOLUTELY bespeaks the reason EXPERIENCE, EXPERIENCE EXPERIENCE is ALL important.

What they FAILED to do is KILL the normal human
NONPILOT reaction to that situation. They AUTOMATICALLY DID WHAT SOMEONE WHO DOESN'T KNOW HOW TO FLY WOULD DO. Pull UP. That GUARANTEED their crash.
OLD pilots are far better than young new pilots. It is not training but thousands of hours of experience that succeeds in forcing people to do what is AGAINST gut instinct, but correct procedure.

What a shame. And what a shame we have nurtured a culture that worships youth and peak physical condition to the dismissal of the CRITICAL role that age and extensive experience plays in handing off the duties of one generation to another.

They SHOULD make an inexperienced pilot fly as COPILOT for years with a seasoned pilot in command before allowing him the chief pilot seat and EVEN THEN not give a new chief pilot a totally green copilot. Totally green co-pilots should ONLY go with the seasoned pilots. Apparantly nobody flying the plane had much experience either as a pilot OR in that particular aircraft. Criminal pilot scheduling.

Anybody flying a commercial aircraft would be well versed on stall recovery procedures. It is one of the first thing learned as a student pilot. How to recognize a impending stall,implement a correction and how to recover from a stall. I'd give the pilot some credit if I was you. They are trained a lot more than you think. From a private pilot on up. If they didn't have the necessary experience they would not be in that position.

 

[LA Woman]

Anybody flying a commercial aircraft would be well versed on stall recovery procedures. It is one of the first thing learned as a student pilot. How to recognize a impending stall,implement a correction and how to recover from a stall. I'd give the pilot some credit if I was you. They are trained a lot more than you think. From a private pilot on up. If they didn't have the necessary experience they would not be in that position.

Absolutely. The problem is, in stall recovery training, wing stall is emphasized but not tip stall or tail stall. The recovery procedures are different for each. But, frankly, I don't think Chuck Yeager could have pulled this one out. They dropped 800 ft in 5 seconds.

 

[LA Woman]

This is the part that amazes me to no end. I've never had an ATP ticket. Just multi engine land and instrument here and I've never flown a turbine. But I can't believe that these aircraft certified to part 121 don't have specific type rated checklists in icing situations for approach speeds, flap configuration, ect. Do they leave flap and slat configuration up to the individual pilot in such situations? Heck there are checklists for everything else why not this hazardous condition? I've only been in significant icing a few times but the 2 axis autopilot was turned off and I hand flew it all the way in. There is no way I would trust the autopilot in such a situation. It handled like a truck, wasn't responsive and certainly felt funny. I carried a quite a bit of extra speed on final, no flaps and landed hot. I certainly was on pins and needles and most glad to be back on the ground in one piece!!

Also, I'm with you, I'd never fly in icing without my paws on the yoke. But, I have a commercial ticket and greater latitude, my ATP friends are required by the FAA to fly by their SOP's.

Here's something that might interest you. Sent shortly after the crash occurred:

email rec'd from a retired engineering test pilot:

... That was a tragic aircraft accident last night in Buffalo. Icing,I am sure was the major cause factor especially the freezing rain element.
I suspect that as they were approaching the outer marker beacon they were slowing down and configuring the aircraft for landing by lowering the landing gear and extending the flaps.
I suspect that not only were they getting too slow while they were exercising the inflatable wing leading-edge de-ice boots,the horizontal tail stalled as the flaps were going down resulting in a rapid nose down pitching moment. Normal icing they could have handled with the de-ice system,however,when one has runback ice forming behind the de-ice boots from the freezing rain that is a more serious situation.
As the flaps extend the airflow aft of the wings creates a greater downwash(angle of attack) on the horizontal tail that may stall if the tail surface is contaminated with ice. That type high wing aircraft with the high T-tail is similar to the smaller Canadian Twin Otter aircraft that was prone to pitch down rapidly in icing when the flaps were lowered and many accidents occurred. Otter pilots was later instructed to only use partial flaps while in icing conditions and to use faster airspeeds for approaches. Much training was done using the Otter experience for pilots expected to operate in adverse wx parts of the country. Also pilots were taught to rapidly undo any configuration changes that gave unexpected results.
The NTSB will come out with more findings as the tapes are reviewed further. My initial conclusion is "Tail stall"
Take care. ...

 

[A7D]

I just heard on the news that they went into stall then pulled nose up while increasing throttle. Wish I had a dollar for every time I did the opposite. No excuse period.

 

[LA Woman]

I just heard on the news that they went into stall then pulled nose up while increasing throttle. Wish I had a dollar for every time I did the opposite. No excuse period.

Did NTSB release another report? I only ask because that would contradict all the information they've released through Sunday.

 

[LA Woman]

This is from WSJ:

According to the plane's flight recorders, Flight 3407's descent into Buffalo was routine until roughly a minute before impact, when the crew lowered the landing gear, followed by the command to extend the wing flaps, which enable the plane to fly at slower speeds.
Almost immediately, these people say, the plane's air speed slowed rapidly, causing a stall-warning device known as a "stick-shaker" to cause the pilots' control column to vibrate. This was followed by a "stick-pusher," which automatically forces the stick forward.
At this point, the captain appears to have pulled back with enough force to overpower the stick-pusher and shoved the throttles to full power, according to people familiar with the matter. Safety board officials said the nose pitched up to a 31-degree angle. Already at a dangerously low speed, the wings immediately stopped generating lift. The plane whipped to the left and then entered a steep right turn, losing 800 feet of altitude in less than five seconds. At one point the right wing was perpendicular to the ground, according to information taken from the flight data recorder.
The pilots continued to fight with the controls almost all the way to the ground, and in the final moments, "it appeared that they were beginning to make headway when they ran out of altitude," said one person who looked at the data.


I'm only going to say, IF this is true, WTF?

He fought the pusher? This violates all procedures of any type of stall recovery.

The CVR must be very revealing. I am gobsmacked.

 

[imaginative]

Updated 03/25/2009 01:42 PM
Feds: Fatal Air Flight 3407 Did Not Have Mechanical Problems

By: NY1 News

Federal safety investigators say that the fatal Continental Connection Flight 3407, which killed two Manhattan residents and 48 others in February, did not have mechanical problems and had its stall warning system activate right before the accident.

National Transportation Safety Board officials are investigating why the plane crashed into a house near Buffalo, N.Y. on the night of February 12.

The plane was flying in icing conditions, and are determining whether the plane experienced an aerodynamic stall caused by icing and the pilot's reaction to conditions.

The NTSB has scheduled a three-day public hearing starting May 12.

All 49 aboard the plane and one man in the house died.

Among the dead was Beverly Eckert, a September 11th widow and an advocate for families of World Trade Center victims.

http://www.ny1.com/content/top_stor...did-not-have-mechanical-problems/Default.aspx

 

[imaginative]

Looks like the one & only 911 court case has been averted

"All 49 aboard the plane and one man in the house died.

Among the dead was Beverly Eckert, a September 11th widow and an advocate for families of World Trade Center victims."

Just before this plane inexplicably went down, Beverly Eckert, the only 9/11 widow who refused to accept the 2 million dollar payoff for her silence & compensation, wrote these words....

My Silence Cannot Be Bought
Updated 2/13/2009

By Beverly Eckert
This piece by Beverly Eckert was originally published on Friday, December 19, 2003, and ran on the Opinion page.

I've chosen to go to court rather than accept a payoff from the 9/11 victims compensation fund. Instead, I want to know what went so wrong with our intelligence and security systems that a band of religious fanatics was able to turn four U.S passenger jets into an enemy force, attack our cities and kill 3,000 civilians with terrifying ease. I want to know why two 110-story skyscrapers collapsed in less than two hours and why escape and rescue options were so limited.

I am suing because unlike other investigative avenues, including congressional hearings and the 9/11 commission, my lawsuit requires all testimony be given under oath and fully uses powers to compel evidence.

The victims fund was not created in a spirit of compassion. Rather, it was a tacit acknowledgement by Congress that it tampered with our civil justice system in an unprecedented way. Lawmakers capped the liability of the airlines at the behest of lobbyists who descended on Washington while the Sept. 11 fires still smoldered.

And this liability cap protects not just the airlines, but also World Trade Center builders, safety engineers and other defendants.

The caps on liability have consequences for those who want to sue to shed light on the mistakes of 9/11. It means the playing field is tilted steeply in favor of those who need to be held accountable. With the financial consequences other than insurance proceeds removed, there is no incentive for those whose negligence contributed to the death toll to acknowledge their failings or implement reforms. They can afford to deny culpability and play a waiting game.

By suing, I've forfeited the "$1.8 million average award" for a death claim I could have collected under the fund. Nor do I have any illusions about winning money in my suit. What I do know is I owe it to my husband, whose death I believe could have been avoided, to see that all of those responsible are held accountable. If we don't get answers to what went wrong, there will be a next time. And instead of 3,000 dead, it will be 10,000. What will Congress do then?

So I say to Congress, big business and everyone who conspired to divert attention from government and private-sector failures: My husband's life was priceless, and I will not let his death be meaningless. My silence cannot be bought.

http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-02-13-eckert-opinion_N.htm

 

[Hfcomms]

Talk of ice on wings, then a scream and crash

Talk of ice on wings, then a scream and crash
By JOAN LOWY

WASHINGTON (AP) - Showing no alarm, the captain and his first officer chatted about the ice on their plane's windshield and wings, making light of their shared concerns about flying in wintry weather as they sped toward Buffalo, N.Y., on the night of Feb. 12.

Minutes later, pilot Marvin Renslow said "Jesus Christ" and Rebecca Shaw screamed as Continental Connection Flight 3407 plunged to the ground, striking a house in a fiery crash. All 49 people aboard and one man on the ground were killed.

The haunting transcript of the plane's final moments - preserved by the cockpit voice recorder - was released Tuesday by the National Transportation Safety Board at the start of a three-day public hearing to examine safety issues raised by the crash.

Among those issues are whether Renslow and Shaw responded properly to warnings that the Dash 8-Q400 Bombardier, a twin-engine turboprop, was nearing a stall.

In response to questioning from board members, officials from Manassas, Va.-based Colgan Air, which operated the flight for Continental, acknowledged that the two apparently weren't paying close attention to the aircraft's instruments and failed to follow the airline's procedures for handling an impeding stall in the final minutes of the flight.

"I believe Capt. Renslow did have intentions of landing safely at Buffalo, as well as first officer Shaw, but obviously in those last few moments ... the flight instruments were not being monitored, and that's an indication of a lack of situational awareness," said John Barrett, Colgan's director of flight standards.

The NTSB's investigation has indicated that ice on the wing was a precursor to the stall warning but was not severe enough to cause a crash.

About the time the two first remarked to each other about the ice, the plane was descending from 11,000 feet and had received permission from air traffic controllers to go as low as 4,000 feet in preparation for landing. Federal regulations prohibit nonessential cockpit conversations below 10,000 feet.

"It's lots of ice," Shaw said.

"Oh, yeah, that's the most I've seen, most ice I've seen on the leading edges in a long time, in a while anyway, I should say," Renslow replied.

Renslow then remarked that he'd flown about 625 hours in the region before he was hired for this job by Colgan.

Shaw replied: "I really wouldn't mind going through a winter in the Northeast before I have to upgrade to captain. ... I've never seen icing conditions. I've never deiced. I've never seen any. I've never experienced any of that. I don't want to have to experience that and make those kinds of calls. You know I'd've freaked out. I'd've have like seen this much ice and thought, 'Oh, my gosh, we were going to crash.'"

"I would've been fine," Renslow replied. "I would have survived it. There wasn't, we never had to make decisions that I wouldn't have been able to make but ... now I'm more comfortable."

The crew then lowered the landing gear and adjusted the airplane's flaps, but at 10:16.26 p.m. there was a sound similar to movement of the flap handle, according to the transcript, and Shaw says, "Uhhh."

Less than a second later, there were sounds similar to the stick shaker - a warning transmitted through the control stick that the aircraft is nearing a stall. They lasted for 6.7 seconds. Then a horn sounded signaling the autopilot disconnecting, and that horn continued until the end of the recording.

Three seconds later, a click was followed by the sound of increased engine power, according to the transcript.

At 10:16.34.8, Renslow said, "Jesus Christ."

Shaw said she has put the flaps up and asked if she should put the landing gear up. Renslow replied: "Gear up, oh, (expletive)."

As noise in the cockpit increased, Renslow said: "We're down."

Then the sound of a thump.

Shaw: "We (sound of scream)."

With that entry, at 10:16.52, the transcript ends.

NTSB documents indicate that after the stick shaker went off, Renslow increased air speed and pulled back on the control column in an apparent attempt to bring the plane's nose up. Instead, the plane began to pitch and roll. Aviation experts said the proper response would be to push forward, pointing the nose down slightly or to keep level.

Within moments the plane's stick pusher kicked in. The automatic safety system points the plane's nose downward in a stall to build up enough speed so the plane can be guided to a recovery.

Shaw also retracted the plane's flaps. An expert on stall recovery working for the plane's manufacturer, Wally Warner, told the board retracting the flaps would significantly increase the potential for a "secondary stall" and make it harder to recover.

"Did the crew do anything right post stick shaker?" asked board member Debbie Hersman.

It was correct to increase air speed, Warner responded.

Asked if a crew could have recovered from the stall experienced by Flight 3407, Paul Pryor - Colgan's head of pilot training - replied simply: "Yes."

The board is holding the public hearing a mere three months after the crash to probe safety issues that have arisen during its investigation rather than wait the year or more that such investigations typically take. A second hearing will be conducted when the investigation is complete.

All four of the board's members were present, underscoring the seriousness of their concerns. The board hasn't held such an "en banc" public hearing in more than five years.

A top concern is the training Renslow received from Colgan. He failed several training tests before and after being hired by Colgan in 2005. He had been certified to fly the Dash-8 plane for about three months. Pryor acknowledged Renslow didn't have any hands-on training on the Dash 8's stick pusher, although he had received hands-on stick pusher training on a smaller plane that he previously flew.

The hearing is expected to explore the role of fatigue in the crash. Both pilots commuted to Newark, N.J., to make the flight - Renslow from his home near Tampa, Fla., and Shaw on a red-eye flight as a passenger from her home near Seattle. Shaw also complained about congestion and may have been suffering from a cold.

Renslow received his commercial pilot's license in 2002. He had 3,379 hours of flight time, 110 hours on the Dash 8.

http://apnews.myway.com//article/20090513/D98511S80.html

 

[Desperado]

Fatal distraction: Captain was flirting with pretty co-pilot just moments before plane crash which killed 50

By David Gardner
Last updated at 12:14 AM on 13th May 2009

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An airline captain was flirting with his young woman co-pilot moments before sending his packed commuter plane into a deadly tailspin that killed 50, it was reported yesterday.

The 'fatal distraction' was revealed before the opening of a public hearing into the crash in the U.S.

Captain Marvin Renslow, 47, and Rebecca Shaw, his 24-year-old co-pilot, died in the crash as the Bombardier Q400 turboprop aircraft approached Buffalo airport in New York State in February.
Captain Marvin Renslow was reportedly flirting with his young co-pilot, Rebecca Shaw, shortly before the plane crashed

Captain Marvin Renslow was reportedly flirting with his young co-pilot, Rebecca Shaw, shortly before the plane crashed

Their banter about relationships was captured on the flight recorder, according to the New York Post, despite despite Federal Aviation Authority rules that forbid non-flight-related talk below 10,000 feet.


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The pilots' conversation was the latest bombshell to emerge from the investigation into the February crash as a three-day inquiry by the US National Transportation Safety Board began yesterday in Washington.

A transcript of the conversation is expected to form part of the evidence, said the Post.

Captain Renslow had reportedly failed five flight tests during his career and was never adequately taught how to respond to the emergency that led to the plane’s fatal descent.

Sources also suggested his co-pilot was ill and tired after taking a cross-country red-eye flight to get to work after a ski trip in Seattle.
Continental Airlines Flight 3407

‘Fatal distraction’: The wreckage of Continental Connection Flight 3407 which crashed moments after the pilot and co-pilot were discussing relationships

Miss Shaw is said to have complained about a head cold and told colleagues she should have taken a day off sick.

As the plane’s speed slowed to a dangerous level, the captain did the opposite of the proper procedure to avoid it lurching into a stall, according to a report in the Wall Street Journal.

The slowing speed set off an automatic safety system – called a ‘stick-pusher’ – which pushes the control column down to send the plane into a temporary dive so it can regain speed and recover from a stall.

But Captain Renslow allegedly tried to force the Bombardier Q400 turboprop aircraft to do the opposite and yanked back on the controls while adding thrust.

His actions manually overrode the stick-pusher, causing the aircraft to lose lift, buck violently and start to roll before plunging to earth.

buffalo

Tragedy: Volunteer firefighters attempt to put out flames after the plane crashed a few miles short of Buffalo airport

Although the captain had five ‘unsatisfactory’ training check rides in his career, he passed a subsequent series of tests and was fully qualified to fly the plane that crashed.

A spokesman for Colgan Air, the commuter carrier that employed Captain Renslow, said its pilot training programmes ‘meet or exceed regulatory requirements for all major airlines’ and told the Journal its crews ‘are prepared to handle emergency situations they might face.’

The Virginia-based company operates nearly 50 planes, carries 2.5 million passengers a year and employs 480 pilots.

It serves as a commuter airline feeding bigger US carriers like Continental, United Airlines and US Airways.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/wor...pilot-just-moments-plane-crash-killed-50.html

 

[Desperado]

PDF - Transcript of the cockpit voice recorder Flight 3407
http://www.buffalonews.com/532/story/668909.html

 

[BillyT]

I read the transcript and I just don't get it. She put the flaps up. Why in the world would you do that?

 

[Satanta]

I read the transcript and I just don't get it. She put the flaps up. Why in the world would you do that?

She was new and stupid and the captain was an inept flunkie that never bothered learning WTF he was actually supposed to do in a FUBAR situation.