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Posted for fair use.....
https://www.commentarymagazine.com/foreign-policy/middle-east/iraq/to-die-in-an-unserious-war/
To Die in an Unserious War
Max Boot / Oct. 27, 2015
Last week, Delta Force staged a raid inside Syria along with Kurdish Peshmerga to free prisoners held by the Islamic State. The operation reportedly freed 70 hostages, but resulted in the death of Master Sargent Joshua Wheeler, one of Delta’s storied “operators.”
It was one of the few times in the past year that there was news of a Joint Special Operations Command raid against ISIS, coming after a May operation in which the “operators” (again, reportedly Delta) swooped into Syria to try to snatch an ISIS organizer and financier whose nom de guerre was Abu Sayyaf. That raid resulted in the target’s death, but did result in the capture of his wife and much intelligence that was said to be useful.
It is possible, indeed likely, that some other JSOC operations have taken place without attracting any press attention. (JSOC includes Delta, Seal Team Six, the Night Stalkers aerial regiment, and other top-tier units.) But, in all likelihood, not that many.
Back in the day — in the 2005-2008 period when the campaign against Al Qaeda in Iraq, ISIS’s predecessor, and Shiite counterparts such as the Mahdi Army was at its most intense — JSOC would stage an estimated 10-12 operations a night in Iraq. Night after night, its operators would go out to capture or kill “high-level targets,” with many of these raids resulting in either the capture of prisoners who could be interrogated or documents and computers that could be exploited. Then, using the intel thus generated, JSOC would come up with fresh targets and go after them too — sometimes that very night.
Under General Stanley McChrystal and his successor, Admiral William McRaven, JSOC became a brutally effective man-hunting machine — arguably the greatest special operations force in history. It’s true that its brutal operations tempo, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, took a heavy toll on its operators; men such as Master Sargent Wheeler, who went out on deployment after deployment. Wheeler was typical. He was said to have been deployed 14 times, in each case probably for around 90 days. That takes a heavy mental and physical toll, even among those who return alive and unwounded, and not all do. These operators have paid with lasting injuries similar to those suffered by professional athletes, mental traumas, divorces, and other costs that cannot be fully assessed publicly or perhaps even acknowledged privately.
But the JSOC operations took an even heavier toll on the enemy. JSOC’s skill in targeting the senior echelons of AQI contributed to the overall success of the “surge” in 2007-2008. Even if leadership targeting by itself cannot eliminate an insurgency, it can be an important – indeed, essential — line of operations in a broader campaign plan.
The question is: Why isn’t JSOC mounting the same kind of intensive campaign today against ISIS in spite of President Obama’s promise to “degrade and ultimately destroy” that terrorist group? Because, as I have previously argued many times (see, e.g., this Wall Street Journal op-ed, President Obama isn’t serious about actually defeating ISIS.
All indications are that he is content to contain ISIS and nibble around the edges of its fanatical terror state, while leaving the actual defeat of ISIS to his successor. To do more now, Obama must realize, would require sending more troops and risking losing more soldiers. That he is unprepared to do, because he is so firmly committed to pulling back from military involvement in the Middle East at all costs. As a result, ISIS continues to be as strong as ever in spite of some losses at the margins — e.g., it recently lost control of the oil refinery in Baiji, Iraq, to a force made up of Shiite militia and a smaller number of Iraqi security forces.
There are many things that Obama would do if he were serious about defeating ISIS, but among them would be unleashing JSOC as President George W. Bush did. JSOC squadrons based in the Kurdish region of Iraq, in Jordan, and possibly Turkey could mount regular operations against ISIS strongholds. As far as we can tell from open source reporting (which is admittedly an imperfect source of information on such highly classified matters), that’s not happening. Apparently JSOC is going out only occasionally — just often enough to run the risk of casualties such as Master Sargent Wheeler, but not enough to actually have a strategic impact. That raises the troubling question of why JSOC’s elite operators are risking – and, in the case of Master Sergeant Wheeler, losing — their lives if their commander-in-chief is not serious about winning.
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.commentarymagazine.com/foreign-policy/middle-east/iraq/to-die-in-an-unserious-war/
To Die in an Unserious War
Max Boot / Oct. 27, 2015
Last week, Delta Force staged a raid inside Syria along with Kurdish Peshmerga to free prisoners held by the Islamic State. The operation reportedly freed 70 hostages, but resulted in the death of Master Sargent Joshua Wheeler, one of Delta’s storied “operators.”
It was one of the few times in the past year that there was news of a Joint Special Operations Command raid against ISIS, coming after a May operation in which the “operators” (again, reportedly Delta) swooped into Syria to try to snatch an ISIS organizer and financier whose nom de guerre was Abu Sayyaf. That raid resulted in the target’s death, but did result in the capture of his wife and much intelligence that was said to be useful.
It is possible, indeed likely, that some other JSOC operations have taken place without attracting any press attention. (JSOC includes Delta, Seal Team Six, the Night Stalkers aerial regiment, and other top-tier units.) But, in all likelihood, not that many.
Back in the day — in the 2005-2008 period when the campaign against Al Qaeda in Iraq, ISIS’s predecessor, and Shiite counterparts such as the Mahdi Army was at its most intense — JSOC would stage an estimated 10-12 operations a night in Iraq. Night after night, its operators would go out to capture or kill “high-level targets,” with many of these raids resulting in either the capture of prisoners who could be interrogated or documents and computers that could be exploited. Then, using the intel thus generated, JSOC would come up with fresh targets and go after them too — sometimes that very night.
Under General Stanley McChrystal and his successor, Admiral William McRaven, JSOC became a brutally effective man-hunting machine — arguably the greatest special operations force in history. It’s true that its brutal operations tempo, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, took a heavy toll on its operators; men such as Master Sargent Wheeler, who went out on deployment after deployment. Wheeler was typical. He was said to have been deployed 14 times, in each case probably for around 90 days. That takes a heavy mental and physical toll, even among those who return alive and unwounded, and not all do. These operators have paid with lasting injuries similar to those suffered by professional athletes, mental traumas, divorces, and other costs that cannot be fully assessed publicly or perhaps even acknowledged privately.
But the JSOC operations took an even heavier toll on the enemy. JSOC’s skill in targeting the senior echelons of AQI contributed to the overall success of the “surge” in 2007-2008. Even if leadership targeting by itself cannot eliminate an insurgency, it can be an important – indeed, essential — line of operations in a broader campaign plan.
The question is: Why isn’t JSOC mounting the same kind of intensive campaign today against ISIS in spite of President Obama’s promise to “degrade and ultimately destroy” that terrorist group? Because, as I have previously argued many times (see, e.g., this Wall Street Journal op-ed, President Obama isn’t serious about actually defeating ISIS.
All indications are that he is content to contain ISIS and nibble around the edges of its fanatical terror state, while leaving the actual defeat of ISIS to his successor. To do more now, Obama must realize, would require sending more troops and risking losing more soldiers. That he is unprepared to do, because he is so firmly committed to pulling back from military involvement in the Middle East at all costs. As a result, ISIS continues to be as strong as ever in spite of some losses at the margins — e.g., it recently lost control of the oil refinery in Baiji, Iraq, to a force made up of Shiite militia and a smaller number of Iraqi security forces.
There are many things that Obama would do if he were serious about defeating ISIS, but among them would be unleashing JSOC as President George W. Bush did. JSOC squadrons based in the Kurdish region of Iraq, in Jordan, and possibly Turkey could mount regular operations against ISIS strongholds. As far as we can tell from open source reporting (which is admittedly an imperfect source of information on such highly classified matters), that’s not happening. Apparently JSOC is going out only occasionally — just often enough to run the risk of casualties such as Master Sargent Wheeler, but not enough to actually have a strategic impact. That raises the troubling question of why JSOC’s elite operators are risking – and, in the case of Master Sergeant Wheeler, losing — their lives if their commander-in-chief is not serious about winning.