PREP "I'm Just A Prepper. I Have No Military Background. I'm Worried, What Do I Do?"

[Dozdoats]

I posted this to jump start a discussion (if anyone is interested enough in the topic that is). It may not be useful for everyone here, or appropriate for everyone here, but it is at least a starting place if one is needed.
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http://mountainguerrilla.wordpress.com/2014/04/27/guest-post-from-spartan-monkey/

“What Do I Do Next?” Guest Article from SpartanMonkey

A common question see in the patriot/prepper community is this: “I have no military background. I’ve been storing food, ammo, water, etc. I’ve got some training. I don’t have many folks around me that share my views. What do I do next?”

I began with a military background, then started adding in the typical prepper stuff like food storage, etc. IMO, it’s much easier to pick up prepper skills than military skills for the simple reason that it takes a lot of time and practice to become proficient in military type skills. Not to mention requiring a whole learning environment that includes having enough guys to form both your and opposing teams, commo gear, pyro, ammo, land, air assets (both rotary and fixed wing), mortars, etc. Plus, there’s a whole host of skills to learn like land nav, various types of patrols, marksmanship, leadership, etc. But have hope; you CAN learn what you must. You’ll need to do a lot of reading (military manuals), buy some DVDs, take some formal training, and practice, A LOT. Having realistic expectations about how fast your skillset evolves and how many skills comprise that skillset will help you keep a positive attitude, which will keep you moving forward. There is no realistic way you’re going to gain the level of skill and experience that an active duty soldier has. The good news is that you don’t need to learn to do a whole host of things like call for close-air support (CAS), or indirect fires, so the number of things you need to learn is reduced.

Once you’re okay with that revelation, progress can begin. I suggest that your goal be to provide for the protection of your home and family—and possibly neighbors if you’re ready for that. If you limit yourself to your own AO, you’re a hero to your family, plus you’re not out their pulling lone-wolf missions the effects of which may make life difficult for the well-organized/trained groups that may be handling the bigger picture missions.

For the guy or gal who has no military experience—and what I really mean is infantry or SOF—here’s what I recommend: build your skills like the military does. First: focus on on individual skills. Individual skills are those things you can do on your own. Second: Collective tasks. Collective tasks are performed by a group. Third: Missions. Several collective tasks support any given mission.

Here are some examples of each:
Individual Skills: zero your rifle, maintain your rifle, send a radio message, report enemy information, physical fitness training, combatives (yes, you need someone else to make it realistic, but this can be pursued without a like-minded companion, at any number of decent judo or MMA schools), land navigation, survival skills, etc.
Collective Tasks: Perform actions at danger areas, clear a building, move as part of a fire team, etc.
Missions: Attack an enemy position, recon an enemy position, defend a position, etc.

Do an internet search for “STP 21-24-SMCT,” “ARTEP 7-8-ARTEP,” and “ARTEP 7-8-DRILL.” Those are three of many of the manuals the US Army uses—or at least used when I was in—to plan training. Look through them and you’ll see how the individual skills support collective tasks, and how the collective tasks support missions. These things are explained in those training manuals.

Master the individual skills first since all else build on those and you can do them yourself. Those skills—especially weapons handling, PT, survival, and land nav—are basic skills to master, even if you’re not planning on being part of a larger force. Once you’ve got those down, get your family members and/or a buddy or two and start practicing some collective tasks. Pick collective tasks that you’d find mot useful like clearing a building, since this could be used if you have to clear your home. Learn how to move tactically with a couple buddies. Do battle drills until they require no thought to execute. When you’ve got all that down, then you plan a mission where you there are a bunch of specific collective tasks that you will have to do. For example, if the mission is to attack an enemy position, you’ll need to move in a formation, you’ll need to navigate to get there, you’ll need to cross danger areas, then you’ll need to execute the assault itself. When planning your missions, don’t just wing it, but use the formal planning process—the troop-leading procedures. Actually, if you want to be able to plan missions, get to know this process well:
1.Receive the Mission
2.Issue a Warning Order (WARNO)
3.Make a Tentative Plan
4.Start Necessary Movement
5.Conduct Reconnaissance
6.Complete the Plan
7.Issue the Operations Order (OPORD)
8.Supervise and Refine

You can even use these TLPs in the civilian world—I’m always surprised by how many senior managers fail because they fail to execute Step 8. See how we build from simple to complex> Have your missions evaluated by someone (who is a subject matter expert, or at least experienced), outside your group to get impartial, unbiased comments. When done training, do an AAR (after-action review). This is where everyone gets a turn to say 1) what went well, 2) what didn’t go well, and 3) how to improve for the next time. Keep the comments impersonal—this is not a time to point fingers and cast blame—it’s a time for honest, constructive reflection, with the goal of getting better. Do an AAR yourself, even if you’re just dry-firing in your basement.

For all tasks, use the “Crawl/Walk/Run” methodology: Crawl means that, for tasks new to you, you execute them so slowly and deliberately that it feels like you’re crawling. As you get better, you can run it a little faster (walk). When you’ve mastered the task, you do it more naturally, so it appears faster (run). Keep in mind that “run phase” doesn’t necessarily mean literally to run—unless you’ve achieved that Nirvana—it all just seems to come together and happen. There’s no use trying to be all high-speed, low-drag when you don’t know what you’re doing—you’ll just make mistakes and get frustrated, so start at the crawl speed. You’ll probably feel proficient ASAP, and won’t want to make mistakes because it makes you look bad in front of your peers. Trust me, making mistakes is how you learn—better to make your mistakes in training where life gives you a mulligan and you get to try it again! Mistakes become bad when you can’t seem to figure out how to stop making the same ones over and over.

Train as you’ll fight. I can’t stress this enough. Under stress, you’ll fall back on your training. This means train with the gear that you expect to use, in the kind of terrain and weather that you expect to fight in. Don’t practice shooting only at 10 meter targets if, in reality, you’ll need to engage out to 250 meters—but the opposite is true as well. If your training isn’t realistic, you’re screwing yourself and those who’ll be fighting beside you. How do you make it realistic? Using crawl/walk/run, first do things in daylight, so the environment isn’t distracting you and you can focus on skill development. Then, when your skill level has progressed to where you’re executing somewhere in the latter part of the walk phase, do it at night. Start in good weather, then do it in foul weather. Go to the range on a shitty day, when it’s cold and raining. Do PT outside when it’s cold and raining. Basically, start simple and then make things more complex so you’re always pushing the envelope of your skill level, but never push so far beyond your capabilities that you become a danger to yourself or those around you.

Chances are, your primary mission is to defend your personal homeland—your house and family. So pick missions that make sense for that. Once you can effectively protect your own shit, then start spreading your area of influence. Start with immediate neighbors, and build your buffer zone out farther and farther, until you’ve got your whole neighborhood on the same program. IMO, until you can secure your own personal AO, you’ve got no business thinking about being part of some larger force, doing bigger things.


If you’re focused on protecting your clan, they are the ones to recruit first. Get your spouse involved. If your kids are of age, then train them too! If they’re not “into it,” keep getting ready on your own and gently—over time—explain to them why you’re doing what you’re doing. My son is four years old, but he like “rough time” with Daddy—he actually demands it. He loves to try to push me down and wrestle, which gives me an opportunity to teach him some basic grappling skills, without him even realizing it. He loves to run, so I create little obstacle courses for him which builds his agility and endurance. I do it all in a very positive, no pressure, can-do way, in order to keep him wanting more. The same can be applied to others—figure out what they need to know, then teach them in a way that they don’t even realize that they’re learning something specific.

I’ve really just scratched the surface. There are so many things to know. That’s why you really need to get input from someone who’s had the training. At least if you read the manuals and get squared away with the individual tasks though, you’ll be able to focus on the next level stuff the trainer can teach you. I’d suggest writing down a formal plan that’ll get you from where you are now to where you want to be. Feel free to adjust the plan as you learn, but keep it up to date, and realistic.

 

[Jeff B.]

It's a great article and conversation to start. I too read this, it was cross posted on WRS. The progression and logic is very good. When acronyms are used, the author does well in explaining the phrase or meaning in parenthases.

Getting to the meat of the question, there's alot of pretty sound doctrine out there that can be studied and practiced to develop basic skills. If a person understands the difference between cover and concealment and masters (OK, can do them) individual movement techniques, they'll be far ahead of about 90% of the population.

If they take the next jump and work at Team and Squad movement and tactics you can move that up to about 95%.

But, all that said, if they're not proficient with their weapon of choice, its all for naught. Learn you gun(s). Strip, clean and re-assemble. Do it again, again and again. Do it until you can literally do it in the dark without fumbling around. Get your load bearing system set up and know it as well. Get used to wearing it if you go for a walk in the woods. Try it with your canteens (bladder) and magazines loaded. Woo... kind of heavy isn't it?



Again, do these few things and you'll be way ahead of your fellow citizens. It's also a good idea to work a bit of exercise into your routine. I've got a bone to bone right knee, so use a bike for exercise. Do what you can. If nothing else, go for a daily walk. Get off the couch. Stretch and stay limber.

Not too many of us are in the shape or condition we were at 18, 28 or 38, ok!, you get the idea...

Looking forward to seeing other comments and suggestions!

Learning is another useful daily activity.

Jeff B.

 

[MountainBiker]

It is a good article with good suggestions. Not all of us are suited to be warriors though. I'm in pretty good shape for an old guy and while my stamina and endurance are good, my strength is not what it used to be, nor my speed or flexibility. Sometimes one knee rebels if overworked as does one of my shoulders. I know that I could do more good in a support, planning, and/or organizing role. It is towards those ends that my prepping has been focused, though in the end we'll all do what we have to do.

 

[dogmanan]

When the time comes pick up a weapon and fight till you die, pretty simple.

 

[AlfaMan]

Great article. Gives a lot of good pointers.
A potentially off topic question for the group though-does anyone have information of prepping for the physically disabled? It's become an interest of mine, because over the past two years between 2 heart attacks, diabetes and advanced rheumatoid arthritis I'm down to essentially one good leg and 6 fingers. I've broken my preps into smaller bags and wheeled carts but I'd love more ideas. My days of "humping and bumping" are sadly over. Any ideas would me most helpful.

 

[night driver]

Gotta love Mosby. He clearly learned the primary basic lesson y'all taught after the "Q" course.

The first thing a SF Officer is is a teacher.

 

[2x2]

Too old to do my MIL training; PLF's.

 

[The Mountain]

The first question I'd ask here is, "do you really NEED military training?" Really think through your situation: if you have visions of single-handedly holding off a mass of armed Fed agents a la Bunkerville, forget it. Unless you KNOW, without a doubt, that you will be in harm's way because of some specific reason (and allegedly being on some "list" does not count), you're probably just wasting time and energy that could be put to better use.

Plenty of preppers and "survivalists" didn't seem to think it necessary back in the 70s and 80s to have full Infantryman skills. It's only in the last five years or so that I've seen a sudden upswing in the idea that to be a prepper, you have to be some kind of pseudo-Special Forces guy too. Remember, Mosby and Culper and those guys aren't putting this info out for ordinary preppers. That stuff is intended for FreeFor/IIIpers who actually intend to take the fight to what's left of a tyrannical FedGov. The VAST majority of preppers are not going to be in that fight. Remember, the main point of prepping is to buy yourself time to get past a major societal dislocation, not to turn yourself into Rambo.

There is certainly value in a fair amount of the non-combat training that the Military does, such as field hygiene, comms, and first aid. These are things that can be translated easily to ordinary prep situations. However, things like "bounding overwatch" movement, CQB, and so on, are highly-specific to fighting, and in a prep situation that's unlikely. Despite the wild-eyed talk about martial law and confiscation and all that, the reality is that whatever's left of the Fed in a collapse situation is going to have their hands more than full just trying to keep order. Recall the effect that the DC Sniper and Dorner had, now multiply that by a hundred or so per city. The feds aren't going to waste much effort tracking down the relatively tiny caches of food individual preppers are going to have stashed away.

Now, there *will* be some level of threat from scavengers, but again you're probably not going to need Ranger training to defeat them. Any level of resistance at all is likely to send them looking for easier pickings; the risk-to-reward balance will be too high early on in any collapse, and by the time they really get desperate they're also not going to be nearly as much of a threat.

IMHO, don't get hung up on military combat training. It's not a must-have to be a prepper. Common sense and careful planning will carry you through pretty much everything you're likely to experience. Don't go it alone, and you'll have a very good chance of coming through.

 

[L.A.B.]

I would think that a form of SERE with an emphasis on SEE would be the Preppers main objective.

Like the line from Tom Cruise's character in 'War of The Worlds' to the young man that played his son... "Can you come up with a plan that doesn't require your little sister joining the U.S. Military to fight the Aliens." (Or something to that effect).

 

[Inthewoods]

The first question I'd ask here is, "do you really NEED military training?" Really think through your situation: if you have visions of single-handedly holding off a mass of armed Fed agents a la Bunkerville, forget it. Unless you KNOW, without a doubt, that you will be in harm's way because of some specific reason (and allegedly being on some "list" does not count), you're probably just wasting time and energy that could be put to better use.

Plenty of preppers and "survivalists" didn't seem to think it necessary back in the 70s and 80s to have full Infantryman skills. It's only in the last five years or so that I've seen a sudden upswing in the idea that to be a prepper, you have to be some kind of pseudo-Special Forces guy too. Remember, Mosby and Culper and those guys aren't putting this info out for ordinary preppers. That stuff is intended for FreeFor/IIIpers who actually intend to take the fight to what's left of a tyrannical FedGov. The VAST majority of preppers are not going to be in that fight. Remember, the main point of prepping is to buy yourself time to get past a major societal dislocation, not to turn yourself into Rambo.

There is certainly value in a fair amount of the non-combat training that the Military does, such as field hygiene, comms, and first aid. These are things that can be translated easily to ordinary prep situations. However, things like "bounding overwatch" movement, CQB, and so on, are highly-specific to fighting, and in a prep situation that's unlikely. Despite the wild-eyed talk about martial law and confiscation and all that, the reality is that whatever's left of the Fed in a collapse situation is going to have their hands more than full just trying to keep order. Recall the effect that the DC Sniper and Dorner had, now multiply that by a hundred or so per city. The feds aren't going to waste much effort tracking down the relatively tiny caches of food individual preppers are going to have stashed away.

Now, there *will* be some level of threat from scavengers, but again you're probably not going to need Ranger training to defeat them. Any level of resistance at all is likely to send them looking for easier pickings; the risk-to-reward balance will be too high early on in any collapse, and by the time they really get desperate they're also not going to be nearly as much of a threat.

IMHO, don't get hung up on military combat training. It's not a must-have to be a prepper. Common sense and careful planning will carry you through pretty much everything you're likely to experience. Don't go it alone, and you'll have a very good chance of coming through.

Excellent post.

Instinct and fight or flight decisions are what will get you through is what I get out of this post.
If you and yours are SUPPOSED to survive these trying times, you WILL.
If not, it's GODs will.

 

[homepark]

The military training is good in helping to set a survival mind-set. Combat experience even better, as it takes things from theoretical to real. Prepping and a self-subsistence skill set will help immensely. The ability to pull together folks with a similar interest in surviving the long haul....priceless.

 

[Dosadi]

Not many individuals have the logistic tails to support extended military operations, no matter the degree of skills and training.

A completely different mindset for the private person seeking to get through grubby times must exist.

Fighting is something done as a last resort, not a militia type event. Thus preppers are not soldiers, militia may want to be soldiers, but will have to deal with logistics some way.

Of all the skills not addressed by these various trainers is where to resupply without becoming the same as the looters they are supposed to be opposing by taking from everyone else in the area to support their fight.

Justify that or not it still boils down to taking from some against their will to sustain operations. That is the nature of war, it always takes from producers at provide for those doing the killing needs.

 

[Hfcomms]

I have the mil training but IMO that doesn't mean as much today as what it used to since the training today is much too soft except for the SF type community. That being said I agree with others who think that while the training can be helpful it's not the be all and end all. Lot's of soldiers really have very little knowledge in the way of woodsman knowledge and things of that nature. I don't know how many people have watched the show 'Dual Survival' where they send two guys out into austere environments to survive together. There was a recent shakeup in the show but one of the guys is a naturalist type than can literally make a silk purse out of a sows ear and the other guy is a legitimate special forces veteran with more military skills than you can shake a stick at. The SF guy although a type A personality and intensely driven admits that he doesn't have the skill set that the other guy has when it comes to fire making and basic survival.

The SF guy takes the kinds of risks and chances that although necessary on a military mission could injure you or kill you in a survival situation where you have little if any outside support. I think that is where those that are in groups have an advantage. The military skill set is very important when it comes to tactical knowledge and security issues but that doesn't do you a lot of good if you don't have the good ole boy knowledge in your back pocket as well. At least in a group you can complement each others skills.

The mil training can be helpful but it's not essential. I'd rather have someone with me that has skills in a lot of different areas because in a survival situation the best fight is the one you can avoid if possible. Someone with good horse sense if you will and who can think clearly under pressure will do ok for himself/herself.

 

[Jeff B.]

I agree that Joe Six Pack doesn't need to be or aspire to be an "Operator". But I still feel that knowing some of the basic type, CTT tasks could well be a differentiator if Joe found himself (and family) in an unavoidable conflict/confrontation.

Hell, most of us that have (had) the skills aren't much good for more than instructing or performing a defense in place (DIP alternate meaning). IMO folks, for the most part should be looking to protect their family, supplies and place. Going unnoticed can be a form of protection as well. There's no need to look, act or sound like a Rambo. Gray is good.

Jeff B.

 

[TerryK]

"I'm Just A Prepper. I Have No Military Background. I'm Worried, What Do I Do?"


The first thing to remember is don't try and be a soldier if you're not.
Second don't try and be a soldier if you don't have an army with you.


The whole mindset of soldiers pretty much doesn't apply to preppers come shtf.


You don't have a supply train a mile long.
You don't have elaborate medical facilities available in minutes if you are injured.
You aren't supported by thousands of backup forces and an elaborate command chain.
(no calling in artillery or air strikes )
If you are injured or killed the "war" for you and your family is pretty much over.


There is a huge difference between what soldiers need to know and be and what guerilla fighters need to know and be, and what simple people trying to survive "preppers" need to know and be capable of.

 

[Oscar Wilde]

The underlying but critical point of the training is discipline. As is apparent society wide not many folk possess any semblance of personal discipline.

Living is essentially a series of goals that through appropriate procedure must be accomplished. A person lacking discipline will not be able to accomplish many of their objectives satisfactorily and safely.

Discipline is not exclusive to military training but is a rarity in present times.

O.W.

 

[dogmanan]

The underlying but critical point of the training is discipline. As is apparent society wide not many folk possess any semblance of personal discipline.

Living is essentially a series of goals that through appropriate procedure must be accomplished. A person lacking discipline will not be able to accomplish many of their objectives satisfactorily and safely.

Discipline is not exclusive to military training but is a rarity in present times.

O.W.

You are so dead on with this.

Theire is not very much discipline if any in most americans any more that's for sure.

 

[Kathy in FL]

I would say for those not military-minded or able first learn the difference between tactics and strategy. While they can work in tandem, the fact remains that they are very different animals.

Let me use the Dummie's Guide for Business Planning as one way to look at it:

Strategy is the “what” part of the equation and helps you answer the question, “What are we trying to accomplish?” Yet your business design may not be sustainable; you may have trade-offs for how you position your business with customers and competitors.

Every business has limited resources and deals with a competitive landscape. The more it does of one thing, the less it can do of another. This concept leads to tactics, or the “how” part of the equation. Your tactics help you answer the question, “How are we going to accomplish our goal?”

While I'm not saying survival is a business or bit of commerce, in a very real sense there are elements of that in it. You have resources/assets, you have members/labor, you have trade/barter/customer relationships, etc.

The first thing you should do is make a plan ... what are your goals and how do you plan on meeting those goals. This is your strategy and tactics.

The next thing someone with no military training should do is study history. The first realization should be that there are far more serfs than soldiers and even fewer generals/knights and the fewest would be warlords/kings. Decide where you want to be on that hierarchy. And when you do also understand that the higher up you go the greater your responsibilities and accountability will be. Also understand that there is a reason why when you mention someone in leadership position you usually say something to the effect, "He is serving as" and name the position of authority.

A good read is http://leadershipchallenge.typepad.com/leadership_challenge/2009/01/the-origins-of-leadership.html

The other thing to remember is that leaders go first. Leaders don't ask of people what they themselves are unwilling to do. If you aren't willing or able to go first and actually lead then you need to find someone to follow. In a prepping situation this would mean that if you are unable or unwilling to lead a burial committee or lead on the front line of a battle then you aren't the leader and you should shut up and make sure that who you follow is someone worth following.

Because the truth is you either lead or you follow. If you are unable to lead, unwilling to lead, or are incompetent to lead you better make for damn sure who you wind up following isn't going to lead you straight to hell.

 

[Dozdoats]

The first thing to remember is don't try and be a soldier if you're not.
Second don't try and be a soldier if you don't have an army with you.


The whole mindset of soldiers pretty much doesn't apply to preppers come shtf.


You don't have a supply train a mile long.
You don't have elaborate medical facilities available in minutes if you are injured.
You aren't supported by thousands of backup forces and an elaborate command chain.
(no calling in artillery or air strikes )
If you are injured or killed the "war" for you and your family is pretty much over.


There is a huge difference between what soldiers need to know and be and what guerilla fighters need to know and be, and what simple people trying to survive "preppers" need to know and be capable of.

Thanks, Terry. In a nutshell that's what I was looking to get introduced into this thread, and try and get across to people here.

There's obviously a lot more to consider, and a lot of things will change with different situations and individuals, but those are the landmarks I wanted to get people here navigating among.

A friend of mine, one of the best Special Forces soldiers I ever knew, always said "If I ever get dropped in to support a resistance movement, my dream would be to link up with the area commander, who would immediately welcome us and introduce us to his S-1, S-2, S3, and S-4."

S1 - Adjutant/Administration Officer
S2 - Intelligence Officer
S3 - Operations and Training Officer
S4 - Supply Officer

That's the kind of organization it takes to run a resistance movement, ultimately. It ALWAYS evolves to that eventually, with some level of formality or other, depending on the eventual size of the organization.

But no ordinary person with no military background is going to START OUT at that level! It's necessary to KNOW about such things, yes. Because that's what eventually will have to evolve. But there is a long, steep learning curve before anyone ever gets there.

THE biggest killer, early along, will not be enemy action. It won't be disease. It will be lack of security, pure and simple. Americans are CLUELESS about security. We have always been able to afford to be, because after all, we live in a "free society," right?

Well, not any more. Right now we live in an evolving police state, and IT IS GOING TO GET WORSE. It will get MUCH worse MUCH faster for those who object to the increasing inroads against liberty that are currently being made by the regime that masquerades as "our government." If you do not live through the opening acts of this drama as a free (not in prison) person, you will have no role in what comes, and all of this will be irrelevant to you.

Many will not. They will die or be confined without ever being able to strike a blow for the continuation of liberty in this nation.

What a waste...

But it is inevitable. The price of this learning curve is ALWAYS measured in pain and blood, in sacrifice and death. Always. And everyone here who lives to see the eventual evolution of events in this nation will pay some part of that price, if indeed they haven't already.

So there's lesson one of what I wanted to get across here. Thanks much to all who have contributed, and as long as interest in the subject continues, so will this thread.

 

[Dozdoats]

-- http://walterzoomiesworld.blogspot.com/2014/05/im-odd-but-you-knew-that-already.html

 

[ainitfunny]

I'm a "night person", so this DAILY observation (around MIDNIGHT) never fails to remind and trouble me about how DIFFICULT it would be to conceal the possession of food from those seeking to steal it in times of famine.

Just about every night, around midnight, even in the dead of winter when everyone has their home sealed up against the cold, one of my (must be working) neighbors COOKS AN "evening meal" which must be for the next days family supper. I can pretty much recognize what is being cooked while sitting inside MY closed up home, at least 200 feet from the nearest neighbor. I will smell a ham baking, bread baking, or spaghetti or lasagna in the oven, a pot of baked beans, turkey, or any of dozens of "next day meals" cooking in the wee hours. It often drives me to fix myself a "midnight snack" just from the mouth watering odors penetrating both our homes!

It is funny, your neighbors KNOW when you "burn the toast", make a fresh pot of coffee, or fry bacon! AND, I smoke a lot so my sense of smell is not even as acute as any normal nonsmoker, let alone a hungry transient!!

 

[GenErik]

Erik & I wonder about this also. I have RA and Erik has several herniated/bulging discs with alot of nerve damage. It's just the 2 of us (no kids, no family) most of our friends are older and not in great health themselves.

We have wheeled carts and have put smaller packages of items together and use some gamma seal lids. We've done our best to make the house and property easy for us to use (see out, defend, etc...) but we know we need other people too. It's just so hard to know who to trust/believe in anymore.

 

[Kathy in FL]

Whether you are a soldier or not there are going to be leaders and followers and as an individual security against both is going to be paramount.

In our Constitution there is supposed to be a prohibition against soldiers taking their "pay" out of the local civilians but we all know good and well the likelihood of that remaining true during war - even if they aren't calling it that - to be slim to none.

So for me strategy/goal #1 would be ... how not to become a part of the supply line, especially the enemy's supply line.

 

[Kathy in FL]

And Doz ... thanks for the interesting discussion. Just because my dad was a career military man, that doesn't make me a soldier. (grin) It has created some interesting points getting raised however. My father doesn't talk much about the indepth workings of what his job entailed, often because he is still prohibited from it despite having been retired over 25 years. But the generalities and mindset ... yeah. Every time I would want to put the military or a certain military person on a pedestal my father would remind me of reality. He honored his career, position, and his superiors but he was a realist to the core and tried to instill the same thing in my brother and I. It took age and experience however to really have some of what he was trying to impress on us to sink in. I'm now the age my father was when he "retired" for the military. Whole different perspective than I used to have.

 

[Hansa44]

I have the mil training but IMO that doesn't mean as much today as what it used to since the training today is much too soft except for the SF type community. That being said I agree with others who think that while the training can be helpful it's not the be all and end all. Lot's of soldiers really have very little knowledge in the way of woodsman knowledge and things of that nature. I don't know how many people have watched the show 'Dual Survival' where they send two guys out into austere environments to survive together. There was a recent shakeup in the show but one of the guys is a naturalist type than can literally make a silk purse out of a sows ear and the other guy is a legitimate special forces veteran with more military skills than you can shake a stick at. The SF guy although a type A personality and intensely driven admits that he doesn't have the skill set that the other guy has when it comes to fire making and basic survival.

The SF guy takes the kinds of risks and chances that although necessary on a military mission could injure you or kill you in a survival situation where you have little if any outside support. I think that is where those that are in groups have an advantage. The military skill set is very important when it comes to tactical knowledge and security issues but that doesn't do you a lot of good if you don't have the good ole boy knowledge in your back pocket as well. At least in a group you can complement each others skills.

The mil training can be helpful but it's not essential. I'd rather have someone with me that has skills in a lot of different areas because in a survival situation the best fight is the one you can avoid if possible. Someone with good horse sense if you will and who can think clearly under pressure will do ok for himself/herself.

I am in complete agreement on this point.

 

[Watchman2]

The colonist were not soldiers and did not have infinite supply lines. They had resolve, a want to.

Get your resolve now, your going to need it..........

All of the other stuff is certainly helpful, but we need EVERYONE ON BOARD and ALL HANDS ON DECK.

We need to work together.

W2

 

[Dozdoats]

Actually there was a good deal of military experience present in the colonies. The militia system was much stronger and better organized then than it is now, though it still had inherent weaknesses when it came up against the world's largest professional army at the time. The French and Indian War (1754-1763) had given a good deal of experience to a number of colonials, like one George Washington, who worked closely with the British Army and in 1755 was given command of The Virginia Regiment, the first full-time military unit established in the colonies.

And then just as now, there is a LOT of military experience - much of it recent - among the population. There are useful, current skillsets available all over. It will take some time to locate, identify and coordinate the individuals who have those skills, but when the time comes they will emerge. We don't have to worry about that.

We DO have to worry about keeping our act together until we can find our own role in the eventual happenings. That means keeping our wits about us, understanding what's going on around us, finding our own place in our own communities and working from there toward our eventual place in whatever organization emerges around us.

I would not encourage anyone right now to go noisily looking for their local militia at this point. No matter who or what you are, you ARE the militia... even if you have to content yourself to be a militia of one for the time being. Keep an ear to the ground in your daily activities and listen for gossip or news. Find a service role in your community's volunteer structure. If you are young and healthy, join the volunteer fire department, rescue squad or the like. Take advantage of the training those organizations offer, as well as supporting the needs of your community and getting to know and be known by others of like mind. Even if you are not young and spry, you might be able to take advantage of some of the available training - a good EMT or paramedic will always have a place. But for the now, do not be the one who eagerly responds to any opening with, "You know of the rebellion against the Empire?" like the excitable young Luke Skywalker (hey, this month is the 37th anniversary of the original release of Star Wars, so ...). Let 'the rebellion' come to you ... it will.

And in the meantime, beware of false flags and agents provocateur. The regime is scared, and it will be redoubling its efforts to gin up 'domestic terrorist cells' all over the place. Many who are unaware have already fallen into those traps, lending unwarranted support to the regime's claims that all its subjects are in serious danger from this new breed of extremists. As I said earlier, far too many Americans are clueless about security, and now is not the time to be careless and overly talkative. Beware the loudmouth who always wants to 'get something done' or 'has a plan to strike a blow against the regime.' Those people are out there and they are looking for the unwary, the unsophisticated, the unwise.

Enough of that for now, more later. In the meantime, if you STILL have not watched it, take time or make time to look at the video of this old (early to mid 1960s) Special Forces graduation exercise - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5RS7wOfbbx8. They were still doing it pretty much the same way when I went out to 'play' on Robin Sage exercises in piedmont North Carolina in the 1990s. This is a good introduction to "what it will be like" when it goes hot.

Get used to it - it will be worse when it's for real.

 

[MountainBiker]

Dozdoats, good points and video. The wars in Iraq & Afghanistan have resulted in millions of recent vets with experience in combat zones, and it seems TPTB are slowly and subtly trying to stigmatize them.

I don't know about other colonial colonies but in the MA Bay Colony all able bodied men from 16 to 60 were part of the local militia. They were required to supply their own gun but if they were too poor to afford one the community would provide it. Where I used to live the "parade grounds" where they trained is still town-owned property. The men chose their own commanders and in the lead up to the Rev. War a communication network was established throughout the colony that triggered militias from throughout eastern MA to marching through the night to come to the aid of Lexington and Concord. If anyone is interested in an exceptionally well research book that tells the story of "the shot heard round the world", I'd recommend "Paul Revere's Ride" by David Hackett Fischer. http://store.rwvaappleseed.com/page11.html

 

[Dozdoats]

WARNING: soldier language follows.

More on subjects that might make some people unhappy, but the interest here is in 1)keeping people alive, and 2)helping establish workable units in the field when the time comes.

The initial predicate was "I have no military background." OK, so what? When you were six months old you didn't know how to walk or talk, and you went to the bathroom in your pants, right? But you learned better - right?

Life is all about learning. But life is short - so let's focus on APPROPRIATE learning, because we won't live long enough to learn everything. Appropriate learning in this case is for people who will in fact be fighting, which won't be many - a few percent of us. And not many at TB2K, since as near as I can tell we here tend to run to an older demographic.

So - if the following applies to you, go for it. If it doesn't review it and drive on.
====================================================

http://mountainguerrilla.wordpress....e-sacred-cows-a-rant-about-militia-standards/

Skull-Stomping More Sacred Cows: A Rant about Militia “Standards”
April 25, 2014

(Before anyone starts whining about me picking on people, or judging others….a little background.

I’ve taught over a dozen classes, in field and classroom environments to “militias” over the last two years. I’ve also had militia members in open-enrollment classes. While there are some exceptions that have proved the rule, the vast majority of them, when I showed up, were as squared away as a ****ing soup sandwich. I’m not sure if they’re better now, but at least they’ve been shown a better way.



I have respect for anyone who will get off his ass and go out, on a weekend, and do SOMETHING. I think it’s awesome that guys are getting off the couch and going to militia drill weekends, and getting outside and shooting their weapons (I hope they’re shooting their weapons).



I think it’s awesome that so many guys threw their shit in the truck and went to Nevada to stand up to the BLM. I KNOW that at least one guy who showed up is a former USMC NCO, with combat experience in Iraq. I hope there were a bunch more, and I hope all the militia “commanders” were at least smart enough to listen to the adult supervision.



What I don’t like? People passing off stupid bullshit as “training” and “standards” to well-meaning people who don’t know any better, under the color of “authority” as militia “commanders” because some jackass wrote a really poorly written set of “standards.”



I guarantee the “Lightfoot Militia Standards” mentioned in the below quoted comment from my last article was NOT written by anyone with military leadership experience. –JM)



The following comment was posted in the comments on the last article, and precipitated this skull-stomping:







“It is rather unfortunate that you don’t claim your name to this post.

Whereas (editorial note. I corrected spelling for readability—JM), I find the info useful, I need to point out a detail I feel needs to be addressed.

There certainly is a place for “secret squirrel” units but looking at the name of your website here, that doesn’t look exactly covert as you were proposing. Lightfoot units are Constitutional civilian groups independent from each but with a common set of standards.



Feel free to review our website like the NSA, SPLC, and others have done as am sure they have this Facebook (NSA data mining program) account. It is too late to be worried about that or what someone names their unit. We are all in this together and with legal standing.”



I’m going to go out on a ledge and guess that your reading comprehension needs development. I did not, in any place, suggest some sort of “secret squirrel” unit. I suggested not naming your organization after units of the Imperial British Army in the ****ing 18th century….You know? The ones that fought AGAINST colonial forces during the Revolution?



As far as “It is too late to be worried about…what someone names their unit….” On the contrary, you’re as wrong as two boys ****ing. Militia groups in this country, right or wrong, have a public image of being a bunch of ignorant ****ing rednecks who sit around in camouflage, stroking their rifles like some phallic talisman. You claim historical precedence, then you name your group after the ENEMY of the Founding Fathers…..That decidedly does NOT do anything to change your image in the public perception, and if you think the public perception is not important, I’m wasting my time, and need to quit writing this blog, because you’re not learning the ****ing important shit.



At your suggestion, I took the time to download and re-read the Lightfoot Militia Standards .pdf….



“Article 1. The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia

and volunteer corpsfulfilling the following conditions….

….4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.”



Someone needs to sit your people down and have a serious discussion about the Hague and Geneva Conventions and the Law of Land Warfare, as it pertains to insurgent forces….This is giving people a completely skewed view on what the underlined portion above refers to. Never mind the fact that, in the event you are shooting at federal government forces, you are NOT going to be treated like a lawful belligerent. Suggesting to people that they will be stretches the bounds of both credulity AND reason. Or, perhaps you can demonstrate a time—any time—in history, when a government treated its citizens who resisted it with force of arms, as lawful belligerents, rather than criminals and terrorists?



I’m not suggesting that resistance is futile, or unnecessary. I’m just saying, be ****ing honest about it.



“Excellent physical fitness level – 5 mile field march w/Level 3 (72 hour) gear in 2 hours.”



You’ve obviously not been reading this blog long, or you probably wouldn’t have suggested I read this. I realize, not everyone is a healthy, 20-year old meat-eater. I get it, people get old, and they get crippled. Nevertheless, even after all the ****ed up injuries I’ve had (including a broken back x2, broken femur, broken hip, and a host of other issues), this is damned near a 30-minute mile. I can probably ****ing CRAWL this fast. I get people bitching, because I suggest a 12-15 minute mile, and point out that a 10-minute mile with a ruck on is possible with motivation, but holy **** me in the ass while I’m running, this is like grade-school level fitness. Way to set the bar high there, “Commander.”



“The Militia Marksmanship Qualification course is used to sharpen the skills of militiamen

and provide an objective means of qualifying personnel when ammunition is in short supply

and/or range areas are limited.…The MMQ is conducted at the conclusion of the Basic Marksmanship Course (see “Skill Level: Recruit”, pg. 20) which is required for all Militia members. The MMQ incorporates three firing positions, magazine changes, movement and a timer to add stress. Only 15 rounds are required to qualify. A range of 50 yards is needed and a 8-1/2 x 11 inch target (approximates “center mass”). Start sequence: Load 3 magazines with 5 rounds each. At the firing line assume the low ready position with the weapon loaded and on safe. At the signal the shooter will fire 5 rounds from the standing position, RELOAD, fire 5

rounds from the kneeling position, RELOAD, and fire the last 5 rounds from the prone position,

all within 45 seconds. …Scoring: 3 points per hit, for a total of 45 points….Point breakdown : 25-34 MARKSMAN 66% - Level 1…35-39 SHARPSHOOTER 77% - Level 2…40-45 EXPERT 88% - Level 3….



…Ten shot DMR- Designated Marksman Rifle (see S.W.O.R.D. )- Ten out of ten shots in a

8-1/2”x11” center mass target at 200 yards. Prone position. Timed: 3 minutes.…”



Seriously? Honestly, if these are your standards, there’s no ****ing way, in Hell, I’m going anywhere near you ****ing morons in a gunfight, except to take your shit, so it will be used effectively, after you die.



We call your MMQ the D-Drill, or The Modified Navy Qual. The standard is 20 seconds, with zero misses. It’s a pretty basic drill, used at every “tacti-cool” shooting school I’m aware of, with some minor modifications (some places use a 10rd and a 5rd magazine, only requiring one reload. I run it in probably half my classes, sometimes at 100 yards.



Further, the “ten shot DMR” test demonstrates a) what I would expect as a MINIMUM level of ability with a rifle, albeit in WAY the **** less than 3 minutes…..and b) a distinct misunderstanding of what the **** the Designated Marksman’s role is in a rifle squad.



Have you ****ing people even heard of Appleseed? There are women and children shooting better than this, in less than one full weekend of training. THIS IS PATHETIC!!!!!



But, let’s quit beating that dead horse. Let’s look at some other “standards.”



“a. Road march for 2 miles in 40 minutes with all Level 1 gear.

b. 3 to 5 second rushes (with 2-3 second pauses) for 100 yards, in L1 gear.

c. 10 push ups, 10 sit ups.”



Okay, so I’ve already beat on your “Road march” standards. Now, you’re down to 20 minutes, but with only Level One gear on. Still gayer than a bag of dicks.



Subsection B, not too bad. I’m curious how many of you can actually go 100 meters doing legit, 3-5 second rushes, with only 2-3 seconds in between, but I’ll give you the benefit of the doubt, “Commander.”



Subsection C is retarded. Seriously. Just pull it out of your ****ing handbook. My 2-year old can do 10 ****ing push-ups! If a grown man can’t do—at a minimum—50 push-ups, he needs to eat a ****ing gun. Period.



I don’t care if those are just your “private” standards. Holy ****, you douchenozzle, 20 years ago, you had to be able to do 13 just to START basic combat training in the Army….go read some of my PT articles, you pussy.



And…don’t think I didn’t notice that your “NCOs” don’t have to do push-ups anymore for PT standards…..way to lead from the front there guy…..



SKILL LEVEL THREE:

To progress to Skill Level 3, the militia soldier must have mastered all Level 2

qualifications. In addition he must demonstrate the following skills:

1. Physical Fitness: 3XX

- 5 mile field march in 2 hours with Level 3 gear.

2. Marksmanship: X3X

Rifle: Score of 40-45 on the MMQ.




S.W.O.R.D. TEAMS (Select Weapons, Ordinance and Reconnaissance Detachment):

S.W.O.R.D. Teams consist of 6 men who receive extra training in one of three areasesignated Marksman, Land Navigation or Communications. Two men in each team will duplicate the necessary disciplines of “Shoot, Move and Communicate”.They will carry highly accurate rifles with higher end optics/night vision (Select Weapons); study the theory and employment of military weapons they may encounter on a future battlefield, such as grenades, RPG’s, mines, etc. (Ordinance); and practice advanced land navigation, compass/map reading and recon techniques (Reconnaissance).

All members of the team must be: – Level 3 qualified in both Physical Fitness and Marksmanship (i.e. a Grade Modifier of 33X). – Assault Pistol qualification is also required.


Aw, isn’t that cute? SWORD teams huh? By the way, it’s ORDNANCE. An Ordinance is a law or regulation. Why do you people insist on such retarded ****ing names. THIS IS WHY PEOPLE DON’T TAKE YOU SERIOUSLY!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!



Communications:

- Must complete a HAM radio training program



To what level? Technician, General, Advanced?



Designated Marksman Team:

- Both must pass DMR qualification. In the field one will act as the spotter.

- Conduct a terrain survey.

- Estimate range to target.

- Construct and use a ghillie suit.

- Construct and use a Sniper/Forward Observation Post hide.

- Conduct long range surveillance of target for intelligence gathering purposes.

Plan and implement a enemy harassment plan.


Plan and conduct interdiction operations on key target personnel.




Suggestion? Since you obviously don’t know what the **** a SDM does, why don’t you just call these guys snipers? Because pretty much everything on that list, with the exception of “estimate range to a target” is a sniper task, not a SDM task. Of course, that would require far more than a basic ****ing rifleman’s qualification.



By the way….estimate range to a target? How far away do I have to be able to accurately estimate range? Your qualification only requires me to hit out to 200 meters. I don’t need range estimation for that. It’s this thing called Battle Sight Zero. Most soldiers (not even just infantrymen) in the US Army can hit to 200 meters….with iron sights.



Advanced Land Navigation:

- Advanced map/compass reading

- Excellent land navigation skills

- Plan, lead and execute patrols and reconnaissance gathering missions.



Okay, “Commander?” “Excellent land navigation skills” and “advanced map/compass reading?” Synonymous. Finally, “plan, lead and execute patrols and reconnaissance gathering missions” is NOT a land navigation task.



Boots -

Be good to your feet and they’ll be good to you. Uncle Sugar spends millions of dollars to

figure out what boot is best (for the smallest amount of money) for his soldiers. He knows full

well that if his fighter’s feet are fubar (say that 3 times fast) they simply can’t fight.

Having said that, any boot worn by our combat troops will be more than sufficient. Don’t

expect to last very long if you plan to fight in a pair of sneakers. Go get a good pair of boots, and

don’t skimp.



I’m going to go out on a limb here (admittedly, a very short, very stout limb), and guess that paragraph was written by someone who has a) never served in an infantry unit, b) never done a lengthy foot movement under a ruck, while wearing USGI boots, and c) is a ****ing idiot.



Yes, USGI boots will suffice. No, they are not the “best,” even for the smallest amount of money.



Seriously? Go pony up the money for a good pair of boots. Don’t send people to Joe’s Surplus to buy contract over-run GI boots.



Helmet -

Kevlar or steel pot, worth it’s weight in gold. Get one. (FYI… the kevlar helmet will better

protect you noggin’, but you can’t use it as a shaving/wash basin).

Seriously? Once again, THIS IS WHY PEOPLE DON’T TAKE YOU SERIOUSLY!!!!!!!!!!!!!



Okay. I’ll stop picking on the slow reading group.



Look, I know, everyone is all now butt-hurt, because I’m picking on people who are “at least doing something.” The problem is…what you’re doing is going to get your own people killed, as well as people who are more serious, because you’re still turning the public away with your Rambo fetishes.



Seriously. Go find a former infantry NCO, and make him the ****ing unit commander, and then? Do WHATEVER the **** he tells you, as far as standards, equipment, training, and performance. If his PT standards are too high? Then go join a ****ing gym, you ****ing, fat, lazy bastard.



If his marksmanship standards are too high? Go take a ****ing Appleseed and learn how to shoot. Don’t stop until you hit “Rifleman” standard, at least. Then? Go take an actual fighting rifle course somewhere. Get your new unit commander to start a rifle training course every other weekend.



If you are a former infantry NCO, and you are reading this….go join your local militia, tell them you’re now in charge of training, and start fixing shit.



If you’re a militia “commander,” and have zero ****ing infantry experience? Step down, and pass the reins to someone who’s actually qualified. Quit polishing your ego by having half-wit ****ing goobers polish your knob, and DO THE RIGHT THING!!!!



(and no, I won’t join your militia)

 

[Dozdoats]

What it looks like on the ground, from the air, at night...

http://wn.com/apache_gun_footage

 

[Dozdoats]

You can run but you can't hide ... or can you? Photos and video at the link - take this in while you still can.
===============================

http://www.maxvelocitytactical.com/2014/04/thermal-shield-concept-test-by-apache-flir-pass/

*VIDEO* Thermal Shield Test by Apache FLIR – Pass!


Posted by Max Velocity in Uncategorized on April 30, 2014

I have now received the video of this test, so I have added it and bumped this post to the top.

MVT _Shield_Proto_Trial_2

Above: A Prototype of the MVT SHIELD, which performs better than the Mylar/tarp in the following video/photos: zero thermal bloom

I received this from a reader, Nicholas. Before you read it, note three things:

1) He is using just a USGI Poncho allied with a Mylar survival blanket. There are a few issues of ‘thermal bloom’ remaining. This is what my research has led me to find, and why I am using a different material/configuration in the sandwich for the MVT SHIELD.

2) The important thing to note is that this field expedient method worked. And the pilot knew where he was!

3) I advocate for the Shield to be away from the body, strung up like a shelter tarp, so the air gap helps to prevent thermal bloom.

This is pure gold – testing from an actual Apache. The Apache is at about 2000 feet.

__________



__________

Nicholas Sends:

I wanted to test out a thermal shield made with a USGI poncho and a mylar survival blanket. I am an Apache pilot and very familiar with FLIR and thought it would be fun to test this out with some friends of mine and see if I can hide from an AH-64. To test this I coordinated with a friend to fly out to my house and take a look at a couple of different shelters. The first shelter was just a poncho, the second was a poncho with a mylar survival blanket under it. We needed some diversity in this test so I did have a friend of mine who was a Blackhawk pilot help out. I knew that it would be better to have the shelter set up a few inches away from me but I wanted to know how much heat would be seen through the shelter in the worst case, so both shelter will be touching us in this test. My friend who is flying is very experienced and have a difficult time seeing me. It is easier to see things in more detail when reviewing the tapes afterward on a computer screen than it is to see while in the cockpit, so the pictures you will see of this test show a little more than my friend was seeing while on station. Below are notes that belong to the corresponding pictures. I hope this information helps.
1.(Below)) The poncho with a mylar blanket is to the south (top) and the one to the north (bottom) is just a USGI poncho. As you can see, the poncho by its self does little to hide your thermal image. You can see some heat through the poncho / mylar shelter at the legs and head. Both of the shelters were about 6 inches off the ground, therefore both of the shelters were touching us. I was wearing a battle belt so the rear pouches were holding the shelter off of my mid section, those few inches makes a big difference as you can see.1
2.This picture you can still see my legs but I had put my head down to the ground so it is no longer showing up. My friend to the north is still visible with just the poncho.2
3.Another view with my head down, I have only about 2 inches of space between myself and the shelter, my legs are touching and visible. Depending on the position the poncho can help distort the thermal image of my friend to the north but it is still a large heat signature.3
4.Coming out from the poncho / mylar shelter.4
5.Both of us are back under the shelters.5
6.You can see that you will need to set up this shelter so you will not be touching it.6
7.The south east corner of my shelter opens up a little and you can see some heat coming from under it. Make sure you have the edges of your shelter hang down some to prevent this.7
8.Both of us are standing up.8
9.Another view with us exposed.9
10.We have taken the shelters off from the supporting logs and I have the poncho / mylar wrapped around me while kneeling on the ground to the south and my friend has the poncho wrapped around him to the north.10
11. We are both standing up, I have the poncho / mylar wrapped around me, you can really only see my head and feet. My friend is standing without any covering.11
12.Both of us exposed.12
13.My friend is exposed, I have the poncho / mylar wrapped around me.13

A USGI woodland camouflage poncho and mylar survival blanket can make a great field expedient thermal shelter, here are a few things I have learned by testing this out:
•Put 100mph tape on the corners of your mylar blanket for reinforcing the corners so you can tie it off.
•Set up shelter so that you will have about 6 inches of space between your body and the shelter.
•Have the edges of the shelter droop down a little so you keep your thermal signature inside.
•Have the mylar blanket sandwiched between two ponchos or between some canvas so that it does not make a loud crinkling sound with the lightest of breezes.
•You can not use a hand held radio from under a mylar shelter.

 

[Kathy in FL]

For women alone ... either living alone, traveling alone, etc ... you need to take your security seriously. So ok, what if your friends think you are a little nutso or over the tope? Big whoop. There is going to come a time when safety and security of your person will be up to you and you alone. Deal with that fact now. Practice good habits now. If it makes you seem a little militant/militaristic again ... big whoop. The time to strategize and learn tactics is now ... not in the middle of an event.

1. Take time and get to know your neighbourhood surroundings. Recognizing the lay of the land can familiarize you with places that tend to be dark or deserted at certain hours, as well as places where a person could possibly hide.

2. Always keep your doors locked during the day and at night. This is a tried and tested safety tip. Many burglars have claimed that they won’t enter a residence if they can’t get in under a minute. Ensure your door is solid and has an intercom and spy hole fitted to help identify individuals. Be sure to lock all your windows as well, as these can also be entry points for any home intruder.

3. Get a dog. Dogs are not just loyal companions, but they can also protect you from harm. They can either attack an intruder, or alert you if someone else is inside your place. Certain dog breeds make very good guard dogs.

4. Set up a home alarm system. Much as a dog can alert you, a home alarm system can tell you if someone has broken into the house. It would also help if you put a sign outside your place saying that you have an alarm system. Get advice from a reputable security company on the best alarm system for your place of residence. A good alarm system really can become a life saver.

5. If you are living in a house, keep your shrubs neat and trimmed. If they are overgrown, they can be the perfect hiding place for criminals. Also consider outside lighting that can be triggered off by an intruder.

6. If you live in an apartment block, try not to walk through the parking lot to your car alone at night. If you see someone suspicious, ask the security guard on duty to walk you to your car.

7. You can fool people into thinking there is a man living with you in your house if you leave a pair of men’s boots or shoes outside the front door.

8. Do not develop a pattern. Stalkers can pick up on your daily routines if you do them at the same time and in the same way every day. Make sure that you collect your mail at different times of the day, and try to take different routes going to and from work once in a while.

9. Arrange to call a friend/family member at a specific time of the day just to ensure that you are safely at home.

10. Cover your windows with curtains to discourage thieves and peeping toms. Don’t leave them open when you leave your residence, and keep them closed at night. Also consider when you go out at night to have your lights within your house/flat set on timers.

11. Get to know your neighbours Introducing yourself and making friends with them will ensure that there are people around to look out for you. It will also help you easily recognize if a stranger seems to be lurking around longer than usual.You never know, one of your nearby neighbours maybe a policeman or woman.

12. You may think that your information is private because it is inside your mailbox, but what is on the outside can be just as telling. Avoid having your full name on your mailbox. Instead, have only your initials or your last name to avoid having strangers know that you are a single woman living inside the home.

13. Seriously think about what you put on your social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, etc. Limited information that shows your address details and that you live alone. Common sense is key when publishing ones personal information on social media sites.

http://www.4pointsecurity.com/security-tips-for-woman-living-alone/

Other home security courtesy of being a landlord for 18 years:

• Metal doors and metal door frames provide the best protection as long as they are kept in good repair ... in other words don't let them rust out as it weakens them.
• If you can't have a metal door/doorframe then have a solid wood door ... I didn't say a wood door but a solid wood door. Don't have "panels" in the door that are inset as that will be the easiest part to kick in.
• If you insist on having glass in your door make sure that it is security glass and not just some silly bit of decorative glass.
• Change that porch light as soon as it goes out. If you find that the bulb is "going out" often or that the cover of your porch light is being messed with you probably have a prowler setting you up.
• It is unbelievably easy to bump most door locks. Make sure you use good quality dead bolts that extend at least 1" into the door frame. and that all door hardware like plates and hinges are attached with 3 screws.
• It is also easy to pop a window lock with a small screw driver. A thumb or hex lock added to your windows will make it harder for an intruder to make a "silent" entrance.
• Good shades and black out curtains will keep people from being able to spy on you from the street ... or anywhere else for that matter.
• Don't leave home repairs for the last minute ... if something breaks/breaks down then get it fixed right away.
• Don't overlook things like defensive landscaping, security/motion detector lighting, good fencing making good neighbors, etc.
• Also, don't set up habits that have to be broken ... for instance letting kids cut across the backyard if they aren't your kids. Once a pattern is developed it is very hard to change.

 

[Dozdoats]

So, the simple truth is, most of us won't actually be fighters or 'soldiers' in the way many people imagine. In a regular conventional army, guess what - most 'soldiers' AREN'T FIGHTERS EITHER. There's this concept known as "tooth to tail ratio" - it takes about ten (or more) support personnel in uniform to keep every trigger puller going who is engaged in actual combat. No, that's not very efficient - the modern military model is anything BUT efficient.

And insurgent/guerrilla/resistance organizations are, if anything, EVEN MORE inefficient, sporadic, unpredictable, just because of the nature of the conflict in which they are engaged. Most of us who actually participate in the war which is now under way here will do so as supporters of those who actually are engaged in fighting. Those who take an active role in helping insurgents, resistors or guerrillas are usually referred to as "the auxiliary." So here's a look at that role...
=======================================================

http://mountainguerrilla.wordpress.com/2012/09/28/organization-and-development-of-the-auxiliary/

Organization and Development of the Auxiliary

September 28, 2012


(Over the course of this blog’s life, I’ve received a lot of correspondence from those wondering how they fit into the concept of a resistance organization as the auxiliary, since they are “too old or infirm” to actively engage the regime’s security forces as members of the subversive underground or paramilitary guerrilla force. –J.M.)

The auxiliary includes, or may include all those individuals who are not full-time active participants in the paramilitary guerrilla force or the subversive underground, but who are sympathetic to the resistance or actively voice support to the resistance and are willing to lend assistance. Traditionally the activities of the auxiliary have been directed and controlled by the area command authority (For all you “leaderless resistance” believers out there, you’re going to have some variation of an area command authority, whether you want to believe it or not. Attempting to do anything without the organization and planning coordination between cells will result in blue-on-blue and wasted efforts as cells hit the same targets or otherwise get in each others way).

This coordination allows that assistance that is available from the auxiliary to be “spent” in the most efficient way, to leverage it into the most support for the resistance as possible. Otherwise, the auxiliary will see its efforts wasted as some assets are over-used by their local buddies, and other assets, sorely needed elsewhere, go to waste. While a resistance effort is necessarily local at the tactical level, tactics exist solely to facilitate the strategic end-goals. A bunch of guys with similar views (or as we’ve all seen, sometimes vastly different views all labeled the same way…..) committing acts of violence against the regime are not a resistance movement. While they MAY coalesce into an organized resistance, history has repeatedly demonstrated to us that more often than not, they will be individually run to ground, exterminated, and written off by the victorious regime as common criminals and brigands. Since the victor writes the history books……

An individual’s specific contribution to the resistance will depend largely on their socio-economic status and roles and their occupation (while a stripper or bartender may provide crucial intelligence-gathering/collection roles facilitating a specific raid or ambush by the guerrilla force, or simply drop some “roofies” into the drink of a senior member of the security force, setting up a snatch by the subversive underground, a local farmer or homesteader may “only” provide assistance by providing some extra harvest to feed the troops or to be sold on the black market to finance another operation. On the other hand, the farmer may end up providing space in a barn for a way-station on a transportation route, or an extra barn may be used as a guerrilla hospital…), but it is critical to understand that the success of the auxiliary’s efforts depends on the organization and operations remain clandestine. The secret must be kept not only from the regime security forces, but even apparently friendly or supportive neighbors. Unless they are participating in the specific auxiliary operation, keeping information compartmentalized reduces the chances of the regime learning of it.

Specific Auxiliary Taskings

Security and warning. Auxiliary personnel and units provide a physical security and warning system for the resistance’s active elements. They organize and direct sympathizers into networks to observe, record, and report on security force activities, whether the sympathizers are aware of what they are doing or not. Do you know who your local constabulary is? Which ones are sincerely carrying out their oaths, and which are too enthusiastic about federal handouts and “gifts?” Do you know the names, faces, and addresses of the local federal LEOs who will be organizing and directing the security forces efforts in your area? Do you live next to a National Guard armory and have the ability to start now developing a history of activity patterns, so you’ll know when the regime is stepping up activities? Do you work in the garage that repairs local LEO vehicles, and can record the pertinent information on undercover vehicles to facilitate their identification when needed?

Logistics. Are you a farmer who can set aside a portion of your harvest to feed the guerrillas? Are you a gun dealer or pawn shop owner who can buy a couple of guns from private parties and “forget” to record them so they can be passed on or even sold (no one wants you to go broke) to the resistance to provide arms for those who don’t have any (don’t think there are not guys out there who believe the right way, but are too busy feeding their families to buy quality weapons). Hell, even a case of ammunition a month could be set aside and stored for the future….Are you a machinist that can manufacture AR lower receivers when the balloon goes up and arm more of your local citizens’ defense group? Or, are you a grocery store employee who can set aside some of the discarded staples that are still good, but have damaged packaging that precludes their sale (something I would only advocate in the here and now if the chain was going to throw the shit out anyway)?

Medical Support. The auxiliary provides medical supplies and support, arranging for doctors and other medical personnel to provide care for the sick and wounded. Are you a doctor or nurse? EMT or paramedic? Veterinarian? CNA? Hell, can you afford to pick up an extra roll of bandage each time you go to the grocery store and set it aside for later use? Can you take an EMT course? Even a CNA certification class? Doctors and nurses are going to need help caring for wounded personnel, and “even” a CNA will have a role to play.

Recruiting. The auxiliary identifies and screens potential recruits for active resistance units. Who do you know that is in the right place politically, but doesn’t know the right people to actively train with the local resistance cells? Are you a gunsmith or gun store owner or employee who is in the position to meet the guy who just bought his first AR-15 or AKM and wants to get some good training in how to use it? Is he concerned about the socio-political direction the country is headed in? You probably know another local gun-owner who can be “convinced” to provide some lessons in the use of the weapon, both technically and philosophically, don’t you? Maybe you’re just a regular at the local gun shop and have had some serious, quality firearms training…throw some business cards out there and let the employees know you’re offering training. It’s not about making a living off the training, so who cares if you only get a half dozen clients a year, if that means you can develop even one of them into a member of your group (although, maybe you’ll turn out to be an incredibly talented trainer and can make a go off it as a business?)? Quit being afraid of the fed “bogeyman” and start networking more actively.

Reserve Forces. Many times the auxiliary will be called on to provide active support to the guerrilla force or the subversive underground as reserve force personnel. Whether it’s as part of a security element for a raid, or a sniper shot to elicit a quick-reaction force to be ambushed or something else, don’t neglect to maintain your marksmanship training, physical conditioning, or study of small-unit tactics, just because you think you’re too old, infirm, or crippled to be of use. Even if you simply observe most of the training, or do walk-throughs while those around you are running and gunning, you’ll develop the skillsets better than if you just read the manuals….(I’ve told at least one participant in every SUT class I’ve taught that I’d rather see them walk through the classes and be able to teach it later, or only pull it off once–when it counts–than permanently cripple themselves in a class now).

Escape and Evasion. The auxiliary participates in the escape-and-evasion corridors for the resistance and provides safe-houses for evaders. Whether you are building a hidden crawlspace into your home, or caching evasion supplies in nearby public land, you can do things now to help later. Establish (and record the locations of) evasion corridors with stable foodstuffs, water purification, maps and compass, and ammunition and inexpensive firearms, to allow future evaders to not only continue to evade successfully, but to defend themselves (this would be a great application for the cheap POS Mosin-Nagants and SKS’s everyone loves to stockpile…far better than relying on them as your primary weapon).

Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence. The auxiliary collects and collates information to support its own operations (who can be trusted as part of the auxiliary? Who can’t?) as well as the operations of the local area command. The auxiliary also acts as a counter-intelligence asset by maintaining watch over transient civilians, screening potential guerrilla and subversive underground recruits, monitoring refugees, and reporting to the area command, known or suspected attempts by the regime to infiltrate agents into the area. In the here and now, are you talking to and getting to know your local LEOs? Do you know some of the local “criminal” elements that can be leveraged to find out who the local CI (read “snitches”) are? Remember, before you immediately discard the idea of dealing on good terms with “criminals” that most of us commit at least one “crime” per day. Really, is a gunrunner such a bad dude? If a local boy is busted for selling pot, who has he really hurt, if in fact he actually sold the pot? Do you really understand the difference between “mala in se” and “mala prohibita” offenses? There really is a difference between a crime and a victimless “crime.”

Psychological Operations. The auxiliary may provide one of it’s greatest functions by spreading word amongst the civilian populace today about the value of armed citizen’s defense groups. Whether it’s a whispered word of support in the right ear, or simply pointing out that the difference between a Neighborhood Watch and a “militia” is that the militia can actually do something about the criminal activity that the government overlooks, the spoken word, by respected, upstanding members of society can be an effective tool for the resistance today. Maybe it’s just pointing out to people that the SPLC is full-of-shit, or teaching an adult education class on Constitutional Law or American History 101 at the local community center. Are you a CCW instructor, or teach a class on canning and food preservation? Can you incorporate preparedness lessons into your curriculum that help Suzy Homemaker and Bob the Banker begin to see the light? Can you print out flyers or bumper stickers to hand out at local gun shows or preparedness expos?

Communications. The auxiliary provides a secure, compartmentalized communications network for the resistance. Whether you are learning and mastering HAM radio or studying and practicing computer/internet encryption and historical tradecraft methods, you can work on developing this ability now (As many correspondents have discovered over the course of this blog, I was definitely NOT an 18E. My commo and encryption skills leave a lot to be desired…..).

Organization of the Auxiliary

Auxiliary elements are typically organized to coincide with or parallel the existing political and administrative divisions of the operational area. Doing so ensures that each community and the surrounding areas are the responsibility of a given auxiliary unit (obviously, this means that auxiliary organization will vary depending on the existing local political structure). Organization of the auxiliary can be either centralized or de-centralized, but the basic organization of each level usually takes the form of a command committee organization that controls and coordinates the activities of the auxiliary within it’s area of responsibility. This means of course, that at least at some level, people need to quit being afraid of the big, bad Fed bogeyman, and start networking with like-minded people in their area and outside of their area. It is subordinate auxiliary activities that need to be compartmentalized for security to minimize the effects of probable eventual compromise.

The ultimate advantages of an organized auxiliary command committee is that a) it prevents the wasteful and unnecessary duplication of efforts, b) reduces the chances of interfering with other auxiliary unit activities, and c) it reduces the danger of accidentally crossing into another auxiliary unit’s area of responsibility and causing an inadvertent blue-on-blue blow-up. Finally, it precludes the chances of two different auxiliaries operating in the same community area, leading to a violent power play as the resistance comes to power.

Successful Auxiliary Planning and Organization

You will know you are on the right path to organizing an effective auxiliary when you can accurately say that you have:
Organized the auxiliary to provide internal support to the guerrilla force and the subversive underground.
Allowed for the assignment of direct support missions to specific guerrilla force units.
Provided for its own security and clandestine operations in the above-listed tasking areas.
Begun to develop E&E networks, safehouses, and re-supply caches.
Developed a command-and-control structure for the auxiliary, including a call-chain (probably well-encrypted and hidden)
Begun the development of a compartmented communication system (see the above about an encrypted call chain, as well as the use of open-source encryption, TOR, and other internet-based options)
Have developed an organized “shadow government” even if the roles are not all filled, and do not actively seek any current “power grabs” from the “legal” local government. On the other hand, once this shadow government is developed, it would be prudent to start campaigning to get people elected to the legal offices…..(just sayin’…..) This of course would require that the auxiliary members filling shadow government positions actually be of sufficient character and moral fiber that you would actually want them in positions of legitimate power. Your second-cousin Joe Bob, who runs the meth-lab two counties over, is probably not the guy to nominate as the shadow mayor of your community, if for no other reason than the fact that he’d never earn the support of the civilian populace.
You have compartmentalized subordinate auxiliary elements to minimize compromise. If a subordinate discovers a potential “recruit,” he needn’t spend much effort actively recruiting him. Once some minor bonafides have been established, the recruitment effort should be passed up the chain.

Obviously, the presence of an auxiliary has a solid reason for existence, whether your perception of the coming tribulation is one of needing to actively resist government activities, or simple community self-defense during a WROL societal breakdown. If you cannot envision yourself as an active gunfighter in the coming troubles, that doesn’t mean you need to write yourself off as a liability to your community. Start organizing your local auxiliary networks today.



Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

 

[The Mountain]

For women alone ... either living alone, traveling alone, etc ... you need to take your security seriously. So ok, what if your friends think you are a little nutso or over the tope? Big whoop. There is going to come a time when safety and security of your person will be up to you and you alone. Deal with that fact now. Practice good habits now. If it makes you seem a little militant/militaristic again ... big whoop. The time to strategize and learn tactics is now ... not in the middle of an event.



Other home security courtesy of being a landlord for 18 years:

• Metal doors and metal door frames provide the best protection as long as they are kept in good repair ... in other words don't let them rust out as it weakens them.
• If you can't have a metal door/doorframe then have a solid wood door ... I didn't say a wood door but a solid wood door. Don't have "panels" in the door that are inset as that will be the easiest part to kick in.
• If you insist on having glass in your door make sure that it is security glass and not just some silly bit of decorative glass.
• Change that porch light as soon as it goes out. If you find that the bulb is "going out" often or that the cover of your porch light is being messed with you probably have a prowler setting you up.
• It is unbelievably easy to bump most door locks. Make sure you use good quality dead bolts that extend at least 1" into the door frame. and that all door hardware like plates and hinges are attached with 3 screws.
• It is also easy to pop a window lock with a small screw driver. A thumb or hex lock added to your windows will make it harder for an intruder to make a "silent" entrance.
• Good shades and black out curtains will keep people from being able to spy on you from the street ... or anywhere else for that matter.
• Don't leave home repairs for the last minute ... if something breaks/breaks down then get it fixed right away.
• Don't overlook things like defensive landscaping, security/motion detector lighting, good fencing making good neighbors, etc.
• Also, don't set up habits that have to be broken ... for instance letting kids cut across the backyard if they aren't your kids. Once a pattern is developed it is very hard to change.

Regarding "defensive landscaping", read up on the concept of CPTED. This will tell you a great deal about setting up your outdoor environment to passively protect you. This has the additional effect of making it harder for out-of-control LEO to effectively raid your place "accidentally (on purpose)".

 

[Dozdoats]

More...
===============

http://guerrillamerica.com/2013/03/the-formation-and-organization-of-resistance-movements-part-one/

The Formation and Organization of Resistance Movements, Part One
March 11, 2013 at
John Mosby


org-resistThis is Part One of a two-part series. Part Two will be published next week.


Resistance movements generally begin with the desire of individuals or small groups of individuals to remove intolerable conditions imposed by an unpopular regime. Opposition towards the regime and hatred of existing conditions that conflict with the individual’s or the group’s values, interests, and way of life spread from the individual (or group of individuals comprising the group) to family, close friends, and neighbors. This can result in an entire community cohering in an obsessive hatred for an established regime. Generally, this hatred has historically manifested itself as sporadic, spontaneous, nonviolent and violent acts of resistance towards the regime, or available representatives of the regime. As the discontent grows, natural leaders (historically, former military personnel, clergymen, local political leaders, and community organizers- remember most resistance insurgencies in the last century had a basis in communist/socialist ideals…) emerge to channelize the discontent into an organized resistance movement that promotes its own growth. The population must be convinced by this leadership that it has nothing to lose, or at least, more to gain, by resistance, than by maintaining the status quo.


The ultimate key to progressing from increasing discontent to active insurrection is the belief by the populace that they have nothing to lose by revolting, combined with the belief that they have a genuine chance to succeed. Additionally, there must be some sort of catalyzing trigger that ignites popular support against the regime’s power and a dynamic resistance leadership that can exploit the situation when it arises. (Critical Note: this apparent focus on leadership within the resistance should not be construed to invalidate the concept of “leaderless resistance.” The concept of leadership should not be relegated to some shadowy, mythical central controlling party of the resistance, but rather, individual cells should have the ability and willingness to take advantage of any key trigger events to leverage the already present discontent to begin active operations to win the support of the populace.).


Once the resistance begins to act out against the regime, there are two types of initial resistance: Clandestine resistance and overt resistance.


a) Clandestine Resistance is conducted by people who outwardly appear to follow their normal mode of existence. This type of resistance may or may not be controlled by any level of leadership, and may include the following activities by individuals and/or small groups/cells.


- Political action and campaigning


- Propaganda development and dispersal


- Espionage


- Sabotage (see my previous post on the critical differences between sabotage and terrorism. They are NOT the same thing.)


- Black marketeering


- Intelligence gathering


b) Overt Resistance is conducted by individuals trained along paramilitary lines. This is the guerrilla force and provides the military arm of the resistance. These individuals and groups make no secret of their existence or objectives (once hostilities have begun in earnest), although they may use the leaderless cell approach and compartmentalize information closely to prevent compromise of the entire movement. The guerrilla force will generally be comprised of those individuals who have previously been openly disdainful or antagonistic towards the regime, and recognize the probability that they have been targeted by the security forces anyway (as much as he hates sleeping on the ground, especially in cold weather, your author recognizes that he has probably set himself up to be stuck playing this role if the inevitable happens. This really sucks since I have bad arthritis anyway, courtesy of letting Uncle Sugar convince me what a great idea it was to walk out of perfectly functioning aircraft that were in flight….and carrying a 90-130lb rucksack? Why gee, that sounds swell!)


Part Two (notes the subversive underground, the support auxiliary, and the paramilitary guerrilla force) will be published next Monday.



Nous Defions,

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains

John Mosby is a former Army Ranger and Green Beret, and the author of the Mountain Guerrilla blog.



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Related posts:
1.The Formation and Organization of Resistance Movements, Part Two
2.French Resistance Organization: the Maquis
3.Chetnik Guerrilla Resistance, 1941
4.Qualitative Measurement of Resistance and Revolution Models

 

[Dozdoats]

Part 2
=====

http://guerrillamerica.com/2013/03/the-formation-and-organization-of-resistance-movements-part-two/

The Formation and Organization of Resistance Movements, Part Two
March 18, 2013 at
John Mosby


org-resistThis is part two of a two-part series. Part One can be found here.

There are three necessary components to a successful insurgency. The subversive underground is always present and is the first component of the resistance to form and begin active operations. The strategic goals of the resistance movement will determine the level of development for all three components:

the subversive underground
the support auxiliary
the paramilitary guerrilla force

The subversive underground.

The subversive underground is a cellular organization within the resistance movement that has the ability to conduct operations in areas that are practicably inaccessible to the paramilitary guerrilla force, such as populated areas that are under tight control of the regime’s security forces. The underground maintains the ability to operate in these denied areas because it operates clandestinely, returning to innocuous “day jobs” when not performing missions.

Typical tasks for the subversive underground include, but may not be limited to:

-Gathering intelligence and the development of intelligence networks.

-The development and operation of subversive “pirate” broadcast systems that control the dissemination of propaganda through radio, newspaper and leaflet distribution, and/or internet communications and web page development.

-The fabrication of special materials, such as false identification, weapons, and munitions.

-Black market networks and safe houses for transport of personnel and logistics.

-Sabotage by individuals and/or small units in urban centers.

-Operation of clandestine medical facilities to treat injured/wounded resistance personnel.

Members of the underground are normally active, productive members of their community, and their ability to function as part of the resistance is a product of their daily life and/or position within the community. They operate by maintaining a strict compartmentalization and delegating most risk to their auxiliary workers. The functions of the subversive underground are what allow the resistance to have a noticeable effect within urban or built-up areas.

The underground operational cell should typically be comprised of a leader and a few cell members who operate directly as a unit to conduct direct-action missions for the underground. The intelligence cell is different in that the cell leader should seldom, if ever, be in direct contact with the subordinate members of his cell, and the members of the cell are rarely in contact with one another. All communications of the intelligence cell would typically be conducted through dead-drop and other covert/clandestine methods of tradecraft.

It is imperative for the potential future guerrilla fighter to understand that, until he sees and recognizes these actions being undertaken by unknown parties, there is little point to “going to guns.” Doing so will only accelerate the actions of the regime to hunt down such “extremist” outlaws. Since the security forces will not be forced to deal with hunting down members of the subversive underground at the same time, there will be little to prevent them from focusing extensive assets to hunting down the “bandits hiding out in the woods.” If you have friends, whom you trust enough to discuss these matters and potential future issues with, who are not outspoken and openly critical of the current demise, educate them on the need for future subversives. They need to remain quiet and simply prepare for the day they need to wire a couple cans of ether to some douchebag’s engine manifold…(I’ve actually never tried it, but I’m pretty well convinced that it would be an extremely effective anti-vehicle/anti-personnel device to be utilized by a mechanic who happens to secretly support the resistance. If anyone has a junk vehicle that will still run, they should try it and let me know how it works out…Don’t run out and try it on a local police cruiser, please. I am not saying do it now. I’m saying consider such possible weapons in case they are needed in the future.

The auxiliary.

This term refers to members of the population who provide very limited clandestine support to the subversive underground and/or the paramilitary guerrilla force. Very seldom will they be “active” members of the movement and, as such, offer little intelligence value to the regime if compromised. Functions of the auxiliary may take the form of logistics, labor, or intelligence collection. Auxiliary members may not know any more than how to perform their specific function or service that supports the network. They may not even realize they are actively supporting the resistance. They should certainly never be asked to perform a job by a valuable member of the subversive underground cadre, face-to-face. Even in the modern environment of credit card payments and billing services, there are ways to accomplish such chores remotely. Until they are trusted, they do not learn the names or identities of the resistance.

In many ways however, the auxiliary personnel are at the greatest risk of compromise (thus the importance of their not offering intelligence value to the regime if compromised). Typical functions of the auxiliary include:

-Logistics procurement (either through stealing from a workplace, or purchasing on the black market, or open market, if it can be done without compromising their security or that of the movement.)

-Logistics distribution (transporting goods and dropping them in pre-determined cache locations for later pick-up by resistance forces.)

-Labor for special material fabrication (in some instances, the fabrication will be conducted in assembly-line fashion, to preclude any one group of auxiliaries from recognizing what they are manufacturing).

-Security and early warning for underground facilities and guerrilla bases (obviously, this is a task that must be reserved for well-trusted and very secure members of the auxiliary…cooks in regime mess halls/dining facilities who may overhear conversations regarding upcoming operations, mechanics who notice an increase in the request for pre-mission checks on vehicles, etc…)

-Intelligence collection (intentional or otherwise)

-Recruitment (obviously, in this case, the auxiliary member knows his part, but can still be compartmentalized to reduce risk to the actual underground or guerrilla force).

-Communications networks staff such as couriers and/or messengers.

-Propaganda distribution.

-Safe house management.

-Logistics and personnel transport (if functioning as part of the black market, the auxiliary member may never realize he is actively supporting the resistance).

The paramilitary guerrilla force.

The paramilitary guerrilla force is the overt military arm of the resistance. As individuals who actively engage the conventional military in combat operations, guerrillas have traditionally held a significant disadvantage in terms of training, equipment, and firepower (it should be noted that, in the event of an U.S. resistance movement, these would not necessarily be the case. That’s the purpose, after all, of this blog). For all their disadvantages, however, the guerrilla force has one distinct advantage that can offset any unfavorable balance – the initiative. In any operational planning, the guerrilla leader must strive to maintain and exploit this advantage.

The guerrilla element only attacks when it can develop and maintain a relative, if temporary, state of superiority of force. The element avoids any sort of decisive engagement, thus denying the conventional force military of the regime the opportunity to recover, regain their superiority, and use it against the guerrilla force (the application of conventional small-unit tactics, such as raids and ambushes, in an unconventional manner, such as an IED/EFP-initiated ambush, followed by selective targeting of personnel, then an exfiltration, or a rapid, snatch-and-grab raid to kidnap a key enemy leader, are the definition of guerrilla warfare tactics). The guerrilla element is only capable of generating this type of tactical success in areas where they possess a significant familiarity with the terrain and a connection to the local civilian population that allows them to harness clandestine support for security and intelligence-gathering purposes. Don’t ever allow yourself or your unit to suffer the terminal disease of testosterone poisoning and think you’re going to survive, let alone win, a toe-to-toe slugfest with a conventional force rifle platoon. You might have better riflemen, and even bigger numbers, but they have indirect-fire support, close air support, and a faster Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to call on for reinforcements.

Depending on the degree of control over the local area, a guerrilla force element may range in size from fire-team size all the way up to a brigade-level force. In the initial stages of a resistance, the guerrilla force, regardless of size, will generally be limited to stand-off attacks that we typically think of as “guerrilla warfare.” This may include the aforementioned raids and ambushes, albeit on a slightly larger scale. As the guerrilla force grows, however, so should its ability to engage the regime’s conventional military forces on a larger scale, allowing some degree of parity with the enemy. In these cases, formerly isolated bands of guerrillas may be able to connect and coalesce, forming liberated territory that allows for the development of a larger, more conventional military force to face the regime’s conventional force.

It is critical to delineate the difference between a true resistance guerrilla fighter, and other small-unit, irregular force operatives that may appear similar but in fact, are drastically different, such as militias (although the local militia may operate as a part of the guerrilla force in liberated territories), mercenaries, and criminal/narco-terrorist gangs. The militia’s only intent should be to provide security for the local community and its residents. Mercenaries and criminal/narco-terrorist gangs will seldom hold themselves to any sort of moral construct similar to that of the resistance-force guerrilla. It is critical for the guerrilla force insurgent to recognize that only uniformed personnel of the enemy regime are legitimate targets for the guerrilla force. Key political personnel, civilian population sympathizers and informants, etc, must be dealt with solely by the subversive underground. This is critical to the PSYOP campaign for the resistance, since conduct of assassinations/kidnappings, etc., by the underground can be plausibly blamed on the regime’s security apparatus if it is not conducted by organized paramilitary forces of the guerrilla.

Nous Defion,
John Mosby
Somewhere in the mountains

John Mosby is a former Army Ranger and Green Beret, and the author of the Mountain Guerrilla blog.

 

[Dozdoats]

There are tons of books and manuals out there on UW (unconventional warfare) for anyone who wants to make a genuine study of the subject.

Here's one, from 'the schoolhouse':

http://publicintelligence.net/leaders-guide-to-unconventional-warfare/

U.S. Army

U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center Leader’s Handbook on Unconventional Warfare

March 7, 2012

The following manual was originally published on the Army’s own website approximately two years ago. It has since been removed. The handbook provides an excellent overview of the U.S. Government’s history of funding and facilitating violent insurgencies around the world by waging “unconventional warfare.” The handbook should be read alongside the U.S. Army’s Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Manual.

A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare
•SWCS PUB 09-1
•40 pages
•November 2009

Download

 

[Dozdoats]

Think all this is just ancient history?

Nope... I recall an article about the Zapatistas in southern Mexico from back in the early 1990s when I was just getting started on the net, titled something like "The Revolution Will Be Digital." And guess what? It is... part of it anyway.
=============================

http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/archive/SW2502/SW2502SocialMediaAndUW.html

Social Media and UW

By Lieutenant Colonel Brian Petit
Originally published in the April-June 2012 edition of Special Warfare


Unconventional warfare, meet social media. Future mission success could depend on Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Google+, or iReporting. Te pervert Leon Trotsky's axiom on war, "You may not be interested in social media, but social media is very interested in you."



Social media — blogs, social-network sites, information aggregators, wikis, livecasting, video sharing — has decisively altered that most extreme of socio-politico acts: revolution. The 2011 Arab Spring revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East were engineered through citizen-centric computer and cellular-phone technologies that streamed web-enabled social exchanges. The Arab Spring has profound implications for the U.S. special-operations mission of unconventional warfare. This article posits that the study, practice and successful execution of future UW must deliberately account for and incorporate social media.

This article first examines the role of social media during the Arab Spring revolutions and uprisings. Next, social media’s profound political effects are woven to the historical and doctrinal practice of UW. Three areas of UW are analyzed: social mobilization, the digital underground and the weapon of the narrative. This article concludes with an appeal for the focused study of the nexus between social media and UW to include the practice of and experimentation with the use of social media enabled by handheld technologies.

The Arab Spring

Labeled alternately the Arab Spring or the Twitter Revolution, the spring of 2011 witnessed uprisings and revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Bahrain, with revolution-inspired, violent demonstrations following in multiple Middle Eastern, North African and European nations. The uprisings were sparked by the Dec. 17, 201, self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi, a frustrated Tunisian fruit-and-vegetable street vendor (with a computer science degree).1 Public outrage followed, led by viral social-media postings. Months later, across the Middle East and North Africa, social media achieved another innovative milestone: a decentralized community of web-based activists rapidly coalesced into politically powerful, loosely organized insurgents who produced not just riots, but astonishing revolutionary change.

The uprisings represented a true “starfish”t moment: peer-to-peer relationships generated a collaborative will that sparked defiant acts of resistance spanning two continents. Social media proliferated compelling images and stories that resonated with all classes of citizens, worldwide, inspiring a mix of activism and outrage that ignited revolutionary sentiment.

It is said that revolutions “come, they are not made.”3 Despite the unpredictability of revolutions, the Arab Spring uprisings demonstrated that the medium is as important as — or more important than — the message. Handheld technologies and social media connectivity aggregated small acts of resistance that produced frenzied revolutionary momentum. The lack of a cohesive revolutionary ideology was less significant than the collective thrill of millions of like-minded, networked citizens expressing dissent.

Even if revolution was not the aim, it was the outcome. Social-media collaboration generated accidental revolutionaries. The connected masses forged rapid, digital alliances too dynamic to be ignored and too unpredictable to be countered. In a remarkably short time span, social-media communities viewed their collective action in historical terms, generating the key ingredient required for revolutionary momentum: inevitability.

The pervasive and resilient character of web-based social media enabled rapid social organization that circumvented regimes and inspired bold and effective acts of resistance. Social media demonstrated that it is effective in sparking revolutions. It also showed some proficiency in managing the tactics and flexibility required to sustain spirited, if disorganized, revolutionary momentum. Even the state-sponsored physical violence, media control and comprehensive counterrevolutionary measures could not effectively thwart the uprising.

The inspiring, liberating spirit of the Arab Spring has given way to a long year of discord, civil war and state-on-citizen violence. We are reminded that revolutions are messy, violent affairs, whether delivered by cell phone or pitchfork. Outcomes notwithstanding, the Arab Spring confirms that the digital networks that promulgate social-media content present both an environment and a communication-based weapon system.

UW Background

To place social media within UW, it is helpful to review the definition of UW, address special-operations responsibilities for the conduct of UW and give examples of UW campaigns.

Going viral: The revolution in Egypt was stimulated by this Facebook page, dedicated to a slain Egyptian businessman. The page continues to serve as a hub for information on events around the world. http://www.facebook.com/elshaheeed.co.uk


Going viral: The revolution in Egypt was stimulated by this Facebook page, dedicated to a slain Egyptian businessman. The page continues to serve as a hub for information on events around the world.


UW is defined as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.”4 UW is not a mechanism for creating revolutionary conditions — rather, it seizes on and supports existing political, military and social infrastructure to accelerate, stimulate and support decisive action based on calculated political gain and U.S. national interests.

U.S. Army Special Forces are the Department of Defense’s only military unit designed to conduct UW, and are specially trained to operate in politically sensitive, denied areas that characterize UW environments.

UW is inherently an interagency activity, which combines the military component of the U.S. Army Special Forces with the U.S. government agencies that possess the requisite authorities and capabilities to support a UW campaign.

The principle components of an insurgent or resistance movement are the underground, the auxiliary and the guerrilla force. UW pairs Special Forces with resistance groups, insurgents, revolutionaries, tribes or other cohesive indigenous social groups that qualify as a legitimate threat to an existing power. The insurgent forces must be determined to be a suitable partner, both militarily and politically, for the conduct of operations in support of U.S. national interests.

The two major U.S. wars of this decade — Afghanistan and Iraq — were initiated with successful Special Forces-supported UW campaigns.5 Strategically, UW offers a rapid, flexible option where large-scale conventional forces are not suitable or advisable. UW and its nearly polar opposite, foreign internal defense, remain the principal mission for the Fort Bragg, N.C.-based United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne).

Linking the Arab Spring and UW

To clarify, the Arab Spring revolutions are not case studies of UW. The majority of the Arab Spring uprisings are homespun insurrections in various phases of their revolutionary cycle. In Libya, the anti-Qaddafi regime rebels have received external support from the U.S. and NATO. This support, both direct and indirect, falls short of the full application of UW. As of this writing, NATO support to the Libyan rebels is best classified as indirect support6 or limited intervention.7

The Arab Spring was fueled through social media such as the Twitter hashtag #25jan. http://twitter.com/#!/search/#25jan


The Arab Spring was fueled through social media such as the Twitter hashtag #25jan.


The value in examining UW against the Arab Spring is twofold. First, the Arab Spring revolutions and uprisings contain the environmental complexities resident in UW environments. Studying these cases offers insight into the way UW environments might take shape in the future. Second, the aim of UW is to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power or government; precisely the aim of a revolutionary. The successes and failures of the resistance movements and the subsequent actions of the governments provide valuable information for informing future UW theory, doctrine and training principles.

Borderless social mobilization. UW will be affected by the advent of hyper-accelerated social organization. The ability of citizens to instantly connect, communicate and act constitutes an evolution of the military notion of mass. High-volume social-media content forms a relatively innocuous type of mass until they stimulate and assist in illegal acts of resistance or war. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, creators of the concept of netwar8 have synthesized cyber, social and military capabilities into a modern concept of “swarming.” Arquilla and Ronfeldt define swarming as “seemingly amorphous, but it is a deliberately structured, coordinated strategic way to strike from all directions.”9

Swarming in the digital domain can easily span time zones, geography, economic and cultural barriers. The Arab Spring demonstrated how social media can congregate its users digitally, then quickly shift to directing or influencing some form of focused physical mass or swarm.

In Egypt, thousands of social-media exchanges combined the normally benign activity of online social commentary with the unpredictable actions of revolutionaries, disenfranchised individuals and opportunists. The result? A persistent wave of e-mass inspired civil disobedience that toppled a 30-year regime in 18 days with a “narrative and a nudge.”10

Revolution in Egypt was stimulated by Wael Ghonim11, an Egyptian-born, Google regional marketing manager, who created a Facebook page titled, “We are all Khaled Said,” dedicated to a slain Egyptian businessman.12 Ghonim’s Facebook page became a catalyst for the revolution. In a modern example of swarming initiated by digital mass, Ghonim’s Facebook page went viral, igniting the masses against the 25-year rule of President Hosni Mubarak.

Wael Ghonim’s role in the revolution illustrates how social media has made the creation and mobilization of active revolutionaries in days and weeks — a stunning evolution that impacts the organizational principles of resistance movements.

Social media continues to be a leading source for revolutionary thought. http://www.facebook.com/Syrian.Revolution


Social media continues to be a leading source for revolutionary thought.


Borderless social mobilization, enabled by digital mass, has compelling organizational implications for UW. Initially, borderless social mobilization allows like-minded groups to coalesce digitally with less risk than the traditional early, vulnerable stages of building a resistance movement. Subsequently, borderless social mobilization can be blended with traditional organizational methods, combining established techniques with innovative social-organization technologies. The organizational progression blends a digital front and a physical front, both of which are decentralized. The result is a multi-front, or more aptly, a “multi-sphere” campaign. This is the art and science of interpreting and acting on social-media cues as a principal element of combat-advising indigenous resistance forces. UW practitioners must now consider their organizational capacity to leverage social media in concert with traditional methods of supporting an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force.

In the initial phases of digital-centric mobilization, U.S.-supported resistance forces can capitalize on the rapidity and relative safety of the decentralized cyber domain. For a regime attempting to defend or attack its internal threats, social media can create a highly decentralized and challenging front. As this decentralized front self-organizes in the cyber domain, a traditionally organized front of armed military capability— the supported guerrilla force — can organize in the physical domain. The threatened occupying power faces a multi-pronged, networked threat that is as difficult to predict as social media itself. This multi-sphere UW campaign methodology combines the chaotic power of borderless social mobilization with the lethality and precision of focused military effort.

This paradigm levels the physical realm of war with the digital realm, recognizing social-media-centric communication as an equal to tactical military actions. Without question, acts of war and violent, tactical military actions will always shape the narrative. Arguably, tactical actions and social narratives can rarely be separated. However, this scenario illustrates the “information order with an operations’ annex” supposition14 that emphasizes the lasting effects of effective information proliferation over the fleeting nature of successful tactical actions. We must recognize that citizen-generated media content will shape public perceptions with credibility and speed. Our meticulously crafted and dogmatically staffed military public-affairs releases will be poor competitors for influence in this environment. Our UW proficiency will depend on revised authorities, uncomfortable risk calculations and social-media aptitudes that are not normally associated with the military action.

Our application of UW information management must understand what sociologist Manuel Costells calls the shift from the age of mass communication to the age of mass self-communication.15 To shape the way people feel, think and behave, UW must consider social media as one would a catastrophic weapon system with no single owner or operator: how is it oriented, what are its targets, who understands its capabilities, how can one influence it, how can I protect myself and how can I leverage it against my adversaries?

Social media has expanded the possibilities for both U.S. and indigenous forces to mobilize, organize, recruit, communicate and network. The traditional resistance organization methods — furtive meetings, clandestine contacts, cellular structures — still have great relevance. However, social media is a proven accelerant, defying historical prognostications for the time required for irregular force information dissemination and organizational action. Previous methodical approaches and linear progressions of UW campaigns can now leverage unthinkably rapid social mediums. Managing this paradigm shift in a UW environment might be less suited for U.S. Cyber Command and better suited for a Special Forces Soldier with a smartphone, a computer and a cadre of a wired, indigenous underground. For SOF, herein lies our challenge: Will the Special Forces leader who recognizes a decisive but fleeting opportunity, have the command authority, legal authority, the connectivity, the situational awareness and the confidence to risk seizing the initiative through social media?

Future UW campaigns must be designed to anticipate, nurture and capitalize on the multi-sphere concept. As a start, current UW education, training and experimentation venues must widely educate and train our force on borderless social mobilization, the phenomena of digital mass, swarming and the impacts of hyper-accelerated social organization.

The Decentralized Underground

Successful insurgencies and resistance groups require leadership. In doctrinal UW, the underground is the nucleus of leadership that provides the direction, organization and stewards the strategy for the resistance force. Historically, the underground is a clandestine, cellular structure with adequate hierarchy to synchronize resistance actions. The proliferation of social media has introduced a new type of underground: a digitally connected, leaderless organization with varying levels of commitment to the cause.

The multiple-nation Arab Spring uprisings contained a similar pattern of electronic and physical mass that pre-existed any true unified leadership. In all affected countries, the resistance leadership formed after the initial revolutionary thrusts. To be sure, pockets of leadership did exist prior to revolutionary actions. However, these leaderless revolutions witnessed aspiring leaders scrambling behind the leading edge of the revolution, reacting and attempting to build organizational cohesion and primacy in the midst of upheaval.

Ori Bronfman and Rod A. Beckstrom describe the emergence of leaderless organizations in The Spider and The Starfish: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations.16 The authors explain how decentralized organizations survive, thrive and, often, dominate. The first principle is “when attacked, a decentralized organization tends to become even more open and decentralized.”17 This principle aptly describes the behavior of nearly all 2011’s North African and Middle Eastern web-inspired insurrections.

Examined against UW doctrine, the leaderless Arab Spring revolutions were initiated by a previously non-existent, highly decentralized digital underground. Remarkably, these self-forming digital undergrounds performed the exact functions of a traditionally organized underground: intelligence, counterintelligence, subversion, propaganda, control of networks and direction of tactical actions. The digital underground has additional characteristics evolving in the media age: redundancy, distributed leadership and the ability to survive by mutation.

As witnessed in 2011, these digital undergrounds can morph into highly visible “overgrounds.” Publicity, transparency and mass communication become their salient features. The revolutionary strength of a decentralized digital underground lies not in secrecy but publicity, signifying a complete reversal of the UW doctrinal template for undergrounds.

U.S. UW practice may have to contend with powerful “leaderless” forces impacting the operational environment. Working with resistance forces is already inherently nuanced and often chaotic. Future UW outcomes will hinge on skillfully channeling the chaos inherent in both the digital and physical domains and rapidly adjusting based on cues from each domain. The advent of spontaneously organized, leaderless resistance movements could be highly advantageous or unpredictability damaging. The challenge may lie less in the application of force, and more in understanding the nature of the resistance and anticipating how and when to sequence digital and physical actions needed to retain the initiative.

Battle tracking or more accurately — social tracking - the sentiment of these social forces and influencing their behaviors, will be a critical function of the U.S. UW headquarters. Future UW campaigns may require sophisticated “social-media operation centers” that track web- and cellphone-posted content, analyzing and potentially influencing the social-media indicators and resulting behavioral outcomes. The social-media common-operating picture will track and display Facebook feeds, Twitter posts, citizen-posted reports, YouTube videos, iReports and critically, their trends in viewership. The doctrinal decision-support matrix might contain actions to be taken when social-media tripwires are sprung. Battle drills might contend with flash mobs (creating or preventing), technology denial or patching detours around state-sponsored Internet censors.18

Political campaigns already use similar tactics — all open source — to engage, in real time, by keeping a Twitter stream open to instantly understand how their candidates’ messages and exchanges are viewed.19 Twitter provides instant feedback on how messages or actions are resonating. Political campaigns are increasingly skilled in enhancing a positive message or deflecting a negative outcome. The interpretations of the Twitter community can be more important than the candidate’s actual words or intent — this interpretation is seldom left to chance in the political arena and arguably it should never be left to chance during an UW action.

In future UW campaigns, we will have to recognize all forms of leadership, especially those that challenge our preconceived notions. Our prevailing mental images of insurgent leaders are the muddy-boots field leaders like Ernesto “Che” Guevara in the Bolivian jungles or the intrepid Afghan horsemen of the Northern Alliance. Our view of insurgent leadership must expand to the “digital commuter,” starfish-style leaders of the Egyptian revolution who stayed awake for days on end — sitting on their couches — feverishly texting and tweeting until the Mubarak regime capitulated.20

Both the military-style field leaders and the digital catalysts constitute insurgent leadership. While both play a factor, it is people who topple regimes, not cellular phones. SF should be prepared to effectively support both the decentralized digital insurgents and our traditional partners, the armed guerrilla leader. Success in future UW campaigns will likely blend the understanding of social networking with the application of SF advisers and U.S. joint firepower in support of a resistance movement or insurgency.

We must understand the nature of leaderless organizations and calculate how distributed leadership can support and not cripple, the U.S.-sponsored resistance group. Social media has radically changed the mechanics of how communication affects social organization. We must educate and train ourselves to recognize and interact with these nontraditional forms of leadership and power.

Weapon of the Narrative

Social media, wireless Internet, cellular phones and associated liberation technologies21 are increasingly the predominant methods of transmitting compelling narratives. The Arab Spring, the London riots,22 the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit23 episode and most famously, the Occupy movements are examples of the emergence of a visually-oriented, ideologically impulsive Internet culture with the means to rapidly and collectively plan and act.

Human connections have moved beyond the traditional face-to-face and social media must be leveraged in UW operations in order to keep pace with the environment. Graphic by Jodi Breckenridge Petit.


Human connections have moved beyond the traditional face-to-face and social media must be leveraged in UW operations in order to keep pace with the environment. Graphic by Jodi Breckenridge Petit.


Electronic narratives are so pervasive that they generate actions before ideologies are considered. Nearly all the Arab Spring insurrections lack ideological cohesion for governing; what they have in common is powerful narratives for dismantling. Social media enabled the proliferation of these powerful narratives, amplifying what cultural anthropologists already know: narratives in the form of stories, rumors, biographies and pictures drive our behaviors and shape our convictions.

Future UW considerations must ascertain how to compete in a fickle psychological arena in the era of the electronic narrative. Historically, insurgent ideological indoctrinations were slow-boiling, methodical processes in which narratives were used for the “hook,” and ideological indoctrination followed. The methods of Mao Zedong and other communist insurgent methodologies employed compelling, emotive narratives to recruit supporters. Only after these narratives mobilized recruits would the communist political indoctrination be introduced. Following the political indoctrination, one could then be trained as a true guerrilla.

With greater emphasis on building a narrative and less on ideology, social media offers an alternative to the historical, linear progression of developing a resistance storyline. This shift is incidental and accidental; a byproduct of our digitized world. Social-media content — personal, citizen-centric, picture-rich, story-filled — promotes personal narratives in greater volume and frequency, resulting in the increasing centricity of personal chronicles that demote the importance of ideologies.

Social media proliferates information so quickly and broadly that the narratives replace ideology, at least temporarily. Whether it is narratives or ideologies that generate momentum, the psychological aspects of UW in the digital age require reviewing the agility of our methods of supporting insurgents, surrogates or resistance groups.

At its essence, UW is a method of psychological warfare. The merger of social media and UW is a natural progression. The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School was originally named the Psychological Warfare Center because of the inherent nature of special-operations forces and their emphasis on indirect, nonstandard methods.

Importantly, UW is a method for coercing and disrupting not just overthrowing. Coercion and disruption are psychological-influence methods used against our adversaries, where the objective is not to overthrow a regime but to achieve a more limited goal: creating a second front, supporting a deception operation, pressuring for peace or discrediting a regime’s ability to provide security.

Within UW, social media could prove to be a tool for persuading neutral populations to support an embryonic effort. A polarizing video, post or message could create favorable conditions for a UW campaign. Conversely, a detrimental posting could go viral, spreading negative perceptions that could erect unforeseen obstacles or foil well-sequenced actions. Future UW endeavors — even those in remote areas with little connectivity — remain subject to the perceptions created by citizen-generated information.

A UW campaign could be sequenced with psychological and social lines of effort as the principle “means” of delivery. Tactical actions would be planned and executed based on anticipating, shaping and exploiting social and psychological conditions. For example, the digital lines of operation could be monitoring (understanding), posting (shaping), denying (blocking), spreading (pushing coverage), swarming (mass) and messaging (tactical or digital actions designed for psychological effect). In the digital domain, tactical actions would be evaluated as those having the most effect, derived from indicators quickly surfacing in social-media venues.

Experimentation is underway in current SF UW exercises to incorporate social media and handheld technologies into campaign planning and tactical execution. For technical analysis and application of social media in today’s operational environment, the Department of Defense Analysis Common Operational Research Lab is conducting real-time analysis on the effects of social media by integrating geospatial, cultural, relational and temporal data tracked, open source, from cellular phone technologies.24

As the Arab Spring results and the CORE Lab studies on Egypt25 have proven, social media is powerful tool for producing the psychological effects necessary for a skilled application of UW. The tradecraft options are unlimited and well beyond the scope of this article. The challenge is maintaining the psychological initiative where everyone — citizens, states, provocateurs, refugees, media, militaries, hackers — has equal access to information and therefore, influence.

Across our education and training domains, the SOF community must recognize that social media and its rapid and effective proliferation of narrative have expanded the boundaries of the UW battleground.

Conclusion

The future study, practice and successful execution of future UW must deliberately incorporate and account for the highly public sphere of social media. For U.S. SOF engaging in UW, the effective use of social media and the use of handheld technologies is perhaps less about technology training and more about mindset shifts in how we view the boundaries of UW.

To provide the widest range of options to our leaders, SOF must be prepared, rehearsed and comfortable in combining low-technology practices within a high-technology, commercially driven, social-media rich environment.

The classic UW image is of the underground resistance-cell leaders meeting with U.S. advisers, clustered in a dark basement around a crumpled map, secretly organizing and planning their next tactical move. This image, and its low-tech nature, is not passé — it is more valid than ever. UW remains a business of trust, respect and the human connection that is the hallmark of language-trained, regionally-oriented, combat-experienced SF Soldiers. But the traditional image of UW is now incomplete. It has a counterpart image that is equally important: a scattered network of digerati, males and females, urban and rural, local and global, all texting, tweeting, posting and hacking from thousands of locations. Publicity is as paramount to the success of the digerati as is secrecy vital to the success of the traditional underground resistance cell. We must be prepared to operate in the secret and the public domains, simultaneously.

UW campaigns are bold and decisive acts of military and political will. Future campaigns will contend with mature and powerful social-media environments. The Arab Spring merits further analysis of borderless social mobilization, digital undergrounds and the weapon of the narrative. Refreshing the theories, education, training, authorities and experimentation of UW will serve us well when our nation calls and our best option is — once again — UW.


Lt. Col. (P) Brian Petit is the Director of the Special Operations Forces Leader Development and Education at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. Social networking and unconventional warfare are analyzed in the Advanced Unconventional Warfare Elective, A576, required for all SOF officers attending theIntermediate Level Education. Lt. Col. (P) Petit has commanded Special Forces units at the detachment, Ccompany and battalion level. He is a veteran of Operation Joint Forge (Bosnia), Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines and Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan.

 

[Dozdoats]

Part 2: Notes to the above-
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Notes

1. http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/101...hamedbouazizi-the-man-who-toppled-tunisia.htm.

2. Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom, The Spider and the Starfish: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations, (Penguin Books, 2006).

3. American abolitionist Wendell Phillips (1811-1884). This quote was taken from Theda Skocpol, “Social Revolutions in the Modern World,” (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 241.

4. Department of the Army Training Circular No. 18-01, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, (Washington D.C.; US Government Printing Office, 28 January 2011; distribution restriction), 1-1.

5. Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan was initiated with a doctrinal unconventional-warfare campaign, partnering the 5th Special Forces Group and their interagency partners with the Northern Alliance resistance forces. The northern front of Operation Iraqi Freedom was also a doctrinal unconventional-warfare operation, pairing the 10th Special Forces Group with the Iraqi Kurdish Forces.

6. Support to Libya has components of indirect support and direct support, less ground combat roles. The acknowledged use of US and NATO airpower is direct support to a resistance force and could well be considered doctrinal combat support.

7. “Limited intervention” is a US Army doctrinal term (not a joint term). US Army Doctrine, Field Manual 3.0 Operations (Washington D.C., US Government Printing). Limited intervention is not included in the new Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-0, 2011.

8. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt have well-developed theories on swarming dating back to In Athena’s Camp (1997), Networks and Netwars (2001).

9. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict (RAND, Santa Monica, CA, December 2, 2010). This excellent study examines the possibilities of adopting swarming as a doctrinal technique for US Forces.

10. CBS News, February 12, 2011, posted on http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/02/12/eveningnews/main20031662.shtml.

11. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/video/2011/feb/08/egypt-activist-wael-ghonim-google-video

12. http://www.facebook.com/elshaheeed.co.uk

13. Traditional organizational methods include clandestine organization methods used by undergrounds to establish leaders, organizational goals and tactical actions.

14. Remarks made by Admiral Eric Olson, commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, January 2009 at the NDIA-SOLIC conference, Washington, D.C. The author of this article was present for this speech.

15. Manuel Costells, Communication Power, (Oxford University Press, New York, 2009).

16. Brafman and Beckstrom.

17. Ibid, 21.

18. James Glantz and John Markoff, “U.S. underwrites internet detour around censors,” The New York Times, June 12, 2011, 1.

19. Ashley Parker, “In Nonstop Whirlwind of G.O.P. Campaigns, Twitter is a Critical Tool,” The New York Times, January 29, 2012, 15.

20. For Egypt, the story of the #25Jan hashtag illustrates the power of a 22-year old female in disseminating information rapidly.

21. Glantz and Markoff, 1. The term “liberation technology” broadly refers to communication networks and supporting technologies that provide regional and global connectivity that bypass state-sponsored restrictions or enable technologically underdeveloped regions.

22. The London riots occurred between August 6 and 10, 2011, following a public protest organized around the fatal shooting of a British citizen by law-enforcement officers. Outside of traditional media outlets, much of the reporting occurred on social media outlets, both informing the public and shaping the events themselves.

23. The San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) incident in August 2011 included local officials shutting down cellular phone service to thwart protesters from organizing via handheld technologies. The incident provoked wide public discussion on the role of law enforcement in limiting access to technologies that could cause potentially be used to cause harm to the public or damage property.

24. The CORE Lab at the Naval Postgraduate School “was established in 2007 with the mission to support U.S. and International field operatives in the analytical craft of integrating geospatial, cultural, relational and temporal data in order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the Irregular Warfare environment.” COL Greg Wilson and Dr. Sean Everton are the co-directors of the CORE Lab. In addition to real time analysis, the CORE Lab instructs NPS students on how to apply advanced analytical methods for current conflicts. Reference CORE Lab pamphlet and author’s visit to NPS in September 2011.

25. The CORE Lab conducted an analysis of the hashtag referenced in footnote 18 (#25Jan hashtag) using open source data. This type of analysis provides invaluable information in mapping networks, network nodes, deception attempts, and social data relevant to understanding and visualizing a rapidly changing environment.