GOV/MIL Hypersonic boost glide weapon analysis, flight profiles, detection and early warning

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
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http://nextbigfuture.com/2016/04/hypersonic-boost-glide-weapon-analysis.html

April 30, 2016

Hypersonic boost glide weapon analysis, flight profiles, detection and early warning

Comments 2

From a purely technical perspective, hypersonic boost-glide weapons would offer certain unique attributes to military planners. Their speed is unmatched by any other kinetic weapon, except for ballistic missiles. And, compared to ballistic missiles, boost-glide weapons have potentially longer ranges, can generally transport a heavier payload over a given range, are capable of midcourse maneuvering, and fly at lower altitudes. Understanding whether these attributes would be likely to provide a significant military advantage and, ultimately, whether the benefits of boost-glide weapons would outweigh their costs and risks raises a complex series of technical and policy questions."

* boost-glide roughly doubles the range over the purely ballistic trajectory.
* In contrast to these maneuvering warhead concepts, there has been growing interest in the traditional boost-glide concept not to extend range per se, but to allow it to reach a given range while flying at a much lower altitude. The goal in this case is to keep the reentry vehicle below radar coverage until it enters the terminal phase.

Science and Global Security: The Technical Basis for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons

The United States, Russia and China are developing hypersonic boost-glide vehicles. A simple model of their trajectory is developed by assuming that the vehicle does not oscillate during the transition to equilibrium gliding

A model is also used to calculate the tactical warning time that a boost-glide attack would afford an adversary. Other aspects of boost-glide weapons’ military effectiveness are explored. Approximate calculations suggest that, compared to existing non-nuclear weapons, boost-glide weapons could penetrate more deeply but would be less effective at destroying silos. The distance at which a boost-glide weapon armed with a particle dispersion warhead could destroy a mobile missile is also calculated; it is expected to be significantly larger than for an explosive warhead.

The current American attempt to develop boost-glide weapons dates to 2003 when the administration of George W. Bush initiated a program that became known as Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) to develop fast, long-range, non-nuclear weapons. The United States has since tested two gliders: the Hypersonic Technology Vehicle-2 (HTV-2) and the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW).

The HTV-2, which had a planned range of 17,000 km, was tested in April 2010 and August 2011. Both tests were terminated prematurely and this program has now been effectively canceled. Instead, current U.S. efforts are focused on the AHW. According to a 2008 study by the National Research Council of the U.S. National Academies, the AHW would have a range of about 8,000 km and might, therefore, be more accurately described as a non-global Conventional Prompt Global Strike weapon. The AHW was tested successfully in November 2011. A second test, in August 2014, failed because of a booster problem.

In January 2014,Beijing tested a boost-glide system for the first time. A second test, in August 2014 over a planned range of 1,750 km, appears to have ended in failure following a booster problem. There is some evidence that, unlike the United States, China's goal is the delivery of nuclear weapons—although the overall scale and scope of the Chinese program remain extremely murky.

China just completed a seventh successful hypersonic test.

Russia has its own Conventional Prompt Global Strike program.

A standard exo-atmospheric gliding trajectory, used by the HTV-2 for example, is shown below.

boostglidemodel.gif

https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-LF_GtwDl...aHdxNwOKhiBq1yqgCLcB/s640/boostglidemodel.gif

Schematic diagram of the different phases of an exo-atmospheric boost-glide weapon's trajectory. The labels, tn, indicate the time at which each phase ends. For clarity, radial distances are exaggerated relative to tangential distances, making it appear as though the booster's trajectory is lofted, whereas it is actually depressed.

Alternatively, it is possible to launch the glider on such a highly depressed trajectory that it never leaves the atmosphere. This strategy appears to have been adopted for the AHW, which the National Research Council describes as “endoatmospheric.” In theory, if an endo-atmospheric booster is able to attain horizontal flight at exactly the right altitude it could inject an RV straight into equilibrium gliding without the need for a pull-up. It does not appear, however, as though the AHW test flight involved this kind of direct injection. So, in practice, the HTV-2 and AHW trajectories are probably quite similar after the start of the pull-up.

htv2.gif

https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-psP143LX...091i4pDQI7WIKozSgfMKFE0yCdACLcB/s640/htv2.gif

Detection and early warning of hypersonic boost glide missile attack

Three different types of early-warning system are considered:

1.satellite based infra-red sensors designed to detect missile plumes, and
2.ballistic missile early-warning radars and
3.modified air defense radars designed to detect incoming re-entry vehicles (RVs).

An area for further study is the possibility of detecting the heat signal of an incoming glider by airborne or space-based infra-red detectors.

Currently, only the United States operates satellite-based infra-red sensors (known in U.S. military jargon as overhead persistent infra-red sensors) to detect ballistic missile launches. Following a series of technical failures, none of Russia’s early-warning satellites are operational at the moment, but it had a space-based early-warning capability until 2014.

Because a boost-glide weapon would be launched by a rocket very similar to a long-range ballistic missile—if not by a repurposed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)—it would be detected by an appropriately positioned satellite very shortly after launch; at the latest immediately after penetrating through any clouds that happened to be present. For satellite-based early warning systems, therefore, the warning time would essentially be equal to the total weapon travel time.

An alternative means to detect an incoming boost-glide weapon would be radar. The United States, Russia and China all operate large land-based radars designed to detect incoming intercontinental-range missile RVs early in flight. The differences between the boost-glide and ballistic trajectories have important implications, however, for monitoring by such radars. The HTV-2, for example, is designed to glide at an altitude of less than 50 km and to approach the target at 30–40 km. By contrast, ICBMs generally “top out” at well over 1,000 km. In consequence, an incoming hypersonic glider would be located below a radar’s horizon—that is, hidden from it by the Earth’s curvature—for much more of its trajectory than a ballistic missile. Thus radars would provide much less warning time of a boost-glide weapon attack than a ballistic missile attack.

Finally, a state could attempt to use a less powerful air-defense radar to detect an incoming boost-glide weapon. In this case, the detection distance would depend on the radar cross section, ó, of the incoming RV.

timeinminutes.png

https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-HF_7dfB_...dtbXgA-EzkocW1aMmgCLcB/s640/timeinminutes.png

Existing air-dropped penetrators are reported to be able to reach speeds of between 460 and 500 meters per second, significantly lower than is required to maximize penetration depth.

Boost-glide weapons weapons, by contrast, could deliver a penetrator at the optimum speed. In fact, they would generally need to slow down from their cruising speeds to prevent failure of the penetrator on impact.

Optimum impact speed maximizes penetration depth. This speed depends on the yield strength of the penetrator’s shell and is between about 1, 000 and 1, 200 meters per second for modern materials.

There are plans to weaponize the HTV-2 called for it to be armed with a particle dispersion warhead with a total mass of about 390 kg consisting of 70 kg to 90 kg of high explosive and “several thousand debris particles, each measuring no more than a few centimeters...in diameter.

The high explosive in this kind of weapon is detonated shortly before impact in order to create an expanding cloud of debris particles. These particles aim to damage the target through their kinetic energy (the high explosive plays no direct role in effecting this damage). Changing the height at which the explosive is detonated changes the size of the weapon’s “footprint” on the ground. Clearly, a large footprint is desirable to mitigate uncertainty about the location of a mobile target. However, increasing the size of the footprint reduces the density of debris particles, increasing the probability that, even if the weapon’s footprint overlaps the target, none of them hit it. There is, therefore, a trade-off involved in choosing the size of the footprint.

For a particle dispersion warhead mounted on a boost-glide weapon, the kinetic energy of the debris particles could be extremely large. For example, if there were 4, 000 particles in the warhead with a combined mass of 300 kg, and if the weapon reached the target at “only” 2, 000 meters per second, then the kinetic energy of each particle would be 150, 000 J. By way of comparison, a particle with an energy of 20, 000 J is required to inflict heavy damage on an aircraft. An energy of 150, 000 J therefore seems more than sufficient to penetrate the missile skin and any protective canister, providing it is not too highly armored (which seems unlikely given the weight constraints imposed by mobility).

A ballistic missile can be effectively disabled by penetrating its motor with even a single debris particle.

If the particle dispersion weapon contains 4, 000 particles then the weapon footprint should have a radius of 94 meters. Boost-glide weapons would be more effective at attacking mobile missiles if armed with a particle dispersion warhead rather than an explosive warhead.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.nationalinterest.org/blo...guide-chinas-hypersonic-weapons-program-16029

The Buzz

The Ultimate Guide to China's Hypersonic Weapons Program
Missile_Ranges.jpg

http://www.nationalinterest.org/fil.../main_images/Missile_Ranges.jpg?itok=9otcShJZ

The development and testing of this new class of hypersonic weaponry in China has been extremely secretive--until now.

Erika Solem,Karen Montague
May 3, 2016
Comments 39

China¡¯s military is reorganizing itself to be a more modern, effective force. On January 1, 2016, the Second Artillery Force (µÚ¶þÅÚ±ø²¿¶Ó) (responsible for China¡¯s nuclear and conventional ballistic missile arsenals) was reorganized into the People¡¯s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF; »ð¼ý²¿¶Ó), elevating it to a service (¾üÖÖ) fully on-par with the Navy, Army and Air Force (Sina [5], January 1). As China streamlines its military and works to improve the quality of its personnel, several cutting edge projects are in the works to provide the People¡¯s Liberation Army with advanced weapons. One of these is the PRC¡¯s hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), called the DF-ZF in China and designated by U.S. defense officials as the Wu-14. The development and testing of this new class of hypersonic weaponry in China has been extremely secretive. However, its eventual operational deployment will represent a significant improvement in the PLARF¡¯s conventional and nuclear arsenals, as it has the potential to penetrate even the strongest layered anti-missile defenses of the United States and its allies.

Hypersonic Arms Race:

In addition to China, the United States and Russia are pursuing various iterations of HGVs and all three have developed prototypes of this high-tech weapon. The X-51A, Yu-71, and DF-ZF are the current HGV prototypes for the U.S., Russia and China, respectively. This new class of weapons has prompted each nation to adopt different approaches, with each model using a different engine, fuel type, and delivery method, but all HGV weapons¡¯ core characteristic is sustained and controlled Mach 5 (3,836 mph) flight.

The variation in each country¡¯s testing of their respective HGVs provides a glimpse into their motives for pursuing this costly technology. It is speculated that the United States hopes to improve the speed of its Prompt Global Strike capability (which would enable to hit a target anywhere in the world with a conventional warhead in less than an hour), while both Russia and the PRC want the ability to pierce U.S. missile defenses. The competition between the three countries is resulting in both a new arms race fueled by ambiguous goals and a lack of transparency on all sides.

U.S. Hypersonic Glide Vehicle Developments:

To understand China¡¯s progress toward an operational HGV, an examination of the U.S. military¡¯s hypersonic projects is important. The United States has been researching and developing hypersonic technology since the early 2000s under the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency¡¯s (DARPA) Force Application and Launch from Continental United States (FALCON) Project. Since then, the U.S. Air Force, DARPA, Boeing, and many others have collaborated on the X-51A Waverider HGV. The Waverider uses a B-52 bomber as a launch platform, is intended to be capable of Mach 5+ speeds, and is equipped with a scramjet engine that uses high speed to pressurize the air-to-fuel mixture, allowing more efficient combustion and greater speeds. The first Waverider test took place on May 26, 2010, and set a record with a 200-second burn, beating out the 12-second burn of NASA¡¯s X-43 in 2004 (Edwards Air Force Base News [6], May 26, 2010). In contrast, Chinese media reports that its military has the capability to launch its HGV from a variety of types of ballistic missile models. Among these are the DF-11B, DF-15B, DF-15C, DF-16, DF-21C, DF-21D, DF-26 (rumored), and the M-20/DF-12 (Sina Military [7], June 18, 2015). When comparing HGV technology, the U.S.¡¯s delivery method and intended range appear to be more ambitious. However, the U.S. program has had a much lower test launch success rate (25 percent), compared to China¡¯s 83 percent. Despite its recent advances with its HGV program, the United States has not conducted a Waverider test in the past two years, which makes the Chinese program appear more advanced.

China and its Goals for the DF-ZF

China has conducted six DF-ZF tests in the past year and a half. Although frequency does not determine test quality, it does demonstrate that China is dedicated to the successful development of this technology. Its 10th Research Institute (also known as the ¡°Near Space Flight Vehicle Research Institute¡±), which is under the China Aerospace Science Industry Corporation (CASIC) 1st Academy, is the sole entity responsible for the development of HGVs. This unique concentration of the entirety of the program into the 10th Research Institute seems to have facilitated a remarkably quick development of China¡¯s DF-ZF. Unlike the United States, China is assumed to be using a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) transporter erector launcher (TEL) as the delivery method for all of its HGV tests. This design launches the boost-glide vehicle into the atmosphere along a trajectory similar to a traditional ballistic missile. After the vehicle reenters the earth¡¯s atmosphere, it boosts itself back into the upper atmosphere. It then performs a pull up maneuver to control speed and altitude before gliding into its target (Next Big Future [8], August 1, 2015). The up-and-down trajectory of the HGV is believed to be able to confuse current ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems as the projectile¡¯s erratic course prevents the system from locking onto its target. Countries in East Asia with BMD available to intercept a Chinese HGV include Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, each with U.S.-supplied PATRIOT-3 (PAC-3) batteries, along with India, Pakistan and Russia, each of whom has its own indigenous BMD, as well as BMD purchased from other countries. The DF-ZF¡¯s unpredictable flight path and ability to be launched from a variety of missiles, each with different range capabilities, shows that China¡¯s goals for its HGV is to evade ballistic missile defense systems that threaten its ability to launch a successful offensive or defensive strike.

A major concern about China¡¯s HGV program is that the technology could be applied to both conventional and nuclear weapons. The wreckage of China¡¯s second (and failed) HGV test indicates that it was conducted using a liquid-fueled launch platform. This test contradicts the many reports that China is using the DF-21 solid-fueled rocket as a launch platform. However, it warrants special attention because it is the only one that has public images of its components (Arms Control Wonk [9], September 3, 2014). This is important because liquid-fueled launchers are associated with China¡¯s nuclear program. The use of a liquid-fueled launch platform such as the Long March-4C (speculated to be used in the second test) indicates that China may be developing the DF-ZF for both conventional and nuclear use. An alternative explanation for the use of liquid fuel could be to compensate for the weight of the glider during acceleration to hypersonic speed. However, this explanation likely complements¡ªrather than displaces¡ªthe theory behind intended nuclear use (Carnegie Endowment [10], November 21, 2014).

China¡¯s primary goal for the HGV is to have it travel fast enough while making use of the HGV¡¯s unique flight characteristics to evade BMD systems. China has expressed its frustration with deployed U.S. BMD in the Western Pacific for over a decade due to the perception that such a system would degrade China¡¯s limited nuclear deterrent (MOD [11], May 26, 2015; MOD [12], December 9, 2011). Further adding to China¡¯s unease, other regional powers such as Japan and South Korea have also invested heavily in ballistic missile defense, making any sort of larger-scale engagement in the region quite challenging for China¡¯s missile forces (CRS [13], April 3, 2015). Most of China¡¯s HGV tests have attempted to travel distances up to 1,750 kilometers (1,087 miles) and have been launched from Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center, located in Shanxi province (China Military Online [14], December 12, 2014). The intended distance of these tests is a strong indicator that China is either less advanced in its HGV development than the United States or is focused on addressing regional threats. If China successfully designs an operational short-range HGV, it will have a better chance of delivering successful missile strikes against its regional adversaries. Given China¡¯s strategic focus on regional security issues¡ªparticularly on developing the ability to defeat Taiwan militarily¡ªa shorter-range HGV addresses China¡¯s more immediate needs.

Since the Taiyuan launch center is used primarily for testing new missiles, once development of the DF-ZF is complete, it likely will be relocated to PLARF bases that house compatible launchers. Because China¡¯s DF-ZF appears to be regionally focused, there is a strong possibility that it would be placed under the jurisdiction of the 52nd Base command. The 52nd Base command covers a majority of the Eastern coast of China and it is likely that the DF-ZF will be placed directly in the 807th brigade headquarters, the 817th brigade headquarters, the 818th brigade headquarters, the 819th brigade headquarters, and/or any PLARF bases that house the HGV compatible DF-11A, DF-15B, and DF-21D. There are also specific locations under Base 53¡¯s command on the southeast coast of China, which could also be strategic for the use of a DF-ZF in a regional strike (AusAirpower.net [15], January 27, 2014). The DF-11A and DF-15B are able to reach Taiwan, while the DF-21 is able to reach Taiwan, the Philippines, southern Japan, South Korea and North Korea. (See Image 1) Furthermore, it is reported that a glide vehicle extends the weapon¡¯s range by 500¨C1,000 kilometers, but it is unclear if this distance is accounted for in the Chinese tests or choices of launch vehicles (Tencent News [16], November 27, 2015). If the additional distance was not accounted for in published distances, the HGV could have the ability to cover even the farthest parts of the South China Sea and potentially the Second Island Chain, which includes Guam.

Hypersonic Glide Vehicle Applications:

One major application of a hypersonic glide vehicle could be to deliver a ¡°decapitating strike,¡± which is an attack on an adversary¡¯s command-and-control centers. An example would be to strike the U.S.¡¯s military bases in Asia, hoping to render American forces vulnerable and incapable of an immediate retaliatory response. If conducted successfully, this approach causes an opponent to be unable to retaliate with its own weapons. Some aspects of Chinese strategy already emphasize these tactics, for example, network attacks to paralyze an opponent¡¯s communications at the outset of a conflict. The DF-ZF could provide ¡°hard¡± kill capability against hardened infrastructure or leadership facilities to complement cyber-attack ¡°soft kills¡± against infrastructure. As China¡¯s research into HGV technology progresses, a number of other strategic roles could be developed. Extended range, possibly through the use of scramjet engines (which take advantage of high speeds to compress air for combustion and greater propulsion), could give Chinese missile units the ability to destroy the assets of countries in range.

The DF-ZF does not currently use a scramjet engine like Boeing¡¯s X-51A. However, the PRC recently announced that it is now the second country to possess this technology. Since the announcement, there have not been reports of scramjet engines being tested in the DF-ZF (Sina Military [17], October 9, 2015). Since scramjet engines, when successful, have the potential to travel very long distances, they are optimal for obtaining rapid global strike capability with HGVs. The majority of U.S. tests using scramjets, for example, have attempted to travel around 3,800 km, supporting the idea that the U.S. is aiming for a very long-range strike with their weapons. China¡¯s own interest in scramjets was demonstrated in 2015 when the Chinese government gave the developer of its scramjet, Wang Zhengou, an award at the 2nd China Aeronautical Science and Technology Conference, which indicates that China highly values the development of this technology (Tencent News [18], October 8, 2015). Although up to this point China has been testing to obtain hypersonic speeds over short distances (a function that a scramjet engine is not optimal for), their recent attainment of scramjet technology will allow them to expand the goals of their HGV development.

Yet, with or without a scramjet engine, if the PRC expands its targets to include countries outside of the East Asian region, attaching a HGV to one of its SRBMs would extend the reach of this weapon to MRBM and ICBM ranges. When conducting a conventional prompt global strike, there is the potential for other nations to associate that ICBM with a nuclear strike, which could escalate the conflict (Congressional Research Service [19], February 24). Because SRBMs give off a different radar return than ICBMs, using one to reach the same striking distance would not seem as threatening and would ameliorate this perception problem. The PRC¡¯s use of a DF-21 as an HGV launch vehicle requires the use of specific locations and firing circles, many of which are well known and monitored by the United States. Since missile launch preparations are very rare, it might be possible to detect HGV-equipped DF-21s before launch.

Conclusion:

Based on an analysis of China¡¯s HGV development, the authors speculate that the PRC¡¯s main priority for the DF-ZF is to bypass regional BMD. Of all the launchers currently deployed by the PRC, based on the assumed intent and estimated range capabilities, the DF-21 seems to be the most likely launch platform for the HGV. Unlike the DF-31, which is a liquid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the DF-21 is a solid-fueled medium-range ballistic missile, which means quick preparation times compared to liquid-fueled. It also has a reported range of at least 1,500 km (932 miles), meaning it can reach all of the countries in the East Asian region. In 2001, it was reported that the solid fueled DF-21 takes anywhere between 10 to 15 minutes to prepare. Since technology has advanced immensely over the last 15 years, it is very possible that it now takes even less time to prepare. The newly released DF-26 is the next generation of the DF-21 and has a longer range. It is speculated that China will use the DF-26 as a launch platform for the DF-ZF in the future (IHS Jane¡¯s 360 [20], November 26, 2015). No matter the type of launch platform, an HGV can extend the reach of any missile by at least 1,000 km. If the DF-ZF truly does have the capability to bypass ballistic missile defense, it has the potential to deliver a devastating conventional or nuclear strike to any country. Even the threat of its use could be sufficient to make an adversary consider Chinese demands.

There are clear symbolic and military benefits for the nation that successfully develops a hypersonic weapon. The DF-ZF, though impressive, still has a long way to go before it can truly threaten the security of the United States and its allies. Therefore, China will continue frequent testing of the DF-ZF as a display of its military¡¯s power and advancement. Although in its current form the applications of the DF-ZF are constrained to East Asia, it is likely that China will continue to expand the range and capabilities of this weapon. Given the recent increase in investments in BMD by nations such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, the DF-ZF is a potentially destabilizing capability. If China is able to complete development of the system and operationalize it over the coming years, the DF-ZF system could further erode the U.S. military¡¯s deterrent in Asia. In the future, it will play an important role in calculating the relative balance of power in the region.

Erika Solem is a Ph. D. Fellow at the Potomac Foundation where she supports the research efforts on the "China¡¯s 21st Century Strategic Arsenal" project. She is a first year Ph. D. student at George Washington University with a focus on Chinese Space Policy and Defense. She has extensive experience both living and studying in China.

Karen Montague is a Research Fellow at the Potomac Foundation, where she assists in war gaming and simulation development efforts and supports the research efforts on the "China¡¯s 21st Century Strategic Arsenal" project. She earned her B.A. in International Studies from Texas A&M University in 2011 and M.S. in Defense and Strategic Studies from Missouri State University in 2013.

This piece first appeared in ChinaBrief [21], supported by the Jamestown Foundation.

Image: ChinaBrief.

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Links:
[1] http://www.nationalinterest.org/blo...guide-chinas-hypersonic-weapons-program-16029
[2] http://www.nationalinterest.org/profile/erika-solem
[3] http://www.nationalinterest.org/profile/karen-montague
[4] http://twitter.com/share
[5] http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sz/2016-01-01/doc-ifxncyar6156692.shtml
[6] http://www.edwards.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123206547
[7] http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2015-06-18/1233833444.html?cre=sinapc&mod=g&loc=22&r=h&rfunc=9
[8] http://nextbigfuture.com/2015/08/russia-yu-71-us-prompt-global-strike.html
[9] http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/207443/crashing-glider-hidden-hotspring/
[10] http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/11/21/new-high-speed-arms-race
[11] http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2015-05/26/content_4588132.htm
[12] http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2011-01/06/content_4249946.htm
[13] https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43116.pdf
[14] http://military.china.com/important/11132797/20141212/19096490_all.html
[15] http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-Second-Artillery-Corps.html#mozTocId156465
[16] http://news.qq.com/a/20151127/017330.htm?tu_biz=1.114.2.1
[17] http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2015-10-09/0941840617.html?cre=newspagepc&mod=f&loc=2&r=h&rfunc=-1
[18] http://news.qq.com/a/20151008/041042.htm?qqcom_pgv_from=aio
[19] https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf
[20] http://www.janes.com/article/56282/...e-hypersonic-manoeuvring-strike-vehicle-test/
[21] http://www.jamestown.org/programs/c...id]=25&cHash=ef3ec13b43963b154107e370fa20b1c5
[22] http://www.nationalinterest.org/tag/hypersonic-weapons
[23] http://www.nationalinterest.org/tag/df-zf
[24] http://www.nationalinterest.org/tag/military
[25] http://www.nationalinterest.org/tag/defense
[26] http://www.nationalinterest.org/tag/china
[27] http://www.nationalinterest.org/tag/technology
[28] http://www.nationalinterest.org/topic/security
[29] http://www.nationalinterest.org/region/aisa
 
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