DISASTER Fukushima apocalypse: Years of ‘duct tape fixes’ could result in ‘millions of deaths’

DoomBuggy

Veteran Member
http://rt.com/news/fukushima-apocalypse-fuel-removal-598/

Fukushima apocalypse: Years of ‘duct tape fixes’ could result in ‘millions of deaths’ (pics at link)

Published time: August 17, 2013 13:15

Even the tiniest mistake during an operation to extract over 1,300 fuel rods at the crippled Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan could lead to a series of cascading failures with an apocalyptic outcome, fallout researcher Christina Consolo told RT.

Fukushima operator TEPCO wants to extract 400 tons worth of spent fuel rods stored in a pool at the plant’s damaged Reactor No. 4. The removal would have to be done manually from the top store of the damaged building in the radiation-contaminated environment.

In the worst-case scenario, a mishandled rod may go critical, resulting in an above-ground meltdown releasing radioactive fallout with no way to stop it, said Consolo, who is the founder and host of Nuked Radio. But leaving the things as they are is not an option, because statistical risk of a similarly bad outcome increases every day, she said.

RT: How serious is the fuel rod situation compared to the danger of contaminated water build-up which we already know about?

Christina Consolo: Although fuel rod removal happens on a daily basis at the 430+ nuclear sites around the world, it is a very delicate procedure even under the best of circumstances. What makes fuel removal at Fukushima so dangerous and complex is that it will be attempted on a fuel pool whose integrity has been severely compromised. However, it must be attempted as Reactor 4 has the most significant problems structurally, and this pool is on the top floor of the building.

There are numerous other reasons that this will be a dangerous undertaking.

- The racks inside the pool that contain this fuel were damaged by the explosion in the early days of the accident.

- Zirconium cladding which encased the rods burned when water levels dropped, but to what extent the rods have been damaged is not known, and probably won't be until removal is attempted.

- Saltwater cooling has caused corrosion of the pool walls, and probably the fuel rods and racks.

- The building is sinking.

- The cranes that normally lift the fuel were destroyed.

- Computer-guided removal will not be possible; everything will have to be done manually.

- TEPCO cannot attempt this process without humans, which will manage this enormous task while being bombarded with radiation during the extraction and casking.

- The process of removing each rod will have to be repeated over 1,300 times without incident.

- Moving damaged nuclear fuel under such complex conditions could result in a criticality if the rods come into close proximity to one another, which would then set off a chain reaction that cannot be stopped.

What could potentially happen is the contents of the pool could burn and/or explode, and the entire structure sustain further damage or collapse. This chain reaction process could be self-sustaining and go on for a long time. This is the apocalyptic scenario in a nutshell.

The water build-up is an extraordinarily difficult problem in and of itself, and as anyone with a leaky basement knows, water always 'finds a way.’

'Trivial in light of other problems at Fukushima, water situation could culminate in the chain reaction scenario'
At Fukushima, they are dealing with massive amounts of groundwater that flow through the property, and the endless pouring that must be kept up 24/7/365 to keep things from getting worse. Recently there appears to be subsidence issues and liquefaction under the plant.

TEPCO has decided to pump the water out of these buildings. However, pumping water out of the buildings is only going to increase the flow rate and create more of these ground issues around the reactors. An enormous undertaking - but one that needs to be considered for long-term preservation of the integrity of the site - is channelling the water away, like a drain tile installed around the perimeter of a house with a leaky basement, but on an epic scale.

Without this effort, the soils will further deteriorate, structural shift will occur, and subsequently the contents of the pools will shift too.

The damage to TEPCO's No.1 Fukushima nuclear power plant's third reactor building in the town of Okuma, Fubata district in Fukushima prefecture (AFP Photo)The damage to TEPCO's No.1 Fukushima nuclear power plant's third reactor building in the town of Okuma, Fubata district in Fukushima prefecture (AFP Photo)


Any water that flows into those buildings also becomes highly radioactive, as it is likely coming into contact with melted fuel.

Without knowing the extent of the current liquefaction and its location, the location of the melted fuel, how long TEPCO has been pumping out water, or when the next earthquake will hit, it is impossible to predict how soon this could occur from the water problem/subsidence issue alone. But undoubtedly, pumping water out of the buildings is just encouraging the flow, and this water problem needs to be remedied and redirected as soon as possible.

RT: Given all the complications that could arise with extracting the fuel rods, which are the most serious, in your opinion?

CC: The most serious complication would be anything that leads to a nuclear chain reaction. And as outlined above, there are many different ways this could occur. In a fuel pool containing damaged rods and racks, it could potentially start up on its own at anytime. TEPCO has been incredibly lucky that this hasn't happened so far.

'One of the worst, but most important jobs anyone has ever had to do'
My second biggest concern would be the physical and mental fitness of the workers that will be in such close proximity to exposed fuel during this extraction process. They will be the ones guiding this operation, and will need to be in the highest state of alertness to have any chance at all of executing this plan manually and successfully. Many of their senses, most importantly eyesight, will be hindered by the apparatus that will need to be worn during their exposure, to prevent immediate death from lifting compromised fuel rods out of the pool and placing them in casks, or in the common spent fuel pool located a short distance away.

Think for a moment what that might be like through the eyes of one of these workers; it will be hot, uncomfortable, your senses shielded, and you would be filled with anxiety. You are standing on a building that is close to collapse. Even with the strongest protection possible, workers will have to be removed and replaced often. So you don't have the benefit of doing such a critical task and knowing and trusting your comrades, as they will frequently have to be replaced when their radiation dose limits are reached. If they exhibit physical or mental signs of radiation exposure, they will have be replaced more often.

The stricken Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) Fukushima daiichi No.1 nuclear power plant reactor number three (L) and four (R), with smoke rising from number three at Okuma town in Fukushima prefecture (AFP Photo)The stricken Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) Fukushima daiichi No.1 nuclear power plant reactor number three (L) and four (R), with smoke rising from number three at Okuma town in Fukushima prefecture (AFP Photo)

It will be one of the worst, but most important jobs anyone has ever had to do. And even if executed flawlessly, there are still many things that could go wrong.

RT: How do the potential consequences of failure to ensure safe extraction compare to other disasters of the sort – like Chernobyl, or the 2011 Fukushima meltdown?

CC: There really is no comparison. This will be an incredibly risky operation, in the presence of an enormous amount of nuclear material in close proximity. And as we have seen in the past, one seemingly innocuous failure at the site often translates into a series of cascading failures.

'The site has been propped up with duct tape and a kick-stand for over two years'
Many of their 'fixes' are only temporary, as there are so many issues to address, and cost always seems to be an enormous factor in what gets implemented and what doesn't.

As a comparison: Chernobyl was one reactor, in a rural area, a quarter of the size of one of the reactors at Fukushima. There was no 'spent fuel pool' to worry about. Chernobyl was treated in-situ...meaning everything was pretty much left where it was while the effort to contain it was made (and very expeditiously I might add) not only above ground, but below ground.

At Fukushima, we have six top-floor pools all loaded with fuel that eventually will have to be removed, the most important being Reactor 4, although Reactor 3 is in pretty bad shape too. Spent fuel pools were never intended for long-term storage, they were only to assist short-term movement of fuel. Using them as a long-term storage pool is a huge mistake that has become an 'acceptable' practice and repeated at every reactor site worldwide.

A destroyed building of TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi (No. 1) atomic power plant at Okuma town in Fukushima prefecture (AFP Photo)A destroyed building of TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi (No. 1) atomic power plant at Okuma town in Fukushima prefecture (AFP Photo)

We have three 100-ton melted fuel blobs underground, but where exactly they are located, no one knows. Whatever 'barriers' TEPCO has put in place so far have failed. Efforts to decontaminate radioactive water have failed. Robots have failed. Camera equipment and temperature gauges...failed. Decontamination of surrounding cities has failed.

'If and when the corium reaches the Tokyo aquifer, serious and expedient discussions will have to take place about evacuating 40 million people'
We have endless releases into the Pacific Ocean that will be ongoing for not only our lifetimes, but our children’s' lifetimes. We have 40 million people living in the Tokyo area nearby. We have continued releases from the underground corium that reminds us it is there occasionally with steam events and huge increases in radiation levels. Across the Pacific, we have at least two peer-reviewed scientific studies so far that have already provided evidence of increased mortality in North America, and thyroid problems in infants on the west coast states from our initial exposures.

We have increasing contamination of the food chain, through bioaccumulation and biomagnification. And a newly stated concern is the proximity of melted fuel in relation to the Tokyo aquifer that extends under the plant. If and when the corium reaches the Tokyo aquifer, serious and expedient discussions will have to take place about evacuating 40 million people from the greater metropolitan area. As impossible as this sounds, you cannot live in an area which does not have access to safe water.

The operation to begin removing fuel from such a severely damaged pool has never been attempted before. The rods are unwieldy and very heavy, each one weighing two-thirds of a ton. But it has to be done, unless there is some way to encase the entire building in concrete with the pool as it is. I don't know of anyone discussing that option, but it would seem much 'safer' than what they are about to attempt...but not without its own set of risks.

And all this collateral damage will continue for decades, if not centuries, even if things stay exactly the way they are now. But that is unlikely, as bad things happen like natural disasters and deterioration with time...earthquakes, subsidence, and corrosion, to name a few. Every day that goes by, the statistical risk increases for this apocalyptic scenario. No one can say or know how this will play out, except that millions of people will probably die even if things stay exactly as they are, and billions could die if things get any worse.

Workers spraying resin on the ground near the reactor buildings to protect the spread of radioactive substances at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant at Okuma town in Fukushima prefecture (AFP Photo)Workers spraying resin on the ground near the reactor buildings to protect the spread of radioactive substances at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant at Okuma town in Fukushima prefecture (AFP Photo)

RT: Are the fuel rods in danger of falling victim to other factors, while the extraction process is ongoing? After all, it’s expected to take years before all 1,300+ rods are pulled out.

CC: Unfortunately yes, the fuel rods are in danger every day they remain in the pool. The more variables you add to this equation, and the more time that passes, the more risk you are exposed to. Each reactor and spent fuel pool has its own set of problems, and critical failure with any of them could ultimately have the end result of an above-ground, self-sustaining nuclear reaction. It will not be known if extraction of all the fuel will even be possible, as some of it may be severely damaged, until the attempt is made to remove it.

RT: Finally, what is the worst case scenario? What level of contamination are we looking at and how dire would the consequences be for the long-term health of the region?

CC: Extremely dire. This is a terrible answer to have to give, but the worst case scenario could play out in death to billions of people. A true apocalypse. Since we have been discussing Reactor 4, I'll stick to that problem in particular, but also understand that a weather event, power outage, earthquake, tsunami, cooling system failure, or explosion and fire in any way, shape, or form, at any location on the Fukushima site, could cascade into an event of that magnitude as well.

'Once the integrity of the pool is compromised that will lead to more criticalities'
At any time, following any of these possible events, or even all by itself, nuclear fuel in reactor 4's pool could become critical, mostly because it will heat up the pool to a point where water will burn off and the zirconium cladding will catch fire when it is exposed to air. This already happened at least once in this pool that we are aware of. It almost happened again recently after a rodent took out an electrical line and cooling was stopped for days.

Once the integrity of the pool is compromised that will likely lead to more criticalities, which then can spread to other fuel. The heat from this reaction would weaken the structure further, which could then collapse and the contents of the pool end up in a pile of rubble on the ground. This would release an enormous amount of radioactivity, which Arnie Gundersen has referred to as a “Gamma Shine Event” without precedence, and Dr. Christopher Busby has deemed an “Open-air super reactor spectacular.”

This would preclude anyone from not only being at Reactor 4, but at Reactors 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, the associated pools for each, and the common spent fuel pool. Humans could no longer monitor and continue cooling operations at any of the reactors and pools, thus putting the entire site at risk for a massive radioactive release.

'At least the northern half of Japan would be uninhabitable, and some researchers have argued that it already is'
Mathematically, it is almost impossible to quantify in terms of resulting contamination, and a separate math problem would need to be performed for every nuclear element contained within the fuel, and whether or not that fuel exploded, burned, fissioned, melted, or was doused with water to try to cool it off and poured into the ocean afterward.

Workers using a German-made pump to pump water from the spent fuel pool in Unit 4 at Fukushima No.1 (Dai-Ichi) nuclear power plant in the town of Okuma in Fukushima prefecture (AFP Photo)Workers using a German-made pump to pump water from the spent fuel pool in Unit 4 at Fukushima No.1 (Dai-Ichi) nuclear power plant in the town of Okuma in Fukushima prefecture (AFP Photo)

Some researchers have even ventured to say that other nuke plants on the east coast of Honshu may need to be evacuated if levels get too high, which will lead to subsequent failures/fires and explosions at these plants as well. Just how profound the effect will be on down-winders in North America, or the entire northern hemisphere for that matter, will literally depend on where the wind blows and where the rain falls, the duration and extent of a nuclear fire or chain-reaction event, and whether or not that reaction becomes self-sustaining. At least the northern half of Japan would be uninhabitable, and some researchers have argued that it already is.

This is already happening to the nuclear fuel in the ground under the plant, but now it would be happening above ground as well. There is no example historically to draw from on a scale of this magnitude. Everything is theory. But anyone who says this can't happen is not being truthful, because nobody really knows how bad things could get.

The most disturbing part of all of this is that Fukushima has been this dangerous, and precarious, since the second week of March 2011. The ante will definitely be upped once the fuel removal starts.

'The mainstream media, world governments, nuclear agencies, health organizations, weather reporters, and the health care industry has completely ignored three ongoing triple meltdowns that have never been contained'
An obvious attempt to downplay this disaster and its consequences have been repeated over and over again from 'experts' in the nuclear industry that also have a vested interest in their industry remaining intact. And, there has been a lot of misleading information released by TEPCO, which an hour or two of reading by a diligent reporter would have uncovered, in particular the definition of 'cold shutdown.’

Over 300 mainstream news outlets worldwide ran the erroneous 'cold shutdown' story repeatedly, which couldn't be further from the truth…[it was] yet another lie that was spun by TEPCO to placate the public, and perpetuated endlessly by the media and nuclear lobby.

Unfortunately, TEPCO waited until a severe emergency arose to finally report how bad things really are with this latest groundwater issue...if we are even being told the truth. Historically, everything TEPCO says always turns out to be much worse than they initially admit.

'Unfortunately there is no one better qualified to deal with this than the Russians, despite their own shortcomings'
I think the best chance of success is…that experts around the world drop everything they are doing to work on this problem, and have Russia either lead the containment effort or consult with them closely. They have the most experience, they have decades of data. They took their accident seriously and made a Herculean effort to contain it.

Of course we also know the Chernobyl accident was wrought with deception and lies as well, and some of that continues to this day, especially in terms of the ongoing health effects of children in the region, and monstrous birth defects. Unfortunately there is no one better qualified to deal with this than the Russians, despite their own shortcomings. Gorbachev tried to make up for his part in the cover-up of Chernobyl by opening orphanages throughout the region to deal with the affected children.

Underwater silt fence with orange floats being set in the sea near the drain of TEPCO's Fukushima nuclear power plant at Okuma town in Fukushima prefecture (AFP Photo)Underwater silt fence with orange floats being set in the sea near the drain of TEPCO's Fukushima nuclear power plant at Okuma town in Fukushima prefecture (AFP Photo)


But as far as Fukushima goes, the only thing that matters now is if world leaders and experts join forces to help fix this situation. Regardless of what agendas they are trying to protect or hide, how much it will cost, the effect on Japan or the world’s economy, or what political chains this will yank.

The nuclear industry needs to come clean. If this leads to every reactor in the world being shut down, so be it. If the world governments truly care about their people and this planet, this is what needs to be done.

Renowned theoretical physicist Michio Kaku stated in an interview a few weeks after the initial accident that “TEPCO is literally hanging on by their fingernails.” They still are, and always have been. The Japanese have proven time and time again they are not capable of handling this disaster. Now we are entrusting them to execute the most dangerous fuel removal in history.

We are extremely lucky that this apocalyptic scenario hasn't happened yet, considering the state of Reactor 4. But for many, it is already too late. The initial explosions and spent fuel pool fires may have already sealed the fate of millions of people. Time will tell. Anyone who tells you otherwise is not being honest, because there is just no way to know.
 

rafter

Since 1999
I would think that it would be the utmost importance to put all the nuclear minds in the world together to try to get a handle on this thing. Instead everyone just sits on their hands.

I wonder what the worst case scenario is besides Japan becoming uninhabitable. How long before it starts to affect the US?
 

Night Owl

Veteran Member
I've said it before...why hasn't UN gotten involved...why hasn't Japan done. Something to seal the reactors or U.S. tell them they won't trade or stop Visas from Japanese coming to U.S. until this has been rectified. So frustration living in Pacific zone waters and we eat from the sea effected by Japan's radiation fiasco.
 

BornFree

Came This Far
"But it has to be done, unless there is some way to encase the entire building in concrete with the pool as it is. I don't know of anyone discussing that option, but it would seem much 'safer' than what they are about to attempt...but not without its own set of risks."

Has anyone stopped to think how lame that is in this case. We have situation where if you stop cooling things including the spent fuel rods then you have an explosion. And if two rods come in contact with each other then boom in a short period of time.

Concrete is simply not an option in this case- Period.
 

lisa

Veteran Member
I think the fact is that NOBODY knows what to do. If there was a solution it would have been offered and accepted.
 

JamestheFin

Senior Member
I wonder what the worst case scenario is besides Japan becoming uninhabitable. How long before it starts to affect the US?

Probably immediately. The big question is if large bits of Japan, most likely the main island, Honshu, largely become uninhabitable where are those 128 million Japanese going to go?

Sure, some of Japan might be inhabitable, but not for everyone. Definitely not enough to fit 128 million into those areas far enough away from Fukishima. Imagine 60-80 million Japanese fleeing Japan for the only place they think is far enough away from Fukushima eg. the West Coast of the United States and Canada. Think about that. Basically, a national evacuation of 20? 40? 60? 80 million Japanese to the US and Canada. Why just the US & Canada? I can't think of any other nation taking them.

Russia? Probably not, although that might shore up some of their sparse population in Siberia, especially vis-a-vis the Chinese.

China? No way. There's just too much national hatred between the Chinese and Japanese. Ditto for S. Korea. and elsewhere.

Australia & New Zealand? Probably Australia could take several million refugees in, definitely not New Zealand for obvious geographic reasons.

So that pretty much leaves Canada and the US as the only possible place for tens of millions of Japanese to go. Of course, it would mean that all of the West Coast cities from Vancouver to San Diego resemble the overcrowded dystopia(with a overpresent Japanese influence) portrayed in Blade Runner. West Coast cities could look like the following;
ku-xlarge.jpg


and;
congested-city-streets.png


If that scenario does play out, the other big questions are where are you going to house all of those tens of millions of people? How are you going to feed them? Where is the water going to come from? What about Sanitation and sewage systems? Likely overwhelmed.

On the positive side, tens of millions of hard working Japanese are going to be a asset for the US, at least far more than the black and latino welfare parasites. Then again, how the abomination of an immigration bill plays out also matters. Let's just say the Republicans actually do the right thing and kill this abomination, what happens when the Latino's see Americans welcome tens of million of Japanese refugees when they just saw Americans reject Latinos? A lot of potential for ethnic conflicts between Latino's and Asians.

What if the Republicans do pass the Immigration Bill and all of a sudden the US is overwhelmed with not just a projected 40-50 million Latinos but another 40-50 million Japanese in a short amount of time?

I'm sure there are other implications for this scenario but I think it's important to consider this potential scenario.
 

DefVoid

God Luck and good speed!
Its only a matter of time before all the water in the world will become contaminated at some level. Living on the west coast of Canada water is everywhere. We have so much, its ridiculous. But what good is all that water if its undrinkable. It keeps me up at night thnking about it. And whats up with that giant ball of crap heading my way. Its almost here. :shkr: I hate Fukishima. This disaster hasn't even started yet.This is gonna get bad. Real bad.
 

RCSAR

Veteran Member
"The big question is if large bits of Japan, most likely the main island, Honshu, largely become uninhabitable where are those 128 million Japanese going to go?"

They will die. Let them move to Africa or the mideast!
That mess is going to plague the u.s. for a long long time. Last I heard Hillary ask for imports from Japan to not be tested for radioactivity.

The fuel rod removal should have started ASAP like 2 years ago! They should also be picking up all radioactive pieces that is scattered all over a long time ago. As it is it keeps getting recontaminated everyday. If they try and remove the rods in the pool it may blow but if they leave them there they will melt and blow eventually.

I think we should have nuked the area to try and consume as much as possible just before the first monsoon hit to try and mitagate the fallout.

I am more worried about the bad releases from a reactoe gone bad than a the different releases from a nuke detonation. The lesser of two evils and better for us unless my radiological training is way off.

Who would complain? The japanese of course but I doubt the rest of asia would really care and just say "oh darn don't do that again, ok". All that place is now is a giant lab for the scientists to study how long it takes a bad reactor to wipe out a place and how long it takes the people to die.

We still have time to nuke it and consume as much of it as we can. No one will do the right thing.

As it is I quit eating pacific AND gulf of mexico fish years ago. I have many cans of tuna fron before the fukushima accident and I savor everyone of them as a special treat because I don't know where to get clean tuna anymore.


If there is a nuclear medicine Dr here I would love to hear thoughts on nuking vs cleanup.
 

Doc1

Has No Life - Lives on TB
"The big question is if large bits of Japan, most likely the main island, Honshu, largely become uninhabitable where are those 128 million Japanese going to go?"

They will die. Let them move to Africa or the mideast!
That mess is going to plague the u.s. for a long long time. Last I heard Hillary ask for imports from Japan to not be tested for radioactivity.

The fuel rod removal should have started ASAP like 2 years ago! They should also be picking up all radioactive pieces that is scattered all over a long time ago. As it is it keeps getting recontaminated everyday. If they try and remove the rods in the pool it may blow but if they leave them there they will melt and blow eventually.

I think we should have nuked the area to try and consume as much as possible just before the first monsoon hit to try and mitagate the fallout.

I am more worried about the bad releases from a reactoe gone bad than a the different releases from a nuke detonation. The lesser of two evils and better for us unless my radiological training is way off.

Who would complain? The japanese of course but I doubt the rest of asia would really care and just say "oh darn don't do that again, ok". All that place is now is a giant lab for the scientists to study how long it takes a bad reactor to wipe out a place and how long it takes the people to die.

We still have time to nuke it and consume as much of it as we can. No one will do the right thing.

As it is I quit eating pacific AND gulf of mexico fish years ago. I have many cans of tuna fron before the fukushima accident and I savor everyone of them as a special treat because I don't know where to get clean tuna anymore.


If there is a nuclear medicine Dr here I would love to hear thoughts on nuking vs cleanup.


Rcsar,

The problem with "nuking" the site is that the in-situ fuel will not be consumed. Virtually all of it will merely be vaporized and scattered, creating an even worse situation. Atomic detonations are more difficult to achieve than many people suspect. A typical atomic (or thermonuclear) exposion uses a surprisingly small percentage of the weapon's fuel in actual fission. Most of it is merely blown apart and scattered by the tremendously powerful forces unleashed. Weapons engineers have for decades attempted to improve the efficiency of their designs, but have not come anywhere close to 100%. Additionally, in the case of spent reactor fuel rods, there is a huge percentage of the total weight that is radioactive-but-not-fissile. This is more stuff that won't fission, but will merely represent additional (and now vaporized and spreading) radoactive contamination.

There are a lot of additional bad things that can still go wrong with Fukushima. Let's pray that explosions don't enter into the mix!

Best regards
Doc
 

BH

. . . .
I think the fact is that NOBODY knows what to do. If there was a solution it would have been offered and accepted.

Unfortunately, those in the know likely understand that this genie has been let out of the bottle and the bottle has been destroyed. There is no putting it back. Worst case, as the problem grows more reactors/fuel storage pools are abandoned or lost (50 reactors in Japan) - eventually it will be an ELE....

Here are some stats on just the Fuku Daiichi facility (according to The Mainichi Daily News from March 2011) -

Spent Fuel
• Reactor No. 1: 50 tons of nuclear fuel
• Reactor No. 2: 81 tons
• Reactor No. 3: 88 tons
• Reactor No. 4: 135 tons
• Reactor No. 5: 142 tons
• Reactor No. 6: 151 tons
• Also, a separate ground-level fuel pool contains 1,097 tons of fuel; and some 70 tons of nuclear materials are kept on the grounds in dry storage.

The reactor cores themselves contain less than 100 tons of fuel.

Those numbers add up to 1,914 tons of nuclear material at that one facility.

A wise old Indian once told me, if man builds it, it will break.
 

RCSAR

Veteran Member
Doc I'll have to assume you are correct.
My thinking was that the nonfissile material was consumed in the fireball it would become irradated enough to be changed into the daughter products of a nuclear detonation and not the products of a reactor which scare the hell out of me. Like I said I'm not the county nuclear health phyisist (pardon the spelling) we have to borrow one from a nearby county but I am the go to guy for the local county so I just don't have the college hours to pull that off.

In a simple way can you explain to me why it would not happen the way I'm thinking? I do not disagree with you I'm just wondering why the thermonuclear neutrons and gamma rays will not alter it?

heheh I think we have used enough key words now to pop up on every gov computer. Aslo my thinking is Tepco has screwed up so bad for so long by doing so little that the main island might just be a write off no matter what. I hate to think what our response would be since we build the damn things on fault lines as it is. Most of the year we are down wind of our local plant here in Texas and my advice to the county judge is going to be RUN AWAY! Like I said the daughter products of reactors scare me more than a small nuke going off 90 miles away which is about the distance to my local reactor. If you can't run shelter in place, either one is not really welcome for me to hear about.

BTW I'm not a tree hugging anti nuke power guy but I really think we need to shape our act up and we have been lucky.

Edit for a ps: Sorry to ask such a question that requires a long complex response. If you say "just because" I can leave it at that. I'll put the "nuke it from orbit just before monsoon" plan as a last option.
 
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Countrymouse

Country exile in the city
Probably immediately. The big question is if large bits of Japan, most likely the main island, Honshu, largely become uninhabitable where are those 128 million Japanese going to go?

Wouldn't China also be affected?

Maybe this whole scenario helps explain why a massive army of 200,000,000 "from the East" invades the MIDDLE EAST in the end times---hasn't it traditionally been true that when a kingdom's own area becomes too small to contain it, OR when they have something happen to them that makes their own homeland unable any longer to sustain them, that they go away from their own country to CONQUER other lands around them that seem to them more desirable?

Bible scholars have often said this army comes specifically just to attack Israel, but it could be it has nothing to do with Israel---just that China (and what is left of the survivors from the Asian nations around her--Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, etc.) is moving away from her OWN "contaminated" and uninhabitable homeland to "greener pastures" elsewhere?
 

Doc1

Has No Life - Lives on TB
Doc I'll have to assume you are correct.
My thinking was that the nonfissile material was consumed in the fireball it would become irradated enough to be changed into the daughter products of a nuclear detonation and not the products of a reactor which scare the hell out of me. Like I said I'm not the county nuclear health phyisist (pardon the spelling) we have to borrow one from a nearby county but I am the go to guy for the local county so I just don't have the college hours to pull that off.

In a simple way can you explain to me why it would not happen the way I'm thinking? I do not disagree with you I'm just wondering why the thermonuclear neutrons and gamma rays will not alter it?

heheh I think we have used enough key words now to pop up on every gov computer. Aslo my thinking is Tepco has screwed up so bad for so long by doing so little that the main island might just be a write off no matter what. I hate to think what our response would be since we build the damn things on fault lines as it is. Most of the year we are down wind of our local plant here in Texas and my advice to the county judge is going to be RUN AWAY! Like I said the daughter products of reactors scare me more than a small nuke going off 90 miles away which is about the distance to my local reactor. If you can't run shelter in place, either one is not really welcome for me to hear about.

BTW I'm not a tree hugging anti nuke power guy but I really think we need to shape our act up and we have been lucky.

Edit for a ps: Sorry to ask such a question that requires a long complex response. If you say "just because" I can leave it at that. I'll put the "nuke it from orbit just before monsoon" plan as a last option.

Rcsar,

Just because... and a lot of other reasons which include the following: "Fission products" and "daughter products" aren't exactly the same thing, though the terms are often used interchangably. Nuclear explosions produce a lot of interesting phenomenon, including transmutation through neutron activation. This means that, at the moment of detonation, the neutron flux actually changes elements into different elements or into different isotopes of elements. This is how both fission weapons and nuclear reactors produce their energy. So far so good, except - and there's always an except - in your context, this doesn't really work to the good.

The non-fissile material would not be, as you say "consumed." Some of it might be transmuted, but most of it would probably just be vaporized and dispersed more widely than it would be otherwise. Additionally, what was transmuted would likely be more radioactive than the original material. Not good, but it gets worse. Transmutation can turn countless non-radioactive elements into radioactive isotopes! Think of all that non-radioactive material at the Fukushima site. There's the earth the plants sits on, the concrete and steel materials in the reactor structures and lots of other material. This stuff is not radioactive. Oh, it may be contaminated with radioactive material, but the underlying material is not. Suddenly - according to your plan - it's subjected to a close range nuclear detonation (including the associated neutron flux). Then, through neutron activation and transmutation, you will turn much of that non-radioactive material into radioactive fallout! This now-radioactive stuff contaminates even greater amounts of previously safe stuff. That's in addition to dispersing the already radioactive stuff in the reactor complex. I think the technical term for this is BAD JUJU.

Also, understand that the fission products of nuclear weapons are generally very similar to those of reactors. The difference is not so much in type as in percentages. Weapons produce more of the shorter-lived isotopes while reactors produce more longer-lived poison. Neither are good, but your plan will produce copious quantites of both. This doesn't even address the fallout from the weapon itself. Some weapons are relatively "clean" and others are incredibly "dirty." All of them do produce highly radioactive fallout and some of the most powerful are also the dirtiest. A fusion weapon (hydrogen bomb) uses an atomic bomb as its trigger, which then fuses lighter elements. The most powerful types use a third, fission stage which is typically a jacket of depleted uranium. This, U238, is the same cheap material used in kinetic projectiles like tank-killer munitions. It is non-fissile, but under the heat and pressure (and neutrons) of a thermonuclear detonation it does fission! Its fission products are horribly radioactive and dangerous. Understand that the fissile materials in the Fukushima reactors are Uranium 235 and Plutonium 239, but they also contain massive quantities of non-fissile U238. Depending upon where your postulated hydrogen bomb is detonated, it may fission some of this U238, making matters altogether worse.

There's a great deal more to all of this, but I hope I've been able to outline some of the worst possible effects for you.

Best regards
Doc
 

Kronos

Veteran Member
Eye-Opening detail... Posted October of ***2011***

24 Hours at Fukushima

http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/24-hours-at-fukushima

A blow-by-blow account of the worst nuclear accident since Chernobyl.

[ Me/OP: 1st 48 or so hours. TRAGIC in the details ]

By Eliza Strickland
Posted 31 Oct 2011 | 14:37 GMT

~~~

This has those side-bars which make cut-n-paste a difficulty.

Please go to link

~~~

Great detail, and so sad... the Fukushima Disaster COULD have been averted.

It ALMOST WAS averted.

However, the Genie (Djinni) is OUT of the Bottle, and furthermore, the Bottle is Broken.

Refer: Pandora's Box - though dunno if HOPE remains...
 

night driver

ESFP adrift in INTJ sea
Wish y'all hadn't merged these 2. Kronos article deserved separate reading...





24 Hours at Fukushima

A blow-by-blow account of the worst nuclear accident since Chernobyl

By Eliza Strickland
Posted 31 Oct 2011 | 14:37 GMT
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radiation check and after explosion
Photos:
Christoph Bangert/ LaIF/Redux;
TEPCO
RADIATION AND RUIN: Evacuees were checked for radiation
in the days after explosions tore the roofs off three reactor buildings
. Click images to enlarge.

Special Report: Fukushima and the Future of Nuclear Power
Editor's Note: This is part of the IEEE Spectrum special report: Fukushima and the Future of Nuclear Power.


Sometimes it takes a disaster before we humans really figure out how to design something. In fact, sometimes it takes more than one.

Millions of people had to die on highways, for example, before governments forced auto companies to get serious about safety in the 1980s. But with nuclear power, learning by disaster has never really been an option. Or so it seemed, until officials found themselves grappling with the world's third major accident at a nuclear plant. On 11 March, a tidal wave set in motion a sequence of events that led to meltdowns in three reactors at the Fukushima Dai-ichi power station, 250 kilometers northeast of Tokyo.

Unlike the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 and Chernobyl in 1986, the chain of failures that led to disaster at Fukushima was caused by an extreme event. It was precisely the kind of occurrence that nuclear-plant designers strive to anticipate in their blueprints and emergency-response officials try to envision in their plans. The struggle to control the stricken plant, with its remarkable heroism, improvisational genius, and heartbreaking failure, will keep the experts busy for years to come. And in the end the calamity will undoubtedly improve nuclear plant design.

True, the antinuclear forces will find plenty in the Fukushima saga to bolster their arguments. The interlocked and cascading chain of mishaps seems to be a textbook validation of the "normal accidents" hypothesis developed by Charles Perrow after Three Mile Island. Perrow, a Yale University sociologist, identified the nuclear power plant as the canonical tightly coupled system, in which the occasional catastrophic failure is inevitable.

On the other hand, close study of the disaster's first 24 hours, before the cascade of failures carried reactor 1 beyond any hope of salvation, reveals clear inflection points where minor differences would have prevented events from spiraling out of control. Some of these are astonishingly simple: If the emergency generators had been installed on upper floors rather than in basements, for example, the disaster would have stopped before it began. And if workers had been able to vent gases in reactor 1 sooner, the rest of the plant's destruction might well have been averted.

The world's three major nuclear accidents had very different causes, but they have one important thing in common: In each case, the company or government agency in charge withheld critical information from the public. And in the absence of information, the panicked public began to associate all nuclear power with horror and radiation nightmares. The owner of the Fukushima plant, the Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO), has only made the situation worse by presenting the Japanese and global public with obfuscations instead of a clear-eyed accounting.

Citing a government investigation, TEPCO has steadfastly refused to make workers available for interviews and is barely answering questions about the accident. By piecing together as best we can the story of what happened during the first 24 hours, when reactor 1 was spiraling toward catastrophe, we hope to facilitate the process of learning-by-disaster.

graphic link photos of system failure Click on image for the full graphic view.
When the 9.0-magnitude earthquake struck off the east coast of Japan, at 2:46 p.m. on 11 March, the ground beneath the power plant shook and alarms blared. In quivering control rooms, ceiling panels fell open and dust floated down onto instrument panels like snow. Within 5 seconds, control rods thrust upward into the three operational reactors and stopped the fission reactions. It was a flawless automatic shutdown, but the radioactive by-products in the reactors' fuel rods continued to generate tremendous amounts of heat.

Without adequate cooling, those rods would become hot enough to melt through the steel pressure vessel, and then through the steel containment vessel. That would result in the dreaded core-meltdown scenario, which could lead to the release of clouds of radioactivity that would be carried by winds to sicken or kill masses of people.

But the heat wouldn't be a problem so long as Fukushima Dai-ichi had power to run the pumps that circulate water from the reactor cores through heat-removal systems. The mighty earthquake had toppled power transmission towers and jumbled equipment at nearby substations, but the interruption in power to the plant was negligible: Within 10 seconds, the plant's emergency power system kicked in. Twelve diesel generators, most of them installed in basement areas below the turbines, were now responsible for the integrity of the plant's reactors—and the well-being of its workers.

THIS REPORT is based on interviews with officials from the Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO), Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the International Atomic Energy Agency, local governments, and with other experts in nuclear engineering, as well as a review of hundreds of pages of official reports.
At the time of the earthquake, three of the power station's six reactors were operating; the other three were down for scheduled maintenance. In the control rooms governing the active reactors—units 1, 2, and 3—the staff checked the cooling systems that remove residual heat from the reactor cores by cycling water through heat exchangers filled with seawater. Everything seemed under control. Water also filled the spent-fuel pools on the top floors of all six reactor buildings to prevent the pools from overheating.

At 2:52 p.m., the shift supervisor overseeing the plant's oldest reactor, the 40-year-old unit 1, confirmed that a backup cooling system called an isolation condenser (IC) had started up automatically. This system didn't need electric power to cycle steam through a cold-water tank on a higher floor, or to let the resulting water drop back down to the pressure vessel. But operators soon noticed that the IC was cooling the core too quickly, which could stress the steel walls of the pressure vessel. So they shut the system down. It was a by-the-book decision, but the book wasn't written for the extraordinary events of 11 March.

Tsunami alerts flashed on TV screens, predicting a 3-meter-high tsunami for Fukushima prefecture. Although the coastal Fukushima Dai-ichi plant was 10 meters above sea level, nonessential personnel followed procedure and began evacuating the site.

At 3:27 p.m. the first tsunami wave surged into the man-made harbor protecting Fukushima Dai-ichi, rushing past a tidal gauge that measured a water height of 4 meters above normal. At 3:35 another set of much higher waves rolled in and obliterated the gauge. The water rushed over the seawalls and swept toward the plant. It smashed into the seawater pumps used in the heat-removal systems, then burst open the large doors on the turbine buildings and submerged power panels that controlled the operation of pumps, valves, and other equipment. Weeks later, TEPCO employees would measure the water stains on the buildings and estimate the monstrous tsunami's height at 14 meters.

In the basements of turbine and reactor buildings, 6 of the 12 diesel generators shuddered to a halt as the floodwaters inundated them. Five other generators cut out when their power distribution panels were drenched. Only one generator, on the first floor of a building near unit 6, kept going; unlike the others, all of its equipment was above the water line. Reactor 6 and its sister unit, reactor 5, would weather the crisis without serious damage, thanks in part to that generator.

The rest of Fukushima Dai-ichi now faced a cataclysmic scenario that nuclear power plant operators have long feared but never experienced: a complete station blackout.

graphic link to power and protection illustration Click on image for the full graphic view.
In the control room where operators managed reactor 1, the alarms went silent. The overhead lights blinked off, and the indicator lights on the instrument panels faded away. The floodwaters had even knocked out the control room's batteries, the power source of last resort. The operators would have to respond to the emergency without working instruments.

With the power out, the pumps were no longer channeling water from unit 1's pressure vessel through the cooling system's heat exchangers, and the ferociously hot fuel rods were boiling the water into steam. The water level in the nuclear core was dropping, but, lacking power for their instruments, the plant operators could only guess at how fast the water was boiling away.

LESSON 1
Emergency generators should be installed
at high elevations or in watertight chambers.

The isolation condenser, which relied on convection and gravity to perform its cooling function, should have helped keep the water level high in unit 1's core through the crisis. But operators had turned off the system just before the tsunami by closing its valves—and there was no electric power to reopen them and let steam and water flow. Workers struggled to manually open the valves on the IC system, but experts believe the IC provided no help after the tsunami struck.

As the operators surveyed the damage, they quickly realized that the diesel generators couldn't be salvaged and that external power wouldn't be restored anytime soon. In the plant's parking lots, workers raised car hoods, grabbed the batteries, and lugged them back to the control rooms. They found cables in storage rooms and studied diagrams. If they could connect the batteries to the instrument panels, they could at least determine the water levels in the pressure vessels.

LESSON 2
If a cooling system is intended
to operate without power, make sure all of its parts can be manipulated without power.
TEPCO did have a backup for the emergency generators: power supply trucks outfitted with high-voltage dynamos. That afternoon, emergency managers at TEPCO's Tokyo headquarters sent 11 power supply trucks racing toward Fukushima Dai-ichi, 250 km away. They promptly got stuck in traffic. The roads that hadn't been damaged by the earthquake or tsunami were clogged with residents fleeing the disaster sites.

At 4:36 p.m., TEPCO officially informed the Japanese government about the increasingly dire situation at reactor 1. The company declared that it "could not confirm" that any water was being injected into the reactor's core. The situation was better at the slightly more modern reactors 2 and 3, where emergency cooling systems were operating, driven by the steam from the reactors themselves. And the idled reactors 4, 5, and 6 didn't pose an immediate threat.

At 5:41, the sun set over the pools of seawater and the mounds of debris scattered around the power station. Work crews picked their way through the gloom by flashlight.

At around 9 p.m., operators finally plugged the car batteries they'd collected into the instrument panels and got a vital piece of information—the water level in reactor 1. The information seemed reassuring. The gauge registered a water level of 550 millimeters above the top of the fuel assembly, which, while far below normal safety standards, was enough to assure the operators that no fuel had melted yet.

But TEPCO's later analysis found that the gauges were wrong. Months later, calculations would show that the superheated water inside the reactor 1 pressure vessel had dropped all the way below the bottom of the uranium fuel rods shortly before operators checked the gauge, leaving the reactor core completely uncovered. Heat pulsed through the exposed rods. When temperatures passed 1300 °C, the fuel rods' protective zirconium cladding began to react with the steam inside the vessel, producing highly volatile hydrogen gas. And the uranium inside the fuel rods began to melt, slump, and sag.

aerial shot Photo: Gamma/Getty Images The Damage: In the days following the tsunami, explosions tore the roofs off reactors 1, 3, and 4, and an interior detonation is thought to have damaged reactor 2. Click to enlarge.
Throughout the night of 11 March, radiation levels rose around the plant. At 9:51 p.m. managers prohibited entry into the unit 1 reactor building.

It was a wise decision, because in the bowels of the reactor, the meltdown had already begun. In the reactors used at Fukushima, the control rods thrust up into the pressure vessel from below, and the housings around each control rod's entry point were essentially weak spots. When the melted fuel began to pool at the bottom of the pressure vessel, it likely melted through those vulnerable seams. TEPCO's later analysis found that the pressure vessel was damaged by 11 p.m., allowing highly radioactive water and gases to leak into the primary containment vessel.

LESSON 3
Keep power trucks on or very close to the power plant site.

The containment vessel, which surrounds the pressure vessel, is a crucial line of defense: It's a thick steel hull meant to hold in any tainted materials that have escaped from the inner vessel. At 11:50 p.m. operators in the control room finally connected car batteries to the pressure gauge for the primary containment vessel. But the gauge revealed that the containment vessel had already exceeded its maximum operating pressure, increasing the likelihood that it would leak, crack, or even explode.

As 11 March turned into 12 March, TEPCO headquarters told the sleepless operators that they must bring down the pressure by venting the containment vessel. A venting operation would jet the vessel's radioactive gases into the air; Fukushima Dai-ichi's nightmare would soon spread across the countryside.

That night, the desperate struggle to contain the peril at reactor 1 diverged into three responses. Besides the team making preparations to vent the containment vessel, there was also a group getting ready to receive the power supply trucks, which were still making their way to the plant. On arrival, they would supply electricity to restart the pumps and reestablish steady water circulation through the pressure vessel. The third team focused on another, short-term plan for cooling the core: fire trucks, which could inject water from emergency tanks into one of the reactor's cooling systems.

It was after midnight when the first power supply trucks began to arrive at the site, creeping along cracked roads. The trucks parked outside the unit 2 turbine building, adjacent to the troubled unit 1, where workers had found one undamaged power control panel. In the darkness, they began snaking a 200-meter-long power cable through the mud-caked building in order to connect it to the power control panel. Usually trucks are used to lay such a cable, which weighed more than a ton, but that night 40 workers did the job by hand. It took them 5 hours.

Work continued at the power control panel all morning and into the afternoon of 12 March. Finally, at 3:30 p.m., everything was ready. Current flowed from a power supply truck through the cable to the panel, which was ready to switch on the pumps for a backup cooling system inside the reactor 1 building. Workers prepared to start the flow of freshwater into the pressure vessel, knowing that they were about to take a crucial step toward stabilizing the plant.




Meanwhile, the fire engine team had been grappling with difficult logistics all through the early morning hours. Of the three fire engines on site, one had been wrecked by the tsunami; another was stuck near reactors 5 and 6, trapped by damaged roads. That left one fire engine to cool the overheating reactor 1. This truck was the best hope for getting water into the pressure vessel quickly, but it took hours to maneuver it through the plant's wreckage. Finally the workers smashed a lock on an electronic gate and drove the fire engine through.

LESSON 4
Install independent and secure battery systems to power crucial instruments during emergencies.
In their initial, improvised response, the fire crew pumped water into the truck's storage tanks, then drove close to the side of the reactor building and injected the water into the fire protection system's intake lines. It was 5:46 a.m. on 12 March when the first drops of water sprayed across the molten fuel. Then the workers drove back to the water tanks and began the slow, arduous operation all over again. Eventually workers managed to use the fire engine's hoses to connect the water tanks directly to the intake lines and established a steady flow of water. By midafternoon, they had injected 80 000 liters of water into the pressure vessel using this makeshift system. But it was too little, too late.

At 2:54 p.m., with freshwater supplies running short, TEPCO headquarters ordered the fire truck crews to inject seawater into the pressure vessel through the fire protection line. Under normal conditions, saltwater is never allowed in a reactor pressure vessel because it would corrode the vessel's protective steel walls and leave a mineral residue on the fuel rods. The decision was an admission that saving the reactor was no longer an option and that operators could only hope to prevent a wide-scale disaster. Fukushima Dai-ichi was now beyond the point of no return.

Workers stretched long fire hoses from a seaside pit that had been filled with seawater by the tsunami; three newly arrived fire engines lined up to pump the water through. They connected the hose to the fire protection system's intake line, and around 3:30 on 12 March they prepared to blast the reactor with seawater.

It had been 24 hours since the tsunami roared into the harbor, and the desperate efforts of both the power crew and the fire truck crew were about to pay off. It must have seemed that their exhaustion and terror were nearly at an end.

The order to vent the containment vessel had come at midnight. But without power to remotely operate the vent system's valves, it wouldn't be a simple task.

And whether the workers knew it or not, time was of the essence. While the venting team prepared for action during the early morning hours of 12 March, gases were building up inside the primary containment vessel and pushing on its weakest points, its gaskets and seals, and they were starting to give. Hydrogen gas hissed through the breaches and drifted up to the top of the building. Hour by hour, the gas collected there until it formed a layer of pure combustible menace.

LESSON 5
Ensure that catalytic hydrogen recombiners (power-free devices that turn dangerous hydrogen gas back into steam) are positioned at the tops of reactor buildings where gas would most likely collect.

The workers in charge of the venting operation took iodine tablets. It was a feeble attempt at protection against the radiation they'd soon encounter, but it was better than nothing. They gathered protective head-to-toe suits and face masks connected to air tanks. At 3:45 a.m., the vent crew tried to measure the radiation dose inside the reactor building, which had been off limits for 6 hours. Armed with handheld dosimeters, they opened the air lock, only to find a malevolent white cloud of some "gaseous substance" billowing toward them. Fearing a radiation steam bath, they slammed the door shut. They didn't get their reading, but they had a good indication that things had already gone seriously wrong inside the reactor.

If they could have looked inside the reactor pressure vessel at around 6:30 a.m. on the morning of 12 March, they would have seen a nuclear core transformed into molten sludge. The melted mixture of uranium, zirconium, and other metals had oozed to the bottom of the reactor pressure vessel, where it was gradually eating through the steel floor.

But as the morning ticked on, the vent crew were forced to sit and wait; they were standing by for word that residents had been evacuated and that it was safe to release the radioactive gases into the air. The government had issued an evacuation order for residents living within 3 km the night before; in the early morning hours officials announced that everyone within a 10 km radius of the plant should pack up and go. Residents who had lived their whole lives in the shadow of the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant boarded buses, expecting to be gone for a couple of days at most.

At 9:03 a.m. the message came: The last buses had departed. At 9:04 workers set out for the reactor building to open the valves that would allow gas to flow out of the primary containment vessel. They entered the reactor building and began a long, dark trek around the periphery of the primary containment vessel, guided only by flashlight beams. As they walked, their handheld dosimeters flashed troubling numbers. In normal conditions, a nuclear plant employee's radiation limit is 50 millisieverts per year; in an emergency situation it is 100 mSv. The workers had covered about half the distance to the valve when they realized they had to turn back—if they continued, they would exceed the 100 mSv dose. They returned to the control room at 9:30. They had failed.

Over the next hours the operators scrambled to find another way to open the valves; finally they decided to blast the valve open with air. They used a crane truck to haul a portable air compressor, the kind typically used at construction sites, to the crucial valve's location. At 2:00 p.m. the vent crew switched the compressor on, while workers in the control room nervously watched the gauge.

By 3:30 p.m. on 12 March, it seemed that the venting had worked and that the worst was over. The pressure had dropped significantly in unit 1's primary containment vessel, suggesting that the valve had opened and that gases had rushed through the pipes to the ventilation stack near the reactor building. The workers must have felt that the danger was ebbing. They had no idea that leaks from the vent lines had added even more hydrogen to the gas collected below the ceiling of unit 1's outer building—and it was now ready to blow.

At 3:36 p.m., a spark flashed in the darkness of the reactor building, and hydrogen gas ignited. With a roar, the top of the reactor building exploded.

The roof shattered and the walls splintered; fragments of the building flew through the air. Chunks of rubble cut into the cable leading from the power truck, and the flow of current stopped; now the pumps could not be turned on, and freshwater could not cascade into the core. Other pieces of debris sliced into the fire engine hoses leading from the seawater pit. Smoke billowed upward, radiation levels soared, and the workers fled Fukushima's first radioactive ruin. It wouldn't be the last: The battle to contain the catastrophe during the first 24 hours was lost, and the explosions would keep coming.

LESSON 6
Install power-free filters on vent lines to remove radio-active materials and allow for venting that won't harm nearby residents.

The failure of reactor 1 made efforts to stabilize the other reactors exponentially more difficult: Now workers would be laboring in a radioactive hot zone littered with debris. In addition, when work crews returned to the power truck sometime after the explosion, they couldn't get the power flowing. So the disaster continued. At reactors 2 and 3, emergency cooling systems functioned for several days. When reactor 3's overtaxed system failed on 13 March, workers struggled to connect alternate water supplies and to vent the primary containment vessel. But work was slow, and soon reactor 3 followed reactor 1's example. Leaking gas collected at the top of the building, and it exploded on the morning of 14 March.

That blast further impeded recovery efforts at reactor 2, and on the morning of 15 March some still-obscure explosive noise resonated inside the unit 2 reactor building. On that same day, an explosion tore the roof off reactor building 4 and a fire broke out inside. TEPCO reports say the problems in reactor 4 were probably due to hydrogen gas that leaked in from reactor 3; despite early reports to the contrary, the spent fuel rods stored in pools in reactors 4, 5, and 6 were covered with water throughout the accident and never posed a threat.

Each detonation made the effort to stabilize the plant more hopeless. It is clear that if workers had been able to gain control of reactor 1, the whole terrible sequence of events would have been different. But could the workers have done anything differently to speed up their response? Could the full scope of the catastrophe have been averted? So far, TEPCO management hasn't answered those questions.

We've learned a great deal about the Fukushima accident in the past seven months. But the nuclear industry's trial-and-error learning process is a dreadful thing: The rare catastrophes advance the science of nuclear power but also destroy lives and render entire towns uninhabitable. Three Mile Island left the public terrified of nuclear power; Chernobyl scattered fallout across vast swaths of Eastern Europe and is estimated to have caused thousands of cancer deaths. So far, the cost of Fukushima is a dozen dead towns ringing the broken power station, more than 80 000 refugees, and a traumatized Japan. We will learn even more as TEPCO releases more details of what went wrong in the first days of the accident. But as we go forward, we will also live with the knowledge that some future catastrophe will have yet more lessons to teach us.​
 
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RCSAR

Veteran Member
Thanks Doc for taking the time. I have been following this since days one of the flood. Even patyicipated in some english bases radio shows over there. I got disgusted after 6 months with the media there and even the "honest" reporters who had to abide by the daily laws released over what could be said.

That whole whole place is disfunctional in a passice functional sick way. Kinda creepy.
 

Garand

Veteran Member
The rods need to be sent off planet. Build 10 rockets and send this crap out into the universe.
 

Dennis Olson

Chief Curmudgeon
_______________
The issue is not in sending the waste off-planet. The issue is that rockets have a distinct tendency to explode on launch. And we know what would happen to that waste then, don't we...?
 

summerthyme

Administrator
_______________
Well, that and the problem that you can't even let the cores touch each other. Gonna need a LOT more rockets.

Summerthyme
 

Countrymouse

Country exile in the city
given the Pacific fish 'fry' (that is being desperately referred to by authorities as a "disease" -- just a DISEASE!----even though they admit they don't know WHAT "disease", I thought this thread should be kept on Main in the 'public eye' a bit longer...
 
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