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All the critics are wrong. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development party, Turkey has never been better. In fact, it continues
warontherocks.com
SYMPHONY OF DESTRUCTION: HOW THE AKP IS UNDERMINING TURKEY’S INSTITUTIONS
BURAK KADERCAN
NOVEMBER 22, 2021
COMMENTARY
All the critics are wrong. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development party, Turkey has never been better. In fact, it continues to improve! The economy is thriving, and is projected to become
one of the top 10 in the world by 2023, which is not only the centennial of the Republic of Turkey but also
an election year. Don’t listen to the doomsayers: Almost all households in Turkey (and their doormen) have a
car of their own. The economy is so good that people can’t find enough cars to buy. While Western countries from France to Germany, from the United States to the United Kingdom, are
struggling with shortages, Turkey passed the pandemic test with flying colors — in fact, it set
a model of success for the rest of the world. A “
world leader” himself, Erdoğan’s strong and ethical leadership has garnered admiration in the eyes of the oppressed, and drawn jealousy and fear from the oppressors. Things are not good — they are
great, all thanks to Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (popularly known by its Turkish acronym, AKP).
Tune into the (AKP-controlled) mainstream media in Turkey, and you will immediately be exposed to these narratives. “Narrative” is the operative word here. In reality, as almost all Turkey-watchers would agree, Erdoğan and the AKP are at a crossroads seemingly not of their own choosing, and most certainly not of their liking. The AKP can no longer deliver as it did in the past and is increasingly proving itself to be borderline incompetent across a range of activities, from providing basic public goods to handling the refugee crisis and managing a modern economy.
This is not the first time that the AKP has hit a rough patch. In the past, it could make it through troubled times with audacity, determination, and intimidation. But this formula isn’t working today, not least because it is unclear if Erdoğan knows where he wants to go. For example, he may wait until 2023 for general elections, when they are currently scheduled. Alternatively, he may press the button for
early elections tomorrow. No one really knows, which is nothing new. What is new is that the AKP is acting as if it doesn’t know either.
How did we get here? Where do we go from here? The answer to the first question entails a paradox. In order to rise to the top and make sure it stayed there,
the AKP “hollowed out” Turkey’s institutions, from the bureaucracy and the judiciary to the central bank and the national media. The AKP has succeeded in cementing its hegemonic status in Turkish politics, but at the cost of undermining the very same institutions through which it is supposed to govern. The result is an institutional decay that is gradually but surely transforming the Turkish political landscape.
The second question is much harder to answer. In order to reverse — or at least slow down — its decline, the AKP is increasingly focusing on creating an alternative reality of some sort for its core constituents. It is thereby, and rather ironically, institutionalizing the existing polarization and societal tensions in the country. The result is a “clash of realities” that is bound to tear apart the very fabric of Turkish society. Whether Turkey can pull out of this spiral is an open question. If it cannot, darker days are ahead.
This Time It’s Different
“New directions in Turkish politics” is a catchphrase probably as old as the first English-language commentary ever published on modern Turkey. What is special
now? The AKP has long relied on three key mechanisms to sustain its position as a “
unipole” in Turkish politics, and these mechanisms no longer seem to be working. This dysfunction emboldens the opposition while weakening the AKP.
The first part of the AKP’s strategy is the provision of public goods, enough to keep most of the public
content, if not ecstatic. Most notably, the AKP
went to great lengths to provide social welfare benefits to middle- and low-income families, while also revitalizing the healthcare system. This dynamic, usually lost in conventional debates over “culture wars,” “identity politics,” and “secularists versus Islamists,” has long played an important role in allowing the AKP to cement its relationship with its core constituents.
However, due to a declining economy and poor governance (which are closely related), the AKP has become incapable of providing these benefits. More importantly, its failings in governance have now become too visible to either ignore or deny. First and foremost, Turkey is bedeviled by
economic problems, with no apparent recovery on the horizon. The Turkish lira has
lost almost half of its value in the span of three years. While the
economy is still growing,
rising prices are affecting middle- and low-income households significantly. “Escaping” (migrating) to Europe has become a
dream for countless youth, who see no real future for themselves in Turkey.
The COVID-19 pandemic also hit the country hard, and the AKP failed to provide the kinds of subsidies and funds that many Western governments provided to their citizens for relief. Furthermore, the AKP even faltered in an area where it was supposed to be strongest: healthcare.
Turkey’s healthcare system is one of its core strengths, and probably one of the ruling party’s biggest accomplishments. When it came to vaccinations for COVID-19, however, the government put all its
eggs in one basket: China’s Sinovac vaccine. The promised vaccine did not show up in sufficient numbers, leading to a crisis. Facing criticism, the minister of health declared in May that 100 million Sinovac vaccines were on their way. However, the government then abruptly
turned to BioNTech in June and rapidly vaccinated a substantial proportion of the population. Still, the botched Sinovac episode cost Turkey some critical months, and what happened remains a mystery.
This summer’s wildfires in the forests along the Aegean coast offer yet another example of failure. The public learned that Turkey lacked sufficient working firefighting aircraft. It turned out that the government had chosen to allow its existing aircraft to rot in their hangars while outsourcing the relevant services to private purveyors, whose assistance was neither satisfactory nor timely. This obvious failure created
a public outcry. The AKP responded as it always does, announcing that its management of the disaster was nothing but superb, and that those who criticized the government were in fact harboring malign and shady intentions.
Perhaps the single biggest problem facing the AKP in terms of domestic support is the
refugee crisis. Estimates differ, but most concur that Turkey now hosts somewhere between four and seven million refugees, primarily from Syria. This influx has created many societal tensions in the country. The government’s refugee policy also lacks institutional transparency and attracts considerable criticism from the party’s own base, making it one area where, arguably, the AKP’s infallibility narrative has very limited mileage — even for the party’s staunchest proponents.
The second leg of the AKP’s strategy of domination involves Erdoğan himself. His antics may appear repulsive to his domestic and foreign critics, but that is largely irrelevant. Like it or not, Erdoğan holds a special appeal for his followers. This special “bond” has allowed Erdoğan to signal strength, willpower, and determination in times of crises. A master orator, his discourses and behavior have spoken directly to the hearts and minds of his core supporters.
However, especially in the last couple of years, he looks less like the Erdoğan of the past.
Some have argued that his health and mental capacity are rapidly declining. Such rumors have long been in circulation and cannot yet be verified — but still, something about him is off. Recently, he has taken some measures that appear rather odd, particularly if his intent is to launch a charm offensive. For example, the president has developed a habit of
throwing bags of Turkish tea on unsuspecting crowds at random occasions. The criticism peaked when he was seen doing so
from his bus during his summer visit to the fire-hit Aegean region. It isn’t clear why he distributes tea in this way, and obviously no-one on his team has had the courage to tell him that even some of his core supporters are not very enthusiastic about the practice.
Furthermore, Erdoğan has also engaged in certain public stunts that do not necessarily speak to his strengths (to say the least). For instance, he recently went on live television,
singing with a choir of youngsters. On paper, such actions might show that he is still in touch with the country’s youth. In practice, however, a televised concert showing Erdoğan singing lethargically in front of a less-than-enthusiastic crowd only signals how far he and his team have strayed from their core constituents.
The third part of the AKP’s strategy involves efforts to keep the opposition divided. The logic is straightforward: The AKP can still claim the single largest voter bloc. As long as the opposition does not unite, the AKP can preserve its status as a unipole. However, the old tricks do not work as well anymore, especially after recent public policy failures and with Erdoğan’s image as a declining leader. Most notably, in the municipal elections of 2019 the AKP lost its
quarter-century-long hold on Turkey’s two major cities, Istanbul and Ankara. In a parallel universe where the AKP could actually engage in self-critique, these electoral losses might have served as a wake-up call. Instead, the AKP responded by challenging the Istanbul elections, claiming that the opposition had somehow cheated. The elections were repeated, and the AKP suffered a crushing and humiliating defeat at the hands of Ekrem Imamoglu, now the mayor of Istanbul.
Continued.....