OP-ED Do Japan and South Korea Need Nuclear Weapons? - Cyber Brief

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Do Japan and South Korea Need Nuclear Weapons?

OCTOBER 6, 2017 | FRITZ LODGE

The North Korean regime of Kim Jong-un conducted its sixth underground nuclear test early this September – which Pyongyang claims as its first test of a hydrogen bomb – and in late August and again, two weeks later, the hermit kingdom launched a ballistic missile directly over the territory of Hokkaido in northern Japan. Now, the U.S. and its key allies in the region – primarily South Korea and Japan – look ahead to the anniversary of the founding of North Korea’s communist party on October 10, which may yield yet another nuclear provocation from the rogue state.

For both Tokyo and Seoul, the nuclear threat posed by North Korea is undeniable, yet neither Japan nor South Korea – rich and technologically capable developed countries – possesses their own nuclear deterrent against Pyongyang or the long term threat posed by rising Chinese military power in the region. The reasons for this are varied, but at the end of the day, one stands out: The U.S. nuclear umbrella. For both countries, the reassurance of the United States that it will retaliate in kind to a nuclear attack on either ally is the lynchpin holding them back. However, as Pyongyang closes in on developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of delivering a nuclear weapon to the U.S. mainland, some wonder whether Washington would really be willing to trade Los Angeles for Seoul in a shooting war.

If North Korea does develop a functional nuclear ICBM, could South Korea and Tokyo consider developing their own nuclear deterrent, and what ramifications could that have on regional stability?

Beyond the security of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, there are significant political and historical factors preventing America’s two primary east Asian allies from developing their own deterrent, particularly in Japan. The nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II showed the Japanese people in livid detail the horrors of nuclear war. As a result, says Kuni Miyake, President of the Foreign Policy Institute in Tokyo, voters have developed a “nuclear allergy based on the experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” This “allergy” played a major role in the creation of a powerful peace movement in Japan and contributed strongly to the strength of the Anpo Toso – protests against the mutual security treaty with the U.S. in 1960, which became the largest mass movement in modern Japanese history and upended the ruling government. In Miyake’s mind, this anti-nuclear sentiment, combined with the budgetary cost of developing and maintaining nuclear weapons, means that “Japan is not likely to go nuclear as long as the U.S. extended deterrence is guaranteed.”

However, says Thomas Cynkin, a former U.S. diplomat in Japan, this is only part of the story. While the development of a Japanese nuclear capability is certainly deeply unpopular, “Japanese leaders have also preserved Japan’s nuclear option both by carefully and consistently articulating their policy in this regard, and by nurturing Japan’s actual capacity to produce and deploy nuclear weapons.” The Anpo Toso protests in 1960 largely nixed the plans of then Prime Minister Nobosuke Kishi – current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s grandfather – to rearm Japan after the war and possibly develop an independent nuclear capability. However, Japanese policymakers have never fully left nuclear weapons off the table. Instead, they have cultivated a nuclear “latency option,” while pursuing a strictly non-nuclear official policy. Boasting an advanced civilian nuclear industry, Cynkin says the country is estimated to have “9 tons of plutonium, enough for over 1,000 warheads,” as well as an advanced space industry, which provides easy access to ballistic missile technology. The end result is a non-nuclear Japan with the capability to rapidly become nuclear if the U.S. guarantee is undermined.

These dynamics are quite different in South Korea. There, the concept of developing a domestic nuclear capability is far more openly discussed, especially as North Korea’s nuclear program accelerates. According to a Gallup Korea poll, 60 percent of South Koreans support developing their own nuclear capability, while 68 percent want to see U.S. nuclear weapons, which were removed from the peninsula by President George H.W. Bush in 1991, redeployed there. In fact, says Admiral James ‘Sandy’ Winnefeld, Cipher Brief Expert and former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as recently as August 2004, “Seoul owned up to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to having done some nuclear weapons research.” In addition, experts believe South Korea could develop its own nuclear arsenal in as little as 18 months.

There are several key factors holding Seoul back, however. First, if South Korea develops its own nuclear arsenal it would have to leave the NPT, this would put it in league with North Korea, which withdrew in 1993. In addition to this diplomatic dent to South Korea’s reputation, an independent nuclear deterrent could prompt other regional powers – including Japan – to develop their own capabilities. More importantly, it would almost certainly provoke an aggressive reaction from Pyongyang and China, and it would alienate the United States, which insists that the security of South Korea is guaranteed under the nuclear umbrella and has strongly pressured South Korea to remain non-nuclear throughout its history.

For these reasons, it is unlikely that the South Korean government, and especially its relatively pacifist President Moon Jae-In, would pursue their own capability in the near future. Instead, says Winnefeld, hints “from a nation like South Korea that they are considering developing their own weapon would…likely stimulate further reassurances that they do not need to because we have their back…it is possible that such hints are merely designed to gain such reassurance.”

This strategy is very close to what Cynkin describes as Japan’s “policy of preserving a latent nuclear option” as a means to keep the United States nuclear guarantee rock solid. After a period of uncertainty in the early days the Trump Administration about the U.S commitment to its east Asian alliance system – during the presidential campaign Trump said that U.S. allies should pay more for their security and suggested that Japan develop its own nuclear weapons – American security assurances now seem to be on better footing. In June, for instance, Trump promised to protect South Korea with “the full range of United States military capabilities, both conventional and nuclear.”

This is a positive sign. The possibility of either Seoul or Tokyo developing their own nuclear arsenals would both deeply strain their alliances with the United States and dangerously provoke North Korea and China. However, a North Korea ICBM capable of reaching the United States will almost certainly bring this issue back to prominence. If that capability is real, it means that a decision to retaliate against North Korea for an attack on South Korea, Japan, or any other U.S. ally would risk the destruction of an American city. When that happens, the Trump Administration will need to make sure that its nuclear guarantee is reliable if it wants to prevent its east Asian allies from considering their own nuclear options.

Fritz Lodge is an analyst at The Cipher Brief. Follow him on Twitter @FritzLodge.


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EXPERT COMMENTARY

Seoul Searches for Options as North Korean Missiles Fly
ADMIRAL JAMES 'SANDY' WINNEFELD
FORMER VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Tokyo Weighs Risks and Rewards of Atoms for War
THOMAS CYNKIN
VICE PRESIDENT, DANIEL MORGAN GRADUATE SCHOOL
 

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EXPERT COMMENTARY

Seoul Searches for Options as North Korean Missiles Fly

OCTOBER 6, 2017 | ADMIRAL SANDY WINNEFELD

On October 10, as North Korea celebrates the creation of the ruling Worker’s Party, the United States and regional allies will brace themselves for the possibility of yet another provocative missile test. With multiple missile launches this year, and even the test of a hydrogen nuclear bomb, Pyongyang is pushing the limits of its nuclear aggression, sparking heated rhetoric between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. However, despite assurances from the United States that its allies are protected under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, the impending possibility of a North Korean ICBM capable of carrying a nuclear weapon into the U.S. homeland has many in South Korea wondering whether Washington would really be willing to trade one of its own cities for its allies in the Asia Pacific, and whether this might be the time for South Korea to develop its own nuclear deterrent. As the North Korean crisis heats up, the Cipher Brief’s Fritz Lodge spoke with Admiral James ‘Sandy’ Winnefeld, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Cipher Brief Network Expert, about whether South Korean hints at developing an independent nuclear deterrence might be designed to gain further reassurance from the U.S.

The Cipher Brief: What has kept South Korea from developing its own nuclear deterrent, particularly in light of the rising threat posed by North Korea?

Sandy Winnefeld: The Republic of Korea (ROK) has flirted from time to time with developing its own nuclear weapons program. It is well known that they actively considered it during the 1970s, but under pressure from the international community, they eventually ratified the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1975. However, that doesn’t mean they aren’t still interested.

In August 2004, Seoul owned up to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to having done some nuclear weapons research but were not sanctioned. Since then, public and political support within the ROK for such a program has ebbed and flowed, largely with the fortunes of the North Korean program and Pyongyang’s episodic provocations.

Several factors serve to inhibit the ROK from moving forward with a program. First, pulling out of the NPT would be a major affront to the international community, for which South Korea would pay diplomatically and economically. It could cause some restrictions in support for their fairly robust civilian nuclear power program.

Second, it could lead to a regional arms race, with Japan feeling the need to develop its own program, which South Korea certainly does not desire.

Third, such a move in defiance of long-standing U.S. policy could impact U.S. willingness to continue to station troops on the Peninsula.

Fourth, it would provoke a strong negative reaction from South Korea’s largest trading partner: China.

Finally, it would almost certainly provoke North Korea, which might feel the need to make a preemptive move of some kind.

For all of these reasons, and perhaps others, South Korean President Moon Jae-in has publicly rejected the idea of his nation developing its own program.

TCB: How long would it likely take Seoul to develop its own capability?

Winnefeld: South Korea has a robust nuclear power industry and likely possesses the requisite expertise to commence a nuclear weapons program. Estimates range from around 18 months to three years for weapons development. However, there are a lot of variables that go into the timeline. Will they do it clandestinely? How will they test the weapon? What kind of delivery mechanism do they intend to use? Will anyone interfere by restricting access to the types of technologies required to make such a weapon actually work?

TCB: What do you make of the argument that the U.S. commitment to the nuclear umbrella might be compromised if North Korea gains the ability to strike the American mainland?

Winnefeld: Any country needs to look after its own interests, and as the global landscape changes, it certainly makes sense for allies to soberly assess the willingness of the United States to stick to its extended deterrence commitment. Clearly, flip statements from influential political leaders or commentators, or shifting winds in U.S. public opinion that question our commitment can undermine allied confidence in our resolve. That said, we have routinely reassured our allies, including in Europe and Asia, of our full intent to live up to our stated obligations, which has the virtue of being true. Moreover, any hint from a nation like South Korea that they are considering developing their own weapon would, in addition to negative reactions from the U.S. and other nations to such a signal, likely stimulate further reassurances that they do not need to because we have their back. So it is possible that such hints are merely designed to gain such reassurance.

TCB: How would a South Korean nuclear capability change the security dynamic in the region?

Winnefeld: It goes without saying that acquisition of a nuclear capability on the part of the South Koreans would be received with alarm by every player in the region, both friendly and hostile. The two greatest risks are that it would spark a regional arms race, or worse, provoke a destabilizing reaction from North Korea. It would also be a body blow to the U.S.-ROK relationship.

TCB: Do you think the Trump Administration has done an effective job of assuring Seoul, and how could they improve this effort?

Winnefeld: The president did make negative statements during the campaign regarding a lack of allied investment in their own defense and also alluded to the potential for regional nations to develop their own weapons. I do not believe those statements were either well-informed at the time or were taken seriously in the region. President Trump’s more recent, very strong statements regarding the consequences to North Korea of any use of nuclear weapons stand on their own. I do not know what signals may have been delivered privately by senior government leaders such as Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford. However, I find it likely they have reassured both South Korea and Japan that we remain serious about extended deterrence.

THE AUTHOR IS ADMIRAL JAMES 'SANDY' WINNEFELD

Admiral Winnefeld graduated from the Georgia Institute of Technology and served for 37 years in the United States Navy. He retired in 2015 after serving four years as the ninth Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the United States' number two ranking military officer. As a flag officer, he commanded the Theodoore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group, NATO Joint Command Lisbon, Striking and Support Forces NATO, the United States Sixth Fleet, United States Northern Command, and the North... Read More

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EXPERT COMMENTARY

Tokyo Weighs Risks and Rewards of Atoms for War

OCTOBER 6, 2017 | THOMAS CYNKIN

Japan has the means, motive, and opportunity to produce nuclear weapons. However, as a matter of long-standing policy, Tokyo has kept its options open, as long as it can rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The perception is widespread that, due to its history as the only country upon which a nuclear weapon has been used, Japan has an innate nuclear allergy that precludes it from going down the path of nuclear proliferation.

This is partially true, but Japanese leaders have also preserved Japan’s nuclear option both by carefully and consistently articulating Japan’s policy in this regard, and by nurturing Japan’s actual capacity to produce and deploy nuclear weapons. In addition to its intrinsic merit, this nuclear latency approach serves to convince the U.S. that it must continually reassure Japan of the credibility of its nuclear umbrella to prevent Japan going nuclear.

Given the dense concentration of the Japanese people in relatively few urban centers, Japan is particularly vulnerable to nuclear and other military strikes. Japan’s alliance with the U.S. – its sole military ally – is crucial to the country’s ability to deter such attacks. Should North Korea, for example, strike Japan, U.S. forces would be capable of rapidly delivering a devastating response. However, the deployment of North Korean nuclear ICBMs capable of striking American cities may ultimately corrode the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent. Accordingly, as North Korea accelerates its nuclear and missile programs, Japanese leaders may begin to question the continued reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, intensifying debate in Tokyo about the nuclear option.

The Origins of Japan’s Nuclear Option

History belies the superficial impression that Japan is somehow inherently anti-nuclear. In fact, Japan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons began in earnest during World War II, when Japan had not one, but two nuclear weapons development programs: The Imperial Japanese Navy’s Project F-Go at the Imperial University, Kyoto, and the Imperial Japanese Army’s Project Ni-Go, at the Institute for Physical and Chemical Research (RIKEN), Tokyo. These projects were only scuttled by U.S. occupation forces after the war.

Following the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a major segment of the Japanese public understandably developed a deep dread of nuclear weapons. However, as the memory of World War II fades with each passing year beyond the nuclear attacks on Japan, the degree and intensity of Japanese public sensitivities toward nuclear weapons may gradually fade as well. Beneath the public anti-nuclear patina, meanwhile, Japanese policymakers have consistently kept Japan’s nuclear options open.

In 1957, scarcely a decade after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi – grandfather of current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe – said Japanese possession of nuclear weapons was allowed under Japan’s so-called “peace constitution,” provided that they were the minimum necessary for self-defense. “Contrary to the impression conveyed by the overwhelming popular sentiment in Japan against any association with nuclear weapons,” reported a declassified August 1957 State Department document, “there is mounting evidence that the conservative government in Tokyo secretly contemplates the eventual manufacture of such weapons, unless international agreements intervene.”

Following China’s first nuclear test in 1964, Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato (Kishi’s younger brother) told President Lyndon Johnson that if China had nuclear weapons, Japan needed them as well. Sato’s Japan Defense Agency Director (and future Prime Minister) Yasuhiro Nakasone commissioned a white paper concluding that the possession of small-yield nuclear weapons for defensive purposes would not violate Japan’s constitution.

The Johnson Administration, concerned about a possible Japanese nuclear break-out, pressured Japan to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Responding in 1967 to internal and external political pressures, Sato announced Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles: Japan would not manufacture, possess, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons in Japan. However, the Japanese Government continued to adhere to an early 1960s arrangement with the U.S. allowing U.S. warships with nuclear weapons to make calls in Japanese ports. Sato also made clear, soon after, that the Three Non-Nuclear Principles would pertain only if Japan could rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Japan finally did sign the NPT in 1970, but only ratified it six years later, in 1976 – and then, only after the U.S. reassured Tokyo that it would not interfere with Japan’s pursuit of independent nuclear reprocessing capabilities, the nuclear hedge.

Kishi’s basic policy line has been reaffirmed in numerous Japanese Government studies and fora ever since – including in 2006 by Prime Minister Abe – generally with the caveat that Japan need not pursue the nuclear option while it can rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Given the Japanese Government’s willingness to consider the nuclear option so soon after the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it should come as no surprise that, over 70 years later, Japan’s policy debate about nuclear weapons has grown more robust. North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006 seems to have accelerated this trend.

Japan’s public advocacy of nuclear disarmament continues to contrast with its support of the U.S. extended deterrent and preservation of Japan’s nuclear option. Recently, UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu chaired the ceremony opening the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons for signature, even as the Japanese Government declared that it would never sign such a treaty.

A Turn of the Screw

Given its policy of preserving a latent nuclear option, it follows that Japan is the only non-nuclear weapons state with complete nuclear fuel-cycle technologies – with enrichment as well as reprocessing. As early as 1956, Japan had established the goal of developing a completely independent closed fuel cycle through the recycling of spent fuel. Several years ago, Japan reportedly had 9 tons of plutonium, enough for over 1,000 nuclear warheads, and an additional 35 tons of plutonium stored in Europe.

Japan’s world-class space launch program has led to a broad consensus that it is within Japan’s capability to produce delivery systems that could strike North Korea (although there has been no suggestion that the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency is researching ballistic missile applications for military use). The distance between Japan and North Korea is around 650 miles, while the maximum range of Japan’s missiles is currently less than 200 miles. Notably, Japanese Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera recently requested substantial funding for research and development of high-speed missiles with extended range, with an eye toward a conventional response to the North Korean threat.

The daunting political and technical obstacles to Japan going nuclear should not be underestimated and have been described elsewhere. That said, open literature suggests that it could take between one and five years for Japan to build nuclear weapons, with the median estimate at around one or two years. It is worth recalling how rapidly the U.S. was able to produce nuclear weapons with the technologies available 70 years ago, and to consider the possibilities resulting from a modern-day Japanese Manhattan Project should Tokyo be driven to extremes.

North Korean ICBMs capable of targeting U.S, cities would be a game changer. Washington should take every reasonable measure to thwart and deter North Korea from producing and deploying them, and to counter the North Korean threat. Additionally, the U.S. should intensify its communications with Japan at every level, including through public diplomacy, with regard to strategic stability and the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The shifting correlation of forces in Asia will have an impact on the nuclear debate in Japan, and the U.S. cannot afford to be complacent. Rather, Washington must proactively engage the Japanese with countervailing arguments to reassure them that the seamless web of deterrence linking U.S. and Japanese security will be maintained, and that the alliance is secure no matter what.

THE AUTHOR IS THOMAS CYNKIN

Dr. Thomas Cynkin is Vice President at the Daniel Morgan Graduate School, and Adjunct Professor of Economics at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. Cynkin previously headed the Washington Office of Fujitsu Ltd. as Vice President and General Manager. A former Foreign Service Officer, he served seven years as a Japanese-speaking diplomat in Japan, and was the Asian affairs advisor to two Deputy Secretaries of State and two US Ambassadors to the UN.
 
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