WTF?!? Behind That F-35 Air Combat Report

[Housecarl]

I used this prefix because of the last time these assumptions were made an awful lot of good men died.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://aviationweek.com/blog/behind-f-35-air-combat-report

Behind That F-35 Air Combat Report

Jul 6, 2015 by Bill Sweetman in Ares
Comments 55

Martin is claiming that all three versions of the F-35 will have kinematic performance better than or equal to any combat-configured fourth-generation fighter. The comparison includes transonic acceleration performance versus an air-to-air configured Eurofighter Typhoon and high angle-of-attack flight performance vis-a-vis the Boeing Super Hornet. "The F-35 is comparable or better in every one of those metrics, sometimes by a significant margin, in air-to-air," says Billy Flynn, a Lockheed Martin test pilot.

It is therefore understandable that people thought it was news when a report showed the F-35 as inferior in energy maneuverability to a Block 40 F-16 - which nobody would claim matches the Typhoon's speed, the Super Hornet's high-AoA performance or the Su-35's combination of the two. Some of the responses from Team F-35 were worth reporting too.

Related Reading

»Controversy Flares Over F-35 Air Combat Report

First on the scene was Dan Goure of the Lockheed Martin-sponsored Lexington Institute. "You Say the F-35 Can't Dogfight? I Say Good", the piece was headed. Although Goure seems to equate all air combat maneuvering with dogfighting, and all dogfighting with gun kills (which was entirely true until 1956) he cites John Stillion's recent report for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments as evidence that sensors, networks and weapons have made maneuvering irrelevant. "The important conclusion is not that the F-35 is a bad aircraft," Goure says, "but that the existing fleets of fourth-generation aircraft are increasingly obsolete."

In the U.K., the Royal Air Force requirement calls for the F-35B to be capable of full-spectrum air combat missions as part of an aircraft carrier group - and the F-35B has an empty weight 3,200 lb. heavier than the F-35A, which is not good from the maneuverability viewpoint. Lockheed Martin executive and former RAF Tornado pilot Andrew Linstead talked to the Daily Telegraph, praising the F-35's situational awareness and saying that air combat had changed. "People are using metrics they know, understand and may have an emotional attachment to, but they have to think about it differently. The battlefield picture they have now means they can avoid their adversary or choose to fight in a way that will give them a better outcome."

Goure, Linstead and Flynn seem to be on opposite sides of the same debate, one that started about 30 years ago as fighter traditionalists and stealth purists fought tooth and nail over the requirements for the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF). One group argued that stealth air combat was like submarine warfare - "the last thing you want to do is surface and use the deck gun" - while the others, with the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile still in development, maintained that there would always be leakers who survived the first beyond-visual-range (BVR) missile exchange and closed within visual range (WVR) where radar stealth would be irrelevant.

The traditionalists won. The F-22 Raptor was designed to be highly agile with a large usable flight envelope (hence its monster tail surfaces) and it had a complex, space-consuming arrangement that allowed AIM-9 missiles to be fired in lock-on-before-launch mode almost anywhere in the forward hemisphere.

The JSF is not as agile, but program leaders say that it will prevail in BVR because of stealth and situational awareness, and in WVR it will use its 360-deg. target-tracking device- the Distributed Aperture System (DAS) - to cue high-off-boresight air-to-air missiles (AAM) on to its adversaries.

What they don't say as loudly is that it can't do both, at least on the same mission. Unlike the F-22 (and the Chengdu J-20 and Sukhoi T-50) it doesn't have side bays and trapezes for rail-launched AAMs. If the F-35 carries AIM-9s it does so externally, and by Lockheed Martin's own definition it is not stealthy.

This is not an accident, or even a matter of program execution. The F-35 was "70% air-to-ground and 30% air-to-air" at its inception - a direct quote from George Muellner, who was in charge of what was then the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program in 1995. The U.S. Air Force, as the biggest customer, called the shots on the requirement. The F-117 Nighthawk had been the hero of the first Gulf War but had three main limitations: it couldn't find targets in-weather, couldn't hit moving targets and had neither the situational awareness nor the armament to survive in daylight. JAST was designed to do all these things as well as having external weapon stations to act as an F-16 on "Day Two" when the defenses had been degraded.

The Air Force in 1995 expected to have 442 F-22s to deal with any fighter threat, and side AAM bays would not remotely fit into the size and weight constraints imposed by the short take-off, vertical landing requirement. Stovl also limited the weight and size of the wing and the length of the body.

But what if the ATF traditionalists were wrong - as Goure and Linstead seem to imply - and WVR combat can and should be avoided? There are two ironies in Goure's citation of Stillion's work. The first is that Stillion was a co-author of the RAND report that drew down Davis' ire in 2008. The second is that Stillion's new study for CSBA suggests that the way to win a future air battle is not to use F-35s or F-22s but to launch AAMs from highly stealthy unmanned air vehicles, controlled from an aircraft that looks like the Long Range Strike Bomber. The logic is powerful: high-performance fighters are almost by definition short-legged, and even if they are not vulnerable, their tankers are. (I'm not the only one to have concluded that the J-20 is aimed directly at tankers and other support assets.)

That view of air combat is bolstered by Stillion's extensive study of air combat history, which shows a steady migration from guns to short-range AAMs to BVR AAMs. But there is an inkling of doubt here. Others have seen different trends - notably, the developers and customers in the MBDA Meteor program predict that BVR battles will involve more maneuvering, at high speeds. History is instructive, but not determinative.

Notably, air-to-air conflicts in the past 30 years have been grossly unbalanced. The U.S. and its allies have had a major advantage in equipment - the West has never faced the Sukhoi family, and the most modern Russian fighter to have been encountered is the early-model MiG-29, which has pitiful range and is locked into the Soviet ground-controlled-intercept doctrine. Training and experience have been on the Western side by a huge margin. And generally, one side has had the support of airborne warning and control, signals intelligence and communications jamming assets and the other has had none of these.

Not surprisingly, then, many engagements have been decided BVR; and adversaries have been given cause to believe that any attempt to get into a WVR engagement is likely to be fatal. But that kind of imbalance is not an eternal reality. Dan Goure's reaction to the F-35's possible lack of agility may be "I say, good," but he's not flying it in combat, is he?

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://medium.com/war-is-boring/test-pilot-admits-the-f-35-can-t-dogfight-cdb9d11a875

Test Pilot Admits the F-35 Can’t Dogfight

New stealth fighter is dead meat in an air battle

by DAVID AXE
June 29, 2015, updated Jul 2, 2015

A test pilot has some very, very bad news about the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The pricey new stealth jet can’t turn or climb fast enough to hit an enemy plane during a dogfight or to dodge the enemy’s own gunfire, the pilot reported following a day of mock air battles back in January.

“The F-35 was at a distinct energy disadvantage,” the unnamed pilot wrote in a scathing five-page brief that War Is Boring has obtained. The brief is unclassified but is labeled “for official use only.”

The test pilot’s report is the latest evidence of fundamental problems with the design of the F-35 — which, at a total program cost of more than a trillion dollars, is history’s most expensive weapon.

The U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps — not to mention the air forces and navies of more than a dozen U.S. allies — are counting on the Lockheed Martin-made JSF to replace many if not most of their current fighter jets.

And that means that, within a few decades, American and allied aviators will fly into battle in an inferior fighter — one that could get them killed … and cost the United States control of the air.

The fateful test took place on Jan. 14, 2015, apparently within the Sea Test Range over the Pacific Ocean near Edwards Air Force Base in California. The single-seat F-35A with the designation “AF-02” — one of the older JSFs in the Air Force — took off alongside a two-seat F-16D Block 40, one of the types of planes the F-35 is supposed to replace.

The two jets would be playing the roles of opposing fighters in a pretend air battle, which the Air Force organized specifically to test out the F-35’s prowess as a close-range dogfighter in an air-to-air tangle involving high “angles of attack,” or AoA, and “aggressive stick/pedal inputs.”

In other words, the F-35 pilot would fly his jet hard, turning and maneuvering in order to “shoot down” the F-16, whose pilot would be doing his own best to evade and kill the F-35.

“The evaluation focused on the overall effectiveness of the aircraft in performing various specified maneuvers in a dynamic environment,” the F-35 tester wrote. “This consisted of traditional Basic Fighter Maneuvers in offensive, defensive and neutral setups at altitudes ranging from 10,000 to 30,000 feet.”

At top and above — F-35s and F-16s. Air Force photos

The F-35 was flying “clean,” with no weapons in its bomb bay or under its wings and fuselage. The F-16, by contrast, was hauling two bulky underwing drop tanks, putting the older jet at an aerodynamic disadvantage.

But the JSF’s advantage didn’t actually help in the end. The stealth fighter proved too sluggish to reliably defeat the F-16, even with the F-16 lugging extra fuel tanks. “Even with the limited F-16 target configuration, the F-35A remained at a distinct energy disadvantage for every engagement,” the pilot reported.

The defeated flier’s five-page report is a damning litany of aerodynamic complaints targeting the cumbersome JSF.

“Insufficient pitch rate.” “Energy deficit to the bandit would increase over time.” “The flying qualities in the blended region (20–26 degrees AoA) were not intuitive or favorable.”

The F-35 jockey tried to target the F-16 with the stealth jet’s 25-millimeter cannon, but the smaller F-16 easily dodged. “Instead of catching the bandit off-guard by rapidly pull aft to achieve lead, the nose rate was slow, allowing him to easily time his jink prior to a gun solution,” the JSF pilot complained.

And when the pilot of the F-16 turned the tables on the F-35, maneuvering to put the stealth plane in his own gunsight, the JSF jockey found he couldn’t maneuver out of the way, owing to a “lack of nose rate.”

War Is Boring Presents: ‘Your New Stealth Fighter Is Really, Really Awful’

Our first book volume explains what went wrong with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter—and what that means for America
medium.com

The F-35 pilot came right out and said it — if you’re flying a JSF, there’s no point in trying to get into a sustained, close turning battle with another fighter. “There were not compelling reasons to fight in this region.” God help you if the enemy surprises you and you have no choice but to turn.

The JSF tester found just one way to win a short-range air-to-air engagement — by performing a very specific maneuver. “Once established at high AoA, a prolonged full rudder input generated a fast enough yaw rate to create excessive heading crossing angles with opportunities to point for missile shots.”

But there’s a problem — this sliding maneuver bleeds energy fast. “The technique required a commitment to lose energy and was a temporary opportunity prior to needing to regain energy … and ultimately end up defensive again.” In other words, having tried the trick once, an F-35 pilot is out of options and needs to get away quick.


Buy ‘The Air Force Way of War: U.S. Tactics and Training after Vietnam.’

And to add insult to injury, the JSF flier discovered he couldn’t even comfortably move his head inside the radar-evading jet’s cramped cockpit. “The helmet was too large for the space inside the canopy to adequately see behind the aircraft.” That allowed the F-16 to sneak up on him.

In the end, the F-35 — the only new fighter jet that America and most of its allies are developing — is demonstrably inferior in a dogfight with the F-16, which the U.S. Air Force first acquired in the late 1970s.

The test pilot explained that he has also flown 1980s-vintage F-15E fighter-bombers and found the F-35 to be “substantially inferior” to the older plane when it comes to managing energy in a close battle.

 

[Housecarl]

And the F-4 can "take" the F-35 as well....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://medium.com/war-is-boring/th...sed-the-f-4-would-never-dogfight-3e1a66da4e73

The U.S. Air Force Promised the F-4 Would Never Dogfight

Now it’s saying the same thing about the F-35

by DAVID AXE
July 6, 2015

The aerial dogfight was not supposed to happen. On May 20, 1967, eight U.S. Air Force F-4C fighters were patrolling over North Vietnam when they spotted as many as 15 enemy MiG-17 fighters a short distance away.

Fog and the MiGs’ low altitude had prevented the F-4s from detecting the North Vietnamese jets from farther away.

Diving to attack, the twin-engine F-4s fired a staggering 24 Sparrow and Sidewinder missiles, shooting down just four of the single-engine MiGs. The North Vietnamese jets reacted quickly, forming into a tight-turning “wagon wheel,” with each pilot watching the tail of the man in front of him.

As the heavy, twin-engine F-4s tried to out-turn the nimble, single-engine MiGs, a North Vietnamese pilot peppered one of the American planes with cannon fire, igniting it and forcing the two crewmen to eject.

“The turning ability of the MiG-17 is fantastic,” one F-4 flier recalled later. “It must be seen to be believed.”

But the Air Force had assumed that wouldn’t be a problem — that its then-brand-new twin-seat F-4s would never even get into a close-range dogfight. Instead, the F-4s — and other Air Force and Navy fighters — would always destroy their enemies from long range, using the Sparrow and other air-to-air missiles.

It was a flawed and dangerous assumption that got scores of American aviators shot down over Vietnam. But 49 years later, the Air Force is assuming the same thing … with regards to its new F-35 stealth fighter.


In January 2015, the flying branch pitted a radar-evading F-35A against a 25-year-old F-16D in mock air combat. The F-35 proved too slow and sluggish to defeat the F-16 in a turning fight, according to the official test report that War Is Boring obtained.

But the Air Force says not to worry. “The F-35’s technology is designed to engage, shoot and kill its enemy from long distances, not necessarily in visual ‘dogfighting’ situations.”

Sounds familiar.

The Air Force’s faith in long-range aerial warfare proved disastrous in Vietnam. There are good reasons to believe it will prove equally disastrous the first time squadrons of new F-35s fly into battle against a determined foe.


Above — a North Vietnamese MiG-17, as seen from a U.S. Air Force fighter. Air Force photo. At top — F-4Cs over Vietnam. Photo via Wikipedia

For the first four decades of air-to-air fighting, opposing planes mostly shot at each other with guns. Then in 1946, Navy engineer William Burdette McLean began work on a heat-seeking rocket — the Sidewinder, the first effective air-to-air missile.

Twelve years later, Washington outfitted Taiwanese F-86 fighters with the first combat-ready Sidewinders. In aerial battles over the Taiwan Strait, the F-86s shot down Communist Chinese MiG-17s — and seemingly changed air warfare forever. Soon, new and better missiles — some with radar guidance — were rolling out of laboratories all over the world.

The Air Force and its sister branches enthusiastically embraced the missile age, even dropping guns from many of its new warplane designs, including the early F-4Cs.

The new missile technology coincided with a shift in doctrine. The Pentagon decided that in future wars, jet fighters would climb high and fly fast to target Soviet long-range bombers, striving to hit them from far away before they could drop their atomic bombs.

American jets of the era were powerful but lacked agility. “Our tactical fighters were designed primarily for nuclear war where penetration was more important than maneuverability,” Air Force Gen. Bruce Holloway wrote in a 1968 issue of Air University Review.

But the next war America fought wasn’t global Armageddon with the Soviets. Instead, U.S. troops joined the South Vietnamese military battling a communist insurgency backed by North Vietnam’s own army and air force.

American military planners had bet on a high-tech war of atoms, electrons, rockets and high Mach numbers during straight-line flights. What they got were slow, twisting dogfights low over the forest canopy. It didn’t take long for the Air Force and Navy to realize their technology and tactics just didn’t work very well against Hanoi’s MiGs.

Between 1965 and 1968, American fighters launched 321 radar-guided missiles over Vietnam. Slightly more than eight percent hit their targets, according to a 2005 analysis by Air Force Lt. Col. Patrick Higby.

The Navy scrambled to analyze the terrible hit rate. “A primary reason for less-than-desired combat performance of air-to-air missile systems in Southeast Asia is their design optimization for a high-altitude engagement against a non-maneuvering, large (bomber) target,” the sailing branch concluded in a 1968 report.

With a little bit of warning, a MiG-17 could out-turn a missile — and then use that same maneuverability to get on the American jet’s tail.

The Pentagon upgraded the Sparrow and Sidewinder missiles and added a gun to the new “E” version of the F-4. Pilots got training for turning fights. Soon, kill-loss ratios improved for U.S. aircrews. But what America really needed was a brand-new fighter — one that didn’t just excel at a narrow sort of high and fast, long-range fighting.

America needed a dogfighter.

An F-35 with an F-16. Air Force photo

“A tremendously improved thrust-to-weight ratio, which, coupled with a low wing loading, will produce high Mach and ceiling along with superior climb, acceleration and turn ability throughout the flight envelope,” is how Holloway described the new jet’s characteristics in 1968.

“Advanced avionics and armament, which will provide the necessary ability to defeat any foreseen adversary with a wide variety of weapons, including missiles and guns,” Holloway added.

The result was the twin-engine F-15, which debuted in 1972 and 43 years later is still the Air Force’s most numerous air-superiority fighter. The smaller, single-engine F-16 followed a few years later. It, too, could fight high or low, fly fast and turn tight, launch missiles and fire guns.

The F-15 and F-16’s designers didn’t optimize them for fanciful, idealized war scenarios. They optimized them for our own imperfect planning, for uncertain circumstances and for an enemy that gets his own vote — in other words, for the real world.

Which has only become more important as Russian fighter design has progressed. MiG-17s gave way to speedy MiG-21s and, later, highly maneuverable MiG-29s and Su-27s. Today’s Su-35 — a heavily redesigned Su-27—can fly faster and turn better than an F-15 and carries more and arguably better weapons.

Less and less, America gets to dictate the terms in aerial warfare. More and more, the Pentagon needs fighters that can fight.


Buy ‘MiG-17 and MiG-19 Units of the Vietnam War.’

But America’s new F-35, which is set to become the Air Force’s main warplane, is “substantially inferior” in a turning battle even to an F-15, according to the pilot in the January 2015 mock dogfight. The Air Force insists that’s no problem because the stealthy F-35 will avoid detection and hit enemy planes from long range.

In other words, the Air Force insists it can dictate the terms of the F-35’s engagements.

Maybe that’s partially true. Maybe the F-35’s stealth properties will actually work somewhat. Maybe its missiles won’t miss all the time. Maybe Russia won’t export the Su-35 to every interested buyer. Maybe the United States won’t ever wage a full-scale war against a high-tech foe that can negate the few advantages the F-35 possesses.

But what if the government’s rosy projections turn out to be even slightly off-target? What if something doesn’t work perfectly and F-35 pilots find themselves in dogfights with aerodynamically superior Sukhois or MiGs or Chinese-made planes? What if we send a fighter that can’t turn into battle with fighters that can?

It’s happened before to Air Force fighter jets that weren’t ever supposed to fight close. And a bunch of F-4 crews paid for the government’s blind faith in long-range, straight-line aerial warfare with their freedom … or their lives.

 

[energy_wave]

GE Jet Sets Record; Will F-35 Get New AETD Engine?

Videos in the link...

http://breakingdefense.com/2015/06/ge-sets-aetd-record/


By Colin Clark on June 18, 2015 at 8:41 AM

PARIS AIR SHOW: Pratt & Whitney has refused to disclose the price of its F135 engines for the F-35 for quite a while, even while Lockheed Martin boasted it would bring down the price of the Joint Strike Fighter to $80 million a copy — including engine.

Now we know why. At a Monday briefing here, the head of Pratt’s F135 program, Mark Buongiorno, told reporters the company didn’t want to release the information because the Adaptive Engine Technology Development (AETD) program’s engines were being tested for dimensions that matched those of the F-35. A more fuel-efficient AETD engine could overcome one of the longstanding concerns about the F-35 in an era of ever deeper anti-access/area denial defenses, its relatively short unrefueled range of a bit more than 600 nautical miles.

Then General Electric put out a release late yesterday about testing for its Adaptive Versatile Engine Technology (ADVENT) project, which achieved the highest combined compressor and turbine temperature operation “in the history of jet engine propulsion.”

That release included this sentence: “It is now being applied to the next step – an engine that could fit an F-35-like aircraft.”

You could almost hear the pin drop. Years after former Defense Secretary Bob Gates pushed hard to kill the so-called second engine program — GE’s F136 — it looks as if GE may be poised to come back with what could be either a second engine for the F-35, a replacement for Pratt’s F135, or the next-generation power plant.

GE finished tests on a new engine, which included the highest combined compressor and turbine temperature operation “in the history of jet engine propulsion.”

Daniel McCormick, general manager of GE’s advanced combat engine programs, said there had been a Preliminary Design Review that involved the Air Force, NASA and Lockheed Martin. The new engine can adapt for either maximum thrust — to outrun an enemy anti-aircraft missile, for example — or long-range cruise — say, to penetrate deeply and stealthily into an enemy air-defense zone.

As more details emerge it will be fascinating to hear how senior Pentagon officials and Air Force leaders view this GE engine: as a technology marvel, the beginnings of the next generation in F-35 power, or as a “second engine.”

 

[Knoxville's Joker]

This is a big dot folks. This is a game changer. If I am reading this correctly the engine cost on this new design will considerably lower the cost of the f-35 fighter jet to something more reasonable.

 

[Sacajawea]

But if the plane was designed to other specs for the original engine, won't the redesign cause more money to compensate - and offset the original higher cost? And - doesn't that multiply the chances for a mission-critical "oops" that no one foresaw?

 

[Dozdoats]

a flawed and dangerous assumption

Making flawed and dangerous assumptions seems to be one of the few things modern 'Murkins are good at.

 

[Border guard]

You can make a brick fly with enough thrust. The F-16 was designed to be maneuverable, the F-35 was designed to be stealthy on a budget and to replace everything from the A-10 to the F-18. The laws of physics won't let you design aircraft on the cheap. In the past, aircraft were designed to fill a specific role well. There is no plane that can master every role and do it as well as a plane designed to perform a particular role. This is what happens when you let bean counters design aircraft.

 

[Housecarl]

But if the plane was designed to other specs for the original engine, won't the redesign cause more money to compensate - and offset the original higher cost? And - doesn't that multiply the chances for a mission-critical "oops" that no one foresaw?

Engine change out depends on how the engine bay on the aircraft is laid out, particularly if that possibility was part of the design.

 

[Richard]

I thought the F35 engines were problematic and that's why it didn't fly at Farnborough Air Show last year.

In contrast the Eurojet engines in the Eurofighter are very good.

 

[Knoxville's Joker]

Engine change out depends on how the engine bay on the aircraft is laid out, particularly if that possibility was part of the design.

And this could have been designed as a direct retrofit or had that option in mind on selling it.

 

[Housecarl]

I thought the F35 engines were problematic and that's why it didn't fly at Farnborough Air Show last year.

In contrast the Eurojet engines in the Eurofighter are very good.

Yes. The #4 posting is talking about changing out the "problem" engine with a new one.

 

[Housecarl]

And this could have been designed as a direct retrofit or had that option in mind on selling it.

Yes. Pretty common with commercial jets, though the nacelle mounting on them makes that a much easier deal.

 

[Housecarl]

You can make a brick fly with enough thrust. The F-16 was designed to be maneuverable, the F-35 was designed to be stealthy on a budget and to replace everything from the A-10 to the F-18. The laws of physics won't let you design aircraft on the cheap. In the past, aircraft were designed to fill a specific role well. There is no plane that can master every role and do it as well as a plane designed to perform a particular role. This is what happens when you let bean counters design aircraft.

Yes. The F-35's design has more to do with being a direct mission replacement for the F-117, a precision guided bomb "truck". That it's been pushed on allies as a direct replacement for the multi-role F-16, where it does everything in their air forces, is literally criminal. If they were to have been marketing the F-22 in that matter the circumstances would literally be a 180 from this brewing mess.

Just look at the released specs on Japan's new "in house" experimental design, the Mitsubishi ATD-X Shinshin, for a comparison.

http://www.defenceaviation.com/2014/01/the-importance-of-mitsubishi-atd-x-shinshin-to-japan.html

http://i.kinja-img.com/gawker-media...ogressive,q_80,w_636/pqt0zuuar7yfp5qqly7d.jpg

http://defense-update.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/5th-generation-fighters_atdx725.jpg

General Features:
• Crew: 1
• Wingspan: 9.099 meters (29.85 feet)
• Length: 14.174 meters (46.50 feet)
• Height: 4.514 meters (14.80 feet)
• Dry thrust: 10 tonnes (22,046 pounds) each
• Powerplant: 2 × IHI XF5-1 turbofans
• Max. takeoff weight: 13 tonnes (28,659 pounds)
• Thrust with afterburner: 15 tonnes (33,069 pounds) each
• Maximum speed: Mach 2+

 

[Richard]

Yes. The #4 posting is talking about changing out the "problem" engine with a new one.

Yes I found that quite surprising, bit late in the development day for such an aircraft, it did sound like we've suddenly solved the problem with a new engine and can sell the Jets cheaper than anything else. How long does it take to develop a new engine at this late stage in the F35 program.

The new engine is not yet part of the F35 program. My prediction the F35 will eventually work or be seen to work probably 15 years later than planned, with an operational introduction of very minimal capabilities and a long update program, just like the Eurofighter or even worse.

 

[Housecarl]

Yes I found that quite surprising, bit late in the development day for such an aircraft, it did sound like we've suddenly solved the problem with a new engine and can sell the Jets cheaper than anything else. How long does it take to develop a new engine at this late stage in the F35 program.

The new engine is not yet part of the F35 program. My prediction the F35 will eventually work or be seen to work probably 15 years later than planned, with an operational introduction of very minimal capabilities and a long update program, just like the Eurofighter or even worse.

With a program lag that long, they'll end up more than likely as "optional" drones/UCAVs.

 

[Richard]

With a program lag that long, they'll end up more than likely as "optional" drones/UCAVs.

In my opinion there will be a great lag in the F35 program as there has been in the development of other sophisticated Jets especially when designed by committee not by fear (e.g. Migs etc). There will be IMO a great hiatus in 20 years time regarding the future of air combat, drones vs manned jets and there will not be an obvious answer.
I can envisage no new manned Fighter Jet programs being advanced in the West following the F35, but that drones will not be capable of fulfilling the military role with major drawbacks in the concepts. As a consequence I can see older Jets being kept in service for a very long time in the 2030s whilst the future of air combat is debated, in the meantime there will be wars in which only tried and tested manned jets are used.

 

[Housecarl]

In my opinion there will be a great lag in the F35 program as there has been in the development of other sophisticated Jets especially when designed by committee not by fear (e.g. Migs etc). There will be IMO a great hiatus in 20 years time regarding the future of air combat, drones vs manned jets and there will not be an obvious answer.
I can envisage no new manned Fighter Jet programs being advanced in the West following the F35, but that drones will not be capable of fulfilling the military role with major drawbacks in the concepts. As a consequence I can see older Jets being kept in service for a very long time in the 2030s whilst the future of air combat is debated, in the meantime there will be wars in which only tried and tested manned jets are used.

Yes, I can definitely see your point. Heck, aside from RCS there's nothing wrong with the Typhoon, Rafael, Gripen, F-15, F-16 or F-18 vs "stealth" aircraft. All of them paired with stand off weapons, data links and AWACs/IADS can "do the job", just an issue of airframe life. That's why the USN put in for more F-18s despite the F-35 program.

The "stealths" unless they've got AWACS/IADS support are going to have to use their own radars, and like tracers they work both directions.

You take a new manufactured F-16 or F-15 and put up to date avionics and munitions on board and you've still got one heck of a performer. As to "reach", the cancelled follow on to the AIM-120 and proposed upgrades to it, as well as suggestions to putting air launched PAC-3s on them would give them the "reach" in the air to air role they need for "peer vs peer" scenarios.

ETA: IIRC there was an article posted here, maybe by me, that went into the push by the Services to start up a next generation combat aircraft program beyond the F-35's now "dated" technology.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.......

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.defenseone.com/managemen...no-longer-untouchable/117448/?oref=d-topstory

Pentagon Reconsidering Total F-35 Buy, Dunford Says

July 9, 2015 By Marcus Weisgerber

Gen. Joseph Dunford, the nominee for chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said he’s willing to rethink the acquisition plan for the most expensive weapons program ever.

Much has changed about the Pentagon’s Joint Strike Fighter program in the past 13 years, but one thing has remained steady: the number of F-35s to be bought for the Air Force, Navy and Marines.

All three variants have seen design tweaks, program managers have come and gone, and the projected price tag has climbed and climbed. Meanwhile, the world changed as well, while wars in Afghanistan and Iraq sucked money from long-term weapons projects. Through it all, Pentagon officials maintained they would need exactly 2,443 combat F-35s, plus 14 development aircraft, to deter and fight potential adversaries such as China.

But now radical extremists are wreaking havoc across much of the Middle East and northern Africa, and Russia has re-emerged as a major foe. On Thursday morning, Gen. Joseph Dunford, the Marine Corps commandant nominated to become the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the F-35 buying plan is under review.

“Given the evolving defense strategy and the latest Defense Planning Guidance, we are presently taking the newest strategic foundation and analyzing whether 2,443 aircraft is the correct number,” Dunford wrote in response to questions asked by the committee in advance of his hearing Thursday. “Until the analysis is complete, we need to pursue the current scheduled quantity buy to preclude creating an overall near-term tactical fighter shortfall.”

Dunford’s comments come one week after Army Gen. Martin Dempsey, the outgoing JCS chairman, warned in a new National Military Strategy that the military might need to rethink and reorganize for the hybrid wars of the future.

That doesn’t mean the F-35 — the largest weapons program ever, by many billions of dollars — is going away. “With projected adversarial threats challenging our current capabilities in coming years, the Joint Strike Fighter is a vital component of our effort to ensure the Joint Force maintains dominance in the air,” Dunford wrote.

The entire program, both developing and buying the actual jets, is projected to cost $400 billion, while operating and maintaining those planes is projected to cost between $859 billion and $1 trillion. In addition to the 2,457 U.S. aircraft, allies are projected to purchase hundreds of F-35s.

Many experts believed the Pentagon’s vision of a fleet of 2,443 Lockheed Martin F-35s was a pipe dream — but also that the program was likely stable for at least 15 to 20 years of its planned three-decade procurement period.

“I don’t think anybody on Wall Street would be surprised if [the Defense Department] starts to back away from that number just because I don’t think anybody really gave Lockheed Martin or the subcontractors on the program full credit for the total buy,” Byron Callan, a defense analyst with Capital Alpha Partners said.

“That said, we’re still probably going to get to a build rate of 150 [aircraft] per year total, at least for the early part of the decade,” he said. “Then the real question is what happens beyond that.”

After years of cost increases and schedule slips, the F-35 project has largely stabilized over the past three years, according to defense officials. The Marine Corps version of the jet will soon be declare battle-ready. In the coming years, the Pentagon is planning to increase its annual orders of the aircraft.

But while the F-35 program stretched out year by year, other strategic national-security priorities began appearing. At the end of the next decade, the Air Force is planning to buy new long-range stealth bombers, while the Navy plans to buy an expensive replacement for the Ohio-class submarine.

“If confirmed, I will advise the Secretary as he assesses the delicate balance of the capacity and the capabilities of the future Joint Force,” Dunford wrote. “This advice will be informed by the extent to which the F-35 program conforms to the priority requirements identified by Combatant Commanders and the Department’s strategic plans.”

While Dunford is the first senior-level defense official to acknowledge that the total F-35 buy could change, his comments are not likely to affect stocks or prompt companies to change their business plans, Callan said.

Lockheed shares were up $2.60 to $192.70 in late-day trading.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realcleardefense.com/art...a-10_is_not_holding_back_the_f-35_108145.html

June 29, 2015

No, the A-10 is not Holding Back the F-35

By David Axe

Fed auditors blast Air Force’s baseless Warthog retirement plan

Two years ago, the U.S. Air Force annoyed the other military branches, Congress and the general public when it announced a plan to quickly retire its roughly 300 A-10 Warthog attack jets — rugged tank-killers that have flown down-and-dirty close air support, or CAS, for American ground troops since the 1991 Gulf War.

The Air Force’s rationale for dumping the A-10s keeps shifting. Now government auditors have poked holes in the flyboys’ latest justification — that the branch must drop the ungainly Warthogs in order to free up maintainers for the slowly-growing fleet of pricey F-35 stealth fighters.

Amid public outcry and skepticism from the Army, Congress rejected the Air Force’s A-10 “divestiture” scheme in the 2014 and 2015 budgets — and seems likely to do the same in 2016. The flying branch has tried out different tactics to penetrate this solid wall of opposition.

First, the Air Force claimed it couldn’t afford the billion dollars or so a year it costs to keep the A-10s in the air. The plane’s defenders pointed out that the brute-simple Warthog is actually one of the cheapest warplanes to operate — $19,000 per flying hour, compared to $68,000 per hour for the F-35.

So the Air Force tweaked its argument, insisting the Warthog can’t survive over today’s dangerous battlefields. But then, accepting reality, the flying branch deployed A-10s to the Middle East to help wage the war on Islamic State and sent some of the cannon-armed Warthogs on a tour of Eastern Europe to try to frighten the Russians.

The Air Force basically called its own bluff.

Starting in late 2014, the branch tried out its latest and most eyebrow-raising justification for cutting the low- and slow-flying attackers. The Air Force explained that the squadrons of new F-35 stealth fighters standing up at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona must have the A-10’s maintenance personnel — and soon.

The Air Force claimed that if the F-35 program doesn’t get at least 800 maintainers from A-10 units in 2015, the branch’s first squadron of radar-evading F-35As won’t be ready for combat in December 2016, as the generals have been promising.

It was always an odd assertion, as the Air Force has been cutting other warplanes besides the F-35 —including Predator drones, C-130 transports and F-15 and F-16 fighters — and could poach personnel from those squadrons … or from less essential, non-flying units.

Plus, no prior plans for standing up F-35 squadrons, going back years, required prematurely retiring A-10s. The F-35 has been in development since the late 1990s.

Above — A-10s of the 81st Fighter Wing sit at Spangdahlem Air Base in 2012. At top — A-10s from the 188th Fighter Wing take part in an exercise. Air Force photos

Now the Government Accountability Office, the feds’ official auditing agency, has shot gaping holes in the Air Force’s bizarre claim. In a June 25 report, the GAO points out that the only analytical backing for the manpower justification, as thin as it is, comes from the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Capabilities Assessment and Program Evaluation report, or CAPE — a document dated January 2015.

“The issue of how to best fill F-35 maintenance personnel needs — the subject of the CAPE report — was not a factor in the Air Force budget decision” to get rid of the A-10 in 2013, the GAO explains. “The CAPE report was issued more than a year after the Air Force made its decision to divest the A-10 and therefore was not part of the context in which the decision was made.”

Buy ‘A-10 Thunderbolt II Units of Operation Enduring Freedom 2002-07.’

For good measure, the GAO also blasts the original budgetary justification for retiring the Warthog. “Our analysis found that the Air Force’s estimated savings are incomplete and may overstate or understate the actual figure. For example, A-10 divestment could increase the operational tempo of remaining CAS-capable aircraft, which could increase costs related to extending the service lives of those remaining CAS-capable aircraft.”

With the auditors and, ahem, reality canceling out all the official justifications, it should be obvious to any half-attentive observer that the Air Force’s true reasons for wanting to dump the A-10 are rooted in the flying branch’s culture … and the organizational biases of its senior leaders.

“I can’t wait to be relieved of the burdens of close air support,” Maj. Gen. James Post, the vice commander of the Air Force’s Air Combat Command, allegedly told a group of officers at a training session in August 2014.

It seems the brass just don’t like the unglamorous Warthog and its unglamorous mission.


This articel originally appears at War is Boring.

 

[energy_wave]

Here's an interesting comment from one of the F-35 news articles...

TCast
5 days ago

They aren't talking about it publicly, but the end game for the F-35 is not to be an air-to-air combat fighter or a bomber or anything traditional. It is an airborne neural network that can operate out of reach of direct threats and process real-time situational data from all assets connected to the network. It's primary roll will be in the rear of the fight, using electronic attack and counter measures along with advanced detection capabilities to quickly identify and process targets and relay that information to forward units for engagement. What are the forward units? Simple: UAV. Why place pilots and very expensive machinery in harm's way? Take the General Atomics Predator-C Avenger for example. This done cruises at 400mph with a top speed of 460mph. It has a massive 60,000ft service ceiling and marathon endurance of 20hrs on standard fuel. The speculated round trip operational range is between 4,000 and 4,500 miles with attack range of 1,800 miles. It has six external hard points for missiles and can hold 3,500lbs of munitions in its internal bay. It's weapon system is designed to fully integrate with the F-35's EOTS electro-optical targeting system. It is only rated for surface to ground missiles and bombs at this point, but that is because they are trying to not tip their hand. They even gave the exhaust profile and body limited stealth capability if weapons are limited to the internal bay. They only cost $12 million per unit, and production has been limited to three units in three years. When they ramp up production, that will drop in half. Right now, each F-35 costs about $105 million and will cost around $90 million once we reach at full capacity. They didn't put all of those expensive electronics and stealth systems in it to have it shot at by visible range opponents! They designed it to be the quarterback, orchestrating the offense on the field, calling out targets and audibles to confuse the defense and exploit weaknesses. The on-board weapons are simply for self-defense. They are a way to protect the brain if the enemy manages to get fighters up and headed in their direction. If that happens, they'll down the enemy before they even know that they are there. If necessary, they turn around and bug out at Mach 1.6 before the enemy gets within targeting range. In future years, each flight group of 3 x F-35's ($300 million total cost) will be providing real-time electronic warfare, tactical awareness, targeting data, and other combat logistics for a fully accompaniment of UAVs. I'm picturing 60 mixed role UAV executing air-to-air, air-to-ground, strategic bombing, electronic warfare, and reconnaissance with the F-35's managing the battle and calling the shots in real-time with the integrated targeting network. A squadron of 60 complimentary UAV will probably cost around the same piece as the three F-35's ($300 million), but the combined attack and munitions capabilites of the squadron would provide for an attack force with striking power multiple orders of magnitude greater than a handful of traditional fighters. Don't forget that the F-35 helmet doesn't just allow the pilot to see under, above, and behind their plane using its live camera feeds, it will also enable them to access live targeting feed from other assets on the network.

The point it, get over dogfighting! It's romantic and sexy and manly and courageous, but you know what else it is...or isn't? It isn't in our game plan for the playbook of future warfare and that is ok. We'll be fine as long as we have the assets necessary to fill the role...and we will!

http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/07/0...ousy-review-from-test-pilot-in-secret-report/

 

[night driver]

I'd buy this on a 22, with the capabilities there, but I dunno about the 35...

 

[JohnGaltfla]

I said it before, I'll say it again.

It's a modern day Brewster F2A.

 

[Nowski]

I said it before, I'll say it again.

It's a modern day Brewster F2A.

View attachment 121287

The Brewster needed a 5000hp engine, with jato assist.
It was severely underpowered.

During the Battle of Midway Island, US Marines flying Brewsters
were decimated by the Japanese Zeros. Many brave US Marines,
flew to their deaths in the Brewsters, including their leader Major Parks,
who was awarded the Navy Cross.

Brave men, such as Major Parks, have paid the ultimate sacrifice,
when going into battle, with inferior armaments.

This country, and its military, have their collective heads up their arses.
Why cannot they learn from history? Why must there be more Major Parks,
because surely there will be, if this worthless POS aircraft isn't stopped.

P51 Mustang. Now there was a plane that this country and its
aircraft industry got right, and nothing prop driven could touch it.

Regards to all,
Nowski

 

[OldArcher]

The Brewster needed a 5000hp engine, with jato assist.
It was severely underpowered.

During the Battle of Midway Island, US Marines flying Brewsters
were decimated by the Japanese Zeros. Many brave US Marines,
flew to their deaths in the Brewsters, including their leader Major Parks,
who was awarded the Navy Cross.

Brave men, such as Major Parks, have paid the ultimate sacrifice,
when going into battle, with inferior armaments.

This country, and its military, have their collective heads up their arses.
Why cannot they learn from history? Why must there be more Major Parks,
because surely there will be, if this worthless POS aircraft isn't stopped.

P51 Mustang. Now there was a plane that this country and its
aircraft industry got right, and nothing prop driven could touch it.

Regards to all,
Nowski

Nowski, my friend, our people have always gone to war- prepared and equipped for the last one! Toss in, built by the "lowest bidder," and there you have it...

OA

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.businessinsider.com/f-35-cant-fight-at-long-range-2015-7

The F-35 may have big problems fighting at long range

Jeremy Bender
Jul. 10, 2015, 2:25 PM
Comments 40

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) was supposed to fill multiple roles for the Air Force, Navy, Marines, and US foreign partners.

The jet — the most expensive US weapons project of all time — was designed to have aerial combat, close-air support, and long-range-strike capabilities.

But that's not how the plane's turned out so far. A string of damning reports have seriously called the $1.5 trillion plane into question, specifically it's "dogfighting" ability when matched against less sophisticated aircraft. And now, one expert has made a convincing case that the fighter's long-range capabilities don't measure up to expectations either.

In a report for War Is Boring, military analyst Joseph Trevithick writes that in a long-distance engagement, the F-35 would have to rely on stealth to avoid enemy-radar detection while maneuvering close enough to engage enemy air and ground targets.

In an ideal situation, the F-35 would eliminate its targets before detection and leave. But as Trevithick notes, Russian and Chinese fifth-generation fighters have been outfitted with infrared sensors that can pinpoint a plane's heat signature over fairly vast distances. The F-35 has a single, large rounded engine nozzle that leaves a larger heat signature than the flat nozzles of other stealth aircraft, such as the F-22 or the B-2.

This infrared signature could tip off enemy fighters to the F-35's location, negating any benefit it may have from its stealth design.

Stealth may offer diminishing returns anyway. The technology isn't foolproof, and radar technology is improving around the world.

"You can only go so fast, and you know that stealth may be overrated," Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jon Greenert said during a speech in February. "Let's face it, if something moves fast through the air, disrupts molecules and puts out heat — I don't care how cool the engine can be, it's going to be detectable. You get my point."

The F-35 may be more detectable at distance than the plane's advocates claim, meaning the plane might have questionable utility during long-range aerial combat and attack runs. On top of that, the F-35 could find itself outgunned in a potential missile engagement with rival Russian or Chinese fighters.

The F-35 is supposed to be outfitted with AIM-120 Slammer missiles, which have a comparable range to Russian and Chinese air-to-air missiles.

However, as Trevithick notes, the F-35 may actually turn out to be slower than its Russian and Chinese rivals. It's lagging speed means that it cannot launch the missiles with as much force as enemy jets. Moving at supercruising speed, a sustained speed exceeding the sound barrier, an enemy aircraft could "potentially fling its missiles farther than a missile’s advertised range."

The difference in missile range might not actually be that important. If the F-35's stealth capabilities are as good as advertised, or if enemy aircraft don't have the weight load or sophistication to carry longer-range missiles, the plane will be able to maintain its expected supremacy over other fifth-generation models. Additionally, in a war game conducted by the Royal Aeronautical Society, the F-35 beat the advanced Russian Su-35s in a long-range aerial engagement.

But in that simulation, the F-35 wasn't armed with the AIM-120 but with the Meteor Beyond-Visual-Range Air-to-Air Missile (BVRAAM). No concrete figures have been released on the BVRAAM's range, but it is thought to be greater than that of the AIM-120 and any current air-to-air missile in either the Chinese or Russian arsenal.

Unfortunately, as a different War is Boring article notes, any integration of the BVRAAM with the F-35 is years off. The F-35 will not be able to use the BVRAAM until Lockheed releases its next software update for the F-35, which is still in early development. Until that time, the F-35 may find itself in a challenging position relative to Russia and China's own upcoming fifth-generation fighters.

The F-35 has questionable abilities at shorter range, too. A leaked report from an F-35 test pilot obtained by War is Boring noted that the aircraft was incapable of outmaneuvering and besting an F-16 in a simulated dogfight. The F-16 first entered service in 1978 and is one of the planes that the F-35 is being built to replace.

In response, Lockheed Martin wrote in a July 1 press release that “the F-35’s technology is designed to engage, shoot and kill its enemy from long distances."

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://arstechnica.com/business/201...6-face-off-was-also-a-battle-of-philosophies/

Disastrous F-35 vs. F-16 face-off was also a battle of philosophies

Ironically, the older plane was a response to the same assumptions.

by Jonathan M. Gitlin - Jul 10, 2015 10:05am PDT
Comments 203

Lockheed Martin's F-35 Joint Strike Fighter has been having a terrible time of late. In June, War is Boring journalist David Axe obtained a report detailing the F-35's performance—or lack thereof—as a dogfighter. The F-35 went up against an F-16 in January of this year and, with the exception of a single 'Hail Mary' move, was soundly outclassed by the older plane.

Over at Aviation Week, Bill Sweetman has joined the merge with a considered take on where we stand with the F-35. Sweetman—probably the leading journalist in the field—argues that one's view on the new fighter depends on whether you fall into one of two schools of thought: traditionalists and those who think stealth rules everything.

First, a quick recap of January's F-35/F-16 showdown. At altitudes between 10,000' and 30,000' (3,000-9,000m), the two airplanes carried out a series of basic fighter maneuvers, with the test pilot specifically focused on how the F-35 performed at high angles of attack (i.e. its nose was pointing further up than the direction it was flying). The newer jet did not distinguish itself, beyond being able to perform a defensive move that "required a commitment to lose energy" and which "meant losing the fight unless the bandit made an error," according to the leaked report.

Aerial combat maneuvers are all to do with energy—how much you have, how much you can afford to lose—and in this regard the F-35 was at a distinct disadvantage, with an underpowered engine. To make matters worse, the test pilot found it almost impossible to turn his head to see behind the plane, something you'd want to do in a dogfight.

The F-35A in question was one of the earliest airframes off the production line, As such, it wasn't equipped with much of the fused sensor suite that F-35 supporters point to as one of the jet's big leaps forward (this combines data from radar and infrared sensors to give the pilot increased situational awareness). The F-35A was up against an F-16D (a two-seat version of that plane) that should have been at a disadvantage, encumbered as it was with two external fuel tanks hanging off its wings. Even if we accept Lockheed Martin's explanations for the F-35's poor performance, the fact that it couldn't best the much older plane should be worrying.

Yes, the F-16 is a highly maneuverable fighter, but it's also long in the tooth. The F-35's peers are newer planes like the Eurofighter Typhoon, which doesn't have the F-35's stealth but is at the leading edge of sensor fusion. And as Sweetman points out, Lockheed Martin claimed that the F-35 would outperform the Typhoon as well as the F/A-18 Super Hornet, yet both of these planes are at least equal to or better than the older F-16 in air combat maneuvering.

As Sweetman explains, the F-35 belongs to a school of thought that says air combat within visual range (WVR) is a thing of the past, rendered obsolete by the F-35's stealth, sensors, and networking ability. The opposing school of thought believes that stealth and long-range air-to-air missiles are well and good but that one ought to be prepared for a sneaky (or lucky) adversary that gets past your scanners and taps you on the shoulder.

Stealth isn't a magic invisibility cloak. Yes, it can significantly reduce the range at which a plane is detected by a radar, but that's one of the reasons why everyone else has been pursuing sensor fusion, augmenting radar with infrared and so on. Lockheed Martin's foreign competitors have also been investing heavily in electronic countermeasure technology, an area in which the US has lagged as it went down the stealthy road. It's a foregone conclusion that the F-35 will be in service long after its stealth advantage has been negated.

Perhaps the greatest irony to emerge from January's test involves the F-16's origin story. Like the F-35, the F-16 is a multi-role aircraft, designed to carry out air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. A product of the 1970s, it was a response to the US Air Force's dismal showing during the early years of the Vietnam war. Just like today, the US Air Force of the 1950s and 1960s believed that dogfighting was a thing of the past and that air combat would take place beyond visual range with radar guided missiles. The Vietnam War demonstrated the folly of that belief at the cost of almost 1,000 planes and far too many American pilots.

Still, the F-35 program has time to remedy this; after all, that's the purpose of tests like this. Unfortunately, one of the best chances to do so went away when Congress killed the alternate engine that was under development, despite work being almost complete.

STOVL problems

The bad news for the F-35 program doesn't end there. Lockheed Martin is actually developing three different versions of the aircraft. There's the F-35A, which will be used by the US Air Force, a short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B for the US Marine Corps and the UK, and the F-35C for the US Navy.

The F-35C has had its share of troubles, but the real problem child is the F-35B. This plane is meant to replace the aging (and tricky-to-fly) Harrier, and it is capable of using improvised runways or aircraft carriers without catapult launchers to take off and land vertically. The UK needs the F-35B for the carriers it's building, since the government made the decision not to equip them with catapults. The US Marine Corps wants a STOVL jet because of institutional memories from World War II, when it had to fight without naval support, despite the fact that the F-35's special stealth coatings (and enormous price tag) almost certainly negate any chance of the aircraft being deployed to unsecured forward areas in a time of war.

Although Lockheed Martin and its technical partners have made headway in taming the F-35B's STOVL problems, this variant remains heavier and less maneuverable than the F-35A and to many observers is a millstone around the project's neck.

The Australian government probably agrees with that assessment, as it has this week decided to cancel plans to buy between 18 and 35 F-35Bs. The decision was made due to the enormous cost ($4.4 billion) required to upgrade Australia's ships, HMAS Canberra and HMAS Adelaide, for F-35B operations.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/9/jed-babbin-the-deadly-f-35-strike-fighter/

The deadly F-35 strike fighter

The jet is incapable of defending itself or American troops on the ground

By Jed Babbin - - Thursday, July 9, 2015
Comments 55

America’s military is being redefined but not by changes in strategy or evolutions of the threats we face. The redefinition is the unplanned result of budgetary constraints and bad choices of weapon systems we spend hundreds of billions of dollars to buy.

The two effects of this redefinition combine to make their sum greater than their parts. First, there are missions our forces are in the process of abandoning because their shrinking size doesn’t allow performance of them. Second, the ability to perform essential missions is being dangerously abandoned in the design of the most expensive weapons we are buying.

For example, the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (the LCS, known in defense circles as the “little crappy ship”) is supposed to operate in shallow coastal waters. But as the Defense Department’s Office of Operational Test and Evaluation said, it’s so lightly armed and armored it won’t survive in combat. Nevertheless, the little crappy ship is still being bought at a cost of about $475 million each.

The worst example is the F-35 joint strike fighter. Purchases of the F-35 fighter aircraft, the most expensive weapon system the Pentagon has ever bought, are being accelerated. It will cost more than $400 billion to buy about 2,500 of them and another $1 trillion to own and operate for the 50 years of their projected life. For that entire time, absorbing a huge chunk of the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps budgets, the F-35 will be the fighter that ate the defense budget.

The F-35 is supposed to be all things to all services, replacing the F-15, F-16, A-10 and F/A-18. The Marines want it to provide close air support for troops on the ground. The Air Force and the Navy want it to be both an attack aircraft and an air superiority fighter. After nearly 14 years of development, it’s clear that it can’t perform either of those missions well.

The Air Force has always taken its responsibility for air supremacy seriously. (The last American ground troop to be killed by an enemy aircraft died in 1953). That track record is currently maintained by the F-22 Raptor, a highly-capable fifth-generation fighter that can engage and kill any other aircraft.

In the days the “fighter mafia” ran the Air Force, there was a mix of “high” and “low” fighters. The F-22 is the air dominance fighter and the F-35 was supposed to be the “low” fighter, responsible for strike missions and close air support. But the problem is obvious: With 2,500 F-35s and only 187 F-22s, the F-35 is going to have to defend itself most of the time. It can’t, because its designers — and the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps leadership — neglected to deal with the simple math to figure out that you can’t protect 2,400 F-35s with just 187 F-22s. That leaves our air forces unprepared to fight other nations’ best such as Russia’s Su-35 or China’s J-10. To build fighters that can’t makes no sense.

At that point, the Pentagon leaders’ responsibility required them to either redesign the F-35 to give it the ability to win air-to-air fights or resume production of F-22s. They did neither.

Last year, Gen. Michael Hostage, then commander of Air Combat Command, said that without the F-22 flying with it to provide defense, the F-35 “will be irrelevant.”

Proof of Gen. Hostage’s judgment came in a Lockheed Martin test pilot report published by the War is Boring blog. The report was of a flight in which the F-35 engaged an F-16 (which the Air Force has flown since 1980) in a mock dogfight to test the F-35’s computer “laws.”

Computer “laws” govern the performance of modern aircraft. Sometimes overriding the pilot’s controls, the computer’s programming governs what the aircraft does. In the F-35, everything — from the aircraft’s ability to turn to how much thrust the engine is producing — is a function of the 8-million-plus lines of code in the onboard computer.

The War is Boring blog reported that the test pilot determined that the F-35 couldn’t perform one of its most basic functions: winning a dogfight even against a 1980s vintage F-16.

The test pilot’s report confirms what Gen. Hostage said. It says, for example, that “Overall, the most noticeable characteristic of the F-35A in a visual engagement was its lack of energy maneuverability.” Energy maneuverability is a combination of the power of the engine to get an aircraft into (or out of) a “shooting solution” and the aircraft’s control surfaces — wings, rudders and such — to do the same. The single-engine F-35 is underpowered and its control surfaces too small to maneuver effectively and win a dogfight.

The test pilot’s report also says that the F-35 helmet — which has to be tailored for each pilot at the cost of about $400,000 — “was too large for the space inside the canopy to adequately see behind the aircraft.” In a dogfight that too would be fatal.

Those design problems can’t be fixed by tinkering with the software. They represent enormous risks and not just for pilots in an aircraft that’s not capable of winning a dogfight. The danger of losing air dominance puts every American soldier on the ground at risk, and our nation at risk of losing battles or even wars.

The F-35 program is an example of how weapons shouldn’t be bought. It needs to be stopped in its tracks until all of its substantial design problems are solved in a manner that enables it to perform all of the missions required of it.

• Jed Babbin served as a deputy undersecretary of defense in the George H.W. Bush administration. He is a senior fellow of the London Center for Policy Research and the author of five books including “In the Words of Our Enemies.”

Follow us: @washtimes on Twitter

 

[DannyBoy]

America’s military is being redefined but not by changes in strategy or evolutions of the threats we face. The redefinition is the unplanned result of budgetary constraints and bad choices of weapon systems we spend hundreds of billions of dollars to buy.

The two effects of this redefinition combine to make their sum greater than their parts. First, there are missions our forces are in the process of abandoning because their shrinking size doesn’t allow performance of them. Second, the ability to perform essential missions is being dangerously abandoned in the design of the most expensive weapons we are buying...

...The F-35 program is an example of how weapons shouldn’t be bought. It needs to be stopped in its tracks until all of its substantial design problems are solved in a manner that enables it to perform all of the missions required of it.

Finally got to read through all of this... That quote is just spooky and sad... say it ain't so.

 

[energy_wave]

F-35 project team says bad dogfight report “does not tell whole story”
Older F-35 didn't bring "A" game, and besides—plane isn't supposed to dogfight.

by Sean Gallagher - Jul 1, 2015 11:56am EDT

In a release posted today to Lockheed Martin's F-35 program website, a spokesperson for Lockheed Martin and the Department Of Defense's F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) responded to this week's media coverage of a leaked F-35 test pilot report. The test pilot's assessment of the performance of the F-35 in mock combat encounters with an F-16D in January, which was published by David Axe of War is Boring, was that the F-35 was at a distinct disadvantage against the F-16. This despite the F-16 carrying two wing fuel tanks that give it inferior aerodynamics.

F-35 pilot found his aircraft "substantially inferior" in close battle.
The author of the Lockheed Martin/JPO response wrote that the War is Boring post "does not tell the entire story. The F-35 involved was AF-2 [the second F-35 airframe]...designed for flight sciences testing of the aircraft. It is not equipped with a number of items that make today's production F-35s 5th Generation fighters."

The tests that the report was based on were intended "to test the flying qualities of the F-35 using visual combat maneuvers to stress the system, and the F-16 involved was used as a visual reference to maneuver against," the response said. "While the dogfighting scenario was successful in showing the ability of the F-35 to maneuver to the edge of its limits without exceeding them and handle in a positive and predictable manner, the interpretation of the scenario results could be misleading."

The explanations offered up in the release included that the AF-2 :

"Does not have the mission systems software to use the sensors that allow the F-35 to see its enemy long before it knows the F-35 is in the area."
"Does not have the special stealth coating that operational F-35s have that make them virtually invisible to radar."
"Is not equipped with the weapons or software that allow the F-35 pilot to turn, aim a weapon with the helmet, and fire at an enemy without having to point the airplane at its target."

Of course, stealth coating and mission systems software are not as essential when combat happens in visual range. And given that the pilot reported having difficulty turning his head to track the F-16 during the mock dogfights because of the constraints of the F-35's canopy and the size of the helmet, the ability to "aim a weapon with the helmet" may not apply either.

But that's all fine because as the spokesperson noted, the F-35 isn't supposed to get into within-visual-range dogfights to begin with. "The F-35's technology is designed to engage, shoot, and kill its enemy from long distances, not necessarily in visual 'dogfighting' situations," the spokesperson wrote. And in four-on-four mock battles between F-35s and F-16s, "the F-35s won each of those encounters because of its sensors, weapons, and stealth technology."

One should hope so, given that the F-16D's price tag was $18.8 million in 1998 dollars (about $27.3 million today when adjusted for inflation) and costs about $24,000 per flight hour to operate. By comparison, the current official unit cost of the F-35A is $98 million, and the cost per flying hour has been $31,900. Doing the math, perhaps a fairer matchup in financial terms would be four F-35As against a dozen F-16Ds. That number might be higher considering that the F-35 has a history of occasionally catching fire during take-off.

The Lockheed Martin/JPO response also noted that "the release of this FOUO report is being investigated," and "candid feedback provided by our test community is welcomed because it makes what we do better. The disclosure of this report should not discourage our warfighters and test community from providing the Program Office and Lockheed Martin with honest assessments of the F-35's capabilities."

Update: The mock combat between the F-35 and the F-16 was publicly reported by Aviation Week in April, at which time Lockheed Martin's F-35 lead test pilot David "Doc" Nelson told Aviation Week, "The door is open to provide a little more maneuverability." The combat maneuvers were the first time the F-35 was put into a dogfight-like situation. “When we did the first dogfight in January, they said, ‘you have no limits.' It was loads monitoring, so they could tell if we ever broke something. It was a confidence builder for the rest of the fleet because there is no real difference structurally between AF-2 and the rest of the airplanes.”

F-35 program Director Rod Crieger told Aviation Week the flight "was an early look at any control laws that may need to be tweaked to enable it to fly better in the future. You can definitely tweak it—that's the option."

http://arstechnica.com/information-...ys-dogfight-report-does-not-tell-whole-story/

 

[Nowski]

Its a POS. The sad thing is, a bunch of F-35 drivers are going to pay with
their very lives, just as the drivers of the Brewster Buffaloes did.

Every last one of the morons pushing this folly of an aircraft,
both in the federal government, and in the military industrial complex,
need to be tried for high treason, and incompetence.

The Russian Su-35, an updated aircraft based on a 1970's design,
can run rings around the F-35. The Su-35 is better than even the latest
block F-15, so we currently have NOTHING, that can counter the Russian
Su-35 in a real world, air to air combat encounter.

This is being done on purpose, because you cannot just make this stuff up.

Regards to all,
Nowski

 

[OldArcher]

Its a POS. The sad thing is, a bunch of F35 drivers are going to pay with
their very lives, just as the drivers of the Brewster Buffaloes did.

Every last one of the morons pushing this folly of an aircraft,
both in the federal government, and in the military industrial complex.
need to be tried for high treason, and incompetence.

The Russian Su-35, an updated aircraft based on a 1970's design,
can run rings around the F35. The Su-35 is better than even the latest
block F15, so we currently have NOTHING, that can counter the Russian
Su-35 in a real world, air to air combat encounter.

It has to be done on purpose, because you cannot just make this stuff up.

Regards to all,
Nowski

Concur, 100%. Eisenhower was right- "Beware the military/industrial complex..."

Only God can save us...

Maranatha

OA

 

[night driver]

Its a POS. The sad thing is, a bunch of F-35 drivers are going to pay with
their very lives, just as the drivers of the Brewster Buffaloes did.

Every last one of the morons pushing this folly of an aircraft,
both in the federal government, and in the military industrial complex,
need to be tried for high treason, and incompetence.

The Russian Su-35, an updated aircraft based on a 1970's design,
can run rings around the F-35. The Su-35 is better than even the latest
block F-15, so we currently have NOTHING, that can counter the Russian
Su-35 in a real world, air to air combat encounter.

This is being done on purpose, because you cannot just make this stuff up.

Regards to all,
Nowski

Are ya SURE that the F-22 can't deal with it??

 

[Nowski]

Are ya SURE that the F-22 can't deal with it??

NO, sadly even though the performance characteristics of the F-22 are similar,
the Su-35 driver will probably prevail in any encounter,
solely for the following reason.

The F-22 driver will have been trained and taught to fly according to
the political correctness mantra that has destroyed the USA.
The F-22 driver will be wondering if he/she has insulted a gay, transgender, black,
or if some freaking fish in California isn't getting enough fresh water,
or if the earth is going to cease to exist, because of climate change.

No, hands down, the Russian Su-35 driver will return to HIS base,
having successfully dealt with the politically correctness trained,
USA F-22 driver.

It is a sad state that the USA is currently in, and there is nothing,
outside of the supernatural, that will change the course of destruction,
that the USA is currently on.

Would that it was otherwise.

Regards to all,
Nowski

 

[energy_wave]

First look at F-35's controversial hidden wing cannons firing

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R1HJjcVIuJg

 

[Archetype]

No, hands down, the Russian Su-35 driver will return to HIS base,

The Su-35 pilots no doubt get get a fraction of the flight time of their US counterparts, and don't have exercises like Red & Green Flag.

Know how many of the vaunted Su-35s they've actually built for Russian use, including modified first-generation Su-27s? 49. Soviet/Russian crap works, when it works at all, because of sheer force of numbers of cheap aircraft. The Russians can't buy enough front-line fighters of any kind to go back to that paradigm.

 

[Last Resort]

The F-22 will own the skies as long as our lamentably low production quantity of them lasts. 2400 F-35s that can't turn and burn too well but can get 30-40% closer to an airborne enemy and ambush them, or get 20% deeper into an ADA envelope, and share info with their buddies to coordinate attacks, are truly a game changer. Even if they are too damn expensive. I'd be interested to see how an F-35B stacks up against a Block 60 F-16, with all the extra stuff and conformal tanks piled on the Falcon's airframe, with a 2 AIM/2AMRAAM and 5,000 pound bomb load on each plane. And I'm not even a big fan of the F-35. They'll still suck at CAS.

 

[Housecarl]

The F-22 will own the skies as long as our lamentably low production quantity of them lasts. 2400 F-35s that can't turn and burn too well but can get 30-40% closer to an airborne enemy and ambush them, or get 20% deeper into an ADA envelope, and share info with their buddies to coordinate attacks, are truly a game changer. Even if they are too damn expensive. I'd be interested to see how an F-35B stacks up against a Block 60 F-16, with all the extra stuff and conformal tanks piled on the Falcon's airframe, with a 2 AIM/2AMRAAM and 5,000 pound bomb load on each plane. And I'm not even a big fan of the F-35. They'll still suck at CAS.

According to this article the conformal fuel tanks on the F-16 doesn't impact performance anywhere near the way that wing drop tanks do. The thinking as to why the USAF hasn't adopted them is a bit nebulous at best......

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/why-dont-new-u-s-air-force-f-16s-use-these-futuristic-1712746714

Why Don't The Newest US Air Force F-16s Use These High-Tech Fuel Tanks?

Tyler Rogoway
Filed to: Vipers
6/22/15 1:42pm

Fuel is the ever-present specter that looms over every pilot. It�fs great when you have enough of it, and terrifying when you don�ft. This is especially true for notoriously fuel hungry tactical fighters. Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs) have become an increasingly popular way to add range to existing fighter designs, such as the F-16, without making a large impact on the jet�fs speed and agility. Many overseas operators utilize CFTs on block 50/52 and later Vipers, but why don�ft America�fs late model F-16s have a similar luxury?

Conformal Fuel Tanks are not just the domain of late model F-16s, the F-15 has long benefitted from its own CFTs, and CFTs are in the works for the Gripen, Super Hornet, Rafale, Ching Kuo and Eurofighter. Advanced versions of the MiG-29 have also been fitted with a dorsal conformal fuel tank and China�fs J-10 has a CFT option in development.

The Amazing Saga Of How Israel Turned Its F-15s Into Multi-Role Bombers

When the F-15 was created, it was created to be a pure air-to-air fighter, with the philosophy of�c

Read more

The F-16�fs CFTs weigh just 900 pounds per set and can carry 450 gallons, about 3,050 pounds of jet fuel. Considering that an F-16 holds about 7,000 pounds of internal fuel, just the CFTs alone offer a 43.5 percent fuel increase with little additional drag. Also, they don�ft take up precious stores stations under the jet�fs wings or belly like traditional drop tanks.

Why Don't The Newest US Air Force F-16s Use These High-Tech Fuel Tanks?ðD
3

Pilots have been fairly explicit about how little the F-16�fs CFT�fs impact the F-16�fs notoriously spirited performance. Maj. Timothy McDonald, U.S. Air Force project pilot for F-16 CFT testing at Eglin AFB described the bolt-on addition like this:


�gThe CFTs have very little adverse effect on the F-16�fs renowned performance. A set of CFTs carries 50 percent more fuel than the centerline external fuel tank, but has only 12 percent of the drag. The aircraft retains its full 9-g capability and flight envelope with the CFTs installed. The drag impact is very small, less than one percent in combat configuration at cruise conditions.�h

Stephen Barter, Lockheed�fs CFT project pilot at the time of their developed also stated:

�gThe flying qualities of the F-16 with CFTs are essentially unchanged when compared to a non-CFT equipped airplane. For most combat flight conditions, it�fs as if the CFTs are not even there. The surest way for me to tell if CFTs are installed is to look over my shoulder.�h

F-16 CFTs are designed for the jet�fs full flight envelope, up to 9 g�fs, maximum angle of attack, sideslip and maximum roll rate and they have almost no impact on maneuverability or speed below mach one, where fighters spend the vast majority of their time. Even above mach one, they have less performance impact and carry more fuel then a centerline drop tank.

While Israel, Turkey, Poland, Greece, Morocco, Pakistan, Oman, Singapore and the UAE all actively use CFTs on their F-16 fleets, the U.S. has bypassed the option all together.

Why Don't The Newest US Air Force F-16s Use These High-Tech Fuel Tanks?ðD
4

Seeing as USAF F-16s never fly in combat without multiple external fuel tanks, which greatly hampers the jet�fs performance, aren�ft CFT�fs a no-brainer? It would seem so, but the USAF uses some seemingly backward logic when it comes to not procuring them for their Block 50/52 F-16 fleet, which is the top-of-the-line, youngest F-16 sub-fleet in the USAF�fs inventory.

From what I have gathered over the years on the topic via talking to pilots directly and seeing mentions of the decision in publications from time to time, the USAF justifies not procuring CFTs because it already has so many tanker aircraft. Additionally, in a major air battle they don�ft need the extra weapons stations freed up by the inclusion of CFTs as a great advantage because they can simply assign more F-16s to target set. For longer-range strike missions they can use the F-15E or even a bomber.

These justifications, and the fact that although the CFTs don�ft inhibit daily line maintenance and inspections when fitted to the aircraft they do take a couple hours to remove for heavy duty servicing and phase inspections, seems to be entire reasoning behind not equipping American late model Vipers with CFTs.

Why Don't The Newest US Air Force F-16s Use These High-Tech Fuel Tanks?ðD

Now let�fs take a closer look at this rationale. It is true that the U.S. has a dizzying amount of tanker aircraft, about 450 in total, with 59 being KC-10 Extenders and the rest being KC-135R Stratotankers. These aircraft can also be used for cargo missions but mainly they provide refueling for thirsty U.S. and allied military aircraft. Meanwhile, the F-16 still represents the backbone of the USAF�fs tactical air combat capability, with over 900 units still in service even after many squadrons have been shuttered due to budgetary cuts.

Over 250 of these aircraft are Block 50/52 F-16CJs that were delivered optimized for CFTs. In other words, around 30 percent of the USAF most advanced and youngest F-16s could easily be fitted with CFTs, many of which have the challenging �gWild Weasel�h Suppression of Enemy Air Defense/Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD/DEAD) mission. This demanding mission is a critical support capability that is needed to ensure the safety of both short-ranged and long-ranged aircraft against an enemy with even a rudimentary air defense system.

Why Don't The Newest US Air Force F-16s Use These High-Tech Fuel Tanks?ðD

The F-16, with its limited range and �gwork in progress�h Harm Targeting System (HTS), has never been ideally suited for this mission, only really coming into its own in it after key avionics and weapons upgrades over the last decade or so. The addition of another 40 percent or so of internal fuel would help make the jet the best Wild Weasel it could possibly be, and give it the legs it needs to work anti-aircraft systems over while strike and counter-air aircraft accomplish their missions in enemy airspace.


The USAF's Deadliest F-16 Viper Pilot On Women, Combat, And The F-35


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Adding close to 50 percent internal fuel to 25 percent of the USAF�fs existing F-16 fleet offers a slew of benefits, both tactically and strategically. First off, greatly enhanced loiter time and range. This will allow these F-16s to not be as closely tethered to aerial tankers as they are today, having to depart roughly every hour to refuel while over the combat area, which greatly complicates planning and can leave a hole over a key area of the battlefield. This is especially when executing critical close air support (CAS) and Wild Weasel missions.

On medium and short range missions, CFTs mean more maneuverability, less drag penalty and more weapons available per aircraft when compared to flying an F-16 with cumbersome under-wing tanks. On long-range missions, where underwing drop tanks are paired with CFTs, it means enhanced range and on station time.

Why Don't The Newest US Air Force F-16s Use These High-Tech Fuel Tanks?ðD

As for the idea that the USAF�fs massive tanker force makes CFTs less relevant, this seems like a very near sighted look at the enhanced capabilities CFTs offer, and it is a somewhat archaic look at the current realities of air combat.

America�fs tanker fleet will erode in numbers over time. The KC-135s, many of which are over 50 years old, cannot fly forever, and finding funding for replacing them on a one-to-one basis with the KC-46 will be all but impossible. Even the heavy hauling KC-10 Extenders have been under the budget axe as of late, simply due to their cost of operation.

Broken Booms: Why Is It So Hard To Develop & Procure A New USAF Tanker?


I was catching up on the KC-46 Pegasus program when I read this story and this story, among others, �c

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Keep in mind that this comes as the USAF looks to procure over 1700 F-35As, each carrying over two and a half times the internal fuel as their F-16 counterparts. This would not be an issue if the new stealthy jets featured over double the range or combat radius, but they don�ft. As such, they will be highly dependent on tanker gas to accomplish their mission just as their F-16 predecessors, only they are much more thirsty. This will put greater pressure on a shrinking tanker fleet during future conflicts.

Why Don't The Newest US Air Force F-16s Use These High-Tech Fuel Tanks?ðD

Then you have the Pentagon�fs supposed �gpivot towards the Pacific,�h where long distances and the realities of limited logistics and austere basing and support infrastructure are the greatest challenges to overcome. Allowing America�fs Block 50/52 F-16C/Ds to operate more independently of tankers, over greater ranges, is a logical move if this strategy is going to be taken seriously.

Then there is the tanker vulnerability issue, as they are large targets incapable of defending themselves, and tasked with operating within a few hundred miles of their short-legged fighter dependents. During a war against an enemy with anti-access and area-denial capabilities, this could mean long �etanker bridges�f shuffling fighters from far away bases to the front lines. It also means that the tankers themselves will be far-forward deployed. As such, they will be vulnerable to enemy attack, especially during swarming enemy operations, or those where advanced low-observable enemy aircraft are being used. Thus, the farther these tankers can be pushed back by increasing our combat aircraft�fs organic range the safer they will be during such a conflict conflict.

Also keep in mind that over the vast reaches of the Pacific, during even a limited near peer-state conflict, if the enemy kills the tanker, they may also have killed all the fighters dependent on that tanker as they would have to divert to bases vulnerable to enemy attack or run out of fuel and ditch in the ocean.

Why Don't The Newest US Air Force F-16s Use These High-Tech Fuel Tanks?ðD

Finally, you have cost. Tanker gas costs anywhere from $25-$35 per gallon (some claim it is closer to $50) when you factor in the costs associated with aerial refueling. This is in comparison to about $5 to $6 when an aircraft is fueled on the ground. During sustained low-intensity warfare operations or during training, relying more on ground-based fuel than on tankers is a much more economical way to go about the fighter business. It will also offer more time per sortie during training when aerial refueling assets are not used. This means less aircraft �gturns�h and much greater efficiency when getting pilots their required training hours. Less sorties, but longer ones, is also easier on the hardware.

The best part about the CFTs is that they are removable. For certain operations, if they are deemed unnecessary, the aircraft can be left stripped of them, and for other missions they can be fitted. For instance, over Afghanistan, where persistence during CAS missions was key and there was no air-to-air or advanced surface-to-air threat, hauling some 40 percent more gas while being able to carry more weapons seems like a pretty logical advantage. Yet even during combat operations, where there is a robust surface-to-air and air-to-air thrust, any slight hinderance the CFTs cause to agility, which apparently is almost nothing, is overcome by being able to stay in the fight longer at higher thrust settings.

Also, we live in time of high-off bore-sight air-to-air missiles and towed decoys, where raw agility is becoming less and less of advantage in combat. Instead, range, persistence and the ability to get the maximum out of the aircraft�fs powerplant when needed, for as long as needed, are what�fs paramount.

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The claim that the USAF can just stack more F-16s to take out a set amount of targets and fulfill a set number of patrols seems incredibly reckless. Just because the assets are available it does not mean their use is necessary. Why put more crews and material at risk than you absolutely have to during a time of war? Especially considering that losing just one F-16 will end up in putting so many more personnel at risk during a combat search and rescue operation.

The fact of the matter is that America�fs youngest F-16s will continue to serve for decades to come, most likely taking on many of the �ebread and butter�f roles that using a $100M+ stealth fighter makes absolutely no sense for.

With all this in mind isn�ft it totally reasonable to ease up a bit on America�fs fighter force tanker gas addiction and give F-16C/D Block 50/52 crews more persistence and range via the addition of CFTs? Especially considering the capability is proven, bolt on in nature, has little adverse consequences when it comes to agility and is already available off the shelf?

Logic would say yes, but the USAF somehow says no.

Contact the author at Tyler@jalopnik.com.

Photos: Turkish F-16 wikicommons/SAC Helen Farrer RAF Mobile News Team, Singapore F-16 Wikicommpns/Luhai Wong, Polish F-16 Wikicommons/SFJZ, Top shot IAF/IDF, Bottom shot via Lockheed Martin, all other photos via USAF.

 

[Housecarl]

Figured I'd add to the thread drift just a little more with the article on what the IDF/AF has done in expanding the use of their originally air superiority optimized F-15 A/B/C/Ds......

For links and images see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/the-amazing-saga-of-how-israel-turned-its-f-15s-into-mu-1701606283

The Amazing Saga Of How Israel Turned Its F-15s Into Multi-Role Bombers

Tyler Rogoway
Filed to: Eagles
5/08/15 3:45pm

When the F-15 was created, it was created to be a pure air-to-air fighter, with the philosophy of �gnot a pound for air-to-ground�h guiding designers. So how did Israel end up turning their F-15s into deadly long-range multi-role strike aircraft well before the F-15E Strike Eagle became a reality? Here�fs how.

In Need Of A Game Changing Fighter

Israel�fs love affair with the F-15 began out of the need to procure a fighter that could trump the increasingly complex fighters that surrounding Arab states were amassing from Russian and French sources. Both the F-14 Tomcat and the F-15 Eagle were tested by Israel Air Force pilots in the US during the mid 1970s, with the Eagle being chosen hands down over the Tomcat. In Hebrew, they call it the �gBaz.�h

Israel received the first of its initial order of two single seat F-15As and two, two seat F-15Bs in 1976 under the Peace Fox foreign military sales program. These aircraft were largely used as test, training and evaluation planes so that the Israeli Air Force could prepare for its full order to arrive. Another 19 F-15As and two F-15Bs were delivered by 1978, entering active service with 133 Squadron at Tel Nof airbase.

The Amazing Saga Of How Israel Turned Its F-15s Into Multi-Role Bombers ðD

The Baz represented a quantum leap in capability for the IAF, with the service having flown the F-4, A-4 and Mirage series prior to it, and was far and away the most capable fighter aircraft in the region during the 1970s. Well, at least aside from Iran�fs then growing F-14A fleet.

The Baz was truly a national source of pride in Israel at the time of its arrival and remains so to this day, with only the IAF�fs very best pilots selected to fly it. Obviously the aircraft�fs strict air-to-air focus helped with this image as the jet was viewed as a guardian of Israel, a weapon that would ensure the country�fs ability to exist through overwhelming air superiority capability.

Israeli F-15A and Bs were quick to live up to their hype, shooting down five Syrian MiG-21s over Lebanese skies on June 27th, 1979. More Syrian kills followed that September. Then, on February 13th, 1981, the Baz shot down the very aircraft that spurred the F-15�fs original development in the late 1960s, a high and fast flying MiG-25 Foxbot, also of Syrian origin.

Israeli F-15s went on to support Operation Opera, the IAF�fs daring raid on Iraq�fs nuclear reactor. Six F-15s would provide counter-air escort the eight newly received F-16s that would do the bombing. The high-risk mission was a massive success.

The Baz fleet would then go on to score dozens of kills against Syrian MiGs during the Lebanon War of 1982. IAF Brig. Gen. Moshe Marom-Melnik explained just how powerful the Baz was even against waves of Syrian MiGs:


�gWe kept the Syrians from flying in Lebanon, and did it in the best possible fashion. Every flight of Syrian planes that tried to cross the lines and attack our forces in Lebanon was shot down. Sometimes a single plane out of the flight escaped and told the others the story of what had happened. We had a field day, basically, shooting down practically everything that flew. The MiG-21 and MiG-23, which formed the backbone of the Syrian air force, were crushed. As far as our squadron was concerned, the war was more like a shooting range.�h

The Amazing Saga Of How Israel Turned Its F-15s Into Multi-Role Bombers ðD

During the early 1980s, the IAF received the improved F-15C/D Baz. 18 F-15Cs and 8 F-15Ds were delivered during the 1982-1983 timeframe. These new jets were more capable than their predecessors in almost every respect, although their airframe remained visually nearly identical to the older A/B models. These F-15C/Ds were in no way replacements for the IAF�fs older A/B models, instead they were meant to augment and grow Israel�fs cherished and battle proven Baz force and would work alongside the equally as new and growing fleet of F-16A/Bs.

Operation Wooden Leg- The Multi-Role Eagle Is Born

The very idea of what the Baz/Eagle is, and how it could be used in combat, was totally changed on October 1st, 1985 when six F-15Ds and two F-15Cs flew over 1200 miles from their Israeli bases across the Mediterranean Sea to strike the PLO�fs headquarters located on the coast of Tunis, Tunisia. This complex and risky strike, which was dubbed Operation Wooden Leg, was in retaliation for the supposed murder of three innocent Israelis yachting off of Cyprus. The PLO claimed they were Israeli spies.


At the time, this was the longest-range IAF airstrike ever, which took advantage of the Eagle�fs great endurance, especially the new C/D models which carried approximately 2,000lbs of additional internal fuel than their predecessors. It was also made possible by IAF�fs new aerial refueling capabilities, with two KC-707s being used as tankers and command posts for the mission. The tankers were procured in 1983 and the idea to give the Baz some sort of precision guided strike capability began around that same time. By 1985, crews were trained and the gear was ready for just this type of operation.

Still, training for something and executing it in reality are two entirely different things.

The Amazing Saga Of How Israel Turned Its F-15s Into Multi-Role Bombers ðD

In order for the mission to succeed, the flight had to remain undetected by North African countries, as well as Syrian and even U.S. Naval vessel�fs radars. As a result, the route was far from direct. An Israeli vessel with a helicopter aboard was pre-positioned off of Malta should any of the crews have to eject. Also, two spare F-15s, in addition to the eight primary attacker F-15s, would make it to the first refueling point before turning back. This was a hedge against any mechanical failures with the primary attack force.

Although the distances involved in the strike were groundbreaking, the fact that the F-15 would prove its ability to be adapted for the ground attack role in actual combat was monumental. The F-15A-D was actually built with a very austere ground attack capability based around gravity bombing with basic Mk82, 83 and 84 general purpose bombs. This largely dormant capability has never been exercised by any other operator but the IAF. Still, having the Baz lob dumb bombs at targets could not provide enough precision for such a high-value operation as Wooden Leg, which was aimed at telling the PLO, and the world, that Israel could retaliate against its enemies anywhere in the world via air power, with devastating results.

With this goal in mind, the six F-15Ds used in the strike were equipped with the ability to launch and guide a pair of 2,000lb GBU-15 optically guided glide bombs, with the backseaters controlling the massive weapons via a man-in-the-loop, two way data-link pod mounted on the Eagle�fs centerline station.

The Amazing Saga Of How Israel Turned Its F-15s Into Multi-Role Bombers ðD

The GBU-15 has a range of about 24 miles when launched from 40,000 feet, but in practice, a launch from 25,000 feet, with a range of about 12-15 miles is more common. The other two aircraft used on the raid were F-15Cs, which would be the last aircraft on target. They carried six 500lb Mk82s general purpose bombs each on a multiple ejector bomb racks attached to the Baz�fs centerline station. In addition to air-to-ground weaponry, the Eagles flew with AIM-7 Sparrows and their 20mm cannon magazines topped off with 940 rounds (510 rounds in the D model), just in case an aerial threat materialized.

The jets, which had all their identifying marks stripped off before the mission, made it to their targets undetected. As the first wave of three Bazs approached the coastline they launched their weapons and obtained perfect results, with the second trio launching theirs GBU-15s shortly after. The flight lead then joined with the final pair of F-15Cs after the first 5 jets turned back towards the east, their wing stations now empty. He then push into the target area with the last two F-15Cs for their bomb runs, working as a spotter and taking photos of the damage for later assessment.

The Amazing Saga Of How Israel Turned Its F-15s Into Multi-Role Bombers ðD

Almost every weapon hit their intended target, obliterating the PLO headquarters totally. For the IAF, the mission was a massive success, obliterating the briefed targets and killing large amounts of PLO personnel (IAF claimed around 60 PLO personnel were killed, while others claimed the death rate to be in the hundreds). The attacks resulted in broad international condemnation, even from the US, although for the Israelis the message they wanted to send to the world could not have been clearer. On top of this, they realized that their F-15 Baz fleet, which gained Israel air supremacy once and for all over the region in years prior, could become so much more, it could be a deterrent force aimed at enemies far from Israel�fs borders.

Strike Eagles And FAST Packs

Although details of Israel�fs startlingly long-ranged attack were kept out of the public eye following the mission, US intelligence services were surely aware of exactly how the mission was executed after the fact. The use of lightly modified F-15C/D Bazs undoubtedly gave further heft to the then finally blossoming F-15E Strike Eagle program, which had been envisioned in different configurations by McDonnell Douglas and the USAF as far back as the mid 1970s.

The F-15E�fs official first flight, after the demonstrator beat out the F-16XL during a fly-off competition, would occur just a year after Operation Wooden Leg, with its introduction into USAF service occurring in 1988, although without many of its most advanced features available.

One of the features that the F-15E would be built with was conformal fuel tanks, otherwise known as �gFAST Packs,�h as in Fuel And Sensor Tactical Packs. These flank hugging 849 gallon tanks were not new to the F-15 with the advent of the Strike Eagle, in fact they were envisioned as an option for the F-15C/D and even retrofittable to the A and B models early on, with the first test flight being flown with them attached to an Eagle in the mid 1970s. They were envisioned to carry everything from fuel to cargo, although the majority of these concepts never made it to fruition.

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USAF Eagles only took limited advantage of FAST packs, with some jets deployed to Iceland or stationed in Alaska using them sporadically for the long-range air sovereignty role. The IAF on the other hand saw the great utility in these conformal fuel tanks, not just to enhance range, but to make their air superiority focused Bazs true multi-role heavy fighters.

Like those found on the F-15E, F-15 Baz�fs conformal tanks could be fitted with hardpoints for air-to-air missiles or for bombs. This allows for the Baz to fly missions with a pair of underwing tanks and even a centerline tank while still being able execute air-to-ground missions. Today, many Bazs can be seen fitted with indigenously developed FAST Packs built by IAI, but the fact is these were flying on Bazs many decades ago.

By many accounts, they we integral in giving the aircraft flown on Operation Wooden Leg enough range to make the mission possible, as their two wing stations were filled with one GBU-15 each, and their centerline station was fitted with the data-link pod needed to control these weapons. As a result, there was no room for external tanks aside from the FAST packs.

The IAF�fs love affair with conformal fuel tanks continues on today, not just on the remaining Baz fleet, but also on every fighter aircraft ordered since the early 1990s. Additionally, fuel is not the only thing they carry. Sensors and emitters can also be fitted within them, giving the Baz a whole range of secondary mounting options beyond just its stock hardpoints.

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Upgrades And Final Baz Orders

By the late 1980s, the IAF took delivery of yet another batch of F-15C/Ds, some of the last ever built. Then, following the Gulf War, the US awarded Israel with 12 surplus F-15As and a single surplus F-15B, all from Louisiana Air National Guard stocks, as a thank you for not intervening in Operation Desert Storm even though Saddam�fs SCUD missiles were fell on the country throughout the conflict. Exactly what happened to these aircraft remains unclear. Some were said to have been in worse condition than Israel�fs own F-15A/Bs, although the B model, which the IAF puts a heavy value on, was surely integrated into the Baz fleet. The rest of the aircraft may have been used for training and/or cannibalized for spare parts.

During this same time period, much like its once Fleet Defender turned attack aircraft naval counterpart, the F-14 Tomcat, the Baz fleet received small upgrades enhancing its ability to attack ground targets. The longer range Popeye air-to-surface missile was integrated into the Baz�fs repertoire, which greatly expanded the Baz�fs standoff ground attack range to almost 50 miles. Still, the Popeye used a similar, demanding control interface as the GBU-15 and it was an expensive and powerful weapon. Nonetheless, it made the Baz fleet more capable of striking targets deep in highly defended enemy territory than ever before.

The Python 4 high-off-boresight short-range air-to-air missile and the Elbit DASH helmet mounted sight were introduced into the fleet as well. This gave Baz pilots the ability to engage enemy fighters far off the jet�fs centerline by having the pilot simply look at the target and fire the missile. This was a first for the F-15 and a capability that would only come to USAF F-15s well over a decade later in the form of the Joint Helmet Mounted Cuing System and the AIM-9X Sidewinder.

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The Baz also saw air-to-ground combat once again during Operation Accountability on July 25, 1993, striking Hezbollah targets in Lebanon. This was the first time the Baz had hit targets in the regional defense role, something that would become a bread and butter mission for the big fighter in the new millennium.

Baz 2000 and The F-15I Ra�fam

The Louisiana air guard surplus F-15As and single F-15B were the last batch of F-15 Bazs delivered to the IAF, with orders switching over to the F-15E Strike Eagle derivative, known as the F-15I �gRa�fam�h or �gThunder�h after 1993.

Ever since the Strike Eagle become operational in USAF service, Israel was interested in buying the advanced jet, yet the US was not willing to sell it to them. Then, the signing of the Oslo Accords occurred in 1993, which opened the door for Israel�fs Strike Eagle wishes to become a reality. This is very similar as to how the signing of the Egypt-Israeli peace treaty opened the door to the F-16 for the IAF about a decade and a half earlier.

Price was a major issue surrounding the Strike Eagle purchase. The aircraft would cost almost three times that of an F-16, and close to double that of a F/A-18. The fact that unique Israeli sub-systems would need to be integrated into the Strike Eagle design only made procuring large amounts of the jets more cost prohibitive. Israel even looked at buying used F-111s Aardvarks instead of the Strike Eagle, along with more F-16s, as a way to get more value for their dollar. After closely examining F-111 operations at RAF Lakenheath in England, they realized the maintenance required for the swing-wing bombers would be prohibitive. Also, the F-111 had very little ability to defend itself against enemy fighters, so it would still rely on the F-15 to get its job done.

In the end, a total of just 25 of the Strike Eagle derivatives would be ordered and they would become the most capable fighter in IAF service. As a way of augmenting the reduced F-15I buy, Israel would procure a similarly modified, but much more plentiful F-16I �gSufa,�h or �gStorm,�h fighter fleet of 100 jets.

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By the mid 1990s, with 100 F-16Is and 25 F-15Is on order, Israel turned its focus on a much needed deep F-15 Baz upgrade program, with enhancements similar to those found in the USAF�fs F-15 MSIP (Multi-Stage Improvement Program). Israel had to chose between going through an American led improvement program, or largely going about enhancing the now dated Baz for the coming decades on its own.

The IAF chose to indigenously upgrade the Baz fleet, mainly due to cost and the fact that their own unique sub-systems would have to be integrated anyway. Known as the Baz 2000 program, this reworking of the best of the IAF�fs Baz fleet would give F-15A/B/C/D aircraft a common cockpit configuration, although that was just the start of the improvements.

Many of the upgrades were ported over from the F-15I, while others were unique to the Baz fleet. The radars were upgraded to fire the AIM-120 AMRAAM. A new Hands-On Throttle And Stick setup was installed. Multi-function displays were added to the cockpit, both front and aft in the B/D model�fs case. Enhanced data-links and updated communications gear were installed. A new electronic warfare suite was also integrated into the middle aged jets along with new mission computers and navigation systems (with embedded GPS). Enhanced cooling was also a much needed feature. To support these new systems, the Bazs were totally rewired, which in itself was an impressive feat.

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In the end, the Baz 2000 initiative gobbled up an incredible 8,000 man hours per jet and ran from 1995 to 2005. Israeli technicians found that many jets was built slightly differently, so they could not just replace one black box with another, each jet had to be worked on in a one by one basis. The whole process was said to be a grueling one.

The result of the costly program was a Baz that looked very similar to the way it did decades before, but when it came to deadliness and adaptability, it was an entirely different animal. Because Israel had flown the wings off (literally!) of a good portion of the oldest Baz fleet, not every available airframe was put through the Baz 2000 upgrade program, with only the cream of the fleet (about 50 aircraft) being renewed for decades of future operations.

The Baz Is Old But Wise

Israel�fs reinvigorated Baz fleet has never been more relevant than it is today. The advent of GPS guided weaponry, such as the JDAM, allows them to finally work as pinpoint, all weather, fixed target strikers without having to rely on cumbersome optically guided weaponry. They can also still work as standoff weapons haulers as they had for decades, the only difference being that now Israel has a whole array of standoff weaponry that can be tailored to the target at hand. In addition, the Baz�fs speed, range and stability made it an ideal platform for tactical reconnaissance, and large reconnaissance pods have been seen slung underneath these jets over the last decade or so.

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Because the Baz still has similar range as its more contemporary successors, the F-15I and the F-16I, it can work as a forward deployed networking and command and control node, absorbing the battle picture via data-link from fighters within its line of sight and then beaming this information up to a satellite, which then beams it back down to Israeli commanders hundreds, or even thousands of miles away. This can also go in the opposite direction, with new orders, alerts of pop-up air defenses, and other updates being sent from behind friendly lines or from orbiting strategic intelligence aircraft to the F-15B/D Baz. From here, the Baz can disperse this information to the rest of the non-satellite communications equipped strike package.


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This high bandwidth satellite communications modification can be seen on F-15B/Ds packing a large bulbous R2-D2 like satellite communications dome just behind the environmental cooling system vent, located on the jet�fs forward spine..

Going �edowntown�f over enemy territory with a strike package is something a traditional command and control aircraft cannot do, but the Baz can. In fact, it can do this while also doing other tasks, such as electronic warfare, attacking fixed targets or conducting counter-air duties. The later of which is what the Baz was originally envisioned for, and with an unbeaten Israeli combat record to this day of 50 to 0, it is a mission the jet is still very capable of.

The Baz Continues To Confront Threats Both Old And New

In recent years, the upgraded Baz fleet has been used in conflicts near and within Israel�fs borders as well as far beyond them. With the IAF taking out Syrian and Hezbollah targets on a seemingly regular basis, and long-range raids, like the one on the Khartoum weapons dump in 2012, continuing to be an operational reality, the IAF�fs F-15 fleet remains a cherished resource. Additionally, the Baz has been used on attack missions within Israel�fs own borders during conflicts in Gaza, the most recent being the wide-ranging and controversial Operation Pillar Defense.

Still, no target looms larger for all of Israel�fs longer-ranged fighter force than Iran and its nuclear facilities. Clearly, this mission alone has helped justify the continued investment into the aging F-15 Baz fleet. The jet�fs ability to lug large weapons over long distances and be rapidly adapted to various roles beyond fighter or bomber makes it an intrinsic part of any potential sustained air operation against Iranian nuclear interests. This is especially true if Israel were to have to take a long, round-about route to strike Iran, a feat that will push the IAF�fs small but growing tanker fleet to the absolute max.


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The Baz is scheduled to not just remain in service for decades to come, but to also receive more investment in the form of additional upgrades. These proposed upgrades could include improving the jet�fs radar, upgrading its electronic warfare capability, integrating new weapons, and fielding new cockpit display interfaces. Even a possible structural upgrade may be ordered. This should allow at least the F-15C/D portion of the Baz fleet to continue flying well into the next two decades, at which time it will be joined by the F-35A Joint Strike Fighter.

If the F-15C/D Baz fleet were to see an Active Electronically Scanned Array radar upgrade, similar to the USAF�fs APG-63V3 radar upgrade for its Eagles, such a powerful radar system could be a force multiplier for the rest of Israel�fs fighter fleet. It could provide long-range situational awareness, enhanced ability to spot low-flying cruise missiles and stealthy targets in the homeland defense roll, and it could be yet another electronic attack weapon in Israel�fs already bristling bag of electronic warfare tricks.

Such a system could also benefit the F-35, which like all stealth aircraft, best goes about its business without putting any electromagnetic energy into the environment around it. Instead, it could use the F-15C/D�fs AESA radar information, taken from dozens of miles to its rear and sent forward to the F-35 via data-link, to evade or even prosecute aerial targets without emitting any electromagnetic energy at all. Similar tactics have been developed for the USAF�f sF-15C/D and F-22 air dominance team.

Although it remains unclear if the Baz will make the leap into the AESA capability space, it is possible, although it depends on Israel�fs impression of the F-35. If the F-35 becomes a favored part of the IAF�fs arsenal, it will compete for large portions of the IAF�fs available funds, just like it does within the Pentagon today. Such a struggle could limit how much more the Baz evolves, no matter how relevant the jet remains. If further upgrades do indeed comes to pass, the Baz could remain Israel�fs long sword and watchful sentinel for decades to come, adding to a legacy that has become the most illustrious in the history of modern air combat.


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Photo credits, a huge thanks to Nir Ben-Yosef for providing the images where marked. All other images via IAF. USAF, AP, Public Domain