GOV/MIL Air Force Launches New Campaign to Quell A-10 Firestorm

[Housecarl]

General: Praising the A-10 to Lawmakers is ‘Treason’
Started by Millwright‎, 01-21-2015 07:55 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...aising-the-A-10-to-Lawmakers-is-%91Treason%92

Air Force considering A-10 replacement for future close air support
Started by Housecarl‎, 02-14-2015 03:08 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...A-10-replacement-for-future-close-air-support
_____

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=1769

Air Force Launches New Campaign to Quell A-10 Firestorm

By Sandra I. Erwin
3/8/2015

As it faces yet more political backlash over the mothballing of the A-10 warplane, the Air Force is launching a new effort to prove that it truly cares about the mission of supporting ground troops with massive firepower.

In an unprecedented move, top Air Force leaders last week convened a “Close Air Support Summit” at the Pentagon with senior officials from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, National Guard Bureau and Special Operations Command.

For the Air Force, one of the takeaway messages from the summit was that it needs to explain more clearly how it will support ground troops if the A-10 is taken out of service. Another is that it has to consider the possibility that it might need a new strike aircraft to fill the gap between the A-10 and its intended replacement, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

In a briefing with reporters March 6, on the final day of the summit, Air Combat Command chief Gen. Herbert J. “Hawk” Carlisle said the central aim of the week-long gathering was to “assess the current state of close-air support and work with the Joint Staff, Special Operations Command and sister services to gain enhanced understanding of mission requirements against the backdrop of fiscal and operational challenges.”

Carlisle insisted that the summit was not about A-10 politics or damage control. He suggested there is big misunderstanding about the Air Force’s commitment to close-air support and about what it will take to operate in enemy airspace in future wars. “This week was about taking everything we've learned and continue to get better so we can operate in contested environments.”

The Air Force has been in a tough spot trying to defend the scrapping the A-10 Thunderbolt attack plane at a time when the aircraft has been in high demand in Afghanistan and in the war against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. A group of powerful lawmakers last year, led by Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., blocked the proposed A-10 retirement. Critics have blasted Air Force leaders for discarding an aging but proven weapon system to save $3.7 billion over five years and shift funding to the more glamorous F-35 Joint Strike Fighter that will not be ready for combat for several years.

A-10 supporters argue that troops are best served with a close-support airplane armed with a weapon like the 30mm Gatling gun that can get up close with the enemy and loiter over the battlefield, whereas high-flying jets like the F-35 are too far from the action.

The problem with the 40-year-old A-10 — nicknamed the Warthog for its ungainly appearance — is not its performance today but its future inability to fly in defended airspace, Carlisle said. “In a permissive environment and some level of contested environment, the A-10 operates extremely well,” he said. In highly defended airspace, the A-10 is “going to have a challenge, so the F-35 is the next step.”

There is simply not enough money in the Pentagon’s budget to keep every fleet in the inventory, he added. The Air Force has had to downsize dramatically. It had 160 fighter squadrons in the 1990s and it is down to about 50. “If your capacity is down, you take out the platform that is going to have a harder time operating in the future,” said Carlisle, although he recognized that Congress will have the final word. “Congress knows, everyone knows, we will eventually phase out the A-10 because of the environments we'll operate in.”

The decision to host a CAS summit and bring in the Pentagon’s top brass speaks to the bruising political fight that Air Force leaders have waged since the retirement of the A-10 was first proposed two years ago. More recently, the service came under fire when it was reported that Air Force Maj. Gen. James Post told officers in a private meeting that “anyone who is passing information to Congress about A-10 capabilities is committing treason.” The Project on Government Oversight and other watchdog groups also pounded on the Air Force for starting an alleged smear campaign against the A-10 by releasing data showing that the aircraft is responsible for more incidents of fratricide and civilian deaths than any U.S. military aircraft since 2001.

Air Force Chief of Staff Mark Welsh conceived the summit as a forum to discuss “where we are with CAS, what we’ve learned and where we are headed in the future,” said Carlisle. “This is not necessarily in response to anything other than the changing world environment we're living in and the fiscal constraints” that have compelled the Air Force to make tough decisions about investments in new weapons. Carlisle also noted that friendly fire deaths are a concern. “We want precision, weapons where we can control the yield,” he said.

Carlisle unveiled a number of new Air Force initiatives that are aimed at bolstering the close-air support mission. “We need to maintain the culture,” he said. But the A-10 is not the only aircraft that can do this mission, he insisted. “As long as it's in the inventory I'm going to use it, it's a fantastic platform,” but so are other aircraft, he said. “Based on congressional guidance, over time we will divest our A-10 fleet. We will have predominantly CAS squadrons of F-16s and F-15s and eventually F-35s. We want the CAS expertise to keep that knowledge base and culture alive.”
A third of the first F-35 squadron at Nellis Air Force, Nevada, are A-10 pilots. The F-35, however, will not be ready for CAS mission until its Block 4 upgrade scheduled to happen in the next several years.

The Air Force intends to create a “CAS integration group” probably at Nellis, with representatives from all the military services and special operations forces, Carlisle said. “The idea is to continue to advance CAS understanding.” There is consideration of assigning 12 F-16s to the CAS integration group for pilot and ground-controller training. “We need resources to build up the organization, build exercises. It'll evolve over time.”

The Air Force’s fiscal year 2016 budget request seeks to retire all 164 A-10s by 2019. The Warthog is on its last legs, Carlisle said. The aircraft already have been modernized with new wings, engines and cockpits. “There's only so much you can get out of that airplane. We could keep it in the inventory for 10 years but they'll wear out. They've been worked very hard. It will eventually age out.” In the next decade, the F-35 will be the “primary CAS platform” although he did not rule out the possibility of seeking a lower cost airplane as an alternative to the F-35. “We'll continue to look at this. We're not going to start developing a new platform but we have to be open to what transition points we may face.” A commercially developed military plane like Textron’s Scorpion is not inconceivable in CAS missions, he said. “We have looked at other platforms to meet the low end CAS mission at lower cost.”

Air Force leaders know that the battle over the A-10 is far from over, said retired Air Force Lt. Gen. David Deptula. Everyone was surprised by how emotional and contentious the issue became, Deptula told National Defense. Last week’s Close Air Support Summit is unlikely to have occurred were it not for the A-10 controversy. “Big summits on individual mission areas are unusual,” he said. “This clearly was driven by the attention.”

The Air Force is making the right decision on the A-10, he said. “What you read about the Air Force not caring about CAS is nonsense. I’m surprised there is this much backlash. The facts do not support the accusations.”

Some people attach too much importance to one aircraft, he said. “They forget that the A-10 was not designed for CAS.” The 30mm gun that fires uranium depleted rounds was intended to kill tanks in the Fulda Gap in Central Europe. “That’s direct attack of armor and interdiction and not CAS.”

The Air Force to some degree created its own problem because “we like to label things,” said Deptula. “We call B-52s strategic bombers, but we have used B-52s for CAS. I had A-10s doing road reconnaissance, airfield attacks, Scud hunting and interdiction.” Then there is the budget argument. “The Air Force has done a thorough analysis. What else does Congress want? Unfortunately this has taken up a lot of the leadership’s time and attention.”

 

[The Mountain]

It's a much smaller step from tank-killer to CAS than it is from air-to-air fighter to CAS. Even with ultra-precision munitions, some aspect of CAS is always going to have to include the "Close" aspect, and a fighter just isn't built to do that properly. Someone needs to make a point in these discussions to attach the names of the AF officers defending the F-35 as a CAS platform, so their careers can go down in flames along with all the expensive (and unarmored) aircraft that'll get chewed up by AAA emplacements due to their idiotic decision.

Oh, and yes, just about any aircraft *can* be used for CAS, even the high-altitude bombers like the B52. That does not mean they'll be *good* at it.

 

[Blue 5]

The day they cancel the F-35 program (which I think will now happen because Lockheed is suddenly talking about ramping up production of a new, upgraded version of the F-16!), I believe that everyone in the Congress, Lockheed, and the Air Force who was involved in the procurement process should be taken to the nearest prison and locked away for life. There is no excuse for the level of corruption and misappropriation of funds that this boondoggle cost the Republic.

Long live the Warthog!

 

[Publius]

Some aircraft company needs to tool up for reproducing the A10 and with correction of the flaws taken into account. The ordinal maker destroyed all the tooling they had after completion of the contract and why they did this is unknown.

 

[sy32478]

So what is the difference in stall speed for an F-16 or an F-35 vs. an A-10?

 

[Publius]

So what is the difference in stall speed for an F-16 or an F-35 vs. an A-10?

The A-10 has a stall speed of 138 MPH so it must maintain 145 MPH to avoid problems.

The F-16 can probably fly at a very slow speed but the steep nose up angle it must fly to do this makes it useless for any defense, they can just come in for a look around and the F-16 have no redundant systems like the A-10 and has no armor.

 

[The Mountain]

If we're unequivocally losing the Thunderbolt, then that's just going to be the way it is. I don't think this is a battle that can be won at this point.

That said, I wonder if a non-folding variant of the Osprey would make for a nice CAS platform?

 

[Dozdoats]

CAS platforms need to be:

1) Cheap, so they can be built in quantity

2) Tough, so they can take a licking and keep on ticking

3) Modular, so they can be easily repaired on the front lines and put back into service

4) Capable of long duration low and slow missions, so they can loiter over the dogfaces on the ground who suddenly NEED CAS RIGHT NOW REALLY BAD

5) Capable of being operated out of austere airfields close to the front lines

6) Capable of hauling LOTS of ordnance, and delivering it right into the pickle barrel on demand

7) Flown by Army warrant officer pilots, because the USAF has demonstrated repeatedly that it DOES NOT WANT the CAS mission.

The zoomie fast movers need to be focused on the air superiority mission, to keep the skies safe for the low and slow guys flying CAS. That's what zoomies want to do - either AS or flying bomb trucks, to keep the 'bomb 'em into the stone age' blue suiter proponents happy (and still deluded). So let 'em do what they want to do, and assign CAS to the people who understand it at sphincter level.

 

[Hogwrench]

So what is the difference in stall speed for an F-16 or an F-35 vs. an A-10?

The better question is maneuvering speed, which is why the A-10 can not be effectively replaced by anything else at this time. Sure an f-16 can come in at 175 knots at 200 feet AGL. But the maneuverability of the f-16, or any supersonic capable aircraft for that matter, at slow airspeeds sucks. The reason being is that wings are very low drag and produce little lift. The A-10 has a traditional cambered wing just like you would find on a cessna which is why it works so well at at CAS. An A-10 can do an orbit over a target inside of 100 meters. The F-16 takes about 250 meters to do a "tight" orbit. You can see a hell of a lot more from inside 100 compared to 250 meters. By orbit I mean a tight 360 degree turn. Most fighters are very susceptible to even small arms fire when operating within a few hundred feet of the ground. The A-10 was designed to mitigate this threat. Hell when I worked at Nellis we had an F-15E come back that someone had shot with a .30 cal and hit the left Horizontal Stabilizer. Probably a pissed off rancher. The Aircraft was grounded for over a week because the stab is composite and required replacement, for a single hole. The price of a new stab was about half a million if I remember correctly.

They tested using F-16s for CAS when I was in. The JTACS and CCT's hated them because they wanted to operate from several thousand feet. To the flip side of that, The Hog pilots had laser pointers that they would attach to their left index finger, and at night would confirm ground targets by lighting them up with the fingertip ir laser. This ensured that they were on the correct target and friendlies would not be hit.

Can the F-35 and F-16 be used for CAS. The short answer is yes. But they will never be as effective as an A10. They will operate from higher altitudes and not go play in the dirt. A result of that will be more aircraft downed and a higher friendly fire casualty rate. Danger close is exactly that. Most Hog pilots will give a low pass and orbit to visually confirm where friendly and enemy forces are at. Then they make it rain. The other aircraft require radio comms to establish their locations, which being off by a hundred feet could mean friendly death or not taking the shot in fear of hitting friendlies.

We have the best trained pilots and crews in the world. They will do whatever it takes to bring our brothers back safely. Politicians on the other hand can go to hell. They should be looking for a replacement for the A10 from the ground up. Not making due with what we already have. Fairchild designed a phenomenal aircraft in the 70's, so imagine what we could come up with today if we tried.

 

[Gitche Gumee Kid]

CAS platforms need to be:

1) Cheap, so they can be built in quantity

2) Tough, so they can take a licking and keep on ticking

3) Modular, so they can be easily repaired on the front lines and put back into service

4) Capable of long duration low and slow missions, so they can loiter over the dogfaces on the ground who suddenly NEED CAS RIGHT NOW REALLY BAD

5) Capable of being operated out of austere airfields close to the front lines

6) Capable of hauling LOTS of ordnance, and delivering it right into the pickle barrel on demand

7) Flown by Army warrant officer pilots, because the USAF has demonstrated repeatedly that it DOES NOT WANT the CAS mission.

The zoomie fast movers need to be focused on the air superiority mission, to keep the skies safe for the low and slow guys flying CAS. That's what zoomies want to do - either AS or flying bomb trucks, to keep the 'bomb 'em into the stone age' blue suiter proponents happy (and still deluded). So let 'em do what they want to do, and assign CAS to the people who understand it at sphincter level.

>================================0==================================>

Thanks, Dozdoats for your definitive post.

GGK

 

[Shacknasty Shagrat]

The day they cancel the F-35 program (which I think will now happen because Lockheed is suddenly talking about ramping up production of a new, upgraded version of the F-16!), I believe that everyone in the Congress, Lockheed, and the Air Force who was involved in the procurement process should be taken to the nearest prison and locked away for life. There is no excuse for the level of corruption and misappropriation of funds that this boondoggle cost the Republic.

Long live the Warthog!

Thanks for the post.
There is enough smoke, misinformation and utter bullsht in the article to fill a large room.
The first step is to replace lying snakes like Gen. Herbert J. “Herk” Carlisle and retired Lt. Gen. David Deptula. Prison can come later.
Next, the F-35 'Failure' program should be ended before more money is expended. The only future for the single engine, slow, low climb and agility F-35 is to be a blot on the resumes of those who supported it.

“We call B-52s strategic bombers, but we have used B-52s for CAS.' This is not a solution. And high altitude strategic bombers are poor CAS, like in the Clinton War in the Balkans. Few planes are lost but little to no damage is done to targets.

“They forget that the A-10 was not designed for CAS', And neither is the F-35 nor the F-16. And these blowhards forget that the priority is to get something that works, not some sort of process worship.
There is a list of improvements to the A-10 that a new A-10 design could incorporate that would allow real Close Air Support, but the Air Force is off with their zoomy disinterest in protecting grunts and holding ground or pressing the ground assault. First you get the mission(close air support) and then you get the men and machines to carry it out. F-35s and F-16s do not provide effective, reliable CAS.
SS

 

[Dozdoats]

Thanks, Dozdoats for your definitive post.

I wish

Comes from a good many hours sitting around NCO Club tables with a bunch of old MACV-SOG snake-eaters ...

Who all had all had love affairs with A-1 SPADs and Cobras in their pasts, or they probably wouldn't have been there.

And hearing the pain in the voices of men who had been stuck working the radios while they had two teams on the ground in contact ... and only had CAS resources to send to one of them.

 

[night driver]

Some aircraft company needs to tool up for reproducing the A10 and with correction of the flaws taken into account. The ordinal maker destroyed all the tooling they had after completion of the contract and why they did this is unknown.

Likely because they were told there weren't going toi be any follow on contracts.
Tooling usually DOES get trashed after completion, since there really is no good place to store some junk you aren't ever scheduled to use again.

We were SPECIFICALLY NOT trying to sell Thunderbolts to ANY OTHER country.

 

[OldArcher]

CAS platforms need to be:

1) Cheap, so they can be built in quantity

2) Tough, so they can take a licking and keep on ticking

3) Modular, so they can be easily repaired on the front lines and put back into service

4) Capable of long duration low and slow missions, so they can loiter over the dogfaces on the ground who suddenly NEED CAS RIGHT NOW REALLY BAD

5) Capable of being operated out of austere airfields close to the front lines

6) Capable of hauling LOTS of ordnance, and delivering it right into the pickle barrel on demand

7) Flown by Army warrant officer pilots, because the USAF has demonstrated repeatedly that it DOES NOT WANT the CAS mission.

The zoomie fast movers need to be focused on the air superiority mission, to keep the skies safe for the low and slow guys flying CAS. That's what zoomies want to do - either AS or flying bomb trucks, to keep the 'bomb 'em into the stone age' blue suiter proponents happy (and still deluded). So let 'em do what they want to do, and assign CAS to the people who understand it at sphincter level.

Truly BRILLIANT analysis! Well Done, Sir!!!

Maranatha

OA

 

[OldArcher]

The better question is maneuvering speed, which is why the A-10 can not be effectively replaced by anything else at this time. Sure an f-16 can come in at 175 knots at 200 feet AGL. But the maneuverability of the f-16, or any supersonic capable aircraft for that matter, at slow airspeeds sucks. The reason being is that wings are very low drag and produce little lift. The A-10 has a traditional cambered wing just like you would find on a cessna which is why it works so well at at CAS. An A-10 can do an orbit over a target inside of 100 meters. The F-16 takes about 250 meters to do a "tight" orbit. You can see a hell of a lot more from inside 100 compared to 250 meters. By orbit I mean a tight 360 degree turn. Most fighters are very susceptible to even small arms fire when operating within a few hundred feet of the ground. The A-10 was designed to mitigate this threat. Hell when I worked at Nellis we had an F-15E come back that someone had shot with a .30 cal and hit the left Horizontal Stabilizer. Probably a pissed off rancher. The Aircraft was grounded for over a week because the stab is composite and required replacement, for a single hole. The price of a new stab was about half a million if I remember correctly.

They tested using F-16s for CAS when I was in. The JTACS and CCT's hated them because they wanted to operate from several thousand feet. To the flip side of that, The Hog pilots had laser pointers that they would attach to their left index finger, and at night would confirm ground targets by lighting them up with the fingertip ir laser. This ensured that they were on the correct target and friendlies would not be hit.

Can the F-35 and F-16 be used for CAS. The short answer is yes. But they will never be as effective as an A10. They will operate from higher altitudes and not go play in the dirt. A result of that will be more aircraft downed and a higher friendly fire casualty rate. Danger close is exactly that. Most Hog pilots will give a low pass and orbit to visually confirm where friendly and enemy forces are at. Then they make it rain. The other aircraft require radio comms to establish their locations, which being off by a hundred feet could mean friendly death or not taking the shot in fear of hitting friendlies.

We have the best trained pilots and crews in the world. They will do whatever it takes to bring our brothers back safely. Politicians on the other hand can go to hell. They should be looking for a replacement for the A10 from the ground up. Not making due with what we already have. Fairchild designed a phenomenal aircraft in the 70's, so imagine what we could come up with today if we tried.

Yet more BRILLIANT analysis! Too bad the Pentagon brass hats are so corrupt- playing with the lives of Patriots...

Maranatha

OA

 

[AlfaMan]

The tooling got tossed after Republic went out of business/got bought out. It's interesting the F-105 Thunderchief was also made by Republic and tooling was also trashed after the last G models were made. Fairchild Republic built some fantastic aircraft!
The textron Scorpion looks like an interesting potential replacement for the A10-frankly it looks like a 3/4 scale Alpha Jet. Or an L39 Delfin.....I don't think it would be as effective as the A10 however. And a V tail arrangement? With a bomb load? Talk about longitudinal instability! Load up a V 35 Bonanza with luggage and try and keep it on a straight and level.You'll wear out the autopilot.....same thing with this scorpion.
For those of the Vietnam generation; this same argument came up-fast movers versus solid and cheap COIN and ground attack planes. At that time Temco I believe tried to get the AF to buy a COIN plane that looked like a scaled up Mustang with a PT 6 turboprop engine.
I'd like to see the close air support mission go back to the Army-warrant officers could easily handle this mission.

Likely because they were told there weren't going toi be any follow on contracts.
Tooling usually DOES get trashed after completion, since there really is no good place to store some junk you aren't ever scheduled to use again.

We were SPECIFICALLY NOT trying to sell Thunderbolts to ANY OTHER country.

 

[Housecarl]

All of these "suggestions" might be ok for COIN/LIC but what's going on in Iraq now or what could jump off either in Eastern Europe or the Korean Peninsula (or for that matter the SAM/AAA/MANPAD environment they operating in during Gulf Wars 1 and 2) needs something more that an armed advanced trainer. Considering this came out of the Washington Post I'm not overly surprised that such a nuance was missed by the author and the editor. However it wasn't lost on those commenting.....Housecarl

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/...ace-the-a-10-if-the-pentagon-spends-the-cash/

These planes could someday replace the A-10 — if the Pentagon spends the cash
By Dan Lamothe March 9 at 1:10 PM Follow @danlamothe
Comments 70

The impending mothballing of the A-10 Thunderbolt II attack jet has prompted outrage among its advocates in the active-duty military, hand-wringing on Capitol Hill and questions from analysts about whether the new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter can be operated cheaply enough to support ground troops on a regular basis.

But it also has sparked a question: Which plane could the U.S. military adopt if it ultimately decides it needs a new, designated plane to provide close-air support?

[RELATED: Close-air support mission to get new scrutiny as the A-10 retires]

The mission has been handled by a variety of aircraft in recent years, but it is the A-10, nicknamed the Warthog, that is beloved for its ability to loiter over a battlefield and target enemy fighters, tanks and vehicles. Even as its heads into retirement, it is carrying out about 11 percent of the combat sorties against the Islamic State militant group, Air Force Secretary Deborah James said in January.

Air Force Gen. Herbert “Hawk” Carlisle, the commander of Air Combat Command, left open the possibility on Friday that the service could eventually need another plane to fill the close-air support mission. He called it the “A-X,” with the “A” meaning its primary mission would be attacking enemy forces on the ground. (As opposed to fighter jets, which get the “F” prefix.)

But the Air Force isn’t planning to pay for that anytime soon. Rather, it plans to retire the A-10 and rely on other existing planes like the F-15 Strike Eagle and F-16 Fighting Falcon to carry out close-air support. Defense officials want the F-35 to eventually take the mission over, but it isn’t clear how long that will take. Getting rid of the Air Force’s 283 A-10s will save $3.7 billion over five years, senior defense officials said.

[RELATED: Air Force to move A-10 jets into backup status despite congressional opposition]

Carlisle said that questions about “capacity” leave the door open to an “A-X” plane.” Each variant of the F-35 costs more than $30,000 per hour to fly, according to Pentagon estimates that some critics consider conservative. The cost to fly the A-10 is closer to $11,500, according to an analysis by The Atlantic.

The A-10 and possible successors wouldn’t fare well in dogfight with other advanced fighters. But against the variety of militant groups that have seized attention in the last year, they’d still be effective, and at a fraction of the price. Here are a few planes analysts discuss in the close-air support mission:

A-29 Super Tucano

Air Force Capt. Matthew Clayton, of the 81st Fighter Squadron, flies an A-29 Super Tucano on March 5, 2015, in the skies over Moody Air Force Base, Ga. The 81st FS is the only A-29 squadron in the Air Force. (Photo by Senior Airman Ryan Callaghan/ Air Force)

The U.S. military thought enough of this turboprop aircraft to purchase a number of them for the nascent Afghan air force, which the Pentagon is funding and training. The first 20 arrived at Moody Air Force Base in Georgia in September, as the service prepares to train Afghan pilots there.

The Super Tucano, called the A-29 by the Air Force, is made by Brazilian aviation firm Embraer, and has been used by militaries across the world. It typically costs about $1,000 an hour to fly. It could be outfitted with a variety of bombs and machine guns, and has drawn interest from a variety of African militaries facing insurgencies. The Afghan version is made in the United States by Embraer and Sierra Nevada Corp.

Afghanistan won’t receive its first Super Tucanos until December, Gen. Joseph Campbell, the top U.S. commander there, testified last week. The fact that the plane will not be available for fighting season this year is considered a setback for the Afghan military.

The Scorpion

The Textron Scorpion is a small jet that has been pitched by the company as an option for close-air support. (Photo released by Textron)

The Scorpion jet has been developed by Textron, which includes Bell Helicopter, Cessna and other major aviation companies. It was first introduced in 2013, and recently reached 300 hours in flight testing, company officials said. It costs about $3,000 per flight hour, and has been pitched by the company as a cheap option to perform maritime security, close-air support and surveillance missions.

Carlisle left open the possibility that the Air Force might pursue the Scorpion when asked about it Friday. But he said other planes also are in play, without naming any.

“We have to keep thinking about those things because, frankly, we haven’t been very good at predicting the future and what it’s going to look like,” the general said.

The aircraft has drawn interest from militaries across the world, and was displayed at an international airshow in Abu Dhabi, the International Defense Exhibition and Conference (IDEX), last month.

The AT-6

The Beechcraft AT-6 has competed with the Super Tucano for contracts in the past. (Photo released by Beechcraft)

Beechcraft’s AT-6 has been used by the Air Force as a trainer plane for years, and used by the a variety of militaries abroad, including Iraq’s and Mexico’s. The single-prop plane can carry a variety of weapons on stations mounted on its wings, and has competed with the Super Tucano for contracts in the past.

The American version is sometimes known as the Texan II. Raytheon is integrating the 44-pound Griffin “mini-missile” onto it in the future, upping its firepower. The Griffin has been used on other U.S. aircraft, including the KC-130 gunship, which is equipped with a powerful Harvest Hawk weapons suite.

Dan Lamothe covers national security for The Washington Post and anchors its military blog, Checkpoint.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com...a-class-colorado-laid-in-rhode-island-029799/

Navy Refurbishing F-18s 1 Per Week; Buying F-35s 1 per Quarter | Keel of Virginia-Class Colorado Laid in Rhode Island

Mar 10, 2015 03:56 UTC by Defense Industry Daily staff

Americas

Much tut-tutting external link is heard in the trade press now that the Air Force is stating openly that the F-35 will not be prepared to take on the close air support (CAS) role for which it is, in small part, slated. This has not slowed down the Air Force’s ardor for retiring the current CAS airframe, the A-10. It is certainly handy for the Air Force to shift a few billion dollars over to the needful F-35 project in the interim.

In related news, Senate Armed Services Committee Chair John McCain is promising to reverse external link what he sees as dunderheaded Air Force moves to mothball the A-10s. He has vocal congressional support, including that from fellow Arizonan Martha McSally (R-AZ) who herself was a warthog pilot supporting Operation Southern Watch over Iraq and Kuwait.

The U.S. Navy is pumping out newly refurbished F/A-18s external link at a much faster clip than Lockheed is producing the F-35s, guaranteeing the Navy’s primary strike capacity will be its F-18s for the next decade at least. Plans are to extend the Super Hornet’s hours capacity from 6,000 to 10,000. The Navy hasn’t been terribly gung-ho on F-35 procurement, averaging about four per year for first seven years, and planning to order four more for 2016. The Navy intends to refurbish another 50 F-18s in the coming year, up from 40 the year before.

The keel of the Colorado, the 15th and newest of the Virginia class fast attack submarine was laid external link in a ceremony in Rhode Island. The subs, at about $2.5 billion a piece, were designed in the Clinton era specifically to be more cost-efficient than the Seawolf class, which topped out at about $3.5 billion per boat by the time the third and last was finished. The Seawolf was one of the first major weapons systems in the modern era that was extinguished by the politically unsupportable weight of its costs in what would later be termed a “cost death spiral.” Reduced numbers of units caused a cost-per-unit rise that then fed additionally into the pressure to cut future units.

Middle East

The profusion of new sensors on the battlefield brings the command and control elements virtually closer to the action, but this can cut both ways. More people seeing more information does not quicken the decision making process, and pilots loitering over ISIS targets are starting to complain external link.

Sikorski is about to start the upgrading process external link for UAE’s Black Hawks.

Iran’s newly announced Soumar missile external link could carry a 410 kg warhead more than a thousand miles, or perhaps a bit less then that, in good part depending on whether or not the Iranians have access to the Russian TRDD-30 or Ukrainian R95 engines. The Russian version of this – the Kh55 – carries a roughly 200 kiloton nuclear warhead.

Saudi Arabia beat out India this past year in defense imports to become the worlds largest importer external link by value.

Asia

Yonhap is reporting external link that China’s President Xi Jinping directly appealed to South Korean President Park Geun-hye, entreating her to reject the American effort to install THAAD on the Korean Peninsula. The THAAD system, directed at the undeniable North Korean missile threat, could theoretically also cork up some of China’s capacity to lob missiles eastward toward Pacific targets. China is reportedly willing to give South Korea unspecified trade benefits, which seems a poor bargain versus an existential threat. The Chinese may be expecting to win only a limited assurance or a type of system limitation. Seoul’s strategy to date appears to have been reaffirmed in another Yonhap report external link, with the government repeatedly stressing it has no plans to purchase a THAAD system and shrugging at the suggestion that the U.S. would install its own to protect the 28,500 U.S. troops hosted by South Korea.

Today’s Video

Iran’s Soumar missile is unveiled. Here is a test flight…

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[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://theaviationist.com/2015/03/09/a-10-deployed-al-udeid/

The U.S. Air Force has moved more A-10 Thunderbolt attack planes to the “Arabian Gulf”

Mar 09 2015 - 0 Comments
By David Cenciotti

U.S. A-10s have arrived in Qatar to take part in regional exercises.

Six A-10 Thunderbolts and more than 120 personnel assigned to the 190th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron have arrived to Al Udeid airbase, in Qatar to take part in three major exercises in the region.

The Thunderbolts and accompanying servicemen are from the 190th Fighter Squadron, 124th Fighter Wing, at Gowen Field Air National Guard Base, Boise, Idaho.

Noteworthy, even though several platforms will participate in the drills, the focus of these exercises will be more heavily on the A-10 and aimed at sharing pilots expertise in several areas mastered by the Warthog: close air support, forward air patrol, and combat search and rescue.

Usually, combat planes already in theater support these exercises; however, as explained by the Air Force Central Command: “because of the increased operations tempo required to support real-world operations like Operation Inherent Resolve, the Air Force has tasked units not currently engaged in the combat operations to participate in the regional exercises.”

According to the Air Force, the Air National Guard Thunderbolts have already taken part in one exercise but exact locations for the remaining two exercises are not released “due to host-nation sensitivities.”

For sure, some local nation, possibly one of those already involved in the air war on ISIS in Syria and Iraq is due to attend the exercises. Worth of note is the way the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy have started to refer to the Persian Gulf.

Here is an excerpt from the official USAF press release (highlight mine):

“We want to give our young pilots the experience of flying in the Arabian Gulf and allow them to see what it’s like operating with different procedures in different countries.”

Although the name of the body of water between the Arabian peninsula and Iran is historically and internationally known as the Persian Gulf after the land of Persia (Iran), some Arab countries have disputed the naming convention since the 1960s. The U.S. military is frequently using the term Arabian Gulf instead of Persian Gulf, most probably as a sign of the Washington armed forces’ will to follow local conventions or laws that ban the use of “Persian Gulf”.

For instance, the caption of the photos that showed a French Navy Rafale operate from the USS Carl Vinson in the Persian Gulf, referred to the waters of the Persian Gulf as “Arabian Gulf”.

Anyway, the A-10s are still heavily employed in theaters across the world in spite of their planned withdrawal.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://in.rbth.com/blogs/2015/03/11/how_russias_s-400_makes_the_f-35_obsolete_41895.html

How Russia’s S-400 makes the F-35 obsolete

March 11, 2015 Rakesh Krishnan Simha

The sale of the powerful S-400 surface-to-air missile systems to China not only marks another milestone in Russia-China relations, it is a remarkable example of how a comparatively inexpensive weapon can make a trillion dollar project obsolescent before it even gets off the ground.

It’s not often that a relatively inexpensive air defence weapon is able to make a trillion dollar fighter programme obsolete. But the $500 million S-400 missile system has done precisely that to America’s brand new F-35 stealth fighter.

In November 2014 Moscow and Beijing inked a $3 billion agreement for the supply of six battalions of S-400 anti-aircraft/anti-missile systems that will significantly boost China’s air defence capability against the US and its allies in the Western Pacific.

With a tracking range of 600 km and the ability to hit targets 400 km away at a blistering speed of 17,000 km an hour – faster than any existing aircraft–the S-400 is a truly scary weapon if you are facing its business end.First deployed by Russia in 2010, each S-400 battalion has eight launchers, a control centre, radar and 16 missiles available as reloads.

пустым не оставлять!!
S-400 air defence missile system defends the skies over Moscow

Unlike the overhyped US Patriot missile that turned out to be a dud in battle, the S-400 was designed to create the daddy of Iron Domes. “Given its extremely long range and effective electronic warfare capabilities, the S-400 is a game-changing system that challenges current military capabilities at the operational level of war,” Paul Giarra, president, Global Strategies and Transformation, told Defense News. The S-400 will have the “effect of turning a defensive system into an offensive system, and extend China’s A2/AD (anti-access/area-denial) umbrella over the territory of American allies and the high seas.”

But first a bit of background. The S-400 was developed to defend Russian air space and a few hundred kilometers further against missiles and aircraft of all types, including stealth. Because it is a highly potent and accurate weapon that can tip the balance of power in any war theatre, Moscow has long resisted the temptation of exporting even its older iteration, the S-300, to troubled allies Syria and Iran.

An S-300 missile fired from, say, Damascus will blow away an aircraft over central Tel Aviv in about 107 seconds, giving the Israelis just enough time to say their prayers. It is precisely because the S-series missile systems can so dramatically upset the military balance that Israel has pressured Russia against introducing it into the Middle East tinderbox. Israel has also warned it would go after Syrian S-300 batteries with everything it’s got.

However, China’s case is different because the chances of another country daring to take a shot at the Chinese are next to zero. This development is really bad news for the F-35.

Russia and the US have traditionally adopted different military strategies. During the Cold War the US relied upon carrier-based aircraft to project power in the Western Pacific, and the strategy continues today. The Russians on the other hand decided these floating airfields were easy targets for their shore-based long-range aviation and anti-ship cruise missiles.

Military
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Defence and Security

If it came to war, waves of long-range bombers such as the Tu-95M Backfire would take off from safe bases deep in continental Russia, fire their powerful cruise missiles from safe stand-offdistances and blast the carriers out of the water. The Russian pilots would then head home to watch the damage on CNN!

The Russian logic was elegantly simple. Back then the average nuclear powered aircraft carrier cost$1 billion whereas the average anti-ship cruise missile cost $1 million or less. For the money they’d have spent on a single carrier, the Russians figured they could build a thousand cruise missiles. Even if just a fraction of these missiles got through, all American carriers were dead in the water.

The Russians were so sure about the accuracy of their cruise missiles that the Backfirescarried only one Raduga Kh-22 (NATO name AS-4 Kitchen) missile armed with a nuclear warhead. According to weapons expert Bill Sweetman and Bill Gunston these missiles could be “programmed to enter the correct Pentagon window”.

China too is following the same trajectory. It has adopted the Russian Cold War strategy of attacking aircraft carriers with waves of bombers armed with its cruise missiles(that are knockoffs of Russian missiles). In fact, complete destruction of a carrier isn't necessary; even slight damage can put such large vessels out of commission for months. And since wars don’t last that long these days, the crippling of its carrier arm will force American capitulation early on in any conventional conflict.

To counter the missile threat to its carriers, the Americans are relying on the F-35 as a cruise missile killer. More than a trillion dollars have already been spent on this troubled project. Even if the F-35 is able to miraculously overcome its shortcomings, the S-400 upends this strategy.

пустым не оставлять!!
Strategic forces to use Yars ballistic missiles

Lockheed-Martin claims the F-35 has such advanced electronics that it can jam anything directed at it.But the S-400 won’t be easy to shake off. “It has many features specifically designed to overcome countermeasures and stealth, such as a larger, more powerful radar that is more resistant to jamming. It also actually has a set of three missiles of varying range that provide overlapping layers of defense," Ivan Oelrich, an independent defence analyst told The Diplomat.

There’s another way the S-400 degrades the F-35’s availability. Fourth generation aircraft such as the Su-30 and MiG-29 have aluminium bodies but stealth aircraft have composite bodies with special radar absorbing coating that requires several hours to apply. For each hour of flight, the F-35 requires 9-12 man hours of maintenance.

But that’s in normal flight. Wear and tear will be of a higher degree during evasive maneuvers that are inevitable if trying to shake off an S-400 radar lock (that's if the F-35 has enough time to react to the missile in the first place). Not only does the stealthy skin require new repair techniques, but extensive skin damage will necessitate repairs at Lockheed's land-based facilities. It is because of this reason that Eglin air force base in Florida has 17 mechanics per F-35.

Navy gets jitters

The F-35’s backers say the aircraft can emit frequencies, which can confuse and disable the S-400. But the US Navy's acquisition of 22 Growler jamming aircraft suggests the F-35’s jamming capability is not really all that it’s cracked up to be. According to Air Force Technology, there aresome figures in the US Navy and industry which say the F-35's stealth and EW capabilities are simply not enough.

“Pentagon officials are in an awkward position. If the Pentagon was to invest in more electronic warfare aircraft – such as the Growler – it would signal a lack of faith in the F-35's capability to penetrate enemy airspace. Equally, if it didn't invest in additional electronic warfare capabilities, the lives of F-35 pilots could be at risk with the proliferation of more advanced A2/AD weapons in countries such as China.”

пустым не оставлять!!
How Russian military technology is used abroad

These weapons the Pentagon is losing sleep over are clearly the S-300 and S-400.

According to Air Power Australia, “The S-300P/S-400 family of surface to air missile systems is without doubt the most capable SAM system in widespread use in the Asia Pacific region.”

“While the S-300P/S-400 series is often labelled ‘Russia's Patriot’, the system in many key respects is more capable than the US Patriot series, and in later variants offers mobility performance and thus survivability much better than that of the Patriot.”

Growing trust

The missile deal is a pointer to the increasing bonhomie between the political leaderships in Moscow and Beijing. The S-400 deal follows the clearance of the Su-35 fighter-bomber sale to China last year. Negotiations that had got bogged down for years because the Russian side wanted to protect their intellectual property were greenlighted after the West imposed sanctions.

The Russian concern was the Chinese would buy a few ‘samples’, take them apart, and then cancel the deal after deciding they could reverse engineer local versions. These knock-offs which would then be peddled cheap as chips overseas. In fact, the Chinese have traditionally reverse-engineered Russian weapons. Their J-15 jet fighter, for instance, is a copy of the Russian Sukhoi-33.

However, the complexity of the S-300 and Russian aircraft engines has proved to be the biggest constraint on Beijing’s copycat industry. This has reassured Moscow about proceeding with the sale of advanced weaponry. Plus, in 2008 and 2012 Russia made China sign stronger intellectual property protection agreements.

As of now Beijing will only receive four of these systems, but even this small number will be enough to create the daddy of Iron Domes over future battlefield theatres.

If you are an F-35 pilot, here’s a piece of advice: stay out of range.

The opinion of the writer may not necessarily reflect the position of RIR.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.defensenews.com/story/de...oeing-f-35-joint-strike-fighter-jsf/70243170/

US Navy Details New Strike Fighter Need

By Christopher P. Cavas 6:48 a.m. EDT March 13, 2015

WASHINGTON — It's been only two years since the US Navy quit buying F/A-18 Super Hornet strike fighters — part of a long-planned transition to the F-35C joint strike fighter — but a confluence of events has led to the new possibility that more attack aircraft could be ordered from Boeing.

When the US Navy submitted its fiscal 2015 request a year ago, it was the first budget since the 1970s that did not include some version of the F/A-18 Hornet strike fighter. Procurement of F/A-18 E and F Super Hornets ended in 2013, and the last of 138 EA-18G Growler electronic warfare versions was included in the 2014 budget.

Congress, however, added an unplanned-for 15 Growlers in the 2015 budget, responding to a Navy unfunded priority list request to meet a joint tactical need. The move keeps open Boeing's St. Louis production line an extra year, through 2017.

Now, a strike fighter shortfall the Navy thought it could manage by a variety of methods is being further exacerbated, and it seems highly likely that when the new unfunded requirements list is submitted to Congress by mid-March, it will include a request for new Super Hornets.

"We have a shortfall in Super Hornets, we do," Adm. Jon Greenert, chief of naval operations, told Congress on March 4. "And we're going to have to work our way through here in order to manage it."

The shortfall is not a new situation — it's been developing for years, and was something the Navy's leadership thought it could manage its way through. But in recent weeks, sources said, the emphasis has shifted from using current resources to deal with the problem to including the purchase of new aircraft as part of an overall solution.

Simply put, the situation breaks down like this:


•The fleet has about 600 F/A-18C Hornet "legacy" aircraft — pre-Super Hornet strike fighters — in its current inventory, with something over half scheduled to be replaced by 340 new F-35Cs. About 300 of the 18Cs are out of service, according to the Navy.
•Budget constraints and software development issues have pushed out F-35C procurement to the right — delayed by several years — and the first "35 Charlies" aren't scheduled to reach initial operating capability until 2018. Full rate production of 20 aircraft per year isn't planned until 2020, and it will be another two years before those aircraft enter service.
•Increased operating tempos due to combat operations against the Islamic State in northern Iraq and western Syria meant that the Navy did not realize reduced flying hours from the drawdown in Afghanistan.
•Thus the legacy Hornets need to keep flying longer. While they were rated up to a lifespan of 6,000 flying hours, the Navy figures it needs a service life extension program (SLEP) to get 150 of those planes out to 8,000 hours.
•With fewer F/A-18Cs flying, newer E and F Super Hornets are being used up at higher rates than planned.
•Budget reductions in recent years reduced money for depot maintenance, creating something of a backlog that, a year ago, reached 65 F/A-18Cs. Technicians, however, discovered much higher levels of corrosion when those aircraft were opened up, leading to growth in the number of aircraft that needed work, and a longer work period to deal with them. While the Navy has restored the depot funding, the backlog has expanded from 65 to 100 aircraft, and the service is struggling to hire more skilled labor to work on the planes.
•The growth in the backlog of 35 aircraft over the past year led Greenert to estimate the need was for "two or three squadrons" of new strike fighters to plug the gap. F/A-18 E and F Super Hornets are organized into 12-plane squadrons, while 18Cs fly in squadrons of 10 aircraft. Two squadrons of new planes works out to 24 aircraft, 36 for three squadrons.

The Navy in 2012 surveyed its strike fighter inventory to assess the problem. "We looked at the inventory challenges," said Rear Adm. Mike Manazir, the Navy's director of air warfare. "SLEP 150 F/A-18Cs and buy 41 Es and Fs."

"As we pushed JSF outside to the right — this latest budget moved 16 outside the FYDP [future years defense plan] — I'm not making up those aircraft." Over the past three years, Manazir said, a total of 159 F-35C carrier variant and F-35B Marine jump jets have been moved out of the FYDP.

Assuming the air fleet keeps flying at about 330 hours a year per airplane, he said, "from 2020 to 2035, I need to be buying about 30 to 39 aircraft per year to replace" older, worn-out aircraft. "It's a product of supply and demand."

Another key factor, Manazir noted, is the Super Hornet mid-life refit program expected a decade from now.

"I have to get 563 Super Hornets out to 9,000 hours," he noted. "Ten years from now I'm going to be in the middle of SLEP'ping 563 airplanes. Do I have enough depot capacity? If I can do that successfully, I can manage that risk. Procurement [of new aircraft] reduces that risk."

Some observers look at a Navy effort to keep buying Boeing F/A-18s as an indication the service is soft on support for the Lockheed Martin F-35. Manazir insists there is no truth to that.

"There is no move here to not buy something," he declared. "In order for me to win in 2024 I have to have F-35Cs flying with F-18Es and Fs. I have to. And I have to be able to fill my air wings out.

"I am trying to get rid of the myth that all the Navy wants to do is continue F-18 Es and Fs. If I only have F-18 Es and Fs in 2024 I can't win. I have to have a number of F-35C squadrons."

"What I try to do is avoid — because it's not true — the F-18 Boeing versus the Lockheed Martin F-35" story line, he said. "Because for the United States Navy, it's not all about getting the F-35, it's about getting the integrated capabilities of the high-end war fight, which takes the F-18 E/F and the F-35C. It takes them both."

The number of aircraft Greenert is talking about, Manazir said, is the right number.

"So two to three squadrons in 2016 — 36 airplanes — helps me reduce my risk of extension for that.

"If I reduce my risk through that procurement that he testified to, and I can extend my 18Es and Fs to the plan that I'm going to now, and I'm going to procure F-35Cs to the tune of 20 per year starting in 2020, I've reduced my risk to a manageable level. And that's my entire cohesive plan going forward."

E-mail ccavas@defensenews.com

 

[Dozdoats]

Seems there are enough "spare" F-16s in US inventory that they are now being used as target drones and SHOT DOWN ... this Boeing video is over a year old now.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7wDXTo1dSMg

Boeing's QF-16 makes its first unmanned flight

Published on Sep 25, 2013

As a pilotless F-16 roared into the sky last week at Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla., members of Boeing's QF-16 team and the U.S. Air Force celebrated.
===============

Or not shot down Seems 'close is good enough.'

http://www.businessinsider.com/qf-16-aerial-drone-2014-8

 

[OddOne]

Y'all are missing the forest for the trees, methinks...

They want to mothball the A10 and move the F35 into its position to act as a standoff air-support tool, not in an on-the-hotspot traditional CAS role. They want drones to move into the actual CAS role, and much of the movement in the defense drone development space is pointed strongly in that direction. Drones make the perfect choice for close support - cheaper, faster, capable of maneuvers that no pilot can make due to physical limitations, and much harder to defeat due to the ability to be faster and more maneuverable while being much smaller. Not to mention the manpower side, specifically with regard to injury/death potential for the pilots. The USAF is all about trying to maximize its firepower while reducing its personnel requirements. Hell, you don't even need a warhead if you want to go the kinetic route - getting hit by a 6" diameter chunk of steel with a DU tip that's moving at 2,000+ MPH will leave a mark without requiring explosives.

The F35 would be a great hovering platform for semi-autonomous fire-and-forget smart weapons like JDAM packages on conventional dumb bombs (and their replacements) as well as remotely operated drones (which would likely be the replacements).

 

[The Mountain]

Y'all are missing the forest for the trees, methinks...

They want to mothball the A10 and move the F35 into its position to act as a standoff air-support tool, not in an on-the-hotspot traditional CAS role. They want drones to move into the actual CAS role, and much of the movement in the defense drone development space is pointed strongly in that direction. Drones make the perfect choice for close support - cheaper, faster, capable of maneuvers that no pilot can make due to physical limitations, and much harder to defeat due to the ability to be faster and more maneuverable while being much smaller. Not to mention the manpower side, specifically with regard to injury/death potential for the pilots. The USAF is all about trying to maximize its firepower while reducing its personnel requirements. Hell, you don't even need a warhead if you want to go the kinetic route - getting hit by a 6" diameter chunk of steel with a DU tip that's moving at 2,000+ MPH will leave a mark without requiring explosives.

The F35 would be a great hovering platform for semi-autonomous fire-and-forget smart weapons like JDAM packages on conventional dumb bombs (and their replacements) as well as remotely operated drones (which would likely be the replacements).

And the problem with that is that even "smart" weapons still suck at telling friend from foe, and you can't just call one on the radio to tell it it's aiming at the wrong target.

 

[Housecarl]

Y'all are missing the forest for the trees, methinks...

They want to mothball the A10 and move the F35 into its position to act as a standoff air-support tool, not in an on-the-hotspot traditional CAS role. They want drones to move into the actual CAS role, and much of the movement in the defense drone development space is pointed strongly in that direction. Drones make the perfect choice for close support - cheaper, faster, capable of maneuvers that no pilot can make due to physical limitations, and much harder to defeat due to the ability to be faster and more maneuverable while being much smaller. Not to mention the manpower side, specifically with regard to injury/death potential for the pilots. The USAF is all about trying to maximize its firepower while reducing its personnel requirements. Hell, you don't even need a warhead if you want to go the kinetic route - getting hit by a 6" diameter chunk of steel with a DU tip that's moving at 2,000+ MPH will leave a mark without requiring explosives.

The F35 would be a great hovering platform for semi-autonomous fire-and-forget smart weapons like JDAM packages on conventional dumb bombs (and their replacements) as well as remotely operated drones (which would likely be the replacements).

And the problem with that is that even "smart" weapons still suck at telling friend from foe, and you can't just call one on the radio to tell it it's aiming at the wrong target.

And it's easier to jam a data link to a drone than a "jam" a pilot in a cockpit in "line of sight" with the troops on the ground.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realcleardefense.com/art...warthog_too_old_to_keep_fighting__107750.html

March 15, 2015
The A-10 Warthog: Too Old to Keep Fighting?
By Joseph Trevithick

After failing to convince the public that A-10s are a threat to friendly troops, the U.S. Air Force now wants you to believe that the ground attack planes are simply too old to keep fighting.

Earlier in March, Air Force officials hosted a summit to discuss the future of close air-support — the critical air strikes that help out troops on the ground.

After the gathering wrapped up, Air Combat Command—which controls the bulk of the service’s combat aircraft—kept up its media blitz against the A-10 by zeroing in on the aircraft’s age.

“There’s only so much you can get out of that airplane,” ACC chief Gen. Herbert Carlisle told reporters, referring to the A-10. “Those airplanes are gonna wear out.”

Carlisle offered these comments while the low- and slow-flying A-10s attack Islamic State in Iraq and Syria — and stare down the Russians from NATO bases in Europe. His statements also came despite upgrades that should keep the Warthogs combat-ready for decades, according to the flying branch’s own internal documents.

“They’ve been worked very, very hard,” Carlisle said. “But eventually that platform is going to age out.”

It’s fairness, it’s technically true the A-10 will eventually age out. But any actual problems are at best a self-fulfilling prophecy — and at worst — tantamount to willful sabotage.

Practically since the first squadrons got their Warthogs in 1977, the flying branch has continually tried to cancel or limit any improvement programs and even routine maintenance on the aircraft.

Carlisle’s statements were “at a minimum a mendacious spin,” A-10 designer Pierre Sprey told War Is Boring. In reality, the Air Force has made a “deliberate choice” to retire the Warthogs, Sprey added.

The flying branch already has a storied history of stonewalling against any serious efforts to keep the A-10 fleet going.

“The A-10 and the close air support mission have always been seen as lower priorities that take money away from favored programs,” said Mandy Smithberger, director of the Straus Military Reform Project at the Center for Defense Information — part of the Project On Government Oversight.

Here’s another thing. Often due to pressure from Congress, the Warthogs today are significantly more capable — and longer-lived — than the original design.

Most notably, the Air Force hired Boeing to install new wings on more than 200 of the blunt-nosed attackers in 2007. The Air Force itself declared these new, reinforced spans would keep the A-10s airworthy for at least another three decades.

But having already expected to get rid of the straight-winged planes, the Air Force effectively waited until the last possible moment to approve the upgrade.

“The A-10 fleet received no money for major modifications or programmed depot maintenance during the 1990s,” the Government Accountability Office reported a month before the work started. “As a result, the Air Force is now faced with a very large backlog of maintenance, structural repairs and extensive modifications.”

The next year, the problems became particularly evident. Cracks in the wings from “fatigue and corrosion” sprouted up across the A-10 fleet, according to an Air Force history we received through the Freedom of Information Act.

“Of 144 aircraft inspected, 138 had cracks,” Air Combat Command’s 2008 historical review explained. “A planned A-10 deployment for the spring of 2009 to Korea was shifted to other systems, ACC cancelled at least one upcoming exercise due to lack of A-10s and one training course was ‘effectively grounded.’”

Even with these self-inflicted problems, the Air Force conceded that it expected to save more than a billion dollars in future maintenance costs with the improvements. On top of that, Boeing designed the new wings for a grand total of $1.1 billion. This final bill was around a fifth of what the Pentagon spends today to operate a single A-10 for a year.

And at the same time the aircraft were getting their improved wings, the service began overhauling older A-10As into modernized C models. The upgraded variants got brand new flight computers and other advanced systems.

“The A-10 offered an example of how ACC sought to sustain its existing fighter force while giving priority to the new systems it wanted,” the command touted in its 2007 internal history, which we also obtained through FOIA.

Since 2009, Lockheed has uploaded regular software updates into the A-10Cs to make sure the extra gear stays up-to-date and working. But four years after the first batch of new code, Air Force officials tried to stop buying these patches.

Without the updates, the planes’ wouldn’t be able to fully make use their systems to find the enemy, drop smart bombs and communicate with troops, other aircraft and command centers.

After getting an earful from the A-10’s supporters in Congress, Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James caved and put the funds—a paltry $22 million—back into the service’s budget request.

With all these improvements, the Warthogs aren’t nearly as dangerously worn out as Carlisle said.

In addition, the aircraft now carry the same targeting pods as F-15 and F-16 fighters, and can drop the same laser- and GPS-guided bombs. On top of that, the aircraft still have their unique and devastating 30-millimeter Gatling gun, and the ability to loiter in the skies above the battlefield for hours on end.

Compared to the A-10 with its multiple radios, “there is no other aircraft with that capability to talk to [troops on] the ground,” Sprey added.

But as the A-10s keep on flying, the Air Force has tried to paint the upgrade programs as a problem.

The flying branch complained the projects—especially extensive because of a lack of regular improvements—were overly onerous and kept too many Warthogs out of action for too long.

“The Warthog was a workhorse,” ACC’s 2011 historical narrative stated. “The down side of this was a heavy modification schedule resulting in below Air Force aircraft availability standards.”

That year, the Air Force blamed congressionally-mandated budget cuts—rather than the service’s desire to shift money to other aircraft, namely the Joint Strike Fighter—for causing a shortage of new wing assemblies and threatening the upgrade program.

Maj. Gen. Jim Martin — the Air Force’s deputy assistant secretary for budget — told reporters that the service could save $500 million if it shut down the rewing project entirely. That amount is equivalent to around three F-35As, which the flying branch wants to eventually replace the Warthogs with.

Of course, “this is a classic game played by all of the services to prematurely retire platforms to make way for the shiny new toy,” Smithberger said.

But Air Force leaders also appear to have something of a “special vendetta” against the Warthog, and their approach has become “quite confrontational,” Smithberger added.

“Anyone who is passing information to Congress about A-10 capabilities is committing treason,” Maj. Gen. James Post—Air Combat Command’s number two officer—reportedly told airmen under his command in January.

But that sort of language — which Air Force spokespersons have described as “hyperbole,” isn’t new. The flying branch treated Lt. Gen. Elwood “Pete” Quesada with the same disdain, Sprey noted. Quesada was a pioneer of close air-support tactics during World War II, and went on to become the first commander of the service’s brand new Tactical Air Command in 1947.

“Pete Quesada? I wouldn’t talk to that traitor!” is how Sprey described the attitude of bomber-focused Air Force senior leaders in the late 1940s.

And the Warthogs specifically have prompted this sort of anger, too. In 2003, then-ACC deputy chief Lt. Gen. Bruce Wright warned his subordinates against talking to reporters about the A-10 in a memo.

The command’s officers needed to “look hard at themselves, their individual professionalism, and their personal commitment to telling the complete story,” Wright wrote.

Journalist Robert Coram had just reported that the flying branch was secretly trying to ditch the A-10 as early as 2004 in an op-ed for the New York Times. “This is a serious mistake,” Coram argued.

“The cheap, effective A-10 is a symbol and counterpoint for how broken today’s acquisition system for expensive systems like the F-35 is,” Smithberger said.

Unfortunately, the service is insistent on sending the A-10s to the Boneyard. If this happens, Sprey has a pretty good idea what will happen to American servicemembers serving overseas if these plans go ahead. “Many more will die,” he said.

But with this media blitz in full effect, the Air Force isn’t looking back. And given the way they’ve clumsily spinned the facts, the service clearly hopes no one else will, either.

This piece first appeared in War Is Boring here.

 

[OddOne]

I didn't say drones as frontline weapons were a smart idea, just that this is the idea the defense sector is running with.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://medium.com/war-is-boring/th...o-replace-the-a-10-with-the-f-16-474fc2db2963

Now the U.S. Air Force Wants to Replace A-10s With F-16s

An old idea — and a terrible one

By Joseph Trevithick
on Mar 19·11 min

Eventually, the U.S. Air Force wants to replace the low and slow-flying A-10 Warthog with the fast-moving F-35 stealth fighter. But it’ll take years before the troubled jet fighters are ready for duty.

In the meantime, the Air Force still needs a plane for dedicated close air support missions — something the A-10 excels at. So what does the flying branch propose? Not keeping the Warthog.

Instead, the Air Force wants to replace the Warthog with a modified F-16 fighter jet — an old concept that failed to live up to expectations decades ago. The F-16s would fill in temporarily until the F-35s can take over.

We have a hard time believing it — but yes, this is a serious proposal.

Air Force leaders pitched the plan during a March summit focused on how close air support missions—the complex and often dangerous air strikes that help out troops on the ground—would work in a world without the A-10.

The conclusion? With the Joint Strike Fighter not yet ready, and saving the Warthogs completely off the table, the only option is to have existing fighter jets do the A-10’s job.

“We want to take those [A-10] aviators, and have designated, predominantly close air support squadrons in F-15s and F-16s,” Gen. Herbert Carlisle, head of Air Combat Command, told reporters after the gathering. “We will always do close air support.”

Carlisle oversees most of the Air Force’s active-duty combat jets and spy planes. But beyond taking advantage of the Warthog crews’ experience, the general offered very few specifics.

“The findings of the summit … can be summed up by the phrase ‘we have a plan,’” retired Air Force officer Tony Carr wrote. Carr has diligently followed the A-10 debate on his blog John Q. Public.

The meetings were “a PR briefing, not how to fix close air support,” former Pentagon analyst and A-10 designer Pierre Sprey told War Is Boring.

Before the Air Force creates or converts any of these new squadrons, the flying branch will first build an organization tentatively called the “CAS integration group” to make sure everything works. CAS is the common abbreviation for close air support operations.

The new group could get up to a dozen F-16s to run its experiments. Tactical air controllers—troops who coordinate bombing and strafing runs from the ground—would also take part in the tests.

“We need resources to build up the organization [and] build exercises,” Carlisle said. “It’ll evolve over time.”

Above—F-15s and F-16s fly past burning Kuwaiti oil fields in 1991. At top—an F-16 prepares for a mission during Operation Desert Storm. Air Force photos

But in 1985, the service proposed essentially the same plan as an alternative to the A-10 … and for many of the same reasons.

It didn’t work out.

At the time, the flying branch concluded that the Warthogs would soon be too vulnerable to survive above the battlefield without major improvements. Modern radars and powerful anti-aircraft missiles were emerging as a growing threat to the slow-moving A-10s.

The Air Force told the Pentagon and Congress that former A-10 pilots flying modified F-16s—also known as F/A-16s or simply A-16s—would be the most sensible option.

With a GPU-5 gun pod strapped on, Air Force officials believed the fast-moving F-16s could attack enemy troops just as well as A-10s — while avoiding enemy missiles. The GPU-5 contained a 30-millimeter Gatling gun derived from the Warthog’s monstrous main cannon. Both guns fired the same massive shells.

The Air Force had already tested A-10s against A-7 strike planes armed with the GPU-5. But during the flight tests, the Warthog proved to be the more effective aircraft.

Aviation firm Piper Aircraft also expected its PA-48 Enforcer — an unlikely challenger derived from the World War II P-51 Mustang — would carry these weapons, as well.

Three years later, the Government Accountability Office examined the Air Force’s plan. The federal watchdog was … skeptical.

“The GAO observed that the tactical aircraft development priority is the Advanced Tactical Fighter,” the report noted, referring to what would become the F-22 stealth fighter. “The Air Force cannot afford to fund two development projects concurrently.”

Meanwhile, the Pentagon was worried they would be on the hook for three different aircraft. Since the Air Force hadn’t yet converted any F-16s, the Warthogs would still have to keep flying — for at least some amount of time.

“The [Defense] Department was concerned that the Air Force may not have sufficiently considered all viable aircraft alternatives or adequately emphasized the close air support mission,” the GAO reported.

But by the time Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the Air Force had prevailed and begun implementing its plan. When the American-led coalition unleashed its aerial blitzkrieg against Iraq, the flying branch had F-16s with GPU-5s ready to go.

The results were a mess.

An A-10 sits on the tarmac after a mission against Islamic State. Air Force photo

“The F-16 … did not live up to the expectations,” the RAND Corporation concluded in a study ordered by the Air Force afterwards. “The GPU-5, 30-millimeter gun pod, was tried for one day.”

The biggest problem for the add-on guns was recoil. Attached to the centerline pylon under the F-16’s fuselage by two relatively small hoops, the pods wobbled around violently as they fired the huge shells.

Shooting straight was practically impossible. The F-16’s “weapon releases were so inaccurate they couldn’t hit a dinner plate with a spoon,” Sprey said, relating an anecdote he’d heard from a veteran of the conflict.

The abortive GPU-5s are now long gone. The Air Force has no current plans to buy any other similar weapons.

Over Iraq and Kuwait, the aircraft’s only saving grace had been the sheer amount of them. “The F-16 force provided the numbers to keep constant pressure on the Iraqi army,” RAND noted.

To be fair, the Air Force didn’t give many smart bombs to units flying the Falcons — which would have improved their accuracy. The flying branch believed the F-16’s computer gear was sophisticated enough for pilots to lob unguided bombs onto enemy formations.

“Although this accuracy is satisfactory for buildings and large targets, it is not an effective way to engage hard point targets such as tanks, unless the weapon has a large lethal radius,” RAND’s researchers stated.

Not bad for waves of F-16s bombing entrenched Iraqi positions. But this sort of “accuracy” would have been wholly insufficient, if not downright dangerous, if the Iraqis came especially close to friendly troops.

As a result, “most of their sorties were flown against Iraqi forces … in the kill boxes centered in the northern half of Kuwait, and in southern Iraq,” well away from coalition forces, RAND’s report stated.

F-16s now regularly lob all sorts of guided missiles and bombs at hostile targets. But today’s much improved version—lovingly referred to as Vipers—still don’t have anything that can match the Warthog’s devastating gun.

And after a series of upgrades, A-10s now carry the exact same precision weapons as the Vipers.

Make way for the F-35

Of course, the Air Force wouldn’t have to worry about finding a quick fix at all if the F-35 performed as expected. But with mounting delays and cost overruns, the flying branch is desperate to keep the way open for its new stealth jet.

Unfortunately, the Air Force only expects the first combat units to start getting the F-35—which the Air Force hopes will eventually replace both the F-16 and the A-10—next year. In the meantime, something has to be in the skies to support American ground forces.

And while the Air Force called its recent summit the “Future of CAS Focus Week,” the flying branch only seemed to have a good idea of what it didn’t want.

Participants went in understanding that there is no future for the Warthog, according to Sprey. “One other huge lie was that this was a joint enterprise,” the A-10 designer added.

Air Force officials effectively briefed members of the other services and U.S. Special Operations Command on a decision they had already made, rather than truly soliciting their advice, Sprey explained.

The gathering came right as the Air Force and members of Congress find themselves locked in an increasingly public battle over the branch’s rigid timeline for retiring the Warthog. For one, the Air Force is dead set on getting rid of the aircraft before the F-35s even arrive.

Lawmakers are especially concerned about the fact that the F-35 won’t be ready to take on close air support missions for at least another seven years. That’s how long it will take to write the software the F-35 needs for the Small Diameter Bomb II, according to the Pentagon.

The Air Force expects this new guided bomb to become its main tool for hitting enemy troops on the ground. For Lockheed’s part, the company still has to figure out how to fit the weapon inside the F-35B’s internal bomb bay.

A U.S. Air Force F-35A drops a practice version of the GPS-guided Joint Direct Attack Munition, or JDAM, during tests. Air Force photo

The B model — which is the Marine Corps version of the F-35 — has less space to play with because of a large and complex lift fan, which allows the aircraft to land and take off like a helicopter. The Marines expect the SDB II to be an important weapon in their future aerial arsenal.

On top of that, the Air Force’s A variant will have a 25-millimeter Gatling gun and only 180 rounds of ammunition. The pilot will be able to fire one three-second burst, or three one-second bursts.

By comparison, the Warthog carries a normal load of almost 1,200 30-millimeter rounds, each one about the size of a milk bottle. The A-10 can make at least five three-second strafing runs on enemy positions. The blunt-nosed attackers can carry up to eight tons of missiles and bombs, too.

Not that these comparisons matter much. The F-35A’s internal gun also needs a new software package—currently slated to arrive in 2019—to work effectively, according to The Daily Beast.

All of this has raised question about whether the F-35 is really an adequate replacement for the A-10. If the Air Force succeeds in retiring the Warthogs, there will be no reason to hold any actual competition between the two types.

“Platforms like the A-10 amplify the deficiencies in the F-35 program, and the Air Force doesn’t want the A-10 there to serve as a direct competitor,” said Mandy Smithberger, director of the Straus Military Reform Project at the Center for Defense Information—part of the Project On Government Oversight.

“Keeping the A-10 around makes the [F-35’s] CAS shortfalls particularly pronounced, and creates an opportunity for fly offs.”

Still, Air Force officials have left the door open for a new purpose-built, ground attack plane. But just how serious the service is about finding a true successor to the A-10 isn’t clear.

When talking to reporters, Carlisle suggested that an aircraft like the Textron Airland Scorpion might fit the bill. First revealed to the public two years ago, this significantly smaller plane is cheap and nimble, but can’t carry nearly as many weapons as the upgraded Warthog.

“It could,” Carlisle responded when quizzed about whether the Scorpion had what it took to join the Air Force’s inventory. “That’s not something that’s outside the realm.”

“We have gone out and looked at other platforms to see if they could meet the low-end CAS capacity at a reasonable cost-per-flying-hour,” Carlisle stressed. “We’re keeping our eyes open.”

But the idea that the flying branch has been looking at “A-X” contenders—a common term for any potential new attack plane—is “another big fat lie,” Sprey said.

Because with the steadily increasing costs of the F-35, the Air Force doesn’t have enough money for a new plane. The flying branch has likewise insisted that it must retire the A-10 to free up funds for the Joint Strike Fighter program.

As was the case 30 years ago, the Pentagon probably isn’t interested in shelling out more cash for yet another new airplane.

The F/A-16 idea definitely hasn’t aged any better. Under the current proposal, the Air Force doesn’t appear to be suggesting any modifications to the Vipers to make them more suitable for close air support strikes.

Plus, if the flying branch had actually been looking for a dedicated A-10 replacement, the service would probably have held their summit before drawing up its newest budget proposal, Smithberger noted.

The Air Force’s most recent budget request didn’t ask for any funds for a new plane designed specifically to hit targets on the ground.

If nothing else, Gen. Carlisle’s comments could be “hugely demoralizing” to the Warthog’s pilots, Sprey said.

Smithberger agreed. With this attitude from the highest levels of the Air Force, “How do you keep a good close air support culture?” she asked.

Not with F-16s that didn’t make the cut … decades ago. The Air Force brass will hopefully be honest with themselves—and everyone else—before they have to learn this lesson all over again.

 

[dstraito]

Once again, can we apply the adage "Follow The Money".

the Military-Industrial complex is lobbying and driving this because they want to generate more $$$$$$.

Instead of following the "If it ain't broke, don't fix it" and going with what works, they want to spend countless sums replacing something that doesn't need replacing.

they should have built the aircraft like the auto manufacturers with planed obsolescence.

 

[Housecarl]

Once again, can we apply the adage "Follow The Money".

the Military-Industrial complex is lobbying and driving this because they want to generate more $$$$$$.

Instead of following the "If it ain't broke, don't fix it" and going with what works, they want to spend countless sums replacing something that doesn't need replacing.

they should have built the aircraft like the auto manufacturers with planed obsolescence.

"Planned obsolescence" in the case of aircraft is actually "built in", it is called airframe hours. There's a way around that with inspections and replacing or reinforcing structural components, something the USAF wasn't doing per articles posted here at TB2K. (Carrier based naval aircraft with the amount of beating they take in operating off a carrier get to a point where you're basically building a new plane with an old tail number if you were to fully commit to such a route.) If you resolve that, the next issue is acquiring spare parts for key parts of the aircraft. The A-10 was built in such a manner that it allowed for "easy" upgrades, particularly when you look at the shrinking of electronics in size and power requirements vs capabilities. (To be fair the same can be said for the B-52, B-1, F-15, F-16 and F-18.)

 

[Dozdoats]

At the time, the flying branch concluded that the Warthogs would soon be too vulnerable to survive above the battlefield without major improvements. Modern radars and powerful anti-aircraft missiles were emerging as a growing threat to the slow-moving A-10s.

Close air support (CAS) is delivered CLOSE - as in, at low altitude. Down in the bushes, where the troops who need the support are. In CAS, if you fly high, you die.

Zoomies can find untold numbers of excuses to 1)do what they want to do, and 2) not do what they don't want to do. Zoomies are the spoiled brats of the US armed forces (look at the abortion their waaaah-waaaaah-we-gotta-have-it F35 has turned out to be).

One more time - the zoomies need to be stripped of the CAS mission RFN, before they get any more troops killed - or continue to kill them themselves, by using airframes not appropriate to the job. CAS needs to be assigned to the Army, period, and the 1947 Key West bullshit over the Army not flying armed fixed wing aircraft, abandoned.

 

[Weps]

Y'all are missing the forest for the trees, methinks...

They want to mothball the A10 and move the F35 into its position to act as a standoff air-support tool, not in an on-the-hotspot traditional CAS role.

Just because it's an idea, doesn't make it a good one. The AF Brass has been wrong before, many times before.

The F-35 is the same kind of nonsensical boondoggle as the LCS.

They want drones to move into the actual CAS role, and much of the movement in the defense drone development space is pointed strongly in that direction. Drones make the perfect choice for close support - cheaper, faster, capable of maneuvers that no pilot can make due to physical limitations, and much harder to defeat due to the ability to be faster and more maneuverable while being much smaller.

Seeing no sources cited, I'm going to assume this is wishful thinking.


We'll compare the only UCAV (Unmman Combat Aerial Vehicle) in inventory the MQ-9 "Reaper", with the A10.


A-10 Unit Cost: $18.8 million
MQ-9 "Reaper" UCAV Unit Cost: $16.9 million

Marginally "cheaper", but the cost/benefit ratio is horrendous.



A-10 Cruise Speed: 340MPH
A-10 Combat Maximum Speed: 439MPH

MQ-9 "Reaper" UCAV Cruise Speed: 194MPH
MQ-9 'Reaper" UCAV Maximum SPeed: 300MPH

So much for faster.


A-10 Powerplant: 2 × General Electric TF34-GE-100A turbofans
MQ-9 "Reaper" UCAV Powerplant: 1 × Honeywell TPE331-10 turboprop at 900HP

So much for being more maneuverable.


Some other comparatives;

A-10 Operating Range: 2580 miles
MQ-9 "Reaper" UCAV Operating Range: 1,150 miles



MQ-9 "Reaper" UCAV Payload: 3,800 lb
A-10 payload: 16,000 lb


A-10 Source: http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104490/a-10-thunderbolt-ii.aspx

MQ-9 Source: http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104470/mq-9-reaper.aspx


Now, before we get into a tizzy about "future" combat systems, the only physically built "future" prototypes of UCAV's is the X-47 and Avenger. Neither of which offer specs that out preform the A-10, let alone even match it.

Not to mention the manpower side, specifically with regard to injury/death potential for the pilots. The USAF is all about trying to maximize its firepower while reducing its personnel requirements. Hell, you don't even need a warhead if you want to go the kinetic route - getting hit by a 6" diameter chunk of steel with a DU tip that's moving at 2,000+ MPH will leave a mark without requiring explosives.

KEV utilized by the USAF are not composed of Depleted Uranium, additionally the M829 APFSDS series (and sister munitions such as the PGU-14/B) utilizes traditional conventional explosives as propellant to achieve their kinetic energy.

The F35 would be a great hovering platform for semi-autonomous fire-and-forget smart weapons like JDAM packages on conventional dumb bombs (and their replacements) as well as remotely operated drones (which would likely be the replacements).

JDAM are not FaF, LJDAM are FaF.

 

[OddOne]

Again, I didn't say it was a smart move, just that the flow is in that direction. And I agree with your implication that all the drones in the world built with the most modern tech around can't hold a proverbial candle to what a Warthog built 50 years ago in the hands of a suitably ballsy and skilled crew can accomplish. Those things flew home missing large portions of themselves.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/03/25/the_a-10_retirement_debate_heats_up_.html

March 25, 2015
The A-10 Retirement Debate Heats Up
By Mandy Smithberger

“I can’t wait to be relieved of the burdens of close air support,” Major General James Post, the vice commander of Air Combat Command (ACC), allegedly told a collection of officers at a training session in August 2014. As with his now notorious warning that service members would be committing treason if they communicated with Congress about the successes of the A-10, Major General Post seems to speak for the id of Air Force headquarters’ true hostility towards the close air support (CAS) mission. Air Force four-stars are working hard to deny this hostility to the public and Congress, but their abhorrence of the mission has been demonstrated through 70 years of Air Force headquarters’ budget decisions and combat actions that have consistently short-changed close air support.

For the third year in a row (many have already forgotten the attempt to retire 102 jets in the Air Force’s FY 2013 proposal), the Air Force has proposed retiring some or all of the A-10s, ostensibly to save money in order to pay for “modernization.” After failing to convince Congress to implement their plan last year (except for a last minute partial capitulation by retiring Senate and House Armed Services Committee chairmen Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) and Representative Buck McKeon (R-CA)) and encountering uncompromising pushback this year, Air Force headquarters has renewed its campaign with more dirty tricks.

First, Air Force headquarters tried to fight back against congressional skepticism by releasing cherry-picked data purporting to show that the A-10 kills more friendlies and civilians than any other U.S. Air Force plane, even though it actually has one of the lowest fratricide and civilian casualty rates. With those cooked statistics debunked and rejected by Senate Armed Services Chairman Senator John McCain (R-AZ), Air Force headquarters hastily assembled a joint CAS “Summit” to try to justify dumping the A-10. Notes and documents from the Summit meetings, now widely available throughout the Air Force and shared with the Project On Government Oversight’s Center for Defense Information (CDI), reveal that the recommendations of the Summit working groups were altered by senior Air Force leaders to quash any joint service or congressional concerns about the coming gaps in CAS capabilities. Air Force headquarters needed this whitewash to pursue, yet again, its anti-A-10 crusade without congressional or internal-Pentagon opposition.

The current A-10 divestment campaign, led by Air Force Chief of Staff Mark Welsh, is only one in a long chain of Air Force headquarters’ attempts by bomber-minded Air Force generals to get rid of the A-10 and the CAS mission. The efforts goes as far back as when the A-10 concept was being designed in the Pentagon, following the unfortunate, bloody lessons learned from the Vietnam War. For example, there was a failed attempt in late-1980s to kill off the A-10 by proposing to replace it with a supposedly CAS-capable version of the F-16 (the A-16). Air Force headquarters tried to keep the A-10s out of the first Gulf War in 1990, except for contingencies. A token number was eventually brought in at the insistence of the theater commander, and the A-10 so vastly outperformed the A-16s that the entire A-16 effort was dismantled. As a reward for these A-10 combat successes, Air Force headquarters tried to starve the program by refusing to give the A-10 any funds for major modifications or programmed depot maintenance during the 1990s. After additional combat successes in the Iraq War, the Air Force then attempted to unload the A-10 fleet in 2004.

To ground troops and the pilots who perform the mission, the A-10 and the CAS mission are essential and crucial components of American airpower. The A-10 saves so many troop lives because it is the only platform with the unique capabilities necessary for effective CAS: highly maneuverable at low speeds, unmatched survivability under ground fire, a longer loiter time, able to fly more sorties per day that last longer, and more lethal cannon passes than any other fighter. These capabilities make the A-10 particularly superior in getting in close enough to support our troops fighting in narrow valleys, under bad weather, toe-to-toe with close-in enemies, and/or facing fast-moving targets. For these reasons, Army Chief of Staff General Ray Odierno has called the A-10 “the best close air support aircraft.” Other Air Force platforms can perform parts of the mission, though not as well; and none can do all of it. Senator Kelly Ayotte (R-NH) echoed the troops’ combat experience in a recent Senate Armed Services committee hearing: “It's ugly, it's loud, but when it comes in…it just makes a difference.”

In 2014, Congress was well on the way to roundly rejecting the Air Force headquarters’ efforts to retire the entire fleet of 350 A-10s. It was a strong, bipartisan demonstration of support for the CAS platform in all four of Congress’s annual defense bills. But in the final days of the 113th Congress, a “compromise” heavily pushed by the Air Force was tucked into the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2015. The “compromise” allowed the Air Force to move A-10s into virtually retired “backup status” as long as the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office in DoD certified that the measure was the only option available to protect readiness. CAPE, now led by former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management and Comptroller Jamie Morin, duly issued that assessment—though in classified form, thus making it unavailable to the public. In one of his final acts as Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel then approved moving 18 A-10s to backup status.

The Air Force intends to replace the A-10 with the F-35. But despite spending nearly $100 billion and 14 years in development, the plane is still a minimum of six years away from being certified ready for any real—but still extremely limited—form of CAS combat. The A-10, on the other hand, is continuing to perform daily with striking effectiveness in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria—at the insistence of the CENTCOM commander and despite previous false claims from the Air Force that A-10s can’t be sent to Syria. A-10s have also recently been sent to Europe to be available for contingencies in Ukraine—at the insistence of the EUCOM Commander. These demands from active theaters are embarrassing and compelling counterarguments to the Air Force’s plea that the Warthog is no longer relevant or capable and needs to be unloaded to help pay for the new, expensive, more high-tech planes that Air Force headquarters vastly prefers even though the planes are underperforming.

So far, Congress has not been any more sympathetic to this year’s continuation of General Welsh’s campaign to retire the A-10. Chairman McCain rejected the Air Force’s contention that the F-35 was ready enough to be a real replacement for the A-10 and vowed to reverse the A-10 retirement process already underway. Senator Ayotte led a letter to Defense Secretary Ashton Carter with Senators Tom Cotton (R-AR), Lindsey Graham (R-SC), Thom Tillis (R-NC), Roger Wicker (R-MS), Mike Crapo (R-ID), Johnny Isakson (R-GA), and Richard Burr (R-NC) rebuking Hagel’s decision to place 18 A-10s in backup inventory. Specifically, the Senators called the decision a “back-door” divestment approved by a “disappointing rubber stamp” that guts “the readiness of our nation’s best close air support aircraft.” In the House, Representative Martha McSally (R-AZ) wrote to Secretary Carter stating that she knew from her own experience as a former A-10 pilot and 354th Fighter Squadron commander that the A-10 is uniquely capable for combat search and rescue missions, in addition to CAS, and that the retirement of the A-10 through a classified assessment violated the intent of Congress’s compromise with the Air Force:

“The classification of the explanation for cutting the most effective Close Air Support platform flies against the open nature of our government. The public has a right to review the analytic methods used, the alternatives assessed, and any competing recommendations. Otherwise, it is reasonable to conclude the ‘rubber stamp’ nature of the classified report is simply a backdoor attempt at divestment.”

Some in the press have been similarly skeptical of the Air Force’s intentions, saying that the plan “doesn’t add up,” and more colorfully, calling it “total bull*hit and both the American taxpayer and those who bravely fight our wars on the ground should be furious.” Those reports similarly cite the Air Force’s longstanding antagonism to the CAS mission as the chief motive for the A-10’s retirement.

A Summit to Convince Congress

By announcing that pilots who spoke to Congress about the A-10 were “committing treason,” ACC Vice Commander Major General James Post sparked an Inspector General investigation and calls for his resignation from POGO and other whistleblower and taxpayer groups. That public relations debacle made it clear that the Air Force needed a new campaign strategy to support its faltering A-10 divestment campaign. On the orders of Air Force Chief of Staff General Mark Welsh, General Herbert “Hawk” Carlisle—the head of Air Combat Command—promptly announced a joint CAS Summit, allegedly to determine the future of CAS.

It was not the first CAS Summit to be held (the most recent previous Summit was held in 2009), but it was the first to receive so much fanfare. As advertised, the purpose of the Summit was to determine and then mitigate any upcoming risks and gaps in CAS mission capabilities. But notes, documents, and annotated briefing slides reviewed by CDI reveal that what the Air Force publicly released from the Summit is nothing more than a white-washed assessment of the true and substantial operational risks of retiring the A-10.

Just prior to the Summit, a working group of approximately 40 people, including CAS-experienced Air Force service members, met for three days at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base to identify potential risks and shortfalls in CAS capabilities. But Air Force headquarters gave them two highly restrictive ground rules: first, assume the A-10s are completely divested, with no partial divestments to be considered; and second, assume the F-35 is fully CAS capable by 2021 (an ambitious assumption at best). The working groups included A-10 pilots, F-16 pilots, and Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs), all with combat-based knowledge of the CAS platforms and their shortfalls and risks. They summarized their findings with slides stating that the divestment would “cause significant CAS capability and capacity gaps for 10 to 12 years,” create training shortfalls, increase costs per flying hour, and sideline over 200 CAS-experienced pilots due to lack of cockpits for them. Additionally, they found that after the retirement of the A-10 there would be “very limited” CAS capability at low altitudes and in poor weather, “very limited” armor killing capability, and “very limited” ability to operate in the GPS-denied environment that most experts expect when fighting technically competent enemies with jamming technology, an environment that deprives the non-A-10 platforms of their most important CAS-guided munition. They also concluded that even the best mitigation plans they were recommending would not be sufficient to overcome these problems and that significant life-threatening shortfalls would remain.

General Carlisle was briefed at Davis-Monthan on these incurable risks and gaps that A-10 divestment would cause. Workshop attendees noted that he understood gaps in capability created by retiring the A-10 could not be solved with the options currently in place. General Carlisle was also briefed on the results of the second task to develop a list of requirements and capabilities for a new A-X CAS aircraft that could succeed the A-10. “These requirements look a lot like the A-10, what are we doing here?” he asked. The slides describing the new A-X requirements disappeared from subsequent Pentagon Summit presentations and were never mentioned in any of the press releases describing the summit.

At the four-day Pentagon Summit the next week, the Commander of the 355th Fighter Wing, Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Col. James P. Meger, briefed lower level joint representatives from the Army and the Marine Corps about the risks identified by the group at Davis-Monthan. Included in the briefing was the prediction that divestment of the A-10 would result in “significant capability and capacity gaps for the next ten to twelve years” that would require maintaining legacy aircraft until the F-35A was fully operational. After the presentation, an Army civilian representative became concerned. The slides, he told Col. Meger, suggested that the operational dangers of divestment of the A-10 were much greater than had been previously portrayed by the Air Force. Col. Meger attempted to reassure the civilian that the mitigation plan would eliminate the risks. Following the briefing, Col. Meger met with Lt. Gen. Tod D. Wolters, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations for Air Force Headquarters. Notably, the Summit Slide presentation for general officers the next day stripped away any mention of A-10 divestment creating significant capability gaps. Any mention of the need to maintain legacy aircraft, including the A-10, until the F-35A reached full operating capability (FOC) was also removed from the presentation.

The next day, Col. Meger delivered the new, sanitized presentation to the Air Force Chief of Staff. There was only muted mention of the risks presented by divestment. There was no mention of the 10- to 12-year estimated capability gap, nor was there any mention whatsoever of the need to maintain legacy aircraft—such as the A-10 or less capable alternatives like the F-16 or F-15E—until the F-35A reached FOC.

Other important areas of concern to working group members, but impossible to adequately address within the three days at Davis-Monthan, were the additional costs to convert squadrons from the A-10 to another platform, inevitable training shortfalls that would be created, and how the deployment tempos of ongoing operations would further exacerbate near-term gaps in CAS capability. To our knowledge, none of these concerns surfaced during any part of the Pentagon summit.

Actions for Congress

Inevitably, the Air Force generals leading the ongoing CAS Summit media blitz will point congressional Armed Services and Appropriations committees to the whitewashed results of their sham summit. When they do, Senators and Representatives who care about the lives of American troops in combat need to ask the generals the following questions:

-Why wasn’t this summit held before the Air Force decided to get rid of A-10s?

-Why doesn’t the Air Force’s joint CAS summit include any statement of needs from soldiers or Marines who have actually required close air support in combat?

-What is the Air Force’s contingency plan for minimizing casualties among our troops in combat in the years after 2019, if the F-35 is several years late in achieving its full CAS capabilities?

-When and how does the Air Force propose to test whether the F-35 can deliver close support at least as combat-effective as the A-10’s present capability? How can that test take place without A-10s?

Congress cannot and should not endorse Air Force leadership’s Summit by divesting the A-10s. Instead, the Senate and House Armed Services Committees need to hold hearings that consider the real and looming problems of inadequate close support, the very problems that Air Force headquarters prevented their Summit from addressing. These hearings need to include a close analysis of CAPE’s assessment and whether the decision to classify its report was necessary and appropriate. Most importantly, those hearings must include combat-experienced receivers and providers of close support who have seen the best and worst of that support, not witnesses cherry-picked by Air Force leadership—and the witnesses invited must be free to tell it the way they saw it.

If Congress is persuaded by the significant CAS capability risks and gaps originally identified by the Summit’s working groups, they should write and enforce legislation to constrain the Air Force from further eroding the nation’s close air support forces. Finally, if Congress believes that officers have purposely misled them about the true nature of these risks, or attempted to constrain service members’ communications with Congress about those risks, they should hold the officers accountable and remove them from positions of leadership.

Congress owes nothing less to the troops they send to fight our wars.

Mandy Smithberger is the Director of the Straus Military Reform Project at the Center for Defense Information at the Project On Government Oversight.

This article was first posted by the Center for Defense Information (CDI) at POGO here.

 

[Dozdoats]

http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=f59_1427399347

A-10 Fighters of the 354th Expeditionary Squadron
image: http://edge.liveleak.com/80281E/u/u/ll2/hd_video_icon.jpg

Last month, when the U.S. deployed 12 A-10s to Germany as part of the first TSP (Theater Security Package) we wrote that the aircraft might be temporarily stationed in Poland. Apparently, our assumptions turned out to be founded: on Mar. 24, four Thunderbolts have arrived at the 33rd Powidz Transport Air Base, near Gniezno, in the Greater Poland District.

The purpose of the visit is yet unknown. Most probably the Thunderbolts will be involved in the exercises related to Operation Atlantic Resolve, which is a NATO programme aimed at providing reassurance for the Mid-Eastern European countries (against the Russian threat).

The arrival of the attack aircraft was preceded by arrival of two USAF C-130 Hercules transports, one from the 86th Airlift Wing stationed at Ramstein AB and another one from the 302nd Airlift Wing from Colorado Springs, both part of the rotational USAF Aviation Detachment.

We do not have any information related to length or plan of the unexpected visit. Notably, one of the Warthogs was piloted by a female pilot.

Added: 2 hours ago Occurred On: Mar-26-2015
By: euronymus
In: Other Entertainment, Vehicles
Tags: A-10, fighter, 354th, expeditionary, poland
Location: Poland (load item map)
Read more at http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=f59_1427399347#AIqeRJetlWOkiHed.99

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://aviationweek.com/defense/usaf-eyes-new-era-close-air-support

USAF Eyes New Era Of Close Air Support

U.S. Air Force’s campaign to reinvent CAS

Mar 30, 2015 Amy Butler Aviation Week & Space Technology - Defense Technology Edition
Comments 17

In the fall of 2001, when the Pentagon issued what would become the largest development contract ever for a combat aircraft for the Lockheed Martin F-35, the close air support (CAS) mission was not at the forefront.

But timing played a hand; the 9/11 attacks occurred only weeks before that contract was signed and CAS missions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria became common. At that point, the fact that the F-35A would handle CAS in contested environments was a footnote in briefings as the Air Force focused on its virtues as a deep-strike counterpart to the twin-engine F-22, built for air superiority. Now lawmakers are weighing in on how to handle the mission as the Air Force struggles to argue that the A-10 retirement proposal is not a binary A-10 versus F-35 choice. After last year’s failed attempt to retire the A-10, the service is locked in a campaign to “energize” the discussion, says Air Force Chief of Staff Mark Welsh, toward a future CAS fleet including a bevy of fighters and bombers, not just the F-35.

The issue is growing in urgency for the Air Force. In Washington, significant defense spending cuts are being planned as fiscal pressure mounts across the government. And the Air Force has once again offered up the A-10 for retirement, stating there is no longer enough money to keep single-mission aircraft in the fleet.

Having conducted a summit on the future of CAS with its sister services, the Air Force is now focusing on how to handle the mission without the A-10 or total dominance of the skies.

The Politics

Last year’s attempt to retire the A-10 flopped; Congress agreed to the mothballing of 36 aircraft—a small dent compared to the hoped-for savings. Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James last month approved placing 18 into backup inventory; retiring all 36 would have resulted in the stand-down of an entire squadron. Maintainers supporting those 18 A-10s will be shifted to training for the F-35A ramp up, but many more new maintainers are needed fast to support plans to declare the fighter operational by December 2016.

Resistance is still strong. A vocal A-10 constituency includes some in U.S. ground components who directly benefit from the aircraft’s mission and others in Congress out to protect A-10 bases in their districts. But there are signs of change. Last year Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno was a strong proponent of the A-10. But this year Army Secretary John McHugh came out in favor of the retirement. “What the soldier wants to see and what the command structure in the U.S. Army wants to happen [is placing] explosive ordnance on enemy positions . . . in a timely and effective” manner, he told reporters last month.

“We know there are some members who just do not agree with this proposal,” James said. “It comes back to ‘if not this, then what?’ Or will you lift sequestration and give us more money?” Keeping the A-10 for fiscal 2016 would cost about $520 million, Welsh told Congress; keeping it through fiscal 2020 would require $4.2 billion. “There are circumstances where you would prefer to have an A-10, but we’ve priced ourselves out of that game.”

The A-10 retirement argument was not helped when Maj. Gen. James Post, vice commander at Air Combat Command (ACC), recently equated A-10 support from officers with treachery: “Anyone who is passing information to Congress about A-10 capabilities is committing treason,” the military blog John Q Public quotes him as saying.

Ever since the controversy broke, the service has been attempting to steer the conversation away from an A-10 versus F-35 debate, hosting two major media events focused solely on CAS. At issue, according to Welsh, is a need to plan for a future beyond A-10. “We’re not trying to reset the message on anything,” the USAF chief of staff avers. “We’re trying to reset the CAS mission for the future, but we’ve been trying to do that for the last two years. This is nothing new.”

http://aviationweek.com/site-files/...s/uploads/2015/03/CloseAirSupport_chart2B.jpg

The Statistics

From 2006-13, 67% of the CAS missions in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq have been flown by traditional Pentagon fighters, with 24% handled by the A-10, says USAF Col. Tadd Sholtis, spokesman for U.S. Air Forces Central Command. The A-10 is by no means the sole workhorse CAS aircraft for these missions, although it is a solid contributor.

But it is a symbol—especially for ground troops—of the virtues of CAS, using airpower to save the lives of soldiers engaged in close combat. This is largely because of the A-10’s characteristic cannon, a seven-barrel, 30‑mm Gatling gun, and the ability of its pilots to fly lower and slower to support ground troops—a visible relief in combat. Its companion fighters also have cannons, but they typically fly faster and higher so ground troops might not see them in action as often.

Thus Welsh’s frustrated refrain: “CAS is a mission, not a platform.” He is visibly irritated by the rhetoric from A-10 supporters who assert that USAF has abandoned the mission. “The Air Force isn’t committed to close air support? Well, I’ve got 140,000 data points over the last seven years that prove that is a ridiculous statement,” Welsh says. “That’s how many CAS sorties we’ve flown. About 20,000 a year. When is a little bit of credit given for that?”

The bottom line in talking to pilots who have flown CAS missions since 9/11: CAS is all about the training.

http://aviationweek.com/site-files/.../uploads/2015/03/CloseAirSupport_table3_0.jpg

The Training

“You could put us in a Cessna 172 with an AK-47 and we’d go fly CAS,” said one F-15E pilot. Standard procedure, he says, is to have CAS aircraft—not just A-10s—on alert. When a “troops in contact” (meaning friendlies in a firefight need air support) call comes in, entire support crews line up to ensure the sortie takes off quickly, and they salute the pilots as they taxi—a sign of support for the mission to assist soldiers in peril.

In talking with eight pilots at different bases—all of whom performed CAS missions—they universally said that CAS is not about the platform, it is about the training. Ground-based airmen—aka Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC)—tasked with calling in a strike, agree. “At the end of the day, the tactics are taught to work with any platform,” said one JTAC among the team at Nellis AFB, Nevada, Weapons School who is charged with developing tactics. The JTACs and pilots of various aircraft— F16s, F-15Es, A-10s, B-1s and B-52s—are trained to employ a variety of weapons in myriad weather and topographical conditions. This includes the now widespread use of precision-guided munitions and, when needed, cannons.

The airmen are trained to “check in” with the JTAC when arriving at airspace over troops in contact. The JTAC then requests the needed effect and often specifies which weapon and its yield. Pilots can then set the fuze as needed with the Joint Programmable Fuze employed on service air-launched munitions. Even with the most advanced targeting pods and sensors, JTACs often “talk” a pilot onto a target. In some cases—notably ambushes in mountainous regions or urban conditions—selecting too large a weapon or missing by meters can mean life or death for friendlies. These missions are called “danger close.”

CAS pilots point to the so-called Green Flag exercises, which take place throughout the year at Nellis or Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. Whereas in widely known Red Flags the service trains pilots with increasingly complex air-to-air scenarios, Green Flags incorporate Army ground forces who, together with USAF components, participate in scenarios to hone CAS skills.

The preponderance of focus has recently been on maintaining currency for pilots to conduct CAS in a permissive environment. While A-10 pilots are primarily focused on CAS, the training and tactics focus on the mission for F-15E, F-16 and B-1 pilots has forced other missions for these multirole platforms to take a backseat, pilots say. For many of these pilots at a captain rank, “We’ve known nothing but this war,” so the idea of a high-end fight against a near peer is academic.

More than half of the Air Force’s combat units are not ready to fight the “high-end” fight, USAF Secretary James has told Congress, referring to a shift in focus toward operating in the permissive airspace of Iraq or Afghanistan. Skills for penetrating enemy airspace and attacking the most protected targets have atrophied.

The Technology

Pilots of various platforms agree that the A-10 is purpose-built for CAS. It is designed to provide the pilot a good field of view of the ground; it is optimized to fly low and slow and can carry plenty of precision-guided munitions and cannon rounds. But the rhetoric that “only the A-10 guys can do CAS is mostly bar talk,” says one A-10 pilot. Air Force officials say a variety of weapons are employed in CAS scenarios—from strafing rounds to the 5,000-lb. bunker-buster, and they are dropped from a variety of aircraft (see graph above).

However, the advent of precision-guided munitions has dramatically enhanced CAS accuracy and allowed the mission to be carried out from aircraft flying higher and faster. Most recently, the new 250-lb. Small-Diameter Bomb (SDB) has been employed from the F-15E. Designed as a long-distance glide bomb, it was not optimized for direct attack. However, F-15E pilots developed tactics to alter altitude for the drop, and manufacturer Boeing came up with a fix to reduce glide time when needed.

In some cases, A-10s have been called in to take over air support when fighters are either unavailable or insufficient for the job. In other cases, however, fighters have onboard systems that allow them to fly low, dipping under weather in valleys, to execute a CAS mission.

An F-15E pilot reports a case where soldiers were under fire in a valley in Eastern Afghanistan. “Dropping a bomb in a situation this chaotic was not going to work for them through the weather, [but] we knew how important it was. It is the scariest thing I’ve ever done in an aircraft,” he says. “To say we can’t do it is just wrong; we can. We have systems onboard that allow us to do it, that actually look at the terrain. We have maps that tell us what altitude the terrain should be . . . and then you make the decision to go. . . . We got down, got low, got fast over the target and the enemy broke contact and ran. Often that is sufficient. Once they see us, they run.”

The Air Force calls these “show of force” missions, where merely arriving on the scene repels the enemy. And pilots report the shows of force are now more often driving the enemy back—reducing the need to drop ordnance.

Some USAF officials admit that retiring the A-10 could expose the military to a capability gap, but one that can largely be addressed with tactics employed from other aircraft.

“We could shoebox the best solution to being a platform. But . . . you don’t always have the ability to provide what you want [so] you provide the effect; there is the potential that there would be a gap in capability,” says an A-10 pilot.

But Air Force brass say the bottom line is money—there is not enough to retain a single-mission aircraft. “The A-10 is incredible at CAS . . . but other airplanes are doing the mission,” Air Combat Command chief Gen. Herbert Carlisle told Aviation Week. “Any time you transition an airplane, there is some inherent risk. But we are committed to [CAS] . . . and are using almost every platform we have to do CAS.”

And as USAF aircraft have become more advanced with precision targeting pods and munitions, so have Army and Marine helicopters. The downside of rotorcraft is their lack of speed and range to get to a target when friendly forces are based far forward. They are also susceptible to hostile fire, especially in a contested environment. But they are effective when they can be used; Army AH-64 Apaches and A-10s, for example, have been called in to support troops fighting so-called Islamic State targets.

This is a main thrust behind the Air Force’s push to discuss CAS; officials want to explain that many platforms can provide the muscle needed. And the retirement of the A-10 does not mean the CAS mission will solely fall on the unproven F-35.

The Transition

Chief of Staff Welsh emphasizes that the planned initial operational capability (IOC) for the F-35A by December 2016 is just that—an initial capability. Air Combat Command’s Carlisle is responsible for the declaration, and he is focused on three missions: CAS, air interdiction and limited suppression of enemy air defenses. He acknowledges that the F-35’s CAS abilities then will be “basic.” Suitable munitions at IOC are limited to 500-lb. laser-guided bombs and the 2,000-lb. joint direct attack munition. Pilots will not be able to fully exploit the synthetic aperture radar modes until Block 4 software is in service, years from now, nor will a video link to the ground controllers be available at IOC.

“The basic capability in the airplane we go to IOC with will have some communication capability,” Carlisle says. “We won’t have the Rover [data-sharing system] . . . where they can see the pod [video] and we can talk guys on [to targets] very easily.” He says the assumption is that other platforms can handle the mission while the F-35’s capabilities are ramping up, unless CAS is needed in a contested space.

Already officials at the Weapons School have begun a “CAS investigation” to examine and codify tactics for the F-35 operating in CAS missions, says Lt. Col. Benjamin Bishop, commander of the 422 Test and Evaluation Sqdn. at Nellis. This includes how the F-35 pilot will interact with the JTAC. The findings will be integrated into the aircraft’s tactics manual. CAS was the first of the missions to be worked in part to support Marine Corps IOC, which is slated for July 1. Bishop says that the Air Force’s 3i software-equipped aircraft—those with which IOC will be declared—and 3Fs are a “baseline investment” until the more robust Block 4 is fielded.

“We know that 3i is not going to have all of the weapons, right? We know there will be more weapons and more capability in 3F for the FOC [full operational capability]. So we have to develop the tactics and operationally test the tactics,” says Maj. Gen. Jay Silveria, commander of the Air Warfare Center at Nellis. “We’ll get more capability in 3F and will expand the testing and the tactics development based on those other weapons.”

By contrast, the Marines say their Block 2B F-35s, slated for IOC in July, will offer additional capability over the F-18s and AV-8Bs. “The increased capability due to the aircraft’s sensor suite and improved pilot situational awareness will decrease the time required to employ precision ordnance,” says Maj. Paul Greenberg, a Marine Corps spokesman. “This aircraft will be able to support the ground element in environments which previous aircraft could not” because of its stealthy qualities.

Block 3F will feature improved data fusion, full use of the infrared search-and-track capability, use of the cannon and wider use of the radar. The electro-optical targeting system in the meantime, however, allows for night CAS from the F-35, Silveria says.

Block 4 will further expand those and a variety of munitions, including the 250-lb., all-weather, moving-target SDB II now in development. The F‑35A will be able to employ its cannon when the 3F software is approved, and officials at Edwards AFB, California, expect to begin testing the gun when it is installed on a test aircraft by June.

The Plan

The Air Force is taking a number of steps to transform CAS, not only for permissive airspace but to establish the technology and tactics needed for CAS in contested airspace.

The service hosted a CAS Summit with representatives from its sister services this month to identify a way forward. Chief among the steps ahead is to consolidate CAS aviator experience in the Air Force. Pilots from the A-10 community will be assigned to squadrons of F-16s, F-15Es and, eventually, F-35s focused on that mission. “We want that CAS expertise to go to those squadrons that are dedicated to CAS to keep . . . that culture alive,” Carlisle says. “When we get to the Block 4s of the F-35s, those are going to be great CAS platforms.”

The service is also establishing a CAS Integration Group at Nellis to act as an umbilical cord on training, tactics and technology for the mission. It will include members of the other services as well as ground-based air controllers. USAF is also planning to incorporate live virtual training into the curriculum to boost the number of JTACs available to meet demand. “In 1990, we had 100% of the requirement at 450,” Carlisle says. During the Gulf war, airpower was used to take down defenses and potential airborne threats in Iraq, so CAS was not needed as much. “Today, we have over 1,500 and we’re still not meeting the requirement.” Another option is to use contract aircraft to train more JTACs, he notes.

The CAS Integration Group will also examine how to transfer relevant CAS lessons to operations likely in a contested environment. “If we’re in a contested environment where there’s an ability to fight your way in, to defend yourself in the airspace and still conduct a mission, that’s a higher level of training and it takes a lot of work,” Carlisle says.

Finally, the Air Force is examining ideas for future CAS weapon systems, including, potentially, a dedicated platform. This is only in a study phase, but Carlisle says careful review is needed not for capability as much as potentially fielding extra tails to augment the dwindling numbers of fighters.

“There is a capability requirement for the future threat. There is also a capacity discussion,” Carlisle says. “As . . . you look at the real high-end players and . . . if they get to the capability we anticipate they will get to . . . we have to keep thinking about how we maintain that capacity. . . . There may be an inflection point in the future that says at this point we need more capacity and to get that we have to do it at lower cost.” However, given the threat and budget environment “we are not there yet.”

Meanwhile, Air Force laboratories are continuing to examine a long-held desire to field true “dial-a-yield” weapons, which could provide tailored destructive effects “dialed in” by the pilot to reduce the destructive power or increase it based on scenario. Also hoped for are multirole weapons that can be carried internally in the F-35 to allow for their use in a contested environment. “The other capability that has always been key is either point- or cue-and-shoot. With the A-10 you pull your nose around, we’d like to do that same thing but maybe cue and shoot where . . . you use the helmet-mounted cueing system,” Carlisle says. “We do that for some weapons as well, but we haven’t developed them” for a forward-firing-type CAS environment, he notes.

Beyond this, Welsh says that he wants out-of-the-box thinking on CAS weapons—including such concepts as directed energy to smaller, precision-guided systems. “We should be focused on the next generation of close air support weapons. . . . There are different ways to look at this problem that technology can solve,” he says. “A large number of forward-firing laser-guided rockets [for example]. Is it something that fragments from a rocket into a thousand bullets . . . so you have thousand-round bursts” instead of the [far fewer rounds] “we get out of the gun in the front of an airplane today, [yet] the effect looks exactly the same on the ground?”

Although these ideas are on the table, there is little consensus as to the Air Force’s ability to fund its plans to revamp the mission.

__

Some of the comments....


Warrant9
on Mar 25, 2015

“ . . . the service is locked in a campaign to “energize” the discussion, . . . ” Not True, and all the evidence says so to date. Everything else is a smoke screen. All of the USAF fighters and bombers are inappropriate for the mission.

As for John McHugh’s support for cancellation, that was obviously a political decision influenced by his boss. The customers of the CAS support think otherwise, and some of them have died proving the case when Blue bombs take out Blue troops.

The A-10C is the “Bird in the hand”. The USAF wants to go to an ineffective “Bird in the bush”.

Inclusion of ‘Coalition & Other’ is miss leading because the USAF is the only operator of this type CAS support aircraft. Fast movers are fast movers regardless of the flag on the tail. When those statistics are placed in that perspective, the A-10 benefits the most from that accurate evaluation of USAF CAS support, particularly as evaluated by the customer.

The fast jets simply are not favored by the troops not because they cannot be seen or heard. On a gun run the fast jet can be seen . . . trust me. But effectiveness on target suffers greatly due to the speed of approach and time spent over the target. Also the 30mm goes THROUGH mountain rocks. The 20mm typically bounces off. The fast movers don’t shoot a thousand rounds, heck they don’t carry a 1,000 rounds.

When asking the troops in the field (the customer) about their satisfaction of the performance of those 140,000 data points . . . and the customer says up to 40-50% they wish hadn’t happened, particularly in ‘Danger Close’ this statistic takes on a whole new light, that is closer to the TRUTH!

” The bottom line in talking to pilots who have flown CAS missions since 9/11: CAS is all about the training.” Obviously a statement not spoken by an experienced CAS pilot who listens to the troops. When getting that experience, it is so evident why the Fast Movers can’t do the job. However, if one deliberately precludes themselves of that experience, then they should probably preclude themselves of testifying about the topic.

I can’t wait to hear the justification for the loss of the first F-35 to ground fire doing CAS because it took rounds of ground fire that got to the engine.

All the F-35 capability discussed in 3F or 3I software is years in the future. Our troops need quality CAS support TODAY and TOMORROW. The USAF is trying to create a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ in their CAS argument, and it rings hollow to anyone with real experience on the ground. That is why those guys are not there, or heard.

If one wishes to hear TRUTH about CAS, one must talk to the customers. They are conspicuously missing in this discussion.
_

Continued.....

 

[Housecarl]

Continued.....

Arizonan
on Mar 30, 2015

The customers, the USMC and Army, can develop tactics to do their own CAS with UAVs and helicopters. This should be their call. They probably want medevac helicopters and attack helicopters wherever they go.

The best close air support may be artillery, targeted by UAVs and supplied by unmanned helicopters.
_


Capt Carl
on Mar 26, 2015

I am a former FAC and my first choice out of flight school was the F-16. Instead, I wound up in OV-10 Broncos for my first assignment. I learned to appreciate CAS as both an air FAC and ground FAC. A lot of times you need a CAS aircraft that is closer to the ground, can stay on station longer, and is orbiting at a speed that allows the pilot to better survey the environment with their eyes. For that, I am going to want the A-10. Yes, the F-16 and F-15E can be super accurate given the right conditions, but an A-10 is going to be better when you have to get in lower and closer...in my opinion.

The Air Force command keeps saying it can't pay for the A-10 and the F-35. Well, can't that same argument be made for the F-16? In fact, isn't it a better argument that we start replacing F-16s with F-35s first? The Air Force constantly belittled the air superiority capabilities of the F-16 in order to maintain support for the more expensive F-15 and F-22. Therefore, it stands to reason, that the air-to-air capability of the F-16 (from Air Force leadership's view) is not that critical. The F-16 is far more expensive to operate than the A-10, so the AF could retire a lesser number of F-16s for the same savings as a greater number of A-10s. Yes, you lose the high speed interdictor capability, but that is primarily the F-15Es role and now we've seen that potentially the F-22 can support that role. And yes, you lose air-to-air capability, but that role is primarily filled by the F-15 and F-22.

The article is interesting in that if you read it closely, it would seem the Air Force is actually emphasizing the fact that the F-35, especially in it's initial configuration is not going to be a good CAS solution. They come right out and say that CAS capability is going to be very basic at first. The also emphasize the need to be able to fight into and out of highly contested airspace - the suggests a Russia or China scenario. It certainly has not been Syria, Afghanistan, or much of the Iraq conflict. Then, in the "plan" they talk about bring the A-10 pilot experience to the fast mover space. If the fast movers adequate at CAS, then why is that even necessary? Finally, they come to the cost argument saying they can't afford to keep a single role combat aircraft. Should they then also abandon all of the recce bird and heavy bombers? The Air Force is just not making all that great an argument.

So, if this is going to be a dollars and cents argument and the A-10 is continually demonstrating its highly survivable capabilities in combat, I would think we would be looking at retiring F-16s. And if we were really smart, we would re-engine the A-10s - should have done that a long time ago.

_


LM_Guy
on Mar 30, 2015

You make very good points about the F-16 & F-16, so don't worry, their over use and 13 years of war have used up much of their available flight hours and most of these jets will be grounded in the next 5-6 years.

_


pfaustin@bellso...
on Mar 27, 2015

We are all joint now, right? CAS in a permissive environment is adequately covered by the heavy bomber and fighter force. In dense, hostile environment, not only may A-10s become death traps without a very thorough SEAD campaign but so do the F-16s, B-52s, B-1s and Eagles.
In an extreme hostile air environment, F-35s, B-1s and F-22 are the only _aircraft_ that could deliver precision fires.
Then there's artillery. The Army has developed a suite of weapons ranging (literally) from 300km ATACMS through 49km GMLRS to guided tube artillery. In a really hostile air enviroment, the Army's artillery assets can not only supply precision fires for FEBA support but within range, can exploit signals intelligence to do the SEAD job as well.

-


1933john
on Mar 30, 2015

Everyone likes the smell of a new car;
especially the shareholders and banks.

_

Rudder
on Mar 30, 2015

The USAF has allowed publication of this story to pave the way for the exit of the A-10 and the entry of the F-35. The statistics are extremely misleading; fast movers are given credit for ISR support even if on station for a very short period of time; bombers are given credit even if they were unsuccessful in finding a target set. What would be illuminating is a series of graphs and pie charts which display the following:
* Time on station by aircraft type
* # of kinetic engagements by aircraft type
* Types of targets engaged by aircraft type
* % of successful "Danger Close" engagements by aircraft type
* % of successful kinetic CAS employment by aircraft type

While it is true that a multitude of aircraft can perform the CAS mission well, there is one that clearly stands above all others, that being the A-10. Just ask those that have served on the ground and in the air in actual combat--and have retired, so as not to subject to some incredible gag order by senior officers. All other things being equal, they will choose the A-10. Yes, if you have six fixed targets, then any of the aircraft listed in the article could service these targets effectively, but irregular warfare and counterinsurgency battles do not often present these types of targets today. Targets in this current fight (and for the foreseeable future) are mobile, fleeting, dynamic, and typically blend in with non-combatants. A B-1 or B-52 is rarely going to be as effective as an A-10 in this type of mission. An F-16 or F-15E could be as effective, depending upon the level of CAS proficiency and ordnance on board. A-10 pilots are experts in CAS; experts in discerning friendly from enemy; experts in communication with Joint Terminal Attack Controllers and Special Forces on the ground; experts in understanding the ground commander's intent; and experts in selecting ordnance appropriate for the target set.

Let's be clear: the USAF needs the F-35, but not at the expense of turning its back on the soldiers and airmen on the ground. The F-35 brings a multitude of capability to the table, but F-35 CAS proficiency, even as this article admits, is a long way off. Retiring the A-10 without a suitable substitute would be catastrophic to our effectiveness in supporting a sacred mission once revered by an Air Force gone by the wayside of seductive and expensive technology.

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jeb.hoge@gmail.com
on Mar 30, 2015

"A-10 pilots are experts in CAS; experts in discerning friendly from enemy; experts in communication with Joint Terminal Attack Controllers and Special Forces on the ground; experts in understanding the ground commander's intent; and experts in selecting ordnance appropriate for the target set."

My question then is this: Does the transition from flying A-10s to flying, say, F-16s (or pick your platform) remove this CAS expertise? If so, is it done surgically or by brainwashing? If the transition does NOT remove the CAS expertise and experience, then doesn't it follow that the former Hog driver still has the skill set and toolset (plus more speed and altitude and targeting sensors) to effectively employ munitions in the pursuit of killing bad guys near good guys? I understand that the big 30mm won't be part of the package, but it's clear that USAF brass are opening their minds to some other weapons options that can fill the gap, and from longer range. Laser-guided 70mm rockets, for instance...

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MandS
on Mar 30, 2015

The M261 and possibly M255 rockets offered by the General may be out of the question. The one qualifies as a cluster munition with it's 9 mini grenadelets and variable fuze (controlling coverage area) and isn't cheap. The other is the flechette round similar to the European multi-dart and also has limits in high density urban areas.

Not that I am a fan of the GAU-8 since a 30-50 round burst is going to occupy an ellipse about 70ft long from altitudes where the platform is safe and the use of DU rounds (the only such which will not fall out of the pattern in a Combat Mix due to projectile mass effects on retained energy) is also a MAJOR concern as you lose about 1-2% of the munition effect as ablation on the outside of the target face going-in and as much as 20% of the munition mass on the inside which equates to a vaporized uranium oxide that is both pyrophic and extremely toxic. Meaning if it starts a fire, it will form a film on everything that burns, leaving the position untenable. DU rounds in fact also corrode and the more they break up the more they do so while ability of the PGU-14 to 'skip' from intended targets (Serbian military and tank repair shop depots) into occupied urban areas as much as half a mile away is also well documented.

The GAU-8 is a tank killer (and not a very good one) because using it on anything else is a war crime, IMO.

Have said this there are multiple holes in the arguments as-stated. If you have no UAV you have no ROVER emulant. If you do have a UAV (Predator/Reaper) you have fires -and- ROVER which means that the time overhead as guardian angel to see the threat in approach is determinative and the UAV wins here by, tens of hours.

Any dropfire bay ordnance is 'nice to have' but not really applicable to the argument since it doesn't exist, yet. If you want to impress with dedication to the mission, changing the F-35 (particularly the B model which the Marines -bought for CAS- since ALL their jets are effectively tube-replacements to stay light) initial loadouts to rapid qualify the Brimstone/Hellfire would be a step in the right direction. The RAF MQ-9 already has this capability and it brings the number of shots from four to six on just two pylons, including the ability to fire 270` around the airframe using a GPS based autopilot to keep the nose tangential to the target bearing.

The A-10 is largely an overhead CAS platform. Which puts it at significant BHD risk and actually _slows_ engagement rates way down. The Marines use a cardinal point system whereby jets flying orbits come into to the target lane, drop and turn away in a SALH designation wheel while the next jet is already inbound. With small munitions to control the uplift of obscurants (so as not to block the next designation) this actually leads to BOTOTs as little as 5-10 seconds apart and is absolutely devatasting to threats which are dispersed across a battlefield to combat exactly this kind of attack.

A-10s do not fly high very well. It's not just a matter of retained thrust on that HVAC-fan-powered-by-hamster-wheel core. Things like the big fat wing and VNEs also come into it. What this means is that the A-10 doesn't do terribly well in the tanker stacks and so sits hot pad ground alert /because/ it doesn't have the legs to be airborne. The fact that the A-10 has no combat tanks (and likely shouldn't, so long as it remains below 10,000ft AGL) only compounds this issue while sitting at Bagram or Kandahar and 'awaiting the call' in a 350 knot airframe translates to a 30-40 minute transit instead of a 10-20 minute one for a CAS ambulance.

And make no mistake. It is a fast ambulance condition and it _will get worse_ as the threat shifts more and more the sophisticated ATGW and guided rounds of their own.

The ability to head and tail the column and then wreak unimaginable horror on the vehicles trapped inbetween is not an artifact of Mortain or Falaise. In these conditions, if you don't have an A-UAV overhead to start bringing the pain on the primary threat shooters, you MUST have:

1. Effective APS.
2. Ballistics ATGW of your own.

The Spike ER is essentially a miniature FOG-M. Jumper is a direct copy of Netfires. ALL of these systems can be installed, under armor in VLS pallets, directly in the convoy vehicles. While per round costs are not cheap, the ability to put a man in the loop on actual seeker video and use thermographic contrast to pick out threat firing sites is priceless. Even as, at 50,000 dollars per round, also much less expensive than training a squadron of CAS experts, year in and year out.

Such as system is NOT a fast ambulance because your reaction times go down from tens of minutes to tens of seconds and indeed, your NLOS capable guided weapon can become your primary mission effector in high intensity conditions, avoiding the need for direct contact engagements altogether.

Finally, a word on training. Combat pilots across the services these days are at a decades long low in terms of flight hours per year, averaging 100-120 hours per year when most other nations are at 200+. This means that they rotate in and out of deployment readiness based on who is deploying next and are NOT 'expeditionary ready', out of the box, without workup.

Such will only continue to get worse in decades to come as China takes more and more oil in reflection of her continued march to industrial dominance and jets which are old now take more and more spares to remain FMC.

In this, the notion that 'training counts' effectively -makes- a platform single role, whether you want it to or not. It takes roughly 20hrs, per mission, per month, to remain combat coded and current. If you do just CAS as a 'trained force' you will not have sufficient remaining flight time as a SEAD or OCA/DCA capable aviator to be competitive with 'dedicated' threats which do those missions and those missions alone, all the time and far more often.

With this in mind, 'how well trained you are' is only half the scenario at best. If you are fighting ASB with performance superior Flankers and J-xx airframes you don't need CAS. But you will need every ounce of ACM capability you can muster because you are in the **inferior jet** with the F-35.

This goes double for the Marines who seem to honestly think that you can bring a six jet detacthment to the boat, sans gas, EA or COD, and be a viable mini-carrier.

CONCLUSION:
You fight the war you brung. Evolutionarily, in the natural world, the winners among the predator species are those who either hyper specialize (owls and cheetahs) or hyper-generalize (house cats with bugs and mice and snakes) or are _team players_ (lions and wolves). Generally the breakdown is 1 in 3, 1 in 5 and 1 in 7 (where pack or pride always gets a kill because some member is always lucky).

Where, as the Spartans used to say, 'You never want to fight the same enemy so many summers in a row that you teach them how best to defeat you', what I am seeing here is the breakdown in multiple means of approach in an F-35 airframe design that attempts to be all things to all people and fails miserably because it is too costly to own in numbers and too expensive per flight hour to train with, effectively and doesn't have the weapons mix or /alternative systems approaches/ (imbedded in other services) to remain unpredictable and thus effective.

When you attempt to make one club be all things to everyone, it is generally useless at anything for anyone. Which means you are right back at using single, squadron dedicated, 'trained' skill sets to compensate and the whole idea behind JSF, as a means to standardize across the board, is conceptually and factually defunct.

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Warrant9
on Mar 30, 2015

“CAS is a mission, not a platform.” Not a message coming from the Customer, but the service provider.

In talking with eight pilots at different bases—all of whom performed CAS missions—they universally said that CAS is not about the platform, it is about the training. Once again, the message and data points are from anyone but the customer, whose satisfaction is supposed to drive the equation.

The USAF, platforms, pilots, ground controllers and support personnel are quoted all over the place. I wish the general would send me his uniform so I can prepare it for him to wear. Don’t think he would like it very much and his [the customer] evaluation of my [service provider] performance would not be good. Well, the ground pounders who depend on this support for their very lives is left completely out of the equation.

“The A-10 is incredible at CAS . . . but other airplanes are doing the mission,” Air Combat Command chief Gen. Herbert Carlisle told Aviation Week. “Any time you transition an airplane, there is some inherent risk. But we are committed to [CAS] . . . and are using almost every platform we have to do CAS.” A statement by someone who obviously does not understand the mission and has not called for support from the ground, and received the satisfaction of a successful mission. Fast movers in “Danger Close” introduce so much risk into the situation, the troops on the ground will often forgo the support.

I and most of the American public no longer trust the Chain of Command of the United States Air Force, and they have no one to blame but themselves. They have skewed (deliberately lied about) data to support their argument trying to turn this equation into a self-fulfilling prophecy, and been caught at it . . . and yet they persist.

“When we get to the Block 4s of the F-35s, those are going to be great CAS platforms.” . . . until the F-35 eats a bullet, or heaven forbid, it experiences modern flack. Then it’s not a $100 Million stealth aircraft anymore.

To take an expensive stealth platform that is allergic to bullets and place it in the close proximity to the certain agent of its demise, is a solution that could only be proposed by the USAF Chain of Command. There is an A-10 that flew home without one engine (the engine was missing from the pylon). Ask an F-35 to do that!

Anyone of reasonable intelligence who looks at the real data, and compares actual operational support costs of the A-10C as compared to any of the proposed replacement platforms, knows that the A-10 is not just the quintessential CAS platform, but a bargain to boot. Close Air Support is probably the only mission that REQUIRES a dedicated platform, and the USAF is “Living on a River in Egypt”.

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Tommy
on Mar 30, 2015

"...but we’ve priced ourselves out of that game.”
Why isn't that same argment used to cancel the F35 and use the money to buy a lot more of the aircraft currently available. The stealth factor is totally misleading today.

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akear@comcast.net
on Mar 30, 2015

We don't know if the F-35 can even fly across the Atlantic to the Farnsborough airshow. If F-35 has to have its engines checked every 3 hours what good is it in a real world CAS environment? The F-35 does not even meet most basic airworthy criteria. If the plane does not meet this basic criteria why is it even be discussed for any mission.


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