WAR 2-18-2017-to-02-24-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

(255) 1-28-2017-to-02-03-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...03-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(256) 2-04-2017-to-02-10-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...10-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(257) 2-11-2017-to-02-17-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...17-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.strategypage.com/qnd/mali/20170216.aspx

Mali: Sahel Coalition Formed

February 16, 2017: Mali, Chad, Niger and the Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso have agreed to form a new “G5 counter-terrorism force” that will work in cooperation with the similar (but larger and better equipped) French force that has been operating in the Sahel (the semi-desert area south of the desert that stretches across northern Africa) since 2014. Back then the French concluded that the Sahel was still troubled by thousands of Islamic terrorists and that this situation could not be taken care of quickly. In order to maintain pressure on the Islamic terrorists France established a special force of 3,000 troops to fight Islamic terrorists throughout the Sahel (actually just Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso). Since then the French force has grown to some 4,000 troops equipped with 200 armored vehicles, 20 transport and attack helicopters, six jet fighters and three large UAVs. There are also two twin engine C-160 air transports available for use within the Sahel. Supplies and reinforcements are regularly flown in using long-range transports (like the C-17) belonging to NATO allies (especially the U.S. and Britain). From the beginning the French force included a thousand French troops in Mali and the rest dispersed to other Sahel bases and ready to quickly move anywhere in the region that Islamic terrorist activity had been detected. The G5 nations already cooperated by sharing intelligence and providing quick access to their territory by the French force. In addition the Americans provided satellite and UAV surveillance and other intel services (especially analysis and access to nearly all American data on Islamic terrorist activities in the region).

All this was meant to keep the Islamic terrorists in the Sahel weak and disorganized. So far that has worked, but AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), which has been around since 2007, is still in business (as gangsters smuggling drugs and illegal migrants north) and getting support from Islamic terrorists in Europe and the Persian Gulf. Islamic terrorists continue to carry out attacks in Mali (mainly the north) and in the G5 states to let the world know that Islamic terrorists were still present in the area.

Another reminder has been the high casualty rate among peacekeepers in Mali. UN peacekeepers in Mali suffered 26 dead during 2016, the highest number of any UN peacekeeping operation and 90 percent of the UN peacekeeper deaths in 2016, even though the Mali force comprises less than 15 percent of all UN peacekeepers. The Mali peacekeepers have been in this situation for three years in a row. Over a hundred peacekeepers (mostly UN, but some French) have died in Mali since they arrived in 2013. This is the highest casualty rate of all current UN peacekeeping operations.

The new G5 forces will be small (500-2,000 personnel) and consist largely of special operations troops. Many of these troops have already worked with their French counterparts or been trained by French or American special operations advisors.

February 14, 2017: In the north (outside Kidal) French soldiers, acting on a tip, found and destroyed a cache of 25 mortar shells that were recently placed there for a planned (according to locals) attack sometime in the next few days. Similar tips by locals have led to the recent disabling of three roadside bombs.

February 13, 2017: In central Mali (near the junction of the Niger and Bani rivers) there was another outbreak of violence over the weekend involving Peul (Fulani) and Bambara tribesmen. It began when some Bambara attacked a Peul village and killed as many as 30 people and wounded many more. More than 500 villagers fled their homes to avoid the violence. This tribal feuding has been going on for years but got worse since 2015 when the Peul became widely known as a source of recruits for Islamic terrorist groups and for generally supporting AQIM. The more numerous Bambara (who tend to be pro-government) live north of the Niger and are about a third of the population. The Fulani (who tend to be more rebellious) are largely from south of the Niger. This is not just a Mali problem as Nigeria complains that armed Fulani herders from Mali have showed up in northeast Nigeria and joined local Islamic terrorist groups.

February 12, 2017: Algeria and Mali have agreed to allow Algerian telecommunications companies to offer Internet and cell phone services in Mali.

February 10, 2017: In the north (near Gao) German peacekeepers now have all three of their leased Israeli Heron I UAVs (similar to the American Predator) operational. The first Heron 1 arrived in October 2016 and its initial mission lasted nearly six hours. Peacekeepers in Mali have found Israeli UAVs very useful for keeping an eye on large, thinly inhabited, areas. The first one found there were no serious problems operating in the Mali desert-like conditions.

February 7, 2017: In the south (300 kilometers east of the capital near the Burkina Faso border) four armed men kidnapped a Catholic nun (from Colombia) who provided health care from a clinic in a parish compound. At first it was feared the kidnappers were Islamic terrorists, who prefer to attack non-Moslems (especially clergy) and kidnap foreigners. The four men claimed to be Islamic terrorists. Police concluded (based on testimony of the other three nuns in the compound) that the attackers were probably just common criminals. The other nuns were not killed by the armed men but rather locked up in a closet as the compound was looted of all valuables and the attackers left with the one nun. The getaway car was later found abandoned. Since then the police have arrested at least twenty people in the area, killing one of them in the process. There has not yet been a ransom demand and it is feared that the criminals plan to sell their captive to Islamic terrorists, who often buy such captives from criminals. That’s because the criminals don’t want the long term problems with police because they made the country look bad by kidnapping a foreigner. The Islamic terrorists, on the other hand, seek that kind of attention and generally can obtain a much higher ransom, or die trying.

January 26, 2017: In the south police arrested two men suspected of being Islamic terrorists who planned an attack in the capital (Bamako). The two were caught with weapons and equipment needed for such an attack, which was cancelled because the heavily guarded international conference on January 13-14 proved impossible for the attackers to get at. Rather than try anyway the Islamic terrorists decided to remain hidden and wait for another opportunity. But police did hear about the plan and began looking for the participants.

The German parliament approved the expansion of the German peacekeeper contingent in Mali from 650 to a thousand. Also approved was the use of eight German military helicopters (four NH90 transports and four Tiger gunships.) While Germany also has troops in Iraq and Afghanistan (as trainers and advisors) but the largest contingent is in Mali.

January 25, 2017: French counter-terrorism forces in the north have arrested three suspects believed to be involved with the January 18th suicide truck bomb attack outside Gao that killed 77 and wounded over a hundred, most of the casualties were members of pro-government Tuareg militias that AQIM later said were being punished for making peace with the foreign infidels (non-Moslems).

January 23, 2017: In the north (outside Kidal) Islamic terrorists fired several mortar shells at a peacekeeper base a killed a soldier from Chad and wounded two others.....
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[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.strategypage.com/qnd/nigeria/articles/20170217.aspx

Nigeria: Putting The Problems Into Perspective

February 17, 2017: Boko Haram is in bad shape and 2016 was its worst year ever. Casualties were heavy, attacks were way down and the organization split into two major factions and a few smaller ones. Cash needed to pay full-time Boko Haram members (so they can support families) is no longer available for everyone. A growing number of Boko Haram deserters claim they left because of no food and no cash. Fewer admitted they left because their prospects were dismal. There are also shortages of ammunition and everything else. There have been growing problems recruiting suicide bombers and by the end of 2016 most of them were women and children (some as young as ten). As a result most suicide attacks now fail. Not just because of inept attackers but also because the security forces (including civilian volunteers) have adopted more effective security measures, especially for screening people quickly. Boko Haram responded by using women with infants to get by the screeners but that has not worked either. Worse, most of the remaining Boko Haram have been confined to Borno State in the northeast and in camps in Cameroon (which is Borno’s eastern border). Thus some 70 percent of Boko Haram violence during 2016 took place in Borno and just across the border in Cameroon. But the attacks were smaller than in previous years and much less successful. Cameroon has been more effective in fighting this foreign invader, and has lost 200 of its soldiers and police doing so, as well as some 2,000 civilians. But northern Cameroon, which borders Borno, is thinly populated and the border areas have a lot of places to hide. Yet the pressure from Cameroonian troops has forced Boko Haram to disperse into smaller groups and stay close to the Nigerian border. Thus most of the Boko Haram attacks in Cameroon are very small scale and often the result of a raid (for food and fuel) or clash with an army patrol.

Borno was where Boko Haram began and where most of the recruiting and terrorist activity has always been. Aa a result most of the damage has been there. Since 2009 nearly three million people (90 percent of them Nigerian) were driven from their homes by Boko Haram and at least a third of those are still living, and often starving, in government run refugee camps or areas where there is no food. Most of those displaced fled before 2015. Six years of Boko Haram violence depopulated over 30,000 square kilometers in northern Borno State. Few of the refugees have returned. The depopulation led to the collapse of the local economy and it is proving difficult to get the economy going again. Instead refugees face chaos and corruption when they return to the depopulated area. That chaos is partly because there are more groups of organized outlaws up there. Most are not Boko Haram but the security forces don’t find that out until a gun battle is over. What makes this worse is that the Nigerian security forces still tend to shoot first and investigate later, if at all. For this reason people prefer to live away from the main roads, where bandits and Islamic terrorists will lie in wait for aid convoys or anyone worth robbing. Troops driving by will shoot at anything that might be an ambush. In most of the depopulated areas aid groups demand armed escorts for aid convoys. But the more troops to assign to convoy escort the less are available for going after and eliminating the remaining Boko Haram and the growing number of bandits. Meanwhile several hundred thousand refugees in Borno are in danger of starving to death. In 2016 the several thousand deaths from disease and malnutrition were far more common than the 300 or so caused by Boko Haram attacks. Since 2009 Boko Haram has killed over 10,000 civilians by direct action (raids, executions, used as suicide bombers or human shields) but that number might be exceeded by the economic aftereffects among the refugees and those still living in economically devastated areas of Borno.

Economic Damage

The decline in oil prices, persistent corruption and inept government have triggered a nationwide economic crises, The Islamic terrorist violence in the northeast has had little to do with the fact that nationwide Inflation is still close to 20 percent and unemployment 14 percent. More telling is that the underemployment rate is 33 percent. Thus just having a job means little if it does not pay enough keep you alive. Noting this, and other indicators, foreign experts like the IMF and World Bank have revised their predictions for Nigerian economic performance downward. This is bad news because the economy apparently shrank 1.5 percent in 2016. Thus the IMF now sees it likely Nigerian GDP will grow .8 percent (if at all) in 2017 rather than one percent.

The government is desperately trying to avoid increases in unemployment and inflation that could trigger widespread unrest. Economic recovery is only possible if the government can control enough of the corruption (that usually cripples such investment efforts) and actually generate an increase in oil revenue. The federal government normally gets 70 percent of its budget from oil income. Oil is normally responsible for 40 percent of all economic activity in Nigeria and 90 percent of foreign exchange (to pay for imports). But now the government has less oil money available and is trying to replace that by going after and halting the massive corruption that had diverted so much oil income in the past. Some progress has been made there and the government also managed to reduce government spending seen as non-essential. Yet foreign lenders and investors are backing off, mainly because of the corruption. In 2016 Chinese economists visited Nigeria and saw the extent of the corruption and economic problems that bad behavior created. China is still willing to work with Nigeria, but only if Nigerian officials can halt an economic collapse corruption has caused. Foreign economists also pointed out that, despite getting oil production back to 1.7 million barrels per day (BPD) at the start of 2017 (up from 1.56 million BPD in November) the goal of 2.5 million BPD by 2020 was unlikely to be achieved much less sustained. All this comes after production fell to a low of 1.4 million BPD in early 2016. Without all this violence and corruption it would be over 2.2 million BPD and the government says that level must be reached in 2017 if the economy is to recover. That is unlikely to happen. As always tribe based gang violence in the Niger Delta (where most of the oil is) prevents growth in production or even maintaining high levels of production. That tribal unrest is largely the result of corruption.

Nigeria, even before it was created by British colonial officials in the 1900s, was always notoriously corrupt. Currently Nigeria is not rated as one of the most corrupt nations on the planet. Instead Nigeria is 136 out of 176 countries for 2016 and somewhat better off than the worst. In 2015 Nigeria was 136 and in 2013 was 144, so there has been some improvement but has stalled. Somalia was rated the most corrupt nation in the world and has held that dubious distinction for a decade. Corruption in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index is measured on a 1 (most corrupt) to 100 (not corrupt) scale. The most corrupt nations (usually North Korea, Somalia or, since 2011, South Sudan) have a rating of under fifteen while for the least corrupt (usually Denmark) it tends to be 90 or higher. The current Nigeria score is 28 compared to 40 for China, 26 for Cameroon, 20 for Chad, 35 for Niger, 36 for Benin, 43 for Ghana, 45 for South Africa, 21 for Congo, 45 for Senegal, 40 for India, 72 for Japan, 37 for Indonesia, 53 for South Korea, 17 for Iraq, 41 for Turkey, 46 for Saudi Arabia, 28 for Lebanon, 29 for Iran, 66 for the UAE (United Arab Emirates), 64 for Israel, 25 for Afghanistan. 32 for Pakistan, 29 for Russia, 11 for South Sudan, 12 for North Korea, and 74 for the United States. A lower corruption score is common with nations in economic trouble. African nations are the most corrupt, followed by Middle Eastern ones. Fixing an existing culture of corruption has proved a most difficult challenge.

Foreign Invaders

In the northeast officials complain that armed Fulani herders from Mali have showed up in northeast Nigeria and joined local Islamic terrorist groups or other criminal gangs. In Mali (along the Niger River) there has long been violence between Peul (Fulani) and Bambara tribesmen. This tribal feuding got worse since 2015 when the Peul became widely known as a source of recruits for Islamic terrorist groups and for generally supporting al Qaeda and Boko Haram. The more numerous Bambara (who tend to be pro-government) live north of the Niger and are about a third of the population. The Fulani (who tend to be more rebellious) are largely from south of the Niger. Some of these Fulani are taking their bad attitudes with them when they travel outside Mali.

February 13, 2017: In the northeast (Borno State) about thirty Boko Haram gunmen attacked a village near the Sambisa Forest but only went to the local mosque and killed an Islamic scholar who had preached against Islamic terrorism. A teenage boy was also killed. Attacks like are part of an effort to intimidate civilians to assist, or at least tolerate Boko Haram activities. That is not working but the remaining Islamic terrorists keep at it.

February 9, 2017: In the northeast (Borno State) a convoy with 250 soldiers (recruits who had recently finished basic training) was ambushed by Boko Haram near the Sambisa Forest. Seven soldiers died, 20 were wounded and three (one of them female) are missing. The Boko Haram fled, taking their dead and wounded with them. The Islamic terrorists also managed to loot some of the trucks.

January 31, 2017: In the northeast (Borno State) a UN aid employee and four others were killed by bandits or Boko Haram just across the Cameroon border. The five were working on a border survey project. The UN pointed out that it could not pay for this kind of work if the people involved were not safe......


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[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-mosul-idUSKBN15X08P

WORLD NEWS | Sat Feb 18, 2017 | 5:49am EST

U.S. coalition says Islamic State command center destroyed in Mosul; IS says civilians killed

The U.S.-led military coalition on Saturday said its forces destroyed a building in the main medical complex of western Mosul, suspected to house an Islamic State command center.

The militant group disputed the assertion, saying in an online statement that Friday's strike killed 18 people, mostly women and children, and wounded 47.

Independent media have no access to western Mosul or other areas under Islamic State control in Iraq and Syria.

The militants are essentially under siege in western Mosul, along with an estimated 650,000 civilians, after U.S.-backed forces surrounding the city dislodged them from the east in the first phase of an offensive that concluded last month.

The coalition accused Islamic State of using the five-story building as a military command and control facility.

"The coalition was able to determine through intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance efforts that ISIS did not use the building for any medical purposes and that civilians were no longer accessing the site," a coalition statement said, using an acronym for Islamic State.

The strike followed reports that the militants are dug in among civilians on the western side of Mosul and storing weapons in hospitals, schools, mosques and churches as a tactic to avoid targeting.

The offensive to dislodge Islamic State from Mosul, its last major city stronghold in Iraq, started in October. The hardline Sunni group declared in 2014 a self-styled caliphate that also spans parts of Syria.

(Reporting by Maher Chmaytelli; Editing by Janet Lawrence and John Stonestreet)

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Pence says U.S. will stand firm with Europe, NATO
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[Housecarl]

Hummm....Anyone with a grasp of history (as well as the political brouhaha in the US between the DNC and Trump over the Russians and the Ukraine Crisis etc, as well) should see this as a "DOT"....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-security-merkel-idUSKBN15X06L

WORLD NEWS | Sat Feb 18, 2017 | 4:02am EST

Merkel calls for joint efforts with Russia to battle Islamist terrorism

German Chancellor Angela Merkel on Saturday said Europe's ties with Russia remained challenging, but it was important to work with Russia in the fight against Islamist terrorism.

"The joint fight against Islamic terrorism is one area where we have the same interests and we can work together," Merkel said in a speech to the Munich Security Conference, where U.S. Vice President Mike Pence was in the audience.

Merkel, who has been critical of a U.S. ban on travel from seven Muslim-majority countries, underscored that Islam itself was not the source of terrorism. She said it was critical to include Muslim countries in the fight against Islamist terrorism.

Germany, under increasing pressure by U.S. leaders to increase its military spending, would do "everything possible" meet a NATO target for spending 2 percent of economic output on defense by 2024, Merkel told the conference.

(Reporting by Andrea Shalal and Noah Barkin)

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For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-security-usa-idUSKBN15X06Q

WORLD NEWS | Sat Feb 18, 2017 | 6:51am EST

Pence says U.S. will stand firm with Europe, NATO

By Roberta Rampton and John Irish | MUNICH
U.S. Vice President Mike Pence on Saturday brought a message of support for Europe from Donald Trump but failed to wholly reassure allies worried about the new president's stance on Russia and the European Union.

In Pence's first major foreign policy address for the Trump administration, the vice president told European leaders and ministers that he spoke for Trump when he promised "unwavering" commitment to the NATO military alliance.

"Today, on behalf of President Trump, I bring you this assurance: the United States of America strongly supports NATO and will be unwavering in our commitment to this transatlantic alliance," Pence told the Munich Security Conference.

While Poland's defense minister praised Pence, many others, including France's foreign minister and U.S. lawmakers in Munich, remained skeptical that he had convinced allies that Trump, a former reality TV star, would stand by Europe.

Trump's contradictory remarks on the value of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, scepticism of the 2015 deal to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions and an apparent disregard for the future of the European Union have left Europe fearful for the seven-decade-old U.S. guardianship of the West.

French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault on Twitter expressed his disappointment that Pence's speech contained "Not a word on the European Union", although the vice president will take his message to EU headquarters in Brussels on Monday.

U.S. Senator Chris Murphy, a member of the opposition Democrats, said he saw two rival governments emerging from the Trump administration.

Pence, Trump's defense secretary Jim Mattis and his foreign minister Rex Tillerson all delivered messages of reassurance on their debut trip to Europe.

But events in Washington, including a free-wheeling news conference Trump gave in which he branded accredited White House reporters "dishonest people", sowed more confusion.

"Looks like we have two governments," Murphy wrote on Twitter from Munich. The vice president "just gave speech about shared values between US and Europe as (the U.S. president) openly wages war on those values."

The resignation of Trump's security adviser Michael Flynn over his contacts with Russia on the eve of the U.S. charm offensive in Europe also tarnished the message Pence, Mattis and Tillerson were seeking to send, officials told Reuters.

U.S. Republican Senator John McCain, a Trump critic, told the conference on Friday that the new president's team was "in disarray," breaking with the American front.

The United States is Europe's biggest trading partner, the biggest foreign investor in the continent and the European Union's partner in almost all foreign policy, as well as the main promoter of European unity for more than sixty years.

Pence, citing a trip to Cold War-era West Berlin in his youth, said the new U.S. government would uphold the post-World War Two order.

"This is President Trump's promise: we will stand with Europe today and every day, because we are bound together by the same noble ideals – freedom, democracy, justice and the rule of law," Pence said.

MUTED APPLAUSE

While the audience listened intently, Pence received little applause beyond the warm reception he received when he declared his support for NATO.

Ayrault, in a speech defending Franco-German leadership in Europe, lauded the virtues of multilateralism at a time of rising nationalism. Trump has promise 'America First.'

"In these difficult conditions, many are attempting to look inward, but this isolationism makes us more vulnerable. We need the opposite," Ayrault said.

Pence warned allies they must pay their fair share to support NATO, noting many lack "a clear or credible path" to do so. He employed a tougher tone than Mattis, who delivered a similar but more nuanced message to NATO allies in Brussels this week, diplomats said.

The United States provides around 70 percent of the NATO alliance's funds and European governments sharply cut defense spending since the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia's resurgence as a military power and its seizure of Ukraine's Crimean peninsula in the Black Sea has started to change that.

Baltic states and Poland fear Russia might try a repeat of Crimea elsewhere. Europe believes Moscow is seeking to destabilize governments and influence elections with cyber attacks and fake news.

Pence's tough line on Russia, calling Moscow to honor the international peace accords that seek to end the conflict in eastern Ukraine, were welcomed by Poland.

"Know this: the United States will continue to hold Russia accountable, even as we search for new common ground, which as you know, President Trump believes can be found," Pence said.

Polish Defence Minister Antoni Macierewicz said Pence's speech "highlighted on behalf of President Trump that the U.S. supports NATO, Ukraine and Europe.

"They want to show the U.S. military potential," he said.

(Additional reporting by Noah Barkin, Andrea Shalal, Vladimir Soldatkin, John Irish and Jonathan Landay; Writing by Robin Emmott; Editing by Janet Lawrence)

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U.S. coalition says Islamic State command center destroyed in Mosul; IS says civilians killed
Malaysia arrests North Korean man as row over Kim Jong Nam's death escalates

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.adn.com/nation-world/2017/02/17/how-the-nuclear-threat-from-north-korea-grew/

Nation/World

How the nuclear threat from North Korea grew

Author: Rick Gladstone, Rogene Jacquette, The New York Times Updated: 6 hours ago Published 6 hours ago

When North Korea tested a missile that fell harmlessly into the sea this month, it was more than just an attempt by its 33-year-old leader, Kim Jong Un, to jolt a new U.S. president. Arms experts observed something new: solid-fuel technology that makes such missiles easier to hide and launch quickly. North Korea's nuclear weapons program has progressed in four areas that bear watching: arsenal size, bomb strength, missile technology and ability to elude detection.

— Arsenal size: small, but thought to be growing.

Knowledge of the weapons stockpile is based on estimates. Experts say that North Korea has fewer than 10 nuclear weapons. Satellite imagery of North Korea's nuclear complex in Yongbyon, combined with official North Korean propaganda photos and recent nuclear tests, suggests that the country could rapidly expand its arsenal. By one estimate, the country now has enough plutonium and highly enriched uranium to build 20 to 25 nuclear weapons.

— Explosive power: from 1 kiloton to 10 kilotons in 10 years.

The explosive force of North Korea's first nuclear device, tested in October 2006, was less than a kiloton, which is 1,000 tons of TNT. Its second test, in 2008, had more than double that force.

By January 2016, the country claimed to have exploded a hydrogen bomb in a fourth test, but outside monitors expressed skepticism. Seismic readings suggested an explosive force of 4 to 6 kilotons.

Seismic readings of North Korea's fifth test, in September 2016, however, registered a force of approximately 10 kilotons, according to South Korea's Defense Ministry.

[North Korean nuclear ambitions to be defining issue for Trump]

— Technology: missiles could reach continental U.S. by 2026.

In 1999, George Tenet, then director of the CIA, said he could hardly overstate his concern about North Korea's program, warning that the Taepodong-1 missile, with a reach of up to 1,243 miles, could deliver bomb payloads to Alaska and Hawaii.

In the nearly two decades since, the country's investment in becoming a nuclear weapons power has succeeded despite diplomacy and international sanctions.

In 2016, Kim launched dozens of missiles for tests and as shows of military might. Some missiles could be launched from mobile pads and submarines, making them easier to hide. They could potentially carry nuclear warheads, according to Siegfried S. Hecker, emeritus director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, birthplace of the atomic bomb.

He and other analysts have said they assume North Korea has designed and demonstrated nuclear warheads that can be mounted on short-range and perhaps medium-range missiles. Writing in September 2016, Hecker said, "Pyongyang will likely develop the capability to reach the continental United States with a nuclear-tipped missile in a decade or so."

— Covert capability: smaller, more mobile weapons.

When he became North Korea's top leader in April 2012, Kim said that his "first, second and third" priorities were to strengthen the military, and he declared that superiority in military technology was "no longer monopolized by imperialists." Less than three years later, Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti, then commander of U.S. forces in South Korea, said he believed that North Korea had made a nuclear weapon small enough to fit atop a missile.

In May 2015, Kim said North Korea had the ability to miniaturize nuclear weapons. That claim was greeted with skepticism by analysts, but in March 2016, Kim was photographed admiring what state media described as a home-built warhead. In August 2016, North Korea test-fired a ballistic missile from a submarine, demonstrating a significant improvement in its ability to strike enemies stealthily.

The missile test this month, analysts said, further proved that North Korea was committed to producing more lethal systems that could be deployed quickly. "The North Koreans are sincerely paranoid," said Joshua Pollack, a senior research associate at the Middlebury Institute's James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. "They're increasingly very blunt about how they would use these things pre-emptively."

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://maritime-executive.com/article/us-strike-group-1-starts-patrols-in-south-china-sea

U.S. Strike Group 1 Starts Patrols in South China Sea

By MarEx 2017-02-19 16:30:09
Comments 1

U.S. Navy Carrier Strike Group 1 has begun patrols in the South China Sea amid growing tensions with China.

China has yet to officially comment on the move that the U.S. Navy says is “routine,” but some observers have indicated that the patrols*demonstrate*that tensions between China and the U.S. could intensify under the Trump administration.

Nations competing with China for claims to parts of the South China Sea include Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Taiwan also claims part of the area.

Carrier Strike Group 1*includes*Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson, the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Wayne E. Meyer and aircraft from Carrier Air Wing 2. The group*began operations in the South China Sea on February 18.*

China wrapped up its own naval exercises in the South China Sea on February 17.*
Earlier this month, U.S. Defence Secretary Jim Mattis said the U.S. did not see the need for major military moves in the South China Sea to contend with China’s assertive behaviors, despite saying that China’s action had shredded the trust of nations in the region.

After several weeks of exercises off Hawaii and Guam, Rear Adm. James Kilby, commander of the strike group, said: “We are looking forward to demonstrating those capabilities while building upon existing strong relationships with our allies, partners and friends in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.”

Vinson last deployed to the Western-Pacific in 2015 and conducted a bilateral exercise with the Royal Malaysian Navy and Royal Malaysian Air Force in the South China Sea. Vinson first operated in the South China Sea in 1983 and in total, has operated there during 16 previous deployments over its 35 year history.*

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For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.military.com/daily-news/...rier-strike-group-patrolling-s-china-sea.html

US Aircraft Carrier Strike Group Patrolling S. China Sea

Agence France Presse | Feb 19, 2017
Comments 76

A U.S. aircraft carrier strike group is patrolling in the South China Sea, the U.S. Navy said Saturday, days after Beijing told Washington not to challenge its sovereignty in the region.

China asserts ownership of almost all of the resource-rich waters despite rival claims from several Southeast Asian countries. It has rapidly built reefs into artificial islands capable of hosting military planes.

The USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier group was engaging in "routine operations in the South China Sea," the navy said in a statement on its website.

Related Video:
A Day Aboard USS Carl Vinson

It noted that the ships and aircraft had recently conducted exercises off Hawaii and Guam to "maintain and improve their readiness and develop cohesion as a strike group."

"We are looking forward to demonstrating those capabilities while building upon existing strong relationships with our allies, partners and friends in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region," strike group commander Rear Admiral James Kilby said in the statement.

China's foreign ministry said ships and aircraft were allowed to operate in the area according to international law.

But Beijing "firmly opposes any country's attempt to undermine China's sovereignty and security in the name of the freedom of navigation and overflight," spokesman Geng Shuang told journalists Wednesday, responding to reports that the Vinson was headed to the South China Sea.

"We also urge the U.S. to refrain from challenging China's sovereignty and security and to respect regional countries' efforts to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea," he said.

The Vinson has deployed to the South China Sea 16 times in its 35-year history, the Navy said.

Washington says it does not take sides in the territorial disputes but has several times sent warships and planes to assert freedom of navigation in the area, sparking protests from Beijing.

Copyright (2017) AFP. All rights reserved.

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http://www.scmp.com/news/china/dipl...ng-expected-test-trumps-threshold-provocation

Beijing expected to test Trump’s threshold for provocation in South China Sea

Ankit Panda
PUBLISHED : Monday, 20 February, 2017, 9:00am
UPDATED : Monday, 20 February, 2017, 9:00am
Comments 34

The South China Sea appears set to heat up this year as US President Donald Trump’s administration considers its options.

During the campaign and the presidential transition, in addition to questioning the United States’ one-China policy and lambasting Beijing for its trade practices, Trump touched on the contested waterway.

In December, after his unprecedented decision to accept a phone call from the president of Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen, Trump took to Twitter to complain that Beijing didn’t “ask” the United States if it could “build a massive military complex in the middle of the South China Sea” – referring to the constellation of artificial islands in the Spratly Islands and its military outposts in the Paracels.

When James Mattis, Trump’s defence secretary, visited Tokyo early this month, he clarified the new administration’s South China Sea policy – mostly reaffirming what the Obama administration had emphasised.

Mattis underlined the importance of freedom of navigation above all other principles and said “the United States did “not see any need for dramatic military moves at all”.

Privately, however, Mattis hinted to Japanese officials the US would seek to pick up the pace of such operations.

The Obama administration carried out four such operations near China’s South China Sea possessions starting in 2015, which were intended to assert navigational rights under international law, but drew sharp protest from Beijing.

According to more recent reports, the US Pacific Command, which had encountered some pushback from the Obama administration on intensifying these operations, would present Trump with options soon to resume them.

China’s loud and vocal opposition to any freedom of navigation operations backed by Trump is a given, but the US stands to benefit from a regular presence in the waters.

The Obama administration baulked at Chinese protests over these operations, fearing that sustained and regular operations would potentially chip away at US-China cooperation in other areas, including on North Korea.

The Trump administration will have fewer qualms in this regard.

Above all, the manoeuvres were never intended for use as a military deterrence tool; they were intended as a mundane form of asserting rights under international law.

China’s regular complaints about the United States’ “militarisation” of the South China Sea, however, seemed to convince the previous administration that such operations were especially provocative.

It remains to be seen whether the Trump administration will place a similar level of emphasis on the July 2016 ruling at the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration on China’s claims in the waters.

The ruling found China’s capacious nine-dash line claim illegal under international law and supported the Philippines’ grievances against Beijing.

Another question that arises in the Trump era in the South China Sea is the question of the Scarborough Shoal.

Once hotly contested between the Philippines and China, since Rodrigo Duterte’s inauguration and Beijing and Manila’s subsequent rapprochement, waters at the shoal have grown relatively still.

This is especially stark when one recalls concerns in early 2016 that China was about to begin island building at the atoll.

Doing so now would erase some of the China-Philippines bonhomie, but Beijing would presumably force the Trump administration into a dangerous test of resolve over the shoal – potentially precipitating a crisis.

There are signs still that China hasn’t quite figured out where Trump’s priorities lie with regard to the US-China relationship or what his administration’s threshold for escalation might be.

But expect to see a major test of this new administration by Beijing.

Ankit Panda is a senior editor at The Diplomat, where he writes on international security, diplomacy and economics in the Asia-Pacific region.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.usnews.com/news/world/ar...es-advanced-rockets-during-military-exercises

Iran Launches 'Advanced' Rockets During Military Exercises

An Iranian semi-official news agency is reporting that the country's elite Revolutionary Guard has launched sophisticated rockets during military exercises.

Feb. 20, 2017, at 6:36 a.m.

TEHRAN, Iran (AP) — Iran's elite Revolutionary Guard has launched several sophisticated rockets during military exercises, Iranian media reported on Monday.

The semi-official Tasnim news agency , considered to be close to the Revolutionary Guard, said the launch of the "smart and advanced" rockets came during an annual three-day maneuver which began on Monday in Iran's central desert.

Later on Monday, state TV showed footage of several rockets launching from the back of trucks in the desert.

Gen. Mohammad Pakpour, head of the Revolutionary Guards' ground forces told the channel that rockets with ranges of more than 100 kilometers (62 miles) as well as the Fajr-3, Fajr-4 and Fajr-5 rockets, all believed to have under 100-kilometer range, were all successfully tested in the exercise.

Pakpour said the tests send a message to any of Iran's potential adversaries: "We are ready to give a crushing respond to any threat."

Earlier in February, the United States said has put Iran "on notice" after the country test fired a medium-range ballistic missile.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.dw.com/en/iraqi-forces-press-on-with-mosul-operation-to-oust-is-group/a-37627458

Iraqi forces press on with Mosul operation to oust IS group

Iraqi forces have moved towards Mosul airport as they meet fierce resistance from IS fighters. Charity groups have expressed concern for civilians trapped in the city.

Date 20.02.2017
Video

US-backed Iraqi regular and paramilitary forces recaptured 15 villages from the so-called "Islamic State" (IS) on Sunday as part of an operation to take the west of Mosul.

"We launched our operation at 7:00 a.m. (0400 UTC)... We are heading towards the airport," said Abbas al-Juburi of the interior ministry's elite Rapid Response force.

There were air strikes and artillery fire in support of the operation. More than half of the 9,000-plus coalition forces deployed in Iraq are American. Some were visible on the front line Sunday, according to AFP.

The forces reached Zakrutiya, a small village 5 kilometers (3 miles) south of the airport by the end of the day, the statements said.

IS fighters have put up fierce resistance from entrenched positions within the city they have occupied for the last two years. "Mosul would be a tough fight for any army in the world," the commander of the US-led coalition forces*Lt. Gen. Stephen Townsend*said in a statement, adding that the coalition has carried out more than 10,000 air strikes against IS in Iraq and trained and equipped more than 70,000 Iraqi forces.

US Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said "The coalition forces are in support of this operation and we will continue ... with the accelerated effort to destroy ISIS."

Humanitarian concerns

Charities have expressed concern for the fate of hundreds of thousands of civilians trapped inside the city. Many of them are believed to be children.

"This is the grim choice for children in western Mosul right now: bombs, crossfire and hunger if they stay – or execution and snipers if they try to run," Save the Children said. Children make up about half the population trapped in the city, the charity said.

The UN's humanitarian coordinator in Iraq, Lise Grande, said in a statement: "We are racing against the clock to prepare emergency sites south of Mosul to receive displaced families."

IS fighters are believed to have developed a network of passageways and tunnels to help them hide and fight among civilians in Mosul. Western Mosul is the site of the old city center with ancient souks, the Grand Mosque and administrative buildings.

Video

jm/bw (Reuters, AFP)

DW recommends

Iraqi army launches operation to retake western Mosul from 'Islamic State'

The Iraqi army has launched military operations to retake western Mosul from the so-called "Islamic State." Iraqi troops began a huge offensive in October to retake the city from the militants. (19.02.2017) *

Iraqi forces have it all to do in western Mosul

Iraqi special forces claim that eastern Mosul is safe for residents to return. However, suicide attacks tell a different story. Now, those forces are preparing to "liberate" western Mosul, as Anna Lekas Miller reports. (16.02.2017) *

Audios and videos on the topic

Iraqi forces press on with Mosul operation to oust IS group *
Iraqi army launches Mosul offensive


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Iraq troops push on in bid to take back Mosul

Video

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39024723

Mosul offensive: Iraqi army resumes advance on IS bastion

4 hours ago
From the section
Middle East

Iraqi government forces have resumed their push towards western Mosul, the last major stronghold of so-called Islamic State (IS) in Iraq.

Artillery fire could be heard in the distance, reports the BBC's Quentin Sommerville, who is embedded with government troops.

Launching the operation on Sunday, the army seized several villages.

The eastern part of the city was liberated from IS last month after heavy fighting.

On Monday, US Defence Secretary James Mattis arrived in Baghdad on an unannounced visit.

He told reporters the US military was "not in Iraq to seize anybody's oil", seemingly to allay concerns after Donald Trump last month said the US "should have kept the oil" when it pulled troops out of Iraq in 2011.

Thousands of Iraqi troops, backed by artillery and air power, are involved in the assault to retake Mosul.

Their progress has been slowed down by huge improvised explosive devices planted by IS along the route of the offensive, our correspondent says.

Bomb disposal teams are being used to clear them.

In their assault, Iraqi soldiers have been using heavy weapons, including rocket missile launchers, our correspondent adds.

On the ground with Iraqi forces

The BBC's Quentin Sommerville is embedded with Iraqi forces as they advance on Mosul. He is tweeting updates as his convoy attempts to move forward:
04:15 GMT: Convoy halted by suspected roadside bomb - IS have planted huge improvised explosives devices along the route.
04:19 GMT: The EOD, or bomb disposal, team are attempting to safely detonate the device.
04:36 GMT: Bomb disposal team heading back to the suspected roadside bomb for a second time. It seems their controlled explosion hasn't worked.
04:36 GMT: No bang. And we can proceed.
04:36 GMT: EOD team checking for secondary bombs.
04:36 GMT: This will be slow progress if it continues.
Follow Quentin Sommerville on Twitter

Iraqi forces have now all but surrounded the western part of Mosul.

Concern has been voiced by the UN about the welfare of civilians trapped in Mosul, amid reports that they could number up to 650,000.

Leaflets warning residents of an imminent offensive were earlier dropped over the west of the city.

'Toughest battle yet'

Day One in pictures
Photos show 'weaponised drones' in Iraq
Satellite images reveal Mosul damage

Military officials say the western side of the city, with its narrow, winding streets, may prove a bigger challenge than the east.

They say that western Mosul, although slightly smaller than the east, is more densely populated and includes districts that are seen as pro-IS.

All bridges from there to the west of the city, across the Tigris river, were destroyed.

The offensive against the eastern part of the city was launched on 17 October, more than two years after jihadists overran Mosul before seizing control of much of northern and western Iraq.

The UN said in late January that almost half of all the casualties in Mosul were civilians.

At least 1,096 have been killed and 694 injured across Nineveh province since the start of October.

http://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/624/cp..._93786494_mosul_city_624map_v15_new_style.jpg

- Iraq gaining momentum against IS
- Islamic State group: The full story

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.scout.com/military/warrior/story/1693945-air-force-we-need-next-gen-nuclear-weapons

Air Force Reviews Vendor Bids to Build New ICBMs Engineered With High-Tech Upgrades

Kris Osborn
Yesterday at 9:23 AM

Video

Air Force plans to build at least 400 new high-tech ICBMs intended to preserve millions of lives by ensuring annhiliation of anyone choosing to launch a nuclear attack. The idea is to prevent major power wars.

The Air Force is now evaluating formal proposals from three vendors competiting to build hundreds of new, next-generation Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles designed to protect the US homeland well into the 2070s and beyond, service officials said.
*
Submissions from Northrop, Boeing and Lockheed are now being reviewed by Air Force weapons developers looking to modernize the US land-based nuclear missile arsenal and replace the 1970s-era Boeing-built Minuteman IIIs.*

If one were to passively reflect upon the seemingly limitless explosive power to instantly destroy, vaporize or incinerate cities, countries and massive swaths of territory or people -- images of quiet, flowing green meadows, peaceful celebratory gatherings or melodious sounds of chirping birds might not immediately come to mind.

After all, lethal destructive weaponry does not, by any means, appear to be synonymous with peace, tranquility and collective happiness. However, it is precisely the prospect of massive violence which engenders the possibility of peace.* Nuclear weapons therefore, in some unambiguous sense, can be interpreted as being the antithesis of themselves; simply put – potential for mass violence creates peace – thus the conceptual thrust of nuclear deterrence.

It is within this conceptual framework, designed to save millions of lives, prevent major great-power war and ensure the safety of entire populations, that the U.S. Air Force is now vigorously pursuing a new arsenal of land-fired, Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles, or ICBMs.

In an interview with Scout Warrior several months ago, Lt. Gen. Jack Weinstein, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, cited famous nuclear strategist Bernard Brodie as a way to articulate the seismic shift in thinking and tactics made manifest by the emergence of nuclear weapons.

Considered to*be among the key architects of strategic nuclear deterrence, and referred to by many as an “American Clausewitz,” Brodie expressed how the advent of the nuclear era changes the paradigm regarding the broadly configured role or purpose of weaponry in war.

Weinstein referred to Brodie’s famous quote from his 1940s work “The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order.” --- "Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on, its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.”

The success of this strategy hinges upon the near certainty of total annihilation, should nuclear weapons be used. ICBMs are engineered to fly through space on a total flight of about 30 mins before detonating with enormous destructive power upon targets.

“If another nation believes they can have an advantage by using a nuclear weapon, that is really dangerous. What you want to do is have such a strong deterrent force that any desire to attack with nuclear weapons will easily be outweighed by the response they get from the other side. That's the value of what the deterrent force provides,” Weinstein said in an exclusive interview with Scout Warrior.

Althought Weinstein did not take a position on current administration considerations about having the U.S. adopt a No First Use, or NFU, nuclear weapons policy, Air Force Secretary Deborah James has expressed concern about the possiblity, in a news report published by Defense News. Limiting the U.S. scope of deterrence, many argue, might wrongly encourage potential adversaries to think they could succeed with a limited first nuclear strike of some kind.*

Ground-Based Strategic Deterrence - New ICBMs

It is within the context of these ideas, informing military decision-makers for decades now, that the Air Force is in the early stages of building, acquiring and deploying a higher-tech replacement for the existing arsenal of Minuteman III ICBMs.

Weinstein pointed out that, since the dawn of the nuclear age decades ago, there has not been a catastrophic major power war on the scale of WWI or WWII.

“When you look at the amount of people who died in WWI and then the number of people who died in WWII, you're talking about anywhere between 65 and 75 million people. WWI killed about 1.8 percent of the world's population. WWII killed 2.8 percent of the world's population. “What you want is to have a really strong capability so that they're used every day to prevent conflict. If you use one, then you've failed,” Weinstein said.

Weinstein added that, in total, as many as 45 million people died during WWII.

“All you need to do is look at pictures of what Dresden looked like and what Stalingrad looked like. These are major powers fighting major powers,” he said.

Nevertheless, despite clear evidence in favor of deploying nuclear weapons, modernizing the US arsenal has long been a cost concern and strategic liability for US strategic planners. In fact, Weinstein said there is concern that both Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals are now more modern and advanced than existing U.S. Minuteman IIIs.*

The new effort to build ICBMs, what the Air Force calls “Ground Based Strategic Deterrence,” aims to construct durable, high-tech nuclear-armed missiles able to serve until 2075.

The new weapons will be engineered with improved guidance technology, boosters, flight systems and command and control systems, compared to the existing Minuteman III missiles. The weapon will also have upgraded circuitry and be built with a mind to long-term maintenance and sustainability.

“Solid rocket fuel ages out after a period of time. You need to have an upgraded guidance package for sustainability and warfighting requirements. Looking at the current technology, it has moved faster than when these were first developed. Civilian industry has leapfrogged so we want the ability to use components that have already been developed,” Weinstein added.

Northrop Grumman and Boeing are among the major vendors planning to compete for the opportunity to build the new weapons; the Air Force released a formal Request For Proposal to industry at the end of last month.

Citing a Congressional Research Service report, a story in National Defense Magazine says the GBSD the program is expected to cost $62 billion from 2015 through fiscal year 2044.* That breaks down to about $14 billion for upgrades to command-and-control systems and launch centers, and $48.5 billion for new missiles, the report says.*

In keeping with the NEW*START Treaty, the US plans to field 400 new missiles designed to replace the aging 1960s-era Minuteman IIIs.

The new ICBMs will be deployed roughly within the same geographical expanse in which the current weapons are stationed. In total, dispersed areas across three different sites span 33,600 miles, including missiles in Cheyenne, Wyoming, Minot, North Dakota and Great Falls, Montana.

“If you look at the*ICBM*field, it's 33,600 square miles. That's how big it is. We sometimes say it's the size of the state of Georgia. It was developed that way for a specific reason. You didn't want them too close together. You wanted it so if the adversary were to attack at one time, you'd still have ones that would survive,” Weinstein explained.

Kris Osborn*can be reached at*Kris.Osborn@Scout.com.
To Ask Military Expert KRIS OSBORN Questions,*VISIT THE WARRIOR FORUMS.
*

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-C...he-moderate-Arab-worlds-biggest-threat-481982

Jerusalem Post Arab-Israeli Conflict
'For first time, Israel isn't the moderate Arab world's biggest threat'

By Anna Ahronheim February 19, 2017 14:46

Defense Minister Liberman calls for Israel to work with Sunni Arab states in order to defeat radicalism in the region.

The top three challenges facing the region are “Iran, Iran, Iran,” and a two-state solution is the only solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict, Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman said on Sunday.

Liberman, speaking at the annual Munich Security Conference, called for working with Sunni Arab states in order to defeat radicalism in the region. He asked those states to help solve the Israel-Palestinian conflict, adding that two-states with population exchanges was the only solution.

“My vision and goal is, without a doubt, the two-state solution,” he said. “I believe that we must ensure Israel remains a Jewish state. The basic solution must include a land swap, and a population swap. There are a lot of misunderstandings.”
The defense minister said “it made no sense” to have one homogeneous Palestinian state and a binational State of Israel. “The biggest problem is that we are willing for them to have a Palestinian state without a single Jew in it, but in Israel, 20% of our population will be Arabs. We cannot create two states this way.

“The Palestinians do not have a capacity to sign a final-status agreement with Israel,” he said. “It is possible only as a part of [an] all region solution. We must sign simultaneously a regional solution with the Arab world and [the] Palestinians.”

Liberman accused Iran of trying to undermine Saudi Arabia and that Maj.-Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force, is “the No. 1 terrorist in the world.”

“If you ask me, ‘What is the biggest news in the Middle East?’ I think that [for] the first time since 1948 the moderate Arab world, Sunni world, understands that the biggest threat for them is not Israel, not Jews and not Zionism, but Iran and Iranian proxies,” Liberman said, pointing to Hezbollah in Lebanon, Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip and the Houthi militia in Yemen.

Israel has not seen more moderate behavior from Iran since it signed the nuclear deal with world powers in July 2015, the defense minister said. To the contrary, he stated, Israel has seen a competition organized in Tehran for the best Holocaust denial cartoon, with a prize of $50,000; parades in Tehran featuring ballistic missiles with Hebrew inscriptions reading “Israel must be wiped out”; a State Department report finding that Iran is the No. 1 state sponsor of terror in the world; Iranian development of ballistic missiles in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231; the persecution of Iran’s ethnic and religious minorities; and 600 executions in 2016, often with little or no due process.

The defense minister said the Iran nuclear deal was “an attempt to avoid reality,” and was a “copy paste” of the nuclear agreements with North Korea and has yielded similar results.

He called for world powers to enforce a tough policy of economic pressure and follow through on UN resolutions, such as in the case of Iran carrying out ballistic missile tests.

The Iranians aim to “undermine stability in every country in the Middle East... their main destination at the end of the day is Saudi Arabia,” Liberman said, adding that Bahrain was also in Tehran’s crosshairs and telling moderator Lyse Doucet that he was looking forward to hearing comments from Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir who spoke after him.

Jubeir also accused Tehran of being a destabilizing force in the region.

“Iran remains the single main sponsor of terrorism in the world” and is “determined to upend the order in Middle East..., [and] until and unless Iran changes its behavior, it would be very difficult to deal with a country like this,” he said.

Jubeir said Iran was propping up the government of Syrian President Bashar Assad, and funding the Houthi separatists in Yemen and violent groups across the region. The international community needs to set clear “redlines” to halt Iran’s actions, with “consequences” if it crosses them, he said.

“I believe that Iran knows where the redlines are if the redlines are drawn clearly, and I believe that the world has to make it clear to the Iranians that there is certain behavior that will not be tolerated, and that there will be consequences,” Jubeir said. “And those consequences have to be in tune with the financial side.”

Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif, who spoke ahead of Liberman, said his country would never seek to build a nuclear weapon, apparently accusing Israel of being the true nuclear-armed actor endangering the region.

“We will never produce nuclear weapons, period,” Zarif said, adding that Iran had committed to this in the nuclear deal signed with world powers, but that the other side has yet to fulfill its obligations under the agreement. “The international community still owes us,” he said.

Zarif said that under so-called “crippling sanctions” intended to curb the Islamic Republic’s construction of centrifuges for enriching uranium, it had gone from 200 centrifuges to some 20,000.

“We don’t respond to threats, we respond to mutual respect,” Zarif said.

Jerusalem Post staff contributed to this report.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-ceasefire-idUSKBN15Z19J

World News | Mon Feb 20, 2017 | 7:47am EST

Fresh ceasefire appears to hold for now in eastern Ukraine

By Pavel Polityuk | AVDIYIVKA, Ukraine

Ukrainian troops and Russian-backed separatists appeared to be respecting a new ceasefire attempt on Monday after international powers called for shelling to stop and for the withdrawal of banned heavy weapons.

In recent weeks, the area around the government-held town of Avdiyivka has seen some of the heaviest artillery fire of the past two years, refocusing global attention on a simmering conflict that has strained relations between Russia and the West.

Violence has since lessened, but the close proximity of the opposing sides and continued use of heavy weapons prompted the leaders of Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine to call on Sunday for renewed efforts to implement the terms of the much-violated Minsk peace agreement of 2015.

As of Monday morning, each side acknowledged that the other was complying.

"Today, as of 1200 (1000 GMT), the enemy has not used heavy weapons," Ukrainian military spokesman Oleksandr Motozyanyk said.

In Avdiyivka, a Reuters witness said no artillery or gunfire could be heard. "The ceasefire was announced yesterday at 1700. It's being respected for now," the head of the local administration, Pavlo Malykhin, told Reuters.

Senior separatist official Eduard Basurin said shelling from the Ukrainian side had stopped at midnight on Sunday, separatist website DAN reported.

"The withdrawal (of heavy artillery) will happen after 24 hours of ceasefire and the main condition is that it be synchronized: if we withdraw, then the Ukrainian side withdraw also," he said.

Around 10,000 people have been killed since fighting erupted in eastern regions in April 2014, following a pro-European uprising in Kiev and the ouster of a Moscow-backed president.

The French and German governments on Monday criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin's decision to temporarily recognize travel and other documents issued by the separatist regions, saying this ran contrary to the Minsk accord.

In a separate development, the Kremlin said it had no prior knowledge of a peace plan by a Ukrainian lawmaker, reported in The New York Times, and said it was absurd.

(Reporting by Pavel Polityuk; Additional reporting by Natalia Zinets in Kiev; Writing by Alessandra Prentice; Editing by Mark Trevelyan)

Related Coverage
France decries Moscow recognition of passports issued by rebels in Ukraine

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ori...med-groups-referendum-coup-mattis-russia.html

Erdogan banks on motley crew of Syrian armed groups

US not persuaded to ditch Syrian Kurds

Posted
February 19, 2017
Comments 8

Fehim Tastekin writes this week that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s expansive goals for Syria include a “Manbij and Raqqa in a three-phased operation. First will be setting up a ‘terror-free safe zone,’ which must also be covered by a no-fly zone. Second, Arabs and Turkmens will be settled in the safe zone. Finally, a national army will be established through a 'train and equip'*program.”

Erdogan’s top priority remains the defeat of the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), the armed wing of the Democratic Union party (PYD), which Turkey links with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which it considers a terrorist group.*Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield in August to break the influence of the PYD and PKK, as well as the Islamic State (IS), in northern Syria.

Erodgan’s war against the Syrian Kurds seems to be the cause of irreconcilable differences with the United States over Syria.*The US counts on the YPG as the core of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), its key on-the-ground partner in Syria. US plans for an attack on Raqqa, IS’*‘"capital"*in Syria,*reportedly depend on the SDF for the first assault wave.*

Amberin Zaman reports that a high-level Turkish delegation led by Foreign Ministry Undersecretary*Umit Yalcin mostly failed in its appeal for the United States to ditch the SDF in meetings with US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Tom Shannon, former national security adviser Michael Flynn before he resigned,*CENTCOM commander Gen. Joseph L. Votel*and others in Washington last week.

“Sources familiar with the substance of the exchanges told Al-Monitor on strict condition of anonymity that Turkish demands that the United States drop its plans to free Raqqa with the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF),*labeling them terrorists, elicited a frosty response,” Zaman writes. “The stiffest demurral came from Votel, the sources said. ‘He explained his position like a soldier would, it was quite tough,’ one source observed. During the encounter, CENTCOM officials reminded the Turks that having talked about putting Turkish boots on the ground for Raqqa as an alternative to the YPG, the Turkish General Staff had yet to present a blueprint detailing Turkey's operational plans and precise contribution. The Turks got their most sympathetic hearing in the White House, the sources added, declining to elaborate.”

The Washington Post reported earlier this month that the US reliance on the SDF is the result of Turkey’s failure to provide alternative forces. Erdogan still seeks to leverage the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) association with an array of armed groups, most of which are Turkmens and others that are Salafi in orientation, to be the backbone of a security force for northern Syria.

Tastekin’s analysis underscores the questionable capacity of these forces. “Although some recent successes in the field have again made the militias attractive, what is not at all transparent is the true strength of the diverse groups,” he writes. “There is no reliable data about them, giving the impression that the usefulness of a motley group of militiamen may be overblown. The potential Erdogan had set his eyes on is melting away with their endless internal squabbles. Many groups associated with Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra) now clash with groups that have allied with Ahrar al-Sham, which is gaining prominence among religious factions. Some groups fighting under Ahrar al-Sham have already decided that joining Euphrates Shield is against their interests. In other words, receiving support from Turkey does not guarantee that they will become Turkey's soldiers.”

Tastekin adds that “looking through the photographs and videos of the al-Bab operation, it is hard to see an effective force in the making. It is impossible to avoid the impression that these are armed hordes that open fire haphazardly and are ill-disciplined, untrained and inexperienced. The TSK had to revise its strategy at al-Bab because of this serious deficiency. While the TSK thought it would suffice to provide fire support with armored operations and air attacks, soon it had to push its elite commando units to the front lines. Today, these units are directly clashing with IS.”

Tastekin also explains Erdogan’s shifting, and questionable, rationale for a safe zone in northern Syria.*“For a long while, Erdogan cited the scenario of a potential refugee flow from Aleppo to justify his safe zone idea. But the civilians evacuated from eastern Aleppo did not come to Turkey as he had been forecasting. Those who came to Idlib under Turkey's protection are military groups and their families. Thus, the pretext of a potential refugee flow lost its validity. … There are even signs that the refugee movement now is not from Syria to Turkey but from Turkey to Syria. …*Local sources Al-Monitor spoke to said this was not yet a mass movement of people, but there are families who have been going back since the Syrian army took over Aleppo.”

The high price of "no"*in Turkey

Pinar Tremblay reports, “Saying no*can have*a high price tag for ordinary Turks*as pressure builds in the days leading up to*an April 16*referendum*on constitutional amendments*designed to widely expand the president's powers.”

“Their fear is*warranted,” Tremblay writes. “Several AKP members, including Cabinet ministers and the*prime minister,*have indicated*multiple times that saying no*is what terrorists would do. The most worrisome statement came Feb. 12 from Erdogan himself. When asked about current polls, Erdogan was unhappy. He said, ‘It is too early to gauge the health of the polls’ because he had*not yet started actively campaigning. Erdogan told the press, ‘April 16 will be the answer to July 15 [the day of the coup attempt]. Those who say no will be siding with July 15.’ … Despite all the public pressure, some brave individuals have taken*the risk —*and paid*the price. … There have also been multiple stories of brutality and intimidation of those who attempt to join*rallies*or refuse to distribute*pamphlets, or who simply tell others that they plan to vote against the referendum. There has*been so much of this talk that people have started questioning if the vote*will be done*through open or secret balloting, and whether those who dare to say no*will be taken into custody after they vote.”

Russia "patient"*on US plans for Syria

US Secretary of Defense James Mattis ruled out, at least for now, military cooperation with Russia in Syria.

“We do not —*or,*are not in a position right now to collaborate on a military level, but our political leaders will engage and try to find common ground or a way forward where Russia,” Mattis said at a press conference at NATO headquarters in Brussels.

Maxim Suchkov writes, “At this point, Russia isn’t pinning all its hopes for Syria and beyond on potential cooperation with the United States. Moscow continues to engage with a number of regional players and intra-Syrian factions, calculating its own challenges, opportunities and further moves. Yet the United States*remains a critical go-to player. While the Kremlin continues to promote its interests via other means, it will wait patiently until the Trump administration gets a sense of how to best approach Russia.”


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[Housecarl]

Sorry folks I've been pummeled by the meat world so have only been on my phone of late....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-southchinasea-exclusive-idUSKBN161029

South China Sea | Wed Feb 22, 2017 | 6:14am EST

Exclusive: China finishing South China Sea buildings that could house missiles - U.S. officials

Video

By Idrees Ali | WASHINGTON

China, in an early test of U.S. President Donald Trump, has nearly finished building almost two dozen structures on artificial islands in the South China Sea that appear designed to house long-range surface-to-air missiles, two U.S. officials told Reuters.

The development is likely to raise questions about whether and how the United States will respond, given its vows to take a tough line on China in the South China Sea.

China claims almost all the waters, which carry a third of the world's maritime traffic. Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam also have claims. Trump's administration has called China's island building in the South China Sea illegal.

Building the concrete structures with retractable roofs on Subi, Mischief and Fiery Cross reefs, part of the Spratly Islands chain where China already has built military-length airstrips, could be considered a military escalation, the U.S. officials said in recent days, speaking on condition of anonymity.

"It is not like the Chinese to build anything in the South China Sea just to build it, and these structures resemble others that house SAM batteries, so the logical conclusion is that's what they are for," said a U.S. intelligence official, referring to surface-to-air missiles.

Another official said the structures appeared to be 20 meters (66 feet) long and 10 meters (33 feet) high.

A Pentagon spokesman said the United States remained committed to "non-militarization in the South China Sea" and urged all claimants to take actions consistent with international law.

In Beijing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said on Wednesday he was aware of the report, though did not say if China was planning on placing missiles on the reefs.

"China carrying out normal construction activities on its own territory, including deploying necessary and appropriate territorial defense facilities, is a normal right under international law for sovereign nations," he told reporters.

In his Senate confirmation hearing last month, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson raised China's ire when he said Beijing should be denied access to the islands it is building in the*South China Sea.

Tillerson subsequently softened his language, and Trump further reduced tensions by pledging to honor the long-standing U.S. "one China" policy in a Feb. 10 telephone call with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

LONGER RANGE

Greg Poling, a South China Sea expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said in a December report that China apparently had installed weapons, including anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems, on all seven of the islands it has built in the South China Sea.

The officials said the new structures were likely to house surface-to-air missiles that would expand China's air defense umbrella over the islands. They did not give a time line on when they believed China would deploy missiles on the islands.

"It certainly raises the tension," Poling said. "The Chinese have gotten good at these steady increases in their capabilities."

On Tuesday, the Philippines said Southeast Asian countries saw China's installation of weapons in the South China Sea as "very unsettling" and have urged dialogue to stop an escalation of "recent developments."

Philippine Foreign Secretary Perfecto Yasay did not say what provoked the concern but said the 10-member Association of South East Asian Nations, or ASEAN, hoped China and the United States would ensure peace and stability.

POLITICAL TEST

The U.S. intelligence official said the structures did not pose a significant military threat to U.S. forces in the region, given their visibility and vulnerability.

Building them appeared to be more of a political test of how the Trump administration would respond, he said.

"The logical response would also be political – something that should not lead to military escalation in a vital strategic area," the official said.

Chas Freeman, a China expert and former assistant secretary of defense, said he was inclined to view such installations as serving a military purpose - bolstering China's claims against those of other nations - rather than a political signal to the United States.

"There is a tendency here in Washington to imagine that it's all about us, but we are not a claimant in the South China Sea," Freeman said. "We are not going to challenge China's possession of any of these land features in my judgment. If that's going to happen, it's going to be done by the Vietnamese, or ... the Filipinos ... or the Malaysians, who are the three counter-claimants of note."

He said it was an "unfortunate, but not (an) unpredictable development."

Tillerson told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last month that China's building of islands and putting military assets on them was "akin to Russia's taking Crimea" from Ukraine.

In his written responses to follow-up questions, he softened his language, saying that in the event of an unspecified "contingency," the United States and its allies "must be capable of limiting China's access to and use of" those islands to pose a threat.

(Reporting by Idrees Ali; Additional reporting by Arshad Mohammed Arshad, David Brunnstrom and John Walcott, and Ben Blanchard in Beijing; Editing by John Walcott, Peter Cooney and Nick Macfie)

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China warns U.S. against fresh naval patrols in South China Sea
BEIJING China's Foreign Ministry on Wednesday warned Washington against challenging its sovereignty, responding to reports the United States was planning fresh naval patrols in the disputed South China Sea.

Trump changes tack, backs 'one China' policy in call with Xi
BEIJING/WASHINGTON U.S. President Donald Trump changed tack and agreed to honor the "one China" policy during a phone call with China's leader Xi Jinping, a major diplomatic boost for Beijing which brooks no criticism of its claim to self-ruled Taiwan.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.atimes.com/article/china-edge-us-carrier-strike-group-exercises-south-china-sea/

Southeast Asia
South China Seas
Analysis

China on edge as US carrier strike group exercises in South China Sea

While the Pentagon insists its warship maneuvers – the first under President Donald Trump – are routine, Beijing has denounced them as a threat

By Bill Gertz February 21, 2017 10:59 PM (UTC+8)
Comments 10

The aircraft-carrier strike group led by USS Carl Vinson conducting naval and air operations in the South China Sea this week is the first challenge to Beijing’s expansive maritime claims to the waters since Donald Trump took office.

The US Navy announced that the operations began on February 18, describing them as “routine,” while Chinese state media quickly called the warships’ freedom-of-navigation activities a threat to China.

A Pentagon official said the naval maneuvers were not freedom-of-navigation but exercises of the kind the US Navy has been doing for a hundred years.

The exercises were ordered by US Defense Secretary James Mattis, who is said to be concerned that a lack of regular US naval and air maneuvers in the sea has undermined regional stability.

The carrier operations put Beijing on notice that the new president likely will continue US policy*in seeking to bolster regional allies that have become increasingly alarmed at China’s assertiveness in the region.

China has been creating islands on a number of atolls and rocky outcrops in the sea, and over the past 12 months has begun adding military facilities.

Subi Reef

Mischief Reef

Hughes Reef

Fiery Cross

US analysts say the Chinese military buildup in the area has been subtle and gradual, and designed to avoid provoking a direct confrontation with Washington.
For example, naval missile emplacements have been spotted on several of China’s new islands in the Spratly archipelago. The missiles seen in intelligence imagery are assessed to have ranges of less than a mile and thus unlikely to threaten passing US warships. Intelligence analysts at the Pentagon, however, noted that the missile emplacements were built to be interchangeable with much more advanced and long-range anti-ship cruise missiles – weapons that would pose threats to US warship patrols through the waters.

http://static.atimes.com/uploads/2017/02/SouthChinaSea-02.png

Mattis is a staunch believer in Trump’s “Peace through Strength” policies. Thus he is likely to abandon the previous administration’s policy of seeking to avoid upsetting China. That led to a diminution of freedom-of-navigation operations in the South China Sea and elsewhere.

Mattis made clear in policy questions posed during his confirmation by the US Senate that China’s activities required bolstering regional allies in Southeast Asia.

“China’s behavior has led countries in the region to look for stronger US leadership,” he*stated, adding that once in office he would seek to strengthen alliances and review US military capabilities in the region.

“We must continue to defend our interests there –*interests that include upholding international legal rights to freedom of navigation and overflight,” he added.

Mattis said*upholding freedom of navigation and overflight was “vital to the defense of our other national-security interests” – a blunt and direct statement of the strong US commitment to preventing any*attempt to turn*the South China Sea into a Chinese lake.

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson also weighed in on the dispute, promising during his confirmation that the United States would block China from further militarizing the islands.

In addition to the Vinson and its warplanes, the guided-missile destroyer USS Meyer is taking part in the South China Sea operations. Strike aircraft that will be flying over the sea include F/A-18 Super Hornet jets, helicopters, and electronic-warfare jets.

Before*entering the sea, the ships conducted training off Hawaii and Guam to improve their military capabilities and “develop cohesion as a strike group,” the US Navy said in a statement.

“The training completed over the past few weeks has really brought the team together and improved our effectiveness and readiness as a strike group,” said Rear Admiral James Kilby, the strike-group commander. “We are looking forward to demonstrating those capabilities while building upon existing strong relationships with our allies, partners and friends in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.”

Last week, China’s Foreign Ministry warned the United States against challenging its*claims to the waters.

“China respects and upholds the freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea, which countries enjoy under international law, but firmly opposes any country’s attempt to undermine China’s sovereignty and security in the name of the freedom of navigation and overflight,” Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang said.

On Sunday, Global Times, an often strident mouthpiece of China’s Communist Party, *said “The deployment of the US aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson to the South China Sea on Saturday is a military threat to China.”*However, the usually over-the-top anti-US rhetoric of the paper*was absent from the recent article. Instead of calling the exercises an act of war or other hostile action, the newspaper stated only that the naval maneuvers would increase the risk of unspecified “interference.”

Retired US Navy Captain Jim Fanell said the carrier deployment was a routine occurrence in the post-World War II US Pacific Fleet.

“Likewise, this carrier strike group’s operations in the South China Sea is neither unprecedented or provocative,” Fanell said. “Quite to the contrary, and despite protests from Beijing, it is encouraging to see the new US administration physically demonstrate America’s continued commitment to the principle of freedom of navigation in international waters.”

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://news.usni.org/2017/02/21/pacom-commander-harris-wants-army-sink-ships-expand-battle-networks

PACOM Commander Harris Wants the Army to Sink Ships, Expand Battle Networks

By: Sam LaGrone
February 21, 2017 7:26 PM

SAN DIEGO, Calif. – The commander of U.S. military forces in the Pacific*called for tighter integration of joint forces, to include Army units tapping into Navy battle networks to help go after complex targets.

For starters, U.S. Pacific Command commander Adm. Harry Harris said he’d like the Army to develop a native anti-ship capability.

“Before I leave PACOM, I’d like to see the Army’s land forces conduct exercises to sink a ship in a complex environment where our joint and combined forces are operating in other domains,” Harris said during the West 2017 conference on Tuesday.

“Moving forward, all the services will have to exert influence in non-traditional and sometimes unfamiliar domains.”

Video

Harris then called for his Navy and Army forces commanders – Pacific Fleet commander Adm. Scott Swift and U.S. Army Pacific commander Gen. Bob Brown – to work out how to tie the Army’s land-based missile defense network into the Navy’s Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air architecture. NIFC-CA – based around the U.S. carrier strike group – creates a network of sensors and shooters to allow ships or aircraft to pass targeting information between several different weapon systems and platforms.

“The Army has a tremendous air defense capability and the Navy*has this incredibly powerful [NIFC-CA] capability. These two systems ought to be talking to each other so they can be complementary and work in order to give us superiority on the battlefield,” he told reporters following his keynote.

“I want them to deliver a missile on target, and I want them to do it interchangeably… so the E-2D [Advanced Hawkeye] and the Aegis destroyer and the Army counter-air are integrated together. I think that’s the way of the future.”

The goal is to further integrate the PACOM forces and create more options and capabilities for commanders.

“We must be able to execute joint operations across far more domains than planners accounted for in the past. We need a degree of ‘jointness’ where no domain has a fixed boundary,” he said.

“A combatant commander must be able to create effects from any single domain to targets in every other domain.”

While Harris, was enthusiastic about inter-service battle networks merging, he stopped short of calling for a NIFC-CA level of connection with Japanese and South Korean forces.

Both countries field – or are set to field – Aegis combat system-equipped ships and aircraft capable of bolting on to the U.S. Navy’s NIFC-CA construct and expanding its reach. When asked by USNI News, Harris declined to say if he wants to link the capabilities of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the South Korean military directly to the U.S. NIFC-CA network.

He did, however, praise a new intelligence-sharing agreement signed in November between the Japan and Korea – the General Security of Military Information Agreement. The two countries have attempted to overcome historical differences to pass the measure since 2012, with no success until late November. While still controversial in both countries, the advancements in North Korea’s ballistic missile technology prompted action from leaders in Tokyo and Seoul.

Harris has called for a trilateral ballistic missile defense agreement between Japan, South Korea and the U.S. in the past and praised recent BMD exercises between the three countries.

“We have made big inroads into the ballistic missile defense piece. We’ve had some very successful trilateral BMD exercises of late,” Harris told reporters.

“The fact that Japan and Korea are working together better now than they have in past is key to this.”

Harris’ calls for U.S. interoperability and international cooperation came during a speech in which he outlined what he saw were the chief challenges in his area of responsibility–*namely, a nuclear-armed North Korea, plus Chinese and Russian governments that violate international laws and norms.

“They can choose to disregard the rules-based security order that has served all nations –*including them –*so well for decades, or they can contribute to it as responsible stakeholders,” he said.

“I hope for the latter, but must be prepared for the former.”

Related

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In "News & Analysis"

U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander Harris Nominated to Head U.S. Pacific Command
In "Aviation"

In Dual Ceremony, Harris Takes Over PACOM, Swift Assumes Command of PACFLT
In "Military Personnel"

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/02/21/japan_christens_a_new_naval_strategy_110841.html

Japan Christens a New Naval Strategy

By Stratfor
February 21, 2017

https://www.stratfor.com/sites/default/files/main/images/china-japan-navy (1).png

To better patrol the East China Sea, Japan has decided that it needs more warships. Reuters reported Feb. 17 that Japan intends to build two 3,000-ton frigates instead of the single 5,000-ton destroyer planned for this year. The shift toward building less capable but cheaper frigate-type vessels in higher quantity is notable because it reflects Tokyo's growing need to effectively contend with an increasingly powerful Chinese navy. In 2016, for instance, Japan launched a single 5,100-ton Asahi-class destroyer while China launched three 7,500-ton Type 052D destroyers and two 4,000-ton Type 054A frigates, along with several other types of vessels.

The Chinese navy is rapidly improving the quality of its naval forces, of which the buildup of its Type 055 heavy destroyers is proof enough. It will also continue to modernize and expand its combat naval forces while increasing its naval force projection. Japan will try to compete with China as best it can with the resources it can muster.

This is not to say that Japan is abandoning it core of premier fighting ships. On the contrary, the Japanese navy will keep relying on powerful destroyer-class vessels in the years to come, including its six existing 10,000-ton Kongo- and Atago-class destroyers. Absent a much larger defense budget, though, the already significant gap between the number of vessels the Japanese and Chinese navies have will only widen. Nevertheless, Japan will bolster its forces as it can, which for the time being means producing a number of decent warships rather than a few premium ones.


This article appeared originally at Stratfor.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm......

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https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/21/world/asia/china-north-korea-trump-talks.html?_r=0

Asia Pacific | Beijing Memo

Is China Pushing Trump to Talk to North Korea?

µã»÷²é¿´±¾ÎÄÖÐÎÄ°æ
By JANE PERLEZ
FEB. 21, 2017

BEIJING ¡ª For years, the United States and others have pressed China¡¯s leaders to suspend imports of coal from North Korea to push the reclusive state to abandon its nuclear weapons program. For years, the Chinese leadership resisted ¡ª until Saturday, when it suddenly announced in a terse statement that it would do just that.

But if Beijing was sending a message to North Korea, it was also directing one at President Trump, who has complained that China was not putting enough pressure on North Korea.

Now President Xi Jinping of China has essentially said: We have done our part in enforcing sanctions. Over to you, Mr. Trump.

The challenge comes at a tantalizing moment. For weeks now, plans have been afoot for a North Korean government delegation to meet in New York in early March with a group of former United States officials who have long been involved in North Korea policy.

Will the Trump administration issue visas to the North Koreans, a move that would suggest the new president is interested at least in hearing from Pyongyang through informal channels?

There have been indications that Mr. Trump was willing to take a quite different tack from President Barack Obama.

During his campaign, Mr. Trump said he was interested in sharing a hamburger with the 33-year-old leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-un. He seemed to suggest he had a smidgen of respect for, or at least curiosity about, the maverick leader, the most recent incarnation of a longstanding dynasty.

Mr. Trump¡¯s response to the recent North Korean missile test was restrained, perhaps the result of Mr. Obama¡¯s warning after the November election that North Korea would be the incoming president¡¯s most dangerous foreign policy challenge.

¡°If the visas are issued, it will be a clear message that the Trump administration is prepared to go the extra mile and engage North Korea,¡± said Evans J. R. Revere, a former principal deputy assistant secretary of state.

There should be little expectation, he warned, of any policy shift by the North, which has shown every indication of wanting to continue building its nuclear program.

The planned meeting, sponsored by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, headed by Donald S. Zagoria, falls far short of talks between the two governments and has been designed as an initial sounding board.

¡°I have been organizing such meetings with the North Koreans since 2003, and our goal is to increase mutual understanding as well as to encourage the kind of frank dialogue that may not be possible in official talks,¡± Mr. Zagoria said.

The gathering would be the first of its type in New York in five years because the Obama administration opposed holding even informal talks on American soil given North Korea¡¯s expansion of its nuclear weapons program. That North Korea is holding two Americans hostage was another impediment.

Meetings with North Korean officials arranged by Mr. Zagoria and other groups were held in world capitals during the Obama era, including Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and Berlin last year.

The decision whether to allow the meeting to proceed in New York is now freighted with more than the usual complications.

Over the last 10 days, North Korea has shown its full colors. First, the regime flaunted its expanding nuclear capabilities with the test of an intermediate-range ballistic missile that uses a solid-fuel technology that will make it easier for the country to hide its arsenal.

Then, last week, Kim Jong-nam, the half brother of the North Korean leader, was assassinated in Malaysia in a crowded passenger terminal at Kuala Lumpur International Airport. The South Korean government has publicly accused North Korea of the killing, and six North Koreans have been linked to the plot.

Without these two incidents, the Trump administration could have won praise for breaking the logjam with North Korea by allowing the New York meeting to go ahead, said a former participant in such meetings who declined to be identified because of the sensitivity of the topic.

But the assassination of Kim Jong-nam would allow opponents of North Korean engagement to charge that granting visas only rewarded bad behavior, the person said.

Soon after the killing, Republican and Democratic members of Congress called for the United States to return North Korea to its blacklist of states that sponsor terrorism, from which it was removed nine years ago.

The Trump administration faces another, perhaps more profound, decision on how to handle North Korea. Annual joint military exercises, set for March between South Korea and the United States, are expected to involve an American aircraft carrier, advanced stealth fighters, B-52 and B-1B bombers and a nuclear submarine, according to South Korean news reports.

This annual show of force, not far from the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea and off the Korean coast, has traditionally been viewed by North Korea as an American preparation for an attack against its forces.

With the heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and Chinese-North Korean relations at a low point, the risk of a strong response by the North to the exercises ¡ª through the launch of missiles or a nuclear test ¡ª is higher than usual, said Peter Hayes, the executive director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability in Berkeley, Calif.

Last year, for example, the North conducted its fifth nuclear test during joint American-South Korean military exercises.

¡°We are likely entering a new and extremely dangerous phase of the Korean conflict,¡± Mr. Hayes said. He suggested ramping down the exercises to ¡°avoid inadvertent clashes and escalation to nuclear war, and to probe North Korean intentions.¡±

China would like the Trump administration to deal directly with North Korea. Beijing¡¯s suspension of coal imports from North Korea was a signal that China was being tougher than usual, offering Mr. Trump a concession to bring Washington to the table with the North.

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has stepped up his contacts with Chinese officials in recent days. On Tuesday he spoke by telephone with Yang Jiechi, China¡¯s top diplomat, and among the topics they discussed was how to handle North Korea.

But how much impact a suspension of coal imports would have on the rudimentary and seemingly resilient North Korean economy was far from clear.

The Foreign Ministry insisted Tuesday that the suspension of coal imports was a bureaucratic procedure. In the first six weeks of 2017 China had already imported almost all its annual quota of coal allowed under the United Nations sanctions, the ministry said.

Zhang Liangui, an expert on North Korea at the Central Party School of the Communist Party, said he was not optimistic that any talks with North Korea, formal or informal, would result in a diminishing of the North¡¯s nuclear capabilities.

¡°North Korea has said more than 50 times that it will not participate in any talks that have denuclearization on the agenda,¡± he said. ¡°I don¡¯t think President Trump could pull this off and talk the Koreans out of it.¡±

Yufan Huang contributed research.

A version of this article appears in print on February 22, 2017, on Page A15 of the New York edition with the headline: China Sends a Subtle Signal on North Korea.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://thebulletin.org/reconsidering-reversal-south-korea’s-nuclear-choices10522

Reconsidering the reversal: South Korea’s nuclear choices

21 February 2017
William Caplan
Kenneth B. Turner

William Caplan
William Caplan*is an M.A. candidate in Georgetown University's Security Studies Program, and works at the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National...
More

Kenneth B. Turner
Kenneth B. Turner is a research intern at the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University, where he conducts research on nuclear proliferation,...
More

US Defense Secretary James Mattis’s*trip to South Korea and Japan*early in February came at a time oddly reminiscent of another during the US–South Korea alliance. During the 1970s, in response to shifting strategic priorities after a change in US administrations, South Korea briefly considered pursuing an indigenous nuclear deterrent.

Then as now, South Korea was concerned that the United States might abandon its commitment to South Korean security—leaving the country vulnerable to threats from North Korea. The geopolitical factors of nearly 50 years ago bear an eerie resemblance to those seen today, making a reexamination of South Korea’s nuclear reversal a timely and useful exercise for the new administration when navigating its East Asian alliances.

The original reversal. In July 1969, in response to growing public dissatisfaction over the Vietnam War, newly elected president Richard Nixon revealed during a press conference in Guam that the United States would require Asian nations to increasingly fend for themselves rather than continue to be dependent on US deployed forces for their defense. In accordance with this new “Nixon Doctrine,” the United States began pulling 24,000 troops out of South Korea in 1970.

As a result of the troop withdrawal, coupled with the US rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China in 1972 and the perceived “abandonment” of South Vietnam after the Paris Peace Accords in 1973, South Korean policymakers became increasingly worried about the United States’ commitment to their defense. North Korea possessed a formidable military capability, and there were realistic concerns that the Korean conflict could go hot for the first time since the ceasefire of 1953.

To ensure his country’s security in the event of US abandonment, South Korean President Park Chung-hee created the Weapons Exploitation Committee to turn Seoul’s highly developed civilian nuclear power enterprise into a nuclear deterrent. South Korea made significant progress by constructing a light water reactor and procuring heavy water reactors and reprocessing capabilities from Canada and France, respectively. CIA analysts picked up on these developments, and the United States began to shut down proliferation avenues, pressuring international suppliers to renege on their agreements with South Korea. US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger told Park that if South Korea got the bomb, the United States would indeed hang Seoul out to dry by pulling economic and military support. Satisfied for the moment by the increased attention from the United States, South Korea reduced its clandestine program and signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1975.

That same year, presidential hopeful Jimmy Carter told the editorial board of the Washington Post that he planned on following up on the Nixon Doctrine. Carter said he would immediately remove 5,000 troops from South Korea, with the goal of pulling all US forces off the peninsula. The former Georgia governor set off alarm bells in South Korea, reigniting doubts about America’s security commitment.

After Carter’s victory in 1976, he reiterated his commitment to withdraw US troops from South Korea by 1982. Seoul quickly doubled down on its nuclear development, ordering the Weapons Exploitation Committee to go full steam ahead toward an independent nuclear deterrent. In May 1977, Park indicated to Carter that South Korea would only terminate its nuclear weapons program if Carter retracted his statements. Widespread fears of a new nuclear nation in East Asia and a chain reaction of proliferation caused Carter to blink. He backed down by 1978, indicating that US troops were not going anywhere. South Korea’s nuclear program soon ground to a halt.

History repeats itself. The relationship between South Korea and the United States today is oddly reminiscent of the situation in spring 1977. South Korea is again facing a militarily powerful North Korea, but instead of a strong conventional military challenge, it now faces Pyongyang’s asymmetric nuclear weapons advantage. This danger is reinforced with every North Korean provocation, be it a nuclear test or missile launch, bellicose rhetoric by North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un, or a conventional attack on South Korean assets.

A more distant danger for South Korea, though no less important, is the threat posed by China and its increasingly revisionist attitude regarding its position in East Asia. One of the most critical aspects of this, China’s nuclear modernization, is a long-term challenge that South Korea will face when strategizing with other East Asian nations that are also attempting to counter China’s burgeoning regional power.

Neither of these situations are sudden developments: North Korea’s nuclear capability has been known for the better part of the last two decades, and China’s nuclear modernization has been a long time coming. The key change in South Korea’s strategic situation is the new US administration.

On the campaign trail, President Donald Trump gained popularity for his support of an “America First”*strategy, whereby the United States would only intervene in conflicts if vital interests were at stake, and allies would have to pull more weight financially in order to continue receiving protection from America’s extended deterrent. South Korea was called out as a country that might need to take its defense into its own hands, when Trump suggested in March 2016 that an indigenous nuclear capability might be the answer to South Korea’s problems with North Korea and China. The sentiment is the same as was expressed by Carter in 1977: The United States cannot afford to be everywhere in the world and still protect its own vital interests.

Since the election, the situation has developed even further. The American public, at first skeptical of President Trump’s willingness to follow through on campaign pledges, has witnessed the administration follow through on a number of promises within the opening days of inheriting the White House. In addition, South Korea’s domestic political situation has become increasingly complicated with the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye, forcing the country’s attention to shift inward for a time.

On January 30, Trump reiterated his “ironclad” commitment to acting president Hwang Kyo-ahn for the defense of South Korea within the full range of US capabilities, including extended deterrence—the US promise to use its own nuclear weapons as a deterrent on behalf of allies. Whether Trump expects allies to pay more for American protection, as he suggested during his campaign, remains unclear. That leaves South Korea in a state of uncertainty regarding the actual depth of the US commitment, much the same as it was when President Carter stepped into the White House 40 years ago.

South Korea’s nuclear options. The South Korean government has a number of issues to consider at this time. While President Trump is currently signaling his commitment to Seoul, it is impossible to predict whether he might at some point impose increased costs on the South Korean government that are considered prohibitively high, with the alternative being the withdrawal of US forces from the peninsula or the nuclear umbrella. While the Trump administration has made deterring North Korea and China a priority, this feat will prove difficult without help from regional allies. These issues are likely to be clarified in the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review and Ballistic Missile Defense Review, both of which were recently ordered by the president. Until then, South Korea may weigh a number of options to enhance its security.

South Korea could continue its efforts to secure an increased US commitment to the country. Carrying over its diplomatic engagement with the Obama administration, South Korea would continue the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense ballistic missile defense system and push to turn the bilateral alliance into a more NATO-like arrangement. In that vein, some defense planners and lawmakers in Seoul want to see a return of US nuclear weapons to South Korea for the first time since 1991, and would like to take part in joint nuclear planning—including target selection for nuclear contingencies.

While this request would ruffle the least number of feathers in Washington, granting significant parts of this wish would make little strategic sense for the United States. The only strategic US nuclear assets that could be deployed to South Korea are B-2 and B-52 bombers. As the force that would send the most visible signal of deterrence, the reintroduction of strategic bombers to the Korean Peninsula would almost certainly risk severe blowback from the Chinese, and the bombers would make easy targets in the event of conflict—for a relatively modest improvement in capability and assurance. Letting South Korean policymakers in on nuclear planning is similarly unlikely, due to a history of notorious leaks from within the South Korean defense community, as well as different target priorities. Absent any new leverage from South Korea, there is little reason for the United States to make a drastic change in its extended deterrent.

If South Korea wanted to go to the other extreme, it could enter into a clandestine crash-course nuclear weapons program to secure itself against the uncertainty of the Trump administration’s security commitments, much as it did in 1977. South Korea has a notable latent nuclear capability on paper: It possesses a significant civilian nuclear industry, and fields short-range ballistic and cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. If South Korea determined that nuclear weapons were necessary for state survival, it would likely be more than capable of building a bomb within a relatively short time frame.

Over the past several years public opinion polls have indicated that there is increasing support among South Koreans for pursuit of an independent nuclear weapons program. While the results of these polls may be misleading, there may now be majority approval.

However, a nuclear South Korea is not the most likely scenario, due to significant changes since the late 1970s. South Korea would either have to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and expel IAEA inspectors, or attempt to duck the international arms control regime and present its bomb to the world as a fait accompli. Thanks to the IAEA’s safeguards and inspection provisions, South Korea would probably not be able to hide its program, and it would either have to double down on becoming a rogue nuclear power and pull out of its treaty obligations or stop its weapons development. In the nuclear power realm, this would mean a cessation of civilian nuclear assistance to South Korea, a consequence that would be harmful to its economy and might even hamper further weapons development. In the broader international context, South Korea would likely become an international pariah, sanctioned similarly to the North Koreans and abandoned by the United States. Finally, a small nuclear arsenal unprotected by the United States would make South Korea an attractive target for a first strike by North Korea or China.

The other option is to use the threat of a nuclear weapons program to extract concessions from the United States, in an attempt to make Washington kowtow to Seoul as it did in 1978. South Korean policymakers are acutely aware of the downsides that a nuclear weapons capability would carry with it, yet may be able to convince the United States that it is considering this capability in order to extract some concessions—for example, dropping any demand that South Korea pay more for the extended deterrent, or receiving a more diverse array of capabilities from the United States.

Given Mattis’ trip to Asia and Trump’s recent statements, the administration appears to be walking back some of the campaign rhetoric. Deterring North Korea and China seems to be a priority for the new administration, so South Korea has some leverage should its leaders decide to use the nuclear bargaining chip. However, President Trump may call the South Korean bluff, correctly assessing that they would prefer the status quo to charting their own path.

A nuclear South Korea does not seem likely, but the events of the 1970s demonstrate that the country is not beyond considering the nuclear option. President Trump should take the threat seriously, and continue along a path that reassures South Korea and reiterates the US commitment.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the US Department of Defense, or the US government.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170222000201

Talks with N. Korea would give Trump same old lesson Pyongyang isn't interested in disarming: ex-official

Published : 2017-02-22 09:44
Updated : 2017-02-22 09:44

Even if US President Donald Trump gives negotiations with North Korea a shot, he would end up learning the same lesson his predecessors learned that North Korea isn't interested in giving up its nuclear weapons, a former senior White House official said Tuesday.

Evan Medeiros, who served as senior Asian affairs director at the National Security Council under former President Barack Obama, made the remark on CNBC television amid growing calls for reopening negotiations with the North to curb its nuclear and missile programs.

Medeiros also said the North will likely be "the single most defining geopolitical challenge" for Trump.

"North Korea doesn't want to give up its nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are key to its survival," Medeiros said. "Talks for North Korea are really about getting sanctions relief, playing for time, playing for advantage, trying to get sanctions lifted."

"What I worry about is Trump, understanding that his options are relatively limited, feeling like he's a great negotiator, as he tells us all, that he might give talks a try only to learn the lesson that several other American presidents and Japanese prime ministers and South Korean presidents have learned, which is, the North Koreans really aren't serious about talks at all," he said.

Calls for opening negotiations with the North have significantly grown in the US since last year as Pyongyang dangerously accelerated its weapons development, including conducting two nuclear tests and a number of missile launches last year alone.

Pro-diplomacy experts have called for negotiating a freeze, rather than denuclearization, with the North. Earlier this week, the New York Times also made a similar case, saying denuclearization isn't realistically attainable and that time is not on the US side.

But many other experts say the US should never settle for a freeze because it would amount to accepting the North as a nuclear weapons state. Even if the North agrees to a freeze, the regime would still be running its nuclear and missile programs at undeclared facilities while rejecting full verification by outside experts, they said.

Robert Gallucci, who negotiated the 1994 nuclear freeze deal with Pyongyang, also told the House Foreign Affairs Committee earlier this month that the US should not seek anything short of North Korea's complete denuclearization, saying a freeze is "unrealistic and dangerous."

Entering into negotiations with the North without the US declaring its goal of a non-nuclear North Korea would "appear to have the United States legitimize the North's nuclear weapons status, and thus increase the likelihood that before too long South Korea and then Japan would follow suit," Gallucci said. (Yonhap)

 

[Housecarl]

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http://dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/22-Feb-17/nuclear-versus-conventional-weapons

Nuclear versus conventional weapons

A debate on India’s Defense Budget (2017-18) Hike

By: Asma Khalid
22-Feb-17

The principle purpose of the nuclear weapon is to deter the adversary to ensure the national security. International scholars has identified that states contribute in the nuclearisation process for various reasons ranging from status-quo to security threats, deterrence, offensive strategies and enhancing the state’s standing in international arena.

Since beginning, the role of nuclear weapon has not much evolved since its origin. Such as during the Cold-War era nuclear capability was used to deter and maintain the balance of power among two symmetric adversaries and nuclear doctrine of the states was perusing state-centric policy.

Whereas in 21st century, the role of the nuclear weapon has slightly evolved as now states go after acquiring the nuclear arsenals to overcome the conventional superiority of the adversary through nuclear deterrence. Another significant shift has seen that nuclear capability is acquired to deal with regional security concerns. Thus, since its inception factor of deterrence has remained the constant, it means that its role in military planning will not change.

Nuclear weapon plays pivotal role in national security as it is the significant component of integrated defence policy that is comprised of conventional forces and diplomacy including the nuclear capability. Nuclear armed states aims to decrease proliferation of nuclear weapons under the Non-proliferation treaty. But the steady hike has been observed in the nuclear spending of these states. The hike in nuclear spending reflects two dominating facts. First, nuclear capability has stabilizing effects among states relations by making the conflict unacceptably catastrophic. Secondly, states negate the conventional military superiority through the deterrence. Rising nuclear budget proves that these both factors are operational in South Asia.

Rising defense budget reflects that states are facing security dilemma. South Asia is significant for unparalleled nuclear build up between two nuclear rivals: India and Pakistan.

Regional security dimensions revolve around the triangular relations between China, India and Pakistan. Pakistan’s military doctrine is India-centric, whereas India claims that it’s military doctrine is China specific but technically and practically most of its strategic developments are made against Pakistan.

Security dilemma and adversarial bilateral relations have resulted in conventional and nuclear arms race. Conventional military imbalance is one of the significant factors that Pakistan is forced to respond the arms buildup triggered by India.

Defence budget is considered as most important element of national security in South Asia. In 2017-18 defence budget, India has allocated US$ 53.5 billion to modernise and expand its armed forces. The latest defence budget aims to achieve the objectives of “make in India” strategy to design, make, develop and produce military arms to achieve self-reliance and reduced dependence on imports, the heart of this initiative is Aero India. India’s Finance Minister Arun Jaitley in his federal budget speech in 2015 stated: “we have been over dependent on imports, with its attendant unwelcome spin offs, we are thus pursuing the ‘Make in India policy’ to achieve greater self-sufficiency in the area of defence equipment.”

India has become biggest arms importer of the world, as it is trying to build its armed forces to counter Pakistan and deal with the rising military power of China. Generally, compared to previous budgets, the military expenditure and spending of India has doubled means 100 % increase in last 10 years, since 2006 as Indian military spending was $19.23 billion in 2006 to US$ 53.5 billion in 2017.Yet,in 2017-18 budget government announced 10% hike to spend on modernization of its forces.

Since 2004, India has increased its defence budget around 16.5 percent. Indian war-prone military strategies and its modernization drive have not only widened conventional asymmetry, but have compelled Pakistan to enhance its defensive strength. There is possibility that a constant focus on modernizing and enhancing armed forces, might give India enough courage to wage a limited conflict against Pakistan.

Although, Pakistan has always rejected a conventional or nuclear arms race with India, but it cannot compromise over its minimum credible and sufficient conventional and nuclear deterrence. It reflects that against India’s growing conventional superiority, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability ensures its deterrence and status quo in region.

Though, Pakistan tries to fill the defence production gap through maintaining its credible nuclear deterrence. Additionally, many factors have compelled Pakistan to increase its dependence on nuclear weapon. Significantly, Economic and technological constrains to achieve conventional parity has played central role to shape Pakistan’s perspective nuclear policy.

Despite India’s military modernization drive, it may not be able to perform an offensive strike, and it is very difficult for Indian policy makers to gain a strategic surprise over Pakistan due to its nuclear deterrence. Therefore, India’s increasing defence spending has been viewed as a factor of instability in regional nuclear/conventional equations and could force Pakistan to review its nuclear calculus.
*
The writer is a Research Associate in Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad, can be reached at asmaakhalid_90@hotmail.com

 

[Housecarl]

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http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/time-for-reality-on-north-korea/

Time for Reality on North Korea

It may be time to start talking to Pyongyang.

By Daniel DePetris
February 21, 2017

Earlier this month, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un sent a strong and unequivocal message to the new U.S. administration — they aren’t afraid of cryptic red lines drawn by President Donald Trump on Twitter. Nor will Pyongyang be cowered by the prospect of even stronger multilateral sanctions on their small economy. In typical Kim fashion, he sent that message by launching an intermediate-range ballistic missile that traveled over 300 miles before crashing into the Sea of Japan.

Pyongyang has conducted so many ballistic missile tests over the last 5 years — more than 50 since Kim Jong-un took over from his father, Kim Jong-il — that an announcement of a new one in the dead of night almost isn’t news anymore. North Korea observers in the United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Europe have gotten to the point where they expect the North Koreans to break U.N. Security Council resolutions. These violations would be easier to gloss over if it weren’t for the reality that North Korea improves its offensive missile capability with every test. The test earlier this month wasn’t an exception to that rule; defense analysts point out that Pyongyang appeared to have used a solid fuel rocket engine, a technological development that allows missiles to be fired with very little warning.

Indeed, the North Korea problem has a cyclical quality to it:

1. Pyongyang does something it isn’t supposed to do;
2. the Security Council meets and passes additional sanctions;
3. China’s enforcement of the sanctions loosens over time;
4. Pyongyang calms down for a little while; and
5. the entire cycle repeats itself as soon as the North test launches yet another missile or perhaps even a nuclear bomb underground.

North Korea hawks in Washington are frustrated — and with good reason. Despite all of the condemnations and economic sanctions measures that have been sent Pyongyang’s way, Kim Jong-un defies the international community’s dictates, makes a mockery of the Security Council, and remains highly invested in ensuring his regime holds the ultimate deterrent.

With each new missile test or nuclear bomb explosion, U.S.-North Korea policy is further exposed for what it is: a bipartisan failure.

Just like previous U.S. administrations going back decades, the Trump administration is currently conducting its own North Korea policy assessment. Neoconservatives don’t want to wait for the process to play itself out, and many members of Congress are willing to pass additional comprehensive sanctions bills on the reclusive regime in the hope that tightening the screws on Kim’s finances will finally convince him that retaining weapons of mass destruction is more detrimental to his regime’s survival than keeping them.

Unfortunately, the fact that these assumptions have proven wrong for the last two decades hasn’t led this camp to reassess its approach.

The Trump administration has the freedom to pursue a fresh start to the North Korean problem, but the White House can only do so if they understand Pyongyang’s perspective, are willing to face the hard reality that is staring them in the face, and is strong enough to ignore the domestic political constraints that have prevented previous administrations from thinking and acting outside-the-box.

Here are three realities that the Trump administration must come to terms with:

The DPRK’s nukes are about the United States: As much as the Kim dynasty would love to eventually invade South Korea, destroy its government, and reunite the Korean Peninsula under its iron grip, Korean unification isn’t the reason Pyongyang has committed so much time and resources toward becoming a nuclear weapons power. The bottom-line is that the North views nukes as the only way to deter the United States from toppling the Kim dynasty and uniting the Korean Peninsula under the democratic government of a U.S.-allied and supported South Korea.

What the United States views as a reassurance policy for its allies in Northeast Asia, North Korea sees as preparation for a U.S.-orchestrated regime change campaign. As long as Kim is persuaded that Washington is building the military capability in the region to eventually overthrow his government, he will regard a nuclear weapons stockpile as the only thing deterring the United States from making the decision to act more aggressively.

Sanctions have become the default option: Whenever Pyongyang does something provocative or belligerent, Washington reflexively adds more sanctions in retaliation. In many ways, this response is a prudent option to take– doing nothing isn’t an option, and using military force would be the height of irrationality, so sanctions in a way hit the sweet spot of punishing the Kim regime for violating Security Council resolutions without risking a second Korean war.

But sanctions have drifted away from being part of a larger strategy to *persuade or pressure North Korea to embrace denuclearization. In the past, cutting off or restricting North Korea’s trade and commerce has been used to accomplish a wider objective: serving as the stick leading to the carrot of paving the way to serious, substantive talks. When diplomacy isn’t perceived as a viable path, however, that economic pressure becomes nothing more than a temporary remedy — punishment for punishment’s sake.

It is time for hard-nosed diplomacy without preconditions: Over the last eight years, the North Korea file has been managed rather than solved. The strategic patience policy of former President Barack Obama, which boiled down to refusing to discuss anything with the North Koreans unless they demonstrated in concrete ways that they were willing to denuclearize, has resulted in the exact opposite outcome that Washington hoped for. Instead of a non-nuclear Kim regime, America is staring at a Kim regime with more nuclear capability, a greater quantity of ballistic missiles with longer ranges, and the dangers of military options *as a last resort are more treacherous than ever.

Sitting down at the same table with one of the world’s most repressive governments is something the American foreign policy establishment isn’t especially fond of. Yet this is the same foreign policy establishment whose policies led to a nuclear North Korea in the first place. It’s also worth remembering the United States has a storied history of talking with governments Americans don’t particularly like or respect. Richard Nixon traveled to communist China in 1972, a trip that helped construct the normalization of U.S.-China relations seven years later. Ronald Reagan struck a nuclear arms control agreement with the Soviet Union, a communist behemoth that he personally despised. Bill Clinton’s administration even had some success with North Korea, arriving at an agreement that effectively froze that country’s plutonium program for eight years.

Each of these negotiations wouldn’t have been possible were it not for the courage required to withstand the tremendous domestic political resistance swirling around Washington at the time. Once that political turbulence was ignored, all three U.S. presidents embraced the pragmatism necessary to develop arrangements which made the world safer. President Trump and his team should remember that diplomacy can yield enormous rewards.

Nobody argues unconditional diplomacy with the North Koreans will be smooth sailing. Indeed, Kim may be at a point in time where capping his nuclear program and placing a moratorium on missile launches are the only demands he is willing to concede. The nuclear-free Korean Peninsula that has defined U.S. foreign policy for decades unfortunately may no longer be possible thanks to years of failed strategy from both Democrat and Republican administrations.

But the United States won’t know what concessions it might win unless and until it gauges the thinking of North Korean officials. Talking with rogue or abusive regimes isn’t a reward for bad behavior, but rather a prerequisite for the U.S. to potentially resolve one of its most intractable national security problems.
Daniel DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.voanews.com/a/mosul-whats-next-/3735184.html

Middle East

Mosul: What's Next?

February 22, 2017 11:50 AM
Jamie Dettmer

The battle for Mosul has been bloody and slow — for Iraqi soldiers and civilians alike.

Since Iraqi forces launched an assault to retake the city, Islamic State’s last major urban stronghold in the country, last October, Iraqi troops have had to endure rockets and mortars, suicide-bombings and sniper fire, as well as unconventional small drone attacks.

With Iraqi forces now focused on the western half of the city after a months-long slog to secure east Mosul, questions about what will happen to the city after IS fighters have finally been ousted are becoming more urgent.

Added to the concerns about how Mosul will be governed, and how sectarian groups can be reconciled, are questions about what will happen to IS.

Earlier this week, U.S. officials, including Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, made clear to reporters in Iraq that there won't be a hasty withdrawal of more than 9,000 American and coalition forces from the country after Mosul’s capture.

"I think the government of Iraq realizes it's a very complex fight and they need the assistance of the coalition even beyond Mosul," Lt. Gen. Stephen Townsend, commander of the joint task force task charged with coordinating anti-IS coalition forces, told reporters in Baghdad.

“The Iraqi political leadership recognize what they are up against and the value of the coalition,” Mattis said at a news conference.

Coalition power

The value of the coalition has been demonstrated in the battle for Mosul. The coalition has carried out thousands of air strikes on IS targets and trained tens of thousands of local ground forces, Iraqi and Kurdish. In the push for the densely populated west Mosul, coalition "advisers" are taking on more frontline roles — especially when it comes to directing airstrikes in order to minimize civilian casualties.

No one expects IS to disappear after losing Mosul. And coalition counter-insurgency expertise could well prove crucial.

Kurdish intelligence officials believe the jihadist terror group will wage a relentless suicide bombing insurgency using remote and rugged terrain as bases, including the Hamrin mountains in northeast Iraq. They believe hundreds, if not thousands, of IS fighters have escaped Mosul in the last few months, and they don't discount the influence of the terror group’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Brutal asymmetrical warfare could continue and worsen rapidly if Baghdad fails to reconcile the country’s competing religious sects.

The Shi'ite-dominated Iraqi government's failure to do so in the past was a major factor in the rise of Islamic State. That explains how, in 2014, a few hundred jihadist fighters seized control of Mosul in a few hours. Many of the city’s Sunni Muslims welcomed them at the time because of their anger at Baghdad and the perceived sectarian abuses of the government.

Avoiding past mistakes

The central government has been careful to keep Shi'ite militias from fighting inside the city. But once the battle for Mosul is over, the conflicting agendas of the main sectarian groups — Arab Sunnis and Shi'ites and the Kurds -- risk conflicting badly, fear analysts.

In a paper last year for the Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies, a think tank based in the Kurdistan capital Irbil, Salahaddin University history professor Othman Ali warned that “divergent and clashing interests” will result, at best, in “a significant amount of uncertainty for the post-IS Mosul.”

At worst, they risk sectarian divisions flaring up quickly, especially over how Mosul should be rebuilt and governed.

https://gdb.voanews.com/64EA996C-E3C6-4970-83AE-24435E1E4C16_w650_r0_s.jpg

Before the assault on Mosul was launched, and while sectarian groups bickered over who should participate in the assault and its timing, Kurdish leaders argued that there needed to be agreements on what would happen to Mosul after being retaken.

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani told an economic conference in Irbil: “All the political and religious components should have deserved roles in the political process and determination of the future of the region and how they want to be governed.”

“If we try to resolve everything before Mosul, Daesh (IS) will never get out of Mosul,” U.S. envoy Brett McGurk remarked days before the battle for the city began.

The worry now is that the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al Abadi will, under pressure from Iraqi Shi'ite leaders and Iran, reimpose a government structure for the city and the surrounding Nineveh Province similar to what existed before IS seized Mosul — meaning that the whole city will remain as a governorate of a Shi'ite-dominated state apparatus.

Kurds and minority groups have called either for decentralized administration for the province, to provide Mosul’s various religious and ethnic groups with some degree of self-rule, or for breaking up the province into smaller provinces. The latter proposal is favored by the Kurdistan Regional Government, which lays claim to a chunk of the province.

Future rule

Many in the minority religious communities — Christians, Yazidis, Kakais, and Shabaks — have been campaigning for their villages to come under KRG rule.

Adding to the complexity, outside powers like Turkey and Iran are eager to try to shape the future of Mosul. Turkey has three main aims: to shrink the sanctuaries in northern Iraq of Turkey’s outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK; to safeguard the rights of Turkmen communities in northern Iraq; and to block Iran from expanding its influence via the Shi'ite militias of the Popular Mobilization Units, currently fighting to the west of the Mosul.

“Only an effective coalition presence in Mosul after the defeat of IS and the desire of the concerned parties for compromise will prevent another wave of bloody encounter in Mosul in the post-IS era,” warns Othman Ali.

In Photos: VOA visits eastern Mosul

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.longwarjournal.org/archi...arried-out-suicide-attack-near-mosul-iraq.php

Ex-Guantanamo detainee carried out suicide attack near Mosul, Iraq

By Thomas Joscelyn | February 22, 2017 | tjoscelyn@gmail.com | @thomasjoscelyn

http://www.longwarjournal.org/wp-co...ld-Fiddler-ISIS-suicide-bomber-near-Mosul.jpg

http://www.longwarjournal.org/wp-co...en-Shot-2016-07-13-at-12.26.28-PM-300x381.png

The British press buzzed yesterday with news that a former Guantanamo detainee known as Jamal al Harith (formerly Ronald Fiddler) had blown himself up in a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in Iraq. Al Harith reportedly took part in the Islamic State’s defensive suicide attacks around Mosul, which is one of the organization’s de facto capitals. The so-called caliphate claims to have launched scores of suicide VBIEDs in defense of the city.

On the same day al Harith executed his attack (Feb. 20), the Islamic State’s Amaq News Agency released a short video of three SUVs being deployed as bombs. All three vehicles had armor added to the front. One of the three was presumably driven by al Harith. The Islamic State released a photo al Harith (seen above), identifying him by the alias Abu Zakariya al Britani. The group also issued a claim of responsibility for his bombing.

Al Harith’s death brings to an end one of the strangest stories in the history of the detention facility at Guantanamo. Along with four others, Al Harith was transferred to American custody in early 2002 after being found in the Taliban-controlled Sarposa prison.

According to leaked Joint Task Force-Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) threat assessments, jihadis in Afghanistan accused all five men of being spies for foreign powers looking to infiltrate the Taliban’s and al Qaeda’s ranks. Sarposa (spelled “Sarpooza” and “Sarpuza” in JTF-GTMO’s files) was overrun by the Northern Alliance in late 2001 and the men (subsequently dubbed the Sarposa Five) were handed over to the Americans and then transferred to Guantanamo.

One of the other four men detained at Sarposa alongside al Harith was Ayrat Nasimovich Vakhitov, a Russian citizen. A photo of Vakhitov from his JTF-GTMO file can be seen on the right.

The US State Department designated Vakhitov as a terrorist in July 2016, saying he “is associated with Jaysh al-Muhajirin Wal Ansar” (JMWA, or “the Army of the Emigrants and Helpers”). The JMWA is a foreign fighter organization in Syria. One powerful faction in the group merged with the Islamic State, while the rest of the organization continued to operate independently before eventually swearing allegiance to Al Nusrah Front in Sept. 2015. Al Nusrah was the name of al Qaeda’s official branch in Syria until mid-2016. Its members are fierce rivals of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s Islamic State.

Vakhitov was arrested by Turkish authorities shortly before his designation.
According to Voice of America, Vakhitov was “among 30 people Turkish authorities say they have arrested in connection with” the terrorist attack at Istanbul’s Ataturk airport in June 2016. The assault on the airport is widely suspected of being the work of the Islamic State. The State Department’s designation page does not mention Vakhitov’s reported arrest in Turkey, but does say he has “used the internet to recruit militants to travel to Syria.”

State also didn’t mention that Vakhitov was a former Guantanamo detainee, but FDD’s Long War Journal confirmed last year that he is the same individual. [See FDD’s Long War Journal report: Ex-Gitmo detainee, Islamic State’s leader in Chechnya designated by State Department.]

A murky past

In some cases, Guantanamo recidivists were well-known to authorities before they were transferred and rejoined the jihad. That was not the case with al Harith. Just two pages of JTF-GTMO’s intelligence on him have been made available to the public via a leak. It is possible that the US government has more information on his past. But the details offered in the JTF-GTMO memo are incredibly murky. The opening paragraph even notes that al Harith was “accused of being a British or American spy,” which is why he was held at Sarposa.

A senior US military commander recommended that al Harith be considered for transfer or release as of Sept. 2002, finding that he was “not affiliated” with al Qaeda and was not a Taliban leader.

Less than one year later, in July 2003, Joint Task Force – Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) reversed this recommendation. Military intelligence officials concluded that al Harith should remain in US custody, as he was “assessed as being affiliated with” al Qaeda. JTF-GTMO concluded that he was “still of intelligence value” and posed a “high threat to the US, its interests and allies.”

However, the intelligence included in JTF-GTMO’s leaked threat assessment is thin and dubious.

For example, JTF-GTMO cited “sensitive information” indicating that al Harith “was probably involved in [a] terrorist attack against the” US. There is no indication which attack he was supposedly involved in.

Moreover, JTF-GTMO noted that he was not “questioned on his ties with those involved in this attack, nor has he been questioned on his own involvement.” It should be noted that other British detainees who were suspected of being tied to specific al Qaeda plots were held at Guantanamo for years after al Harith was transferred in Mar. 2004. If he was really suspected of involvement in a terror plot against America, it is likely that US officials would have fought to keep him in detention.

US military and intelligence officials were uncertain about al Harith’s past. The “timeline” for his “extensive travels in the Middle East” between 1992 and 1996 had “not been fully established” when JTF-GTMO’s assessment was written in 2003. He was “accompanied by Abu Bakr, a well-known al Qaeda operative,” on a trip “to Sudan in 1992 during the same time that Osama bin Laden and his network were” based in the country. However, US officials did not cite any specific intelligence linking al Harith to bin Laden. Instead, they found that the school al Harith claimed he attended in Sudan “did not exist” and that “foreigners” who traveled to Khartoum for “Islamic studies” were often “recruited for training in sabotage, kidnapping, improvised explosive devices, and commando training.” The file does not indicate that al Harith himself attended such training.

Then there was the issue of al Harith’s suspected travels to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s. US military intelligence could draw no firm conclusions about his travels, at least according to the JTF-GTMO memo.

US officials did conduct a “PSYOP/JDOG” [Psychological Operation/Joint Detention Operations Group] “experiment” in Guantanamo’s Camp Delta. It was called “Dining Out,” because “ethnic food was prepared for a select group of detainees.” Al Harith “was noticed calling out to other detainees in other blocks that the food tasted just like that from a restaurant in Jedda, Saudi Arabia.” But al Harith told authorities he had never been to Saudi Arabia. He also claimed to have visited “Pakistan in the early 1990’s,” but “this information” had “not been exploited.”

It is clear from JTF-GTMO’s file that US officials thought al Harith was lying, but they didn’t really know what to make of his story. On Apr. 4, 2003, he was “administered a polygraph exam and was found to be deceptive.” He was specifically asked if he had “contact with any persons connected with extremist groups prior to going to Afghanistan and if he went to Afghanistan for Jihad.” Al Harith “answered ‘no’ to both questions,” but was found to be “deceptive each time.”

Still other purported details about al Harith’s past can be found on the old website for Cageprisoners, a detainee advocate group that has been renamed CAGE. The group is affiliated with Moazzam Begg, another former Guantanamo detainee. American officials alleged that Begg was affiliated with al Qaeda prior to his own detention. The British press, including the Daily Mail, have posted a photo of al Harith and Begg standing next to each other at an event.

Some of the details in Cageprisoners’s short biography match those found in JTF-GTMO’s file, but with an especially benign-sounding twist. The group described al Harith as “a gentle, quiet man who rarely spoke of his faith unless asked, and after four years learning Arabic and teaching English at Khartoum University in Sudan, he seemed happy enough to return home where he started to study nursing.” (The JTF-GTMO file indicates that US officials thought al Harith’s explanation of his time in Sudan was not truthful.) Al Harith returned to the UK but then, “at the end of September 2001,” decided to travel to Pakistan, “retracing a journey he had made to Iran in 1993.” Al Harith “paid a lorry driver to take him from northern Pakistan to Iran as part of a backpacking trip, but they were stopped near the Afghan border by Taliban soldiers who saw his British passport and jailed him, in October, fearing he was a spy.” He was allegedly “interrogated by the CIA” before being transferred to Guantanamo.

After his transfer from Guantanamo, Al Harith stayed in the UK until early 2014, when he fled to Syria and joined the Islamic State. His decision to leave Britain caused a minor uproar in the press, as the British government had paid him £1 million after he claimed that he was abused during his time in custody.

Al Harith was also a plaintiff in a lawsuit claiming that US officials had tortured and abused detainees, among other allegations. The case was ultimately dismissed. Al Harith’s co-plaintiffs are known as the “Tipton Three,” as they are from the town in England of that name. According to an account on the Guardian’s website, two of the three appeared on a television show, “Lie Lab,” in 2007. “Campaigners for the men have always maintained they were innocent tourists-***-aid workers, caught up in the invasion of Afghanistan,” the Guardian’s account noted. But one of the men, Rhuhel Ahmed, was confronted with evidence suggesting “he was less than forthcoming with the truth” and subsequently “confessed” to “visiting an Islamist training camp” and “also handling weapons and learning how to use an AK47.” This caused some mild embarrassment for their advocates in the UK, as the “Tipton Three” were widely portrayed as “blameless heroes.”

The “Sarposa Five”

It is possible that the Taliban was mistaken about al Harith in late 2001. There is no evidence in JTF-GTMO’s file indicating that he was really a spy for either the British or the Americans at the time. This fact would have been known to one or both governments. Many jihadis flocked to Afghanistan to support the Taliban in September and October 2001. We may never know the full truth of al Harith’s intentions, but it is conceivable that he was merely caught up in a chaotic situation and mistakenly accused of being a spy.

Still, according to JTF-GTMO’s threat assessments, the Taliban and al Qaeda accused all four of the other men detained alongside al Harith at Sarposa of being spies as well. At the American detention facility in Cuba, the Sarposa Five were given sequential internment serial numbers (ISN) ranging from 489 to 493. Al Harith’s ISN was 490.

Abdul Rahim Abdul Razak al Janko (ISN 489), a Syrian, was either “recruited by al Qaeda or sent on a United Arab Emirates (UAE) sponsored intelligence mission targeting al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.” That assessment was made on June 30, 2008, more than six years after Janko was first transferred to Guantanamo, indicating that the confusion surrounding him and the others lingered for years.

JTF-GTMO found that Sadik Ahmad Turkistani (491) may have been deported from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan because of his criminal activities. The jihadis apparently suspected that he was sent by Saudi intelligence to spy on al Qaeda and bin Laden.
The aforementioned Ayrat Nasimovich Vakhitov (ISN 492) was “arrested by the Taliban on suspicion of espionage.”

Abdul Hakim Bukhary (ISN 493), a Saudi, was by far the most interesting of the Sarposa Five. He was assessed to be one of al Qaeda’s original members. One of Bukhary’s fellow detainees, Jawed Jabber Sadkhan, told officials that Bukhary knew Abdullah Azzam, the godfather of modern of jihadism and Osama bin Laden’s mentor. Bukhary admitted to authorities that he trained at the Sada camp, which was run by Maktab al-Khidamat, a forerunner of al Qaeda. (He provided conflicting details about his time at Sada.) Bukhary also told officials that he had trained at the al Qaeda-associated Khaldan camp in the early 1990s and he likely attended other al Qaeda camps, such as Al Farouq, as well.

Bukhary claimed that he returned to his home in Saudi Arabia after training at Khaldan in 1992, but US officials found evidence contradicting his claim. Namely, JTF-GTMO cited the testimony of Enaam M. Arnaout, who was convicted in the US of using a charity, the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF), to bankroll jihadists in Bosnia. Arnaout “stated than an Abdul Hakim…held a position with the BIF in Bosnia in 1992.” JTF-GTMO assessed that “Abdul Hakim” was in fact Bukhary. Arnaout explained that “Abdul Hakim” had “traveled inside Bosnia at an unspecified time with BIF financier Adel Batterjee.” Arnaout also “stated he knew Abdul Hakim from Pakistan and added that Abdul Hakim had previously been employed by ARAMCO,” the Saudi Arabian oil company. Bukhary separately “acknowledged working for ARAMCO in Saudi Arabia,” and many of the details he provided about his own past were consistent with the timeline Arnaout provided for “Abdul Hakim.” Bukhary admitted, for example, that some of his fellow trainees in Afghanistan traveled to Bosnia for jihad.

Bukhary was tied to a constellation of senior al Qaeda figures. Regardless, it appears he eventually had a falling out with his comrades. Sadkhan, an Iraqi who was transferred from Guantanamo in June 2009, told US officials that Osama bin Laden himself had Bukhary imprisoned at Sarposa over a disagreement regarding the transfer of some money. The funds were reportedly intended for Jumaboy Namagani, the leader of the al Qaeda and Taliban-affiliated Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), but bin Laden apparently became suspicious that it may be used to fund a “coup against him.” It is not clear what exactly transpired. A senior al Qaeda facilitator who is still detained at Guantanamo, Sharqawi Abdu Ali al-Hajj (aka “Riyadh the Facilitator”), explained that Bukhary “aroused suspicion while in Afghanistan because of his actions and was suspected of being a Saudi Arabian intelligence agent.”

Not the first former Guantanamo detainee to become a suicide bomber in Iraq
Jamal al Harith is not the first ex-Guantanamo detainee to launch a suicide VBIED attack in Iraq.

Abdullah Salih al Ajmi blew himself up in Mosul in 2008. Thirteen people were killed in the explosion and dozens more were wounded. The US detained Ajmi after he fought at the Battle of Tora Bora in Afghanistan in 2001. He was transferred to Guantanamo and held there until he was returned to Kuwait on Nov. 2, 2005. Ajmi was acquitted by a Kuwaiti court in Mar. 2006, released, and then joined the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). The ISI is the predecessor organization to the current Islamic State.

Al Harith’s death means that the Islamic State has now used at least two former Guantanamo detainees in suicide operations in and around Mosul, Iraq.

-----

Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for FDD's Long War Journal.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/nato-middle-east-eastern-europe/


NATO, the Middle East and Eastern Europe

Feb. 22, 2017 NATO’s mission has shifted, but are its members willing to meet the new challenges?

By George Friedman

Over the past week, American officials have attended meetings of NATO and the Munich Security Conference. The topic has been the future of NATO, with the United States demanding once more that the Europeans carry out their obligation to maintain effective military forces in order to participate in the NATO military alliance. At the same time, many European countries raised the question of whether the United States is committed to NATO. The Europeans are charging that that Americans may have military force but lack political commitment to Europe. The Americans are charging that the Europeans may be politically committed to NATO but lack the military force to give meaning to their commitment.

The real issue is that NATO has achieved its original mission, and no agreement exists on what its mission is now. NATO’s original mission was to block a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. That was achieved in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed. Having achieved the mission, NATO could have dissolved, but the problem with multinational institutions is that they take on a life of their own, independent of the reason they were created. Disbanding NATO because it had achieved its goal was never an option. So it continued to exist, holding conferences, maintaining planning staff and acting as if there was political agreement on what it was supposed to do.

As the Soviet Union was collapsing, Iraq invaded Kuwait and the United States, as the only global power, created a coalition going far beyond NATO to repel the invasion. There was great satisfaction at the outcome, without a realization that the Iraqi invasion was not a stand-alone event but the beginning of a massive restructuring of the Middle East that would include vast instability and terrorist attacks on the U.S. and Europe. From 1945 until 1991, the fundamental global issue was the status of Europe in the wake of World War II. From 1991 until today, the fundamental issue for Europe and the United States has been the status of the Islamic world in the wake of the end of the Cold War, which had the effect of imposing a kind of stability in the region.

NATO was created to address post-World War II Europe. That is no longer the pivotal issue. NATO was not built to deal with what came after its success. There is consensus that chaos in the Islamic world is undesirable, but no consensus on three other points. First, there is no agreement that NATO as an institution has an obligation to take collective military action to pacify the region. Second, there is no consensus over what pacification would look like. Third, there is no consensus that a coordinated and collective effort to prevent terrorist attacks on NATO countries should be undertaken.

NATO’s institutions were created with a crisply defined mission, an understanding of the consequences of failure and, therefore, an allocation of military resources appropriate to the mission and to member states’ resources. There is no such agreement on the current conflict and, therefore, NATO does not have a unifying mission. The Cold War was seen as an existential threat to Europe. The Islamic conflict is seen in different ways by different countries at different times. No military strategy can exist based on this political base of sand. Therefore, interests within NATO diverge, particularly between the United States and many European countries. The U.S. has fought a war for 15 years in the Muslim world designed to contain those forces the U.S. perceived as a danger to its security and interests. Some European countries, such as the United Kingdom, have joined this war with major resources. Some have given what I can only call symbolic gestures, considering the resources they could have devoted. Others have been deeply skeptical and critical of U.S. strategy.

Therefore, these countries cannot fully agree on the strategic problem NATO faces and, as a result, can’t adopt a unified strategy. NATO members’ view of the world and willingness to act decisively varies widely. Therefore, the reasonable question is what is the point of NATO? The general feeling is that while the U.S.’ 15-year war did not compel Europe to act as a matter of collective security, other interests bind members together.

The problem is defining what other issues require an organization such as NATO, and whether, having defined the issue, the Europeans are prepared to devote the resources required to carry out the mission. It is vital to constantly point out that NATO is not a political framework where discussions take place but a military alliance that rests on military goals and resources. It is about soldiers and sailors, and if the issues being faced do not involve these, then NATO has no use. Some other sort of institution may be required to address these issues instead.

NATO is an alliance of habit. We used to need NATO and, therefore, surely we still need NATO. It is also an alliance of convenience. Rather than being committed to the military management of current problems, which is its mission, it has become selective in its engagements. The difference between NATO prior to 1991 and now is simple. Prior to 1991, it had a clear purpose and all members were committed to that purpose. It no longer has a clear purpose, and when some members, such as the United States, become involved in wars, participation is elective. To be more precise, participation can be broad but militarily insignificant. Europe’s military force is rationally shaped to the risk it is prepared to take and not to the requirements of the conflict at hand. Participation in conflict is not automatic but optional. Therefore, NATO is no longer an alliance, as an alliance requires mutual interests and support. NATO members have no mutual interest.

In trying to find a reason for NATO to continue operating, the obvious solution is to once again address NATO’s founding mission: deterring Russia. From 1991 until 2008 and the war in Georgia, NATO’s assumption about Russia was that it was the crippled remnant of the Soviet Union, incapable of posing a military hazard and interested primarily in evolving into a variety of liberal democracy with a vibrant economy linked to Europe. It seemed a reasonable assumption, but it was defective. The Russians increasingly saw European and American help as undermining Russia’s economic viability, and saw NATO expansion as designed to strangle Russia. Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004 was the breaking point, along with the admission of the Baltic states into NATO. The Russians saw the latter as a violation of the West’s pledge not to expand NATO into the former Soviet Union, and the former as a desire to build anti-Russian regimes in areas of vital interest to the Russians.

Whatever the subjective intentions of the two sides, NATO’s perception was that Russia was crippled and did not have to be taken into account in planning actions. Russia’s perception was that NATO continued to fear Russia and would not be content until it did become crippled. That evolved into the current issue over Ukraine’s future, as the Russians seem to be modernizing their military force in anticipation of further pressure from the West. The West faces a Russia apparently returning to the patterns that made NATO necessary in the first place.

This issue is particularly important in what used to be called (and should be called again) Eastern Europe. Central Europe contains countries like Germany and Austria, and the dynamics of Eastern Europe are wildly different than those of Central Europe. Eastern Europe finds itself caught between two forces. One is the European Union, still functional but increasingly fragmented and unable to act in concert. The second force is Russia. It is increasingly insecure and seeks to stabilize its western frontier, which means the Baltics, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria are feeling the winds of a rising Russia.

From these countries’ standpoint, the EU’s fragmentation is replicated in NATO. Except for the presence of the United States and Canada, the two organizations are very similar. Eastern European countries are aware that except for the United States, NATO lacks the will and the force to create a major blocking power. A few battalions are shuffled around but nothing that would actually have military significance if the Russians were able to mount an attack.

Russia is posturing as a great power, but its internal economic problems are enormous. Much of its military force is a shadow of what it was under the Soviets, and its modernization program depends on finances, which are strained to near breaking point with declining oil prices. Still, Russia’s military force is greater than Eastern Europe’s, and NATO’s ability (excluding the United States) to deploy militarily decisive forces is limited. This region, which is part of NATO, may be able to count on some countries in the alliance, but cannot count on NATO itself because it lacks effective military force.

It is also a region in which the Russians loom larger than they are. This follows from 45 years of occupation by the Russians. The region’s vision of Russia still conjures hazy memories of Soviet armored guard divisions and a KGB that could hear the grass grow. The guard divisions are badly in need of repair and trained and motivated troops, and the FSB can shape individual politicians but cannot shape global events without their efforts blowing up in their face.

In fact, Eastern Europe, with some help from the rest of Europe and the United States, is quite capable not only of defending itself militarily against the current Russian reality, but also of protecting itself politically against Russian influence. If Eastern European countries were to work together, they would be a formidable force. But the Slovaks and Hungarians have little trust in NATO, and the Poles and the Hungarians are under constant attack from the EU because their people elected governments the EU disapproves of.

NATO’s original mission was to contain Russia. But in this case, countries like Germany do not carry the primary burden. That burden falls on Eastern Europe. But the minimal support needed to secure the region – a few first-rate divisions and air wings – is not available. The U.S. is recovering and perhaps preparing for another round of conflict in the Middle East, and the rest of Europe lacks the minimal capabilities needed for extended deployment a few hundred miles from home. Therefore, NATO’s core strategy cannot be implemented. Something that is well within the brief of NATO, and ought to be well within the ability of countries like German, is undoable. NATO solidarity on protecting Eastern Europe isn’t nearly as strong as it could be, and all the commitment in the world will not create anti-tank capabilities designed to make an unlikely Russian attack scenario impossible.

From a strategic point of view and regardless of internal politics, Poland and Hungary, as examples, are indispensable for deterring the Russians. While NATO’s brief includes this deterrence, the EU retains the right to lecture and condemn both countries even in the face of the political disorder in the rest of Europe. In other words, Eastern European countries have one relationship with NATO and another relationship with the EU. So at a NATO meeting the Germans speak one way, and at an EU meeting they speak another way. And the coalition that would protect Germany from far-fetched events (in a time when the farfetched has become routine) can’t take form.

The United States is a key member of NATO, and the U.S. is trying to figure out NATO’s usefulness. The answer is far from clear. In the one area where NATO can be helpful and can act within its mission, European members’ behavior is both contradictory and primarily theoretical. They simply have not built a military for a mission even clearly within NATO’s purview. To the extent the Russians have the ability to increase their influence on their western frontier, their European adversaries are inadvertently providing the opening.

In the end, there is no NATO problem. There is a European problem. A European consensus on defense does not exist any more than a consensus on economics does. Being in an alliance so unstable that a region the alliance must protect is under attack by the EU is too complicated for the simple and unsophisticated Americans. The sophisticated Europeans in the end are proving too much for the United States. U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis has laid down the price members must pay for NATO protection. The Europeans will assume it is just talk and continue as they were. Having opted out of collective responsibility in the Middle East, the Europeans are also opting out of collective responsibility in Europe. U.S. action in Europe will take place as needed, but it will not be constrained by the votes of those not incurring some of the risk. This is not an opinion on my part, but simply a rational analysis by the U.S. Why submit to an organization that cannot share the risk?

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-mosul-idUSKBN1620HI

World News | Thu Feb 23, 2017 | 5:34am EST

Iraqi forces storm Mosul airport, military base

By Isabel Coles and Stephen Kalin | SOUTH OF MOSUL

U.S.-backed Iraqi security forces closing in on the Islamic State-held western half of Mosul launched a major offensive on the city's airport and fought their way into a nearby military base on Thursday.

Federal police and an elite interior ministry unit known as Rapid Response stormed the airport and engaged in gun battles with Islamic State fighters who used suicide car bombs to try to stem the advance, according to a Reuters correspondent south of Mosul airport.

Police officers told Reuters that the police and Rapid Response forces had taken control of large parts of the airport.

Other officers said the militants deployed bomb-carrying drones to attack the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Forces advancing from the southwestern side of the city.

"We are attacking Daesh (Islamic State) from multiple fronts to distract them and prevent them from regrouping. It’s the best way to knock them down quickly," said federal police captain Amir Abdul Kareem, whose units are fighting near Ghozlani military base.

After ousting the militant group from eastern Mosul last month, Iraqi forces have sought to capture the airport to use it as a launchpad for an onslaught into the west of the city.

The campaign involves a 100,000-strong force of Iraqi troops, Kurdish fighters and Shi'ite militias and has made rapid advances since the start of the year, aided by new tactics and improved coordination.

Losing Mosul could spell the end of the Iraqi side of militants' self-styled caliphate in Iraq and Syria, which Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared from the city after sweeping through vast areas of Iraq in 2014.

U.S. special forces in armored vehicles on Thursday positioned near Mosul airport looked on as Iraqi troops advanced and a helicopter strafed suspected Islamic State positions.

Counter-terrorism service (CTS) troops fought their way inside the nearby Ghozlani base, which includes barracks and training grounds close to the Baghdad-Mosul highway, a CTS spokesman told Reuters.

The airport and the base, captured by Islamic State fighters when they overran Mosul in June 2014, have been heavily damaged by U.S.-led air strikes intended to wear down the militants ahead of the offensive, a senior Iraqi official said.

The U.S. military commander in Iraq has said he believes U.S.-backed forces will retake both of Islamic State's urban bastions - the other is the Syrian city of Raqqa - within the next six months, which would end the jihadists' ambitions to rule and govern significant territory.

Iraqi commanders expect the battle to be more difficult than in the east of Mosul, however, in part because tanks and armored vehicles cannot pass through narrow alleyways that crisscross the city's ancient western districts.

Militants have developed a network of passageways and tunnels to enable them to hide and fight among civilians, melt away after hit-and-run operations and track government troop movements, according to inhabitants.

(Additional reporting by Ahmed Rasheed; Writing by Tom Finn; Editing by Ralph Boulton and Dominic Evans)

Also In World News
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[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/w...war-donald-trump-vladimir-putin-a7595011.html

Russia open to US plan for Syria 'safe zones' but only with Bashar al-Assad's approval

Proposals raise challenges over military cooperation between warring groups

Lizzie Dearden
@lizziedearden
Thursday 23 February 2017 10:48 GMT

Russia is open to the concept of “safe zones” in Syria, but only if they are approved by Bashar al-Assad.

Sergey Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, said he had briefly discussed the US-backed plan with Donald Trump’s administration and was told specifics were still being worked out.

“We believe that any such initiatives concerning the territory of Syria need to be coordinated with the Syrian government - otherwise it would be hard to implement them,” he said at a news conference.*

Video

“Having described our understanding of what we can talk about, we are waiting for clarifications from Washington.

Read more
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"We are also ready to discuss other proposals concerning our cooperation in Syria."

Syria's state news agency said that any attempt to establish safe zones in the country without coordination with Damascus would be a violation of national sovereignty.*

Mr Lavrov met Rex Tillerson, the US Secretary of State, at the Munich Security Conference in Germany following a speech where he called for a “post-West world order”.

Russia has been at loggerheads with the US, Britain and much of the West over its support for Assad’s government in the Syrian civil war.

The country’s air power and deployment of “military advisors” on the ground has been key to reversing gains made by rebels, including in the battle for Aleppo.

Vladimir Putin characterised the launch of his intervention in 2015 as an operation against Isis and jihadis but observers have accused the Russian air force of committing war crimes by bombing civilian areas controlled by opposition groups.

Barack Obama strongly criticised Russia’s tactics but Donald Trump has been more evasive on the issue, having repeatedly praised the Russian President during his campaign and vowed to improve relations strained by Syria and Ukraine.

The US President has supported the idea of “safe zones” to prevent refuges from leaving Syria, telling a rally of supporters in Florida they would be funded by Gulf nations.

“We’re going to have the Gulf states pay for those safe zones, they have nothing but money,” Mr Trump said.

“And we’re going to do it that way instead of taking massive numbers, tens of thousands of people into our country.”

He discussed the plan with King Salman of Saudi Arabia in January, who reportedly agreed that safe zones were the best way forward in Syria and Yemen, although no concrete plans have emerged.

Mr Putin’s foreign affairs adviser, Yuri Ushakov, said the American and Russian presidents discussed possible cooperation on fighting terrorism along with economic issues in a phone call last month.

The Obama administration assessed the prospect of no-fly zones in Syria to protect civilians from Syrian government air strikes but Russia’s intervention raised the threat that moves to enforce restrictions could trigger a military confrontation between the two countries.*

Concerns have also been raised about the logistics of installing the ground forces and air power needed to protect such areas and the cooperation it would require between warring factions.

“Safe areas” were previously set up in Bosnia in the 1990s war, intended to protect Muslim communities from Serb attacks in six designated districts sheltered by UN peacekeepers and air power.

A UN report at the time said the goals included limiting “loss of life and property, deterring aggression, demonstrating international concern and involvement, setting the stage for political negotiations and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid”.
*
One of the zones was Srebrenica, where a Bosnian Serb militia slaughtered thousands of men and boys in an 11-day campaign of genocide in July 1995.

Additional reporting by agencies

 

[Housecarl]

Army Stands Up 6 Brigades to Advise Foreign Militaries
Military.com | Feb 16, 2017 | by Matthew Cox
http://www.military.com/daily-news/...-up-6-brigades-advise-foreign-militaries.html
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...*WINDS****of****WAR****&p=6373160#post6373160

--

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/replaced-security-force-assistance-brigades-vs-special-forces/

Replaced? Security Force Assistance Brigades vs. Special Forces

Tim Ball
February 23, 2017

The U.S. Army recently announced it would be standing up six security force assistance brigades (SFABs), designed to provide the Army with units specifically trained to work as military advisors. As part of their training pipeline, these advisors will likely receive cultural and language training to facilitate working with their partner forces. They will have to become experts in small unit tactics and maneuver warfare, be comfortable living and eating with their host nation counterparts, and be willing to endure hardships in harsh environments across the world. This type of advisor might sound familiar, because they already exist. As the old cadence goes, “See that man in the green beret? Teaching’s how he earns his pay.” If Army leadership needs soldiers to serve as the, “day-to-day experts combatant commanders need to train, advise, and assist our partners overseas,” why aren’t they turning to Army Special Forces – a unit specifically designed to train, advise, and assist other military forces? Taking a broad look at Special Forces over the last 15 years provides some possible answers to this question.

There’s Already an Elite Advisory Force

To be clear, the Army should be commended, not criticized, for taking security force assistance seriously and developing a strategy to execute it responsibly. The new advisory brigades represent the Army acknowledging that trying to shift conventional combat units into advisory roles on demand is not ideal. According to the press release, these new brigades will consist of roughly 500 senior NCOs and officers, all of whom are to be trained at the new Military Advisor Training Academy at Fort Benning. Instead of having to deploy paratroopers to train and advise the Iraqi Army, the conventional Army can now turn to specialized advisory units, full of experienced soldiers who chose to be advisors, instead of junior soldiers who joined the Army to be infantrymen.

Yet this is the same type of design that has already been used with Special Forces. The basic building block of a Special Forces Group is Operational Detachment-Alpha, a team consisting of ten experienced NCOs, a captain, and a warrant officer. These teams are meant as force multipliers, capable of advising battalion-sized units. There is a rich history behind the concept.* During Vietnam, teams of Green Berets advised Montagnard irregulars and South Vietnamese Ranger units. In the 1980s, they worked side-by-side with troops in El Salvador to prevent an insurgency from toppling the government. For years, 7th Special Forces Group deployed teams to Colombia, training their army to counter illicit drug trade and rebels. Special Forces have historically been the premier advisory force when it comes to helping both conventional and irregular forces around the world. However, that perception has changed significantly over the last 15 years.

Sorry, We Only Work with Other Special Operations Forces

In October 2001, Special Forces teams from 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) served as the initial military response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Linking up with members from the Central Intelligence Agency and indigenous Afghan fighters from the Northern Alliance, the teams stormed across Afghanistan with their partner forces, calling in airstrikes against Taliban and al-Qaeda targets. It was a stunning campaign that resulted in the overthrow of the Taliban government, the disruption of al-Qaeda operations, and a revived interest in the concept of unconventional warfare.

The United States quickly realized it would have to build an Afghan state almost from scratch, to include a military and police force. Task Force Phoenix was created to accomplish this task, but the task force was formed around a conventional infantry unit – 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division. When Phoenix transitioned to Phoenix II, the mission was considered so low in priority that it went to the Army National Guard.

Similar events played out in Iraq in 2003. During the initial invasion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and their Kurdish partners wreaked havoc in northern Iraq as conventional forces charged in from the south. However, when it came time to create and train a new Iraqi Army, the advisory role was assigned to both the regular Army and the U.S. Army Reserve. Newly created advisory teams were staffed by officers and NCOs from across the force. These teams eventually evolved into the Military Transition Teams, with many of their billets being filled by officers recently recalled to active duty from the Inactive Ready Reserve.

In addition to these ad hoc advisory units, conventional forces were asked to advise and accompany Iraqi Army units as part of the counterinsurgency strategy that developed during the 2006 “surge.” These conventional forces ranged from infantry platoons to military police squads, and were never designed to act as advisors or trainers. A critical capacity gap had emerged, with the United States attempting to build and train military forces in two different countries in the midst of multiple insurgencies. Despite this gap, conventional forces continued to take the lead in training and advising the Iraqi and Afghan armies.

Meanwhile, Special Forces turned its focus almost exclusively to building smaller Afghan and Iraqi special operations units, and accompanying them on raids. The legacy of this work can be seen in the current fight for Mosul, where Iraqi Special Operations Forces have taken the lead in reclaiming the city from Islamic State militants. Their reliability stands in stark contrast to the conventionally-trained Iraqi Army, a force that collapsed in 2014 when the numerically inferior Islamic State re-emerged in Iraq.

By limiting itself to working primarily with smaller special operations units, Special Forces was able to maintain its own participation in kinetic operations, but it also created a lasting external perception of what Special Forces is supposed to do. Instead of being the premier advisors for any type of military force, it became normal to assume that Special Forces only work with other special operations units. There are still Special Forces teams that work with regular military forces around the world, but the conventional military’s closest exposure to Special Forces has been through watching them train Iraqi and Afghan special operations forces.

ARSOF 2022 and the Unconventional Warfare Revival

Following the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, Special Forces shifted their focus and their traditional advisory role drifted even further away. In April 2013, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command released a special edition magazine entitled ARSOF 2022. The publication was meant to be a blueprint for Army special operations forces. It envisioned splitting them into two categories: special warfare and surgical strike, with each having specific mission sets.

ARSOF 2022 may have been well-intended, but it included information that further contributed to the perception that Special Forces was moving away from advisory missions. On a chart showing special operations and conventional forces, ARSOF 2022 listed the range of military operations and placed them on a linear scale in accordance with which force could more appropriately claim that operation as a core competency. Combined arms maneuver fell directly under conventional forces. At first glance, this seems to make sense. The conventional army conducts maneuver warfare as its primary task. The imagery shows it as a core competency for conventional forces, and its depiction on the chart insinuates that combined arms maneuver is not in the purview of special operations forces. A Special Forces captain is expected to train and advise a foreign counterpart at the battalion level. This tasking requires that captain, and his entire ODA, to therefore be experts in combined arms maneuver.

https://2k8r3p1401as2e1q7k14dguu-wp...uploads/2017/02/Rang-of-Missions-1024x455.jpg

ARSOF 2022 placed unconventional warfare on the opposite end of the spectrum from combined arms maneuver, showing it as a core competency of special operations forces. Around the same time that ARSOF 2022 was released, a renewed emphasis on unconventional warfare began to emerge for Army Special Forces. The U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) was reorganized into 1st Special Forces Command (Provisional) (Airborne), converting what was once a force provider into a potential operational command with a deployable headquarters. The newly formed 4th battalions at each Special Forces Group, originally envisioned as fully equipped and manned line battalions, were reorganized into smaller units meant to specialize in special warfare. Battalion and Group-sized unconventional warfare exercises took place across the United States. Preparing for an unconventional warfare campaign started to take up time, resources, and manpower, reducing the capacity for Special Forces to fill advisory roles. As a result, Special Forces may be better prepared today to conduct unconventional warfare, but is that the mission the nation and the Army needs it to do?

The Problems with Focusing on Unconventional Warfare

While the current, joint doctrinal definition of unconventional warfare involves the coercion, disruption, or overthrow of governments or occupying powers through the support of resistance movements or insurgencies, the definition itself has changed multiple times since the creation of Special Forces in 1952. When unconventional warfare first appeared in doctrine in 1961, the focus for Special Forces was on the guerrilla component of a resistance movement. This tasking resulted in Special Forces developing the requisite capabilities of a military advisor, capabilities that could be applied to guerrillas or established military forces.

It wasn’t until 1990 that Special Forces doctrine included unconventional warfare being conducted in both wartime and in peacetime. Even then, the Special Forces field manual stated explicitly that, “SF units do not create resistance movements. They provide advice, training and assistance to indigenous resistance organizations already in existence.” At its core, Special Forces was still an advisory unit.

In June 2001, the concept of unconventional warfare changed drastically. In an updated field manual, Special Forces declared itself as “the UW [unconventional warfare] force of the United States.” Moving beyond the concept of working with resistance movements in occupied territories, Special Forces now expanded the concept of unconventional warfare to involve “an offensive asymmetric option for employing U.S. military power.” Shortly after the field manual’s publication, the United States was thrust into war by the 9/11 attacks. An offensive mindset took hold, and it became normal for the U.S. military to proactively implement policy abroad, as opposed to being a deterrence measure capable of reactionary defense. Unconventional warfare has followed this line of thinking, and some now argue that it should be a “strategic mission that is an offensive option for policymakers.”

In reality, offensive unconventional warfare is a strategy that has failed repeatedly in the past, and is a potentially dangerous policy to pursue. Some of the reasons for this have been succinctly captured in shorter journal articles, or expounded in an entire Master’s thesis. Arguably, many of the problems with offensive unconventional warfare are the same problems that come with any interventionist policy. Those problems have not gone unnoticed by senior policy makers from both the Democrat and Republican parties. If the demand signal for unconventional warfare doesn’t exist at the political level, should it be the priority Special Forces pursues while sacrificing its advisory role to the conventional Army?

This is not to say that unconventional warfare does not have a time and a place where it can be used as a viable and successful strategy. Defensive unconventional warfare – that is, coming to the aid of an occupied ally by working with a resistance movement inside the occupied territory – has worked successfully in the past. The most obvious example of this is embodied in the Jedburgh teams of World War II – multi-lateral units who acted in support of a conventional military campaign designed to expel an invading power. In modern times, such a scenario could be envisioned happening in the Baltics. If Russia chose to invade one of those countries, a resistance movement would be a vital support piece to any NATO-led conventional response.

The United States may develop an appetite for conducting unconventional warfare in the future, but the demand signal for advisors is current, strong, and not going away anytime soon. Arguably, as seen recently in Iraq, advising and training the partnered conventional forces that make up the bulk of a military are far more important tasks than ensuring they have a competent special operations capability.

Additionally, advising is one of the primary tasks that comes with conducting unconventional warfare. At its core, unconventional warfare is all about training, advising, and assisting another military or paramilitary force – or put simply, working with other people. What better way to train for that mission than to take every advisory mission the Army has to offer? There’s a good argument to be made that the less advisory missions Special Forces does, the less prepared it is to conduct unconventional warfare. Special Forces can try to simulate the human dynamic of unconventional warfare by hiring role players for its exercises, but that doesn’t replace the experience of a team deploying to another country to advise forces with different languages and cultures.

Be Careful Moving Forward

This is why the creation of security force assistance brigades should make Special Forces sit up and take notice. There have been successful advisors in the past who didn’t wear green hats to work, and there are bound to be more in the future, perhaps from these new brigades. As those advisors achieve mission success and build solid reputations for working with other militaries, there is even the possibility of mission creep. These new brigades could start by advising only foreign conventional military forces, but as their reputation grows, what’s to stop Army leadership from asking them to train surrogates or irregulars as well? Special Forces could find itself relegated to a niche role, advising only foreign special operations units while preparing for an unconventional warfare campaign that may never occur.

In response to these new brigades, Special Forces should evaluate the effectiveness of its messaging to both Army and political leadership. Instead of being known as the unconventional warfare force of the United States, it may be more helpful for people to think of Special Forces as the premier advisors of the U.S. military, with unconventional warfare being a natural extension of that advisory mission.

Special Forces should consider this carefully – it might not be long before members of the security force assistance brigade are picking out a color for a newly authorized beret, and establishing their own legacy as elite advisors who live and die with their partner forces in the darkest corners of the world.

-

Major Tim Ball is an Army Special Forces officer.* He has served in 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and at NATO Special Operations Headquarters. *Major Ball is a recent graduate of the Defense Analysis program at the Naval Postgraduate School.* He wrote his thesis on the historical use of unconventional warfare by the United States. The views here do not represent those of the U.S. Army, the U.S. Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-usa-slap-idUSKBN161195

World News | Wed Feb 22, 2017 | 1:00pm EST

Iran ready to give U.S. 'slap in the face': commander

The United States should expect a "strong slap in the face" if it underestimates Iran's defensive capabilities, a commander of the elite Revolutionary Guards said on Wednesday, as Tehran concluded war games.

Since taking office last month, U.S. President Donald Trump has pledged to get tough with Iran, warning the Islamic Republic after its ballistic missile test on Jan. 29 that it was playing with fire and all U.S. options were on the table.

"The enemy should not be mistaken in its assessments, and it will receive a strong slap in the face if it does make such a mistake," said General Mohammad Pakpour, head of the Guards’ ground forces, quoted by the Guards' website Sepahnews.

On Wednesday, the Revolutionary Guards concluded three days of exercises with rockets, artillery, tanks and helicopters, weeks after Trump warned that he had put Tehran "on notice" over the missile launch.

"The message of these exercises ... for world arrogance is not to do anything stupid," said Pakpour, quoted by the semi-official news agency Tasnim.

"Everyone could see today what power we have on the ground." The Guards said they test-fired "advanced rockets" and used drones in the three-day exercises which were held in central and eastern Iran.

As tensions also mounted with Israel, a military analyst at Tasnim said that Iran-allied Hezbollah could use Iranian made Fateh 110 missiles to attack the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona from inside Lebanon.

Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah said last Thursday that his group, which played a major role in ending Israel's occupation of Lebanon, could strike Dimona.

"Since Lebanon's Hezbollah is one of the chief holders of the Fateh 110, this missile is one of main alternatives for targeting the Dimona installations," Hossein Dalirian said in a commentary carried by Tasnim.

Iran says its missile program is defensive and not linked to its 2015 nuclear deal with world powers. During the U.S. election race, Trump branded the accord "the worst deal ever negotiated", telling voters he would either rip it up or seek a better agreement.

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(Reporting by Dubai newsroom; Editing by Sami Aboudi and Alison Williams)

 

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http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/iran-russia-turkey-and-the-future-of-assads-syria

Iran, Russia, Turkey and the future of Assad’s Syria

Michael Young
February 22, 2017 Updated: February 23, 2017 09:08 AM

Related

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A story in Al Hayat newspaper on February 18 highlighted the convoluted nature of foreign interventions in Syria. The article noted that the United States was studying three plans for the takeover of Raqqa from ISIL. One of those plans was presented by Turkey, which does not want to see the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces entering the city.

However, limiting Turkey’s intentions in Syria to blocking the emergence of a Kurdish entity is short-sighted. Ankara is also angling for a role in a post-war Syria. Surprisingly, it seems to have been assisted in this by Russia, which sponsored the Astana negotiations with Turkey and Iran, and has been helping the Turkish military advance against ISIL in Al Bab.

Russian openness to participation by Turkey in a post-war arrangement derives from a realistic reading of Bashar Al Assad’s weaknesses. The Syrian president, in a statement last week, vowed to regain control over "every inch" of Syrian territory. However, there are not enough Syrian ground forces to do such a thing, nor is Mr Al Assad, given his regime’s terrible crimes, in a position to lead post-war reconciliation.

In that context, then, the Russians may have seen an opening to bring in Turkey and Iran to help shape a post-war situation that could better stabilise Syria. One issue it has discussed with both sides is the creation of a military council alongside a government of national accord, which would gather together government and opposition military commanders.

The true role of such a council remains a matter of speculation. A report in Al Araby Al Jadeed in July 2016 suggested that the idea was also discussed by the United States and Russia. While Mr Al Assad could see it as a mechanism to neutralise his foes and consolidate his control over the state, he must also be wary that it might render him redundant, while ensuring that his eventual exit does not undermine a post-war agreement.

Whatever the explanation, Mr Al Assad must view Russian collaboration with Turkey as inherently threatening. It brings Ankara into any political solution that the Syrian president today feels confident he should manage alone, given his regime’s decisive military gains in recent months.

But the Russians appear to be thinking beyond that. They realise that there are tens of thousands of armed men in the opposition who have to be brought under control, and they can see that for as long as Mr Al Assad is in power, it will be impossible to rebuild Syria. Both realities underline how difficult it will be to consolidate a post-war order under present circumstances, regardless of whether the opposition is defeated.

That is where Turkey’s role is vital. The Turks alone control the lifeline of many of the opposition groups, and even of powerful radical groups such as Jabhat Fatah Al Sham (formerly Jabhat Al Nusra), so their participation in a settlement is essential. Moreover, someone in the region has to be able to speak on behalf of Sunni interests in Syria, and Ankara alone, backed by the Arab Gulf states, has that capacity today.

That could be one reason why the Turkish military intervention in Syria last August may have been approved by the Russians, in exchange for Turkey’s withdrawal of a large number of opposition combatants from Aleppo and their redeployment to the border region. That move paved the way for Aleppo’s downfall, but it also brought the Turks into Syria, making inevitable their involvement in a political endgame.

All this indicates strongly that Syria may be heading towards a more decentralised system in the future. A return to the pre-2011 period is difficult to conceive today. If Turkey builds up its leverage in Syria, this is likely to be exercised mainly in zones of influence along the Turkish border, where Syrian refugees now in Turkey would be settled. It is almost fanciful to imagine that Mr Al Assad’s authority will stretch to these areas. That Russia seems to accept this is revealing in itself.

Nor does it appear that Iran would oppose such a step if its own interests are preserved in Syria, above all maintaining supply lines to Hizbollah in Lebanon. Mr Al Assad may have to accept that his power has been so diminished by his reliance on outside powers for his regime’s survival that his say in any final outcome in Syria will be relatively limited.

With the Russian, Iranian, and Turkish militaries on his soil, the Syrian president is hardly in an enviable position. His country will remain buffeted by foreign political agendas. This was brought home in a brutal way by the fact that the Astana negotiations were sponsored by Russia, Turkey and Iran, which largely drafted the final communiqué between themselves, while the Syrian participants were virtual bystanders.

Michael Young is a writer and editor in Beirut
On Twitter: @BeirutCalling

 

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http://in.reuters.com/article/mideast-crisis-syria-turkey-idINKBN1621HC

World News | Thu Feb 23, 2017 | 7:10pm IST

Turkey-backed forces seize control of centre of Syria's al-Bab - state media, rebels

By Humeyra Pamuk and John Davison | ISTANBUL/BEIRUT

Turkey-backed rebels have seized the centre of the town of al-Bab from Islamic State, Turkish state media and rebels officials said on Thursday, marking a likely breakthrough in Ankara's drive to wipe out the militant group in northern Syria.

Turkey launched its Syrian operation, dubbed "Operation Euphrates Shield", in August in an effort to push Islamic State from its border and stop the advance of a Syrian Kurdish militia.

Taking control of al-Bab, an Islamic State stronghold 30 km (20 miles) from the Turkish border, would deepen Turkish influence in an area of Syria where it has effectively created a buffer zone and would allow the Ankara-backed forces to press on towards Raqqa, Islamic State's de facto capital in Syria.

The Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighters, a loose coalition of Syrian Arabs and Turkmen, have been attacking al-Bab since December, aided by Turkish warplanes, tanks and special forces.

Turkey's state-run Anadolu Agency, citing its correspondent in al-Bab, said the rebels had seized control of the town centre and were now clearing mines and explosive devices laid by the jihadists. Some 1,900 square kilometres (734 square miles) in northern Syria has now been cleared of militant groups, it said.

"We had reached the city centre yesterday but there was a suicide attack so we had to withdraw a little bit. And today we attacked again. I can say that 85-90 percent of the city is under control," a fighter from the Sultan Murad Brigade who is in al-Bab told Reuters by telephone.

"They have dug tunnels all under Bab and those who have remained are all suicide bombers. The whole of the city is mined. I can say that every metre is mined."

Another fighter with an FSA group contacted via a social networking site said there was "complete calm" in al-Bab. The fighter said he was speaking from the city centre.

Turkish Defence Minister Fikri Isik told Anadolu the rebels had entered the town centre and that most of the town itself was now under their control.

However, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights monitoring group said that more than half of al-Bab was still under IS control, and that battles continued.
There was no immediate comment from the Turkish military.

STILL FIGHTING
Earlier, a Turkey-based rebel official from a group previously involved in fighting in Aleppo province said the rebels had taken control of al-Bab, although pockets of IS militants were still fighting.

"There has been cleaning up of the last remaining areas of (IS) control, and there were street battles," Zakaria Malahifji of the Fastaqim faction told Reuters, adding that all the strategic areas of the city had been captured.

Turkish officials have repeatedly said that the al-Bab operation was taking longer than anticipated because of numbers of civilians still in the town and the care being taken not to harm them. It dropped leaflets on the town as long ago as December urging civilians to seek shelter.

While Euphrates Shield has been largely focused so far on combating Islamic State, Ankara is also determined to prevent the Kurdish YPG militia, which it considers a terrorist group, from linking the cantons it controls along the Turkish border.

Turkey fears that advances by the YPG could enflame a Kurdish insurgency at home.
President Tayyip Erdogan has said the next target for the Turkish offensive should be Raqqa but that the YPG should not be involved.

(Additional reporting by Tom Perry; Writing by David Dolan; Editing by Daren Butler and Gareth Jones)

-

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BERLIN Germany's Social Democrats have overtaken Chancellor Angela Merkel's conservatives in an opinion poll by Infratest dimap for the first time since October 2006, with seven months to go before a federal election.

 

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https://www.usnews.com/news/world/a...to-rely-increasingly-on-non-nuclear-deterrent

Russia to Rely Increasingly on Non-nuclear Deterrent

Russia's defense minister says the development of the nation's nuclear forces will remain a top priority, but the military will rely increasingly on conventional weapons to deter any aggression.

Feb. 21, 2017, at 9:26 a.m.
By VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV, Associated Press

MOSCOW (AP) — Russia will continue to see the development of its nuclear forces as a top priority, but the military will rely increasingly on conventional weapons to deter any aggression, the Russian Defense Minister said Tuesday.

Sergei Shoigu said Tuesday that weapons such as the long-range Kalibr cruise missiles carried by navy ships, long-range cruise missiles carried by Russian strategic bombers and the land-based short-range Iskander missiles will play an increasingly important role as a non-nuclear deterrent. Those missiles can carry nuclear or conventional warheads.

Shoigu pointed to the new missiles' debut in the Syrian conflict, saying they have proven themselves well.

"The development of strategic nuclear forces will remain an unconditional priority," Shoigu said in remarks carried by Russian news agencies. "Russian nuclear weapons ensure the guaranteed deterrence of aggression by any foreign power."

At the same time, he added, "the role of nuclear weapons in deterring a potential aggressor will diminish, primarily thanks to the development of precision weapons."

Until recently, Russia lacked long-range cruise missiles with conventional warheads similar to those in the U.S. inventory.

The post-Soviet economic meltdown left the Russian armed forces in disarray, but the Kremlin has beefed up the military's conventional forces in recent years amid tensions with the West.

Speaking at a conference on security issues, Shoigu described China as a key strategic partner for Russia and noted that Moscow has signed a contract to provide China with anti-ship missiles. He didn't offer any details of the deal, which follows other recent contracts that envisage the delivery of top-of-the line S-400 air defense missiles and Su-35 fighter jets to China.

Shoigu criticized NATO for identifying Russia as a threat and deploying forces near its borders, but added that Russia remains open for a security dialogue with the alliance.

He described the global situation as increasingly unstable and accused the West of spreading chaos by supporting regime change in the Middle East and North Africa.

"International relations are becoming increasingly tense," he said, noting increased competition for mineral resources and control over their transportation routes.

Last month, Shoigu had a phone call with Libya's Field Marshal Khalifa Hifter, who visited the Russian aircraft carrier returning from a mission off Syria's coast. The visit marked the strongest sign yet of Russian support for Hifter, who is allied with an eastern-based parliament that is at odds with a Western-backed government in the capital, Tripoli.

Shoigu lashed back at British Defense Secretary Michael Fallon, who warned Russia against meddling in Libya and said that "we don't need the bear sticking his paws in."

"We don't think there is an animal in their zoo that could give orders to the bear," Shoigu parried.

 

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http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201702230017.html

Analysis: As China ups heat on North Korea, U.S. faces questions

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
February 23, 2017 at 12:15 JST

WASHINGTON--China's surprising suspension of North Korean coal imports puts pressure not only on Pyongyang, but also on U.S. President Donald Trump. The question for him: Should the United States respond with new North Korea negotiations?

Years of failed efforts to stem North Korea's nuclear and missile programs have followed a usual pattern. The United States seeks tougher action from China, the North's traditional ally. Beijing urges U.S. diplomatic engagement.

But China's move this weekend appears to change the dynamic, addressing the long-standing American demand, one Trump has vociferously repeated. If enforced, the loss of coal revenue could tighten the screws on leader Kim Jong Un after his government's acceleration of nuclear and missile tests this last year.

China rarely makes concessions for free and will want Trump to respond in kind.

"If China is squeezing North Korea, it is for one purpose and one purpose only: to offer a cooperative gesture to the incoming Trump administration in return for an initiative on negotiations," said Stephan Haggard, a North Korea expert at the University of California, San Diego.

Beijing indicated such a strategy was in play.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said the country wants parallel negotiations on nuclear matters and a formal peace treaty to replace the armistice ending the 1950-53 Korean War--a longstanding North Korean request. Washington has said the North's nuclear weapons program must be settled first.

Meanwhile, the newspaper of China's ruling Communist Party, Global Times, published a pair of editorials Wednesday calling for aid-for-disarmament talks to restart. They've been on ice since 2009.

Any breakthrough would almost surely require U.S.-Chinese cooperation. Kim has shown little interest in relinquishing his nation's nuclear deterrent as he closes in on a weapon capable of targeting mainland America, and Sino-American disputes over the best approach to dealing with the confounding North Korean leader have hamstrung international diplomatic efforts.

"We continue to urge China to exert its unique leverage as North Korea's largest trading partner to convince Pyongyang to return to serious talks on denuclearization," State Department spokeswoman Anna Richey-Allen said.

Trump has vowed to "deal with" North Korea, without saying how. His administration is conducting a broad-ranging policy review, including how to make sanctions bite. Negotiations haven't been ruled out, said a U.S. official, who wasn't authorized to discuss internal deliberations and demanded anonymity.

China's decision on coal could change the U.S. calculus. A second administration official described it as a potentially hopeful sign, though the United States was still gauging the significance.

North Korea's coal exports to China totaled $1.2 billion (136 billion yen) last year, according to Chinese customs, representing more than a third of the North's total export income.

Geng, the Chinese spokesman, explained China's decision by saying the coal imports this year already "approximated" a $400 million annual cap set by the U.N. Security Council.

But China has exploited loopholes in the past, raising questions about alternative motivations. These could include embarrassment over the apparent assassination of Kim Jong Nam, the North Korean leader's exiled, half-brother who was spending much of his time in China. Or, a pre-emptive effort to forestall a new U.S.-South Korean missile defense system.

Regardless of motive, "enforcement will be the key," said Joseph DeThomas, a former U.S. diplomat who advised the Obama administration on sanctions. DeThomas, now a professor at Pennsylvania State University, said China's suspension could cost Pyongyang hundreds of millions of dollars in much-needed hard currency.

But Troy Stangarone, senior director at the Washington-based Korea Economic Institute, questioned how significant the economic impact would be. Official Chinese figures don't account for services and illicit border trade between the countries, he said.

China has long resisted applying severe economic pressure on North Korea. While it opposes the North's pursuit of nuclear weapons, Beijing fears any policies that might lead to an influx of North Koreans into China or a U.S.-allied, unified Korea emerging on the Chinese border.

In any case, questions will now be asked of the Trump administration.

As a presidential candidate, Trump expressed a willingness to speak with Kim--a politically risky move given North Korea's history of reneging on past agreements. President Barack Obama refused to re-engage without a commitment from the North to pursue denuclearization, cranking up sanctions while waiting. The approach failed to stop Pyongyang's rapid advances in weapons development.

Trump will need to come up with a strategy soon. A high-profile North Korean defector reported that Kim wants to finish an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of hitting the U.S. mainland in the next year.

It's unclear what, if anything, Trump can offer Kim to bargain over a nuclear program he likely sees as essential to the survival of his totalitarian regime.

Stangarone said the question for Kim becomes this: "Can he weather whatever storm is coming and finish the program and make this fait accompli?"


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Cambodia jails land rights activist for 2-1/2 years February 23, 2017

 

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http://english.alarabiya.net/en/per...rea-A-future-nuclear-threat-to-the-world.html

PERSPECTIVE FEATURES

ANALYSIS: Is Iran’s collusion with North Korea a nuclear threat to the world?

By Tony Duheaume
Friday, 24 February 2017

With North Korean leader Kim Jung Un having announced the detonation of the DPRK’s fifth nuclear device on September 9, 2016, which was said to have been a miniaturized nuke capable of being fitted to a missile, it came close to a time when Iran had openly admitted that it was accelerating its missile development program, making both Iran’s and Korea’s programs to run almost parallel.

But as well as the detonation of a nuke, it also became apparent that a missile launched by North Korea toward Japan on 14 February, 2017, had a solid fuel engine, which in turn, made it fully road mobile, and much quicker to prepare for launch. The missile was also launched from a tractor-erector-launcher unit, which means it could be transported along roads or across rough terrain, and with it being driven to an undisclosed site, it would make it much harder for an enemy to detect.

At the same time, Kim Jung-Un also announced that by the end of 2017, his military will have tested a cruise missile that can reach the United States, and thus, with Iran’s program picking up momentum at the same pace as North Korea’s, it almost seems as though the two countries are in collusion with each other.

Considering the two nation’s statements came so close together, with both accelerating military programs which can cause mass devastation, it leaves a lot of speculation as to whether this is simply coincidental, or it had been planned well in advance. With so much talk about Iran having secret nukes in North Korea, the proof has always been there as far as the two countries past cooperation is concerned over each of their nuclear programs, and experience has shown; what North Korea has today, Iran has tomorrow, or visa versa.

Back to the 80s
North Korea has assisted the Iranian regime militarily since its early days in power. In 1981, when the Iranian’s opened a terrorist training camp at Manzarieh in northern Tehran, among the earliest trainers to arrive on site was a group of North Korean military personnel, and it was thanks to the brain washing techniques taught by these specialist trainers, Iran has been able to transform gullible recruits at its camps into lethal human bombs, and it went on to develop suicide terrorism into the lethal form of unconventional warfare we see today.

During the Iran/Iraq war, a conflict, which lasted from September 1980 to August 1988, Iran had taken a severe beating from the bombardment of Iraqi missiles raining down on its cities, and with the country being the subject of severe sanctions, arms were almost impossible to procure, and so its main missile supplier had been North Korea.

As hostilities intensified, in a war that eventually saw a body count of one million, North Korea found it impossible to keep pace with the supply of missiles needed by Iran for the battlefront. It was at this point, the Iranian regime came to realise its weaknesses in the air war, and was determined to build up its own missile capability, which would eventually lead to the regime achieving self-reliance through an indigenous production line.

It was in 1985, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who at the time head of Iran’s Parliament, signed an agreement to launch a cooperative missile and nuclear development program with North Korea, agreeing to fund the production of North Korea’s 300-kilometre-range Scud-B missiles, and also give financial support for its research and development program pursuing missile and nuclear technology, as well as the sharing of test data and weapons designs, which has continued throughout the decades.

During the 1990s, Iran and North Korea came together in the development of Iran’s Shahab medium range missile, which was almost identical to the North Korean Nodong, and had many of its components imported from North Korea. As the years went on, the two countries were said to have collaborated on many other missile systems, and together had produced Iran’s Shahab-3 and Shahab-4, and the longer Shahab-5 and Shahab-6.

Technology transfer
Then as far as the transfer of technology is concerned, the North Korean Hwasong-10, also known by the names BM-25 and Musudan, a mobile intermediate-range missile that was first on display during a military parade on October 2010, was seen to feature a triconic cone that was almost identical to that of Iran’s indigenously produced Ghadar-1.

But one thing that is really perturbing is how the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, and the North Korean leader, Kim Jung Un, share the same intense hatred of the USA. On top of this, they have pursued an illicit nuclear program for decades, through which they have often shared technology to help each other out, with the endgame of producing nuclear weapons, as well as missiles capable of carrying them, and they now seem to be intent on developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead to reach the shores of the United States.

Over the years, with the two countries having worked together in all fields of missile and nuclear technology, some reports suggest that in 2006, an Iranian team was present when North Korea successfully tested a bomb at a secret underground location, and that a group of Iranian scientists were invited to study the results of the blast, which could be useful preparation for Tehran’s possible testing of its own device at some point in the future.

With the aid of North Korea, Iran has acquired the largest and most diverse ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East, which makes the prospect of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon even scarier, and with the two countries having shared so much technology in the fields of both nuclear weapons and missile development, it makes it all the more conceivable that North Korea could well be testing a bomb for Iran.

But to add to the fear, with the North Koreans having already tested five devices, the first in October 2006, which had produced a one kiloton explosion, the second in May 2009 which produced a four kiloton blast, the third in February 2013 which produced a yield of four kilotons, and a fourth device on 6 January 2016, which North Korea announced to be its first successful testing of a hydrogen bomb, although the weapon was not large enough to be a thermonuclear device, it could well have involved some nuclear fusion, but whichever the case, it had been enough to alarm the international community.

Then on September 9, 2016, North Korea announced its fifth detonation, it had an estimated yield of 10-kilotons, which it was claimed to be that of a nuclear warhead, and could be mounted on a ballistic missile.

The atomic bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, had the yield of 15-kilitons, which meant that the North Koreans are fast on a path to meet this, and with its latest missile test on 12 Feb, 2017, having reached an altitude of 550 km (340 miles), and Kim Jung Un boasting that his military would have an ICBM by the end of 2017, and his further claim of being able to miniaturise a nuclear device, it has most definitely left Donald Trump with his first major headache as President of the United States.

Fissile material
It has been estimated that North Korea already has enough stocks of fissile material to construct at least twenty bombs, added to the fact that its boffins have the capacity to produce enough reserves of fissile material to produce in the region of six or seven WMDs a year, plus the fact that that the two regimes have been known to eagerly share each others technology, should either Kim Jung Un or his close trading partner Ali Khamenei end up being confronted by the U.S., they could in theory soon have an ICBM fitted with a nuclear device be ready to launch against it.

The Iran deal was no deterrent in stopping Iran from pursuing the test-firing of nuclear-capable missiles, as despite the regime denying its pursuit of nuclear weapons; it is still intent on developing missiles capable of carrying them.

Although the present missiles being tested are only presently able to strike short range, medium range, and intermediate-range targets, their long-term goal is to produce one with an intercontinental reach, which is close to fruition, and the Iran Deal has already given the regime billions of dollars to pursue this, as well as subsidise its impoverished partner to pursue its own nuclear agenda.

Last Update: Friday, 24 February 2017 KSA 11:10 - GMT 08:10