WAR 2-11-2017-to-02-17-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
(254) 1-21-2017-to-01-27-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...27-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(255) 1-28-2017-to-02-03-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...03-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(256) 2-04-2017-to-02-10-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...10-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

--------------------

Here we go again.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-sadr-protest-idUSKBN15Q0C1

WORLD NEWS | Sat Feb 11, 2017 | 6:17am EST

Iraq security forces fire tear gas at pro-Sadr protest near Green Zone

Iraqi security forces fired tear gas on Saturday at thousands of supporters of Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr demonstrating near the heavily fortified Green Zone - a cluster of embassies and government buildings - to press for reforms, witnesses said.

The protest organizers said about two dozen demonstrators had choked on the gas but no one was seriously injured or taken to hospital. Live TV footage showed young men running away as white smoke filled Tahrir Square in downtown Baghdad.

Thousands had gathered in the square to demand an overhaul of the commission that supervises elections ahead of a provincial vote due in September.

Riot police fired tear gas when they tried to move toward the Green Zone which also houses international organizations. Sadr's supporters stormed this district last year after violent clashes with security forces.

Sadr suspects that members of the electoral commission are loyal to his Shi'ite rival, former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, one of the closest allies of Iran in Iraq.

Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi called on the demonstrators to remain peaceful and to "abide by the law".

Sadr is openly hostile to American presence and policies in the Middle East and, at the same time, he has a troubled relationship with Iraqi political groups allied with Iran.

(Reporting by Kareem Raheem and Saif Hameed; Writing by Maher Chmaytelli; Editing by Louise Ireland)
 
Last edited:

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-china-idUSKBN15Q05P

WORLD NEWS | Sat Feb 11, 2017 | 1:34am EST

China gets an early win off Trump, but many battles remain

By Ben Blanchard | BEIJING
Combining public bluster with behind-the-scenes diplomacy, China wrested a concession from the United States as the two presidents spoke for the first time this week, but Beijing may not be able to derive much comfort from the win on U.S. policy toward Taiwan.

Several areas of disagreement between the superpowers, including currency, trade, the South China Sea and North Korea, were not mentioned in public statements on Thursday's telephone conversation between Presidents Xi Jinping and Donald Trump. In getting Trump to change course on the "one China" policy, Beijing may have overplayed its hand.

Trump had upset Beijing before he took office by taking a call from Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen, then casting doubt on the "one China" policy, under which Washington acknowledges the Chinese position that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of it.

Trump changed tack and agreed to honor the "one China" policy during the call, prompting jubilation in China. Beijing had been working on diplomatic ways to engage Trump's team and largely blaming Taiwan for stirring things up. [nL4N1FV21K]

Laying the foundation for that call had been the low-key engagement of China's former ambassador to Washington and top diplomat, the urbane and fluent English-speaking Yang Jiechi, with Trump's national security adviser Michael Flynn.

"China was pragmatic and patient. It made every effort to smooth out the relationship, and it paid off," said Jia Qingguo, dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, who has advised the government on foreign policy.

But China also made very clear Taiwan was not up for negotiation, unleashing state media to threaten war and punishment for U.S. firms if that bottom line was breached.

China has long described self-ruled Taiwan, claimed by Beijing as its sacred territory, as the most sensitive issue in Sino-U.S. relations.

Its military had become alarmed after the Trump-Tsai call and was considering strong measures to prevent the island from moving toward independence, sources with ties to senior military officers told Reuters in December. [nL4N1ES0VR]

A source familiar with China's thinking on relations with the United States, speaking to Reuters last month, said China had actually not been too bothered with Trump's Taiwan comments before he took office as he was not president then and was only expressing his personal view.

"If he continues with this once he becomes president then there's no saying what we'll do," the source said.

TSAI'S CHILLED HEART

Despite the U.S. concession, military tensions remain.

On Saturday, the overseas edition of the ruling Communist Party's People's Daily placed a picture on its front page of Chinese warships about to embark on a new round of drills in the South China Sea, right next to an upbeat commentary about the Xi-Trump call.

The paper's WeChat account took a harsher line, saying that with Trump getting back with the program on "one China", Taiwan had better watch out.

"The heart of that Madame Tsai on the other side of the Taiwan Strait must at this moment be chilled to the core," it said.

One senior Western diplomat said China had been redoubling its efforts to win over the Vatican, one of a handful of countries to retain official ties with Taiwan.

Taiwan says it hopes for continued U.S. support, and one ruling Democratic Progressive Party official told Reuters that the "one China" policy had not affected previous U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, even as U.S. presidents' commitment to the island have waxed and waned.


ALSO IN WORLD NEWS

U.S. expresses objection to Palestinian as U.N. envoy to Libya
China expels 32 South Korea missionaries amid missile defense tension


Xi has put great personal political capital into seeking a solution over Taiwan, an issue that has festered since 1949 when defeated Nationalist forces fled to the island after losing the civil war to the Communists. China has never renounced the use of force to bring Taiwan under its control.

But in its relations with Washington, the risk for Beijing remains that its diplomatic win over "one China" will be short lived, as Trump will not want to be seen as having caved in.

"What he's shown the Chinese is he's willing to touch the 'third rail' of U.S.-China relations," said Dean Cheng, China expert at the conservative Heritage Foundation in Washington.

"Beijing can't predict what he'll do next – and he's only been in office three weeks. What is he going to do on trade and other economic issues?"

U.S. officials said the affirmation of the "one China" policy was an effort to get the relationship back on track and moving forward. [nL1N1FV1RU]

But Trump's change of tack may be seen by Beijing as a climbdown, said Tom Rafferty, the China Regional Manager for the Economist Intelligence Unit.

"Mr Trump is erratic and will not appreciate the suggestion that he has been weak."

(Additional reporting by Michael Martina, and J.R. Wu in Taipei and Matt Spetalnick in Washington; Editing by Raju Gopalakrishnan)
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.eurasiareview.com/100220...t-pakistan-on-support-for-militants-analysis/

Trump Pressured To Confront Pakistan On Support For Militants – Analysis

BY JAMES M. DORSEY
FEBRUARY 10, 2017

Pressure on the Trump administration is mounting to adopt a tougher position towards Pakistani support of militants in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan itself. The pressure comes from a chorus of voices that include the US military, members of Congress from both sides of the aisle, and influential Washington-based think tanks.

The calls for a harder line were issued despite a Pakistani crackdown on militants in recent months that many see as half-hearted. It also comes days after China, at Pakistan’s behest, blocked the United Nations Security Council from listing a prominent Pakistani militant as a globally designated terrorist.

Pakistani officials hope that some of Mr. Trump’s key aides such as Defense Secretary James Mattis and national security advisor Michael Flynn, both of whom have had long standing dealings with Pakistan during their military careers, may act as buffers. They argue that the two men appreciate Pakistan’s problems and believe that trust between the United States and Pakistan needs to be rebuilt. Mr. Mattis argued in his Senate confirmation hearing that the United States needed to remain engaged with Pakistan

Pakistani media reported that Mr. Mattis had expressed support for the Pakistani military’s role in combatting terrorism during a 20-minute telephone conversation this week with newly appointed Pakistan Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa.

Military and Congressional support for a tougher approach was expressed this week in a US Armed Services Committee hearing on Afghanistan during which General John Nicholson, the commander of US forces in Afghanistan, noted that 20 of the 98 groups designated by the United States as well as “three violent, extremist organizations” operate in Afghanistan and Pakistan. “That is highest concentration of violent, extremist groups in the world,” Gen. Nicholson said.

In testimony to the committee, General Nicholson called for “a holistic review” of US relations with Pakistan, arguing that the Taliban and the Haqqani network had “no incentive to reconcile” as long as they enjoyed safe haven in Pakistan.

“External safe haven and support in Pakistan increases the cost to the United States in terms of lives, time, and money, and it advantages the enemy with the strategic initiative, allowing them to determine the pace and venue of conflict from sanctuary,” Gen. Nicholson said.

The general’s words were echoed by Committee chairpersons, Republican senator John McCain and his Democrat counterpart, Jack Reed.

“Success in Afghanistan will require a candid evaluation of our relationship with Pakistan… The fact remains that numerous terrorist groups remain active in Pakistan, attack its neighbours and kill US forces. Put simply: our mission in Afghanistan is immeasurably more difficult, if not impossible while our enemies retain a safe haven in Pakistan. These sanctuaries must be eliminated,” Mr. McCain said.

Mr. Reed added that “Pakistani support for extremist groups operating in Afghanistan must end if we and Afghanistan are to achieve necessary levels of security.”

The pronouncements in the committee hearing gave added significance to policy recommendations made by a group of prominent experts, including former Pakistan ambassador to the US Husain Haqqani and former CIA official and advisor to four US presidents Bruce Riedel, associated with among others The Heritage Foundation, the Hudson Institute, the Middle East Institute, the New America Foundation and Georgetown University.

“The U.S. must stop chasing the mirage of securing change in Pakistan’s strategic direction by giving it additional aid or military equipment. It must be acknowledged that Pakistan is unlikely to change its current policies through inducements alone. The U.S. must also recognize that its efforts over several decades to strengthen Pakistan militarily have only encouraged those elements in Pakistan that hope someday to wrest Kashmir from India through force. The Trump administration must be ready to adopt tougher measures toward Islamabad that involve taking risks in an effort to evoke different Pakistani responses,” the experts said in their report.

The experts suggested the Trump administration should wait a year with designating Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism while it takes steps to convince Pakistan to fundamentally alter its policies.

Such steps would include warning Pakistan that it could lose its status as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA); prioritizing engagement with Pakistan’s civilian leaders rather than with the military and intelligence services; imposing counterterrorism conditions on U.S. military aid and reimbursements to Pakistan; and establishing a sequence and timeline for specific actions Pakistan should take against militants responsible for attacks outside Pakistan.

There is little to suggest a reversal of policy in recent Pakistani measures to crackdown on militants including imposing house arrest on Muhammad Hafez Saeed and other leaders of Jama’at-ud-Dawa (JuD), widely viewed as a front for the proscribed group, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and the freezing of accounts of some 2,000 militants.

Apparently pre-warned that action may be taken against him, Mr. Saeed suggested during a press conference in Islamabad in mid-January that JuD may operate under a new name, a practice frequently adopted by militant groups with government acquiescence. Mr. Saeed said the new name was Tehreek-e-Azadi-e-Kashmir (Kashmir Freedom Movement). The Indian Express reported that JuD/LeT continued after Mr. Saeed’s house arrest to operate training camps in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir.

Various militants and analysts said the accounts targeted were not where funds were kept. Maulana Muhammad Ahmed Ludhyvani, a leader of the virulently anti-Shiite group, Ahle Sunnat Wal Juma’at, a successor of Sipah-e-Sabaha, said in an interview that there were a mere 500,000 rupees ($4,772) in his frozen account.

Persuading Pakistan to alter its ways is likely to prove no mean task. The government as well as the military and intelligence believe that the United States favours Indian dominance in the region and has allowed India to gain influence in Afghanistan. Gen. Nicholson went out of his way in his testimony to thank India for billions of dollars in aid it was granting Afghanistan. Many, particularly in the military and intelligence, see the militants as useful proxies against India.

More vexing is likely the fact that military and intelligence support for Saudi-like and at times Saudi-backed violent and non-violent groups with an ultra-conservative, religiously inspired world view has become part of the fabric of key branches of the state and the government as well as significant segments of society.

Cracking down on militants, particularly if it is seen to be on behest of the United States, could provoke as many problems as it offers solutions. Mounting pressure in Washington on the Trump administration amounts to the writing on the wall. Pakistani leaders are likely to be caught in a Catch-22.

The solution might lie in Beijing. Many in Pakistan have their hopes for economic development pinned on China’s planned $46 million investment in Pakistani infrastructure and energy. China, despite having so far shielded a Pakistani militant in the UN Security Council, is exerting pressure of its own on Pakistan to mend its ways. As a result, Pakistan is one area where China and the US could find common cause.

--

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

James M. Dorsey

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.defensenews.com/articles/us-beefing-up-red-sea-presence

US beefing up Red Sea presence

By: Christopher P. Cavas, February 11, 2017 (Photo Credit: MC2 John Herman, US Navy)
Comments 2

Washington — Responding to a growing number of dangerous incidents in waters around Yemen, the US Navy is expanding its presence in the Red Sea, especially around the Bab el Mandeb strait at the southern entrance to the waterway.

The destroyer Cole was tasked on Feb. 3 with patrolling in the region, days after a suicide boat attack by Yemeni Houthi rebels on the Saudi frigate Al Madinah off the port of Al Hudaydah killed two sailors on the warship. Two other suicide boats in the attack were driven off by gunfire.

Now, Pentagon sources say two more destroyers are likely to be stationed in the Red Sea, patrolling opposite ends of the 1,400-mile long body of water. A US assault ship also is staying in the region, carrying attack aircraft and Marines of the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit.

The destroyers could come from the George H. W. Bush carrier strike group, which was operating in the Mediterranean Sea as late as Feb. 10. The destroyers Laboon and Truxtun are part of the group, which left Norfolk Jan. 21 and is headed to the Central Command region in the Middle East on a regularly scheduled deployment. Whether or not directly associated with tensions in the region, the entire group needs to pass through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea to get to its eventual assigned operating areas.

The destroyers carry significant anti-air and anti-missile weapons as well as Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles.

For the record, the Pentagon would not confirm nor deny the movements. Christopher Sherwood, a Defense Department spokesman, would only say that, “the US Navy maintains a continuous combat-ready force within the Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea to protect the free-flow of commerce, reassure our allies and partners and deter acts of aggression against our forces and our partners.”

The waters around the Bab el Mandeb are quite familiar to US Navy warships, which have patrolled in the Gulf of Aden since about 2008 against Somali-based pirates. With rare exceptions, all US Navy warships transiting from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean and the Pacific pass through the strait, including aircraft carriers and submarines.

Ironically, it was at the strategic Yemini port of Aden on the Gulf of Aden where the Cole was famously attacked by an al-Qaeda suicide boat in October 2000. The destroyer nearly sank and the attack killed 17 sailors and wounded 39. It remains the deadliest attack on a US Navy ship by a terrorist group.

Saudi Arabia has been engaged in a hot war in Yemen since early 2015, supporting the Sunni government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi against Shia Houthi rebels led by former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and backed by Iran. The political situation is compounded by the presence of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), who hold about a quarter of Yemen’s mid-eastern section.

The country is in turmoil. According to a November report by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, more than 10,000 Yemenis have been killed in the civil war, and out of a total population of about 27 million, nearly 19 million are defined as being in need of humanitarian or protection assistance.

The conflict in Yemen’s western region, held by the Houthis, has been spreading to the sea as government forces have begun a series of offensives to retake seaports on the Red Sea. According to news reports, the Saudi-led coalition began an offensive Jan. 6 to drive the Houthis from the coast. As they have fled, Houthis reportedly have mined harbors with sea mines and shore facilities with land mines.

On Jan. 29, the US staged a raid in Yemen in an attempt to gather intelligence on AQAP activities. One US Navy SEAL was killed in the action, which turned into a bloody fire fight with multiple casualties on the ground and ended with the loss of an MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft. While it is not clear where the SEALs were staged from, the extracted SEAL Team Six reportedly was flown to the Makin Island, where the wounded sailor died.

President Trump termed the raid a “winning mission” that killed 14 al-Qaeda and garnered useful intelligence. Others criticized the action, with the New York Times reporting that “almost everything that could go wrong did.” There are conflicting reports as to whether or not the Yemeni government has withdrawn permission for US special forces to operate in the country.

Nevertheless, incidents in the Red Sea have visibly been on the rise. On Oct. 9, for the first time in history, a hostile surface-to-surface missile was fired at US Navy ships as three units were operating in the southern Red Sea. The destroyer Mason destroyed one of the missiles while another missed. Several other incidents reportedly had taken place in the days leading up to the direct missile attack.

On Oct. 13, the destroyer Nitze retaliated and launched Tomahawk cruise missiles against three coastal radar sites in Houthi-controlled territory.

Earlier, on Oct. 1, Houthi forces carried out a devastating missile attack on an aluminum ferry operated by the United Arab Emirates. The vessel, once operated by the US Navy as the high speed vessel Swift, had to be abandoned and was largely burned out.

Security agencies also report a growing number of attacks on merchant ships in the region by small boats firing rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons.

While the Pentagon declined to respond directly to queries for this story, Defense Department spokesman Capt. Jeff Davis told Stars and Stripes on Feb. 4 that the stationing of the Cole in the Red Sea was “for no other reason than to respond to Bab el Mandeb incidents.”

“When we see things like what happened to the Saudi frigate earlier this week take place it gives us great pause," Davis told Stars and Stripes. "This is on top of other things we've seen -- to include the well-known missile attempts against U.S. ships last fall -- we've seen evidence that the Houthis are laying mines in the waters outside at least one of their ports. We officially have great concern for the freedom of navigation there.”

The region around the Bab el Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden is full of international naval and military activity. The European Union has maintained regular patrols against Somali-based pirates in the Gulf of Aden since late 2008, using warships from Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, the Ukraine and the United Kingdom. China, Russia and Iran have maintained their own anti-piracy patrols, and China is building a small base in Djibouti to support the operations.

The US-led multi-national naval partnership of the Combined Maritime Forces provides two major operating elements around the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150) is responsible for maritime security and counter-terrorism, while CTF 151 is tasked with counter-piracy. Another unit, CTF 152, handles security operations in the Persian Gulf. There are 31 member nations in the CMF.

A number of nations, including the US, have military activities of various sizes in Djibouti, on the western side of the Bab el Mandeb across from Yemen. US Marine forces aboard deployed amphibious ready groups – including the ARG centered on the Makin Island – routinely exercise in and around Djibouti.

Saudi Arabia is reported as in the final stages of an agreement with Djibouti to establish a base there, and Arab media report that the United Arab Emirates, a key ally of Saudi Arabia in the anti-Houthi conflict, is building a military base at the Red Sea port of Assab in Eritrea.

James Pothecary, an analyst with Allan & Associates, writing in November for the Center for International Maritime Security, noted that “any concerted naval action in the area will face determined resistance. Unlike the Somali pirates of the late 2000s, Houthi fighters are ideologically motivated, trained, battle-hardened, and well-armed. Moreover, they have freedom of movement in areas of south-western Yemen under their control.

“While international naval power, supported by air power and special forces, will likely be able to contain the threat, full elimination of Houthi capability is an unrealistic objective without substantially more committed resourcing,” Pothecary wrote for CIMSEC.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.voanews.com/a/commander-...-pakistani-influence-afghanistan/3719579.html

US Commander Warns of Russian, Iranian, Pakistani Influence in Afghanistan

February 11, 2017 5:10 PM
Paul Alexander

WASHINGTON — The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan says Russia, Pakistan and Iran are pursuing their own agendas with regard to the fragile country, complicating the fight against terrorism and extremism.

"We're concerned about outside actors," General John Nicholson told VOA's Afghan service in an interview.

Russia, which had an ill-fated intervention into Afghanistan that started in 1979 and ended nearly a decade later, has been trying to exert influence in the region again and has set up six-country peace talks next week that are excluding the United States. Nicholson worries about Russia's links with the Taliban.

"Russia has been legitimizing the Taliban and supporting the Taliban," he said. "Meanwhile, the Taliban supports terrorists. I'm very sorry to see Russia supporting the Taliban and narcoterrorism."

Moscow denies that it provides aid to the Taliban and says its contacts with the group are aimed at encouraging them to enter peace talks.

Taliban role in peace efforts

Despite the Taliban's history of violence and extremism, Nicholson didn't rule out a role for the Taliban in the peace process, saying there were elements in the group that appeared to be more pragmatic about the country's prospects for peace.

"Many of its leaders see a better life for all Afghans," he said.

Meanwhile, he said Iran appeared to be supporting extremists in western Afghanistan.

"But the situation is more complex than with Russia," Nicholson said. "There needs to be a relationship" between Afghanistan and Iran, which have seen a resurgence in trade that has partially compensated for a decline in Afghan economic activity with Pakistan.

President Donald Trump's new administration has made a flurry of contacts with top Afghan and Pakistani officials in recent days as it formulates a new policy in the region. That clearly involves pressure on Islamabad to do more to crack down on terrorist groups that hide out near the Afghan border in Pakistan's volatile tribal areas.

"We want cooperation from Pakistan against all terrorists," Nicholson said. "We must have pressure on external sanctuaries in Pakistan."

Rooting out terrorists would help ease Pakistan's concerns about further attacks on its turf that are seen by many as a penalty for the country's support for the U.S. war on terrorism, he said.

"We all hope for a change in Pakistani behavior," Nicholson said. "This is in Pakistan's interest."

Congressional appearance

The general spoke shortly after appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday, where he said he needed "a few thousand" more soldiers to bolster the 8,400 U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

Nicholson told VOA that the extra troops would serve as advisers, extending that role from the core of the Afghan military down to the brigade level to help the country's troops in what he called a "very, very tough fight" to foster peace.

"The enemy is trying to seize cities," he said. "It's a new dimension to the fight."

The Afghan military has suffered heavy losses as a result. More than 6,700 of its soldiers were killed last year through November 12, according to a quarterly report from the U.S. government's Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, up from 6,600 for all of 2015.

Nicholson discounted recent figures that indicated the Taliban has gained more territory this year and now holds about 15 percent of the land, saying it was the result of a revised Afghan government strategy to focus on protecting urban areas.

"This was a wise decision by the government," he said, adding that it had provided greater protection for most of the people. "There's a difference between territory and population. Many areas are sparsely populated."

Propaganda war

U.S.-led forces also have been losing ground in the propaganda war waged by the Taliban and the 20 terrorist groups that operate in Afghanistan, who aggressively use social media, often with false reports that put the international mission in a bad light, Nicholson said.

He sought advice from VOA journalists on the best ways to counter the extremists' message and recruitment efforts, saying "the enemy" was doing a better job than the government and its allies at reaching the Afghan people. "We're trying to be more proactive in communications," he said.

The U.S. has been in Afghanistan for more than 15 years and has committed to at least four more years. But Nicholson said even though the internal fight is currently at a "stalemate," the battle is worthwhile. He added that he did see a peaceful future for the country.

"I believe it will end well for the Afghan people," he said. "Our Afghan brothers and sisters are worth our support."
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Well here's a real DOT....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.defensenews.com/articles/short-range-air-defense-making-fast-comeback

Short-range air defense making a fast comeback

By: Jen Judson, February 10, 2017 (Photo Credit: Staff Sgt. Kevin Pickering / South Carolina National Guard)

WASHINGTON -- After identifying Short-Range Air Defense as a critical gap, particularly in Europe, the Army is moving at lightning speed to bring the neglected capability back to the forefront of the battlefield.

The National Commission on the Future of the Army released a report to Congress last year that determined the Army had an “unacceptable modernization shortfall” in SHORAD capability. And the Army’s European theater commander told Defense News last summer that one of his main priorities was to boost SHORAD capability to deter an intrusive Russia.


Defense News
US Army Grapples With Short-Range Air Defense Gap in Europe

The new Army Space and Missile Defense Command commander, Lt. Gen. James Dickinson, said during an Association of the US Army missile defense conference in Arlington, Virginia, on Tuesday that the goal is to field SHORAD capability to Europe in fiscal year 2018.

The Army made headway in a review wrapped up last year that looked at possible SHORAD weapons from around the world in order to fill the critical gap in Europe.

At Eurosatory in Paris last June, then-Army Acquisition Chief Katrina McFarland called it an “international scrub” of every technology in the world that addresses the concern. And she added the Army is also working to address the gap in its own military labs, developing a launcher than can shoot a wide variety of missiles -- appropriately dubbed the Multi-Mission Launcher.


Defense News
US Army’s Multi-Mission Launcher Defeats Cruise Missile, UAS Threat

The MML will be integrated into the Indirect Fire Protection Capability that is being designed to defeat UAS, rockets, artillery and mortars and cruise missiles, but the weapon is still years away from prime time.

Col. Greg Brady, the fires division chief for Training and Doctrine Command at Army headquarters, said at the AUSA event that the service in 2004 had 26 battalions with SHORAD capabilities. Now the Army has nine. Of those nine battalions, seven are resident in the Army National Guard while two are still with the active force.

“In the end, there are four Avenger batteries in the active component,” Brady said, while the Army is expecting to fight in the future in highly contested and congested environments against adversaries with fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, an abundance of UAS, and other threats where a SHORAD capability will be vital.

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq -- that posed different threats to the warfighter -- caused the Army to focus and prioritize other weapon systems, letting SHORAD capabilities fall by the wayside.

Col. Doug White, a TRADOC capabilities manager for the Air Defense Artillery Brigade, C-UAS and now SHORAD, explained the Army is focused on fielding quickly to Europe, but is also developing the future of the capability.

The service wants "fixed" and "semi-fixed" assets that defend critical combat enablers for the armed maneuver forces and also wants capability resident within the maneuvering force, he said.

Avenger is still a capable system, White said, and, for example, defends the National Capital Region. Other interim capabilities will continue to be used until IFPC is fielded. Sentinel has been around for years, White said, and there are plans in the works to develop a future Sentinel radar in the mid-2020s.

The SHORAD systems in the future will need to be highly expeditionary and easily integrated with other systems on a networked battlefield. The service also wants to eventually bring in low-cost interceptors and game-changing capability still in the early phases of development like directed energy, steerable rounds and high-powered microwave technology, White said.

Hoping for additional support, the Army included more money for SHORAD in a supplemental requirements wish list for fiscal year 2017 prepared for the new administration.


Defense News
Diverting From Norm, Army Sends Hill 2017-2018 Wish Lists

The list asks for $1.3 billion to pay for modifications to the Patriot Air and Missile Defense System, procures Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missiles, accelerates Stinger air-defense system modifications and a service life extension program and also would fund modifications of the Army’s Avenger SHORAD systems.

A list of what the Army needs to fill its more critical capability gaps in 2018 includes another $1 billion boost in terms of upgrades to SHORAD and Patriot missiles and radars. The money would also go toward Stinger man-portable air-defense system upgrades and procurement.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
In the WTF!?!? column....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/10...ary-contractor-syria-russia-malhama-tactical/

The Blackwater of Jihad

A consortium of elite, well-paid fighters from across the former Soviet Union are training jihadis in Syria. Their business model could go global.

BY RAO KOMAR, CHRISTIAN BORYS, ERIC WOODS
FEBRUARY 10, 2017

Heavily armed and expertly kitted with body armor and ballistic helmets, the men can be seen defending bunkers, storming buildings, and even posing by whiteboards giving tactical lessons. Though the titles of these YouTube videos are written in Russian Cyrillic, their background music is an a cappella Islamic chant known as a nasheed, which is often used by extremist groups in propaganda films. But the men are no ordinary jihadis. They are members of Malhama Tactical, the world’s first jihadi private military contractor (PMC) and consulting firm.

Malhama Tactical isn’t an enormous military conglomerate like the infamous Blackwater (now named Academi). It consists of 10 well-trained fighters from Uzbekistan and the restive Muslim-majority republics of the Russian Caucasus. But size isn’t everything in military consulting, especially in the era of social media. Malhama promotes its battles across online platforms, and the relentless marketing has paid off: The outfit’s fighting prowess and training programs are renowned among jihadis in Syria and their admirers elsewhere. It helps that until now the group has specialized its services, focusing on overthrowing Bashar al-Assad’s regime and replacing it with a strict Islamic government.

The group’s leader is a 24-year-old from Uzbekistan who goes by the name Abu Rofiq (an Arabic pseudonym that means father of Rofiq). Little is known about him other than that he cycles through personal social media accounts rapidly, using fake names and false information to throw off surveillance efforts. In virtually every video and photo posted online, he wears a scarf or balaclava to cover his face from the nose down, leaving visible only his narrow dark eyes and long, somewhat tangled, pitch-black hair. He speaks fluent Russian, but with a slight Uzbek accent.

READ MORE

Trump’s Syria strategy would be a disaster.
CLICK HERE
The women who could save Mosul
CLICK HERE

Since launching in May 2016, Malhama has grown to do brisk business in Syria, having been contracted to fight, and provide training and other battlefield consulting, alongside groups like the al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly known as the Nusra Front) and the Turkistan Islamic Party, a Uighur extremist group from China’s restive Xinjiang province. And despite recent rebel setbacks in Syria, including the loss of Aleppo, demand for Malhama Tactical’s services in the country is as strong as ever, Abu Rofiq told Foreign Policy in an interview conducted over the messaging app Telegram.

But he is also beginning to think about expanding elsewhere. His group is willing to take work, Abu Rofiq says, wherever Sunni Muslims are oppressed. He cites China and Myanmar as places that would benefit from jihad. He also suggests that Malhama Tactical might go back to its roots, returning to fight in the North Caucasus against the Russian government.

In November, the group placed job ads on Facebook looking for instructors with combat experience to join the group. The ad described the outfit as a “fun and friendly team” looking for recruits who are willing to “constantly engage, develop, and learn” and work with Jabhat Fateh al-Sham. It even specified that instructors were privy to benefits like vacation time and one day off a week from jihad. The wording was more befitting of a Fortune 500 company than a group of extremists fighting in a brutal and bloody war. Jihad went global long before Malhama Tactical, but rarely with so entrepreneurial a spirit.

Although Malhama Tactical is the first PMC to work exclusively for extremist groups, it’s hardly the first foreign PMC to enter the Syrian battlefield. The Syrian war has now lasted for nearly six years and cost the lives of more than 400,000 men, women, and children. And amid the chaos of groups like the Islamic State, the left-wing Kurdish People’s Protection Units, and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham vying for territory and influence, the Syrian front has also been a boon for military contractors, who have found work fighting on both sides of the war.

The first iteration of PMCs in Syria was the Slavonic Corps, an ill-fated, Hong Kong-registered company comprising ex-Russian military that briefly worked alongside government forces in 2013, according to a report by the Interpreter magazine. But it quickly became clear that they did not have the full support of the Syrian government. First, the Syrian army stole their vehicles, then their paychecks never arrived, and finally a Syrian air force helicopter crashed into the Slavonic Corps convoy after flying too low and running into power lines, injuring one mercenary. The Slavonic Corps’ misadventures came to an end when the group disbanded after a defeat by rebels in the desert near the city of Sukhnah in southern Syria in October 2013. The mercenaries returned home to Moscow and were promptly arrested by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) for their unsanctioned Syrian intervention.

Following the Kremlin’s own intervention in Syria in September 2015, nearly 1,500 Russian mercenaries arrived from the “Wagner” group, an infamous and secretive Russian PMC that previously fought alongside Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine, according to an investigation by Sky News. Their mission was to assist the Assad regime, and unlike the Slavonic Corps, Wagner enjoys extensive support from the Russian government. Dmitry Utkin, a former special forces brigade commander of Russia’s military intelligence service, allegedly leads the group. Although little is known about Wagner, it’s believed that it mimics Academi’s model by operating as an elite infantry unit and relies on the Russian government for support, even flying into Syria on board official military aircraft and training at a Russian special forces base in Molkino in southwestern Russia. Wagner remains in Syria to this day.

READ MORE

The meeting that led to the creation of ISIS.
CLICK HERE
The greatest divorce in the Jihadi world
CLICK HERE

At the same time, a litany of Russian-speaking fighters have fought alongside jihadi groups waging war against the Syrian government. According to the Soufan Group, there are at least 4,700 foreign fighters from the former Soviet Union in Syria, the majority of whom come from the Russian republics of Chechnya and Dagestan. These fighters typically arrive in Syria better equipped and trained than local militants and with years of experience fighting the Russian government in the mountains of Chechnya and Dagestan during the 1990s and 2000s.

These battle-hardened fighters quickly earned respect from local militants, who noticed the Russian speakers took on a much higher death rate than local fighters. They came to populate the ranks of both the Islamic State and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, as well as various smaller groups, where locals refer to them as inghimasi, a term used among jihadis to refer to fighters who plunge into enemy front lines to inflict the maximum amount of casualties with no plan of returning alive. The archetypal inghimasi fights until he runs out of ammunition before detonating his suicide vest as his position is overrun.

But while many of their compatriots have become front-line shock troops, the former Soviet fighters of Malhama Tactical go a different way, carving out their own distinct niche between the worlds of professional PMCs and jihadi groups operating in Syria. They function as consultants, arms dealers, and, on occasion, elite warriors.

Malhama’s elite status makes sense against the background of Abu Rofiq’s own military career. Abu Rofiq told FP that he had moved as a young man from Uzbekistan to Russia, where, in addition to starting a family, he joined one of the Russian government’s most elite military units, a group of airborne troops known as the VDV. In 2013, Abu Rofiq left Russia for Syria, where rather than joining one faction, like most foreign fighters do, he remained independent and moved between them, before founding Malhama in 2016.

Throughout 2016, Malhama Tactical’s units trained the hard-line Islamist rebel group Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham in urban combat to help their fight against the Syrian regime in Aleppo. In one video, trainees practice firing multiple rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) rounds and work as squads to assault a building. In another, a two-man team clears rooms and eliminates targets using grenades and gunfire, all under the watchful eye of Malhama instructors.

This type of training isn’t cheap — the RPG rounds Malhama uses in its practice sessions are estimated to cost around $800 each on the black market — which is why military training for most rebel and jihadi groups in Syria has tended to consist of little more than marching, acrobatics, and basic marksmanship. But for jihadi groups that can afford it, Malhama Tactical’s infantry training is worth the expense. One European military contractor who spoke on the condition of anonymity acknowledged that the group’s tactical skills would provide it, and whomever it trains, a distinct advantage on the Syrian battlefield.

Malhama Tactical’s operators have, on occasion, also acted as special forces for different jihadi groups. In September 2016, they embedded with the Turkistan Islamic Party to help it repulse an Assad regime attack in southern Aleppo, according to a rebel activist source familiar with the group. However, Abu Rofiq says his outfit’s primary goal is to train other rebel and jihadi groups in combat, rather than fight on the front lines. Abu Rofiq admitted that Malhama also produces equipment for other jihadi groups as needed. Malhama, for example, manufactures accessories for the PKM, an extremely popular Russian-made 7.62 mm machine gun. The vests and grips, widely used in Aleppo during the intense fighting there, have become especially sought after among jihadis.

Malhama Tactical also takes its social media presence very seriously. The group advertises its services through Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and the Russian social media site VKontakte, although the group’s account has been suspended. Its Instagram feed has the feel of something produced by a major corporate gun manufacturer. It features artsy, filtered photos of weapons and fighters taken from multiple angles, interspersed between various high-quality Malhama logo designs. With more than 208,160 views on YouTube, Malhama has a large reach, especially for its size. By comparison, the Free Syrian Army al-Moutasem Brigade, which is 50 times larger and half a year older, has just over 110,000 YouTube views. Everyone from rebels in Syria to Ukrainian soldiers and Russian separatists in Donetsk has commented on the group’s posts.

READ MORE

Central Asia’s autocrats welcome the age of Trump.
CLICK HERE
How to stop a martyr
CLICK HERE

Malhama’s YouTube and Facebook pages also showcase free online guides for jihadis, covering improvised grenade construction, weapon cleaning, room clearing, and urban combat, among other skills. The group’s instructors organize online training sessions — on subjects including battlefield first aid; the use of weapons, such as RPG-7s; hand signal systems for urban combat; and introductions on how to conduct ambushes — when in-person assistance and consulting is not possible.

Although Malhama Tactical charges for its services, Abu Rofiq insists he isn’t a mercenary. He says his group’s motivation transcends money. “Our goal is different; we are fighting for an idea,” he said — namely, jihad against Assad.

“We’ll see a lot more of this activity going forward in the decades to come,” said Sean McFate, an associate professor at the National Defense University and author of The Modern Mercenary, a book about private armies. For McFate, the growth of Malhama Tactical is a natural offshoot of the prolonged Syrian war, but the outfit’s mixture of extremist ideology with the privatization of war is a unique and troubling trend. “A jihadi group doing this is a new level because if you’re talking about hardcore idealists paying for [military training], then that’s a milestone of modern warfare,” McFate said.

Abu Rofiq’s leadership has also brought him unwanted attention from the Russian government, which views him as a major terrorism threat. On Feb. 7, Russian airstrikes flattened Abu Rofiq’s apartment in Idlib, killing his wife, infant son, and several other civilians. Despite initial reports to the contrary, a local source confirmed that the airstrikes missed Abu Rofiq entirely. He had exited his apartment just moments before to help casualties from another nearby bombing.

In either case, Abu Rofiq’s jihadi PMC model has already had a significant effect on battles in northern Syria and could soon inspire copycat organizations outside the Middle East. Even if Abu Rofiq is killed and Malhama Tactical is destroyed, he’s already shaken up the war against Assad — and maybe even the future of the global military-industrial complex.

Neil Hauer, lead analyst for the SecDev Group in Ottawa, Canada, contributed to this report.

Top Image Credit: Malhama Tactical Vkontakte page/Foreign Policy illustration

Rao Komar is a Middle East/Eurasia analyst and an Arabic Flagship Scholar at the University of Texas at Austin. @RaoKomar747 on Twitter.

Christian Borys is a Canadian journalist based in Eastern Europe who has covered the war in Ukraine and worked with the BBC, Al Jazeera, VICE and others. Follow him on Twitter: @ItsBorys

Eric Woods is a contributor at the investigative journalism outlet Bellingcat and a researcher focusing on non-state actors and weapons proliferation. Follow him on Twitter: @AnotherWarBlog
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/trump-and-one-china-two-phone-calls-many-interpretations/

Trump and 'One China': Two Phone Calls, Many Interpretations

After the phone call with Xi Jinping, the Trump administration needs to imbue its Taiwan policy with strategic clarity.

By Joseph Bosco
February 11, 2017

When the democratically-elected president of the United States, Donald J. Trump, accepted a congratulatory telephone call from the democratically-elected president of Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen, it generated shock waves throughout the Asian governmental and scholarly communities.

All agreed it was a dramatic departure from four decades of the United States’ official non-recognition and partial isolation of the island that both the China’s Communist leaders and the people of Taiwan consider their own.

But opinions varied wildly on two questions: (a) whether it was a one-off, minor slip-up by a new administration as yet unschooled in the diplomatic etiquette of U.S.-China relations, or a harbinger of fundamental U.S. policy re-assessment; and (b) whether it was a good thing or a bad thing.

The call was quickly followed by a presidential tweet responding to concerns that the U.S. One China policy was being upended: “I fully understand the ‘one China’ policy, but I don’t know why we have to be bound by a ‘one China’ policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade.”

That seemed to point in the direction of substantial policy shift and naturally stirred the waters even more (including by some worried Taiwan would be seen as “a bargaining chip” for other U.S. concerns). The sense of policy turbulence was reinforced by statements from secretaries-designate Mattis (Defense) and Tillerson (State) indicating a more robust U.S. response to aggressive Chinese actions in the South China Sea.

Various official and unofficial statements from Beijing warned the new administration that U.S.-China relations would be dangerously destabilized if these policy expressions remained uncorrected. Many American experts amplified those warnings.

Chinese President Xi Jinping reportedly refused to speak on the telephone until Trump reaffirmed the One China formulation. It was done and the call took place, but that raised a set of new questions and concerns.

For example, what is not known from either the White House or Chinese accounts is whether any other concessions were made by either side to facilitate the accommodation.

Did Xi agree to back off China’s aggressive island-building, militarization, and harassment in the South China Sea? Did he acknowledge China’s enabling of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile program and pledge to press Pyongyang to reverse them?

Also unknown is whether the two leaders differentiated between China’s One China principle and the United States’ One China policy. The former says Taiwan is part of one China; the latter acknowledges that China (and some Taiwanese) says that, but Washington neither agrees nor disagrees, as long as the issue is settled peacefully and with the consent of the Taiwanese people.

Beijing ignores the last two tenets of American policy as buttressed by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, making Taiwan’s security and way of life a matter of U.S. national interest. Instead, it simply arrogates the U.S. position as identical to its own so that when Americans say One China policy, Beijing chooses to hear only the echo of its One China principle.

Further, it has reinforced the seriousness of its non-peaceful option by deploying 1,600 ballistic missiles targeting Taiwan and enacting in 2005 its Anti Secession Law, formally declaring the right to attack Taiwan under various scenarios, including Taiwan’s simply continuing the status quo of de facto independence.

As a master of communications, President Trump is uniquely qualified to set China straight on what America means by its policy based on a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. He can remove the ambiguity by also discarding another dangerous ambiguity over what the U.S. would do in case of a Chinese attack on Taiwan.

He could do no better than by repeating the words once uttered by another American president known for his straight talk, George W. Bush; that America will do “whatever it takes” to defend Taiwan—only this time, the statement will not be walked back.

Such strategic clarity will imbue the two presidential phone calls—with Xi and Tsai—with a much-needed strategic coherence.

Joseph A. Bosco is a member of the U.S.-China task force at the Center for the National Interest and a nonresident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He previously served as China country desk officer in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 2005-2006.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/ar...ts-implications-for-counter-terrorism-efforts

“Remote Controlled” Terrorism and its Implications for Counter-Terrorism Efforts

by Michael Tierney
Journal Article | February 11, 2017 - 2:02am

Introduction

In 2009, Miles Kahler published Networked Politics: Agency, Power, and Governance. His work proved highly impactful in the fields of political science and international relations, as he defined the ways in which various non-state actors interact in the global political system to exercise influence and power. Of utmost interest for security scholars was his chapter on illicit networks, such as terrorist and organized crime groups, because it illustrated the ways in which these groups shift their structure and operations to elude law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and the state.

As an example, Kahler introduced the case of al-Qaeda, which was a tightly controlled, hierarchical organization prior to 2001. While the al-Qaeda brand consisted of several terrorist groups located across Asia and Africa, they mostly deferred to Osama bin Laden and what came to be known as al-Qaeda Central, or AQC, until the international community intervened in Afghanistan in an effort to destroy bin Laden’s command and control infrastructure in 2001.

Over time, the group’s structure became increasingly ‘flat,’ with regional groups operating under local commanders taking general guidance from the remnants of AQC, but prioritizing regional goals and activities over broad, international objectives. Eventually, bin Laden was killed in the now famous Abbottabad raid, which further impacted the hierarchy of the al-Qaeda brand. In many instances, “homegrown” violent extremists were called upon to hit the ‘far enemy’ (e.g., the United States, Canada, and Europe), while affiliates, such as Boko Haram, continued more organized local efforts against the ‘near enemy’ (e.g., so-called ‘un-Islamic’ regimes centred in Asia and Africa).

New Trend: “Remote Controlled” Terrorism

Until recently, the model developed by Kahler had more or less remained the same when considered across a variety of terrorist organizations and other illicit networks. Upon the strategic bombing campaign across Syria and Iraq, coupled with military training exercises and attempts at travel and financial constraints placed upon the Islamic State, the group’s leaders called on its followers abroad to stay home and conduct attacks there accordingly, instead of travelling abroad to join the Islamic State proper.

Yet, recent investigations have shown that there may not simply be two sides of the coin when it comes to the Islamic State’s structural and operational efforts. Unlike groups before, it would appear that Islamic State recruiters and leaders residing in Syria and Iraq are now directing attacks in the West, India, and East Asia via “homegrown” extremists. Called “remoted controlled” attacks rather than “directed” or “inspired,” which were the terms used to denote attacks plotted by an organized group or generally called for by the group’s leadership, these operations seem to be planned, equipped, and carried out via electronic means.

Using apps such as Telegram and Pidgin, ISIS proper members are able to guide recruits located abroad throughout their attack plotting phase. The homegrown extremists are generally still radicalized in the same fashion, by watching videos and discussing content with other extremists online, but are directed to establish cells and procure materiel, while being given religious guidance all the same in their country of origin. In some cases, it would seem that recruiters are even able to set up weapons purchases and establish targets remotely, using dead drops and the internet. Further, funds can be sent via wire payments to pay for materials, rather than for travel as was the case previously.

What Can Be Done?

Fortunately, there are some opportunities for counter-terrorism officials. For starters, it is prescient to note that the conductors of remote control attacks are mostly amateurs. There are numerous stories about these individuals botching their own attacks, in some cases even doing themselves more harm than those around them. It would seem as though many of these attackers require constant contact and guidance from their handlers in the Middle East, with many getting cold feet along the way. This lengthens the window of time in which law enforcement and intelligence personnel have to work to identify the extremist, observe their activities, and ultimately prevent their attacks.

Further, the ongoing and fairly robust contact between handler and recruit provides security personnel with an advantage in the wider counter-terrorism struggle. By effectively monitoring and analyzing a remote control attacker’s behaviour and connections, intelligence analysts are better equipped to track wider networks and find vulnerabilities in their operations. Effective counter-terrorism strategies might include interviews with would-be attackers, likely after a de-escalation strategy has been implemented, to reveal contacts, phone numbers, online identifications, and instructions given by the recruiter to advance counter-terrorism policies worldwide. The information might lead to other prevented attacks, and further constraints placed upon the central terrorist organization.

While the remote controlled tactic now implemented by groups such as the Islamic State presents a new type of threat, there are likely many advantages which can be gained due to this phenomenon moving ahead. Compared to lone wolf extremism, there are actually many more opportunities for counter-terrorism agencies than previously thought. What is required now is an effective analysis of the new terrorism paradigm, and discussion surrounding the most productive ways to combat this new trend. Remote controlled terrorism may seem shocking at first, but the very nature of its organization makes it vulnerable in the end.

About the Author

Michael Tierney holds an M.A. in Political Science from the University of Waterloo. He is currently working as a Senior Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Investigator, and has held previous positions researching security, terrorism, and public safety in Canada.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://breakingdefense.com/2017/02/414-ships-no-lcs-mitres-alternative-navy/

414 Ships, No LCS: MITRE’s Alternative Navy

By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR.
on February 10, 2017 at 4:47 PM
242 Comments

WASHINGTON: The Navy needs a vastly larger fleet — 414 warships — to win a great-power war, well above today’s 274 ships or even the Navy’s unfunded plan for 355, the think-tank MITRE calculates in a congressionally-chartered study. That ideal fleet would include:

14 aircraft carriers instead of today’s 11;
160 cruisers and destroyers instead of 84;
72 attack submarines instead of today’s 52;
New classes ranging from a missile-packed “magazine ship,” to diesel-powered submarines, to a heavy frigate to replace the Littoral Combat Ship, which would be cancelled.
All told, the MITRE plan is even more radical than the competing plan submitted to Congress by the Center for Strategic & Budgetary Assessments. Although both studies would grow the fleet, upgrade the America-class amphibious assault ship into a conventionally powered light carrier, cancel LCS, and build a new frigate, MITRE calls for a larger force overall and more new types of ship. Senate Armed Services chairman John McCain finds both alternatives “impressive” but favors the CSBA scheme.

[Read our detailed analysis of McCain’s favored plan, the CSBA proposal]

The High-Low Mix

Building a 414-ship fleet “is unrealistic,” MITRE acknowledges, even assuming the Budget Control Act is repealed. So the study lays out what MITRE considers a good-enough plan to build and upgrade as many ships as possible for an additional $4.5 billion a year ($1.7 billion in shipbuilding funds and $2.8 billion for new weapons, mostly missiles).

This good-enough plan includes many compromises. Most notably, it slows down the production of aircraft carriers in the near term — even though MITRE believes we ultimately need more — because the Navy doesn’t have enough fighter jets to equip them all, and an aircraft carrier without aircraft is pretty pointless. To close the airpower gap, MITRE advocates buying more F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, since it believes “accelerating F-35C (Joint Strike Fighter) production does not appear to be a viable option.”

More broadly, and similarly to CSBA, MITRE argues against today’s reliance on a small number of exquisitely expensive long-range missiles for anti-aircraft and missile defense. Instead MITRE advocates large barrages of precision-guided shells fired from conventional naval cannon — known as the Hyper-Velocity Projectile — and ultimately from electromagnetic railguns. Fielding HVP “must be a top priority” because it would turn the 5″ guns on every Navy cruiser and destroyer into missile defense systems.

In general, unlike CSBA, MITRE explicitly calls for a “high-low mix” with a smaller number of high-end warships supplemented by a larger force of cheaper, less capable vessels. Most of MITRE’s proposed new types fall in the relatively “low” end:

  • The magazine ship or MG(X), similar to the 1990s concept of an arsenal ship, would be a low-cost hull — derived from a commercial or military transport — that’s packed with missiles. Weapons would include both new kinds of cruise missiles and a new ballistic missile based on the Army’s 1980s-era Pershing (but without the nuclear warhead). The MG(X) might also carry HVP-firing cannon. These ships would provide backup to conventional warships, which have better sensors but less capacity for munitions.
  • Diesel-powered attack submarines are far more common worldwide than nuclear ones, even among our First World allies, and with modern Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) — which eliminates the need for snorkeling — they can be highly stealthy, while still costing a fraction of the price of a nuclear sub. MITRE wants to keep building the nuclear-powered Virginia class at two a year, but would also supplement those boats with cheaper diesel subs.
  • The Navy currently plans to replace its aging LSD-class amphibious ships with a scaled-down version of its San Antonio-class LPD amphibs, to be called L(X)R. MITRE argues for economizing much further, replacing each planned L(XR) with either about six small Expeditionary Fast Transports — catamarans formerly called JHSVs — or three modified Watson-class transports.
  • MITRE’s new frigate, however, would be larger and more capable than the LCS it replaces, with a 5″ gun (firing HVP) and sufficient sensor and missile capacity to conduct air and missile defense over a wide area, instead of only being able to protect itself. MITRE proposes Germany’s new F125 frigates as a model.

Until the new frigate comes online, MITRE would funnel funds saved by canceling LCS into building more destroyers. In fact, MITRE’s ideal fleet would nearly double the current force of 84 “Large Surface Combatants” — destroyers and cruisers — to 160, compared to 104 in the Navy’s 355-ship plan and just 74 in CSBA’s proposal.

CSBA, by contrast, sees cruisers as increasingly redundant and relies heavily on highly capable frigates, 71 of them compared to MITRE’s 46 or the Navy plan’s 52. CSBA also calls for a new fleet of 40 corvettes and also emphasizes even-small unmanned craft more strongly than MITRE. Despite the real differences between MITRE and CSBA, however, both strongly concur on the need for a more powerful small warship than LCS, a frigate able to help defend the fleet against swarms of incoming anti-ship missiles.

The MITRE study doesn’t get as enthusiastic an endorsement from Sen. McCain as does CSBA’s. Nevertheless, its striking ideas will make a major contribution to the naval debate.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/th...e-island-military-bases-the-south-china-19399

THE BUZZ

What Makes China's Fake Island Military Bases in the South China Sea So Dangerous[1]

Take them out, risk World War III?

Kyle Mizokami[2]
February 12, 2017

In recent years the People’s Republic of China has laid claim to ninety percent of the South China Sea, buttressing this claim by creating artificial islands with dredging equipment. These claims run roughshod over Beijing’s neighbors, which have competing claims. The discovery in 2016 that China had militarized these artificial islands was not exactly surprising, but just how useful are these islands in defense of China’s strategic goals?

China’s campaign to militarize the South China Sea began in 2009, when it submitted a new map to the United Nations showing the now-infamous “Nine-Dash Line”—a series of boundary dashes over the South China Sea that it claimed demarcated Chinese territory. Since then, China has expanded at least seven reefs and islets in the sea with sand dredged from the ocean floor, including Subi Reef, Mischief Reef, Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef, Gaven Reef, Fiery Cross Reef and Cuarteron Reef.

According to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative [3], Beijing has created more 3,200 acres of new land. China initially claimed its “territory” was being developed for peaceful purposes, from aid to mariners to scientific research, yet many of the islands now feature military-length airfields, antiaircraft and antimissile guns [4], and naval guns. Cuarteron Reef now has a new High Frequency early-warning radar facility [5] for detecting incoming aircraft, a development difficult to square with a peaceful mission. Farther north, but still in disputed territory, China has installed HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missiles on Woody Island.

On the face of it, China’s territorial grab and apparent turn away from former leader Hu Jintao’s concept of “peaceful rise” is hard to understand. It has alienated China’s neighbors and drawn in other powers, including the United States, India and Japan. One theory is that the country’s leadership may have calculated that securing a bastion for China’s sea-based nuclear deterrent may be worth the diplomatic fallout it created.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union’s ballistic-missile submarines operated from two protective “bastions,” on the Atlantic side in the Barents Sea, and on the Pacific side in the Sea of Okhotsk. There, Soviet missile submarines could be covered by land-based air and naval forces to them from enemy aircraft, ships and attack submarines.

China’s nuclear “dyad” of land- and sea-based missiles relies in part on four Jin-class ballistic-missile submarines. China believes American ballistic-missile defenses threaten to undermine the credibility of its modest nuclear deterrent. In the Chinese view, this makes a protective bastion even more important.

The country’s geography leaves it with basically one ocean, the Pacific, for its own bastion. The Northern Pacific, with the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet and the nearly fifty destroyers of the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force, is a no-go. The South China Sea, on the other hand, is bordered by a number of relatively weak states that could not pose a threat to China’s nuclear-missile submarines.

Sailing ships and flying aircraft through the South China Sea is one thing, but a permanent presence on the ground solidifies China’s hold on the region. It also allows, as the case of the HF radar on Cuarteron Reef demonstrates, the installation of a permanent sensor network.

The ports and airfields under construction will almost certainly grow to defend the region, with help from the mainland, from a complex antisubmarine warfare campaign designed to go after China’s seagoing nuclear weapons.

More surface-to-air missile batteries such as the HQ-9 and land-based antiship missiles are likely, if only to protect other military installations such as airfields and radar systems. Recent freedom-of-navigation operations by the United States and its allies will be used as a justification for heavier defenses. To paraphrase an old saying about bureaucracy, the military presence is growing to meet the needs of the growing military presence.

This points to the Achilles’ heel of China’s island garrisons: in the long run, they are impossible to defend. Unlike ships, the islands are fixed in place and will never move. Small islands cannot stockpile enough troops, surface-to-air missiles, food, water and electrical capacity to remain viable defensive outposts. As Iwo Jima and Okinawa demonstrated, there is no viable defense in depth for islands even miles across.

In any military confrontation with the United States, China’s at-sea outposts would almost certainly be quickly rolled back by waves of airstrikes and cruise missile attacks, devastating People’s Liberation Army facilities and stranding the personnel manning them. How China would respond to such an attack on its nuclear bastion is an open question that should be given serious consideration, as victory in the South China Sea may not herald the end of a campaign but a dangerous new turn in the war itself.

China’s military outposts in the South China Sea are a breach of Beijing’s agreement to not militarize the sea. Although the region itself has great strategic value, they are a poor defensive solution, prone to rapid destruction in wartime. China would be wise to consider the islands only as a temporary solution, until the People’s Liberation Army Navy has enough hulls to maintain a permanent presence in the region.

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009, he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami [6].

Image [7]: An F/A-18E Super Hornet refuels. Flickr/U.S. Navy

Tags
South China Sea [8]China [9]China Island Building [10]defense [11]World [12]Military [13]Technology [14]
Topics
Security [15]
Regions
Asia [16]
Source URL (retrieved on February 13, 2017): http://nationalinterest.org/blog/th...e-island-military-bases-the-south-china-19399
Links:
[1] http://nationalinterest.org/blog/th...e-island-military-bases-the-south-china-19399
[2] http://nationalinterest.org/profile/kyle-mizokami
[3] https://amti.csis.org/
[4] https://amti.csis.org/chinas-new-spratly-island-defenses/
[5] http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/cuarteron-reefs-new-radar-the-china-coast-guards-best-new-toy/
[6] https://twitter.com/KyleMizokami?ref_src=twsrc^google|twcamp^serp|twgr^author
[7] https://www.flickr.com/photos/usnavy/5866433862
[8] http://nationalinterest.org/tag/south-china-sea
[9] http://nationalinterest.org/tag/china
[10] http://nationalinterest.org/tag/china-island-building
[11] http://nationalinterest.org/tag/defense
[12] http://nationalinterest.org/tag/world
[13] http://nationalinterest.org/tag/military
[14] http://nationalinterest.org/tag/technology
[15] http://nationalinterest.org/topic/security
[16] http://nationalinterest.org/region/aisa
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/the-double-edged-legacy-of-obamawar/

THE DOUBLE-EDGED LEGACY OF OBAMAWAR

RACHEL TECOTT
FEBRUARY 9, 2017

From Obamacare to Keystone, President Trump and the Republican-controlled Congress have demonstrated their commitment to reversing President Obama’s domestic legacy. But the latest U.S. drone strikes in Yemen, as well as the ill-fated raid on an al-Qaeda compound, are the first signs that the Trump administration will likely continue Obamawar — Obama’s primary foreign policy innovation and his most consequential legacy as commander-in-chief.

In his first term, Obama’s foreign policy record was punctuated by the failed surge in Afghanistan and the poorly planned ouster of Qaddafi. But in his second term, the 44th commander-in-chief found his footing. Contrary to claims that Obama lacked a coherent logic to guide foreign policy and the application of force, Obama’s use of force in his second term stuck to a clear and consistent pattern.

The Roots and Nature of Obamawar

Obamawar narrowed the use of American military force from counterinsurgency to counterterrorism and focused on disrupting and degrading terrorist networks that threatened the West. Obama didn’t get there right away. Early in his first term, he surged troops into Afghanistan in an effort to quell the insurgency and build functioning governance (textbook counterinsurgency), as his predecessor did in Iraq in the chaos after Saddam’s ouster. And despite his previous misgivings with regime change, founded in opposition to Bush’s removal of Saddam, Obama authorized a humanitarian intervention in Libya that quickly evolved into a military campaign to topple Qaddafi.

But Obama came to consider the ouster of Qaddafi his greatest foreign policy mistake. And even as he authorized the surge into Afghanistan, the President did so with the recognition that an open-ended campaign was unsustainable and ultimately disproportionate to American interests there. In his second term, Obama refused to use force to stop the fighting in Syria or to topple Assad, or to scale up America’s commitment in Afghanistan. Instead, he restricted American force in these theaters to pummeling ISIL in northern Syria, and al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s border regions. Quietly, he also sent additional American military personnel back to Iraq to help with the fight against ISIL. The goal of Obamawar is, simply and unambitiously, counterterrorism.

In keeping with the counterterrorism goal, the targets of Obamawar were non-state actors based in the greater Middle East, South Asia, and Africa resolved to attack the West. Except for his 2011 blunder in Libya, Obama did not target state actors with American force, despite the fact that at various moments over the course of his terms, the governments of Iran and especially Syria were enticing targets.

Obamawar’s most distinctive characteristic was its light-footprint method, which combined two features: precision strikes from the air and special operations forces on the ground. The drone program started during the Bush administration, but the number of precision strikes rose dramatically under Obama, becoming the hallmark feature of Obamawar. Since January 2009, U.S. manned and unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) have attacked terrorist targets in “untraditional” theaters including Pakistan, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Somalia. Exact numbers remain classified, but the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, the most comprehensive (least bad) publisher of drone data, indicates that the United States has launched hundreds of precision strikes against terrorist targets in these jurisdictions.

The second feature of Obamawar’s light-footprint method is the deployment of special operations forces around the world on historic proportions. These forces provide a variety of services, ranging from direct action and “advise and assist” to counseling on health care oragricultural reform, to passing out soccer balls inscribed with anti-jihadi messages. The role of special operations forces has helped to blur the distinction “between war and not-war.” The light-footprint method contrasts with the large numbers of “boots on the ground” required for more ambitious, counterinsurgency operations.

That is Obamawar. Its goal is strictly and narrowly counterterrorism — not counterinsurgency or regime change. Obamawar’s targets are terrorist organizations — not governments. And Obamawar’s method is light-footprint precision strikes from the air and special operators on the ground — not large numbers of infantry, or “boots on the ground.” Obamawar is narrow in goal, target, and method.

Obamawar: The Implications

Though narrow in goal, target, and method, when it comes to space and time, Obamawar is as expansive as it gets. Obama took the counterterrorism fight to new targets in new jurisdictions. He surpassed Bush and all other contenders as America’s longest wartime president, with no end in sight.

Obamawar is a double-edged innovation. For one thing, Obamawar has countervailing humanitarian implications: It is unclear whether precision technology spares lives (through precise targeting) or whether the gradual expansion of Obamawar in time and space will eventually lead to more civilian deaths. Separately, and perhaps most importantly, Obamawar’s low visibility has eroded the remaining public and congressional checks on executive warmaking. Some might celebrate an executive branch insulated against the whims of public opinion and a dysfunctional congress. But checks and balances are there for good reason, even checks on executive warmaking, and complete concentration of warmaking authority inside the Oval Office is worrisome even with the very best president at the helm — to say nothing of the very worst.

The Humanitarian Question

The precision of Obamawar has conflicting implications for collateral damage. Precision munitions minimize collateral damage associated with each strike, making the war on terror for the past eight years one of the most “humane” wars ever fought. Advances in precision and surveillance technology enabled American servicemembers to drop missiles on targets with “near certainty” that there would be no collateral damage. Hundreds (estimates vary widely) of civilians have died in American drone strikes. They die due to mistaken identities, malfunctioning weapons, or predetermined “proportionate” collateral damage. Though the data on civilian deaths is poor, one thing is clear — conventional invasions and occupations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, or World War II style aerial bombing, kill civilians at dramatically higher rates. This is the humanitarian argument for Obamawar, and one that Obama cited in every major counterterrorism address.

But there are reasons to contest the humanitarian argument for light-footprint warfare: it rests on a straw man counterfactual. Precision strikes only spare lives if the alternative is, as Obama argued, conventional force. But in many theaters, the more probable alternative to precision strikes more closely resembles inaction than conventional force. It is difficult to believe, for instance, that the United States would deploy large numbers of American ground troops to the Arabian Peninsula or East Africa if the precision strike option were off the table. The threats posed by al-Qaeda in Yemen and al-Shabaab are simply not big enough to justify such costly action. The relatively low cost (in American blood and treasure) of precision technology enabled Obamawar to expand the fight into more theaters, and at least in those theaters, to kill more people (including civilians) than otherwise possible.

Precision technology allowed Obamawar to expand the counterterrorism war not only in geographic space, but also in time. The United States can sustain low-cost, low-visibility precision strikes indefinitely. Though discreet, conventional operations might result in large numbers of deaths in a given time window. Precision strike campaigns that continue indefinitely may, eventually, kill more people (combatants and civilians) than conventional alternatives.

Erosion of Checks on the Executive

Perhaps the most consequential legacy of Obamawar is the concentration of warmaking authority inside the Oval Office. Because of low American casualties, low collateral damage, and low media coverage, the American people are only vaguely aware of America’s use of force and the ever-expanding, longest-running war in American history. And low-visibility, like precision, is a double-edged sword. Low-visibility enables the executive branch to continue to implement the war with minimal public or congressional interference. A public that barely sees the fight and does not carry its weight in blood won’t oppose it in the polls or hold the executive accountable in elections.

As for congressional authorization, Obamawar relies on the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) as the domestic legal grounds for attacking an ever-growing list of targets. The text of the AUMF implied congressional authorization for military force against only the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The Obama administration, however, developed an expansive interpretation, ultimately claiming that additional congressional authorization would not be needed for adding new targets to counterterrorism hit lists (e.g. al-Shabaab and ISIL). Congress was not a meek victim of executive overreach — it was complicit in the erosion of its own warmaking power. In response to Obama’s repeated requests, Congress repeatedly “refused to take a vote” to repeal the outdated AUMF and to issue new new authorizations tailored to specific organizations. Regardless of which branch is to blame and why, the fact is that the erosion of congressional power to authorize American force is a defining feature of Obamawar. And the erosion of the congressional authorization check is especially significant given that congressional oversight of American war-making has long been on the decline and judicial deference to the executive on the rise. The authorization check was just about the only check left.

An unchecked commander-in-chief may ultimately prove Obama’s most enduring and consequential legacy.

An insulated executive branch could theoretically be a good thing. After all, the executive branch, with its career experts and large budget, is, as Cass Sunstein points out, the most knowledgeable branch, and the branch rightfully entrusted with the authority to implement America’s wars. “When members of Congress see incompetence or wrongdoing, or call for someone’s resignation, they might be right, but they might also have no idea what they are talking about. They are also unaware of that fact.” If public and congressional intrusion hurts more than it helps, low-visibility may be the most positive legacy of Obamawar.

But low-visibility and the erosion of public and congressional checks on executive war-making (which did not begin with Obama but certainly accelerated over the past eight years) have concerning implications.

On pure separation of powers grounds, liberal interpretations of the 2001 AUMF have eroded Congress’ constitutionally designated role as the war authorizing branch.

But, robust checks on executive war-making are more than democratic ends in themselves — they are also important because the executive branch left to its own devices sometimes gets things wrong. For one thing, despite diversity of opinions and deliberations within the executive branch, at the end of the day, everyone works for the same person — the president. There is reason to believe that this group will be relatively like-minded, and issues circulated solely within the executive may weather insufficiently diverse scrutiny. In addition, people who work for the president may be inclined to please, and produce “happy talk” instead of accurate. Third, an un-interrogated executive branch can build policies based more on inertia than rigorous reevaluation.

Pathologies within the executive branch may be especially pernicious when it comes to the development of the precision strike counterterrorism strategy. Targeted killing has been enormously satisfying for defense and intelligence agencies long starved for countable markers of success in counterinsurgencies, and tactical effectiveness can heavily skew estimations of strategic effectiveness. Wars fail when tactics drive strategy. The development of a precision strike approach to counterterrorism may also have been driven by other a-strategic motivations including: the Obama administration’s determination to avoid “quagmire,” interest in appearing tough on terror, and the timing of advances in precision technology.

For these reasons, a counterterrorism strategy designed by even the most expert, well-intentioned executive branch should be accountable to the public, the congress, and in certain cases the judiciary.

And, of course the executive branch will not always be staffed with the most expert, well-intentioned executive servants. As James Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 10, “Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.” An unwise or immoral executive branch with unchecked war-making authority is an ominous development.

Looking Ahead

President Trump has already begun to build on Obamawar, and is likely to expand the war to new targets, into new theaters, and over the duration of his term(s). He can expand the target list, change the targeting criteria, or increase the number of strikes and theaters without congressional authorization, without notifying the American public, and without the threat of ex-post judicial review. He can reduce the granularity of strike information he provides to congressional oversight committees, and reduce disclosures to the public, and neither the congress nor the American people are likely to push back.

Thanks to light-footprint’s trademark precision, American casualties and collateral damage associated with each strike will likely remain low. But with precision comes low-visibility, and with low-visibility comes unchecked executive authority. With unchecked executive authority, it is difficult to imagine how the long war will end. And with unchecked executive authority in the hands of a most unenlightened statesman, the long war will not just get longer, wider, and likely crueler — it may ultimately jeopardize American security.


Rachel Tecott is a PhD student in political science at MIT. She studies strategy and decision-making in inter- and intrastate war. Find her on Twitter @racheltecott.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
North Korea fires off ballistic missile towards East Sea (Sea of Japan)
Started by Lilbitsnana‎, 02-11-2017 04:12 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...listic-missile-towards-East-Sea-(Sea-of-Japan)

------

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.ecns.cn/military/2017/02-13/245098.shtml

Military

S Korea confirms DPRK's development of new mobile IRBM

1 2017-02-13 13:37
Xinhua Editor: Gu Liping

South Korea's military on Monday confirmed the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)'s development of a new road-mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) based on a technology of submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

An unnamed official of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) held a separate press briefing, saying that what was test-fired by the DPRK was a new solid fuel-powered IRBM based on SLBM technology, according to local media reports.

The DPRK test-launched a ballistic missile, which it called Pukguksong-2, from the country's western region early Sunday. It flew east towards the East Sea for 500 km after blasting off at an altitude of 550 km.

Following the launch, the JCS said Sunday that it could be an advanced version of intermediate-range Musudan ballistic missile, which soared as high as 1,413.6 km and traveled 500 km during the June 22 test-flight.

The Seoul military changed the Sunday assessment, saying top DPRK leader Kim Jong Un probably instructed the development of a longer-range ground-based missile based on technology of the SLBM, which was test-launched in August last year.

The new DPRK missile was fired from a crawler-type mobile launcher, and the South Korean military put its range at anything between those of SLBM and Musudan missiles.

The DPRK-owned SLBM is believed to have a range of 2,000-2,500 km, with the estimation of Musudan range put at 3,000-3,500 km. The Pukguksong-2 may have a range of 2,500-3,000 km.

Musudan can put the entire of South Korea and Japan as well as U.S. military base in Guam in its target range.

Related news
DPRK claims successful test firing of medium-long range ballistic missile2017-02-13
DPRK test-fires 1st ballistic missile since U.S. President Trump takes office2017-02-12
Top diplomats of S Korea, U.S. hold phone talks to discuss alliance, DPRK issues2017-02-07
S Korea, U.S., Japan to hold joint maritime drills against DPRK missiles 2017-01-20
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://in.reuters.com/article/india-kashmir-unrest-kulgam-idINKBN15S0AS

ASIA | Mon Feb 13, 2017 | 9:03am IST

Seven killed in militant battle in Kashmir

By Fayaz Bukhari | SRINAGAR
Four militants and two Indian soldiers were among seven people killed in a gun battle in Kashmir on Sunday, a police spokesman said, the latest sign of increasing tension in the Himalayan region disputed by nuclear-armed neighbours India and Pakistan.

Militants opened fire on army troops in the village of Prisal south of Srinagar, the summer capital of Jammu and Kashmir, S.P. Pani, the deputy inspector general of police, told Reuters.

"Two army men, four militants, and a civilian, the house owner, were killed in the gun battle," Pani added, referring to the building where the militants had holed up.

Three soldiers were injured in the exchange of fire.

The army seized four weapons from the site of the encounter in the village, which security forces had cordoned off, army spokesman Rajesh Kalia said.

India has blamed Pakistan for stoking violence in Kashmir by supplying fighters and material across the border, but Pakistan has denied these charges.

The violence peaked last year after Burhan Wani, a 22-year-old separatist leader who enjoyed widespread support in the Muslim-majority region, was shot dead by Indian security forces in July.

Last month, three roadbuilding workers were killed after unidentified militants attacked a camp housing them, police said.

(Writing by Zeba Siddiqui; Editing by Clarence Fernandez)
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://fox13now.com/2017/02/12/violence-erupts-at-protests-over-alleged-police-rape-in-paris-suburb/

Violence erupts at protests over alleged police rape in Paris suburb

POSTED 3:59 PM, FEBRUARY 12, 2017, BY CNN WIRE
By Kimberly Hutcherson and Eliza Mackintosh

(CNN) — The mayor of a town in suburban Paris appealed for calm Sunday after demonstrations over the alleged rape of a young man by police turned violent.

More than 2,000 people marched Saturday in Bobigny, a suburban town nearly six miles (9.2 kilometers) northeast of the French capital. They chanted and carried signs demanding justice for a 22-year-old man who says he was sodomized by a police officer’s baton.

The demonstrations turned violent when a few hundred protesters broke away from the march and began rioting, police said. They smashed windows, set cars and trash cans on fire and attacked law enforcement personnel, who responded by firing tear gas into the crowd.

No one was injured but 37 people were arrested, police said. Several vehicles were set on fire, including a media van for European broadcaster RTL.

At least two local businesses were vandalized, including a supermarket that was also looted. A bus station was also damaged.

The working-class area has been rocked by several days of sometimes violent demonstrations after four police officers purportedly assaulted the young man February 2 at a housing estate in the northern Paris suburb of Aulnay-sous-Bois.

The man, who is black and identified only as Théo, had injuries severe enough to require surgery. The incident has reignited racial tensions between police and immigrant communities in the poorer neighborhoods surrounding Paris, which have occasionally erupted in violence over the past decade.

All four officers involved in the incident have been charged with aggravated assault, while one was also charged with rape, according to the Interior Ministry.

The officers have been suspended pending an inquiry into accusations that they used excessive force.

‘It was as if my body had given up on me’

Théo told French television channel BFM that he was walking with his headphones on when he was approached by the police.

“When I realized how violent their tone was, I said to myself, ‘they seem pretty serious.’ So I stood against the wall, and then one of the policemen beat me,” said Théo, adding that the officer then violated him with a baton.

“As soon as he did that, I fell on my belly. I felt weak. It was as if my body had given up on me. Then they handcuffed me.”

‘Justice for Théo’

People on social media have been sharing images of the young man along with the hashtag #JusticePourTheo.

On February 7, French President Francois Hollande visited Théo at the suburban hospital where he has been treated. In a photo shared by Hollande on Twitter, the President is seen standing at Théo’s bedside. In the tweet that accompanied the photo, Hollande said Théo “reacted with dignity.”

Théo told BFM he has faith in the French justice system and asked that protests remain peaceful.

“I call to calm my city because I love it very much,” he said from his hospital bed. “Violence is not the way to support me. Justice will do its job.”

A fun-loving soccer fanatic

Friends have described Théo as a fun-loving person and a soccer fanatic who plays at the Institute of Private Football in Aulnay-sous-Bois.

“He is a sociable person who loves to laugh with everyone,” said a man who gave his name only as Hicham, who has played soccer with Théo.

That athleticism runs in the family. Théo’s sister, Aurélie, is a professional handball player on Le Havre AC, a French women’s club.

In an interview with BFM, Aurélie said Théo’s doctors aren’t certain about the long-term impact of his injuries.

CNN’s Ben Marcus and Eliza MacIntosh contributed to this story.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://38north.org/2017/02/yuns020917/

Uncertain Futures: China, Trump and the Two Koreas

By Yun Sun
09 February 2017

China waving flagAt the beginning of the Trump administration, the situation on the Korean peninsula is highly uncertain and potentially volatile. During a late January research trip to Beijing, “uncertainty” and “concerns” were the keywords that best characterized how Chinese scholars and officials are feeling about Trump and the two Koreas. During his presidential campaign, Trump suggested that he would be willing to negotiate with North Korea directly. However, that scenario has become more uncertain in recent months, especially given the hawkish instincts of President Trump and his national security team. Chinese analysts nonetheless expect the US to enlist Beijing’s support on the North Korea issue and are anxiously waiting for Washington to engage so that China can bargain for its preferred outcomes. The prolonged silence from the administration is making Beijing increasingly uncertain and uncomfortable, and complicating its plans to reduce the threat that the United States and its network of alliances in Northeast Asia poses to Chinese security and strategic influence.

Between 2013 and 2016, China tested an alternative alignment strategy on the Korean peninsula. Frustrated with North Korea’s brinkmanship continuously damaging Chinese security interests, President Xi Jinping placed his hope on South Korean President Park Geun-hye to improve China’s strategic position. At the heart of this scheme was an effort to turn South Korea into China’s “pivotal” state in Northeast Asia, thereby undermining the US alliance system in the region and diminishing its threat to China. As a result of Sino-ROK rapprochement, senior-level visits soared, bilateral economic ties strengthened and many South Koreans questioned the utility and future of the US-ROK alliance. In an ideal scenario, China’s new realignment strategy would defeat the US-orchestrated “Northeast Asia NATO” based on America’s alliances with Japan and Korea, and counter the US-Japan alliance with an alignment between China and both Koreas. From the Chinese point of view, this would not only reduce China’s vulnerability vis-à-vis the US, but also lay a firm foundation for Chinese regional predominance.

However, events after the fourth North Korean nuclear test in January 2016 entirely derailed China’s scheme. Overestimating its presumed influence over Seoul, Beijing refused to adequately address South Korea’s legitimate security concerns, which eventually led to Seoul’s decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. China sees the THAAD deployment as a threat to strategic stability with the United States and an obstacle to its desired regional blueprint. As such, Chinese policy toward the Korean peninsula has evolved significantly in the last year, reflecting the realization that undermining the US-ROK alliance and turning South Korea into a Chinese strategic asset were both improbable in the near future and raising the prospect that Beijing might not have a choice between the two Koreas after all.

Nonetheless, while China’s ambitious efforts to transform geopolitical alignments on the Korean peninsula did not come to fruition, it still has two other key priorities. First, Beijing has not completely given up its efforts to defeat the THAAD deployment. At a minimum, it hopes that a victory for progressive forces in the upcoming South Korean presidential election, such as the Minjoo Party, could alter Seoul’s deployment plans for the system. While acknowledging that a complete reversal of the deployment decision is unlikely, Beijing hopes that a new South Korean government might delay the initial deployment or reduce the number of deployed units. China sees the propensity of the progressives to engage North Korea, to improve relations with China and to limit the scope of the US-ROK alliance as aligned with its overall strategic agenda. Although China’s ability to sway a South Korean domestic election is limited—for example, by maintaining the implicit sanctions China has imposed on South Korean companies, products and industries for the THAAD deployment—its preference and influence are expected to have an impact.

Second, China hopes to mitigate the impact that any future North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test might have on its strategic position and influence on the peninsula. The conventional wisdom is that North Korea will not want to conduct the test immediately after Trump’s inauguration, as it will almost certainly block the chance for dialogue with the new US administration and boost the popularity of the conservatives in the South Korean election. However, based on North Korea’s previous pattern of behavior, Chinese experts expect to see provocations in the coming months if Trump chooses to follow Obama’s policy of strategic patience. At the same time, Chinese analysts are inclined to downplay the significance of such an ICBM test, citing the immaturity of North Korea’s long-range missile technology and its likely failure. Still, Beijing will oppose any preemptive strike by the US on the launch site, although it does not fully believe that the US would take such a risky move and jeopardize South Korean security—a fundamental assumption embedded in China’s assessment of the prospects for conflict on the Korean peninsula.

Beijing has always insisted that North Korea’s nuclear development is motivated by Pyongyang’s vulnerability and insecurity, and argued that only the US and North Korea can resolve the stalemate through a peace negotiation. Selfless as it may sound, there is a certain level of hypocrisy in that position. As it has become clear to American officials and experts that strategic patience failed to address the North Korean nuclear threat, there have been more vocal calls to resume US-DPRK dialogue in return for a decision by Pyongyang to suspend its nuclear and missile tests. For China, the danger lies in the unpredictable consequences of such a bilateral negotiation. If the United States and North Korea decide to move ahead with a deal, the improvement of relations between them and the shifting balance of power on the Korean peninsula will diminish what China perceives as its leverage and strategic influence. Therefore, if the Trump administration unilaterally initiates bilateral talks with North Korea, it will be met with suspicion rather than enthusiasm from Beijing.

China’s potential reaction to a North Korean ICBM test all comes down to one question: What does Beijing want? One thing is clear: China wishes to see denuclearization and peace dialogues, but also wants to be an indispensable party in these dialogues to monitor and influence their direction. Beijing believes that the “dual-track” approach (parallel negotiations on denuclearization and a peace treaty) it proposed in 2016 offers the best hopes for achieving its strategic and security goals. Although the Obama administration largely rejected this approach, Beijing sees a new opportunity to try it again with the Trump administration. Trump should understand, however, that China’s position on the Korean peninsula is neither objective nor neutral and that it will view all solutions primarily through the lens of its strategic competition with the United States. As a result, it is important for all the concerned parties to have realistic expectations about a grand bargain with China over North Korea and treat it with extreme caution.

The US-China relationship under Trump is undoubtedly the largest uncertainty in China’s relations with both North and South Korea. If the Trump administration, as appears to be the case, chooses a more confrontational approach towards China, soliciting Beijing’s support and assistance in pressuring North Korea will be exceedingly difficult. A more hawkish stance from the United States will make Beijing instinctively seek more policy leverage, and provocative North Korea behavior that goes unpunished militarily by the United States offers tremendous opportunities for Beijing to be wooed by Americans to rein in Pyongyang. Past experience, including the Cheonan incident, the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island and South Korea’s THAAD deployment, have demonstrated the high level of leniency Beijing will afford Pyongyang when the United States applies greater pressure on China in response to such provocations.

The application of US secondary sanctions on China, which some American officials and experts have discussed, is likely to make China less rather than more cooperative on North Korea. It is unlikely that effective sanctions could be imposed on these entities without poisoning bilateral relations and adversely affecting China’s willingness to cooperate with the US on North Korea. China opposes unilateral sanctions as a general principle, and in particular condemns those that affect Chinese companies or interests. Beijing’s cooperation on the Iran nuclear deal was not incentivized by US sanctions on the Chinese Bank of Kunlun and Zhuhai Zhenrong, but by the opportunities offered for expanding Chinese influence in the Middle East and leveraging its cooperation in overall relations with Washington. In the Chinese view, the North Korea nuclear program, unlike the Iranian case, is much more complicated and sensitive because it directly affects China’s national security, and therefore requires more comprehensive and political solutions.

If the Trump administration’s primary goal is to confront China and thwart Beijing’s regional ambitions, the most effective policy (and the worst nightmare for China) would be a unilateral improvement of relations with North Korea. Whether that is politically possible depends on how far the administration is willing to pursue diplomacy and negotiations to defuse the North Korean threat. On the contrary, pressuring China is unlikely to make it cooperate. Beijing wants a grand bargain over the future of the Korean peninsula conducive to China’s interests. Without a proper endgame to incentivize the Chinese and a policy of dialogue that allows Beijing a key seat at the table, neither pressure nor solicitation will succeed.

Found in section: Foreign Affairs
Tags: china, dialogue, donald trump, foreign policy, icbm, strategic patience, THAAD

Previous Topic: Iran’s Missile Test: Getting the Facts Straight on North Korea’s Cooperation
Reader Feedback

2 Responses to “Uncertain Futures: China, Trump and the Two Koreas”

Aidan says:
February 10, 2017 at 2:19 am
“Beijing has always insisted that North Korea’s nuclear development is motivated by Pyongyang’s vulnerability and insecurity,” They’ve had enough artillery to flatten Seoul and all sorts of anthrax and sarin gas for decades now, and they’ve had Hiroshima sized bombs since 2013. How much more secure must they be? The narrative that Pyongyang needs nuclear weapons to protect itself from an imperialist America is directly at odds with domestic propaganda that portrays America as a paper tiger.

“The application of US secondary sanctions on China, which some American officials and experts have discussed, is likely to make China less rather than more cooperative on North Korea.”

Tell that to the executives of Banco Delta Asia. It strains credulity to believe that any sane Chinese businessman would give up his access to the world’s largest economy for the sake of a nation whose chief exports are coal, meth, and human suffering.

“China opposes unilateral sanctions as a general principle…” Except when it doesn’t as any South Korean or Taiwanese can surely tell you. They must pay for the “sins,” of self-defense against North Korea, and a refusal to kowtow and give tribute to Xi Jinping respectively.

“Beijing believes that the “dual-track” approach (parallel negotiations on denuclearization and a peace treaty) it proposed in 2016 offers the best hopes for achieving its strategic and security goals.” There isn’t going to be a peace treaty; there isn’t even going to be a temporary freeze as we have just learned from North Korea itself. http://rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2017-02-06-0005

There will be no US-North Korean reproachment to contain China. War against America is Pyongyang’s raison d’etre. Without its massive arsenals of nuclear and chemical weapons and its periodic lethal attacks it’d be a second-rate Turkmenistan.

Mark Sommer says:
February 9, 2017 at 11:45 pm
I think opening dialogue with North Korea may be a good idea regardless. it would be nice if China went along but the two can be mutually exclusive. North Koreans prefer American products for example that China does not produce. I don’t think we should have any aversions to a bi-lateral relationship with North Korea if it may work to our advantage and give Korean independence more definition without the prospect of Chinese hegemony. And it’s not really pie in the sky either as North Korean Communist rule preceded that of China and one standing member of China’s Politburo is an alumnus of Kim il Sung University in Pyongyang. If we rely on China they’ll be using the missile and testing moderation as levers of power to extract concessions from us. If we go direct we’ll potentially have much more leverage. China will be envious initially but won’t be able to play spoiler over the long term if talks bear fruit.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2017/02/13/world/middleeast/ap-ml-egypt-lebanon.html

MIDDLE EAST

Lebanese President in Egypt, Defends Hezbollah's Arms

By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
FEB. 13, 2017, 5:54 A.M. E.S.T.

CAIRO — Lebanese President Michel Aoun has arrived in Egypt for the first time since his inauguration, shortly after defending the militant group Hezbollah's arms role.

Aoun's Monday visit is the first for the former army commander to Egypt in 55 years. He was elected in October after a 29-month vacuum in the country's top post.

Lebanon's political factions are deeply divided, with some, like Aoun's party and Hezbollah, aligning with Iran, and their opponents siding with Saudi Arabia. He met with Egypt's President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi.

"As long as the Lebanese army is not strong enough to battle Israel ... we feel the need for its existence," Aoun told the Egyptian TV network CBC on Sunday in reference to Hezbollah, adding "It has a complementary role to the Lebanese army."
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ori...ror-groups-syria-kurds-federalism-al-bab.html

Turkey walks fine line in dealing with 'frenemy' jihadis

Crackdown linked to referendum

Summary: Turkey’s mixed messages in crackdown terrorist groups; Ankara on sidelines, again, in Syria; Syrian Kurds consider federalism, view Turkish attack on al-Bab as "fiasco."

Author Week in Review
Posted February 12, 2017
Comments 11

Turkish police detained four terrorist suspects linked to the Islamic State (IS), as well as a cache of explosives and suicide belts, as CIA Director Mike Pompeo arrived in Turkey for official talks Feb. 9.

The arrests are in line with a massive crackdown on Salafi and terrorist networks in Turkey this year. On Feb. 5-6, 820 alleged IS sympathizers and operatives were arrested in 29 cities across Turkey. In all of 2016, Turkish police detained and charged 2,936 people on charges of being Salafi or jihadi terrorists.

Metin Gurcan explains that the “main reason” for the crackdown “is the political climate in Turkey, which is preparing for a constitutional amendment referendum in April that would greatly expand the president's power. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) government is very much aware of the shock effect of the Istanbul nightclub attack in the first hours of the new year. That attack heightened Turkish people's fear of IS and what it can do. The government was harshly criticized for the country’s intelligence and security flaws. IS-initiated, extreme Salafi violence on the eve of the referendum would further frighten the public and expose the government's weaknesses, probably boosting the 'no' votes.”

While the crackdown on IS is unambiguous, Turkey’s objectives are complicated by its ties to what Gurcan refers to as “frenemy” jihadis — those linked to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s powerful Syrian affiliate, as well as other "moderate” Syrian armed groups that are directly supported by Turkey.

Gurcan adds, “Ankara’s most difficult challenge in overcoming the jihadi movement in Syria is that there are no changing loyalties at the level of notables and leaders, but there is a constant movement of foot soldiers changing their affiliations.”

For example, Abdulkadir Masharipov, the terrorist implicated in the Istanbul nightclub attack, had previously been affiliated with so-called moderate groups. Gurcan writes, “A careful study of the backgrounds of Salafi foot soldiers shows that they — especially those with Central Asian, Uighur and Russian backgrounds — have been in contact with many IS, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and moderate groups. This makes tracking them down and keeping an eye on them particularly difficult. For example, how can Ankara really trust a Central Asian or Uighur militant now serving with the Sultan Murad Brigade alongside Turkish soldiers in Syria, but who earlier had served with groups affiliated with Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and even IS? Could IS convince these ‘moderate militants,’ who have easy access to Turkey, to carry out terror acts there?”

Turkey sidelined in Syria

Pompeo’s visit to Turkey was greeted with some fanfare, as it occurred just two days after a phone call between US President Donald Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and was the CIA director’s first official foreign visit. While the White House readout of the Trump-Erdogan call was vague, Turkish official sources claimed that Trump and Erdogan had agreed on joint action in the campaigns against IS in Raqqa and al-Bab. The United States, up to now, has been depending almost completely on the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) for the first wave of the assault on Raqqa. The SDF is made up primarily of Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) forces. Turkey insists that the United States end its support for the YPG, which it considers a terrorist organization linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party and equivalent to IS.

Semih Idiz explains that Turkey is increasingly desperate as it finds itself even further sidelined in Syria. “Ankara is deeply perturbed by Trump's proposal for safe zones in Syria, despite the fact that Turkey has been calling for such a zone in the north of the country for a long time,” Idiz writes. “Some see Trump's proposal as a prelude to granting the Kurds their own region. Ankara is also displeased by Moscow’s offer of autonomy for the Syrian Kurds under a unified Syria.”

Idiz concludes, “The upshot of all this is that Ankara is even more defensive today than it was in the past with regard to Russian and US plans for Syria, even though it appears to be cooperating closely with Moscow and has not allowed its anger with Washington to boil over into a serious diplomatic crisis between the two countries. … Given its continuing inability to alter the course of events in Syria, diplomats fear that Ankara may have decided to play a reactive and obstructive role in the Syrian peace talks, rather than a positive and proactive one. If this is indeed the case, it is not immediately evident that this will provide Ankara with what it wants. To the contrary, it could leave Turkey on the sidelines again, as the powers it is unable to match continue to determine developments in Syria.”

Syrian Kurds weigh federalism

Amed Dicle, reporting from Gaziantep, writes that Syrian Kurdish parties are concurrently weighing both military operations in Raqqa and scenarios for federalism in postwar Syria.

“Raqqa isn't northern Syria's and Rojava's only agenda,” Dicle writes. “The Astana and Geneva talks are also closely followed here. And then there's the draft constitution prepared by Russia. Russia's draft is neither rejected nor accepted — it is considered to be a draft that should be discussed. It is taken as an insufficient step, but a first one by international powers. Geneva and Astana meetings haven't generated hope for a resolution yet. Russia took a step by preparing this draft. Russia suggests autonomy for the Kurds, but the Kurds think their issues will be solved not through autonomy, but through a democratic, federal Syria. In Russia's draft, other peoples and faiths outside of the Kurds have been ignored. That is also seen as a flaw. But it is important that Kurdish rights are mentioned in a document for the first time.”

Dicle adds that Turkey is bogged down in al-Bab and may be limited in its capacity for further military operations. “What's happening there [al-Bab] is generally perceived as a fiasco. This is a useful reminder: Erdogan invaded the Shehba region to the north of Aleppo because of his anti-Kurdish sentiment and his ambition to prevent the Kurds from attaining a status in Syria. They took Jarablus and other places from IS without much fighting. But now, Erdogan's plans appear to be failing at al-Bab. … The Erdogan administration first said they would create a buffer zone from IS 20 kilometers (12 miles) deep after they took Jarablus and Dabiq. But their goals turned out to be different. Forces in the region saw that Erdogan was only pursuing his own agenda there. That is why the FSA [Free Syrian Army], his allies at al-Bab, are upset with Erdogan. They think they have been sold out in Aleppo. Cracks in the alliance between the FSA and Erdogan will surface soon.”

RELATED ARTICLES

IRAQ
Trump no savior for Iraq's Christian minority
Sam Kimball

U.S.
All eyes on Pompeo as CIA chief arrives in Ankara
Amberin Zaman

TURKEY
Turkey steps up action against Salafi networks
Metin Gurcan

U.S.
Why Turkey’s approach to Syria may again push it to sidelines
Semih Idiz
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/trump-and-one-china-two-phone-calls-many-interpretations/

Trump and 'One China': Two Phone Calls, Many Interpretations

After the phone call with Xi Jinping, the Trump administration needs to imbue its Taiwan policy with strategic clarity.

By Joseph Bosco
February 11, 2017

When the democratically-elected president of the United States, Donald J. Trump, accepted a congratulatory telephone call from the democratically-elected president of Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen, it generated shock waves throughout the Asian governmental and scholarly communities.

All agreed it was a dramatic departure from four decades of the United States’ official non-recognition and partial isolation of the island that both the China’s Communist leaders and the people of Taiwan consider their own.

But opinions varied wildly on two questions: (a) whether it was a one-off, minor slip-up by a new administration as yet unschooled in the diplomatic etiquette of U.S.-China relations, or a harbinger of fundamental U.S. policy re-assessment; and (b) whether it was a good thing or a bad thing.

The call was quickly followed by a presidential tweet responding to concerns that the U.S. One China policy was being upended: “I fully understand the ‘one China’ policy, but I don’t know why we have to be bound by a ‘one China’ policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade.”

That seemed to point in the direction of substantial policy shift and naturally stirred the waters even more (including by some worried Taiwan would be seen as “a bargaining chip” for other U.S. concerns). The sense of policy turbulence was reinforced by statements from secretaries-designate Mattis (Defense) and Tillerson (State) indicating a more robust U.S. response to aggressive Chinese actions in the South China Sea.

Various official and unofficial statements from Beijing warned the new administration that U.S.-China relations would be dangerously destabilized if these policy expressions remained uncorrected. Many American experts amplified those warnings.

Chinese President Xi Jinping reportedly refused to speak on the telephone until Trump reaffirmed the One China formulation. It was done and the call took place, but that raised a set of new questions and concerns.

For example, what is not known from either the White House or Chinese accounts is whether any other concessions were made by either side to facilitate the accommodation.

Did Xi agree to back off China’s aggressive island-building, militarization, and harassment in the South China Sea? Did he acknowledge China’s enabling of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile program and pledge to press Pyongyang to reverse them?

Also unknown is whether the two leaders differentiated between China’s One China principle and the United States’ One China policy. The former says Taiwan is part of one China; the latter acknowledges that China (and some Taiwanese) says that, but Washington neither agrees nor disagrees, as long as the issue is settled peacefully and with the consent of the Taiwanese people.

Beijing ignores the last two tenets of American policy as buttressed by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, making Taiwan’s security and way of life a matter of U.S. national interest. Instead, it simply arrogates the U.S. position as identical to its own so that when Americans say One China policy, Beijing chooses to hear only the echo of its One China principle.

Further, it has reinforced the seriousness of its non-peaceful option by deploying 1,600 ballistic missiles targeting Taiwan and enacting in 2005 its Anti Secession Law, formally declaring the right to attack Taiwan under various scenarios, including Taiwan’s simply continuing the status quo of de facto independence.

As a master of communications, President Trump is uniquely qualified to set China straight on what America means by its policy based on a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. He can remove the ambiguity by also discarding another dangerous ambiguity over what the U.S. would do in case of a Chinese attack on Taiwan.

He could do no better than by repeating the words once uttered by another American president known for his straight talk, George W. Bush; that America will do “whatever it takes” to defend Taiwan—only this time, the statement will not be walked back.

Such strategic clarity will imbue the two presidential phone calls—with Xi and Tsai—with a much-needed strategic coherence.

Joseph A. Bosco is a member of the U.S.-China task force at the Center for the National Interest and a nonresident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He previously served as China country desk officer in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 2005-2006.

Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2017/02/11/no_trump_did_not_back_down_from_china_112213.html

No, Trump Did Not Back Down From China

By Harry Kazianis
February 11, 2017

Have you ever seen a boxer get knocked out in a fight before the bell even rang?

If you follow the rush-to-judgement analysis coming out of some outlets when it comes to U.S. President Donald Trump’s Friday-night chat with Chinese President Xi Jinping, you might believe Trump just signed away Hawaii. You might think the new U.S. administration has been completely crushed before the first punches are even thrown in what will be a historic, great power struggle over the next few years.

We should be clear: In fact, Trump did not “change tack," as said in a report by Reuters, or back down to Beijing, as judged by the New York Times, implying that the new administration made some major concession to China in acknowledging the reality that is the One China policy.

What Trump did was simple and quite expected -- he followed a standard line of thinking that dates back to the Nixon administration. Clearly no ground was ceded.

Indeed, let’s recall for a moment what most in Washington consider the One China policy to be, setting aside Beijing’s fantasy version of it. From the Shanghai Communique, the foundation of the U.S.-China relations:

“The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China…”

To me that is no game-changer. It’s just admitting the obvious. No knockout punch here.

But from that simple statement the plot thickens. As many commentators have pointed out (hat tip to my colleagues over at Global Taiwan Institute for pointing this out) -- to “acknowledge” does not mean that the United States accepts such a position.

So now that Trump has simply followed decades of standard U.S. policy when it comes to China and Taiwan, we move on to the harder questions. The real question is where do U.S.-China ties go from here? There is no bigger open question in foreign policy facing the Trump Administration today than what it will do about China’s rising power and its coercive policies throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Will China rise peacefully, as the esteemed John Mearsheimer loves to ask, or will we spring Graham Allison’s Thucydides Trap?

Unfortunately, the future looks quite bleak. Step back for a second and take the 30,000-foot view of where U.S.-China relations are today. The scope and sheer amount of problems both nations have between them is nothing short of historic. In fact, Washington and Beijing face four possible pathways towards a major crisis: territorial tension in the East and South China Seas, Taiwan, and now a growing squabble over trillions of dollars in bilateral trade. Any of these could lead to a major showdown between the world’s two biggest economic and military giants. Combine that with their own unique types of nationalism budding at home, and neither America nor China seem like they will back down anytime soon.

And it is quite obvious that the Trump administration, stacked with Asia wonks itching to push back against years of Chinese coercion, has many options on the table. The new team in the White House could, for example, look at quite a few policy options, such as:

- Beginning the process of helping Taiwan rebuild its aging military, which is currently armed with submarines better suited to fighting World War II than the technologically sophisticated wars of the future. Some have argued to turn the island nation into the military equivalent of a porcupine -- ensuring any military action by China would be costly and hopefully not worth the trouble of an attack.

- Following through with a pledge to rebuild the U.S. military into a fighting force that China would not want to mess with in any possible combat domain. With specific focus on naval, air, and cyber capabilities, Beijing would need to think long and hard about any sort of kinetic conflict with America. In fact, the Trump team should study the recent report published by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments that details in the most comprehensive terms how to restore American seapower -- an area of weakness Washington must shore up soon.

- It could conclude bilateral trade agreements with Japan, Vietnam and many others, replacing the Trans-Pacific Partnership slowly but surely, and ensuring that Washington is tied economically to the Asia-Pacific for generations to come.

- Forge a real partnership with India, with the goal of an eventual alliance of some sort. Washington and New Delhi have shared interests in growing their economic ties. Now with China’s dangerous actions in recent years, the two sides must shed any apprehension and form a more robust and committed partnership.

- Trump also wants to warm ties with Russia, and if somehow successful, this would leave China alone without a great-power partner to rely on.

Trump’s admitting the obvious gives no advantage to Beijing. It just means the bell just rang in what is likely to be a 12-round slugfest that could go on for decades.

Ding. Ding.

Harry J. Kazianis (@grecianformula) is director of defense studies at the Center for the National Interest, founded by former US President Richard M. Nixon, and Executive Editor of its publishing arm, The National Interest. He also serves as fellow at both the Potomac Foundation and the Center for China Policy at the University of Nottingham (UK). He is the author of The Tao of A2/AD: China’s Rationale for the Creation of Anti-Access. In the past Kazianis has led the foreign policy communication efforts of the Heritage Foundation and served as editor-in-chief of The Diplomat and as a fellow at CSIS:PACNET. The views expressed are his own.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/colu...il&utm_term=0_b02a5f1344-6367818866-122460921

The Never Ending Story: The Morass of Afghanistan and Pakistan


FEBRUARY 15, 2017 | KEVIN HULBERT

The new administration must surely be thinking about the challenges of Afghanistan and Pakistan and what to do. The region has bedeviled outsiders for generations. Afghanistan perplexed Alexander the Great, got the best of the British, beat up on the Soviet Union, and now it’s befuddled U.S. Presidents Barack Obama for the last eight years and George W. Bush for most of the eight years before that. While Obama had originally hoped to end our long U.S. military efforts in Afghanistan, he wound up going sideways over the last few years, grudgingly maintaining about 10,000 non-combat mission troops on the ground.

What might the new Trump administration do? On the good side, you have Secretary of Defense James Mattis and National Security Advisor Michael Flynn in the administration, and those two men have deep experience in the area. On the bad side, you unfortunately have a situation that frankly does not have any good answers. These are difficult foreign policy challenges for the U.S. (and the world), and ones where there are no real “solutions” to implement – only a slate of bad options from which you are going to have to choose something and try to make it work.

In Afghanistan, we have now had U.S. military forces in the country for over 15 years. What is the plan? Is there a plan? Are we getting out? Staying forever? Combat operations ended at the end of 2014.

There seem to only be two broad choices in Afghanistan for the new Commander in Chief – and both choices have serious downsides:

  1. Stay the course and continue to spend tens of billions of dollars on Afghanistan every year, paying billions to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and billions to Afghanistan to support the Afghan National Army and other institutions. The only real mission today is to stop the country from falling to the Taliban and to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorists who might plan attacks against the West. Meanwhile, if we stay, the death toll for the U.S. continues as the casualties dribble in.
  2. Pull out, save tens of billions of dollars, save some lives, but despite our best efforts to build an effective government and military in Afghanistan over the last 15 years, the country will probably fall to the Taliban in 30 days after we leave, causing a lot of people to wonder why we spent all that blood and treasure on Afghanistan. Then, the country will likely become a terrorist safe haven, too.

There is a third way: withdraw U.S. troops, but have the U.S. Intelligence Community monitor the area much more closely than it did in say, 2001, to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a terrorist safe haven and to take decisive action if it does. This course of action is admittedly easier said than done. There is the added concern that if you lose the big U.S. military footprint, you’d have a real force protection issue, and it would be exceedingly difficult for others to stay in the country in large numbers. Further, you would be at risk of losing the entire (alleged) Predator program.

In James Mattis’ written testimony for his confirmation to be Secretary of Defense, when asked, “What are the U.S. national security interests and objectives in Afghanistan and what strategy to you recommend to achieve them?” his answer was a succinct, “We all remember what it felt like on 9/11 and 9/12. We should do what is necessary to prevent such an attack from occurring again.”

So, it might appear that the writing is on the wall: We’re likely to stay in Afghanistan, stuck there in a non-combat role, ensuring that the country never again becomes a safe haven for terrorists.

How much money have we spent in Afghanistan, and further, should we just keep on spending money there forever? To the first question, nobody really knows how much the war in Afghanistan has cost. You can add up all of the funding specifically approved by congress for the Afghan war through fiscal year 2017, but that only gives you a very partial understanding of the total costs. But, whatever the total, it is surely a number that is both staggering and disheartening. Some estimates put the total at over a trillion dollars. Others say it was “just” many hundreds of billions. The Congressional Research Service recently soberly opined that the cost of keeping one U.S. soldier in Afghanistan was approximately $3.9 million a year. It seems untenable to keep doing this forever and at some point, we are going to have to think about bringing our troops home and letting the chips fall where they may.

They don’t call it the graveyard of empires for nothing.

Pakistan represents an entire other host of issues. Pakistan is like the bank that is “too big to fail,” or “too big to allow to fail” more appropriately, because allowing the bank to fail could have catastrophic impacts on the greater economy. The “failure” of Pakistan would have implications for the world. We have big problems in Afghanistan with its population of 33 million people, but Pakistan has about 182 million inhabitants, over five times the size of Afghanistan.

With a failing economy, rampant terrorism, the fastest growing nuclear arsenal, the sixth largest population, and one of the highest birthrates in the world, Pakistan is of grave concern. But, what should we do?

The U.S. has given Pakistan tens of billions of dollars in aid, coalition support funds, and International Monetary Fund loans over the last 15 years because they helped us on terrorism, they helped us in Afghanistan (albeit not always as much as we had hoped), and because the specter of Pakistan collapsing presents the U.S. President with more nightmare scenarios than probably any other country in the world. So, we keep throwing money at it, trying to steer them towards good behavior, and with only limited success. But, we must keep trying. In the end, while Pakistan is not the most dangerous country in the world, it probably is the most dangerous country for the world.

There seem few levers to pull in Pakistan today, but if we pursue a strategy of containment or disengagement, things will only get worse. I used to brief U.S. policymakers that Pakistan had the very unique distinction of being both one of our best partners on counterterrorism and one of our worst partners on counterterrorism— all at the same time. Imperfect partners though they are, writing Pakistan off would be a big mistake because then we would lose the ability to work together with Pakistan on various efforts in that troubled region.

THE AUTHOR IS KEVIN HULBERT
Kevin Hulbert is a former senior intelligence officer in the CIA’s Directorate of Operations who retired in June 2014. He is currently the President of XK Group. Kevin served multiple overseas tours as CIA Chief of Station and Deputy Chief of Station.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/...e-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=1

Europe

Russian Cruise Missile, Deployed Secretly, Violates Treaty, Officials Say

By MICHAEL R. GORDON
FEB. 14, 2017

WASHINGTON — Russia has secretly deployed a new cruise missile despite complaints from American officials that it violates a landmark arms control treaty that helped seal the end of the Cold War, administration officials say.

The move presents a major challenge for President Trump, who has vowed to improve relations with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and to pursue future arms accords.

The new Russian missile deployment also comes as the Trump administration is struggling to fill key policy positions at the State Department and the Pentagon — and to settle on a permanent replacement for Michael T. Flynn, the national security adviser who resigned late Monday. Mr. Flynn stepped down after it was revealed that he had misled the vice president and other officials over conversations with Moscow’s ambassador to Washington.

The ground-launched cruise missile at the center of American concerns is one that the Obama administration said in 2014 had been tested in violation of a 1987 treaty that bans American and Russian intermediate-range missiles based on land.

The Obama administration had sought to persuade the Russians to correct the violation while the missile was still in the test phase. Instead, the Russians have moved ahead with the system, deploying a fully operational unit.

Administration officials said the Russians now have two battalions of the prohibited cruise missile. One is still located at Russia’s missile test site at Kapustin Yar in the country’s southeast.

The other was shifted in December from that test site to an operational base elsewhere in the country, according to a senior official who did not provide further details and requested anonymity to discuss recent intelligence reports about the missile.

American officials had called the cruise missile the SSC-X-8. But the “X” has been removed from current intelligence reports, indicating that American intelligence officials consider the missile to be operational and no longer a system in development.

The Russia missile program has been a major concern for the Pentagon, which has developed options for how to respond, including deploying additional missile defenses in Europe or developing air-based or sea-based cruise missiles.

But it is politically significant, as well.

It is very unlikely that the Senate, which is already skeptical of Mr. Putin’s intentions, would agree to ratify a new strategic arms control accord unless the alleged violation of the intermediate-range treaty is corrected. Mr. Trump has said the United States should “strengthen and expand its nuclear capability.” But at the same time, he has talked of reaching a new arms agreement with Moscow that would reduce arms “very substantially.”

The deployment of the system could also increase the military threat to NATO nations, which potentially would be one of the principal targets. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis is scheduled to meet with allied defense ministers in Brussels on Wednesday.

Before he left his post last year as the NATO commander and retired from the military, Gen. Philip M. Breedlove warned that deployment of the cruise missile would be a militarily significant development that “can’t go unanswered.”

Coming up with an arms control solution would not be easy.

Each missile battalion is believed to have four mobile launchers and a larger supply of missiles. The launcher for the cruise missile, however, closely resembles the launcher used for the Iskander, a nuclear-tipped short-range system that is permitted under treaties.

“This will make location and verification really tough,” General Breedlove said in an interview.

--

Related Coverage:

Russia Is Moving Ahead With Missile Program That Violates Treaty, U.S. Officials Say
OCT. 19, 2016

Vladimir Putin Exits Nuclear Security Pact, Citing ‘Hostile Actions’ by U.S.
OCT. 3, 2016

Michael Flynn Resigns as National Security Adviser
FEB. 13, 2017
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://dailysignal.com/2017/02/13/w...al-capacities-are-good-for-regional-security/

International
Commentary

India’s Increased Naval Capacities Are Good for Regional Security

James Di Pane / Lisa Curtis / @LisaCurtisHF / February 13, 2017 / Comments

A key American partner, India, is set to conduct another missile test that will have a wide range of consequences on regional dynamics for years to come.

India’s new K-4 nuclear-capable, submarine-launched ballistic missile is expected to have a range of 3,500 kilometers, a serious improvement over its current operational missile of the same kind.

When coupled with India’s burgeoning nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine program, India is set to seriously increase its second-strike capability in the coming years.

This trend aligns with India’s ongoing efforts to modernize its military with particular focus on naval power. A heftier military capability will extend India’s national influence and potentially rival China.

India’s current operational submarine-launched ballistic missile, the K-15, has a range of approximately 750 kilometers and was designed to be used by the INS Arihant, India’s first indigenously built nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine.

While the Arihant is primarily a training platform that will be used to train crews for future nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, it is also capable of conducting deterrence patrols. India currently has plans to build up to five nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines of a similar design in the future.

Based on the Arihant’s design, these will most likely be used in naval bastions, with cover provided by other naval vessels and aircraft in the Bay of Bengal or near the Andaman and Nicobar islands. These submarines lack the necessary speed and stealth capabilities to effectively defend themselves against hostile attack submarines.

That is why the increased range of the K-4 is so significant. It would give India the capability to strike targets in China or Pakistan from the Bay of Bengal in the event of war. India is also expected to increase naval facilities on the Andaman and Nicobar islands for this purpose.

Some have argued that this new capability from India could lead to more destabilization and conflict in the region rather than less, forcing an arms race in anti-submarine weapons or adding a destabilizing element to future crises.

While that may be the case, second-strike capability is a priority for India due to its policy of “no first use” with its nuclear arsenal. In order to maintain deterrence, it has to ensure that its arsenal cannot be neutralized by a preemptive strike.

Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines have secured this capability for the U.S., Soviet Union/Russia, and China for years, and India seems set to cultivate this technology for its own security.

As the U.S. looks to India to play a more active role in the Asia-Pacific region, this growth in capability will enhance India’s ability to step into that role, further increasing the potential of the U.S.-India strategic partnership.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/02/14/polands_security_challenge_110800.html

Poland's Security Challenge

By Stratfor
February 14, 2017

Summary

As shifts in the global order expose Poland's inherent vulnerabilities, the country has no choice but to look outward for support. Poland will do what it can to boost its own defense capabilities, but in its search for security and stability, Warsaw will also focus on building its web of political military alliances. In the Eurasian borderlands, Poland will work to bolster defense cooperation with countries near the Baltic and Black seas that are likewise wary of the potential for Russian aggression. Poland will also seek to reinforce ties with the broader European Union; though Warsaw will push against EU interference, it will ultimately support efforts to prevent the bloc's collapse. And as EU states diverge on policies toward the new U.S. presidential administration, Warsaw will try to protect its own bilateral ties with the White House.

Analysis

The uncertainties surrounding policy shifts under U.S. President Donald Trump's administration are forcing European countries to adapt their own foreign policy strategies. Germany, for example, is focused on trying to avoid a trade war*with the United States and on developing closer ties with the administration. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom wants to negotiate a free trade agreement with Washington*that would give London more flexibility as it navigates the Brexit process. Poland's main concern regarding the new global order is the same as it's always been: national security.

poland%20%281%29.png

https://www.stratfor.com/sites/defa...blic/main/images/poland (1).png?itok=Vhjz5sYh
Copyright Stratfor 2017

Warsaw's concerns are rooted in its age-old geographic vulnerabilities. Poland is at the heart of the Great European Plain, the largest mountain-free territory in Europe, which stretches from the French Pyrenees in the west to the Russian Ural Mountains in the east. Poland has no clear geographic borders and historically has been surrounded by powerful neighbors such as Germany, Russia and, earlier, Austria. It has repeatedly been invaded and partitioned by its neighbors.

Poland's fragile geopolitical situation explains why a key element of Warsaw's foreign policy strategy is to look for as many alliances as possible to protect its territorial integrity. After the end of the Cold War, Poland joined NATO in 1999 and the European Union in 2004. It also sought to create regional alliances such as the Visegrad Group (with Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) and the Weimar Triangle (with Germany and France). But Warsaw is particularly keen to maintain strong ties with the United States, which it sees as its ultimate protector against Russian aggression.

The American Question

In recent years, Poland's foreign policy strategy has faced two major challenges: The first is the evolution of the European Union's economic crisis into a political crisis, resulting in stark internal divisions within the Continental bloc. The current Polish government has been critical of some aspects of the process of Continental integration, requesting the repatriation of some powers from Brussels back to national governments. But Warsaw is interested in reforming, not dissolving, the European Union. The second challenge has been the crisis in Ukraine, which put the spotlight on an aggressive Russia and a divided Europe. Some EU members, including the Baltic states and Germany, still defend strong sanctions against Moscow. But others, including Polish political allies such as Hungary, would like to lift them as soon as possible. (Thus far, all EU members have repeatedly voted to extend sanctions.)

The fragmentation of the European Union will be easier for Poland to digest if it preserves strong relations with the United States. But Warsaw is worried that the Trump administration might take a very different approach to foreign policy. The U.S. president has called NATO "obsolete" and has showed interest in improving relations with Russia, compelling Polish leaders to redouble their outreach to the White House. According to Polish President Andrzej Duda, in a phone call shortly after the U.S. election, Trump reassured him that bilateral cooperation would remain strong. In early February, Krzysztof Szczerski, one of Duda's senior advisers, met with Michael Flynn, Trump's national security adviser, and invited the new president to visit Poland. On Feb. 5, Trump confirmed that he will attend a NATO summit in Brussels in late May.

Warsaw is looking for more than rhetorical reassurances. In mid-January, the U.S. deployed heavy weaponry and thousands of soldiers to Central and Eastern Europe, but this move was originally ordered by former U.S. President Barack Obama. Poland said it expects the Trump administration to honor the deal reached at the NATO summit last July, when Washington agreed to deploy some 4,000 troops on a rotational basis to Poland and to increase military exercises in the region.

Some of Trump's recent moves have put EU members in the awkward position of having to criticize the White House while simultaneously remaining in its good graces. For Poland, this balance should be easier to maintain, as the ruling Law and Justice party is ideologically close to Trump on several issues. In fact, Poland was one of the few EU governments to actually praise Trump's recent moves to limit immigration into the United States. The Polish government also hopes that the Trump administration will be less involved in Polish domestic political affairs than the Obama administration, which sought to strengthen the rule of law and to amp up the fight against corruption in the region.

Looking at the Baltic Sea

Even if Polish officials have reason to be optimistic about relations with Washington remaining strong during the Trump administration, they are also making preparations for an increasingly uncertain global order. At home, Warsaw's strategy centers around an ambitious plan to modernize its defense capacities. This involves increasing military spending and strengthening its domestic defense industrial base. In December, Poland's Ministry of Defense announced plans to spend more than 61 billion zlotys ($14.5 billion) to acquire weapons and military equipment between 2017 and 2022.

At the regional level, Warsaw is interested in stronger political and military cooperation with its neighbors. A natural area for Poland to seek allies is the Baltic Sea, where countries have similar concerns about Russia's recent moves. Poland already has strong ties with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, all of which have recently increased their own military spending. In fact, Poland and Estonia are among the only five NATO members that currently meet the organization's defense spending target of 2 percent of gross domestic product. (The others are the United States, the United Kingdom and Greece.) Each of these countries generally wants a stronger and, if possible, permanent NATO presence in the region.

Poland and the Baltic countries are also interested in coordinating defense strategies. In mid-2016, for example, they began discussions with defense contractors to create a regional anti-aircraft missile shield. Such cooperation has a political element as well; Warsaw and its Baltic peers often join forces to preserve EU sanctions against Russia and to increase European economic and political cooperation with Ukraine. They are also boosting efforts to strengthen ties with Ukraine outside of the EU context.

Poland's Baltic strategy involves cooperation with Sweden, too. Stockholm has been one of the main supporters of developing closer ties between the European Union and countries in the former Soviet sphere, particularly Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, to bring them closer to the West. And over the past three years, Swedish officials have repeatedly warned about the worsening security situation in the Baltic area. Though Sweden is not a NATO member, since the start of the war in Ukraine the country has deepened its cooperation with the military alliance. In May 2016, for example, Sweden signed an agreement with NATO that allows the alliance to operate more easily on Swedish territory during training or in the event of a conflict.
In late 2015, Sweden and Poland signed their own military cooperation agreement, highlighting their shared interest in deterring potential Russian aggression. Closer Swedish-Polish links open the door for tighter cooperation between Nordic and Baltic countries, as Finland (another neutral, non-NATO country) often coordinates its foreign policy with Sweden. But despite its concerns regarding Russia, Sweden has remained neutral since the early 19th century, and there are no guarantees that Stockholm is ready to change its position and take a more confrontational military position toward Russia. Opinion polls in Sweden show that people are becoming increasingly supportive of NATO membership, but the issue remains controversial.

The Limits of the Visegrad Group

Poland's foreign policy strategy also involves keeping close ties with its fellow partners in the Visegrad Group: Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The bloc has a military component, as its members recently developed a Visegrad EU Battlegroup. But though the group is an effective tool giving Poland political influence within the European Union, is may not be as useful when it comes to dealing with Russia.

Because of differences in their respective geographic positions, not all the members of the Visegrad Group have the same sense of urgency when it comes to Russia. The crisis in Ukraine highlighted the oft-diverging foreign policy goals within the group. Hungary, for example, has openly demanded the lifting of EU sanctions against Russia, while the Czech Republic and Slovakia have been more guarded in their criticism of Moscow's actions. Internal political dynamics also play a role, as Poland sees itself as the natural leader of the Visegrad Group, a view that is not necessarily shared by the other three governments.

This has led Poland to show interest in going beyond its Visegrad allies and developing closer ties with Romania. Before the Ukrainian crisis, Polish-Romanian relations were not particularly active. But Russia's annexation of Crimea put Romania on alert, given that the peninsula is barely 140 miles from the Romanian border. Transdniestria, a breakaway territory of Moldova with close cultural links to Romania but militarily backing from Russia, is even closer. Like Poland, Romania also considers a more active Russia as a threat. Thus, Romania joined forces with Poland to demand a greater NATO presence in Central and Eastern Europe. These days, Romanian representatives are often invited to meetings of the Visegrad Group, and Polish and Romanian authorities been meeting more frequently. Poland supports Romania's request for a larger NATO presence in the Black Sea.

Outreach to Germany

Finally, the new global order could open the door for better ties between Poland and Germany, whose bilateral relations have been relatively cool in recent years. The Polish government has refused to join a German-backed plan to distribute asylum seekers across the European Union, and Berlin has criticized Polish judicial reforms. Warsaw's calls for EU reforms to weaken the central institutions in Brussels and to repatriate powers back to national governments is at odds with Germany's view of a federal Europe.

But Germany is preoccupied with keeping the European Union together amid rising geopolitical uncertainty*and sees Poland's cooperation in that regard important. Warsaw, in turn, is concerned that after the United Kingdom leaves the European Union, it will lose a key ally in its push to preserve tough EU policies on Russia and to maintain strong EU ties with NATO and the United States. More important, for all of Warsaw's criticism of the European Union, the bloc is still a substantial source of funding and protection for Poland. In the current context of EU fragmentation, Germany and other member states have identified defense as one of the few areas on which additional cooperation is still possible. Considering Poland's foreign policy concerns, Warsaw is likely to support initiatives in this area.*

Thus, Poland's strategy to cope with an increasingly uncertain global system will once again focus on developing as many international alliances as possible. At home, Poland will continue to focus on modernizing its military. Abroad, it will seek deeper ties with countries from the Baltic to the Black seas. Poland will remain a critic of some aspects of the European Union, but it will protect its membership within the bloc. And as EU member states struggle to form a united response to the new U.S. government, Warsaw will focus on bolstering its own ties with Washington.


This article appeared originally at Stratfor.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/oren-kessler-egypt-picks-sides-in-the-syrian-war/

Egypt Picks Sides in the Syrian War

How Sisi Learned to Love Assad

Oren Kessler
12th February 2017 - Foreign Affairs

On February 1, a military transport plane left a Russian airbase in Latakia, Syria,*landed*at an airfield near Egypt’s border with Libya, then returned to Syria. For months there had been unconfirmed*reports*that Cairo had sent forces to assist the Syrian regime in the country’s civil war and at first glance the flight appeared to have corroborated those suspicions. That now looks unlikely—the jet’s final destination was Russia, where it had*reportedly*brought wounded fighters, loyal to the Kremlin-allied Libyan strongman Khalifa Haftar, in for treatment. But the very fact that Cairo is coordinating with the Damascus-Moscow alliance on such an operation underscores one of the Middle East’s worst-kept secrets: Cairo supports the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad.*

Back in November, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi essentially admitted as much. Cairo’s priority “is to support national armies, for example in Libya,” he*told*Portuguese state television. “The same with Syria and Iraq.” The host then pressed Sisi over whether he meant the Syrian regime. “Yes,” Sisi*replied*plainly.

It was the first time that Egypt, a longtime U.S. ally, openly acknowledged that it sides with the Syrian government. The Assad regime is not only allied with U.S. adversaries Iran and Russia but is also loathed across much of the Arab world for its scorched-earth attacks and the refugee crisis that its civil war has spawned. Sisi is now one of the only Arab leaders to explicitly back Damascus, which since late 2011 has been*suspended*from the Arab League and which Al Jazeera—by far the most watched television network in the Arab world—incessantly*rails*against.

Of course, hints of Sisi’s sympathy for his Syrian counterpart have been visible for years. Back in July 2013, just weeks after then-army chief Sisi led the military in removing Cairo’s Muslim Brotherhood-led government, Egypt and Syria agreed to*revive*diplomatic ties. (The Brotherhood regime had cut them to protest Damascus’ heavy-handed crackdown on dissent.) Since then, Egypt has followed a wait-and-see approach, biding its time to see who would emerge victorious in Syria before coming out strongly for or against one side. When, for example, Assad seemed on the defensive amid Islamic State (ISIS) advances in summer 2015, Sisi reportedly*told*visiting diplomats to begin preparations for his downfall.

Shortly thereafter, however, the tide turned. Russia’s intervention in Syria in September 2015 swung the momentum in the regime’s favor, and the Assad government began to appear, more than at any time since 2011, the likely victor. Sisi took notice, and by late last year, the previously unsayable—that Syria is better off with Assad than without him—ceased to be so.

In October 2016, shortly before the interview with the Portuguese press, Egypt—a rotating member of the UN Security Council—sided with Moscow in*opposing*a French-sponsored draft resolution calling for an immediate end to air strikes in Aleppo, where the Syrian regime and Russia have conducted a punishing campaign against the city. The same day, Egypt joined Russia (and China and Venezuela) in supporting an amended draft that removed all reference to the city. That same month, Syrian state media reported that Damascus had hosted bilateral meetings with high-level Egyptian officials, including the intelligence chief, and a Syrian army spokesman*said*that talks for joint-military operations were at “an advanced stage.”
*
Cairo’s pro-Assad tilt has drawn the wrath of its most important Arab ally and main financial backer,*Saudi Arabia, which since Morsi’s overthrow has pumped more than*$25 billion*into Egypt’s ailing economy. In October, Riyadh called Cairo’s pro-Kremlin moves at the UN “painful,” and the prominent Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi*tweeted*a reminder that, as the sole Arab member of the Security Council, Egypt should act according to consensus Arab opinion. The next month, the Saudi oil giant Aramco announced that it would*suspend*oil supplies to Egypt until further notice.

Why, then, is Cairo cozying up to Assad at the risk of damaging its own regional prestige, and of irking its financial backers, when its own economy is*in profound crisis?

First, Cairo’s threat perception differs from that of its Arab allies. Although Saudi Arabia views Assad’s patron, Iran, as the foremost threat to its security and interests, Egypt reserves that place for Sunni Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood and ISIS.

The Brotherhood has for decades been the Egyptian army’s primary adversary. Sisi himself came to power in 2013 by removing a Brotherhood regime that had run the country for just a year, and once in power he proceeded to imprison tens of thousands of the group’s members. Since then, in Egypt’s sparsely populated Sinai Peninsula, an ISIS affiliate has killed*hundreds*of Egyptian servicemen in an insurgency with no end in sight.

When Sisi looks at the Syrian conflict, he is reminded of the fragility of his own rule. In Syria, as in Egypt, a decades-old regime—the Assads have ruled Syria for four decades, and army officers in Egypt have for most of the last seven—is pitted against rebels that he dubs extremists. Although untangling the affiliations of Syria’s many opposition parties is tricky, at least one such grouping, the Istanbul-based Syrian National Council, is indeed,*by most accounts, Brotherhood-dominated. As for ISIS, it has distinguished itself as one of the most brutal and effective fighting forces arrayed against Assad.

Second, Cairo and Damascus are in lockstep over their antipathy for the government of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, which is itself rooted in political Islam. Since the 2013 coup, Erdogan has been the*chief antagonist*of the Sisi regime, hosting Brotherhood*leaders*and*beaming out*Arabic-language TV stations that rail against the Egyptian leader’s “illegitimacy.” The Turkish president is even fond of*flashing*the Brotherhood’s signature four-finger salute. Ankara has similarly been the leading international opponent (along with the Saudis) of the Assad regime,*providing*logistical support to sundry opposition groups, and allowing them—as well as ISIS—to*traverse*its border with Syria largely unhindered.

Finally, Egypt’s closer ties with Assad are a function of its warming relations*with Russia. Cairo’s frayed post-coup ties with the former administration of Barack Obama led it to turn to the Kremlin for everything from*helicopters*to joint*military drills*to*nuclear power. Now, sensing an opening, Cairo is*keen to cultivate relations*with President Donald Trump, who has consistently urged*closer cooperation*with Moscow against extremists in Syria while*opposing actions*to bring down the Assad regime.

My own conversations with Egyptians during a recent visit suggest that many tacitly or explicitly support Sisi’s overtures to Assad. True, there was a time, in the early stages of the Syrian uprising, that Assad seemed destined to go the way of Hosni Mubarak, the longtime Egyptian leader forced to resign in early 2011 after 18 days of popular protests. Back then, a critical mass of Egyptians would likely have welcomed Assad’s ouster as part of the wave of revolutions optimistically called the Arab Spring.

But the Middle East of 2017 is dramatically different from that of six years ago. Mubarak’s removal led to the*unhappy experience*of life under the Brotherhood, and the subsequent bloody power struggles between the Islamist group and the army. Syrians, like*Libyans*and*Yemenis, rose up against despots only to reap chaos and carnage instead. Revolution fatigue has set in in Egypt, along with a certain reluctant consensus in favor of stability even at the cost of democratic freedoms.

The coming year promises to be full of surprises, not least in the Middle East, where long-standing partnerships are now coming into question while unlikely ones form in parallel or in their place. One such surprise is likely to be ever-closer ties between Cairo and Damascus: one of them a decades-long U.S. ally and the other an anti-American strongman in league with the Kremlin and Tehran.

Oren Kessler is deputy director for research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Follow him on Twitter @OrenKessler.*
- See more at: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/medi...sides-in-the-syrian-war/#sthash.VdqVSg9U.dpuf
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/who-will-command-chinas-new-ssbn-fleet/

Who Will Command China's New SSBN Fleet?

How will China use its fledgling ballistic missile submarine fleet?

By David C. Logan
February 14, 2017

China’s ongoing nuclear modernization program is significantly altering the size and character of its nuclear arsenal. For decades following its first successful nuclear test in October 1964, China deployed only a few dozen nuclear weapons, most of which were affixed atop unsophisticated and vulnerable land-based missiles. Over the last decade, the country’s nuclear modernization program has seen a significant expansion in the size of its deployed arsenal. Credible public estimates put China’s deployed warheads at between 160 and 260.

The modernization program’s qualitative changes have been more significant than its quantitative changes. China’s arsenal has gradually shifted from unsophisticated liquid-fueled, silo-based missiles to road-mobile, solid-fueled ones. In 2015, the Pentagon assessed that, for the first time, China equipped some missiles with multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).

One of the most significant of these qualitative changes to China’s nuclear arsenal is the development and deployment of the country’s first credible ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force, the Jin-class submarines. China’s nascent sea-based deterrent will present new challenges to longstanding nuclear practices. Among these will be how to structure command and control for the new SSBN fleet to maintain an appropriate balance between positive control (the ability to always launch when desired) and negative control (to never launch when not desired). In a new report for the National Defense University, I analyze potential choices for Chinese command and control of its SSBN force and the implications for strategic stability with the United States.

Current Command and Control

In the nuclear domain, China has traditionally prioritized strict political control over operational flexibility and historically maintained a comparatively restrained nuclear posture. Beijing reportedly keeps warheads unmated from delivery systems and stored in separate locations. The Central Military Commission, the highest military decision-making body in the country, is the only organization that can order a nuclear strike. The country has yet to develop a mature and dedicated early-warning system. Its SSBN force, however, could change these practices.

Public details on command and control of China’s SSBNs are scarce but some American experts and Chinese observers have already predicted that China’s SSBNs will come under the control of the recently formed PLA Rocket Force, the predecessor to the former Second Artillery. However, both official Chinese writings and the current command and control arrangements of the Rocket Force suggest this is unlikely.

First, as pointed out by one Chinese expert, references to the country’s nuclear forces in official Chinese documents suggest command and control of the sea-based deterrent has traditionally been assigned to the PLA Navy. China’s 2013 Defense White Paper attributed only the land-based Dongfeng ballistic missiles and Changjian cruise missiles to the then-Second Artillery. Reference to the country’s Julang submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) were conspicuously missing from the section. In addition, the 2013 edition of The Science of Military Strategy, a PLA textbook vetted by military leadership and believed to represent the strategic thinking of the Chinese military, explicitly directed the Navy to prepare the country’s SSBN fleet.

Second, the Rocket Force appears to lack the organization and capabilities for commanding a fleet of nuclear submarines. While the recent spate of military reforms sought to increase “jointness” between the PLA Army, Navy, and Air Force, the command structures of the Rocket Force remain apart from both the other services and the newly formed Theater Commands. There is no evidence of Rocket Force curriculum or command tracks for sea-based platforms and there is no evidence of the service operating the requisite physical assets, such as very low frequency (VLF) radio stations for communicating with submerged vessels.

By contrast, there is an institutional logic to PLA Navy control of China’s SSBNs. Though the previous generation Xia-class vessel never conducted a deterrent patrol, it did put out to sea, presumably with a PLA Navy crew. The Navy’s submarine academy in Qingdao appears to have one-year majors associated with nuclear missile submarines and faculty at the academy regularly publish on SSBN-related issues. In short, Rocket Force control of SSBNs does not appear likely either in the past or in the near future.

Notional Command and Control Structures

Nevertheless, China’s leadership might see the introduction of the country’s first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent as an opportunity to fundamentally restructure nuclear command and control arrangements. In general, China might pursue one of three notional command and control structures, each of which would allocate differing degrees of command authority to the Navy or to the Rocket Force. Each model also implies the need to establish new bureaucratic or technical capabilities within the services.

In the first structure, Chinese leadership might give the Navy full command and control of SSBNs. PLA Navy leadership might argue that their experience operating submarines — including the Xia*— qualifies it to control the country’s SSBNs. In this model, the Navy would staff and operate both the vessels and their missiles. This model would require the creation of new bureaucratic and technical capabilities within the Navy. For example, Navy control would require the creation of a personnel reliability program for that service, something which the PLA was slow to develop for its land-based nuclear forces. The PLA would also need to develop a mechanism for coordinating targeting between Navy and Rocket Force.

In the second command structure, Chinese SSBNs would be assigned exclusively to the Rocket Force. While the Rocket Force has no experience operating submarines, it is better prepared for the nuclear mission, including handling and safeguarding warheads and vetting key personnel. In this model, the Navy would exercise administrative control of the vessels and its crew but operational authority would be granted to the Rocket Force. This model might require the construction of Rocket Force VLF facilities and the establishment of structures to facilitate coordination between Rocket Force SSBNs and the Navy’s other vessels.

In a third, hybrid model, command and control would be shared by both the Navy and the Rocket Force. A hybrid model could take several forms, for example by entrusting control of the vessels to the Navy and the missiles to the Rocket Force or by instituting a dual-command authority for nuclear launches which would require assent of both the SSBN’s Navy commander and specially assigned Rocket Force personnel. Though such a hybrid model would be unusual, there is a precedent for some level of joint or bifurcated control in the nuclear enterprises of other countries. On Soviet subs, the launch of a nuclear missile required the consent of both the operational commander and the political commissar. At the highest level, U.S. Strategic Command, which controls the country’s nuclear weapons, is a formally joint command.

China’s choices about SSBN command and control will be mediated by several operational, bureaucratic, and political considerations. Operationally, China’s SSBNs, no matter what service controls them, will likely require substantial assistance from other Navy assets given the vessels’ high acoustic signatures and China’s distinctively unfavorable maritime geography. Experts have debated whether China would opt for a bastion or open sea deployment strategy. Each practice would require Navy escorts, either to protect SSBNs deployed close to home or to ferry them past dangerous choke points to the safety of the open ocean.

Bureaucratic forces, including inter-service rivalry, will also shape command and control choices. In an era of slower economic growth and similar slowdowns in military spending, the SSBN fleet may appear to be a valuable new source of funding and prestige. At the same time, China’s historically restrained approach to nuclear weapons might suggest the nuclear domain is not a significant “growth opportunity.” It is unclear to what extent the two services have institutional preferences for the conventional or nuclear mission set. Within the Rocket Force, a disproportionate number of senior leaders have come up through missile bases dominated by conventional units, while Chinese Navy leadership is comprised largely of surface warfare officers.

Finally, China’s political and strategic emphasis on negative control of its nuclear weapons will guide command decisions and could motivate a desire to decentralize command in ways which decrease the likelihood of an accidental or injudicious launch. Such a preference might argue for a hybrid-type of command structure.
Implications for Strategic Stability

China’s choices about how to structure command and control will have important implications for strategic nuclear stability with the United States.

Maintaining strategic stability often depends on a secure second-strike capability and on maintaining a proper balance between positive and negative control. To the extent that the hybrid model increases negative control of China’s nuclear weapons, increases redundancy in command and control infrastructure, and reduces the possibility of entanglement with conventional assets, it would contribute positively to strategic nuclear stability.

Regardless of what kind of macro-level command structure China opts for, there are additional measures it can take to enhance strategic stability. First, China should ensure that all personnel who work on its SSBN program undergo a thorough reliability vetting program. Second, to decrease the chances of misidentification and misperception, China should attempt to erect an operational firewall between its SSBN force and other vessels, especially its conventional attack submarines. This could include establishing parallel communications systems and separate basing schemes. Third, China should adopt an appropriately cautious approach to its SSBN fleet. Until it can ensure the survivability of its SSBNs, it should avoid emphasizing their role in deterrent operations.

David C. Logan is a graduate student in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Kim Jong-Un's Half Brother Assassinated In Malaysia
Started by*Marthanoir‎,*Today*04:14 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...ng-Un-s-Half-Brother-Assassinated-In-Malaysia

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-malaysia-kim-idUSKBN15T1DN

World News | Tue Feb 14, 2017 | 2:03pm EST

North Korea believed behind murder of leader's half-brother: U.S. source

By Emily Chow and Ju-min Park | KUALA LUMPUR/SEOUL

The U.S. government strongly believes that North Korean agents murdered the estranged half-brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Malaysia, a U.S. government source said on Tuesday.

American authorities have not yet determined exactly how Kim Jong Nam was killed, according to the source, who did not provide specific evidence to support the U.S. government's view.

A South Korean government source also had said earlier that Kim Jong Nam had been murdered in Malaysia. He did not provide further details.

South Korea's foreign ministry said it could not confirm the reports, and the country's intelligence agency could not immediately be reached for comment.

In the United States, there was no immediate response to a request for comment from the Trump administration, which faces a stiff challenge from a defiant North Korea over its nuclear arms program and the test of a ballistic missile last weekend.

Kim Jong Nam was known to spend a significant amount of his time outside North Korea and had spoken out publicly against his family's dynastic control of the isolated state.

In a statement, Malaysian police said the dead man, aged 46, held a passport under the name Kim Chol.

Kim Jong Nam has been caught in the past using forged travel documents.

Malaysian police official Fadzil Ahmat said the cause of Kim's death was not yet known, and that a post mortem would be carried out.

"So far there are no suspects, but we have started investigations and are looking at a few possibilities to get leads," Fadzil told Reuters.

Related Coverage
North Korea agents believed behind murder of leader's half-brother: U.S. source

According to Fadzil, Kim had been planning to travel to Macau on Monday when he fell ill at the low-cost terminal of Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA).
 
Last edited:

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://in.reuters.com/article/mideast-crisis-mosul-security-idINKBN15U1UZ

World News | Wed Feb 15, 2017 | 8:39pm IST

Mosul bombings temper residents' relief at Islamic State pushback

By Stephen Kalin | MOSUL, Iraq

The first blast, down the street from his uncle's restaurant in eastern Mosul, sent Mohammed Badr racing towards the door to check the situation. The second one, moments later at the entrance of the restaurant itself, knocked him off his feet.

Together, last Friday's twin suicide bombings killed 14 people and fractured the sense of safety and relief that many residents felt after Iraqi forces pushed the jihadists out of their neighbourhoods in months of heavy street-to-street fighting.

The eatery, called My Fair Lady, stayed open throughout Islamic State's brutal 2-1/2 year rule in the northern city, serving few customers besides the fighters. It quickly expanded after recent military advances, gaining popularity with locals, soldiers and even foreign journalists covering the war.

But restaurants and shops in the Zuhur district remain closed nearly a week later at the direction of security forces who say they could be targeted, and residents say they no longer feel safe staying out past dark.

"They don't want stability. They don't want life to return to Mosul," Badr said of Islamic State, which claimed the attacks. "I don't feel safe at all."

Badr, who was supervising workers emptying the restaurant's pantry on Tuesday, told Reuters he does not expect to reopen.

"The restaurant is finished. Hajj Nasser (the owner) was the pillar of the community. He is a martyr," he said, holding back tears.

Also killed in the attack were two of Nasser's other nephews, the guard who stopped the attacker from entering the restaurant, a longtime server and a young man who had just joined the staff that day.

"He started his first shift at seven-thirty in the morning and by two-thirty he was dead," said Badr, gazing at the spot on he floor where the men had died.

SLEEPER CELLS
As government forces entered eastern Mosul in November, Islamic State militants retreated deeper into the city and mortared civilian areas left behind. They have also stepped up attacks against locals with grenades dropped from drones.

But bombings like the one at My Fair Lady are different because they are likely conducted by sleeper cells, fighters who melted into the civilian population as the military advanced in order to attack the city from inside.

The restaurant bombing was the second of its kind in the four-month-old Mosul battle after three car bombs killed at least 15 people in an eastern suburb in December.

For the hundreds of thousands of residents in eastern districts, who defied expectations by staying in their homes throughout the offensive, this has put them on edge.

False alarms about bombings at schools, markets and other public places have become a daily occurrence along with house raids by security forces following up on tips.

"Of course there are (sleeper cells) but God willing we will eliminate them," said a local police colonel in the eastern suburb of Gogjali, requesting anonymity to speak to the media.

Speaking at a girls' school used by the police after their station was destroyed, he said there were not enough local forces to secure the city, Iraq's second largest.

The most effective Iraqi troops, including the elite counter-terrorism service, have redeployed to the outskirts of western Mosul - where Islamic State maintains full control - ahead of an offensive to retake that half of the city which is expected to start in the coming days.

That has left east Mosul under the control of some army units, a few thousand local police and an array of voluntary, paramilitary forces called Hashid.

Also In World News
Malaysia detains woman, seeking others in connection with N.Korean murder
Trump knew for weeks that aide was being misleading over Russia - White House

NEW INSURGENCY?
The suicide bomber's head, burnt and bloodied, remains in a grassy traffic circle in front of the restaurant in Zuhur. It appeared to belong to a teenager.

Islamic State said in an online statement that the attackers were Mosul natives. Reuters could not verify that, but if true it indicates the group maintains some support among locals.

Badr, expressing contempt for the security forces, questioned how the bombers had crossed the myriad checkpoints in the neighbourhood to reach their targets.

"I don't expect but I fear things could become like 2006, 2007," he said, referring to the height of the Sunni insurgency in Mosul when bombings, assassinations and kidnappings were regular.

The militants behind that violence included al Qaeda, a predecessor to Islamic State, which seized all of Mosul along with a third of Iraq and large swathes of territory in neighbouring Syria in 2014, declaring a modern-day caliphate on that land.

Iraqi and Western officials have long expected Islamic State would revert to those earlier insurgent tactics as they lose ground.

Basman, a 32-year-old paramedic living on the street between Friday's two bomb sites, said he didn't know who was in charge of security in his neighbourhood.

He was unnerved that nobody had yet asked for his name to check it against the government's lists of Islamic State supporters.

"If the security forces don't clear and inspect everything, then what is the point of liberation?"

(Reporting By Stephen Kalin; Editing by Toby Chopra)

Next In World News

U.N. Syria talks to follow agenda set by U.N. resolution - envoy
ROME The agenda of Syrian peace talks due to begin in Geneva next week will be line with a U.N. Security Council resolution aimed at ending the conflict and will not be changed, U.N. Syria envoy Staffan de Mistura said on Wednesday.

Trump says "Russian connection" is "non-sense" - Tweet
WASHINGTON U.S. President Donald Trump on Wednesday dismissed the idea of any "Russian connection" in a tweet that came amid a New York Times report that said members of his presidential campaign had contacts with Russian intelligence officials. [L1N1G0048]

U.N. envoy will not attend Syria talks in Astana - spokeswoman
GENEVA The United Nations special envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, will not attend talks on the Syria crisis in the Kazakh capital Astana, his spokeswoman Yara Sharif said on Wednesday.

MORE FROM REUTERS
Oldest captive fish euthanized in his mid-90s by Chicago aquarium
Indian police bust $550-million internet scam that duped thousands
Russia to ban beef imports from New Zealand
China halts construction at major Lotte project amid THAAD tension
U.S. general calls for review of relationship with Pakistan
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articl...cation-threatens-an-arms-race-with-trump.html

Putin’s Nuclear Provocation Threatens an Arms Race with Trump

President Trump shows little sign of grasping the importance of international weapons deals, and Putin is daring him to tear up the nuclear treaties.

David Axe
02.15.17 2:37 AM ET

The Russian military has reportedly deployed a new, nuclear-armed cruise missile, in direct violation of a 1987 treaty with the United States that bans hard-to-defeat medium-range, land-based nukes.

The deployment of the truck-launched SSC-8 missile apparently somewhere in Eastern Europe, first reported by The New York Times, could escalate nuclear competition between the United States and Russia.

President Trump and his allies in the U.S. Congress have, in just the first few weeks of Trump's administration, already threatened to dismantle hard-won, Cold War-era arms-control measures—the same kinds of measures Russia is now defying. Increasingly unconstrained by treaties, the United States and Russia are set to grow and improve their atomic arsenals, which could greatly raise the risk of nuclear war.

“I think we are in a new arms race,” Tom Collina, policy director at San Francisco-based Ploughshares, an anti-nuclear advocacy group, told The Daily Beast. "The U.S. plans to spend $1 trillion over the next 30 years on nuclear weapons, including new ones. Russia is rebuilding its forces. The rhetoric is getting heated and threatening."

U.S. intelligence detected the SSC-8’s development sometime before 2014. That year, the Obama administration began vaguely referring to a new Russian weapon that, the administration claimed, violated the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty.

The INF agreement, signed by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, banned nuclear and non-nuclear ground-launched missiles with ranges between 620 and 3,420 miles. By 1991, the United States and Russia together had decommissioned around 2,700 existing missiles that the new treaty prohibited.

The 1987 deal helped to eliminate some of the most destabilizing types of nuclear weapons. Intermediate-range weapons can strike quickly, compelling rival atomic powers to keep their own forces on high alert. And unlike ICBMs, the shorter-range nukes are indistinguishable from non-nuclear short-range missiles at the time of launch, increasing the chance that a country might mistake a conventional military operation for an atomic sneak attack.

The regime of Russian President Vladimir Putin is not fond of the INF treaty. From Moscow’s point of view, the treaty preserves America’s existing advantages in sea-launched cruise missiles and anti-ICBM defenses while making it more difficult for Russia to develop weapons that exploit gaps in American technology and strategy. “The narrative in Moscow is that they got a bad deal,” Collina said.

Experts agree that the acceleration of U.S. missile-defense tech under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, all in the context of an expanding NATO, provoked Russia’s development of the SSC-8. The final provocation was apparently the Pentagon’s installation of SM-3 ballistic-missile interceptors in Romania in 2015. The U.S. military is building a similar missile-defense site in Poland.

The Pentagon intends the SM-3 sites to help protect America’s NATO allies in Europe from Iranian rockets, but the Kremlin considers them a threat to the strategic balance of power between the United States and Russia. “Large-scale deployment [of missile-defenses] could deprive Moscow of that ultimate security guarantee” that nukes provide, Nikolai Sokov, a fellow at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, told The Daily Beast.

Feeling threatened, Russia has threatened back. And the timing could not be worse for peace advocates. Where the Obama administration defended existing nuclear treaties and worked to slowly reduce America’s and Russia’s nuclear arsenals, the Trump administration seems determined to tear up decades worth of arms-controls measures.

Trump has urged Japan and South Korea to field their own nukes and has threatened to scrap the international deal with Iran that limits that country’s nuclear-weapons program. In a phone call with Putin on Feb. 9, Trump trash-talked New START, the 2011 treaty that limits the United States and Russia to 1,500 deployed nuclear warheads apiece.

Confusingly, Trump has also said that “nuclear weapons should be way down and reduced very substantially.”

Meanwhile, two of Trump’s close congressional allies—Arkansas Sen. Tom Cotton and South Carolina Rep. Joe Wilson—have proposed to defund the international organization that monitors and helps to prevent nuclear-weapons tests.

New Russian nuke deployments “can’t go unanswered,” U.S. Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove, who was NATO’s top officer before he retired in 2016, told The New York Times. But with more and more nuclear-disarmament efforts collapsing, America must be careful not to answer Russia’s new nukes with new nukes of its own.

“We make new deployments that threaten Russia while sincerely negotiating a return to compliance,” Jeffrey Lewis, also with the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, told The Daily Beast.

“I’d make the new deployments conventional-only”—that is, non-nuclear—“and, if possible, INF-compliant,” Lewis said, adding that the Trump administration should also bolster U.S. forces within the context of NATO.

“We need to show the Russians that NATO is capable of responding in a unified fashion. They are hoping to break NATO. Our goal is to make it clear that Russia’s behavior is why NATO is still necessary.”

But worryingly, Trump has repeatedly attacked NATO as outdated and a drain on America’s finances. “I said a long time ago that NATO had problems,” Trump said in January. “No. 1, it was obsolete, because it was, you know, designed many, many years ago. No. 2, the countries aren’t paying what they’re supposed to pay."

A stronger NATO could be the United States' best response to Russia's nuclear escalation. But a weaker NATO is the likely result of Trump's attacks on the alliance. On its own against a rearming Russia, the United States risks embracing the apocalyptic thinking of the early Cold War. "It is time for both sides to step back from the brink and rethink what they are doing," Collina said. "They are in a race in which they can only lose."
*
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm......

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/ea...nuclear-issue-has-to-be-addressed-china-daily

Editorial Notes

Root cause of North Korean nuclear issue has to be addressed: China Daily

Published 5 hours ago

In its editorial on Feb 15, the paper says that the decades-old hostility between Pyongyang and Seoul and Washington must be addressed in order to settle the North Korean nuclear issue.

It does not matter whether it was meant as a provocation, a test, or simply a call for attention. It may have been any of those, or all.

The test-firing of the Pukguksong-2 intermediate-range ballistic missile on Sunday, which was in no way conducive to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's pursuit of the international recognition and respect it covets, was a timely reminder of an outstanding security challenge the Donald Trump presidency faces.

It might have been an invitation for direct interaction with the United States. But there is no sign that will happen.

As of now, what Pyongyang has received in return, apart from immediate condemnation from the United Nations and calls from the US, Japan and the Republic of Korea for harsher sanctions, is Trump's vow to deal with it "very strongly" and the US' "100 per cent" solidarity with Japan.

However, Pyongyang will not stop now. That the US has not shown any willingness to engage can be read as a sign of indecisiveness and may thus inspire further provocations.

Yet Pyongyang will not get what it thinks it deserves, especially being accepted internationally as a legitimate, respectable nuclear power. For its persistent threats of "nuclear elimination" of "enemy states" alone, it cannot but be deemed as a threat. That is why the UN, along with all countries in Northeast Asia, has remained steadfast on denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

And that is why China and Russia, while consistently appealing for caution and restraint in dealing with Pyongyang and due respect for its security concerns, have joined the international chorus of condemnation and thrown their weight behind the recent UN sanctions.

The UN Security Council may or may not agree on additional, stronger sanctions this time, given member countries' divergences on the right approach to adopt. Even if a new package is approved, it is unlikely to suffice to stop Pyongyang's nuclear weapons programme and missile stunts. Over the years, the world has watched as that programme has grown and thrived despite all the condemnations and sanctions.

Which is why the missile launch should be a wake-up call for rethinking the response to Pyongyang's actions and intimidation.

A solid-fuel engine itself may not suffice to make the Pukguksong-2 a "game changer". Pyongyang may not come up with missile technologies capable of intercontinental attacks soon. But the vicious cycle will not end unless the root cause, the decades-old hostility between Pyongyang on the one hand, and Seoul and Washington on the other, is addressed.

All parties should step up communication and engagement to secure a peaceful settlement of the DPRK nuclear issue.

China Daily is a member of The Straits Times media partner Asia News Network, an alliance of 22 news media entities.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/02/15/president_trumps_east_asia_challenge_110810.html

President Trump's East Asia Challenge

By Joseph Bosco
February 15, 2017

In today's Washington, narratives about the Trump strategy toward East Asia are popping up like late-winter crocuses.* First, it was the candidate's seemingly obsessive focus on China's trade and currency practices and his threats to take retaliatory protectionist actions.

Then the dark references to Beijing's indulgence toward North Korea's nuclear and missile programs menacing South Korea, Japan, and the United States, followed by complaints about China's aggressive actions in the South China Sea. Most of it was dismissed as typical campaign rhetoric carrying over to the pre-Inauguration period.

When President Trump was finally in a position to take official action, his first move--the dramatic telephone conversation with Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen--shocked the system.* It was simply unthinkable to most in the foreign policy establishment that the two Democratic presidents should have direct contact, even before America's president had spoken with the unelected ruler of China--and all because of something called the "One China" policy.

When the new president said he did not feel particularly bound by that arcane formulation, especially given China's actions in the South China Sea and its inaction on North Korea, observers went ballistic and predicted that China would do the same, perhaps literally.* Who was this untutored president to upset forty years of delicate diplomatic balancing and nuance?* Even his Cabinet appointees were stirring the national security mix unnecessarily with their talk of halting China's aggressive maritime moves.

Illustrating how badly U.S.-China relations had deteriorated by those standards in just two weeks of the new administration, Xi Jinping refused to make a congratulatory call to President Trump until he walked back his One China comment. There was a pervasive sense that this unpredictable and pugnacious American president was leading the country into dark and troubled waters.

The narrative suddenly changed when Chinese and American officials worked quietly behind the scenes to arrange a Trump-Xi telephone call.* The president would pay verbal respect to the One China policy after all and Xi would deign to speak with him.* Now the talk was all about presidential capitulation and provocation through weakness.*

The new story line was that the unsophisticated American president had been outmaneuvered and embarrassed by the wily Chinese leader.* After all his tough talk, his bluff had been called, and he retreated under subtle Chinese pressure.* Having restored the One China policy he had repudiated only a few days before, he would now be susceptible to Chinese assertiveness on a range of other issues.*
Moreover, China would not be the only hostile ruler eager to take advantage of this new American vulnerability.* It could even be argued that North Korea's latest missile launches be a direct consequence.* Having been held in check for fear of what the erratic new U.S. president might do, his "caving" on One China convinced Beijing to give Pyongyang a green light to fire away.

Ready comparisons were made to earlier tough-talking presidential candidates like Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton, and the prime example, Richard Nixon himself, softening their anti-China lines once in office.

However, conventional wisdom may have misjudged the situation yet again. It is possible that the initial Trump disparagement of "One China" was predicated on*Beijing's widely-disseminated One China principle that Taiwan is “part of China.”* The President may have reasonably considered that a *foolish notion since he had just spoken directly to the President of Taiwan herself.* When he was fully informed that Washington's One China policy is, in fact, different, that it is agnostic on the sovereignty question and leaves it to the parties to resolve it peacefully, he could afford to be comfortable giving Xi that illusory concession for now.*

This thesis is not far-fetched, given the media's complete misunderstanding of the nuances on the Taiwan question.* When CNN's Fredricka Whitfield interviewed me on December 3, she prefaced her first question by stating: "The U.S. does not formally recognize Taiwan as an independent state and backs Beijing's claim that Taiwan is a part of China."* I took the opportunity to state the actual U.S. position (hopefully politely).* But the record did not stay corrected for long at CNN; in recent days, both Wolf Blitzer and Jake Tapper have repeated the error, and they are far from alone--BBC just did it as well.*

In any event, it is worth reviewing the Trump bidding up to now.* The two Taiwan initiatives that angered the Chinese and directly unsettled the status quo were (a) the Tsai talk and (b) the One China disavowal.* He has now presumably withdrawn the latter, but he cannot undo the former and what it implies for closer U.S.-Taiwan ties.* And, from a purely deal-making perspective, Xi now owes the President for giving up some face.

The One China, Taiwan, bargaining chip has been played; we wait to see what it won for the U.S. in the South China Sea and on North Korea.* If the results are not satisfactory the chip can always be played again in a ratcheting process that incrementally advances Taiwan's international status.

The Trump scenario could be seen as an imitation of Deng Xiaoping's strategic elaboration of Mao Zedong's thought: two steps forward, one step back.* And, in this case, even the step back on One China can easily be reversed again. Moreover, the other warnings to China, on the South China Sea and North Korea, remain on the table.*

Granted the Tillerson threat to block Chinese access to its militarized manmade islands was subsequently modulated to specify "contingencies" in times of potential conflict.* However, with regular, and serious, Freedom of Navigation Operations likely under this administration, it is not difficult to imagine another incident where Chinese ships or planes harass or interfere with normal, lawful U.S. operations and a confrontation develops.* Neutralizing China's new military assets in the region could be one of the U.S. Navy's first defensive tasks.* China is now on notice.

Moreover, nothing in the Trump-Xi conversation that has been made public so far precludes stronger U.S. pressure on Beijing to get its totally dependent North Korean ally in line on its nuclear and missile programs, especially after the latest tests.* The available U.S. measures available against China itself include secondary sanctions on Chinese governmental and commercial entities doing business with North Korea, tools that have only been used sporadically and ineffectually so far.

In addition, it is time for a major strategic communications program through Radio Free Asia and Voice of America directed at the Chinese population publicizing North Korea's atrocious human rights behavior and reckless nuclear and missile and specifying the Chinese Communist Party as its primary, almost exclusive, enabler.

China's Communist leadership needs to be named and shamed for its role in the destabilization of the region and the dehumanization of the North Korean population.*The self-respecting Chinese people are proud of their skyscrapers and Olympic hosting.* But, when fully informed of Pyongyang's transgressions, they will not happily countenance having their national reputation or their resources identified with that odious regime.

Whether any of these U.S. actions are taken will determine which of the two narratives, bumbling, humiliating backdown or astute long-run strategy, more accurately describes the Trump administration's strategic posture.* And it will become clear sooner rather than later now that Kim Jong Un has issued his own challenge to the new president.


Joseph Bosco was China country director in the office of the secretary of defense, 2005-2006.*
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Mattis to NATO: Pay More or U.S. Will ‘Moderate Its Commitment’
Started by*Buick Electra‎,*Today*10:54 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...y-More-or-U.S.-Will-‘Moderate-Its-Commitment’

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.politico.eu/article/nato-survival-will-depend-on-germany/

Opinion

NATO survival will depend on Germany

Europe is $100 billion short of strategic autonomy. Berlin could close that gap.

By Fabrice Pothier 2/15/17, 4:49 PM CET Updated 2/15/17, 6:46 PM CET

The United States will meet its commitments in Europe but NATO’s European members have to step up on their defense spending — that’s the message U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis will try to hammer home*when he meets with European counterparts in Brussels.

What we’re not likely to hear is that the answer to*the alliance’s spending woes*largely hinges on just one country: Germany.

With*Europe’s largest GDP and by far its strongest economy, Germany is the swing state in European defense. If Berlin commits to spending the recommended 2 percent of GDP on defense, it would add $30 billion of defense spending in Europe — a large share of the $100 billion*surplus that would be generated if all European members and Canada met their targets. The move would significantly boost European defense.

On the flipside, marginal increases from Berlin — along the lines of what it has done since 2014 — would keep European defense spending stuck between 1.2 and 1.3 percent of GDP, an embarrassingly low average considering Europe’s share of global GDP is larger than the*Americans’.

The question, however, is whether Germany can — or indeed should — become the leading military power in Europe.

German leaders are well aware of their NATO allies’ expectations even if they are not always publicly expressed.*Despite Berlin’s initial resistance to sign NATO’s defense pledge, its defense budget has increased every year since 2014. The German defense ministry has secured some hard-won increases from Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, the keeper of Germany’s austerity budget, and Chancellor Angela Merkel has repeated on many occasions her commitment to increase defense spending.

But behind the encouraging statements, Germany*only allocates a disappointing 1.2 percent of GDP to defense. The Bundeswehr*is underperforming and has a limited ability to deploy its own troops or those of its allies. Germany is one*of the world’s leading defense manufacturers and exporters, but too much of its defense budget is apportioned to personnel spending. No wonder, then, that*German pledges*to increase spending are usually met*in Paris with an ironic shrug that it will only serve to make German officer pensions more attractive.

* * *

Getting Germany to punch closer*to its weight will not be easy. Berlin’s next coalition*in the Bundestag will have to break with two powerful dogmas of post-World War II Germany: a balanced budget and a pacifist mindset.


Also On Politico
James Mattis calls NATO ‘my second home’
David M. Herszenhorn


Both ideas are deeply entrenched in Germany’s political culture and institutions. But should Merkel be reelected and commit to greater military spending, it would not be the first time the pragmatic chancellor instigated a radical shift with incremental steps. Just look at her refugee*policy or her firm stance against Russia, which clashes with major German industrial interests and coalition partners.

Germany’s postwar doctrines are not as intractable*as they seem. One of Merkel’s*own predecessors, Konrad Adenauer, already partly broke with one when he decided to rearm Western Germany against the advice of many in his own party in the early 1950s.

Some European politicians and security experts have indulged in wishful thinking that Donald Trump’s presidency could mark*Europe’s chance to assert itself as a more autonomous power. But the numbers tell another story.

Europe is $100 billion short of strategic autonomy. A recent closed-doors exercise with former top officials from the Pentagon and U.S. military as well as*senior European officials revealed that neither side could properly defend Europe from Russian hybrid attacks. The U.S. is over committed globally and, in the best case, will only commit to a marginal increase of spending in Europe. The Europeans*still lag behind in terms of modern warfare capabilities.

Now more than ever, $100 billion is a long shot. Other*important European players — such as Italy, Spain and the Netherlands — are either too small or too economically weak to have much of an effect*on the European defense balance. In this scenario,*Germany’s $30 billion could make all the difference between a stronger Europe or a weaker one.

Short of that, any talk of a European defense union, or even of a European pillar within NATO, will remain*just that — talk.

Fabrice Pothier is*senior associate at Rasmussen Global and non-resident senior fellow at the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C. He was formerly head of policy planning at the office of NATO’s secretary-general.*
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.scout.com/military/warrior/story/1683130-is-china-ahead-of-us-with-hypersonic-weapons

Video

Share & Embed
US vs China: Is China In Front of the US in Developing Hypersonic Weapons?

Kris Osborn
Monday at 9:45 AM

The US wants to say in front of China with hypersonic weapons able to travel at five-times the speed of sound and destroy targets with a "kinetic energy" warhead.

The Air Force will likely have high-speed, long-range and deadly hypersonic weapons by the 2020s, providing kinetic energy destructive power able to travel thousands of miles toward enemy targets at five-times the speed of sound.

“Air speed makes them much more survivable and hard to shoot down. If you can put enough fuel in them that gets them a good long range. You are going roughly a mile a second so if you put in 1,000 seconds of fuel you can go 1,000 miles - so that gives you lots of standoff capability,” Air Force Chief Scientist Greg Zacharias told Scout Warrior in an interview. *

While much progress has been made by Air Force and Pentagon scientists thus far, much work needs to be done before hypersonic air vehicles and weapons are technologically ready to be operational in combat circumstances.

“Right now we are focusing on technology maturation so all the bits and pieces, guidance, navigation control, material science, munitions, heat transfer and all that stuff,” Zacharias added.

Zacharias explained that, based upon the current trajectory, the Air Force will likely have some initial hypersonic weapons ready by sometime in the 2020s. A bit further away in the 2030s, the service could have a hypersonic drone or ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) vehicle.

“I don’t yet know if this is envisioned to be survivable or returnable. It may be one way,” Zacharias explained.

A super high-speed drone or ISR platform would better enable air vehicles to rapidly enter and exit enemy territory and send back relevant imagery without being detected by enemy radar or shot down.*

By the 2040s, however, the Air Force could very well have a hypersonic “strike” ISR platform able to both conduct surveillance and delivery weapons, he added.

A weapon traveling at hypersonic speeds, naturally, would better enable offensive missile strikes to destroy targets such and enemy ships, buildings, air defenses and even drones and fixed-wing or rotary aircraft depending upon the guidance technology available.

A key component of this is the fact that weapons traveling at hypersonic speeds would present serious complications for targets hoping to defend against them – they would have only seconds with which to respond or defend against an approaching or incoming attack.

Hypersonic weapons will quite likely be engineered as “kinetic energy” strike weapons, meaning they will not use explosives but rather rely upon sheer speed and the force of impact to destroy targets.

“They have great kinetic energy to get through hardened targets. You could trade off smaller munitions loads for higher kinetic energy. It is really basically the speed and the range. Mach 5 is five times the speed of sound,” he explained.

The speed of sound can vary, depending upon the altitude; at the ground level it is roughly 1,100 feet per second. Accordingly, if a weapon is engineered with 2,000 seconds worth of fuel – it can travel up to 2,000 miles to a target.

“If you can get control at a low level and hold onto Mach 5, you can do pretty long ranges,” Zacharias said.

Although potential defensive uses for hypersonic weapons, interceptors or vehicles are by no means beyond the realm of consideration, the principle effort at the moment is to engineer offensive weapons able to quickly destroy enemy targets at great distances.

Some hypersonic vehicles could be developed with what Zacharias called “boost glide” technology, meaning they fire up into the sky above the earth’s atmosphere and then utilize the speed of decent to strike targets as a re-entry vehicle.

For instance, Zacharias cited the 1950s-era experimental boost-glide vehicle called the X-15 which aimed to fire 67-miles up into the sky before returning to earth.

China’s Hypersonic Weapons Tests

Zacharias did respond to recent news about China’s claimed test of a hypersonic weapon, a development which caused concern among Pentagon leaders and threat analysts.

While some Pentagon officials have said the Chinese have made progress with effort to develop hypersonic weapons, Zacharias emphasized that much of the details regarding this effort were classified and therefore not publically available.

Nevertheless, should China possess long-range, high-speed hypersonic weapons – it could dramatically impact circumstances known in Pentagon circles and anti-access/area denial.

This phenomenon, referred to at A2/AD, involves instances wherein potential adversaries use long-range sensors and precision weaponry to deny the U.S. any ability to operate in the vicinity of some strategically significant areas such as closer to an enemy coastline. Hypersonic weapons could hold slower-moving Navy aircraft carriers at much greater risk, for example.

An April 27th report in the Washington Free Beach citing Pentagon officials stating that China successfully tested a new high-speed maneuvering warhead.

“The test of the developmental DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle was monitored after launch Friday atop a ballistic missile fired from the Wuzhai missile launch center in central China, said officials familiar with reports of the test,” the report from the Washington Free Beacon said. “The maneuvering glider, traveling at several thousand miles per*hour, was tracked by satellites as it flew west along the edge of the atmosphere to an impact area in the western part of the country.”

X-51 Waverider

Scientists with the Air Force Research Laboratory and the Pentagon's research arm are working to build a new hypersonic air vehicle that can travel at speeds up to Mach 5 while carrying guidance systems and other materials.

Air Force senior officials have said the service wants to build upon the successful hypersonic flight test of the*X-51*Waverider 60,000 feet above the Pacific Ocean in May of 2013.

The Air Force and DARPA, the Pentagon's research entity, plan to have a new and improved hypersonic air vehicle*by 2023.

The X-51*was really a proof of concept test designed to demonstrate that a scram jet engine could launch off an aircraft and go hypersonic.

The scramjet was able to go more than Mach 5 until it ran out of fuel. It was a very successful test of an airborne hypersonic weapons system, Air Force officials said.

The successful test was particularly welcome news for Air Force developers because the X-51 Waverider had previously had some failed tests.

The 2013 test flight, which wound up being the longest air-breathing hypersonic flight ever, wrapped up a $300 million technology demonstration program beginning in 2004, Air Force officials said.

A B-52H Stratofortress carried the*X-51A on its wing before it was released at 50,000 feet and accelerated up to Mach 4.8 in 26 seconds. As the scramjet climbed to 60,000 feet it accelerated to Mach 5.1.

The*X-51*was also able to send back data before crashing into the ocean -- the kind of information now being used by scientists to engineer a more complete hypersonic vehicle.

"After exhausting its 240-second fuel supply, the vehicle continued to send back telemetry data until it splashed down into the ocean and was destroyed as designed," according to an Air Force statement. "At impact, 370 seconds of data were collected from the experiment."

This Air Force the next-generation effort is not merely aimed at creating another scramjet but rather engineering a much more comprehensive hypersonic air vehicle, service scientists have explained.

Hypersonic flight requires technology designed to enable materials that can operate at the very high temperatures created by hypersonic speeds. They need guidance systems able to function as those speeds as well, Air Force officials have said.

The new air vehicle effort will progress alongside an Air Force hypersonic weapons program. While today's cruise missiles travel at speeds up to 600 miles per hour, hypersonic weapons will be able to reach speeds of Mach 5 to Mach 10, Air Force officials said.

The new air vehicle could be used to transport sensors, equipment or weaponry in the future, depending upon how the technology develops.

Also, Pentagon officials have said that hypersonic aircraft are expected to be much less expensive than traditional turbine engines because they require fewer parts.

For example, senior Air Force officials have said that hypersonic flight could speed up a five- hour flight from New York to Los Angeles to about 30 minutes. That being said, the speed of acceleration required for hypersonic flight may preclude or at least challenge the scientific possibility of humans being able to travel at that speed – a question that has yet to be fully determined.

Kris Osborn*can be reached at*Kris.Osborn@Scout.com.
To Ask Military Expert KRIS OSBORN Questions,*VISIT THE WARRIOR FORUMS.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/medi...-north-koreas-missile-launch-a-new-us-policy/

Will North Korea’s Missile Launch a New U.S. Policy?

Anthony Ruggiero
12th February 2017

North Korea launched an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), probably the Musudan (Hwasong-10), from western North Korea on Sunday morning (North Korea time). It is no coincidence that the provocation came during a working dinner in Florida between President Trump and Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Both leaders view North Korea as a threat, and both leaders said as much in statements responding to the launch. But for Trump, in particular, this is a crucial moment to set the tone for his presidency.

This would be Pyongyang’s ninth test of the Musudan IRBM, with the eight previous tests all happening in 2016. This aggressive testing suggests that North Korea is interested in deploying the missile on an accelerated timeline. One expert assesses that North Korea could intend to deploy the missile in 2017. A technical analysis of the successful June 2016 Musudan test suggests a range of 3,200 kilometers, although some have reported 2,500 to 4,000 kilometers with a 500 to 1,200-kilogram payload that could reach Guam.

The Musudan is not an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), but its technology is transferable to ICBM development. Based on a technical analysis from a test last April, North Korea could use two engines from the Musudan in the first stage of its road mobile ICBMs (KN-08/KN-14), which have not been flight-tested. This KN-08/KN-14 configuration could deliver a nuclear weapon as far as 10,000 to 13,000 kilometers, which would put New York and Washington, DC within range. This ICBM could be operational by 2020.

The Musudan IRBM would also make an attractive item for sale to foreign customers, including Iran, for hard currency that North Korea desperately needs. Reports suggest that Iran acquired a version of the Musudan in 2005. Remarkably, North Korea-Iran cooperation in this area is not technically prohibited by the 2015 nuclear deal between the P5+1 and Iran, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Indeed, this is one of the deal’s many flaws.

In response to Sunday’s launch, the Trump administration must immediately pursue four core policy elements: 1) increase support to our allies, including accelerating the deployment of the THAAD missile defense system; 2) issue a direct warning to North Korea, clearly stating the consequences for its provocative actions; 3) apply additional sanctions on North Korea and increase implementation of current sanctions; and 4) get tough with China, by presenting a stark choice to Chinese banks: stop serving as a financial lifeline to Pyongyang or face the consequences, including significant fines or other sanctions.

North Korea is a thorny foreign policy challenge that the Obama administration deferred with its policy of “strategic patience.” Sunday’s launch is an opportunity to recalibrate and make it clear to North Korea that further provocations will elicit increasingly harsh responses.

Anthony Ruggiero is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He previously served as a foreign policy fellow in the Office of Senator Marco Rubio and an official at the U.S. Departments of the Treasury and State. Follow him on Twitter @_ARuggiero

-----

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/anthony-ruggiero-north-korea-debuts-new-solid-fuel-missile/

North Korea Debuts New Solid-Fuel Missile

Anthony Ruggiero
15th February 2017

North Korea on Sunday launched a new ballistic missile, the Pukguksong-2. The launch represents not just a significant advancement for Pyongyang’s missile program, but the first foreign policy challenge for the Trump administration.

North Korea-watchers had expected the regime to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in the wake of its leader Kim Jong Un’s remarks on January 1 that preparations for such a launch had reached the final stage. Pyongyang confirmed that the missile uses solid propellant, and that it could be tipped with a nuclear warhead.

The Pukguksong-2 is probably a land-based variant of a submarine-launched ballistic missile. A preliminary analysis suggested the new missile could travel 1,200 to 1,250 kilometers, and one analyst called the launch a “huge step forward” for North Korea’s missile arsenal and capabilities.

The new missile’s use of solid propellant offers a number of advantages over its liquid counterpart, including the ability to launch in just five minutes as opposed to 30 to 60. The size and success of the Pukguksong-2 also put North Korea on track to fielding additional solid-propellant intermediate-range missiles and ICBMs that, with the short time required to fire them, would be difficult for the U.S. military to destroy and could eventually threaten the American homeland.

The Pukguksong-2 launch was likely timed to coincide with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s meeting with President Trump. In a hastily arranged statement, Abe said the launch was “absolutely intolerable” and Trump affirmed that the United States stands behind Japan. South Korea’s acting president said that Seoul would make a “corresponding” response, while China issued a typically noncommittal reaction calling on all sides to refrain from provocations.

At the urging of the United States, Japan, and South Korea, the United Nations Security Council held an emergency session on February 13. The Council, however, merely issued a press release – one of its lowest forms of condemnation – in what was likely the result of China’s long-standing effort to minimize the North Korean issue at the UN. For years, Beijing has refused to allow robust responses to Pyongyang’s provocations by only agreeing to additional sanctions or designations following a North Korean nuclear test or satellite launches using ballistic missile technology.

The Trump administration should issue additional unilateral sanctions in response to the launch, but any such efforts will be insufficient without also focusing on China’s efforts to downplay North Korea’s tests. If that cannot be achieved in the Security Council, Washington should build a coalition outside the UN to ratchet up pressure on Pyongyang.

Anthony Ruggiero is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He previously served as a foreign policy fellow in the Office of Senator Marco Rubio and an official at the U.S. Departments of the Treasury and State. Follow him on Twitter @_ARuggiero - See more at: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/medi...-new-solid-fuel-missile/#sthash.mTMJpJ9R.dpuf
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.defenseone.com/business/...ll-likely-cost-more-planned-heres-why/135418/

It’s About to Cost a Lot More Money to Launch a Nuclear Bomb

New estimates predict the Pentagon's first new nuclear bombers, missiles, and subs in decades will be more expensive than thought.

BY MARCUS WEISGERBER
FEBRUARY 15, 2017

The Pentagon has gotten better at estimating the cost of new weapons, but nuclear-armed ships, subs, and missiles are entirely different animals.

Estimates of the cost to maintain and ultimately replace the current planes, rockets, and submarines that may deliver them — range from hundreds of billions of dollars to more than $1 trillion over the next three decades.

In a new report, the Defense Department’s office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation — considered the gold standard of budget estimators inside the Pentagon — notes that in looking at a proposed ICBM project, “it was unusually difficult to estimate the cost … because there was no recent data to draw upon, and the older historical data was of very questionable quality or was nonexistent. This leads to considerable uncertainty and risk in any cost estimate.”

On Tuesday, the Congressional Budget Office said it will cost the departments of Defense and Energy some $400 billion over the next decade alone to buy new bombers, submarines and ICBMs. That estimate also includes the cost of maintaining current inventory of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

But within that $400 billion figure is $56 billion in anticipated cost overruns. Those costs would be incurred “if the costs for those nuclear programs exceeded planned amounts at roughly the same rates that costs for similar programs have grown in the past,” the report states.

Read more: Welcome to America’s ‘Nuclear Sponge’
Related: Making America’s ICBMs Great Again
See also The US Air Force Just Dropped Two Fake Nukes (Oct ‘16)


The estimates come as the Pentagon and defense firms prepare to build the military’s next-generation intercontinental ballistic missile. That project (along with maintaining the current Minuteman III ICBMs) is expected to cost $43 billion between 2017 and 2026, according to the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office. The Air Force says the new ICBMs will cost $62 billion over 30 years, but the CAPE report estimates that the project will cost more than 35 percent more than service officials have said.

As well, the Congressional Budget Office estimates the 2017-26 cost of new Navy Columbia-class ballistic submarines (and maintaining the current Ohio-class subs) at $90 billion; new Air Force bombers, $43 billion. Then there’s another $58 billion needed for new command-and-control planes and improvements to early-warning satellites and $87 billion for the nuclear weapons laboratories.

That begs the question, how can the Pentagon afford it all?

“For the last three years or so, the department has been very deliberately planning for the modernization bills that we’ve known were coming as a whole suite of systems that were built decades ago are coming up on their end of life,” Jamie Morin, an Obama administration appointee who served as director of the CAPE office until last month, said in an interview shortly before he left office. “All of those programs … are pretty well understood and we have good estimates for the cost and schedule it will take to deliver them.”

But keeping them on schedule is a necessity because the current inventory, particularly the Ohio-class nuclear submarines, only have so much life left in them.

“I think the department has a pretty good handle on when we need them,” Morin said. “I think we recognize that that leaves us just about enough time to responsibly execute these recapitalization programs.”

Despite objections, the Obama administration in July took the first steps toward buying new ICBMs and a controversial long-range nuclear cruise missile, called the Long-Range Standoff Weapon. While President Donald Trump has not laid out a detailed nuclear weapons plan, in December, he tweeted: “The United States must greatly strengthen and expand its nuclear capability until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding nukes.”

The Minuteman III ICBMs date to the 1970s; the last ones were built in 1978. The long-range nuclear missiles are scattered across the north-midwestern United States in underground silos.

Boeing, which made the Minuteman III, as well as Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman have said they intend to bid on the new ICBM project, called the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent. The Air Force is expected to chose a winning bid later this year.

The Air Force selected Northrop Grumman to build a new stealth bomber, which will eventually carry nuclear weapons. Called the B-21 Raider, it will replace the B-1, which no longer carries nuclear weapons, and the B-52, which has been in the Air Force since the 1950s.

Marcus Weisgerber is the global business editor for Defense One, where he writes about the intersection of business and national security. He has been covering defense and national security issues for more than a decade, previously as Pentagon correspondent for Defense News and chief editor of ... FULL BIO...
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realcleardefense.com/art..._militarys_march_toward_modernity_110812.html

The Indian Military's March Toward Modernity

By Stratfor
February 15, 2017

Forecast
  • Major industrial, acquisition and fiscal structural problems will continue to limit the potential of Indian military reform.
  • The cost of salaries and pensions will constrain defense spending.
  • The country's own arms industry will remain heavily reliant on foreign partners.
  • India's struggle to replace aging aircraft and address issues such as ammunition shortfalls would pose a risk to the military on the battlefield.

Analysis
India has taken a military leap forward over the past decade. In 2012, it tested its first intercontinental ballistic missile, the Agni-V, now thought to be operational, and in August 2016, it commissioned its first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, the INS Arihant, making it the first country from outside the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council to operate such a vessel. Its shipbuilding industry has also taken considerable strides, launching the India-constructed Kolkata-class destroyer starting in 2006 and the country's first domestically designed and built aircraft carrier, the INS Vikrant, in 2013. But despite those impressive feats, a number of structural and systemic problems continues to hamper Indian military modernization and reform.

Budgetary and Bureaucratic Obstacles
The Indian defense budget is a consistent constraint on the military's modernization. Though overall defense spending has continued to quickly rise over the past few years, topping $50 billion for fiscal year 2017, much of the increase has been sunk into pensions and salary bumps or negated by inflation. The implementation of the One Rank One Pension reform initiative in 2016 — a longstanding request from service personnel and veterans — has already led to a significant jump in pension costs, with another 36 percent jump projected for 2017. Partially as a result, according to Defense News, the latest proposed budget sliced funding for naval equipment by 30 percent and air force equipment by 6 percent.

Graphs

A notoriously slow acquisitions process has compounded the funding issues. Efforts to weed out the sort of corruption that tainted past equipment deals have led to numerous suspensions of deals pending investigation, the blacklisting of firms and significantly delayed procurement projects over the past 15 years. From 2002 to 2012 alone, more than $5 billion of allocated procurement money is believed to have gone unspent because of these delays.

The troubled acquisition process would be less of an issue if India could rely more on its own fledgling arms industry, but the country remains the world's largest weapons importer. As part of its Make in India initiative, New Delhi has sought to prioritize awarding a number of contracts to domestic companies, in some cases severely limiting participation from foreign vendors — as was the case with a program to upgrade the Pechora air defense system. Furthermore, India has actively targeted technology transfer and "offset" arrangements (where the seller reinvests part of the value of a contract into Indian research and development) as part of its arms import agreements as a bridging mechanism toward a maturing local defense industry. Over the past decade, India has secured approximately $5 billion in offset money, a third of which has been funneled into domestic defense manufacturers. The Indian government expects offset funds to grow to $1 billion annually in the coming years.

Still, India's effort to expand its domestic arms industry continues to face significant hurdles. For example, Bloomberg has outlined how 13 out of 25 contracts signed since 2008 have failed to meet their offset obligations. In many of these cases, local industries have been unable to meet production quotas because of inadequate technical or production capacity, stemming the allocation of offset money. Furthermore, offset money has disproportionately gravitated toward relatively rudimentary production tasks, with the bulk of the advanced manufacturing done abroad or by foreign companies. Given the limitations, some foreign vendors apparently would rather pay the contract penalty than meet their offset agreements.

The limitations of the Indian domestic arms industry are perhaps best highlighted by the effort to develop the Tejas light combat aircraft, a priority for an Indian military facing a significant shortfall in fighter aircraft. The aircraft, developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., is already decades behind schedule and still not fully developed. Moreover, despite a significant effort to maximize indigenous components on the fighter, the key combat systems of the aircraft remain of foreign origin. These include a U.S.-made engine, a Russian gun, an Israeli radar and a British ejection seat.

Implications for Indian Military Readiness
The combination of funding, acquisition and industrial problems are clouding what should be a bright defense outlook — with real-world consequences for the Indian military's force structure. For instance, the military has a standing requirement for 42 squadrons each comprising about 18 combat aircraft, but it currently has fewer than 33 such squadrons. This number is expected to shrink to 22 squadrons by 2032. The declining number of combat aircraft is being driven by two factors. The first is the age of the fleet, with a high number of combat aircraft, including the MiG-21 and MiG-27, due to be retired in upcoming years. The second stems from the laborious process of procuring replacement aircraft, which is greatly delaying force recapitalization. The 2001 tender for the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA), for instance, was originally intended to purchase 126 fighter aircraft. By 2016, however, only 36 French Rafale jets had been ordered.

Graphs

Procurement problems have extended to the availability of spare parts. India's premier combat aircraft, the Su-30MKI, continues to suffer low serviceability rate — the share of the fleet available at any particular time — largely because of shortages of spare parts. The Indian air force has only recently managed to boost Su-30MKI readiness from 46 percent to around 63 percent. The military hopes that a prospective agreement with Russia facilitating production of spares in India will enable it to reach its serviceability rate goal of 75 percent in the coming years.

Meanwhile, the Indian military is also experiencing a significant ammunition reserve shortfall. A May 2015 report by India's comptroller and auditor general highlighted how available ammunition reserves for 125 of 170 different army weapons were insufficient for even 20 days of war-fighting. This problem was likewise blamed on limited production capacity and an excessively slow acquisitions process. A year later, the situation had not changed much, with shortages even affecting internal security forces under the Ministry of Home Affairs, which identified a 75 percent shortfall in 9 mm ammunition. This reportedly has forced paramilitary units to ration ammunition supplies in combat operations against Maoist insurgents and other militants.

Overall, the Indian military is still in a period of growth and transition. Advances in the maritime and aerial spheres over the past 10 years have been particularly significant. Nevertheless, major obstacles related to acquisition and budgetary issues remain, clouding the future of Indian military modernization.

This article appeared originally at Stratfor.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.express.co.uk/news/world...t-fighting-barbes-metro-eurostar-gare-du-Nord

PARIS ON FIRE: Riots reach capital's centre - buildings set ablaze and police attacked

WIDESPREAD suburban rioting spilled into central Paris last night as hundreds went on the rampage over the alleged rape of a young black man by French police.

By PETER ALLEN
PUBLISHED: 05:28, Thu, Feb 16, 2017 | UPDATED: 07:18, Thu, Feb 16, 2017
Comments 516

Officers were forced to unleash tear-gas on angry crowds as buildings and rubbish bins were set on fire around the Barbes Metro station, which is just around the corner from the Eurostar hub at Gare du Nord.

As fire crews went in to extinguish the blazes, lines of riot police were attacked, and shops were looted.

A policeman at the scene said: “Windows have been smashed and officers attacked.

“Small groups of protestors wearing hoods to hide their identities are causing trouble and then running away.

Video
Gallery

“Small groups of protestors wearing hoods to hide their identities are causing trouble and then running away.

“Everything is being done to try and disperse the crowds, but this could go on for a long time yet.”

Tension have been high in council estates in the Paris suburbs since February 2, when a man identified only as Theo was beaten up and allegedly raped.

The youth worker said he was sodomised by police with a truncheon, as well as being racially abused, spat at and beaten around his genitals.

RELATED ARTICLES
Marine Le Pen launches petition to SUPPORT under fire police
Paris council use BOULDERS to drive migrants away from makeshift camp

One unidentified officer has been charged with rape, and three more with assault since Theo was sent to hospital.

He underwent emergency surgery, and has since been visited by President Francois Hollande, who has appealed for calm.

Police stations and squad cars have been attacked since, along with patrols trying to operate around France.

Last night's protest at Barbes was an illegal one, with police in the 18th arrondissement refusing to give permission for it.

The areas is also close to the Sacre Coeur basilica in the Montmartre area - one hugely popular with tourists, including many from Britain.

Many fear a repeat of the mass housing estate rioting that blighted France over three weeks in 2005, leading to a State of Emergency being declared.

Related articles
Tensions boil over in Paris as leaders blasted 'cowardly'
SHOCK SURVEY CLAIM: 80% say France terror attack ‘probable’ in NEXT...
PARIS RIOTS: Tourists ordered to STAY AWAY after rioters ATTACK coach
 

mzkitty

I give up.
I have no clue which body count is correct, but the video below is horrendous - be advised:


Terror Events ‏@TerrorEvents 3m3 minutes ago
Terror Events Retweeted Terror Events

#Iraq #Baghdad - Updated preliminary toll: 19 dead, 40 wounded.


AlternativeViews ‏@LloydZiel 4m4 minutes ago

BreakingNLive: #BREAKING 18 dead, 50 injured after car #explosion in #Baghdad.


Iraqi Day ���� ‏@iraqi_day 15m15 minutes ago

Horrific video of the car bomb that rocked Bayaa south #Baghdad moments ago. 8 dead and 40 wounded.
#Iraq

Video here -- dead bodies:


https://twitter.com/iraqi_day

Another update:

Bangladesh News 24 ‏@bdnews24 49s50 seconds ago
Bangladesh News 24 Retweeted AFP news agency

AFP: #BREAKING Baghdad car bomb death toll rises to 39: police


Another update:

Iraqi Day ���� ‏@iraqi_day 18s19 seconds ago
���� Retweeted Iraqi Day

#BREAKING
#Baghdad operations officially announced that 45 died and 49 wounded in the car bomb attack in Bayaa south of the capital.
#Iraq
 
Last edited:

mzkitty

I give up.
And this from Pakistan. Must be blow up everybody day:


Huge blast rocks holy shrine in Sehwan; dozens martyred; hundreds injured

February 16, 2017

A huge blast rocked the holy shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar’s in Sehwan on Thursday, The Shia Post reports.

The explosion took place at the spot where the dhamaal (Sufi ritual) was being performed, within the premises of the shrine.

According to reports dozens of pilgrims have been martyred where hundreds have been injured.

Local media has reported, at least 50 people have been martyred including women and children.

Multiple injuries are feared as a large number of people frequent the shrine on Thursdays.

A large contingent of police has reached the spot.

http://shiapost.com/2017/02/16/huge...e-in-sehwan-dozens-martyred-hundreds-injured/


Karachiabad ‏@Karachiabad 1m1 minute ago

#BREAKING
50 reported dead, over 100 injured in Lal Shahbaz Qalandar Shrine bomb blast. #PrayForPakistan

Update:

Jakub Dyrda ‏@kuba_dyrda 59s59 seconds ago

#BREAKING: #AmaqAgency: #ISIS claims responsibility for suicide attack in front of Shiite shrine in southern #Sindh province, #Pakistan.
 
Last edited:

mzkitty

I give up.
Death toll goes further up:


Preston Phillips Verified account ‏@PrestonTVNews 1m1 minute ago

#breaking: ISIS suicide bomber kills 75, hurts more than 200 in Pakistan. 20 women, 9 kids. 2nd deadly ISIS attack today, 1st in Baghdad.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/hybr...ed-guerilla-style-warfare-in-asias-littorals/

Hybrid Warriors: China’s Unmanned, Guerrilla-Style Warfare in Asia’s Littorals

Expect China to add drones – little grey (un)men – to its arsenal of hybrid warfare tactics in the South China Sea.

By Tobias Burgers & Scott N. Romaniuk
February 16, 2017

Beijing has always paid close attention to the military activities of other nations, drawing lessons from their successes and failures, and applying the lessons to its own political and military strategies at home. Beijing has also undoubtedly drawn from Russia’s recent “successes,” and (re)embraced the concept and practice of modern hybrid warfare. In recent years, China has made bold steps to reassert its claims of sovereignty and presence over a strategically vital region. Tactics and strategies such as “salami slicing” and the cabbage strategy, have become the mantra in the South China Sea (SCS), mixing government-supported psychological warfare with violent (covert) operations. China’s actions can be increasingly observed in a grey area situated between politics and violence (or war).

The concept of grey zones — those of political, military, and legal actions, patterns, and behavior — is not entirely new for China. For years if not decades, Russia and North Korea, in addition to China, have practiced similar non-linear operations – what can aptly be labeled hybrid warfare. Mao and other guerrilla warfare strategists have long advocated such tactics and strategies, arguing that revolutionary struggles and insurgencies are most effective when conducted with a framework of irregular warfare. Mao famously stated, “[t]he guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.”

In this regard Putin’s little green men are not operating much differently than Mao’s revolutionary fighters, or Castro’s guerilla fighters some six or so decades ago. North Korea’s naval actions against South Korea in the past several years, such as the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan also distinctly smacks of hybrid warfare. China’s fishermen-turned-state-sanctioned-militia, too, fit perfectly into this hybrid framework: Operating primarily as a civil fishing fleet, but with military training, and conducting (para)military operations. They easily disappear into civilian shade at will, becoming Mao’s fish in the sea.

The term hybrid warfare tends to be applied to situations on land but attention is increasingly turning to the use of maritime hybrid warfare. Despite the obvious geographical difference, hybrid warfare or littoral guerilla style warfare functions in much the same fashion as land-based operations. There are several important distinctive advantages for states actively pursuing littoral hybrid warfare activities. The maritime battlespace offers the opportunity of convergence, the blending of conventional and non-conventional forces and force capabilities. A rich line-up of tactics and strategies (that can be described as “multi-nodal”) enhances an actor’s operational spectrum. The prior mentioned fisherman-turned-paramilitary militia is a prime example of how China has sought to increase its influence over the SCS through the use of non-linear or “multi-variant” forms of warfare.

In a recent article for the US Naval Institute journal Proceedings Admiral James Stavridis argued that we are on the brink of further Chinese hybrid warfare actions. The U.S. Naval War College’s Andrew Erickson also argued along similar lines. Given China’s recent action, political language, and expert assessments of the broader picture, one might expect to see China supplement Putin-esque “little green men” with a handful or more of “little blue men.” Such a scenario necessitates further discussion, particularly given that Russia’s achievements in Ukraine have illustrated just how critical understanding the concept of hybrid warfare is for building the requisite foundations of an effective counter-strategy.

However, the current “little blue men” focus remains too restricted and consideration therefore should be made toward enlarging the scope of modern hybrid warfare: It should include the concept of “little grey (un)men” that we presented in a prior article for The Diplomat. In this article, we argued that China’s capture of one of the United States’ “little grey (un)men” — an unmanned buoyancy glider — served to highlight U.S. efforts to look to the use of unconventional forces, such as unmanned systems, in the battlefield as instruments capable of countering threats other than terrorists and insurgents. However, the possible hybrid, unmanned effort by the U.S. is not a one-way street.

As much as the United States could pursue such strategies in the future, China could also enhance its little blue men with a fleet of flying, sailing, swimming “little grey (un)men.” Proving the origin of many deployed unmanned systems could prove extremely difficult because they might not have any national markings on them. Unmanned systems can effectively afflict an actor with inattentional-blindness. Their above/on-the-water counterparts, unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), are also ideally suited for operations in which a visual presence is a requisite condition, such as sailing through contested waters and conducting incursions in an opposing nation’s exclusive economic zones (EEZs).

In addition to political purposes, unmanned systems like those described here can be used for offensive (military) purposes. Used in combination with swarming tactics, they could surround commercial, military, and paramilitary vessels. With no national markings, and devoid of personnel onboard, the possibilities for (direct) communication are almost nil. This ambiguity in communication could lead to a great deal of confusion and miscommunication between two or more hybrid actors, raising the possibility for violent conflict between states operating the systems. The apparent lack of diplomatic interaction compels opposing actors to settle on a limited framework of counter-options: ignore a given vessel, risk collision and possibly destruction, or face the potential of violent encounter. Alternatively, the decision could be made to stand down and allow an incursion to take place even though this would mean running the risk of losing in a larger political battle.

Take China’s capacity for large-scale building, its experience in hybrid warfare, and couple it with small and relatively inexpensive hybrid instruments, and it becomes apparent that an extensive range and application of unmanned systems will likely pose a daunting challenging threat to the security architecture of the SCS over the coming decade.

Tobias Burgers is a Doctoral Student at Otto-Suhr-Institute, Free University Berlin and formerly a Visiting Researcher at CSS, NCCU, Taipei, Taiwan.

Scott N. Romaniuk is a Doctoral Student at the School of International Studies, University of Trento and a Research Associate at the Center for the Study of Targeted Killing, University of Massachusetts (Dartmouth), United States.

---

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/would-china-use-nuclear-weapons-in-a-war-with-taiwan/

Would China Use Nuclear Weapons in a War With Taiwan?

China insists on “No First Use” of nukes, but the threat remains.

By Ben Lowsen
February 17, 2017

On October 28 of last year, the Carnegie Foundation in Washington, D.C. hosted a panel of Chinese scholars and officials to discuss Chinese nuclear thinking. During the event, two former officials—retired diplomat Sha Zukang and retired PLA major general Yao Yunzhu—offered their opinions on how China might react to a U.S. military intervention if a crisis were to take place concerning Taiwan.
Yao was quite direct: “China’s No First Use policy will not change, not only in the Taiwan scenario but in other scenarios as well, and we have 100 percent confidence that we can deal with the Taiwan independence issue by peaceful means and, if necessary, non-peaceful means.”

Unsurprising, but then Sha drew legs on the snake: “And, to add [to] what General Yao said, at any cost we will certainly do the job on our own. … I wish it would never happen, but it’s a wish. But we have to think of the worst scenario … [if] this scenario appeared and China were cornered, as I said earlier, we had no choice but to do the job at any cost.”

Had this been a discussion of a Taiwan scenario, Sha’s comment may have passed with little notice, simply an expression of national resolve. But in a discussion of nuclear policy, it led the audience to a very different and chilling conclusion, expressed in the next audience member’s comment: “It seemed like there was an implied threat to use nuclear weapons in a scenario with China.”

China’s public policy seems clear enough: it will not use nuclear weapons without first absorbing a nuclear attack. It claims that its arsenal is not constructed to target an opponent’s nuclear or command and control capabilities, but rather to deter a nuclear attack by punishing the enemy populace (countervalue targeting). There are undoubtedly details China keeps guarded, but that does not change its outward policy.

Whether intended by Sha or not, the audience’s inference reminds us that a country with nuclear weapons can decide to use them at any time, regardless of policy. Ironically, the very emergencies envisioned by a nuclear policy would be so traumatic as to call any previous policy into question. Thus the threat of nuclear attack always remains as a deterrent to preventing governmental collapse, regardless of policy.

There is however a human instinct to prevent annihilation, such that even under the threat of regime collapse leaders would think twice before launching a senseless strike. They would trust that our better angels would win out in the future, even if they themselves weren’t around to see it. For these leaders, nuclear weapons may be a deterrent only, not a usable weapon.

Sadly and frighteningly, in contrast, the ruthlessness of a regime like North Korea’s makes it less likely to acknowledge others’ humanity. Its paranoia and readiness to employ any means in its own survival should make all other nations wary of the possibility of a nuclear attack out of spite, even in response to a purely internal threat.

China by all accounts, however, is well beyond the stage of needing such desperate measures to stave off collapse. Quite apart from the debate over whether a leader would actually use nuclear weapons, it is possible that a nation seeking to become a “great nation” might very well have an impulse to upgrade its nuclear arsenal and policy commensurate with its new status. Thus Sha’s apparent equivocation may not have been a snake’s legs, but rather a glimpse at a hidden dragon.
 
Top