INTL 12/16 India/Pakistan Crisis: India's options on Pakistan still open

[Housecarl]

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http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JL17Df02.html

Dec 17, 2008
India's options on Pakistan still open
By Richard M Bennett

Pakistan can rightly be described as a failing state. Its internal unity has dissolved into open warfare in significant parts of the country and its relations with India, its heavily armed and nuclear capable neighbor, are in tatters.

Even the patience of its long suffering ally, the United States is now wearing decidedly thin.

Pakistan has a militaristic society that has grown tired of its generals playing politics and instead placed in charge a civilian government that soon appeared to be virtually incapable of tackling head-on the main issues threatening to tear apart the fabric of the nation:

# The growing influence of Islamic extremists in FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), Pakistan-administered Kashmir and many of the northern cities in particular.
# The devious role played by the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) agency with what appears to be evidence that it is still supporting terrorist activity in Afghanistan, Indian-controlled Kashmir and most significantly within India itself.
# The degree to which extreme Islamic beliefs have been wholeheartedly accepted within large parts of the regular army and the junior ranks of the officer corps in particular.

There can be little doubt that besides shoring up the world's shattered economy and dealing with a potentially nuclear armed Iran, high on the list of priorities for the incoming Barack Obama administration will be the fear of a meltdown in Pakistan some time in 2009.

Obama's choice of Hillary Clinton as his secretary of state is a highly significant move in relation to South Asia and has been broadly welcomed by many observers in New Delhi.

Clinton developed a close working relationship with both India and the Indian-American community back home during the eight years her husband Bill Clinton served as president.

It is unlikely that the new US administration will or would want to continue to excuse Pakistan's wanton unwillingness to at least attempt to deal with the rising tide of Islamic extremism threatening both the integrity of the nation and the stability of an already troubled region.

Pakistan's options
In response to the growing chorus of international criticism Pakistan has hinted at a variety of responses, but looked at carefully these would appear to be largely empty gestures made by an increasingly panicked and confused government in Islamabad.

The Pakistan army presently deploys four regular infantry divisions (7th, 9th, 14th and 23rd) in the FATA, the vital region that borders Afghanistan. Islamabad quickly made it known that in response to any saber-rattling by New Delhi, it would be forced to move these units back to their old defensive positions on the border with India.

This in theory would expose the Western forces inside Afghanistan and their long supply route which sees some 350 trucks carrying over 7,000 tons through Pakistan every day to even greater danger from Islamic insurgents. The recent attack that destroyed over 100 US and NATO supply vehicles on Peshawar's outer ring road merely served to highlight this threat.

However, as many seasoned observers quickly pointed out, the Pakistan army with a severely restricted logistic capability would not be able to achieve this massive redeployment quickly or effectively.

Indeed, as many of the army units currently deployed in the FATA have shown little or no interest in actually combating the local insurgency, the withdrawal of one or all of these divisions would probably not have a significant effect on the overall border security situation.

Recently some Pakistan officials have felt it necessary to quietly remind New Delhi - and the world in general - that it is a nuclear power. However, there must still be some doubt as to how many usable nuclear devices Pakistan actually has. Some estimates have been as low as just two 20 kiloton warheads.

Whatever the correct figure may be, Washington's studied indifference to Islamabad's implied nuclear warning goes some considerable way to confirming reports that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is very closely monitored, if not actually controlled in some way by the United States.

It is quite possible that any attempt to move these weapons, let alone deploy them would result in a swift US response and their total destruction.

No change yet
Pakistan is also once again going through the pantomime performance of publicly arresting a few leading members of the Islamic extremist groups that proliferate inside their borders.

Short of these prisoners now being handed over to the Indian authorities along with many others listed as terrorists, New Delhi and an increasingly impatient Washington are likely to remain largely unimpressed.

There has still been no serious attempt by the Pakistan authorities to disarm the militants, close down their training camps or dismantle the organizational structure that provides both new recruits and financial support.

The Lashkar-e-Taiba and other such militant groups with a long track record of carrying out attacks in both Kashmir and India remain very largely untouched and free to continue planning the next terrorist outrage.

The ISI apparently continues to covertly arm, support and train Islamic militants, and some observers have claimed that they may even play a significant role in planning and directing attacks such as those on Mumbai.

Despite the replacement of Lieutenant General Nadeem Taj as head of the ISI on October 1 by the reportedly more moderate Lieutenant General Ahmed Shujaa Pasha, seen by some as an attempt to placate Washington, little of substance has altered and the ISI seems as firmly wedded to its pro-Taliban, pro-Kashmir, anti-Indian stance as before.

The Pakistan army also appears content to remain on its path toward radicalization, providing yet more training and - according to some sources – playing a large role in protecting and maintaining the militant infrastructure.

However, this level of semi-official Pakistan involvement with national and international terrorism may finally bring significant problems for the government in Islamabad.

India's options
India, though usually hamstrung by governments that appear to suffer from some form of strange rictus that prevents anything more than a studied inaction and overwhelming willingness to compromise, may now be forced to at least consider a genuine response.

If the present Congress party government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is removed in the upcoming elections, its replacement in the form of the nationalistic Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) would probably be far more likely to launch a military strike at Pakistan.

The BJP has long accused Congress of being insufficiently aggressive in combating terrorism and now argues that the Mumbai attack was in part a result of this failure.

If the killing of over 170 civilians, police and military in Mumbai proves to be India's September 11, 2001, then it will not be long before New Delhi now finally accepts that one of the most important ways to protect its citizens is to be viewed as willing to retaliate against those who openly sponsor, house, arm and train terrorists.

This could be by way of limited air strikes and commando raids on the scores of Islamic terrorist camps and arms dumps most likely within Pakistan-administered Kashmir, initially.

Some sources have even suggested that the outline of a suitable plan was shown to US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recently. Rice is reported to have quietly commented that while the United States was strongly opposed to a full-scale war between India and Pakistan, it might not be totally averse to some form of limited counter-terror operations.

Risk of greater confrontation
However, a lack of serious and successful crackdowns on Islamic extremist groups within Pakistan by the government of Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, or the repetition of major terrorist acts against Indian targets, could lead to a far wider and more significant confrontation.

Under those circumstances New Delhi may have no alternative but to launch major punitive military operations across the border into Pakistan itself.

It is possible that a clearly exasperated United States may even sanction this as a much-needed salutary lesson for Islamabad that it must take responsibility for the actions of its citizens and for any extremist groups based safely within its national borders.

A military assault is not, of course, the only means of applying pressure on Pakistan. Other punitive measures have been aired ranging from an Indian naval blockade of Karachi and the coast to the withdrawal of large amounts of vital financial aid used to shore up Pakistan's crumbling economy.

Pakistan is rightfully a proud country, but has little to be genuinely proud about in its current situation. It is a nation that has been constantly let down by a succession of weak civilian governments and heavy-handed military dictatorships.

It now faces economic meltdown, a chaotic political situation, widespread extremism and the growing disaffection of significant numbers of the middle class, civil service and the military.

Some experienced observers have openly suggested that tanks and armored vehicles may once again be seen on the streets of Pakistan's cities as the military takes back power from yet another failed civilian administration.

Normally this might have been greeted by a resigned and cautious welcome in Washington. However, this time it might just be that militant Islamic elements within the officer corps are staging a coup.

The real fear then is of an unstable Pakistan sinking into chaos and anarchy and vast amounts of territory, weapons and perhaps nuclear materials falling under the control of Islamic extremists linked to al-Qaeda.

This would without a doubt be the United States and India's worst nightmare. Indeed it might turn out to be the last act before decisive foreign military operations to neutralize Pakistan began in earnest.

Pakistan is potentially a powerful ally in the "war on terror" and a firm friend of the West. Sadly it has chosen to play the devious game of running with the fox and hunting with the hounds for far too long.

Islamabad's continued deceptions are having a caustic effect on its international relations and dangerously increasing tension with India.

Having lived by the sword for so long, Pakistan now risks dying by it as well.

Copyright 2008 Richard M Bennett, intelligence analyst - AFI Research.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/200...ontained_world

The Geopolitics of India: A Shifting, Self-Contained World

December 16, 2008 | 1518 GMT


Editor’s Note: This is the fifth in a series of monographs by Stratfor founder George Friedman on the geopolitics of countries that are currently critical in world affairs. Click here for a printable PDF of the monograph in its entirety.

By George Friedman

The geopolitics of India must be considered in the geographical context of the Indian subcontinent — a self-contained region that includes India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and, depending how one defines it, Nepal and Bhutan. We call the subcontinent “self-contained” because it is a region that is isolated on all sides by difficult terrain or by ocean. In geopolitical terms it is, in effect, an island.

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This “island” is surrounded on the southeast, south and southwest by the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. To the west, it is isolated by mountains that rise from the Arabian Sea and run through Pakistan’s Balochistan province, stretching northward and rising higher and higher to the northwestern corner of Pakistan. There, at the Hindu Kush, the mountain chain swings east, connecting with the Pamir and Karakoram ranges. These finally become the Himalayas, which sweep southeast some 2,000 miles to the border of Myanmar, where the Rakhine Mountains emerge, and from there south to India’s border with Bangladesh and to the Bay of Bengal. The Rakhine are difficult terrain not because they are high but because, particularly in the south, they are covered with dense jungle.
The Geography of the Subcontinent

The subcontinent physically divides into four parts:

* the mountainous frame that stretches in an arc from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal;
* the North Indian Plain, stretching from Delhi southeast through the Ganges River delta to the Myanmar border, and from the Himalayas in the north to the southern hills;
* the Indian Peninsula, which juts southward into the Indian Ocean, consisting of a variety of terrain but primarily hilly;
* the deserts in the west between the North Indian Plain and Pakistan’s Indus River Valley.

Pakistan occupies the western region of the subcontinent and is based around the Indus Valley. It is separated from India proper by fairly impassable desert and by swamps in the south, leaving only Punjab, in the central part of the country, as a point of contact. Pakistan is the major modern-day remnant of Muslim rule over medieval India, and the country’s southwest is the region first occupied by Arab Muslims invading from what is today southwestern Iran and southern Afghanistan.

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The third major state in the subcontinent is the Muslim-majority Ganges delta state of Bangladesh, which occupies the area southeast of Nepal. Situated mainly at sea level, Bangladesh is constantly vulnerable to inundations from the Bay of Bengal. The kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan rest on the heights of the Himalayas themselves, and therefore on the edge of the subcontinent. There is also a small east-west corridor between Nepal and Bangladesh connecting the bulk of India to its restive northeastern states and its eastern border with Myanmar. In this region is India’s easternmost state, Arunachal Pradesh, whose territory is also claimed by China.

The bulk of India’s population lives on the northern plain. This area of highest population density is the Indian heartland. It runs through the area around Lahore, spreading northwest into Pakistan and intermittently to Kabul in Afghanistan, and also stretching east into Bangladesh and to the Myanmar border. It is not, however, the only population center. Peninsular India also has an irregular pattern of intense population, with lightly settled areas intermingling with heavily settled areas. This pattern primarily has to do with the availability of water and the quality of soil. Wherever both are available in sufficient quantity, India’s population accumulates and grows.

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India is frequently compared geographically to non-Russian Europe because both are peninsulas jutting out of the Eurasian land mass. They have had radically different patterns of development, however.

The Europeans developed long-standing and highly differentiated populations and cultures, which evolved into separate nation-states such as Spain, France, Germany and Poland. Their precise frontiers and even independence have varied over time, but the distinctions have been present for centuries — in many cases predating the Roman Empire. The Indian subcontinent, on the other hand, historically has been highly fragmented but also fluid (except when conquered from the outside). Over fairly short periods of time, the internal political boundaries have been known to shift dramatically.

The reason for the difference is fairly simple. Europe is filled with internal geographic barriers: The Alps and Pyrenees and Carpathians present natural boundaries and defensive lines, and numerous rivers and forests supplement these. These give Europe a number of permanent, built-in divisions, with defined political entities and clear areas of conflict. India lacks such definitive features. There are no internal fortresses in the Indian subcontinent, except perhaps for the Thar Desert.

Related Special Topic Pages

* Geopolitical Monographs by George Friedman
* Countries In Crisis
* India’s Strategic Alliances
* Security and Counterterrorism in India
* India’s Economy


Instead, India’s internal divisions are defined by its river systems: the Ganges, the Brahmaputra, the Narmada and so on. All of India’s major cities are centered around one of these river systems, a fact that has been instrumental in the rise of so many distinct cultures in India — Punjabis, Gujaratis, Marathis, Tamils and others — which have manifested in modern times as states within India. That said, Indian nationalism is very strong and counters the separatist tendencies. There is a balance between a strong central governance and substantial regional autonomy.

What is permanent in the subcontinent is the frame, the mountains, and beyond these the wastelands. We can see this most clearly when looking at the population distribution of the surrounding regions. The subcontinent is isolated as a population center, surrounded by comparatively empty regions. It is not only a question of the mountains around it, although those are substantial barriers; the terrain beyond the mountains in every direction is sparsely populated, and in many ways its resources are insufficient to support a sizable, sedentary civilization. As a result, India has rarely demonstrated an appetite for adventurism beyond the subcontinent. If India can find a way to manage Pakistan and Bangladesh, there is little pressure to do anything more.

India’s Geopolitical Imperatives

The geography of the subcontinent constrains the behavior of governments that arise there. If there is to be an independent India, and if it is to be a stable and secure nation-state, it must do the following things:

* Achieve suzerainty in the Ganges River basin. The broad, braided plains of the Ganges basin are among the most fertile in the world and guarantee a massive population. India must become the premier power in this heartland. This does not mean that such power must be wielded by a unified, centralized authority. A coalition of powers can be functional, and even somewhat hostile powers such as Bangladesh can be tolerated so long as they do not challenge India’s authority or security.
* Expand throughout the core of the subcontinent until it reaches all natural barriers. Forests, hills and rivers aside, there is little else in the confines of the subcontinent that limits India’s writ. “Control” of the additional territories can be a somewhat informal and loose affair. The sheer population of the Ganges basin really requires only that no foreign entity be allowed to amass a force capable of overwhelming the Ganges region.
* Advance past the patch of land separating the Ganges basin from the Indus River basin and dominate the Indus region (meaning Pakistan). The Indus Valley is the only other significant real estate within reach of India, and the corridor that accesses it is the only viable land invasion route into India proper. (Modern India has not achieved this objective, with implications that will be discussed below.)
* With the entire subcontinent under the control (or at least the influence) of a centralized power, begin building a navy. Given the isolation of the subcontinent, any further Indian expansion is limited to the naval sphere. A robust navy also acts as a restraint upon any outside power that might attempt to penetrate the subcontinent from the sea.

These imperatives shape the behavior of every indigenous Indian government, regardless of its ideology or its politics. They are the fundamental drivers that define India as a country, shaped by its unique geography. An Indian government that ignores these imperatives does so at the risk of being replaced by another entity — whether indigenous or foreign — that understands them better.

A History of External Domination

India’s geopolitical reality — relative isolation from the outside world, a lack of imposed boundaries, the immense population and the dynamic of a central government facing a vast region — has created localized systems that shift constantly, resist central authority, and ultimately cannot be organized into a coherent whole, either by foreign occupiers or by a native government. It is a landscape of shifting political entities, constantly struggling against each other or allying with each other, amid an endless kaleidoscope of political entities and coalitions. This divided landscape historically has created opportunities for foreign powers to divide India and conquer it — and indeed, the subcontinent was under foreign domination from the 11th century until 1947.

Externally, the threats to India historically have come from the passes along the Afghan-Pakistani border and from the sea. India’s solution to both threats has been to accommodate them rather than resist directly, while using the complexity of Indian society to maintain a distance from the conqueror and preserve the cultural integrity of India. (In a sense, Mahatma Gandhi’s strategy of nonviolent resistance represents the foundation of India’s historical strategy, although the historical basis for Indian nonviolent resistance has been more commercial than ethical.) But essentially, India’s isolation, coupled with its great population, allows it to maintain a more or less independent foreign policy and balance itself between great powers.

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Between the 11th and 18th centuries, India was ruled by Muslims. The first invasion occupied the area of what is today Pakistan. Over the centuries — under various rulers and dynasties, particularly the Mughals — Muslims expanded their power until they dominated much of India. But that domination was peculiar, because the Muslims did not conquer the Hindus outright. Except in the area west of the Thar Desert and the Ganges delta, they did not convert masses of Indians to their religion. What they did was take advantage of the underlying disunity of India to create coalitions of native powers prepared to cooperate with the invaders. The urge to convert Hindus to Islam was secondary to the urge to exploit India’s wealth. Political and military power was a means toward this end, rather than toward conversion, and because of this, the Hindus were prepared to collaborate. In the end, the Indians’ internal tensions were greater than their resentment of outsiders.

European powers followed the Muslims into India en masse. Unlike the Muslims, they arrived from the sea, but like the Muslims, their primary motive was economic, and they sought political power as a means toward economic ends. The British, the most permanent European presence in the subcontinent, used India’s internal tensions to solidify their own position. They did not conquer India so much as they managed the internal conflicts to their advantage.

What was left behind when the British departed was the same sea of complex and shifting divisions that had defined India before they came. Most of the regions that were Muslim-majority areas became Islamic entities, eventually dividing into Pakistan and Bangladesh. The rest of India was united under a single government, but in a sense, that government ruled in the same way the British had.

The Geopolitics of Modern India

Modern India has its origins in the collapse of the British Empire. Indeed, it was the loss of India that ultimately doomed the British Empire. The entire focus of imperial Britain, from the Suez Canal to Gibraltar and Singapore, was to maintain the lines of supply to India. Many of the colonies and protectorates around the world secured by Britain in the 19th century were designed to provide coaling stations to and from India. In short, the architecture of the British Empire was built around India, and once India was lost, the purpose of that architecture dissolved as well. The historical importance of India could not be overestimated. Lenin once referred to it as the supply depot of humanity — which overstated the case perhaps, but did not overstate India’s importance to Britain.

The British gave up India for several reasons, the most important of which was commercial: The cost of controlling India had outstripped the value derived. This happened in two ways. The first was that the cost of maintaining control of the sea-lanes became prohibitive. After World War II, the Royal Navy was far from a global navy. That role had been taken over by the United States, which did not have an interest in supporting British control of India. As was seen in the Suez crisis of 1956, when the British and French tried to block Egyptian nationalization of the canal, the United States was unprepared to support or underwrite British access to its colonies (and the United States had made this clear during World War II as well). Second, the cost of controlling India had soared. Indigenous political movements had increased friction in India, and that friction had increased the cost of exploiting India’s resources. As the economics shifted, the geopolitical reality did as well.

The independence of India resulted in the unification of the country under an authentically Indian government. It also led to the political subdivision of the subcontinent. The Muslim-majority areas — the Indus Valley region west and northwest of the Thar Desert, and the Ganges River basin — both seceded from India, forming a separate country that itself later split into modern-day Pakistan and Bangladesh. It was this separatism that came to frame Indian geopolitics.

India and Pakistan, for the bulk of their mutual existence, have had an adversarial relationship. For a long time, the Indian sentiment was that Pakistan’s separation from India could have been avoided. This attitude, coupled with Pakistan’s own geographic, demographic and economic inferiority, has forced Islamabad to craft its entire foreign policy around the threat from India. As a result, the two sides have fought four wars, mostly over Kashmir, along with one that resulted in the hiving off of Bangladesh.

As noted earlier, the Indian heartland is the northern plain of the Ganges River basin. This plain is separated from Pakistan’s heartland, the Indus Valley, only by a small saddle of easily traversed land; fewer than 200 miles separate the two rivers. If India is to have any ambition in terms of expansion on land, the Indus is the only option available — all other routes end either in barriers or in near-wasteland. Meanwhile, the closeness — and sheer overwhelming size — of India is central to Pakistan’s mind-set. The two are locked into rivalry.

China and the Himalayan Wall

Apart from this enmity, however, modern India has faced little in the way of existential threats. On its side of the mountain wall, there are two states, Nepal and Bhutan, which pose no threat to it. On the other side lies China.

China has been seen as a threat to India, and simplistic models show them to be potential rivals. In fact, however, China and India might as well be on different planets. Their entire frontier runs through the highest elevations of the Himalayas. It would be impossible for a substantial army to fight its way through the few passes that exist, and it would be utterly impossible for either country to sustain an army there in the long term. The two countries are irrevocably walled off from each other. The only major direct clash between Indian and Chinese forces, which occurred in 1962, was an inconclusive battle over border territories high in the mountains — both in the northeast Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh and the Kashmiri border region of Aksai Chin — that could lead nowhere.

A potential geopolitical shift would come if the status of Tibet changed, however. China’s main population centers are surrounded by buffer states — Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet. So long as all are in Chinese hands, the core of China is invulnerable to land attack. If, however, Tibet were to become independent, and if it allied with India, and if it permitted India to base substantial forces in its territory and to build major supply infrastructure there, then — and only then — India could be a threat to China. This is why the Indians for a long time championed the Dalai Lama and Tibetan independence movements, and why the Chinese until fairly recently regarded this as a major threat. Had a pro-Indian, independent government been installed in Tibet, the threat to China would be significant. Because New Delhi held open the option of supporting Tibetan independence, Beijing saw the Indians as engaged in developing a threat to China.

The Chinese tried to develop equivalent threats in India, particularly in the form of Maoist communist insurgencies. Indian Maoists (Naxalites) and Nepalese Maoists have been supported by Beijing, though that support is no longer what it used to be. The Chinese have lost interest in aggressive Maoism, but they do have an interest in maintaining influence in Nepal, where the Maoists recently increased their power through electoral gains. This is China’s counter to India’s Tibet policy.

But for both, this is merely fencing. Neither would be in a position militarily to exploit an opening. Stationing sufficient force in Tibet to challenge the Chinese People’s Liberation Army would outstrip India’s resources, and for little purpose. Using Nepal as a base from which to invade India would be similarly difficult and pointless for Beijing. At the moment, therefore, there is no Indo-Chinese geopolitical hostility. However, these would be points of friction if such hostility were to occur in the distant future.

Russia, the United States and Pakistan

In the absence of direct external threats, modern India’s strategic outlook has been shaped by the dynamics of the Cold War and its aftermath. The most important strategic relationship that India had after gaining independence from Britain in 1947 was with the Soviet Union. There was some limited ideological affinity between them. India’s fundamental national interest was not in Marxism, however, but in creating a state that was secure against a new round of imperialism. The Soviets and Americans were engaged in a massive global competition, and India was inevitably a prize. It was a prize that the Soviets could not easily take: The Soviets had neither an overland route to India nor a navy that could reach it.

The United States, however, did have a navy. The Indians believed (with good reason) that the United States might well want to replace Britain as a global maritime power, a development that might put India squarely in Washington’s sights. The Indians saw in the United States all the same characteristics that had drawn Britain to India. Elsewhere, India saw the United States acting both to hurry the disintegration of the European empires and to fill the ensuing vacuum. India did not want to replace the British with the Americans — its fundamental interest was to retain its internal cohesion and independence. Regardless of American intent — which the Indians saw as ambiguous — American capability was very real, and from the beginning the Indians sought to block it.

For the Indians, the solution was a relationship, if not quite an alliance, with the Soviet Union. The Soviets could provide economic aid and military hardware, as well as a potential nuclear umbrella (or at least nuclear technical assistance). The relationship with the Soviet Union was perfect for the Indians, since they did not see the Soviets as able to impose satellite status on India. From the American point of view, however, there was serious danger in the Indo-Soviet relationship. The United States saw it as potentially threatening U.S. access to the Indian Ocean and lines of supply to the Persian Gulf. If the Soviets were given naval bases in India, or if India were able to construct a navy significant enough to threaten American interests and were willing to act in concert with the Soviets, it would represent a serious strategic challenge to the United States.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the United States was facing a series of challenges. The British were going to leave Singapore, and the Indonesian independence movement was heavily influenced by the Soviets. The Egyptians, and therefore the Suez Canal, also were moving into the Soviet camp. If India became a pro-Soviet maritime power, it would simply be one more element along Asia’s southern rim threatening U.S. interests. The Americans had to act throughout the region, but they needed to deal with India fast.

The U.S. solution was an alliance with Pakistan. This served two purposes. First, it provided another Muslim counterweight to Nasserite Egypt and left-leaning Arab nationalism. Second, it posed a potential threat to India on land. This would force India to divert resources from naval construction and focus on building ground and air forces to deal with the Pakistanis. For Pakistan, geographically isolated and facing both India and a not-very-distant Russia, the relationship with the United States was a godsend.

It also created a very complex geographical situation.

The Soviet Union did not directly abut Pakistan — the two were separated by a narrow strip of territory in the northeasternmost confines of Afghanistan known as the Wakhan Corridor. The Soviets could not seriously threaten Pakistan from that direction, but the U.S. relationship with Pakistan made Afghanistan a permanent Soviet interest (with full encouragement of the Indians, who wanted Pakistan bracketed on both sides). The Soviets did not make a direct move into Afghanistan until late 1979, but well before then they tried to influence the direction of the Afghans — and after moving, they posed a direct threat to Pakistan.

China, on the other hand, did border on Pakistan and developed an interest there. The aforementioned Himalayan clash in 1962 did not involve only India and China. It also involved the Soviets. India and China were both putatively allied with the Soviet Union. What was not well known at the time was that Sino-Soviet relations had deteriorated. The Chinese were very suspicious of Soviet intentions and saw Moscow’s relationship with New Delhi as potentially an alliance against China. Like the Americans, the Chinese were uneasy about the Indo-Soviet relationship. Therefore, China also moved to aid Pakistan. It was a situation as tangled as the geography, with Maoist China and the United States backing the military dictatorship of Pakistan and the Soviets backing democratic India.

From the Indian point of view, the borderland between Pakistan and China — that is, Kashmir — then became a strategically critical matter of fundamental national interest. The more of Kashmir that India held, the less viable was the Sino-Pakistani relationship. Whatever emotional attachment India might have had to Kashmir, Indian control of at least part of the region gave it control over the axis of a possible Pakistani threat and placed limits on Chinese assistance. Thus, Kashmir became an ideological and strategic issue for the Indians.

Shifting Alliances and Enduring Interests

In 1992, India’s strategic environment shifted: The Soviet Union collapsed, and India lost its counterweight to the United States. Uncomfortable in a world that had no balancing power to the United States, but lacking options of its own, India became inward and cautious. It observed uneasily the rise of the pro-Pakistani Taliban government in Afghanistan — replacing the Indian-allied Soviets — but it lacked the power to do anything significant. The indifference of the United States and its continued relationship with Pakistan were particularly troubling to India.

Then, 2001 was a clarifying year in which the balance shifted again. The attack on the United States by al Qaeda threw the United States into conflict with the Taliban. More important, it strained the American relationship with Pakistan almost to the breaking point. The threat posed to India by Kashmiri groups paralleled the threat to the United States by al Qaeda. American and Indian interests suddenly were aligned. Both wanted Pakistan to be more aggressive against radical Islamist groups. Neither wanted further development of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Both were happy to be confronting the Pakistanis with more and more aggressive demands.

The realignment of Indian relations with the United States did not represent a fundamental shift in Indian geopolitics, however. India continues to be an island contained by a ring of mountains. Its primary interest remains its own unity, something that is always at risk due to the internal geography of the subcontinent. It has one enemy on the island with it, but not one that poses a significant threat — there is no danger of a new generation of Muslim princes entering from Pakistan to occupy the Indian plain. Ideally, New Delhi wants to see a Pakistan that is fragmented, or at least able to be controlled. Toward this end, it will work with any power that has a common interest and has no interest in invading India. For the moment, that is the United States, but the alliance is one of convenience.

India will go with the flow, but given its mountainous enclosure it will feel little of the flow. Outside its region, India has no major strategic interests — though it would be happy to see a devolution of Tibet from China if that carried no risk to India, and it is always interested in the possibility of increasing its own naval power (but never at the cost of seriously reshaping its economy). India’s fundamental interest will always come from within — from its endless, shifting array of regional interests, ethnic groups and powers. The modern Indian republic governs India. And that is more important than any other fact in India.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use....
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Kashmir poll marred by fear

By Amy Kazmin in Shirmal

Published: December 16 2008 17:30 | Last updated: December 16 2008 17:30

Under the hostile glare of Indian soldiers, Abdullah Rashid, a Kashmiri farmer, went to a brightly painted school in Shirmal village this weekend to vote for the first time in his life.

The queue to cast ballots for a new government in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir was short – about 12 men, pushed by soldiers into line. Though Mr Rashid, like most Kashmiris, wants an end to Indian rule over Kashmir, he ignored separatist calls for a boycott so he could vote for the People’s Democratic party, which he feels will do more to bring basic services to the village than its rival National Conference.

“There is no relation between elections and the Kashmir question,” said Mr Rashid, 30. “We never have electricity and we want better water supply.”

Just outside the school compound, 100 villagers, watched intently by almost 24 commandos, stood in sullen defiance of an election they consider irrelevant without resolving the dispute over Kashmir’s future.

“We don’t want to cast our votes,” said Ghulam Nabi Lone, 60, a retired school principal, as the crowd murmured assent and commandos moved in closer. “They have promised us the right of self-determination and they are all cheats.”

Such scenes are playing out across Indian-controlled Kashmir as New Delhi holds elections in a region divided between Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan, and claimed by both the nuclear armed neighbours since the British partition of the subcontinent in 1947.

Fabled for its cool climate, mountain scenery and fine handicrafts, Indian-controlled Kashmir, with its mainly Muslim population, was rocked through the 1990s and the early part of this decade by a Pakistan-backed separatist insurgency in which Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Pakistan-based group that New Delhi blames for the Mumbai terror attacks, was a significant force.

While militant violence has dropped sharply since 2002, Kashmir remains a bastion of separatist sentiment, reflected in summer protests that drew 500,000 people calling for independence. Many Kashmiris hoped the marches would give India impetus to revive peace talks with Islamabad over Kashmir’s future. But with New Delhi blaming Lashkar for the Mumbai carnage, many Kashmiris fear the quest for self-determination has been tainted and prospects for peace undermined.

The election is taking place in seven phases – the sixth is on Wednesday – with many of the 500,000 Indian troops in Kashmir deployed at polling areas. Javad Mattoo, superintendent of police in Shopian district, said tight security was required in spite of the fall in militant violence. “We have the presence of local terrorists and foreign terrorists here,” he said. “We are seeing their designs, and it is necessary to have such arrangements to thwart them.”

Yet the presence of so many Indian soldiers amid the deeply resentful population, most of which wants Kashmir to be independent or to merge with Pakistan, is a volatile cocktail.

On Saturday, Muzafar Mushtq Ganai, 21, a shopkeeper’s son and first-year college student, was shot dead by members of the Central Reserve Police Force in Koil Pulwama after villagers protested at a polling station visit by local officials. Hours later, and with two village children in hospital with bullet wounds, hundreds awaited the return of the dead student to his house, with women weeping and wailing in shock, grief and anger. “Who will appear for your exam now,” his mother moaned. “Who will greet us when we come home?”

Rauf Ahmad, a political science student, said neither Ganai nor the children had been protesting when they were shot by police, who are protected by law from prosecution for abuses in Kashmir. “The poll is not the solution,” said Mr Ahmad, 26. “We want freedom from soldiers and complete freedom from India.”

Elections are an old battleground in the Kashmir conflict. Widespread perceptions of rigging of the 1987 polls prompted the first Kashmiri militants to take up arms. Since then, New Delhi has sought to portray any local voting, which has been tainted by allegations of military coercion, as de facto acceptance of Kashmir’s place in India and rejection of militant boycott calls.

But while turnout is higher, political parties in the contest know a vote for them amounts to support for the status quo. Mehbooba Mufti, the PDP president, said: “Participation in Indian elections has not nullified the Kashmir problem. Kashmir is not just about roads and schools or we would not have received so much death and destruction.”

Any new state government must create “conducive conditions” to address the bigger geopolitical issues: reducing the military presence is an urgently needed step. “We need to send the troops back to the barracks,” she said. “There is no gun on the ground, civilian areas need to be cleared of the army . . . You need to uplift this mental siege.”

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2008

 

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* OPINION: GLOBAL VIEW
* DECEMBER 16, 2008, 10:44 A.M. ET

Let's Buy Pakistan's Nukes


Every visitor to Pakistan has seen them: 20-foot tall roadside replicas of a remote mountain where, a decade ago, Pakistan conducted its first overt nuclear tests. This is what the country's leaders -- military, secular, Islamist -- consider their greatest achievement.

So here's a modest proposal: Let's buy their arsenal.

A.Q. Khan, father of Pakistan's nuclear program (and midwife to a few others), likes to point out what a feat it was that a country "where we can't even make a bicycle chain" could succeed at such an immense technological task. He exaggerates somewhat: Pakistan got its bomb largely through a combination of industrial theft, systematic violation of Western export controls, and a blueprint of a weapon courtesy of Beijing.

Still, give Mr. Khan this: Thanks partly to his efforts, a country that has impoverished the great mass of its own people, corruptly enriched a tiny handful of elites, served as a base of terrorism against its neighbors, lost control of its intelligence services, radicalized untold numbers of Muslims in its madrassas, handed the presidency to a man known as Mr. 10%, and proliferated nuclear technology to Libya and Iran (among others) has, nevertheless, made itself a power to be reckoned with. Congratulations.

But if Pakistanis thought a bomb would be a net national asset, they miscalculated. Yes, Islamabad gained parity with its adversaries in New Delhi, gained prestige in the Muslim world, and gained a day of national pride, celebrated every May 28.

What Pakistan didn't gain was greater security. "The most significant reality was that the bomb promoted a culture of violence which . . . acquired the form of a monster with innumerable heads of terror," wrote Pakistani nuclear physicist Pervez Hoodbhoy earlier this year. "Because of this bomb, we can definitely destroy India and be destroyed in its response. But its function is limited to this."

In 2007, some 1,500 Pakistani civilians were killed in terrorist attacks. None of those attacks were perpetrated by India or any other country against which Pakistan's warheads could be targeted, unless it aimed at itself. But Pakistan's nuclear arsenal has made it an inviting target for the jihadists who blew up Islamabad's Marriott hotel in September and would gladly blow up the rest of the capital as a prelude to taking it over.

The day that happens may not be so very far off. President Asif Ali Zardari was recently in the U.S. asking for $100 billion to stave off economic collapse. So far, the international community has ponied up about $15 billion. That puts Mr. Zardari $85 billion shy of his fund-raising target. Meantime, the average Taliban foot soldier brings home monthly wages that are 30% higher than uniformed Pakistani security personnel.

Preventing the disintegration of Pakistan, perhaps in the wake of a war with India (how much restraint will New Delhi show after the next Mumbai-style atrocity?), will be the Obama administration's most urgent foreign-policy challenge. Since Mr. Obama has already committed a trillion or so in new domestic spending, what's $100 billion in the cause of saving the world?

This is the deal I have in mind. The government of Pakistan would verifiably eliminate its entire nuclear stockpile and the industrial base that sustains it. In exchange, the U.S. and other Western donors would agree to a $100 billion economic package, administered by an independent authority and disbursed over 10 years, on condition that Pakistan remain a democratic and secular state (no military rulers; no Sharia law). It would supplement that package with military aid similar to what the U.S. provides Israel: F-35 fighters, M-1 tanks, Apache helicopters. The U.S. would also extend its nuclear umbrella to Pakistan, just as Hillary Clinton now proposes to do for Israel.

A pipe dream? Not necessarily. People forget that the world has subtracted more nuclear powers over the past two decades than it has added: Kazakhstan, Belarus, Ukraine and South Africa all voluntarily relinquished their stockpiles in the 1990s. Libya did away with its program in 2003 when Moammar Gadhafi concluded that a bomb would be a net liability, and that he had more to gain by coming to terms with the West.

There's no compelling reason Mr. Zardari and his military brass shouldn't reach the same conclusion, assuming excellent terms and desperate circumstances. Sure, a large segment of Pakistanis will never agree. Others, who have subsisted on a diet of leaves and grass so Pakistan could have its bomb, might take a more pragmatic view.

The tragedy of Pakistan is that it remains a country that can't do the basics, like make a bicycle chain. If what its leaders want is prestige, prosperity and lasting security, they could start by creating an economy that can make one -- while unlearning how to make the bomb.

Write to bstephens@wsj.com

 

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Russia alarmed by planned U.S. bases in Central Asia


16:52 | 16/ 12/ 2008
MOSCOW, December 16 (RIA Novosti) - A senior Russian military official expressed concern on Tuesday about what he said were U.S. plans to set up military bases in the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

"American military bases are dotted throughout the world," said Gen. Nikolai Makarov, chief of the General Staff of Russia's Armed Forces. "The U.S. has opened bases in Romania and Bulgaria, and according to our information plans to establish them in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan."

Former Soviet republics in Central Asia have seen increased rivalry between Moscow and Washington of late.

The United States has recently stepped up ties with oil-rich Kazakhstan, which allowed U.S. planes to fly over its territory during the 2001 U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan and also contributed troops to Iraq.

Observers in Russia say that Washington will need more bases in countries neighboring Afghanistan due to president-elect Barack Obama's plans to increase the U.S. military presence in the war-ravaged country by 20,000 troops.

The U.S. has run an airbase in Kyrgyzstan since the war in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan expelled U.S. troops from its airbase in 2005, but has recently sought closer ties with the U.S. and other Western powers.

General Makarov also blamed Washington for pushing Georgia and Ukraine toward NATO membership. He said Russia had been surrounded by the military alliance's forces.

The statement came amid an ongoing dispute over Washington's plans to place a missile base in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic. Moscow opposes the plans as a threat to its national security. The U.S. says the missile defenses are needed to counter possible strikes from "rogue" states.

 

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* OPINION
* DECEMBER 16, 2008, 12:09 P.M. ET

China's Pakistan Test
Beijing can help itself by pressuring Pakistan.
By PRATAP BHANU MEHTA | From today's Wall Street Journal Asia

China's economic and military rise has generated a lot of speculation about whether it will become a responsible stakeholder in international politics. It can either cooperate with other powers, especially the United States, to solve common problems. Or it can work at cross-purposes to those other efforts. Pakistan is shaping up to be one of the first big tests of which way China will go.

Pakistan has the distinction of being central to the global strategies of not one but two major powers, the U.S. and China. From Washington's perspective, Islamabad's support is important for the war in Afghanistan, and the war on terror. Pakistan is also home to radical Islamists who, if left unchecked, could destabilize the wider region -- as can be seen from the recent Mumbai attacks. This problem is especially pressing given Pakistan's status as a nuclear state.

Beijing has its own interests in encouraging stability in Pakistan. China has cultivated the country as a counterweight to India, with which Beijing has ongoing border disputes. Pakistan can also serve as a "conduit" or stepping-stone from which Beijing could try to expand its influence in West and Central Asia.

Because of such strategic considerations, both Washington and Beijing have too long turned a blind eye to the political situation within Pakistan. They have been willing to countenance corrupt or authoritarian governments in the name of short-term stability. They have failed to insist on the kinds of political and economic reforms that would make the country more stable over the long-run. Now, however, both sides should be able to see that this strategy hasn't worked. As a result, both Washington and Beijing are struggling with the question of how to continue to exercise leverage over Pakistan while also nudging Islamabad toward better behavior. Neither can do it alone.

Washington's approach has been to press Islamabad to crack down on terror and cooperate more enthusiastically in Afghanistan. It has racked up some successes. Following the Mumbai attacks, America pushed Pakistan into shutting down some alleged terror camps and placing the leaders of Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group allegedly responsible for the attacks, under house arrest. But there is little evidence the U.S. has been able to dent the influence of core structures within Pakistan, such as the security services, that have long been willing to countenance terrorism for their own political aims.

To make genuine progress, the U.S. will need to bring multilateral pressure to bear on Pakistan. This will defuse claims that only the U.S. cares about such issues and that elements in Islamabad can play various world powers against each other. It is hard to imagine that such pressure will bear fruit without the active cooperation of China. Beijing has considerable leverage given its history of support for Pakistan, with which it has an "all-weather relationship." It has invested heavily in infrastructure over the years, and just last year gave Pakistan $500 million in concessional loans to help with its balance of payments crisis. More significantly, China has transferred nuclear and missile technologies.

But China is reluctant to put pressure on the Pakistani establishment to reform. Part of this reluctance has deep roots: China's calculations in the region, unlike America's, are not influenced by the fact that India is a democracy. Beijing is also extremely wary of humiliating an all-weather friend.

So far China has justified its hands-off approach with three arguments. Beijing, like others, has worried that exerting too much pressure would strengthen the hands of hardliners. China also has seemed willing to buy into the idea that the root cause of the problem is Kashmir, meaning that international pressure would be largely irrelevant in resolving Pakistan's political turmoil until the Kashmir issue is solved. And more broadly, China has at times evinced a belief that Pakistan's problems stem from Western meddling in the region, so the West should be responsible for fixing it.

All of these are rather short-sighted, but none more so than the last. China has as big a stake as anyone else in Pakistan's future. Regardless of how Pakistan's problems started, China can't afford to sit back and wait for a solution.

Beijing has taken some steps recently to make itself part of the solution. China declined to extend a $6 billion bailout to cover Pakistan's deepening current-account balance problem; by not coming through with that aid, China pushed Islamabad into the arms of the International Monetary Fund and its policy strictures. While Beijing continues active nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, it has resisted offering a full-blown agreement of the kind India has negotiated with the U.S.

Now it must expand on those efforts. A consistent message from China that Pakistan cannot count on its support in the U.N. Security Council will put great pressure on Islamabad. China has made a modest course reversal by not vetoing a resolution to ban the Jammat-ud-Dawa, widely believed to be front organization for Lashkar-e-Taiba. China can make military and economic cooperation conditional upon reform of the Pakistani state. It can also lend its support to a regional conference of all countries affected by instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In the coming years, China will have to play a major role on issues vital to global security, whether it is Iran or Pakistan. The test of Beijing's commitment to being a responsible power is only beginning.

Mr. Mehta is president of the Center for Policy Research in Delhi.

 

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A lot will depend on India's creative strategy
17 Dec 2008, 0452 hrs IST,
Ajay D Behera
Associate Professor*,
Jamia Millia Islamia

Even though Pakistan is under intense pressure, the seriousness of Pakistan's political leaders to tackle terrorism is still not evident. While Pakistan is faced with difficult choices, the political will is clearly missing. There are fundamental reasons to believe that the cooperation is more likely to be posturing in the hope that the pressures will fizzle out over a period of time.

Whatever action Pakistan has taken so far, it has also made it clear that this action is not due to the pressures from India. No government in Pakistan can be seen to be succumbing to its traditional rival. To what extent Pakistan is going to cooperate, will also be dependent on what the expectations of the international community are. If it is to clamp down on some terrorist groups, there can be the pretence of doing that. If it is to hand over a few terrorists and fugitives, they might also agree to that. But if it is to permanently dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism in Pakistan, as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has demanded, then it cannot be. For, unfortunately the Pakistani ruling elite, including the army, is in no position to do that.

The foundations of the terrorist infrastructure are so deep-rooted that it would require years of political and social engineering to make a dent on it. A political culture of violence, spawned by an intolerant interpretation of Islam and a distorted view of history, lies at the foundation of this terrorist infrastructure. Opportunistic use of religion and politics by successive governments and political groups has created a state that is no longer in control of society. The "non-state actors", which the Pakistani establishment created to pursue its strategic objectives in Afghanistan and India, have gained their own dynamism and autonomy. It will be impossible to excise them without Pakistan itself undergoing serious destabilisation.

But Pakistan is also vulnerable; it can be made to act under pressure. To make Pakistan cooperate in the fight against terrorism, whether through persuasion or coercion, is going to be a long haul. It has to be seen whether India has a creative strategy and the resilience to carry it through.

(*Academy of Third World Studies)

 

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'Non-state actors' call the shots in Pakistan
17 Dec 2008, 0456 hrs IST,
Sushant Sareen
Strategic Affairs Expert

The rather clumsy attempts by Pakistani security agencies to cover up the origins and links of the terrorists responsible for the Mumbai carnage are a clear sign of the lack of sincerity and seriousness with which Pakistan will crack down on the terror networks operating in that country. Demands by Pakistani authorities for sharing evidence, while legally and diplomatically correct, are little more than a diversionary tactic. Within hours of the Mumbai attack the dirty tricks department of Pakistani intelligence agencies would have got a fix on the perpetrators of the attack and have all the information needed to prosecute and punish those responsible for the outrage. And yet it took a UN ban for Pakistan to crack down on the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, and that too very softly, almost apologetically.

Pakistanis are being disingenuous when they compare Mumbai with Marriott. The Islamists who blasted the Marriott hotel are waging an al Qaeda/Taliban-inspired war on Pakistan. The Mumbai attackers, on the other hand, belong to an Islamist organisation that has been and remains a close ally and instrument of the Pakistan army against India. But more than the fraternal links between the Pakistan army and jihadist militias, it is the changed power equation between the state and non-state actors in Pakistan that will block all attempts to dismantle and destroy the jihadist infrastructure. The Pakistani state has neither the capacity nor the capability, and even less the commitment, to eradicate the non-state terror machine thriving in that country.

The real state within the state in Pakistan is not the ISI or the 'ISI within the ISI' but the jihadist network in Pakistan's hinterland, Punjab. The so-called non-state actors, with the help of elements within the state structure, are today as powerful and influential as the Pakistani state. So much so that anything more than a cosmetic clampdown on the jihadists will invite a reaction so severe that the state might not be able to withstand it. So, in all likelihood, the formal government in Pakistan will probably request the informal government to lie low and let the storm pass before the latter can re-emerge in a new incarnation. The charade will finally end when the non-state actors become the state.

 

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Wednesday, December 17, 2008
President meets leaders from ANP, MQM, JUI

* Zardari urges leaders to unite for national security
* Reiterates government’s resolve to maintain peace in Tribal Areas, Karachi

Staff Report

ISLAMABAD: President Asif Ali Zardari on Tuesday urged the country’s political leadership to stand united in the face of security challenges confronting the country.

The president met senior leaders of the ruling alliance at the Presidency to consult them over the steps being taken by the government following the Mumbai terror attacks.

Zardari separately met delegations of Awami National Party (ANP), Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F).

Unity: Sources privy to the meetings said the president told the leaders it was time to rise above political conflicts and considerations and work for the country’s betterment, adding Zardari informed them about his interactions with Indian and other foreign leaders.

He told the delegations’ members the government was trying to defuse the mounting tension with India and had offered its co-operation to probe the Mumbai attacks. Zardari said the Indian government had not shared evidence with Pakistan so far, despite assurances of stern action against those found involved in the attacks.

Sources said the law and order situation in the Tribal Areas was discussed during the president’s meeting with the Asfandyar Wali-led ANP delegation. Other delegation members included Haji Adeel, Afrasiab Khattak and Zahid Khan.

Peace: The delegation briefed the president on the security situation in NWFP and the Tribal Areas, who assured them his full support in dealing with the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

Zardari discussed the situation in Sindh and Karachi with the MQM delegation that was headed by Farooq Sattar. He said the government would ensure peace in Karachi and would not let anyone affect law and order there.

The JUI-F delegation, led by Fazlur Rehman, expressed its apprehensions over the government policy of using force in FATA.

The sources said the delegation also criticised the government for its ‘passive’ response to India's aggressive statements.

The political leaders assured the president of their complete support for pulling the country out of the current security crisis, saying they were ready to play their role to defuse the Indo-Pak tension.

 

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Wednesday, December 17, 2008
FC kills seven Taliban in Mohmand

* One killed, over 30 abducted as violence returns to Kurram Agencyg Houses of eight tribal elders torched in Bajaur
* US jets, spy planes violate Pak airspace in Wana

PESHAWAR/KHAR: Seven Taliban, including a local commander, were killed in a gunbattle with Frontier Corps (FC) troops in Darwazgai area of Mohmand Agency, the FC said on Tuesday, APP reported.

An FC official was also killed in the clash that continued for three hours early in the morning.

Local security officials told AFP the gunfight started around 3am after the Taliban attacked an FC checkpost.

“According to our reports, militant commander Zar Mohammad, alias 606, was killed in the clash,” one official told AFP.

Kurram: Rival tribes in Kurram Agency abducted over 30 tribesmen after some unidentified armed men opened fire at a jeep going to Peshawar, the Online news agency reported.

The firing on the vehicle killed one person and injured another, while the assailants also took three other persons travelling in the vehicle hostage.

According to the details, five family members of the Toori tribe were going to Peshawar from Kurram for the medical treatment of Riaz Ali, when the attackers fired at their jeep near Hangu.

Riaz was killed while Mukhtar Ali, a schoolteacher, sustained injuries.

The Toori, and its rival tribe Bangash, have abducted more than 30 people of each other so far. Police cordoned off the area and started investigation into the killing and abductions.

Bajaur: Unidentified men torched the houses of eight tribal elders in Bajaur Agency on Tuesday, locals told Daily Times.

The houses were burnt in Wara Kharkai area of Mamoond tehsil. No group has claimed responsibility for the attacks.

Meanwhile, security forces are gaining control over various areas of agency headquarters Nawagai, which were earlier under the Taliban control.

WANA: United States spy planes and fighter jets on Tuesday violated Pakistani airspace, flying over several villages in South Waziristan Agency, Online reported. Two US jets entered Pakistani airspace and returned to Afghanistan after hovering over Angoor Adda, security sources in Wana said.

The intrusions by US pilotless aircraft have increased in recent months and at least five drones were seen flying simultaneously over Wana and adjoining areas.

The planes returned to Afghanistan after tribesmen opened fire at them. A jirga of tribal leaders was later held in Wana Bazaar, which strongly condemned the airspace violation.

 

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India, Pakistan Must Keep Talking After Mumbai Raid, U.S. Says

By Ed Johnson and Bibhudatta Pradhan

Dec. 17 (Bloomberg) -- India and Pakistan must keep talking in the wake of last month’s attack on Mumbai, the Bush administration said after Indian officials reported the peace process between the nations was on hold.

“Dialogue is important,” State Department spokesman Robert Wood told reporters in Washington yesterday. “We want to see tensions reduced.”

India’s Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee said yesterday there was a “pause” in negotiations with Pakistan following the Mumbai assault. He repeated demands the government in Islamabad cooperate with the probe into the attack that left 164 people dead. Pakistan says it has been given no evidence its nationals played a role.

President George W. Bush’s administration wants to ensure the attack doesn’t damage the more than five-year-old peace process between Pakistan and India, which have fought three wars since 1947, two over the divided Himalayan region of Kashmir.

In their rhetoric and actions, the governments in New Delhi and Islamabad have shown more restraint than in 2002, when both sides amassed forces at their border after militants thought to have originated in Pakistan attacked the Indian Parliament in December 2001.

“We would promote continued dialogue between India and Pakistan,” Wood said, according to a transcript. “We think that’s important for regional stability.”

Surviving Gunman

The government in New Delhi has blamed “elements” in Pakistan for being behind the Nov. 26-29 assault. Mumbai police officials have said the surviving gunman, Mohammed Ajmal Kasab, has provided information under interrogation that proves the involvement of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based militant group fighting Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir state.

While Pakistan has detained at least 16 suspected militants, including key Lashkar members, it says they won’t be extradited to India and may be tried in Pakistani courts.

India’s Defense Minister A.K. Antony told reporters yesterday his country wasn’t planning “military action” against Pakistan, state-run broadcaster Doordarshan reported.

“But at the same time, unless Pakistan takes actions against those terrorists who are operating from their soil against India and also against all those who are behind the Mumbai terrorist attack, things will not be normal,” the broadcaster cited Antony as saying.

Pakistan said yesterday it was committed to the peace process. “It’s in the larger interests of the whole region,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad Sadiq told Reuters in Islamabad. “If Mr. Mukherjee says there’s a pause, then there’s a pause.”

Peace Process

The peace process between India and Pakistan, known as the composite dialogue, has rebuilt diplomatic, transport and sporting links.

The government in New Delhi has said the process hinges on a January 2004 pledge by Pakistan’s former president Pervez Musharraf not to let Pakistani territory be used by terrorists to attack India.

Pakistan rejects Indian charges it provides support for Islamic separatists fighting Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir. More than a dozen Islamic groups have been fighting since 1989 for the state’s independence from India or its merger with Pakistan in a conflict that has killed about 50,000 people.

To contact the reporters on this story: Ed Johnson in Sydney at ejohnson28@bloomberg.net; Bibhudatta Pradhan in New Delhi at bpradhan@bloomberg.net.
Last Updated: December 16, 2008 19:50 EST