WAR 11-18-2017-to-11-24-2017___THEWINDSofWAR

Housecarl · Nov 18, 2017

(295) 10-28-2017-to-11-03-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...1-03-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(296) 11-04-2017-to-11-10-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...1-10-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(297) 11-11-2017-to-11-17-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...1-17-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

----------

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/iraqi-kurdistan-post-independence-referendum

Iraqi Kurdistan: Post-Independence Referendum

by Christine Balling
Journal Article | November 17, 2017 - 5:21am

On September 25th, against the urging of the United States and other allies, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) held an independence referendum within the boundaries of its autonomous region and provocatively, without, in the city of Kirkuk. While the regional response was fast and furious, the United States did nothing, leaving the Iraqi Kurds at the mercy of a revengeful Baghdad: Erbil and Sulaimaniyah airports were closed to international commercial traffic. Turkey threatened to close borders and the Iranian and Iraqi militaries conducted joint exercises on the Iraqi Kurdish border.* Baghdad sent the Iraqi army and Iranian-backed Shia Popular Mobilization Front (PMF) militias to retake the disputed territories back from the Kurdish peshmerga. Then, on October 29th, KRG president Masoud Barzani stepped down and suspended the post of presidency, distributing control of the KRG to other branches.

Recently, I spoke with four individuals about the ongoing and evolving crisis.*
Barry R. McCaffrey is a retired four-star General who served in the United States Army for thirty-two years. During Operation Desert Storm in Iraq, General McCaffrey commanded the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized).

General McCaffrey prefaced our interview by saying, “I view the situation as a strong supporter of Kurdish independence – certainly in Iraq – and in the longer run, in Turkey, in Syria and Iran.” He acknowledged the potential contentiousness of his opinion, especially vis a vis Kurdish aspirations in Turkey. But, in the shorter term, McCaffrey said that he thought that the Iraqi Kurds had had a reasonable chance for independence, especially given their potential for economic self-sufficiency. “Even though being a land locked state with hostile powers surrounding you is perilous, given the oil in the Kirkuk oil fields - which in my view might belong to the Kurds - I thought the Kurds could make it.” But, he added, after the recent events, it is clear that “Iraq, Iran and Turkey have a coordinated strategy to snuff out the concept [of Iraqi Kurdish independence.]” **

McCaffrey appreciates the Iraqi Kurds’ distrust of Baghdad and was “astonished that the Iraqi Kurds did not fight for Kirkuk.” Further, he was surprised that the Iraqi Kurds “did not find a way around the Iraqi central government closing their airspace.” *He regrets that the Iraqi Kurdish political parties did not come together and “unite behind a single policy” prior to holding the referendum. For that “they are now paying the price.” Lastly, McCaffrey remarked that while he “understands and has sympathy for the United States’ government’s dilemma dealing with this,” he is “disappointed that [the U.S.] did not find a way to facilitate and support Kurdish independence.”*

Representative Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman is the senior representative of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in the United States.

Representative Abdul Rahman spoke about the heavy hand Iran played in Baghdad’s response to the independence referendum. At the time of our discussion, the KRG and the United States were publicly at odds with regards to Iran’s direct involvement in the taking control of Kirkuk: Initially, U.S. spokespeople denied having evidence of direct Iranian involvement, while the KRG insisted that Major General Qasim Soleimani, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force had flown to Kirkuk prior to Baghdad’s sending troops and PMF militias to Kirkuk. (On October 18th at the FDD Summit in Washington, CIA Director Mike Pompeo said that the Agency had been aware of Soleimani’s presence in Kirkuk.)
*
Ms. Abdul Rahman stated that the [KDP party controlled] KRG was “very clear in our position that Soleimani played a personal role in making a secret arrangement between some members of the PUK [opposition party]” so that the PUK peshmerga would leave Kirkuk. “Iran’s motivation is to prevent the referendum from succeeding in any way – even in the distant future.” She explained, “Soleimani travels in and out of Iraq and Kurdistan freely. But on this particular occasion we believe Soleimani wanted the local media to cover his visit so as to send a message to the United States.”

When asked why Erbil held the referendum on September 25th despite U.S. objections, the Representative argued that the Kurds had made their desire to hold a referendum back in 2014, when they agreed to the Americans’ request to fight alongside Iraqi forces against ISIS. However, during the fight against ISIS, the problems between the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Kurds were not addressed and “continued to fester.” Ms. Abdul Rahman emphasized that “the referendum gave the mandate to our leadership to negotiate with Baghdad; it was not…a unilateral declaration of independence.”

The Representative bemoaned the fact that the United States came out “so strongly” against the referendum but had yet to come out so strongly against the recent Iraqi military aggression and the Iraqis’ use of American weapons. Going forward, Ms. Abdul Rahman will continue to lobby in Washington, emphasizing three key points: First, the United States needs to understand the significance of Kirkuk and the extent of Iranian involvement. Second, the Iraqi Kurds need the military aggression against them to stop. And third, the Kurds will continue to look to the United States to help facilitate talks between Erbil and Baghdad. She says, “Let’s sit down before there is any more bloodshed. Let’s sit down before there is any more collective punishment of the people of Kurdistan.”

Ameena Saeed is Yazidi activist and a former member of the Iraqi Parliament. The United States Department of State awarded her the 2015 Hero Acting to End Modern Slavery Award.

When asked about the Yazidi community’s participation in the independence referendum, Ms. Saeed said she supposed that some Yazidis who live in Kurdistan, many probably voted for independence, those living in disputed territories – in the Shingal district for example – probably did not vote at all. She explained that many Yazidis still blame the peshmerga for allowing ISIS to overrun and commit genocide against her people. “If the referendum had been held before August 2014 [when ISIS the genocide occurred in Shingal], Saeed said, “all Yazidis would have voted ‘yes’ in the referendum.”

While the community’s distrust of the KRG lingers, Saeed made the point that “prior to 2003 when Saddam Hussein and Arabs controlled Iraq, there were no Yazidis in political positions. That changed when the KDP peshmerga took control of the region.” She went on to say that “after 2003, a Yazidi became mayor of Sinjar.”

But, now that the Iraqi army has entered Sinjar with the PMF, Saeed says many Yazidis are scared. Though Yazidis hope to one day establish a semi-autonomous region of their own, Ms. Saeed acknowledges that her community might have to take sides in the meantime. “If we belong to Kurdistan, even if it might not be the best option, is it better than living under the Iraqi government because we have had bad experiences with them.” *

A retired senior intelligence officer with decades of experience in Iraq and the region.

When I spoke with the retired officer who worked directly with the Iraqi Kurds for years, the former officer was frustrated and frank: “The situation is an embarrassment. The United States betrayed the Kurds and the Kurds betrayed themselves.” Given the Trump Administration’s new Iran policy, the retired officer saw the Kirkuk crisis as having been preventable. “It the perfect opportunity to act on the administration’s policy. The United States could have pre-empted Bagdad’s taking of Kirkuk by “weighing in heavily diplomatically, sending a delegation to Baghdad and telling the Iraqis that we won’t tolerate a Shia militia presence in Kurdistan and we won’t tolerate Baghdad’s using American weapons to attack to the Kurds.” Instead, the retired officer said, the United States stood by while Qasim Soleimani flew to Kirkuk and struck a deal with members of the Talabani family – founders of the PUK – who agreed to order the PUK peshmerga forces to retreat and allow the PMF to take Kirkuk. **

Referring to President Trump’s October 17th statement that “[the United States is] not taking sides, the retired officer said, “We don’t have to take sides; we only have to engage.”

As to why the United States did not engage, the retired officer said that the State Department’s “outdated” position is to blame: “The State Department refuses to give up on the ‘One Iraq Policy’ pipe dream and accept the reality that they are never going to keep Iraq together.” That said, the retired officer emphasized that the Iraqis and the Kurds must do their respective parts before the U.S. can meaningfully facilitate a deal between Erbil and Baghdad. Specifically, “Baghdad needs get away from the constant pressure from the Iranians and the Kurds need to get their political house in order and address the rampant corruption and lack of unity.” Only then, could the idea of establishing a federated Iraq - a comprise upon which Baghdad and Erbil might eventually agree – could be seriously considered.*
**
----------

As relations between the Iraqis and the Iraqi Kurds continue to deteriorate, Iran will continue to leverage the discord to its advantage. While Erbil’s decision to proceed with the referendum was a political miscalculation, Washington’s inaction verges on political treachery. The Kurds were a loyal and incredibly effective ally in the U.S. led coalition’s fight against ISIS. For the moment, the matter seems settled against them. It must not be.

About the Author

Christine Balling is a Senior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC. During her most recent trip to northern Iraq in January 2017, Balling embedded with an all-female Yazidi peshmerga unit deployed in Snuny. She is a contributor to Foreign Affairs.com and The National Interest.com. Twitter: @christiballing

Housecarl · Nov 18, 2017

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2017/11/17/north-korea-sends-foreign-minister-to-cuba/

North Korea Sends Foreign Minister to Cuba as Chinese Arrive in Pyongyang

by Frances Martel
17 Nov 2017
Comments 2

The communist government of North Korea has dispatched Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho to Cuba for an “official visit,” state media confirmed on Friday, as Pyongyang prepares to receive an envoy from another communist country, China.

The South Korean newswire service Yonhap reported on Friday that Ri and a North Korean delegation flew out of Pyongyang towards Havana on Friday, citing the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). KCNA, the state news service of North Korea, announced that a “delegation led by Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho left here Friday to pay an official visit to Cuba.”

KCNA did not provide any details regarding what that delegation would be discussing with communist authorities in Cuba or why the trip was scheduled for this week. It also remains unclear how long the delegation would be there. Depending on how long they stay, one potential explanation for the visit would be the one-year anniversary of the death of mass murder Fidel Castro on November 25.

Yonhap notes that North Korea is facing deliberations at the United Nations over further international sanctions on its regime over its increasingly belligerent nuclear weapons program. Among those with high standing at the U.N. Security Council are officials in China, who also announced this week that they would send representatives to North Korea.

Special Envoy Song Tao is scheduled to arrive in North Korea on Friday. The Chinese Foreign Ministry explained that his visit would be a routine one that China executes following every Communist Party Congress to other nations.

“It is a long-standing tradition to inform each other on Party Congress between the Communist Party of China and Communist Party of other socialist countries,” spokesman Geng Shuang explained on Thursday. “Therefore, the arrangements regarding sending special envoy to brief Vietnam, Laos and the DPRK were made upon mutual consultation.”

He referred to*North Korea as a “close neighbor,” with which China wants to keep “friendly and cooperative relations.”

He added that the Chinese envoy will discuss “issues of common concern” with North Korea, without elaborating.

China is also engaging in relations with Cuba. The*People’s Daily published an interview showcasing Cuba’s Foreign Vice-Minister Marcelino Medina this week, which the Foreign Ministry highlighted on its website. “In the exchange, the Vice-Minister highlighted the development of bilateral relations in recent years where Cuba has become China’s largest trade partner in the Caribbean and China the second-largest trade partner of Cuba.”

Medina*also expressed support for China’s “One Belt One Road” initiative, a sprawling infrastructure plan designed for China to monopolize global trade.

Cuba is one of North Korea’s most loyal allies on the world stage. In August, the North Korean state newspaper*Rodong Sinmun complimented the bilateral relationship as an “invincible friendship forged under the banner of socialism.”*Granma,*Rodong Sinmun‘s Cuban analog, praised North Korea that month for insisting on continuing its illegal nuclear weapons development—or, as they phrased it, “resisting without fear before Washington’s repeated military threats.”

North Korea and Cuba*have signed multiple intelligence-sharing agreements and many have suspected that Cuba engaged in prohibited trade with the country. In 2014, Panamanian authorities intercepted a North Korean ship attempting to cross the Panama Canal carrying undeclared Cuban weapons, hidden under large bags of sugar. North Korea paid a*$700,000 fine and the ship’s three top crew members were arrested.

-

Comments 2

ken • 10 hours ago
This douchbag is going to try and park his crude nuclear weapons in Cuba and now he will be able to hit the continent United States. He doesn’t care about his people he would rather end in a blaze of infamy then give up power.

1
•
Reply
•
Share ›

−
Hera T • 4 hours ago
Is Kim Jung Um trying to 'talk' now?
It is likely that the PRC diplomats will convey a message in a manor and tone Mr. Um has never heard.

•
Reply
•
Share

Housecarl · Nov 18, 2017

Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.yahoo.com/news/iraq-forces-retake-last-held-town-country-100816558.html

Iraqi forces retake last IS-held town in country

Sarah Benhaida, AFP • November 17, 2017

Baghdad (AFP) - Iraqi government forces on Friday retook the last town in the country still held by the Islamic State group as the jihadists' self-proclaimed "caliphate" faced collapse on both sides of the border with Syria.

The lightning recapture of the small Euphrates valley town of Rawa after a dawn offensive came as the jihadists also faced attack for a second day in the last town they still hold in Syria, Albu Kamal just over the frontier.

The Islamic State group (IS) has lost 95 percent of the cross-border "caliphate" it declared in Iraq and Syria in 2014, the US-led coalition fighting it said Wednesday.
Its losses include all of its major bastions, virtually confining it to pockets of countryside.

Government troops and paramilitary units "liberated the whole of Rawa and raised the Iraqi flag on all of its official buildings," General Abdelamir Yarallah of Iraq's Joint Operations Command (JOC) said in a statement.

Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi hailed the town's "liberation in record time" and said troops would now "conduct search operations in the desert to secure the border with Syria".

JOC spokesman General Yahya Rassoul said that "militarily, IS has been defeated, but we are going to hunt down its remnants to eradicate its presence."

Hisham al-Hashemi, an Iraqi expert on IS, said that after their loss of Rawa, the jihadists no longer exercised any real military or administrative power.

"What has been liberated are the populated areas with demarcated boundaries," Hashemi said.

"But the seasonal river valleys, the oases, the empty expanses of desert which make up around four percent of Iraqi territory, are still in the hands of IS."

Rawa was earlier bypassed in an offensive by the Iraqi army that resulted in the recapture of the strategically important border town of Al-Qaim this month.
The stretch of Euphrates valley abutting the border with Syria has long been a bastion of Sunni Arab insurgency, first against US-led troops after the invasion of 2003 and then against the Shiite-led government in Baghdad.

The porous frontier became a magnet for foreign fighters entering Iraq from Syria, which Baghdad accused of turning a blind eye, and a key smuggling route for arms and illicit goods.

US-led troops carried out repeated operations with code names like Matador and Steel Curtain in 2005 to flush out Al-Qaeda jihadists.

The region swiftly fell to IS when its fighters swept through the Sunni Arab heartland north and west of Baghdad in 2014 before proclaiming its "caliphate".

- 'Days now numbered' -

That offensive left the jihadists in control of a territory the size of Britain, but they have successively lost all their key strongholds, including Raqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq.

"The days of the fake caliphate are now numbered," the US envoy to the coalition Brett McGurk tweeted on Friday.

In Syria, IS still holds around 25 percent of the countryside of Deir Ezzor province but is under attack both by government forces and US-backed Kurdish-led fighters.
In the border town of Albu Kamal, the Syrian army on Friday battled IS fighters who had mounted a surprise counterattack last week, pushing out government forces who had retaken it last month.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a Britain-based monitor of the war, said a new army offensive had successfully penetrated the town, with troops backed by Russian air strikes advancing from the west, east and south.

In Moscow, the defence ministry said six long-range bombers flying from Russia carried out a strike on IS sites around Albu Kamal.

In a sign that IS remains capable of inflicting serious damage despite its battlefield losses, the Observatory also said a car bombing blamed on group killed at least 26 displaced people at a checkpoint in Deir Ezzor province.

It said 12 children were among the victims of the attack.

Syria's state news agency SANA also reported an IS car bombing targeting "a gathering of displaced families from Deir Ezzor", giving a toll of 20 dead and 30 wounded.

With the jihadists' dreams of statehood lying in tatters following their defeats, Western attention is increasingly turning to the challenge of blocking foreign fighters from returning home to carry out attacks.
burs/srm/par

8 reactions

Housecarl · Nov 18, 2017

Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42031131

Turkey abandons Nato drill over portrayal as the enemy

17 November 2017
From the section
Europe

Turkey has pulled its troops out of a Nato exercise in Norway over an alleged insult to its political leaders.

Reports said that an image of the "enemy" in the mock exercise was actually a photo of modern Turkey's founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

Turkish media also reported that a fake social media account in the name of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was used to send anti-Nato messages.

Turkey withdrew all 40 of its participating troops in response.

The country has the second largest military force in Nato, and is involved both in coalition efforts against so-called Islamic State and in Nato's Afghanistan mission.

Norway's Defence Minister Frank Bakke-Jensen issued a statement of apology for the incident, which he blamed on a single individual.

He said the messages had been sent on the private computer network used in the drill, "and in no way" reflected Norway's views.

Turkish broadcaster NTV said that one person involved was a Norwegian officer of Turkish descent.

- Purged: The officers who cannot go home to Turkey
- Turkey row: Why has Erdogan riled Nato allies?

But Mr Bakke-Jensen said the Norwegian involved was an external contractor hired for the exercise, and he had been removed from his role. An investigation is under way, he added.

Nato Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg also issued an apology, calling Turkey a valued member of the military alliance.

Despite Turkey's military and strategic importance, given its borders with Syria, Iraq, and Iran, relations with Western nations have been under stress over the past few years.

President Erdogan was openly embroiled in diplomatic spats with Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands earlier this year when they restricted public political rallies of expatriate Turks.

Instead, Turkey has pursued a closer relationship with Russia, with which it has also co-operated on air strikes in Syria.

Turkey's candidacy for membership of the European Union has also effectively stalled, and the union was critical of President Erdogan's crackdown on academia and the judiciary following an attempted military coup last year.

In its wake, a number of Turkish officers posted to Nato requested asylum - and have been unable to return home.

Housecarl · Nov 18, 2017

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/11/16/the-new-era-of-the-proliferated-proxy-war

The New Era of the Proliferated Proxy War

Andrew Mumford
November 16, 2017

War in the modern world is changing. Since the end of the Cold War inter-state war has declined globally, whilst even civil wars have become a relative rarity. But war is not becoming an obsolete element of human interaction.[1] Governments and militaries around the world are simply changing the way that their strategic objectives are secured. An approximate 50% reduction in major inter- and intra-state conflicts between 1990 and 2010 belies a significant shift in global attitudes to war.[2] A heightened perception of risk, greater restrictions on military expenditure as a result of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, and a greater public aversion (in the West at least) to conventional confrontation has led to an accentuated appeal for national security goals and defence priorities being attained by other means. This is the era of indirect war by proxy.

Concerns over the increased recourse to proxy war are currently prevalent given how the West is tackling the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL/Daesh) in part through the delivery of large amounts of weaponry, ammunition, and money to moderate Syrian rebel groups and the Kurdish peshmerga. Furthermore, Russian military action in the Crimea in 2014 caused much consternation in the West over fears that the Kremlin was attempting to coerce its regional neighbours and expand its borders via ambiguous but aggressive military action.[3] So-called little green men—Russian volunteers, insisted Russian President Vladimir Putin—took control of key areas in the eastern part of Ukraine.

The resurgence of proxy warfare (a type of conflict long associated with the Cold War) does not reinvent the wheel in strategic terms. Indeed, in many ways contemporary proxy warfare is the latest iteration of what Sir Basil Liddell Hart labelled the indirect approach. Liddell Hart based his notion on an understanding that brains were a more effective strategic lever than brawn, arguing that indirect methods “endow warfare with intelligent properties that raise it above the brute application of force.”[4] This required focusing strategic efforts on the psychological will of the enemy, emphasising the nature of surprise. Such characteristics remain pertinent factors in understanding how states aim to degrade and ultimately destroy the capabilities of groups like ISIS, or undermine rival regional powers today. As such, contemporary proxy warfare is a modern manifestation of an indirect strategic approach.

This article reinterprets Liddell Hart’s strategy by arguing that the indirect component of modern warfare is not about the repositioning of one’s own forces for the purposes of deep strategic penetration and rear manoeuvres but the fundamental re-routing of lethal activity through a third party. The indirect element of modern strategic approaches therefore refers to both the source of the threat (something that is complicated by the use of proxies) and the ambiguous methods often utilised (that are seen as a guarantor of maintaining the plausible deniability of the perpetrator and mitigating against escalation). The strategic use of an indirect approach can manifest itself in different ways in modern proxy wars, including the use of third parties to conduct information operations, psychological operations, cyber attacks and the sponsorship of a terrorist attack through the indirect provision of money, weapons and other logistical or communications equipment. Liddell Hart himself had an undeniable tendency to selectively decide what was an example of the indirect approach at work based on its success or failure. However, all proxy wars can be considered contemporary acts of the indirect approach. If we shift our understanding of the main raison d’etre of the strategy away from broad interpretations of avoiding strength to attack weakness and towards an appreciation of the desire to avoid any direct intervention by instead outsourcing kinetic activity to a third party proxy.

Basil Liddell Hart and the Indirect Approach

As Liddell Hart’s biographer Alex Danchev noted, the indirect approach was his “signature tune.”[5] The indirect approach is encapsulated in dictums from Sun Tzu’s Art of War, including “Subdue the enemy without fighting” and “Avoid what is strong to strike what is weak.”[6] Unfairly dismissed by its critics as little more than war avoidance, *the indirect approach is admittedly a strategic ideal, but it is one that is better depicted as war displacement.[7] As Shelford Bidwell argued in the early 1970s, Liddell Hart was “a synthesizer as much as an originator,” owing much to the ideas not just of Sun Tzu, but other members of what Bidwell labels the British school of strategic thought who saw war as an art not a science, especially T.E Lawrence and J.F.C Fuller. Yet Bidwell, correctly, ultimately forgives Liddell Hart’s “exaggeration and fancifulness” because he “used an electric ox-goad to penetrate the hide of orthodox military thought.”[8]

Liddell Hart first enunciated his ideas on the topic in book form in 1929, followed by a further four books building on the same theme in 1941, 1946, 1954, and 1967. The last edition (titled Strategy: An Indirect Approach) sold over 100,000 copies in the US alone and was treated, as Brian Holden Reid rightly describes, as “a major intellectual event in the armed forces of the West and beyond.”[9] His theorising of modern war was borne out of a military career cut short by injury in the First World War, followed by doctrine-writing work for the Army, and as a military correspondent for the Daily Telegraph and The Times. *His works on General Sherman’s influence in the American civil war, Napoleon’s strategic legacy, and perceptions on the evolution of warfare made him a warrior-scholar of international renown. He was feted on book promotion tours and had his ideas openly embraced by the then Senator Jack Kennedy during the 1960 presidential election.[10]

Alex Danchev deftly described the ideas expounded in Strategy: An Indirect Approach as “part prescription, part idealization, part excogitation.”[11] Holden Reid argues that it embodies Liddell Hart’s “Edwardian rationalism that exalted not just reason, but truth, order, progress, judicious compromise and careful understanding.”[12] For Liddell Hart. the indirect approach had manifestly guided the British Way of Warfare (the title of his 1932 book) from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. Again, Danchev’s insights on this synonymy are insightful, especially when he observed that for Britain during this three hundred year period war on land “was prosecuted by proxy, by the artful dodge of ‘lending sovereigns to sovereigns,’ and not sending an expeditionary force."[13]

This artful dodge has been contemporised and indeed arguably come to encompass a broader Western Way of War. The shift in the modern landscape of war wrought by the heightened use of proxy militias and dulled appetite for boots on the ground in conflict zones from Syria to Ukraine should give us reason to learn how to play Liddell Hart’s signature tune as a means of making greater sense of this new era of proliferated proxy war. An indirect approach ensures that “the business of war… [is] not position and attrition and mutual exhaustion, but analysis and paralysis and maximal preservation.”[14] The recourse to proxy war provides a strong capacity for analysis by the proxy’s benefactor given the spatial displacement from any lethal activity; a high chance for enemy paralysis given the sudden potency of their indirectly-sponsored opponent (as seen in Crimea in 2014 given the rapid successes scored by pro-Russian militias); and the most literal guarantee of force protection given the displacement of kinetic activity to proxies.

Proxy War as an Indirect Strategic Approach

Proxy war can been defined as: “the indirect engagement in a conflict by third parties wishing to influence its strategic outcome.”[15] This can involve the provision of weapons, money and other forms of assistance, but crucially absolves the intervening party (often described as a benefactor or sponsor) from having to undertake its own direct military intervention in a pre-existing conflict by outsourcing the lethal activity to a proxy, such as a militia group or other national military (often labelled a surrogate). Proxy wars are fought at arms-length by those who want to simultaneously protect or expand their interests whilst avoiding the exposure and costs of a direct military intervention. As a concept proxy wars transcend the mono-causal modes of conflict that have dominated recent strategic discourse, such as insurgency or piracy. Instead, it encompasses a complex set of relationships, dynamics and processes. Proxy warfare takes place in multi-threat environments in which states and non-state actors interact (both covertly and overtly) for the purposes of extending influence, interest and, in some cases, territory via third parties. This goal does not have to be achieved through lethal means alone, and can indeed be conducted virtually in cyberspace. Historically, states have exploited specific localised events (such as a civil war) to provoke a shift in the wider geo-political environment (such as the stifling of a rival ideology in the broader region).

At the moment, such patterns are evident inside Syria.[16] Since 2011, a myriad of foreign nations have been funding what has been labelled “a chaotic melange of fighters” inside Syria. Syria is a particularly anarchic proxy war involving a broad network of shifting Benefactor-Proxy-Agent relationships, each with different goals and desired end states. The incredibly swift rise of ISIS, combined with their disregard for any other group or country, made strange bedfellows out of the resultant anti-ISIS coalition. America found itself united with Iran and other Gulf states in the effort to quell the rise of this virulent movement and roll back the borders of this self-proclaimed Sunni caliphate. The simultaneous battle to oust Assad from power in Damascus has seen Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar channel financial assistance and weapons towards their favoured rival Sunni groups in the hope it would lead to an outcome of their liking. Instead, this indirect interference was mirrored by pro-Assad Shia groups, like Hezbollah, being sponsored by Iran. The result of this? “Saudi Arabia and Iran have been battling for regional supremacy. For a major criticism of Liddell Hart’s work, which questions how he positioned the indirect approach vis interpretations of the historical record of both world wars, see John J. Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History,*to the last Syrian.”[17] Beset by a disunited opposition and by a network of foreign intelligence agents, Syria has become a particularly bloody proxy battle ground symptomatic of this new era of the indirect approach. *

The need for a proxy war strategy that adequately balances ends, ways, and means (the traditional triptych of strategic design) requires a fundamental self-assessment of the realistic attainability of the endgame, the restriction on the number of ways it can be achieved and the availability of means. Limitations placed on any of these factors can cause a state to pursue non-conventional or irregular strategies that are indirect in nature in order to nullify any material or power disadvantages they have in relation to adversaries. All strategy, as Sir Lawrence Freedman has stated, is “fluid and flexible.”[18] The indirect approach adds uncertainty to its characteristics and it is strategically creative. Freedman reminds us that “underdog strategies, in situations where the starting balance of power would predict defeat, provide the real test of creativity.”[19] By taking the immediate belligerency out of war, via the obfuscation of responsibility for what could be construed as an act of war, the recourse to an indirect proxy war is strategically creative because of the way in which it makes strategic strengths (such as deniability) out of weaknesses (such as economic constraints and a poor conventional military capacity).

Despite its persistent presence throughout the history of warfare, proxy warfare needs to be fully sketched out and conceptually understood to avoid strategic confusion, which often arises when conflicts involving multiple competing actors in confusing political environments are conceived of using traditional concepts of war.[20]*Proxy warfare takes place on multiple platforms using multiple actors. Yet by being strategically designed to circumvent situations that look like, or could lead to, conventional conflict, proxy warfare will take a position of near permanence on the strategic landscape, much like they did during the Cold War. By tackling and engaging in proxy warfare we are both perpetually avoiding and committing to a continuous conflict. For a major criticism of Liddell Hart’s work, which questions how he positioned the indirect approach vis interpretations of the historical record of both world wars, see John J. Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History. Even if the prosecution and countering of proxy warfare looks like neither war nor peace, proxy wars are fought in the increasingly militarised grey area in between due to the indirect responsibility for kinetic activity inside a conflict zone.

So ingrained were proxy wars into the behaviour of Cold War superpowers within, and often beyond, their spheres of influence, that in many ways we can perceive the real front line of the Cold War not as the Iron Curtain that fractiously divided the European continent, but the so-called Third World of Africa and Asia. But proxy wars should not be seen as synonymous with the Cold War. We are entering a new era of proxy war, and thus the indirect approach, for several reasons. Firstly, the appeal of fighting an indirect war still rests on an intrinsic set of assumptions based on interest formation, ideological premises, and perceptions of risk. Collectively, this has meant that states are still reluctant to cede interest but are increasingly unwilling to bear the human and financial costs of maintaining it. The result is a heightened appeal in the use of proxies as a means of securing national interest indirectly.

Secondly, a new set of actors on the international political scene have emerged who are prime to become proxy war-wagers of the future, including private military companies and internet hackers. These new warriors are able to be co-opted by states at a point when national military recruitment is waning and defence budgets squeezed. The literal outsourcing of military operations creates obvious conditions by which states fight wars indirectly.

Thirdly, the inevitable consequence of the War on Terror on American political willingness to wage large-scale regime-changing wars is that the US will revert to engagement in proxy warfare to maximise their interests whilst minimising their political and military exposure. Additional boots on the ground, especially in the Middle East, as a corollary to airpower exposes American foreign policy to the repetition of recent follies. There are few signs emanating from the Trump White House that there is an appetite in the new administration for extensive expeditionary military engagements. Although denoting a neo-isolationist turn, it remains to be seen whether President Trump will feel inclined to preserve American interests overseas through the utility of more proxies.

Finally, we cannot ignore the role played by two key international players: China and Russia. The continuing rise of China as a global superpower raises significant questions as to how it will exert its presence internationally and whether this actually increases the likelihood of it engaging in proxy wars without damaging its trade relations with the West. Compounding this is Russia’s use of proxies inside the contested zones on NATO’s southern and eastern flanks. The coercion of regional neighbours and territorial annexation inside Crimea in 2014 by Russia has opened up a policy dilemma for the West in regards to how Russian use of volunteers creates the scope for indirect war to be waged as part of a wider hybrid war strategy.[21]

In short, it is a mode of warfare that we are likely to see more, and not less of, in the coming decades given the confluence of global power shifts, political recalibration, and strategic reassessment by key international players.[22] This places the indirect approach firmly back on Western strategic horizons for the foreseeable future.

The New Era of the Indirect Strategic Approach

The indirect approach, as envisaged by Liddell Hart, creates the conditions whereby an enemy is forced to realise that their own strategic objectives are unattainable without the need for direct or conventional use of force. As Freedman has noted, “the logic point to deterrence.”[23] Proxy warfare is a form of conflict predominantly designed to deter competitor states from staking significant strategic resources of their own. This is in large part based on acute calculations of political risk and a desire to maximise self-interest that is greater than the will of an adversary to aggressively respond. This in-built logic of deterrence is reinforced by other key components of proxy warfare, namely causal ambiguity (victim states might be deterred from retaliating in a conventional way because of the unclear lines of responsibility for the initial attack).

As a form of deterrence itself, the prosecution of proxy warfare by adversaries is arguably immune to rival forms of deterrence. Liddell Hart observed over half a century ago that “the nuclear deterrent… does not apply and cannot be applied to the deterrence of subtler forms of aggression.”[24] Indeed, nuclear deterrence could indeed promote the recourse of other, more irregular, forms of conflict. The possession of nuclear weapons is therefore not enough to counter the resort to proxy warfare by competitor states, but it may prevent the escalation of hostilities that encompass direct modes of confrontation.

An indirect approach takes what Liddell Hart called “the line of least resistance” in the physical sense and the “line of least expectation” in the psychological sense. It is both ambiguous and attritional, ensuring that an enemy is weakened "by pricks instead of blows."*When states perceive inferiority in their own conventional military capabilities an indirect strategy of proxy warfare may be adopted, especially if the leaders of the state feel assured that the drain on their enemies in countering acts by third party proxies is greater than the sponsorship itself.[25]

The psychological component of the initial recourse to proxy war can be found in acute perceptions of the risks involved in undertaking alternative, more direct, forms of intervention. Christopher Coker has argued that the language and methods of risk analysis are applicable to the way that modern war is understood and conducted and that war has fundamentally "become risk management in all but name."[26]*Recourse to proxy warfare is, logically, an act of risk reduction. The desire by a state to avoid using overt, conventional (possibly even nuclear) force with obvious lines of responsibility denotes a decision influenced by the appeal of waging an indirect war in order to lever as much gain out of a pre-existing or newly manufactured conflict without the risk of being an outright combatant in a conventional war that is subject to normal channels of international legal scrutiny therefore reducing the chances of direct retaliation by the victim state.

The overarching purpose of the indirect approach is to reduce resistance within the mindset of enemy decision-makers. This is assured, Liddell Hart argued, through a sudden "change of front,” thus dislocating the enemy through movement in the physical sphere (which can be achieved through territorial gains made as a result of bolstering a proxy materially or financially) and dislocating the enemy commanders steadfastness in the psychological sphere due to the surprise nature of sudden enemy effectiveness (again achieved indirectly through third party benevolence).[27] As he said of the indirect strategic approach more generally, it is “closely related to all problems of the influence of mind upon mind.”[28] We should therefore expect a greater investment in information warfare and psychological operations in areas of strategic concern. The provision of large amounts of weapons and funding to an enemy’s enemy can affect the decision-making capacity of that enemy if what first appeared to be a winnable war is recalibrated to stalemate thanks to targeted indirect intervention by a third party. If, as Liddell Hart believed, “the perfection of strategy should be sought in the elimination of fighting, then the recourse to war by proxy creates such a situation by default for nations who outsource the fight.[29]

The Indirect Approach: On the Horns of a Dilemma

Proxy wars have been used for centuries as a way for states to indirectly manipulate the outcome of foreign wars (just look at how Catholic Spain and Protestant France flocked to support their co-religionists in the Holy Roman Empire during the Thirty Years' War; or British support for the Confederacy during the American Civil War given the importance of the cotton trade). Indirect war has certainly had a perennial appeal. However, proxy wars are rarely stopped in a way that inter-state wars or civil wars are stopped—through either victory by one side or a mediated peace agreement. Many proxy wars tend to end because the proxy outgrows the relationship with the benefactor state. Increased autonomy for the proxy group negates the need for so much external assistance. Take Hizbullah for example. They were gradually able to independently gain enough weapons and money of their own that they weakened their ties with Iran and Syria—two countries who had been using Hizbullah to fight a proxy war with Israel. States usually take some steps to hide their involvement in a proxy war (if not outright plausible deniability, at least shrouding involvement in ambiguity), so sometimes public exposure of a state’s indirect involvement may cause such international outcry that they cease the supply of money and weapons, as we saw with the US in Nicaragua in the 1980s.

The elongation of violence is a key way in which proxy wars fulfil Liddell Hart’s belief that the indirect approach erodes an enemy’s resistance. The history of proxy wars demonstrates how third party interference causes the prolonging of the initial bi-party conflict through the creation of stalemate conditions, which can alter the strategic perceptions of the target state.[30] However, the indirect approach, and by extension war by proxy, is unlikely to ever lead to outright victory. As with all displacement activities rarely do they fulfil the ultimate objective. It lacks decisiveness, overwhelming force, or the provision of superior numbers. It can soften an enemy, erode their will, but it is not a strategy designed to produce an acknowledgeable battlefield win. Indeed, the best it can produce is a strategic impasse. Even in cases where a munificently sponsored proxy has attained its goals (take the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 in the face of potent CIA-backed mujahedeen resistance) we must not overlook additional explanatory factors, including the domestic political situation (such as the crumbling of the USSR and Gorbachev’s unwillingness to prolong the occupation) and the strategic failures of the enemy (the Soviets had settled upon a strategy of urban pacification in a predominantly rural country where the mujahedeen drew their support from). Yet the increasingly risk averse nature of politically-minded and financially constrained strategic planning has embraced the idea of an indirect approach and eschewed the idea (more out of hope than anything else) that victory comes at the price of blood. *The blood price of modern war waged by the West is now largely for proxies to pay.

Carl von Clausewitz famously described the fog of war to define the absence of information a commander has across a multitude of levels, from the tactical to the grand strategic. Building an intelligence picture of an enemy’s intent, force structure, and weapon capabilities remains a crucial part of any strategy. But proxy warfare represents the foggiest form of war given the deliberate obfuscations that occur in hiding the identity of the benefactor state. Not knowing exactly who the enemy is presents the most fundamental of challenges to strategic formulation. To paraphrase General Sherman during the American Civil War, war waged by proxy puts the opponents on the horns of a dilemma: over-reaction looks preemptive and disproportionate if clear responsibility for an attack has not been established; but the lack of a response leaves a state open to death by a thousand cuts. This is the precarious tightrope that policymakers and military strategists must tread when determining how to respond to the use of proxy warfare by other states in this new era of the indirect strategic approach.

Andrew Mumford is an Associate Professor in Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham, where he is also co-director of the Centre for Conflict, Security and Terrorism. His new book Counterinsurgency Wars and the Anglo-American Alliance: The Special Relationship on the Rocks is due out in early 2018 with Georgetown University Press. His previous books include The Counter-Insurgency Myth: The British Experience of Irregular Warfare and Proxy Warfare.

Notes:
[1] As claimed by John Mueller in his book Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
[2] Statistics drawn from Bruno Tertrais, "The Demise of Ares: The End of War as We Know It?,"*The Washington Quarterly (Vol.35 No.3 2012), p.8.
[3] House of Commons Defence Committee, "Towards the Next Defence and Security Review: Part Two - NATO,"*Third Report of Session 2014-15, (HC 358), 31 July 2014, p.12.
[4] Basil Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (Revised Edition) (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), p.17.
[5] Alex Danchev, Alchemist of War: The Life of Basil Liddell Hart (London: Phoenix, 1999), p.156.
[6] Quoted in Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p.44.
[7] For a major criticism of Liddell Hart’s work, which questions how he positioned the indirect approach vis interpretations of the historical record of both world wars, see John J. Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988). A direct rejoinder to Mearsheimer came from US Army War College professor, and Liddell Hart ‘pupil’, Jay Luvaas’s review of his book. See Jay Luvaas, ‘Liddell Hart and the Mearsheimer Critique: A “Pupil’s” Retrospective’, Parameters (March 1990), pp.9-19.
[8] Shelford Bidwell, Modern Warfare: A Study of Men, Weapons and Theories (London: Allen Lane, 1973), p.199.
[9] Brian Holden Reid, "The Legacy of Liddell Hart: The Contrasting Responses of Michael Howard and André Beaufre,"*British Journal for Military History (Vol.1, No.1, 2014), p.67.
[10] Holden Reid, :The Legacy of Liddell Hart,"*p.69.
[11] Danchev, Alchemist of War, p.157.
[12] Holden Reid, "The Legacy of Liddell Hart,"*p.67.
[13] Danchev, Alchemist of War, p.169.
[14] Ibid., p.161.
[15] Andrew Mumford, Proxy Warfare (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), p.1.
[16] David Ignatius, "Foreign nations’ proxy war in Syria creates chaos,"The Washington Post, 2 October 2014.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Freedman, Strategy: A History, p.xi.
[19] Ibid., p.xii.
[20] Emile Simpson, War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics (London: Hurst, 2012), p.6.
[21] For a discussion of hybrid war see Samuel Charap, "The Ghost of Hybrid War,"Survival (Vol.57, No.6, 2015), pp.51-58.
[22] For further discussion of these factors see Andrew Mumford, "Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict,"*RUSI Journal (Vol. 158, No. 2, April/May 2013), pp. 40–46.
[23] Freedman, Strategy: A History, p.138.
[24] Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach, p.373.
[25] Ibid., p.334-5.
[26] Christopher Coker, War in an Age of Risk (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), p.viii.
[27] Ibid., p.337-9.
[28] Ibid., p.18.
[29] Holden Reid, "The Legacy of Liddell Hart,"*p.68.
[30] Mumford, Proxy Warfare, p.107.
Tagged: Proxy War, Syria, Russia, Liddell Hart, Indirect Approach

Housecarl · Nov 19, 2017

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/11/19/troops-somalia-military-buildup-247668

U.S. military builds up in land of ‘Black Hawk Down’ disaster

The Pentagon now has its largest military presence in war-torn Somalia since the deadly battle in 1993.

By WESLEY MORGAN 11/19/2017 07:09 AM EST Updated 11/19/2017 02:12 PM EST

The number of U.S. military forces in Somalia has more than doubled this year to over 500 people as the Pentagon has quietly posted hundreds of additional special operations personnel to advise local forces in pockets of Islamic militants around the country, according to current and former senior military officials.

It is the largest American military contingent in the war-torn nation since the the infamous 1993 "Black Hawk Down" battle, when 18 U.S. soldiers died. It is also the latest example of how the Pentagon’s operations in Africa have expanded with greater authority provided to field commanders.

The growing Somalia mission, coming more fully to light after four American troops were killed in an ambush in Niger last month, also includes two new military headquarters in the capital of Mogadishu and stepped-up airstrikes. It’s driven by a major shift in strategy from primarily relying on targeted strikes against terrorists to advising and supporting Somali troops in the field, the officials said.

The new operations also come as a peacekeeping mission spearheaded by the African Union is winding down. That is putting more pressure on the fledgling Somali security forces to confront al-Shabab, a terrorist army allied with Al Qaeda that plays the role of a quasi-government in significant parts of the country.

“We had to put more small teams on the ground to partner in a regional way with the Somali government,” retired Brig. Gen. Don Bolduc, who commanded American special operations forces in Africa until June, said in an interview. “So we changed our strategy and we changed our operational approach. That’s why the footprint went up.”

The expansion, which was also outlined by officials at U.S. Africa Command, includes deploying Green Berets and Navy SEALs to far-flung outposts to target the al-Shabab insurgency and a group of militants in the northern region of Puntland who last year pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. The deployment of a special operations adviser team to Puntland alongside Somali troops has served as a model for the broader expansion of the mission.

“Puntland was the example we used," Bolduc said. "We said, ‘We can do this in the other areas.’ So we changed our strategy and we changed our operational approach."

Also, in a move not previously reported, a SEAL headquarters unit has deployed to Mogadishu from Germany to coordinate the adviser teams that are spread across the country. And in a separate move, trainers from the Army's 101st Airborne Division spent the summer working with Somali troops at the fortified airport complex in Mogadishu. That deployment has since ended, but troops from the Army's 10th Mountain Division will perform a similar mission next year, a spokesman for the headquarters overseeing Army activities in Africa said.

To oversee the expanded operation, the Pentagon has also sent a general for the first time: Army Brig. Gen. Miguel Castellanos, a veteran of the 1990s peacekeeping mission in Somali who took charge in June of a unit called the Mogadishu Coordination Cell.

At the same time, more airstrikes are being conducted than ever before to kill militant leaders and to defend the American advisers and their African allies. Those include one conducted Saturday 250 miles from Mogadishu that Africa Command said killed a militant after he attacked a convoy of U.S. and Somali troops.

Some of the strikes have been conducted under new authorities that the Trump administration approved in March. It declared parts of Somalia a zone of “active hostilities” akin to Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, and delegated the authority to approve airstrikes further down the chain of command.

In all, according to Africa Command, the U.S. has conducted 28 airstrikes in Somalia this year, nine of them this month. That's compared to 13 airstrikes and ground raids that the Pentagon announced last year and just five strikes and raids in 2015, according to numbers compiled by the New America Foundation.

The more expansive military effort contrasts with the tiny and secretive U.S. military mission over the past decade headed by the classified Joint Special Operations Command, the military’s main counterterrorism force. JSOC drone strikes reportedly began in Somalia in 2011, and two dozen special operations troops started working as advisers in late 2013.

But the small American contingent was confined mostly to Mogadishu and the Baledogle military airfield in southern Somalia — except during short-duration missions farther afield.

“It was something like 100 people on the ground essentially being the intel and targeting apparatus” for counterterrorism strikes, said an active-duty special operations officer who agreed to speak on the condition of anonymity while discussing sensitive operations.

Officially, the Pentagon disputes that the recent increase in troops constitutes a major buildup of forces.

“I would not associate that with a buildup, as you’re calling it,” said Lt. Gen. Frank McKenzie, director of the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, referring to the troop increase. “I think it’s just the flow of forces in and out as different organizations come in that might be sized a little differently, and I certainly don’t think there’s a ramp-up of attacks.”

A spokesperson for Africa Command, Robyn Mack, told POLITICO that the U.S. presence has increased from around 200 to more than 500 this year.

The larger “advise and assist mission," she explained, is now “the most significant element of our partnership” in Somalia.

The increased presence has not been without controversy inside national security circles, according to multiple people who have been directly involved in the decisions.

Prominent in the discussions has been the recent history of Somalia, which has been wracked by a series of civil wars over the past quarter-century. But the legacy of JSOC's ill-fated man-hunting mission in support of the U.N. peacekeepers in 1993 — in which two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down and a pilot captured — has long made American and Somali officials wary of deeper U.S. military involvement.

"Everybody defaults to ‘Black Hawk Down’ and what happened in Somalia in 1993,” said Bolduc, the former commander of special operations forces in Africa.

“That was a real concern when I was working on Somalia policy at the Pentagon and the White House,” added Luke Hartig, who worked on counterterrorism operations at the National Security Council in the Obama administration. “Some military people would say, ‘We’ve evolved a lot as a force, we’ve done these raids every night in Iraq and Afghanistan and can mitigate risk in a way we couldn’t in 1993.' But it is still one of the real catastrophes of U.S. military operations in the past couple decades."

Nonetheless, most military and counterterrorism officials agreed that air and drone strikes and other pinpoint operations were deemed insufficient to prevent Somalia from becoming a terrorist haven.

“We came to the realization that trying to handle the threat in Somalia just kinetically was not going to work,” Bolduc said. “Taking out high-value targets is necessary, but it’s not going to lead you to strategic success, and it’s not going to build capability and capacity in our partners to secure themselves. So we provided a plan that complemented the kinetic strikes” with a larger military advisory effort.

The arrival of the Trump administration also gave the military an opportunity to make its case to a more receptive audience, the active-duty special operations officer, who had knowledge of the strategy review, told POLITICO.

“It wasn’t, ‘Oh, thank God, new president, new party, now we can go kick ass,’ but there were opportunities with the change in the political situation,” he said.

An equally important factor, Bolduc said, was the Obama administration’s appointment last year of Stephen Schwartz as ambassador in Mogadishu. Schwartz is the first U.S. ambassador to Somalia since before the Black Hawk Down battle and is credited with laying the groundwork with the Somali government, he explained.

But with the stepped-up U.S. military effort also comes greater risk. A member of SEAL Team 6 was killed during one such mission in May.

“Do we get into contact with the enemy? Yes, we do — our partners do and we’re there to support it, and sometimes we come into contact by virtue of how the enemy attacked them,” Bolduc said. “The benchmark that we used in our planning was that U.S. forces coming into contact with the enemy was unlikely. We met that standard most of the time.”

However, Hartig, the former counterterrorism official who also helped craft the new strategy, said he worries about special operations troops getting involved too deeply in rural regions with complex tribal politics. That’s a problem that has plagued U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan.

“Somalia’s incredibly complex human terrain, and you want to be sure you know what you’re getting into,” he said. “Some of the special operations guys do know a lot about Somalia, but we haven’t previously had people on the ground out in the communities.”

Housecarl · Nov 19, 2017

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/africa/isis-eyes-sahel-next-safe-haven

ISIS Eyes Sahel As Next Safe Haven

NOVEMBER 17, 2017 | LEVI MAXEY

ISIS has lost approximately 95 percent of the territory it once controlled across Syria and Iraq. The group may now set its sights on establishing safe havens across the Sahel, a threat that has drawn considerable attention from the U.S. government.

The U.S. has been historically inconsistent in its involvement in Africa – swaying from active involvement in Somalia during the 1990s to near complete withdrawal of overt military presence in the following years. The 2007 establishment of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) based in Stuttgart, Germany, signaled an accelerated U.S. military tempo on the African continent, with the primary goals of neutralizing al Shabaab in Somalia, containing Boko Haram, degrading violent extremist groups, such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Mugreb (AQIM) in the Sahel, and interdicting illicit trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea.
The region is characterized by internal instability primarily from religious, cultural and resource-based conflicts among the inhabitants, and indigenous militant groups have sought to hitch their movements to broader terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda and more recently ISIS. The State Department designated terrorist organizations in the region include: AQIM in Algeria, Mali and Niger; ISIS in Libya and Nigeria; Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria; Ansar Dine in Mali; and Ansar al-Sharia in Libya. Numerous splinter groups, such as the AQIM’s Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), remain undesignated but constitute a real threat to the region.
Early last month, a group of Islamic extremists ideologically linked to ISIS and al Qaeda ambushed a joint U.S.-Nigerien patrol along the Mali-Niger border to the northwest, killing four U.S. troops and five Nigerien soldiers. The news drew the attention of many around the world, most of which were not aware that there were some 800 U.S. forces stationed in the western African country with a predominantly Islamic population of about 21 million.

The landlocked, uranium-rich country of Niger is at the nexus of several recent conflicts in neighboring states – such as Chad in 2008, Nigeria since 2009, Libya since 2011 and Mali since 2012. The United States may see the country gearing up for what could become its own internationalized conflict. Its surrounding borders are experiencing the spillover of neighboring unrest, with local terrorist-affiliated groups seeking to hitch on to resident grievances.

Frank Archibald, Former Director, CIA National Clandestine Service

“Each of these states have long-standing internal conflicts based on some combination of tribal, ethnic, regional, religious, economic, racial or political rivalries. Lack of effective and fair governance, corruption and little economic opportunity all contribute to friction between various ethnic groups. Decades of Saudi-funded, fundamentalist Wahhabi preaching have begun to shape a less tolerant form of Islam in the minds of some of West Africa’s Muslims. All of this is fertile ground for exploitation by those who preach that terrorism is an appropriate response to grievance.”

The 2011 civil war in Libya following the ousting of Muammar Gaddafi discharged a deluge of weapons, fighters and illicit products into the region’s archaic trade routes, with local tribes intertwined with criminal groups transiting post-colonial borders. These smuggling routes have financed, armed and moved militants throughout the region, including Niger.
The Boko Haram insurgency continues to smolder in northern Nigeria after reaching an apex in 2014-2015, at times conducting raids into Niger’s southern Diffa region.
Along Niger’s western border, a French military effort since 2013 has sought to bolster the Malian military’s efforts in stamping out terrorism in the country after al Qaeda-affiliated groups such as MUJAO took over swaths of the northeast after hijacking the insurgency from Tuareg tribes seeking autonomy under the banner of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA).
Perhaps most notable is the fallout of the decade long Algerian civil war ending in 2002, where extremist groups primarily from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) quickly took to the hard desert terrain in the south of the country only to expand their influence throughout the region. In January 2013, an al Qaeda group took some 800 people hostage at the In Amenas natural gas facility along the Algerian border with Libya, killing 67.

LTC (Ret.) Rudolph Atallah, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Africa Center, Atlantic Council

“All of these groups can be traced back to Algeria. The GIA morphed into GSPC, which later became AQIM. After becoming AQIM in 2006, the group atomized itself across the region, and by doing so, it gave credence to different individuals that were upset with local government, and they started to join and some of them of course began to form their own groups.”

John Bennett, Former Director, CIA National Clandestine Service

“With the violence once again flaring in the CAR, it strikes me that the Islamic extremist movements operating in those countries, like the CAR, Nigeria and Cameroon that have significant, if not majority, non-Muslim populations, need to be careful not to overreach and spark a reaction that could take the form of ‘ethnic cleansing.’ For example, at what point do Boko Haram’s attacks on non-Muslims in the North risk provoking reprisals against the Muslim population in Lagos, even though they may be totally innocent? As we have seen too often, it does not take much of a spark to ignite an ethnic/religious based fire in Africa.”

Given the regional dynamics at play, U.S. counterterrorism and stability efforts in the Sahel will also require close cooperation with the security forces of Niger, Mali, Nigeria and Chad. Notably, close intelligence sharing and direct military cooperation with the French, who have an estimated 3,000 forces in the region, will be integral for the long-term success and sustainability of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel.

David Shedd, Former Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

“The relationship with the French is extraordinarily strong by way of cooperation – the ability to have them take pieces of the mission and the Americans take others. The area that I am most familiar with is that there is very strong intelligence cooperation with the French in that region. To the best of my knowledge, that is still going very well.”

France, with historical interests in the region, has set up “specialized posts” throughout neighboring countries. The Ivory Coast is primarily a logistics hub with access to the Atlantic, while much of French airpower, including the Mirage jets that came to the aid of U.S. and Nigerien troops last month, stages out of Chad. Central Niger, in the town of Agadez, is home to a newly established U.S. drone base used for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance over the expansive ungoverned terrain, and the French have a base in the north, home to unmanned Harfang drones and newly purchased American Reaper drones.
Apart from close cooperation with the French, the U.S. should seek to facilitate cross border cooperation among neighboring countries – particularly Niger, Mali and Nigeria. Intelligence sharing, train and equip missions and joint-operations will enable military cooperation along the borderlands that terrorist groups have found safe haven.

David Shedd, Former Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

“No single country is going to be able to defeat one of these entities, such as Boko Haram or AQIM, on its own. It is going to require partner relationships with the Americans and the French, among others in the region, and we can leverage that as a quid pro quo through training and assistance.”

While building the capacity of local forces to secure their own territory is ideal, success is often measured in years, and true success – the elimination of such terrorist groups that pose a threat to U.S. interests in the region – can seem unattainable. Defining an acceptable end goal is first necessary when seeking to develop a counterinsurgency strategy.

John Bennett, Former Director, CIA National Clandestine Service

“It is unlikely that the U.S. and the French can eliminate all “ISIS” elements roaming through the bush or train and equip sufficient local security forces to do it. I would suggest a strategy to isolate them – push them deeper into the desert as the French have been trying to do in Mali and did in Chad in the 1980’s, and monitor them with ISR.”

Levi Maxey is an analyst at The Cipher Brief. Follow him on Twitter @lemax13.

RECENT BRIEFS
Terrorist Safe Haven? Bloodshed Spikes in Central African Republic
Kaitlin Lavinder
How to Weigh the Worth of the Iran Nuclear Deal
Bennett Seftel
Wrapping Intelligence Around the Open Source Whirlwind
Analysis by Levi Maxey
U.S.-Philippine Relations Rebound Under Trump
Bennett Seftel
Trump and Xi Click But National Rivalries Simmer
Callie Wang

ISIS Eyes Sahel As Next Safe Haven
NOVEMBER 17, 2017 | LEVI MAXEY

PHOTO: ALEXANDER KOERNER/GETTY
The Newsletter
Get exclusive analysis delivered to your inbox daily.
SUBSCRIBE NOW
ISIS has lost approximately 95 percent of the territory it once controlled across Syria and Iraq. The group may now set its sights on establishing safe havens across the Sahel, a threat that has drawn considerable attention from the U.S. government.

The U.S. has been historically inconsistent in its involvement in Africa – swaying from active involvement in Somalia during the 1990s to near complete withdrawal of overt military presence in the following years. The 2007 establishment of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) based in Stuttgart, Germany, signaled an accelerated U.S. military tempo on the African continent, with the primary goals of neutralizing al Shabaab in Somalia, containing Boko Haram, degrading violent extremist groups, such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Mugreb (AQIM) in the Sahel, and interdicting illicit trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea.
The region is characterized by internal instability primarily from religious, cultural and resource-based conflicts among the inhabitants, and indigenous militant groups have sought to hitch their movements to broader terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda and more recently ISIS. The State Department designated terrorist organizations in the region include: AQIM in Algeria, Mali and Niger; ISIS in Libya and Nigeria; Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria; Ansar Dine in Mali; and Ansar al-Sharia in Libya. Numerous splinter groups, such as the AQIM’s Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), remain undesignated but constitute a real threat to the region.
Early last month, a group of Islamic extremists ideologically linked to ISIS and al Qaeda ambushed a joint U.S.-Nigerien patrol along the Mali-Niger border to the northwest, killing four U.S. troops and five Nigerien soldiers. The news drew the attention of many around the world, most of which were not aware that there were some 800 U.S. forces stationed in the western African country with a predominantly Islamic population of about 21 million.
The landlocked, uranium-rich country of Niger is at the nexus of several recent conflicts in neighboring states – such as Chad in 2008, Nigeria since 2009, Libya since 2011 and Mali since 2012. The United States may see the country gearing up for what could become its own internationalized conflict. Its surrounding borders are experiencing the spillover of neighboring unrest, with local terrorist-affiliated groups seeking to hitch on to resident grievances.

Frank Archibald, Former Director, CIA National Clandestine Service

“Each of these states have long-standing internal conflicts based on some combination of tribal, ethnic, regional, religious, economic, racial or political rivalries. Lack of effective and fair governance, corruption and little economic opportunity all contribute to friction between various ethnic groups. Decades of Saudi-funded, fundamentalist Wahhabi preaching have begun to shape a less tolerant form of Islam in the minds of some of West Africa’s Muslims. All of this is fertile ground for exploitation by those who preach that terrorism is an appropriate response to grievance.”

The 2011 civil war in Libya following the ousting of Muammar Gaddafi discharged a deluge of weapons, fighters and illicit products into the region’s archaic trade routes, with local tribes intertwined with criminal groups transiting post-colonial borders. These smuggling routes have financed, armed and moved militants throughout the region, including Niger.
The Boko Haram insurgency continues to smolder in northern Nigeria after reaching an apex in 2014-2015, at times conducting raids into Niger’s southern Diffa region.
Along Niger’s western border, a French military effort since 2013 has sought to bolster the Malian military’s efforts in stamping out terrorism in the country after al Qaeda-affiliated groups such as MUJAO took over swaths of the northeast after hijacking the insurgency from Tuareg tribes seeking autonomy under the banner of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA).
Perhaps most notable is the fallout of the decade long Algerian civil war ending in 2002, where extremist groups primarily from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) quickly took to the hard desert terrain in the south of the country only to expand their influence throughout the region. In January 2013, an al Qaeda group took some 800 people hostage at the In Amenas natural gas facility along the Algerian border with Libya, killing 67.
LTC (Ret.) Rudolph Atallah, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Africa Center, Atlantic Council

“All of these groups can be traced back to Algeria. The GIA morphed into GSPC, which later became AQIM. After becoming AQIM in 2006, the group atomized itself across the region, and by doing so, it gave credence to different individuals that were upset with local government, and they started to join and some of them of course began to form their own groups.”

John Bennett, Former Director, CIA National Clandestine Service

“With the violence once again flaring in the CAR, it strikes me that the Islamic extremist movements operating in those countries, like the CAR, Nigeria and Cameroon that have significant, if not majority, non-Muslim populations, need to be careful not to overreach and spark a reaction that could take the form of ‘ethnic cleansing.’ For example, at what point do Boko Haram’s attacks on non-Muslims in the North risk provoking reprisals against the Muslim population in Lagos, even though they may be totally innocent? As we have seen too often, it does not take much of a spark to ignite an ethnic/religious based fire in Africa.”

Given the regional dynamics at play, U.S. counterterrorism and stability efforts in the Sahel will also require close cooperation with the security forces of Niger, Mali, Nigeria and Chad. Notably, close intelligence sharing and direct military cooperation with the French, who have an estimated 3,000 forces in the region, will be integral for the long-term success and sustainability of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel.

David Shedd, Former Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

“The relationship with the French is extraordinarily strong by way of cooperation – the ability to have them take pieces of the mission and the Americans take others. The area that I am most familiar with is that there is very strong intelligence cooperation with the French in that region. To the best of my knowledge, that is still going very well.”

France, with historical interests in the region, has set up “specialized posts” throughout neighboring countries. The Ivory Coast is primarily a logistics hub with access to the Atlantic, while much of French airpower, including the Mirage jets that came to the aid of U.S. and Nigerien troops last month, stages out of Chad. Central Niger, in the town of Agadez, is home to a newly established U.S. drone base used for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance over the expansive ungoverned terrain, and the French have a base in the north, home to unmanned Harfang drones and newly purchased American Reaper drones.
Apart from close cooperation with the French, the U.S. should seek to facilitate cross border cooperation among neighboring countries – particularly Niger, Mali and Nigeria. Intelligence sharing, train and equip missions and joint-operations will enable military cooperation along the borderlands that terrorist groups have found safe haven.
David Shedd, Former Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

“No single country is going to be able to defeat one of these entities, such as Boko Haram or AQIM, on its own. It is going to require partner relationships with the Americans and the French, among others in the region, and we can leverage that as a quid pro quo through training and assistance.”

While building the capacity of local forces to secure their own territory is ideal, success is often measured in years, and true success – the elimination of such terrorist groups that pose a threat to U.S. interests in the region – can seem unattainable. Defining an acceptable end goal is first necessary when seeking to develop a counterinsurgency strategy.

John Bennett, Former Director, CIA National Clandestine Service

“It is unlikely that the U.S. and the French can eliminate all “ISIS” elements roaming through the bush or train and equip sufficient local security forces to do it. I would suggest a strategy to isolate them – push them deeper into the desert as the French have been trying to do in Mali and did in Chad in the 1980’s, and monitor them with ISR.”

Levi Maxey is an analyst at The Cipher Brief. Follow him on Twitter @lemax13.

RELATED ARTICLES

Sept. 11th Intel Vet Rasmussen Leaving NCTC
WILSON DIZARD

Manhattan, October 31
The Devil’s Puzzle: Defining International and Domestic Terrorism
BENNETT SEFTEL AND FRITZ LODGE

Las Vegas Mandaley Bay
What Defines a Terrorist? Motive Matters.
LEVI MAXEY

Housecarl · Nov 20, 2017

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2...rnational-airspace-near-okinawa/#.WhKvjUqnGUk

National

China sends bombers and intelligence-gathering planes through international airspace near Okinawa

by Jesse Johnson
Staff Writer
Nov 19, 2017
Article history

China on Sunday again sent bombers and intelligence-gathering aircraft through international airspace between the islands of Okinawa and Miyako in the East China Sea, part of what Beijing has called continued “regular” exercises in the area.

Japan scrambled fighters in response, though no violation of Japanese airspace was detected.

Four H-6 bombers and two intelligence-gathering aircraft flew a route that took them through the Miyako Strait and back. The flight was believed to be the first through the passageway since August, when six Chinese bombers flew near Kansai’s Kii Peninsula for the first time.

China, under powerful President Xi Jinping, has embarked on a large-scale campaign of modernizing its military — especially its air force and navy — as it seeks to project power farther from its shores.

In a speech during a twice-a-decade Communist Party congress last month, Xi said China is aiming to become a “world-class” force that safeguards the country’s “territorial integrity.”

Beijing is embroiled in a dispute in the East China Sea with Tokyo over the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands, known as the Diaoyus in China.

However, the Defense Ministry in Tokyo said last month it had scrambled fighter jets through September — the first half of fiscal 2017 — a total of 287 times, down 120 times from the same time period in the previous year.

Despite the fall, the ministry documented an uptick in “unusual” flights, including the August drill in skies off the Kii Peninsula.

Last year, the Air Self-Defense Force scrambled fighters 1,168 times, the most since records began being kept in 1958, besting the previous high of 944 — a figure that came at the height of the Cold War in 1984.

China’s military has also sent aircraft, including bombers and fighters, on long-range missions over the Bashi Channel and the Miyako Strait as well as through the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea into the Sea of Japan and back.

In July, the Chinese military sent ships and planes through international but politically sensitive waters and airspace near Japan as part of its continuing push to hone its ability to operate further from its shores.

At the time, the Chinese Defense Ministry said Japan “should not make a fuss about nothing or over-interpret, it will be fine once they get used to it.”

Beijing has blasted Japan for hyping the flights, calling them part of “regular” drills, while Tokyo has said it will keep a steady eye on the “expanding and increasing” actions of the Chinese military in the area.

National
North Korea threatens to make Japan and U.S. bases ‘disappear’
Philippines commissions three more Japan-made coast guard ships

Housecarl · Nov 20, 2017

Technology And The Future Of War - William Murray, Hoover Institute
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...Future-Of-War-William-Murray-Hoover-Institute

Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-pandoras-box-of-the-digital-age/

The Pandora’s box of the digital age

17 Nov 2017 | Carl Bildt

Is the world sliding dangerously towards cyber Armageddon? Let us hope not; but let us also apprehend the threat, and focus on what to do about it.

One country after another has begun exploring options for bolstering its offensive capabilities in cyberspace, and many other countries have already done so. This is a dangerous escalation. In fact, few other trends pose a bigger threat to global stability.

Almost all societies have become heavily dependent on the internet, the world’s most important piece of infrastructure—and also the infrastructure upon which all other infrastructure relies. The so-called Internet of Things is a misnomer; soon enough, it will be the ‘Internet of Everything’. And our current era is not a Fourth Industrial Revolution; it is the beginning of the digital age, and the end of the industrial age altogether.

The digital age has introduced new vulnerabilities that hackers, cyber criminals and other malign actors are already routinely exploiting. But even more alarming is the eagerness of national governments to conduct cyberwarfare operations against one another.

We have already reached the stage at which every conflict has a cyber dimension. The United States and Israel crossed the Rubicon in 2010 by launching the Stuxnet attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Now, there is no telling where ongoing but hidden cyber conflicts begin and end.

Things were different in the old world of nuclear weapons, which are complicated and expensive devices based on technology that only a few highly educated specialists have mastered. Cyber weapons, by contrast, are generally inexpensive to develop or acquire, and deceptively easy to use. As a result, even weak and fragile states can become significant cyber powers.

Worse still, cyberwar technologies have been proliferating at an alarming pace. While there are extensive safeguards in place to control access to sensitive nuclear technologies and materials, there is almost nothing preventing the dissemination of malicious software code.

To understand the scale of the threat we face, look no further than the ‘WannaCry’ virus that, among other things, almost shut down the British National Health Service this past May. The virus exploited a vulnerability in the Microsoft Windows operating system that the US National Security Agency had already discovered, but did not report to Microsoft. After this information was leaked or stolen from the NSA, North Korea quickly put the ransomware to use, which should come as no surprise. In recent years, North Korea has launched numerous cyberattacks around the world, most notably against Sony Pictures, but also against many financial institutions.

And, of course, North Korea is hardly an exception. Russia, China and Israel have also developed cyber weapons, which they are busy trying to implant in systems around the world. This growing threat is precisely why other countries have started talking about acquiring offensive cyber capabilities of their own: they want to have a deterrent to ward off attacks from other cyber powers. Cybersecurity is regarded as complicated and costly; but cyber offence is seen as inexpensive and sexy.

The problem is that, while deterrence works in the nuclear world, it isn’t particularly effective in the cyber world. Rogue actors—and North Korea is hardly the only example—are far less vulnerable than developed countries to cyber counterstrikes. They can attack again and again without risking serious consequences.

Cyberattacks’ often-ambiguous origins make it even harder to apply a rational theory of deterrence to the cyber world. Identifying the responsible party, if possible at all, takes time; and the risk of misattribution is always there. I doubt we will ever see unambiguous proof that Israel is conducting offensive cyber operations; but that certainly doesn’t mean that it isn’t.

In the darkness of cyberspace, sophisticated actors can hide behind oblivious third parties, who are then exposed to counterstrikes by the party under attack. And in the ongoing conflict among Gulf countries, at least one government may have contracted hackers based in other countries to conduct operations against an adversary. This method of avoiding detection will almost certainly become the norm.
In a world riven by geopolitical rivalries large and small, such ambiguity and saber-rattling in the cyber realm could have catastrophic results. Nuclear weapons are generally subject to clear, strict and elaborate systems of command and control. But who can control the legions of cyber warriors on the dark web?

Given that we are still in the early stages of the digital age, it is anyone’s guess what will come next. Governments may start developing autonomous counterstrike systems that, even if they fall short of Dr Strangelove’s Doomsday Machine, will usher in a world vulnerable to myriad unintended consequences.

Most obviously, cyber weapons will become a staple in outright wars. The United Nations Charter affirms all member states’ right to self-defence—a right that is, admittedly, increasingly open to interpretation in a kinetic, digitised world. The charter also touches on questions of international law, particularly with respect to non-combatants and civilian infrastructure in conflict zones.

But what about the countless conflicts that do not reach the threshold of all-out war? So far, efforts to establish universal rules and norms governing state behaviour in cyberspace have failed. It is clear that some countries want to preserve their complete freedom of action in this domain.

But that poses an obvious danger. As the NSA leaks have shown, there is no way to restrict access to destructive cyber weapons, and there is no reason to hope that the rules of restraint that governed the nuclear age will work in the cyber age.

Unfortunately, a binding international agreement to restrict the development and use of offensive cyber weapons in non-war situations is probably a long way off. In the meantime, we need to call greater attention to the dangers of cyber-weapon proliferation, and urge governments to develop defensive rather than offensive capabilities. An arms race in cyberspace has no winners.

Author

Carl Bildt is a former prime minister and foreign minister of Sweden. This article is presented in partnership with Project Syndicate © 2017. Image courtesy of Flickr user Mario Antonio Pena Zapateria.

Housecarl · Nov 20, 2017

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.yahoo.com/news/arab-league-chief-says-lebanon-spared-145626493.html

Arab League chief says Lebanon should be 'spared'

AFP • November 20, 2017

Beirut (AFP) - Arab League chief Ahmed Abul Gheit said on Monday Lebanon should be "spared" from spiralling regional tensions, during a visit to Beirut a day after Arab diplomats condemned Lebanese movement Hezbollah.

The Arab League held an extraordinary general meeting on Sunday in Cairo at the request of Saudi Arabia, which called the ministerial-level session to discuss "violations" by its rival Iran.

Despite the meeting's strongly worded concluding statement, Abul Gheit said Arab nations sought to keep Lebanon insulated from harm.

"No one can accept, or want, any harm to happen to Lebanon," Abul Gheit said after meeting with Lebanese President Michel Aoun in Baabda.

"Lebanon has a special character, a particular and special structure. The League recognises this," he told reporters.

Earlier Abul Gheit told Lebanon's National News Agency that "Arab countries understand and take into account the situation in Lebanon and want to spare it... from any dispute."

Abul Gheit also met parliament speaker Nabih Berri and will attend a conference organised by the United Nations' Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA).

In statements posted on Twitter, Aoun said Lebanon could not be held "responsible" for regional conflicts.

"It did not attack anyone, and it therefore shouldn't pay the price for these conflicts with its political stability or security," he said.

"Lebanon cannot accept the suggestion that its government is a partner in terrorist acts. The position that Lebanon's delegate to the Arab League took expresses a universal, national will," Aoun added.

- Hezbollah 'responsible' -

On Sunday, Arab foreign ministers strongly criticised Lebanon's powerful Shiite movement Hezbollah, which is backed by Iran.

In the meeting's concluding statement, they pledged to hold Hezbollah "responsible for supporting terrorism and terrorist organisations in Arab countries with modern weapons and ballistic missiles".

They also demanded Hezbollah stop intervening in regional conflicts and spreading extremism and sectarianism.

Lebanese Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil did not attend the meeting, leaving permanent representative to the Arab League Antoine Azzam to represent the country.

Abul Gheit said Sunday that Lebanon's delegation had expressed reservations on the statement, "specifically on the points related to Hezbollah's role".

Iran on Monday dismissed the Arab League resolution as "worthless" and urged Saudi Arabia to "stop its pressure on Lebanon, Qatar and the entire region".

Lebanon has been gripped by a political crisis since Prime Minister Saad Hariri announced his surprise resignation earlier this month while in Saudi Arabia, lambasting Iran and Hezbollah for destabilising his country.

The shock announcement sparked worries that Lebanon would be caught up in the spiralling tensions between Riyadh and Tehran, which back opposing political and armed groups across the region.

After resigning, Hariri spent two more weeks in Saudi Arabia amid rumours he was under de facto house arrest there, before travelling to Paris on Saturday.

There, he met French President Emmanuel Macron and pledged he would be in Lebanon in time to mark its independence day on Wednesday.

Hariri said he would be in Cairo on Tuesday to meet Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.

A source close to Hariri said that meeting aimed to "continue the series of Arab and international consultations".

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah is set to give a speech Monday at 6:00 pm (1600 GMT) on the crisis in Lebanon and tensions between Riyadh and Tehran.

almost ready · Nov 20, 2017

HC, re your post #4 and the NATO drill, I know what I'm reading but having a hard time believing it really happened.

Still, it's all the buzz in Turkey

http://www.yenisafak.com/en/news/natos-plan-to-attack-turkey-in-2018-2808661

NATO's plan to attack Turkey in 2018

NATO’s military drill in Norway targeting Atatürk and President Erdoğan was heard of days after the incident took place

NATO’s scandalous “Trident Javelin” military exercise is still being criticized by many, as it targeted Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Turkey on Friday decided to withdraw its 40 troops from the joint NATO drill conducted in Norway after he and Atatürk were depicted as “enemies.”

Reports say that the incident took place one week before the drill ended. It was launched on Nov. 8, the exercise in which the two Turkish leaders were depicted as enemies occurred on Nov. 13 and the drill ended on Nov. 16.

President Erdoğan was notified of the incident on Nov. 17 and announced it to the public. "There can be no such unity, no such alliance," said the Turkish President.

Although the heinous plan is trying to be presented as an incident that “was the result of an individual’s actions,” it serves a greater purpose: preparing for an operation against Turkey. The enemy country was designated as the country of “Skolken” in the scenario of the war game in Norway.

(photo)
NATO chief apologizes to Erdoğan over drill incident

NATO chief apologized to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on Saturday after a civilian Norwegian official depicted the Turkish leader as an "enemy collaborator" during a bloc exercise in Norway, according to a presidential source. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg made the apology over the phone, the source, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to restrictions on talking to the media, said.Turkey withdrew from the Trident Javelin exercise after the incident in Norway on Friday.A portrait of Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was also shown in the "hostile leader list" during a computer-assisted exercise.In the phone call, Stoltenberg also informed the Turkish president that an inquiry had been initiated by the commanding officer and the contracted Norwegian technician involved in the incident was terminated immediately.The NATO chief also said Turkey is an important ally for NATO and that he would take all necessary precautions to avoid a repeat of such an incident.He hoped the scandal would not adversely affect relations between NATO and Turkey, the source said.Stoltenberg had also apologized to Turkey over the incident on Friday.Erdoğan condemns 'impudence' during NATO drillTurkey’s opposition seeks more than apology from NATODeputy PM slams NATO enemy chart

'Dictator' of fictional country

A technician in the Norwegian army put Atatürk’s portrait in the “hostile leader list” as the “dictator” of Skolken during a computer-assisted exercise. The scenario of the drill also included a war scenario that broke out due to the social media content posted by the leader of Skolken. A fake account opened by a Norwegian contract military officer of Turkish origin was part of the drill’s scenario. The officer opened a fake account named “RTerdogan” and identified Erdoğan as the enemy target and depicted him as an “enemy of NATO” who allegedly made deals that was harmed NATO.

NATO starts a war against Skolken

In the generic scenario of the drill, there were remarkable similarities between the fictional country of Skolken and Turkey. According to the scenario, Skolken had made important progress in the bid to buy the S-400 defense systems, and Skolken and the manufacturer country of the S-400s had recently developed closer relations.

Turkey has completed the purchases of the S-400 missile system from Russia, Turkish National Defense Minister Nurettin Canikli said on Saturday.

NATO declared war against Skolken, following these developments and its leader’s social media posts, the scenario depicted. Although NATO attempted to slur over the scandal, saying that “the incidents were the result of an individual’s actions and does not reflect the views of NATO,” the details reveal that this drill was attributed particularly to Turkey.

Turkey, NATO alliance should not be 'undermined'

Turkey’s alliance with NATO should not be undermined, Turkish military chief Gen. Hulusi Akar said on Saturday.Speaking at the Halifax International Security Forum in Nova Scotia in Canada, Chief of General Staff Gen. Akar said: “NATO is the most successful and most effective military organization that has existed throughout history.“Recently, in one of the NATO exercises we had an unpleasant and unacceptable event, reportedly committed by an individual who may be backed by [Fetullah Terrorist Organization] FETO members.“NATO administrators responded timely and appropriately. We should not allow anyone to undermine our alliance and our solidarity.”Turkey withdrew its troops from a NATO military drill in Norway after President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Friday that his name and the picture of Turkish Republic’s founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk were used in an "enemy chart”.Following the incident, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg apologized to Turkey in a written statement as well as to Gen. Akar during a face-to-face meeting in Canada.Gen. Akar said Turkey is one of the countries with the highest number of troops in NATO and the country has supported 14 missions of the alliance in 11 different countries.The general also criticized Turkey’s allies who were providing weapons to PKK/PYD terror group.Allies' cooperation with PKK/PYD“PKK, PYD and YPG are equals of each other. The PKK is listed as a terrorist organization by numerous countries.“They may have different names but they all have the same goal.“It was unfortunate to witness the utilization of terrorist organizations as proxies during this conflict. This has further complicated the situation.“Some of our allies have been cooperating with the PKK-affiliated YPG in a similar fashion. They have been supporting PKK and YPG in almost all demands despite news of such acts amounting to war crimes.”He said it was disappointing to see that some allies provided weapons and ammunition to the PKK/PYD.“I would like to underline that PKK/YPG uses these weapons against Turkish citizens and soldiers."Additionally, we are having a hard time to understand the ethics in fight against terrorist organization with another one. It seems a simple name change has been enough for some states.''Referring to reports about the U.S. backing the deal allowing Daesh to leave their Syrian stronghold of Raqqah that paved the way for PKK/PYD to then takeover the city, Gen. Akar said: ''Some of our allies disregarded the dirty deal that YPG brokered with Daesh in Raqqah.'Unbelievable' Raqqah deal"Evacuation of Daesh terrorists from Raqqah even with their weapons, it’s unbelievable.''The general also said that Daesh had nothing to do with Islam. “Please do not forget that Daesh is also attacking Islamic countries and killing innocent Muslims without hesitation.“Do not mix Muslims with terrorists. The key must be zero tolerance for terrorists."For instance, we have witnessed tragic attacks in Myanmar against Rohingya Muslims recently."The attackers were Buddhists; however, no one referred to them as Buddhist terrorists.''At the end of his speech, Akar quoted Erdogan’s famous words about the world being bigger than a few countries.“As our President Erdogan has said while referring to the UN Security Council, we should remember that the world is bigger than five."The UN’s priority must be global safety and security.”

Preparation for an operation

The drill has been interpreted as “preparations for an operation against Turkey.” The real scenario was to turn NATO against Turkey by spreading fake discourses through President Erdoğan.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg issued a statement apologizing for the incident saying that an investigation was underway.

"It will be for the Norwegian authorities to decide on any disciplinary action," Stoltenberg added.

Turkish Chief of General Staff Gen. Hulusi Akar in his meeting with Jens Stoltenberg said that an investigation launched by Norwegian authorities regarding the incidents should not be limited to the people responsible for it, underlining the need for an “extensive” investigation. He also noted that “those who try to exploit NATO for their own agendas should not be allowed to harm cooperation among NATO allies.”

NATO drills prepared months beforehand

It is not coincidental that an account named “RTerdogan” was opened and that Atatürk was targeted as the “enemy country’s leader” in the drill, as NATO’s scenarios for its annual drills are written down to the very last detail months before its scheduled date within the chain of command. All materials to be used in drills are also prepared in advance. The Trident Javelin exercise, which personnel from the Turkish Armed Forces also joined, was also one of the planned drills of NATO.

Trident Javelin, the fourth of the annual Trident Juncture exercises held for the certification of NATO’s response force, was conducted to certify the Allied Joint Force Commands in Netherlands’ Brunssum and Italy’s Napoli. Following the drill, the joint force would be certified to perform their NATO tasks in 2018. Therefore, Javelin is being evaluated as the exercise for the preparation of a possible operation that NATO will launch in 2018.

Possible FETÖ involvement

Five of the Fetullah Terrorist Organization’s (FETÖ) military officers who held office at the NATO base where the drill was conducted until last year’s coup attempt were granted political asylum in Norway after July 15. Thus, it was also considered that FETÖ might be involved in the scandalous incident. Former Brigadier General Gökhan Şahin Sönmezateş, one of FETÖ’s gunmen during the July 15 coup attempt, was also among those who held office in NATO headquarters 10 years ago.

FETÖ terrorists are led by U.S.-based Fetullah Gülen, who orchestrated Turkey's July 15 coup attempt and is the mastermind behind a long-running campaign to overthrow the state through the infiltration of Turkish institutions, particularly the military, police and judiciary.

Erdoğan condemns 'impudence' during NATO drill

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said Saturday an apology was not enough to solve the NATO enemy chart problem, and added that NATO’s credibility was now dubious.“Yesterday, you have witnessed the impudence at NATO exercise in Norway. The credibility of NATO has become questionable in the eyes of all member states. Some mistakes are not made by fools but by scum. The disrespectful behavior at the NATO drill cannot be solved with a simple apology,” Erdoğan said."I understand this impudence that targets me and founder of our republic Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as a reflection of a distorted point of view that we observe in NATO for a while," the president added.Turkish officials have slammed the incident during a NATO drill in Norway. Turkey withdrew from the Trident Javelin exercise after a civilian Norwegian official depicted Erdoğan as an "enemy collaborator" during a bloc exercise.On Friday, Erdoğan told ruling Justice and Development (AK Party) Party members in capital Ankara that a portrait of Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was also shown in the ‘hostile leader list’ during the computer-assisted exercise.

A Norwegian national was removed from the exercise as a consequence of the incident, and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and Norwegian Defense Minister Frank Bakke-Jensen have apologized to Turkey.Deputy PM slams NATO enemy chartS-400 purchase“The reaction put forward when we attempted to purchase the S-400 from Russia to defend our own security confirms this fallacy. I would like to call out to all our NATO allies. We bought the S-400 system. We are currently discussing financing. We will not allow anyone to threaten us with their technology,” Erdoğan said.Turkey has "completed" the purchase of the S-400 air-defense system from Russia, Turkish Defense Minister Nurettin Canikli said on Nov. 11.The S-400 is Russia’s most advanced long-range anti-aircraft missile system and can carry three types of missiles capable of destroying targets, including ballistic and cruise missiles.“Those who are trying to limit Turkey in the international arena by supporting terrorist organizations against us in Syria and Iraq. How can we believe those who say that they are fighting terrorism?” Erdoğan said.Turkey says purchase of S-400 from Russia 'completed'Turkey will save Syria's Idlib and Manbij“We will save Syria’s Idlib. We will also clear Manbij and deliver it to its rightful owners. We will save Afrin. We will eliminate all terror threats to Turkey in Iraq’s Qandil. We will work to prevent a quarrel among brothers in the Gulf,” said Erdoğan.Erdogan has previously said that Afrin would be on Ankara's agenda after its current operation in Syria's Idlib province, where Turkey and Russia have set up observation points under a "de-escalation" deal reached by Ankara, Moscow and Tehran to ease the bloodshed in the six-year-old Syrian conflict.Turkish troops will be deployed to strategic points in Idlib, near its border with Afrin and Manbij, to monitor the region to prevent clashes between Syrian opposition fighters and Assad regime forces as well as outline a plan for an upcoming operation in the other two areas. The Turkish military has already established six observation posts across Idlib.Turkish presidential aide slams US over PKK-Daesh dealPKK/PYD chemical weapons threaten 6 mln civilians in Turkey'Turkey has evidence of US arming terror groups'Assad regime shelling kills 7 civilians in E.GhoutaCease-fire in Syria’s E. Ghouta ‘over’, observers say

Turkey’s opposition seeks more than apology from NATO

Turkish main opposition party leader on Saturday said that the incident during the NATO drill in Norway cannot be just evaded with an apology.Turkey withdrew from the Trident Javelin exercise after a civilian Norwegian official depicted Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as an "enemy collaborator" during a bloc exercise in Norway.On Friday, Erdoğan told ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party members in capital Ankara that a portrait of Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was also shown in the ‘hostile leader list’ during the computer-assisted exercise.Speaking at an event in Ankara on Saturday, Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu said they cannot accept the “insult” towards Turkey's history and today's Turkey.He said they expect a satisfactory statement from the NATO officials regarding the incident."It is not a topic that can be avoided with an ordinary 'we apologize' thing," Kılıçdaroğlu said, adding "Nobody can insult Turkey's (current) executives and history. We strongly condemn this.”NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and Norwegian Defense Minister Frank Bakke-Jensen have apologized to Turkey over the incident.Deputy PM slams NATO enemy chartNorway apologizes to Turkey over NATO drill incidentTurkey to monitor legal proceedings over NATO incident

Deputy PM slams NATO enemy chart

Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ said on Saturday Turkey strongly condemned the enemy chart incident at a NATO drill in Norway.“We strongly condemn those who conducted this dishonorable action. NATO’s apology is important, but I believe they also have some responsibility in the incident. All necessary actions should be taken regarding those who did this,” Bozdağ said.Bozdağ added that there is an “international cooperation” against President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan."This [international cooperation] reached a level that gave a soldier courage to show the founder and current leader of a NATO country as an enemy target during an exercise," said Bozdağ speaking to reporters in southeastern Şırnak."Until now NATO has not seen a scandal like this. Neither did the world," Bozdağ said, adding that NATO should take necessary steps that will prevent such incidents in the future.Turkey to monitor legal proceedings over NATO incidentBozdağ welcomed the removal of those responsible from the incident and the apology of NATO secretary-general. However, he added that those who run NATO also have responsibility to take.A Norwegian national was removed from the exercise as a consequence of the incident. Erdoğan was depicted as an “enemy collaborator” during the drill."There was an incident in Norway," Erdogan told ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party members in Ankara on Friday."They used an enemy chart in Norway. In that chart, there was my name and [Mustafa Kemal] Atatürk's picture."Norway apologizes to Turkey over NATO drill incidentImmediately after the incident, Turkey withdrew from the Trident Javelin exercise, Erdoğan announced.Following the incident, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has apologized to Turkey. In a written statement, Stoltenberg said: "I apologize for the offense that has been caused. The incidents were the result of an individual’s actions and do not reflect the views of NATO."Stoltenberg’s statement said that the individual in question "was immediately removed from the exercise by the Joint Warfare Centre, and an investigation is underway"."He was a civilian contractor seconded by Norway and not a NATO employee. It will be for the Norwegian authorities to decide on any disciplinary action," he also said.Stoltenberg added that Turkey is a "valued NATO Ally, which makes important contributions to Allied security."Polish Maj. Gen. Andrzej Reudowicz, the commander of the Joint Warfare Center (JWC) in Stavanger, Norway where the exercise took place, has also issued a letter of apology over the incidents, according to the anonymous NATO official.

almost ready · Nov 20, 2017

https://www.turkishminute.com/2017/...alls-on-turks-to-get-ready-for-war-with-nato/

Pro-Erdoğan columnist calls on Turks to get ready for war with NATO

Ardan Zentürk, a columnist for the pro-government daily Star, has said Turkey will fight a war with NATO, adding that whoever says they “will not fight” should leave the country now.

Starting with a recent scandal in which Atatürk was portrayed as an enemy on a war chart during a NATO drill in Norway, then adding US aid to Kurdish forces in Syria, a court case against Turkish-Iranian gold trader Reza Zarrab for violating US sanctions against İran and the US refusal to extradite Fethullah Gülen, who the government accuses of masterminding a failed coup in Turkey last summer, Zentürk in his article published in the Star daily today said: “The US is not now administered by Americans who are accountable to the American taxpayer. Low-life people from the neocon/Zionist lobby with deep media connections have launched an operation against our country by turning [President Donald] Trump into a puppet.”

“The ‘emergence of the East’ has started under the Erdoğan-[Russian President Vladimir] Putin agreement. The first achievement of this rise should be the immediate closure of İncirlik Air Base [in Turkey’s Adana province] if the imperialist attack continues,” said Zentürk.

Claiming that a conflict between Turkey and the US is inevitable and that Turkey is at the point of “to be or not to be,” Zentürk said: ” It is clear that we will fight one day. … I recommend that those who say ‘I am not part of this fight, my property and comfort come before my country’ leave the country today.”

Both Islamist and ultranationalist/Eurosianist circles in Turkey have been pushing the idea of closing NATO/US bases in Turkey and leaving the alliance.

The Yeni Şafak daily, a staunch supporter of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the government, on Sunday said NATO plans to attack Turkey in 2018.

The ultranationalist Aydınlık daily on Sunday called for the closure of NATO bases in Turkey. The newspaper, which is known for its pro-Eurosianist line, on Saturday had called on the Turkish government to leave NATO.

Yalçın Topçu, a key advisor of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, on Monday said NATO was behind all coups in Turkey, stating that it is time to review membership in the alliance.

(Note from AR: Bold emphasis is mine)

edited to add comment: HC, this all seems to look back at the failed coup d'etat of July. That wasn't resolved in any way, IIRC. The coup plotter is still in Pennsylvania, isn't he? Just a nothing burger of news on that, over here, anyway.

Another of Obama's gifts?

Housecarl · Nov 21, 2017

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/or...iran-russia-trilateral-distrust-in-syria.html

Turkey, Iran, Russia: trilateral distrust in Syria

Ali Bakeer
November 20, 2017

Russian President Vladimir Putin will be hosting his Turkish and Iranian counterparts, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Hassan Rouhani, at a trilateral summit Nov. 22 in Sochi, to discuss Syria and regional developments. Prior to the summit, the three countries held a preparatory meeting with experts*in Tehran, followed by another meeting on the ministerial level in Turkey’s Antalya.*

At the conclusion of the Antalya meeting Nov.*19,*Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey*Lavrov seemed very optimistic, and he was quoted as saying that*“the meeting was useful” and the parties to the talks "agreed on all key issues." Yet*Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif acted in a discreet manner when the former talked about bridging the gaps between the three parties*and the latter*did not disclose much.

Although these meetings can be seen as a sign of a growing cooperation between the three parties,*they can also be interpreted as a reflection of distrust between them. When it comes to Russia’s agenda in Syria, both Ankara and Tehran have their own fears*as they are concerned that*Moscow*might exploit them at some point*to achieve its own goals.

Over the last 11 months, the three countries managed to work tactically on selective matters*in order to maximize their gains in the short term in Syria. However, as the battle against the Islamic State (IS) is coming to an end and the topics on which they can agree*shrink, each party fears that Russia will conclude side agreements at their own expense, hence the growing distrust between the three players.

For Turkey, the issue*of*the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and People's Protection Units (YPG) is a priority right now. In a Daily Sabah column, Turkey's*presidential*spokesman Ibrahim Kalin summed up his country’s six grand goals in Syria, reiterating that “the question of the PYD-YPG remains a red line for Turkey.”

Russia’s position on this matter is vague at best when it comes to Ankara’s crucial interests, but pro-Kurdish when it comes to Moscow’s own interests. In a shattered region where failed states are flourishing, minorities tend to be more valuable for foreign powers. While Russia clearly doesn't*want*to leave*the Kurds to the United States, it also wants to use them to gain influence and leverage when needed, whether it be against Turkey, Iran or even Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

In January, Russia presented a*draft constitution*for the new Syria. The draft constitution guarantees the Kurds inflated powers far greater than their size to the extent that even the*Assad regime had refused*them. Apparently, Moscow did not consult with Ankara on this matter despite the fact that both are supposed to be coordinating the*Astana platform.

Last month, Putin expressed the will to host the*Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Sochi.*Moscow, which does not list*the Kurdistan Workers Party, the PYD and the YPG as terrorist organizations, invited the PYD, causing a backlash after*Turkey*and the Syrian opposition objected.*

Again, it was obvious that Moscow had not coordinated this step with Ankara. Most importantly, by doing this*Russia appeared to be ignoring an already well-known Turkish red line, thus raising questions in Ankara about its real intentions.

Explaining this situation,*Kerim Has, a lecturer at Moscow State University, told Al-Monitor, “Turkish-Russian cooperation is not a product of strategic planning.*Ankara is well aware that it needs to cooperate with Russia to have a seat around the table about Syria’s future, while Moscow also needs Ankara’s support to realize Russia’s own geopolitical aims in Syria and the Middle East region in general.”

He added, “There are a lot of diverging issues between Turkey and Russia, but the Kurdish PYD*issue is the most critical one right now. Neither Ankara nor Moscow trusts each other as there is an inevitable partnership based on selective cooperation, and this is why the relations between the two countries are very fragile now."

Last week, Putin and US President Donald Trump*issued a joint statement stressing that there is no military solution for the conflict in Syria, and there is a need to support the UN-backed Geneva political process.*One day later,*reports emerged*citing a bilateral agreement between Russia and the United States*on a cease-fire deal*in southern Syria that would include the expulsion of the Iranian-backed militias from the border areas in the Golan Heights.

Russia*immediately*denied the existence*of such a deal, and Lavrov maintained that Moscow made no such pledges to ensure the withdrawal of pro-Iranian forces from Syria.*Commenting on the issue, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman*Bahram Ghassemi*responded, “Iran has been fully informed by the Russians on the cease-fire agreement. No agreement would be successful without taking the realities on the ground into account.”

The situation on the ground suggests that Iran has the biggest non-regular army in Syria, which consists of tens of thousands of Shiite militia fighters.*Many regional and international players would like to see those militias leave Syria. The eroding and defeat of IS*is shifting the focus again to pro-Iran militias, which makes Tehran very anxious about its situation in Syria.

Contrary to Ghassemi’s calm response,*a well-informed source told Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity, “[Iran] is never comfortable whenever Russia sits with the United States, Israel or Turkey. [Tehran] does not take what the Kremlin says for granted, especially when it comes to its own agenda in Syria.”

The source gave examples of*bilateral agreements between Russia and these countries, stressing, “As Iran is the most powerful player on the ground, [their] ultimate purpose is to hinder [Iran’s] influence in Syria.”

Clarifying the complicated nature of relations between Iran and Russia,*Hakki*Uygur, the vice director of the Ankara-based Center for Iranian Studies, told Al-Monitor, “If there is just one word we could use [to describe] Iran’s foreign policy, it would be distrust.”

He said, “For Iran, Russia is not an exception on this matter, taking into consideration historic and recent experiences*with each other on various issues. Tehran knows that Moscow has its own agenda in Syria with Western powers that*are not in line with that of Iran*—*whether it be regarding the 'axis of resistance issue'*or Assad. That’s why each actor tries to engage with a maximum number of allies and does not want to take the risk of being alone in such a complicated conflict area."

State dealings are not based on trust but interests. However, there are reasons why these three countries have been able to cooperate with each other*until now*despite the growing distrust between them. One of the*reasons could be their position vis-a-vis the US*position in Syria. Yet*to what extent this situation can be sustained is questionable.

Found in:
Syria war spillover, Defense/Security cooperation

Ali Bakeer is an Ankara-based political analyst and researcher. He holds a PhD in political science and international relations. He writes extensively on Middle East politics with a particular focus on the foreign policies of GCC countries, Turkey and Iran. On Twitter: @Alibakeer

Housecarl · Nov 21, 2017

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.cbc.ca/news/opinion/war-middle-east-1.4407876

Opinion

Ominous signs that the next war in the Middle East is coming, and it won't be pretty

It's likely to directly or indirectly involve Israel, Lebanon, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and even Russia

By*Michael Coren, for CBC News Posted: Nov 18, 2017 5:00 AM ET Last Updated: Nov 18, 2017 5:20 PM ET

Related Stories

Lebanon again dangerously at mercy of Saudi Arabia-Iran rivalry: Nahlah Ayed
Lebanon PM Saad Hariri says he'll return within 2 days after mysterious departure
France intervenes in bid to end Lebanon's political crisis

In 2006 I reported on the war in Lebanon, where for virtually the first time in its history the Israel Defense Forces, the IDF, realized that it was not infallible and invincible.

Not that the war was a defeat for Israel – its military is stronger than most of its neighbours combined – but its generals suddenly realized that they did not have carte blanche in the region.

Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shia militia armed and trained by Iran, inflicted serious numbers of casualties and amounts of damage, and while southern Lebanon was devastated by the Israelis and the Lebanese people were once again the victims, the game had changed. As one senior IDF staff officer said to me afterwards, "This must never be allowed to happen again."

Israel's response at the time was initially to send in groups of Special Forces, backed by fleets of attack helicopters. They didn't use the strength that they were capable of, and they were certainly less than efficient. Their intelligence was flawed, they had no idea how well trained and dug-in Hezbollah soldiers were, and they were over-confident. Allowing troops to take cell phones with them into Lebanon, for example, was absurdly slack.

The next war in the north will likely involve prolonged artillery attacks followed by massive infantry and tank infiltration. It will not be pretty. And it's likely to happen sooner rather than later, and directly or indirectly involve Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and even Russia.

Reasserting Israeli authority
There are several factors to consider. First, in September, IDF's Northern Command conducted its largest military exercise in 20 years, involving tens of thousands of troops, tanks, aircraft and even the navy. Such planning takes an incredibly large amount of time and the manoeuvres themselves are extraordinarily costly.

The imagined enemy was Hezbollah. Israel has also attacked Syrian positions several times in recent months, partly to remind Damascus who is the boss of the block, but also to test how they will respond. Syria has always regarded Lebanon as a virtual province and Israel is determined to teach it — and Hezbollah — a lesson, and to reassert its authority.

Lebanon again dangerously at mercy of Saudi Arabia-Iran rivalry: Nahlah Ayed
Hezbollah leader blasts 'unprecedented Saudi intervention' in Lebanon

Second, the Sunni superpower of Saudi Arabia is in an increasingly hot war with the Shia world and in particular, Iran. Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman is heir to the throne and while young, he is the effective ruler of the country. He's economically progressive, internationally connected and determined to modernize the country and also have it throw its weight around.

The civil war in Yemen, for example, is now almost three years old and had led to the deaths of at least 5,000 civilians, many of them children. Saudi Arabia backs the government, in particular with its air force, while Iran supports the Houthi rebels. *
Signs of conflict

The country's involvement in Lebanon is less direct, but equally evident. Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, who also holds Saudi citizenship, travelled to Saudi recently where he denounced Iranian manipulation of his country and then resigned. Bin Salman has called for all Saudi citizens to leave Lebanon, which is generally an ominous warning of imminent conflict. The Saudis have also demanded that Hezbollah disarm; they will never do so of course, and the Lebanese security forces do not have the will or the ability to force them. But it is a further formal, legal prerequisite for a possible state of war.

Israel and Saudi could never form a tangible and open alliance, but they are doubtless in contact. If Lebanon were attacked by Saudi Arabia, it would provide Israel with the perfect opportunity to bring Hezbollah to account.

Several of the IDF's senior commanders have recently been replaced, including the head of the Intelligence Corps – a vital role for such an operation. A Saudi intervention would also deal with the Syrian threat, with Damascus now having the most battle-hardened army in the region due to the war against ISIS.

One of the reasons that Arab armies have fared so badly against the Israelis over the years is that they were trained more to oppress their own people than to fight foreign enemies of similar strength. Syria's military is nowhere near as well armed as Israel's, but it now has troops that will not be easy to defeat.

As for Iran itself, at one time it was the U.S. pressuring Israel*and Saudi Arabia*to hold back. But times have changed and the superpower now calling for peace is Russia, which enjoys a warm friendship with both Iran and Israel. But Moscow has implied that it's Iran, and by extension Syria, who it regards as its closer partner, and that's something that Israel cannot ignore. Russia won't send troops to fight Israel but it could well arm Iran, which in turn will arm its allies in southern Lebanon.

But those concerns aside, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is under strong domestic pressure and drenched in scandal, and nothing distracts more effectively than a war against a despised enemy. Hezbollah fits that bill perfectly. Middle Eastern politics makes for strange bedfellows. Always has, always will.

About The Author

Michael Coren
Columnist and broadcaster Michael Coren is the best-selling author of 16 books, translated into more than a dozen languages. He is currently studying for a Masters in Divinity at Trinity College, University of Toronto.

Housecarl · Nov 21, 2017

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/11/21...-for-control-of-the-middle-east-saudi-arabia/

Argument

Tehran Is Winning the War for Control of the Middle East

And there’s no indication that, despite Mohammed bin Salman’s bold moves, Saudi Arabia stands a chance of turning the tide.

By Jonathan Spyer | November 21, 2017, 9:22 AM

Saudi Arabia appears to be on a warpath across the Middle East. The Saudi-orchestrated resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, and Saudi officials’ bellicose rhetoric after the launch of a ballistic missile targeting Riyadh from Yemen, appear to herald a new period of assertiveness against Iranian interests across the Middle East.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s sudden moves on a variety of fronts may superficially have the feel of Michael Corleone’s swift and simultaneous strikes at his family’s enemies in the closing frames of The Godfather. Unlike in the film, however, the credits are not about to roll. Rather, these are the opening moves in an ongoing contest — and it is far from clear that the 32-year-old crown prince has found a formula to reverse Iran’s advantage.

Let’s take a look at the track record so far. The confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran is taking place across a swath of the Middle East in which, over the last decade, states have partially ceased to function — Iraq and Lebanon — or collapsed completely, as in the case of Syria and Yemen. A war over the ruins has taken place in each country, with Riyadh and Tehran arrayed on opposing sides in all of them.

So far, in every case, the advantage is very clearly with the Iranians.

In Lebanon, Hezbollah vanquished the Saudi-sponsored “March 14” alliance of political groups that aimed to constrain it. The events of May 2008, when Hezbollah seized west Beirut and areas around the capital, showed the helplessness of the Saudis’ clients when presented with the raw force available to Iran’s proxies. Hezbollah’s subsequent entry into the Syrian civil war confirmed that it could not be held in check by the Lebanese political system.

The establishment of a cabinet dominated by Hezbollah in December 2016, and the appointment of Hezbollah’s ally Michel Aoun as president two months earlier, solidified Iran’s grasp over the country. Riyadh’s subsequent withdrawal of funding to the Lebanese armed forces, and now its push for Hariri’s resignation, effectively represent the House of Saud’s acknowledgement of this reality.

In Syria, Iran’s provision of finances, manpower, and know-how to the regime of President Bashar al-Assad has played a decisive role in preventing the regime’s destruction. The Iranian mobilization of proxies helped cultivate new local militias, which gave the regime access to the manpower necessary to defeat its rivals. Meanwhile, Sunni Arab efforts to assist the rebels, in which Saudi Arabia played a large role, ended largely in chaos and the rise of Salafi groups.

In Iraq, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has developed an officially-sanctioned, independent military force in the form of the 120,000-strong Popular Mobilization Units (PMU). Not all the militias represented in the PMU are pro-Iranian, of course. But the three core Shiite groups of Kataeb Hezbollah, the Badr Organization, and Asaib Ahl al-Haq answer directly to the IRGC.

Iran also enjoys political preeminence in Baghdad. The ruling Islamic Dawa Party is traditionally pro-Iranian, while the Badr Organization controls the powerful interior ministry, which has allowed it to blur the boundaries between the official armed forces and its militias — thus allowing rebranded militiamen to benefit from U.S. training and equipment.*Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has been left playing catch up: Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi visited Riyadh in late October to launch the new Saudi-Iraqi Coordination Council, the first time an Iraqi premier had made the trip in a quarter-century. But it is not clear that the Saudis have much more up their sleeve than financial inducements to potential political allies.

In Yemen, where the Saudis have tried their hand at direct military intervention, the results have been mixed. The Houthis and their allies, supported by Iran, have failed to conquer the entirety of the county and have been kept back from the vital Bab el-Mandeb Strait as a result of the 2015 Saudi intervention. But Saudi Arabia is bogged down in a costly war with no end in sight, while the extent of Iranian support to the Houthis is far more modest.

This, then, is the scorecard of the Saudi-Iranian conflict. So far, the Iranians have effectively won in Lebanon, are winning in Syria and Iraq, and are bleeding the Saudis in Yemen.

In each context, Iran has been able to establish proxies that give it political and military influence in the country. Tehran also has successfully identified and exploited seams in their enemy’s camp.*For example, Tehran acted swiftly to nullify the results of the Kurdish independence referendum in September and then to punish the Kurds for proceeding with it. The Iranians were able to use their long-standing connection to the Talabani family, and the Talabanis’ rivalry with the Barzanis, to orchestrate the retreat of Talabani-aligned Peshmerga forces from Kirkuk in October — thus paving the way for the city and nearby oil reserves to be captured by its allies.

There is precious little evidence to suggest that the Saudis have learned from their earlier failures and are now able to roll back Iranian influence in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is no better at building up effective proxies across the Arab world, and has done nothing to enhance its military power, since Mohammed bin Salman took the reins. So far, the crown prince’s actions consist of removing the veneer of multiconfessionalism from the Lebanese government, and threatening their enemies in Yemen.

Those may be important symbolic steps, but they do nothing to provide Riyadh with the hard power it has always lacked. Rolling back the Iranians, directly or in alliance with local forces, would almost certainly depend not on the Saudis or the UAE, but on the involvement of the United States — and in the Lebanese case, perhaps Israel.

It’s impossible to say the extent to which Washington and Jerusalem are on board with such an effort. However, the statements last week by Defense Secretary James Mattis suggesting that the United States intends to stay in eastern Syria, and by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Israel will continue to enforce its security interests in Syria, suggest that these players may have a role to play.

Past Saudi behavior might encourage skepticism. Nevertheless, the Iranians here have a clearly visible Achilles’ heel. In all the countries where the Saudi-Iran rivalry has played out, Tehran has proved to have severe difficulties in developing lasting alliances outside of Shiite and other minority communities. Sunnis, and Sunni Arabs in particular, do not trust the Iranians and do not want to work with them. Elements of the Iraqi Shiite political class also have no interest of falling under the thumb of Tehran. A cunning player looking to sponsor proxies and undermine Iranian influence would find much to work with — it’s just not clear that the Saudis are that player.

Mohammed bin Salman, at least, appears to have signaled his intent to oppose Iran and its proxies across the Arab world. The game, therefore, is on. The prospects of success for the Saudis will depend on the willingness of their allies to engage alongside them, and a steep learning curve in the methods of political and proxy warfare.

Housecarl · Nov 21, 2017

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://nationalpost.com/opinion/viv...bama-for-the-looming-mideast-war-against-iran

Vivian Bercovici: You can thank Obama for the looming Mideast war against Iran

As ISIL filled the vacuum left by the abdication of American power by the Obama administration, so now Iran will occupy the space left by ISIL

November 20, 2017
7:21 AM EST

It has been a particularly busy few weeks here in the Middle East, even by the chaotic standards of the region.

As the world welcomed the demise of ISIL’s reign of terror in the Mideast, it largely missed a more spectacular development: the entrenchment of Iranian power and control, from Tehran to the Mediterranean Sea, controlling large swaths of Syria and all of Lebanon, and strategic outposts in Yemen and Libya. As ISIL filled the vacuum left by the abdication of American power by the Obama administration, so now Iran will occupy the space left by ISIL.

Iran openly brays its desire for the destruction of Israel and its intention to spread its extreme, radical and violent brand of Islam throughout the region. In Iran’s sights are Jordan, the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia.

The Obama administration romanced Iran, but snubbed and even humiliated traditional American allies, like Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and Kuwait. As a result, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, two significant powers threatened and marginalized by Obama’s pro-Iranian policy, have become close and unlikely allies of Israel. Strategic, political, military and intelligence co-operation among these countries is reported to be deeply entrenched and close.

This almost surreal development makes the seemingly haphazard events of the last few weeks more understandable.

On October 30th, the Israeli Defence Forces blew up one of the many Hamas tunnels in a network burrowing from Gaza under Israel. Built mostly with funds siphoned from western aid, this subterranean, state-of-the-art terror warren exists for one purpose: *for Hamas to launch deadly attacks against Israeli civilians.

The timing was likely no coincidence. The tunnel strike was followed, in short order, by a series of stunning events that ricocheted from Jerusalem to Cairo to Riyadh to Beirut to Paris. Together, they expose the radically altered power dynamic in the region.

Within days of the tunnel incident, the 32-year-old Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had hundreds of his very wealthy and powerful compatriots arrested and imprisoned in the Riyadh Ritz Carlton. The decades-long understanding that the notoriously corrupt and wealthy Saudi princely class was immune from consequence became a thing of the past, instantly.

As this drama unfolded, Saad Hariri, the putative PM of Lebanon, announced his resignation in, of all places, Riyadh. A puppet of Hezbollah — the Iranian proxy army and governing authority in Lebanon — Hariri has been “indisposed” since his resignation.

Last week, a wan Hariri appeared briefly on Saudi television, attempting to reassure those concerned for his well being that he was fine and flitting about freely in Riyadh. Days later, French President Macron let the world know that PM Hariri and his family were welcome to decamp, at their pleasure, to France. Hariri arrived there on the weekend to reassure everyone that he would eventually be returning to Beirut and that of course he was never actually held “prisoner” all those days he was stuck in Saudi Arabia.

It all looks like a long-distance, bloodless Saudi coup of sorts in Lebanon. What is less clear is the endgame. There is no one but Hezbollah to assume real power in Lebanon. With the demise of ISIL, Iran wields power in a continuous arc from Tehran to the Mediterranean.

Israel has been warning of Iranian territorial ambitions since forever and was dismissed by Obama and his acolytes as being intransigent and, well, just not enlightened enough. Meanwhile, within 50 kilometres of the Israeli northern border, Iran has recently built an advanced military base. Hezbollah swarms the Lebanese border and has a military capability greatly enhanced since the 2006 war with Israel, aiming well over 100,000 powerful and accurate missiles at Israel from underground tunnels and civilian villages it uses as shields.

Enmeshed in this mess is the Palestinian Authority and its President, Mahmoud Abbas. After touting a recent “reconciliation” with the Gaza-controlling Hamas — another terror group also allied with Iran — Abbas is in a jam. Does he maintain his most recent rapprochement with Hamas, despite its collusion with Iran, and risk angering Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel? Or does he capitulate to their demands that he bolster their efforts to isolate Iran and its agents?

In the last few weeks in Israel, there have been much-publicized Air Force drills, focusing on the northern fronts with Lebanon and Syria. *In the event that there is armed conflict, it almost certainly will flare up on Israel’s northern fronts, with Lebanon and Syria, but the war will actually be with Iran. And it will be unprecedentedly ferocious, likely with significant civilian casualties.

After eight years of Obama’s Mideast policy, this is the outcome. The Saudis, Egyptians, Israelis and others in the region learned from Obama’s snubs that they can trust no one but themselves and have made it very clear that they will confront Iran, whether or not the West continues to cling to its illusion of moderate Iranian leadership. It could all get very ugly, very quickly.

97 Comments

Housecarl · Nov 22, 2017

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.realcleardefense.com/video/2017/11/21/iran_takes_command_of_iraq_syria_and_lebanon.html

Iran Takes Command of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon

Posted By David Craig
On Date November 21, 2017

Video

The John Batchelor Show

Iran takes command of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. @joshrogin

While the Trump administration celebrates a new deal meant to freeze the battlefield in southern Syria, the Assad regime and Iran are preparing for the next phase of the long-running war, in which they will attempt to conquer the rest of the country. Whether Iran succeeds depends largely on whether the United States acknowledges and then counters that strategy.

Tehran is pouring thousands of fighters into newly acquired territories and building military bases. Although U.S.-supported forces hold territories east of the Euphrates River in Syria’s southeast, as well as along the borders of Israel and Jordan in the southwest, Iran has stated its intention to help Bashar al-Assad retake all of Syria.

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani has been recently spotted in the eastern Syrian city of Deir al-Zour, showing how high a priority it is for Iran to take the oil-rich land nearby. Soleimani has also been spotted near the town of Abu Kamal, which sits just across the border from the Iraqi city of Qaim and is the last piece of the land bridge Iran seeks to establish from Tehran to Beirut.*

Housecarl · Nov 22, 2017

Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://breakingdefense.com/2017/11...9.1951869722.1511173034-1863435177.1509967913

acquisition, Air, budget, Intel & Cyber, Sea, Strategy & Policy

CBO’s Nuclear Weapons Cost Estimate Is Way Too High ; Hint — Bombers

By Todd Harrison
on November 21, 2017 at 4:01 AM
48 Comments

Todd Harrison is one of the best defense budget folks around. Like many budget weenies (that’s the technical term) he really cares about how people come up with cost estimates because the underlying assumptions for them can lead in radically different directions. One example is the recent estimate on how much the next generation of nuclear weapons will cost by the relentlessly nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office. This estimate differed by an earlier report by an impressive $800 million. Why, and what does it all mean? Read on! The Editor.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the total cost to build America’s new nuclear forces will be $1.2 trillion over the next 30 years, adding another number to a cluttered and confusing set of estimates already circulated by the Department of Defense (DoD), independent think tanks, and CBO itself.

In particular, CBO published a report earlier this year estimating that nuclear forces would cost $400 billion over the next 10 years. What is not immediately obvious is that CBO used different methodologies in these two reports, and the differences have a significant impact on the results and how they should be interpreted.

The first and most obvious difference is the time period of each estimate. The latest CBO estimate of $1.2 trillion covers a 30-year period — 2017 to 2046.* CBO’s estimate from earlier this year only covered 10 years. Since the new estimate covers a period that is three times longer, on the surface it appears to make sense that the costs would be three times higher. But the cost estimates also differ in how they account for inflation. The CBO estimate from earlier this year is in then-year dollars, meaning inflation is included. In contrast, the latest CBO estimate is in constant 2017 dollars, which means inflation is removed from the costs. If inflation was included in the new estimate, the costs would be higher.

The third difference is perhaps the most important to understand. The new CBO estimate uses the full costs of dual-use systems, specifically bombers that have both nuclear and non-nuclear missions (the B-52s and B-2s already in operation and the B-21s currently in development). It counts the full costs of operation, maintenance, and personnel to support the existing aircraft and all of the research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement costs of the B-21. Previous CBO estimates included only 25 percent of the costs for B-52s and B-21s and 100 percent of the costs for the B-2s. Including the full costs of all nuclear-capable bombers in the latest estimate makes the costs of the airborne leg of the triad higher than CBO’s previous methodology.

While I commend CBO for its thorough and careful analysis and for clearly stating its assumptions, I do not agree with its decision to include 100 percent of the costs of these dual-use systems. My reasoning is straightforward: bombers are primarily used for non-nuclear missions, and the vast majority of their costs are not due to the nuclear mission.* If the United States had no nuclear weapons, it would still need to operate, maintain, and modernize its fleet of bombers.

This is not true for the other legs of the triad because sub-launched ballistic missiles (and the submarines that house them) and ground-based ICBMs only have a nuclear mission, so it is appropriate to include their full costs. But using the full costs of the bombers fundamentally changes the scope of CBO’s estimate to extend beyond just nuclear forces.

The inconsistencies this creates are evident in CBO’s own analysis. One of the options the report considers is eliminating the airborne leg of the nuclear triad.* In calculating the savings from this option, however, CBO does not count all of the bomber-related costs as savings even though the option completely eliminates this leg of the triad.* Instead, it concludes that “elimination of the nuclear mission would allow DoD to decrease production of B-21*bombers from the planned 100 to 80.” In other words, it only counts 20 percent of the cost of the B-21 as savings.

That is a tacit admission that the other 80 percent of its costs are not nuclear-related and therefore should have never been included in the overall $1.2 trillion estimate. It is also notable that CBO treats dual-use tactical fighters differently than bombers. In its latest estimate, as well as in previous estimates, CBO only includes the fraction of the costs of nuclear-capable tactical fighters that is attributable to the nuclear mission. Indeed, it would be ridiculous to count the full costs of all F-16s, F-15Es, and F-35As as nuclear costs. It does not make sense to count the full costs of bombers as nuclear costs for the same reason.

The question then becomes, how much of the bombers’ costs should be allocated to the nuclear mission? This is a matter of analytical judgement similar to the assumptions CBO already makes regarding the fraction of costs it uses for nuclear-capable tactical fighters.* It is hard to know precisely how much of the bombers’ costs are due to nuclear-related requirements, but some guides already exist.* In its written response to questions from Congress earlier this year about nuclear modernization costs, DoD provided a footnote with its estimate of the B-21’s costs that said, “These amounts represent the nuclear-related costs for the B–21 program which are estimated at 5%.”* Similarly, the share of bomber operation and sustainment costs due to the nuclear mission can be estimated by the fraction of the bomber force on nuclear alert at any given time.*CBO has previously assumed that 25 percent of the costs for existing B-52s (and future B-21s) is due to the nuclear mission based, in part, on the fact that about 25 percent of B-52s are on nuclear alert at any given time.

Regardless of the specific percentage one decides to use, CBO should not include the full costs of dual-use systems in the overall costs of U.S. nuclear forces. It needlessly overstates the costs due to nuclear forces and can lead to misperceptions about how much can be saved by eliminating certain parts of the nuclear triad. While nuclear-capable bombers are the dual-use systems that affect overall costs the most, there are other dual-use systems that have the same issue. For example, CBO includes the full costs of missile warning satellites and protected satellite communications systems in its estimates despite the fact that these systems are also used for many non-nuclear missions.

Many more people will hear the $1.2 trillion figure than will read the report and understand these nuances. That’s why it is important to make assumptions in the analysis that enhance the public debate rather than complicate it.

Shacknasty Shagrat · Nov 22, 2017

Glad to see you at work, HC
The media is focused on Tittygate but the wars, violence and chaos in the world continue.
Happy Thanksgiving.
SS

Housecarl · Nov 23, 2017

Shacknasty Shagrat said:
Glad to see you at work, HC
The media is focused on Tittygate but the wars, violence and chaos in the world continue.
Happy Thanksgiving.
SS

Shacknasty Shagrat,

Yeah this whole "distraction" is either specifically that and or blowing enough crap into the air to then use it as an excuse to go after Trump next on similar charges IMHO.

My schedule is so a@@ backwards and other "meat world" events and circumstances crowding me at the moment my "news hounding" has been a bit cramped but I'll keep doing what I can.

As always, if you or anyone else comes across something you think belongs in this weekly thread, by all means feel free to post it in the thread or comment on what's posted here. If you want to open an independent discussion thread on the topic, again, by all means feel free to do so.

Housecarl

------

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/trump-coming-hard-line-china

China | The Trump Presidency

Trump's coming hard line on China

By Ely Ratner
twitter@elyratner
21 November 2017
10:04 AEDT

US President Donald Trump’s first visit to Beijing was an exhibition of mutual flattery. China rolled out the red carpet for what it termed a 'state visit plus', replete with unprecedented pomp and circumstance for an American leader.*

Trump returned the favour with incessant fawning over Chinese President Xi Jinping, supplemented by extravagant admiration for China. 'Nothing you can see is so beautiful', he said of a full-dress Chinese military parade he witnessed in Beijing.

The mood contrasted sharply with Trump’s heated campaign rhetoric (recall*his declaration*'We can't continue to allow China to rape our country'), eliciting a flood of analyses in the Western press that he had reversed course toward a softer approach to Beijing. China’s state-run media was all too happy to reinforce this message, billing the summit as locking in a positive path for the US-China relationship.

Don’t count on it. Happy veneer aside, three factors at home are likely to drive the US toward a harder line on China in the months and years ahead. Call it the 'Three Ps'.

First, people. Trump is slowly, but surely, filling out his Asia team at the National Security Council, State Department, and Defense Department. Not by accident, there’s a near consensus among these political appointees — shared throughout the Administration — on the need for a more competitive strategy toward China. That will begin to show.

Second, policy development. The Trump Administration is finally beginning to get its national security policymaking process up and running. With two big official strategy documents — the National Defense Strategy and the National Security Strategy —likely to drop in the coming months, expect to see a portrayal of China as first and foremost a strategic competitor. This doesn’t mean the Trump Administration will demonstrate perfect coherence or competence on foreign policy, but these frames will drive and inform day-to-day decisions on Asia. When, as anticipated, the Administration gets around to focusing on other regional issues beyond North Korea (with Taiwan and South China Sea as leading contenders), the possibility of greater friction with China is far more likely than not.

The third and most important factor*driving the US toward a harder line on China is politics. Consider how Democrats and even some Republicans have pulled Trump back to a more moderate position on Iran. With China, it’s going to be the opposite. The dominant criticism in Washington — across the political spectrum — is that Trump has failed to deliver on China.

Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer has accused Trump of being 'nothing more than a paper tiger' on China. Across the aisle, the second-ranking Republican in the Senate, John Cornyn, recently introduced legislation to increase scrutiny of Chinese investments in the US, arguing that 'It’s time to wake up to the mounting risks' of China’s threat to the American economy. And let’s not forget that the Bannon-ist, populist, nationalist wing of the GOP first lit this issue on fire in 2016 by blaming China for emptying US factories.

Bottom line: ahead of elections in 2018 and 2020, Trump will feel mounting pressure from all sides to make good on his campaign promise to hold China to account for its unfair trade practices.

But is America even capable of taking on Beijing if it wanted to?

You don’t have to search far these days to find doomsday predictions of American decline. Eurasia Group’s Ian Bremmer stole the mid-November cover of TIME magazine to argue the contest is already over, proclaiming that 'China Won'. Sensing a similar reversal of fortune, former Foreign Policy*chief editor David Rothkopf tweeted upon the President’s departure to Asia that 'Trump about to make history as first POTUS who had to travel all the way to PRC to meet world's most powerful man.' Fair enough: After all, who could fail to compare Xi Jinping’s Davos-friendly odes to globalisation with Donald Trump’s protectionism and damaging withdrawal from the Paris climate deal and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement?

Yet the reality in Asia betrays a far more complicated picture. For starters, in spite of (or, perhaps, because of) concerns about Donald Trump, the most important happenings while Trump was in Asia were demonstrations of resistance to — not willing or reluctant acceptance of — China’s growing influence. On trade and investment, the remaining eleven members of the TPP managed to move forward on the deal without the US. Washington’s absence was notable and costly, but more significant is the collective desire in the region to avoid a China-led economic order.

Similarly, for the first time in a decade, senior officials from Australia, India, Japan, and the US met as a 'Quad' to re-energise cooperation among the region’s leading democracies. Again, little nuance that this is anything other than an effort to generate alternatives to a Sino-centric future.

It bears remembering that Xi Jinping may be consolidating power at home, but remains deeply unpopular overseas. Pew Research polls, often used as evidence of Trump’s low ratings globally, have also shown that the world has barely more confidence in Xi, leaving the Chinese President about as popular as Vladimir Putin. Despite the billions of dollars the Chinese government has spent trying to burnish its leader’s image abroad, Xi’s numbers are in the basement compared to respected figures like Angela Merkel and Barack Obama. This all suggests it is premature to declare China victorious while the region and the world are rejecting both its leadership and its leader.

Finally, let’s remember that, despite Trump’s corrosive effect, the foundations of American power remain strong. The US economy is still the largest and most advanced in the world, with the best universities, the most capable military, strong demographics, and a vibrant civil society. By comparison, take your issue area — economics, politics, environment, energy, demographics, ideology — and China’s position looks more perilous than dominant.

China is no doubt a force to be reckoned with, but Trump has the wherewithal to play hardball on trade, Taiwan, or the South China Sea should he choose. Donald Trump, of course, is the ultimate wildcard, and predicting the future of US foreign policy under his watch is risky business. Nonetheless, all signs are now pointing toward a harder US line against China, regardless of either the royal treatment Trump received in Beijing or his 'great chemistry' and 'very good relationship' with Xi.

-----

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/trump-truancy-asia-could-hasten-hegemon-demise

Asia

Trump’s truancy in Asia could hasten a hegemon’s demise

By Andrew Phillips
twitter@aphillipsintrel
22 November 2017
07:20 AEDT

Donald Trump’s no-show at the East Asia Summit last week sparked fresh anxiety from Asia-watchers worried about Washington’s commitment to the region. These concerns are hardly new and Trump is not the first US president to bypass this summit. But his truancy comes at an especially delicate time for Asia. As the region’s incumbent hegemonic power, the US is now more distracted by domestic division than at any time since Watergate. China is meanwhile skilfully exploiting American introversion, pursuing a grand strategy that seeks to ease out and ultimately displace America as Asia’s dominant power.

Seen in this light, Trump’s summit snub risks amplifying existing Asian fears about America’s appetite for leadership, furthering China’s end-game of hegemonic displacement.

A distracted and divided hegemon
American grand strategy in Asia has never been motivated by altruism, but by a far-sighted view that Washington’s interests could best be advanced by building a*hegemonic regional order*that recognized, accommodated and advanced the security and prosperity of its Asian allies.

Given its densely institutionalized character, this order has persisted on auto-pilot since Trump’s election. But during his Asian sojourn, the President showed little appreciation for the value of this order or the larger advantages accrued for both the US and its partners. Trump’s ostentatiously transactional view of alliances has instead spooked Asian friends already fretful about American commitment to the region, following the underwhelming Obama ‘pivot’, and Trump’s decision to*trash the Trans-Pacific Partnership. His budding bromance with the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte has*meanwhile*downgraded human rights promotion as a focus of American regional engagement, undercutting America’s self-identification as an avowedly liberal hegemonic power.

A hegemon in waiting
The Trump Administration’s Asia policy lays bare real tensions between Washington’s traditional role as Asia’s hegemonic power and the strategic solipsism of ‘America First.’*Coinciding with increased Chinese assertiveness, such tensions only help advance China’s aspiration to displace America as Asia’s dominant power.

The military dimensions of China’s challenge to American regional hegemony are well-known. China’s development of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) capabilities has already substantially raised the costs of US military intervention along China’s immediate maritime periphery, while Beijing’s militarisation of the South China Sea constitutes an ambit claim for control over the sea lines vital to sustaining Asia’s trade and prosperity. Together, these twin policies undermine the credibility of American security guarantees to its Asian allies.

Besides military challenge, however, China is also*emerging as*a clear rival to the US as a provider of hegemonic services to Asian partners. Hegemony is not merely a by-product of military and economic paramountcy; it is ultimately a claim to leadership, a guarantee of collective goods (most notably peace and security) in exchange for junior partners’ willing acquiescence and cooperation.

With this goal in mind, Chinese-led initiatives such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative mark a long-term effort to displace America through hegemonic*‘goods substitution’*in the economic domain. China’s co-leadership (alongside Russia) of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) offers a similar challenge in the realm of multilateral security cooperation – one far more ideologically congenial for Eurasia’s autocracies than established Western-led alternatives.*

A new order matures*
Washington’s Asian allies have survived bouts of US fitfulness before. What distinguishes this moment is that contemporary China is not merely gearing up to challenge US power at the top of the Asian pecking order but is also in the early stages of sponsoring its own institutionalised counter-order to displace America as regional hegemon.*Critically, Trump did nothing on this trip to reassure allies that American hegemony is here to stay - inaction that helps clear the path for the Chinese challenge.

The US retains immense advantages of hegemonic incumbency, not least in the ‘hub and spokes’ alliance system that China cannot copy any time soon. It’s also possible that the American order and a nascent Chinese counter-order might somehow peacefully co-exist in the medium term, allowing canny Asian middle powers to extract benefits from both without submitting wholesale to either.

But it is far more likely Trump’s disregard for Asian opinion, illustrated by his EAS no-show, will embolden China’s leadership ambitions. Regional US allies will not wait indefinitely on Washington for normal hegemonic services to resume. This is especially so, as a prospective Chinese alternative matures. For this reason, now that he has returned to Washington, it is vital that Trump stop tweeting distractions and start meaningfully re-engaging Asia, lest America’s current inward turn forever forfeit its claims to regional leadership.

Housecarl · Nov 23, 2017

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://news.usni.org/2017/11/21/u-...utheast-asia-using-littoral-combat-ships-epfs

U.S. Plans to Expand Naval Engagements in Southeast Asia Using Littoral Combat Ships, EPFs.

By: Dzirhan Mahadzir
November 21, 2017 3:39 PM

KUALA LUMPUR – The U.S. Navy is planning to enhance naval engagement with nations across South and Southeast Asia next year, Rear Adm. Don Gabrielson, the commander Logistics Group Western Pacific/Task Force 73, told USNI on Tuesday.

The command intends to build upon on this year’s successful engagements, which were carried out by the Littoral Combat Ship USS Coronado (LCS-4) and the Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPF) USNS Millinocket (EPF-3), USNS Fall River (EPF-4) and USNS Brunswick (EPF-6). The new engagements will be paired with a more flexible framework that allows the U.S. Navy to develop opportunities for training with regional navies on shorter notice.

The engagements are intended to complement the long-standing exercises already ongoing under a scheduled and formal planning cycle.

“We benefit greatly from year-long planning engagements with our partners in exercises like CARAT and SEACAT (Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training),” Gabrielson said.

“We’re using these strong relationships we’ve built with regional navies over the past 20-30 years to generate additional opportunities to train at sea together in ways that benefit all of our navies.”

As such the command is working on a framework that allows partner nations to conduct a short notice exercise or engagement based on a pre-agreed list of activities. “What happens often is our ships are underway or passing through the region and the dynamic nature of naval operations means that we don’t always have a year to plan when a ship is going to be in a particular place, so sometimes we miss opportunities to conduct training with our partners.”

Gabrielson said that the countries involved will be announced later and these regional engagements will largely involve the use of the LCSs and EPFs, whose size and shallow drafts enable them to operate in most of the littoral waters in the region and visit many shallow water port and naval facilities prevalent across South and Southeast Asia. In addition, with the routine presence of LCS and EPF in the region, these ships are fostering relevant cooperation and training opportunities with partner nations, particularly the smaller littoral navies. This is in contrast to destroyers or cruisers, which are challenged by limited accessibility and whose skill sets and capabilities can be sometimes too high-end for littoral navies focusing on maritime security and preventing terrorism and piracy at sea.

“We’re using the LCSs and EPFs, both individually and together, to conduct these engagements because they are the right-sized platforms and frankly they bring the right kind of skills for many navies to take on the challenges that they are dealing with,” said Gabrielson, adding that LCS and EPFs have access to over a thousand port locations in the littoral regions of South and Southeast Asia while larger ships like destroyers only have access to about a dozen locations.

Gabrielson stated that the 2018 planned deployment of two LCSs is expected to begin at the earliest in mid-2018, but the LCS gap till then will be covered by the ongoing presence of the three EPFs in the region, whose reconfigurable operating spaces and shallow drafts allow it to operate in similar littoral areas suitable for the LCS. He added that the successful 14-month deployment of Coronado marked a milestone in validating the ability to operate the LCS in the region while paving the way to operate greater numbers of LCSs simultaneously.”

Among the key aspects of this has been the increased operational availability of Coronado in contrast to the previous deployments of USS Freedom (LCS-1) and USS Fort Worth (LCS-3). Gabrielson stated that this higher operational availability was due to efficiencies and lessons learned during LCS deployments to the region, which resulted in the reduction of the average maintenance correction time from 15 days to 4 days. At the same time, Coronado’s operational availability was also increased due to the ability to conduct maintenance and work on the ship wherever it was deployed.

“We were able to perform expeditionary maintenance availabilities in Vietnam, Malaysia, and Guam where we actually loaded equipment, in some cases on an EPF and in other cases we flew it there,” Gabrielson said.

“This gave us a lot of operational flexibility on the deployment.”

Gabrielson summed up that the primary conclusion from the rotational deployment of Coronado is that the Navy is ready to support more LCS and EPF to operate in the region and enhance partnerships and training opportunities with regional navies.

“We’re ready to have more LCSs deployed in the region,” said Gabrielson, “But we have to balance that with the requirements for readiness and crew training… The U.S. Navy is committed to the agreement with Singapore to operate multiple LCSs in the region and we’re on a solid path to achieve that goal.”

Related

U.S. Navy Expanding Maintenance Capability in Western Pacific
October 13, 2016
In "Budget Industry"

Austal USA Delivers Two Ships to Navy
June 27, 2016
In "Budget Industry"

Video: USS Coronado Fires Harpoon During RIMPAC 2016
July 21, 2016
In "Budget Industry"

--

About Dzirhan Mahadzir

Dzirhan Mahadzir is a freelance defense journalist and analyst based in Kuala Lumpur Malaysia. Among the publications he has written for and currently writes for since 1998 includes Defence Review Asia, Jane’s Defence Weekly, Navy International, International Defence Review, Asian Defence Journal, Defence Helicopter, Asian Military Review and the Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter.

Housecarl · Nov 23, 2017

Well this should get "interesting"....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/worl...-mexico/ar-BBFvRCQ?li=BBmkt5R&ocid=spartanntp

New Cold War? Iran Sends Warships to Gulf of Mexico

Newsweek
Tom O'Connor
7 hrs ago

Iranian warships are set to leave the waters of the Persian Gulf to sail across the world and tour another gulf—the one that lies between the U.S. and Mexico.

At a time when Iran is looking to expand and modernize its military in the face of what is seen as a growing U.S. threat, its newly appointed navy commander, Rear Admiral Hossein Khanzadi, held his first press conference Wednesday, announcing that a fleet of Iranian ships would soon depart for the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico en route to visits to a number of South American countries, Iran's semi-official Tasnim News Agency reported. The move is reportedly part of a*push to project Iran's military on a more global scale and establish international ties as President Donald Trump and his allies, including Israel and Saudi Arabia, seek to isolate the*revolutionary Shiite Muslim power.

"Sailing in open waters between Europe and Americas should be the navy’s goal, which will be realized in the near future,"*Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, who served as navy chief for 10 years before being assigned by supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to*deputy coordinator of the army, said earlier this month at his successor's ceremony, according to the Tasnim News Agency*and translated by Caspian News.

Khanzadi also pledged to introduce new vessels and submarines next year and announced other upcoming plans to bolster the country's naval power. He said the new*Peykan-class missile-launching corvette*Separ (shield) would join the country's Caspian Fleet next week. In addition to the planned*reintroduction of refurbished and renovated vessels, a new navy airport was reportedly set to be launched*in the southeastern port city of Jask, along the Makran coast.

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution deposed*West-installed Shah Mohammad Reva Pahlavi, the U.S. and Iran have had poor relations. The U.S. has also firmly backed its main Arab ally, ultraconservative Sunni Muslim kingdom Saudi Arabia, in a decades-long struggle to limit Iran's influence. That campaign has become increasingly hostile in recent years, with both sides backing opposing political and militant movements across the region. As Iran outmatched its foe in crucial arenas, Israel has offered to help Saudi Arabia constrain Iran's expanding foothold.

Trump, a staunch supporter of both Israel and Saudi Arabia, has decertified and threatened to scrap a 2015 Iran nuclear deal negotiated by his predecessor, former President Barack Obama. The agreement, which hardline conservatives in both the U.S. and Iran opposed, freed billions of dollars of sanctioned Iranian assets in exchange for Tehran promising to curb its nuclear production. Despite deep criticism from U.S. allies and international bodies that have found Iran to be in compliance with the deal, Trump has left it up to Congress to decide whether to kill the treaty or renegotiate, something Iran said it was not willing to do.

Despite the U.S., Israel and Saudi Arabia's moves, Iran has found itself in a leading position in the Middle East, where it claimed allies in the capitals of Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen. It has also built stronger ties with Russia, which was engaged in its own renewed Cold War with the U.S. and Western military alliance NATO in Europe, over the two countries' mutual support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. This foreign support was crucial in helping Syria's armed forces overcome a long-running uprising by jihadis and insurgents, which had received backing from the U.S., Gulf Arab states and Turkey. With the opposition now largely decimated, Turkey has joined Iran and Russia in administering peace talks.

Iran's latest move toward the Western hemisphere isn't its first. In addition to receiving ongoing political support from friendly Latin American nations, some of which were alleged to host elements of the Iran-backed Lebanese Shiite Muslim movement Hezbollah, Iran said in 2014 it would send warships into the Gulf of Mexico to protest the U.S. Navy presence in the Persian Gulf, according to USA Today.

Prior to that, Iran offered to dispatch experts during the massive BP oil spill in 2010 to "curb the rig leakage in the Gulf of Mexico and prevent an ecological disaster in that part of the world," Reuters reported.

Housecarl · Nov 23, 2017

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.army-technology.com/features/japan-ramps-defences-record-budget/

22 November 2017 Analysis

Japan ramps up its defences with record budget

By Gareth Evans

Another record breaking Japanese defence budget has underlined the once passive nation’s urgency in creating a modern defence force, but will it be enough to address both North Korea’s missile capabilities and China’s maritime expansion?

“I will secure defence spending to protect our nation, to protect Japanese people’s life efficiently, considering issues such as the security environment in Asia-Pacific region, of course including financial situation,” Prime Minister Shinzo Abe told Japan’s parliament in March and backed it up in August with a record budget request for Fiscal Year 2018.

If approved, at 5.26 trillion yen (47.8 billion USD) it represents a 2.5% increase over the initial budget for FY17 and will be the sixth annual increase since Prime Minister Abe returned to office in 2012. He is a man clearly committed to his mission; in his time in office, in addition to reversing the defence cuts of previous regimes, his administration has already reinterpreted the country’s post-WW2 pacifist constitution to ease the restrictions on defence exports and allow the Japanese military to fight abroad.

Now, Abe hopes that, with this record breaking budget, the Ministry of Defence will be able to address its two most pressing concerns of the moment – North Korea’s burgeoning nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities and China’s maritime expansionism.

The Self-Defence Force’s shopping list unsurprisingly reflects that aim, with missile defences and systems intended to “retake invaded remote islands” featuring as high priority purchases.

Missile defence
Currently, Japan has taken a layered approach to ballistic missile defence (BMD), deploying the high-tech Aegis aboard destroyers at sea to engage missiles in space, and land based Patriot Advanced Capability- 3 (PAC-3) interceptors to deal with any that make it to lower altitudes. Kim Jung-Un’s recent missile passes over Japan, the latest of which notched up North Korea’s longest ever flight to date, has however, put BMD firmly back in the spotlight and sparked renewed interest in improving existing defences.

Some 47.2 billion yen is being earmarked to acquire the new type Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) Block IIA interceptor missiles, to hit incoming warheads outside the atmosphere and a further 20.5 billion yen for the superior PAC-3 MSE missiles, which should double the effective range of the present Patriot defensive batteries.

There are also plans to introduce a new anti-ballistic missile system, with Aegis Ashore, the ground-based version of Japan’s existing ship-borne system, being the most likely purchase. Two such units would be able to provide cover for the whole of the country’s landmass, with each costing in the region of 80 billion yen, although according to the Ministry of Defence, the exact price still remains to be negotiated with the US. Tokyo is also reported to be eyeing the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system too.

In addition, a reported 10.7 billion yen of the budget request is intended to update and enhance missile detection and warning capacity, which is said to be in response to North Korea’s increasing use of ‘highly lofted’ missile trajectories which make early detection more difficult for the existing systems. Another 19.6 billion yen will go to help develop a new radar prototype to enhance detection capabilities further in future, particularly since Pyongyang’s missile programme seems to be showing little sign of running out of steam anytime soon.

China’s maritime expansion
Chinese expansion at sea forms the second clear driver of Tokyo’s latest intended boost to defence spending. Chinese vessels have repeatedly sailed into the disputed waters around Japan’s un-inhabited Senkaku islands – known as the Diaoyu in China – in the East China Sea. Such actions fit the larger pattern of Beijing’s muscular staking of territorial claims in the region, and inevitably leave Tokyo worried over what might happen next.

China has, thus far, shown little regard for the rules-based system of international affairs that has held sway for over 70 years, evidently viewing the likes of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) rather differently from the Western powers and their allies. Beijing has already unilaterally declared an East China Sea air defence identification zone, instigated the construction and subsequent militarisation of artificial islands in the South China Sea and comprehensively rejected an international ruling over the sovereignty of waters around the Philippines. Japanese concerns over its own remote island territories are easy to understand.

The threat is not a new one. Previous defence budgets have spoken of countering the danger to “remote islands” and ensuring that Japan has the capacity to retake them should the occasion arise, but this time there is a new urgency. In 2016, one segment of an annual review staged by the Ground Self-Defence Force featured a demonstration of the hypothetical response to the invasion of an unnamed island. That was all fairly standard stuff, with troops fast-roping out of Chinooks and armour rolling across the mud of the Mount Fuji foothills; the funding request for FY2018, however, reflects an altogether more beefed-up approach.

Planned acquisitions to “enhance the ability to protect isolated islands” include two naval escort vessels with anti-sea mine capabilities and there is talk of a possible new submarine, six Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II stealth multi-role fighters and four Osprey tilt-rotor transport aircraft. A requested 55.2 billion yen will go to improve troop facilities on Okinawa, 400 miles south of the rest of Japan, and the nearest Self-Defense Force deployment to the Senkaku islands. In addition, a further 10 billion yen has been pencilled in for the development of a “high-speed glide bomb” – perhaps some kind of a boost glide weapon – in support of missions to “retake invaded remote islands.”

Space unit
Tokyo is also set to press on with plans to establish a new ‘space unit’ within the Self-Defence Force to protect the satellites in use by Japan and the US from damage by orbiting space junk – debris, dead satellites and fragments from discarded launch vehicles, with an expected four billion yen being set aside for designing the observation system to be used.

The Ministry of Defence is also likely to allocate 11 billion yen to the National Security Technology Research Promotion, a programme to fund research into the likes of domestic early-warning satellites and cyber-defence. Although this figure is the same as the previous year, it remains over 36 times more than when the initiative was first set up in 2015.

Keeping context
By Japanese standards, the budget sought is exceptional, but it is useful to see it in the wider context of the two really big defence spenders in the region. On his campaign trail to the White House, Donald Trump repeatedly promised greater funding for the armed forces, and now as President he has set out to make good on his word, seeking a “historic” 10% increase. Although official reports show the increase in Chinese military spending slowing last year to its lowest rate of growth in six years, it still rose by some 7.6%, and there have been calls from some quarters to push it back up to at least 10% in response to the uncertainty and tension in the Asia-Pacific.

If that thinking becomes the universal criterion for setting regional military budgets, then despite Japan’s sluggish economy, this may not be the last time that Prime Minister Abe will be seeking to break national records on defence spending.

Housecarl · Nov 23, 2017

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.newsweek.com/china-tests...ld-strike-anywhere-world-possible-2018-721128

CHINA TESTS 10-WARHEAD MISSILE THAT COULD STRIKE ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD FOR POSSIBLE 2018 DEPLOYMENT

BY JESSICA KWONG ON 11/23/17 AT 1:44 PM

North Korea isn’t the only country in Asia testing intercontinental ballistic missiles. Its neighbor China, which the U.S. has urged to pressure the Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons program, is deploying one of its own.

The People’s Liberation Army of China is adding the next-generation intercontinental ballistic missile to its lineup primarily to show off its growing military clout and because it lags far behind the number of nuclear weapons the U.S. owns.

Called Dongfeng-41, the missile has a 12,000-kilometer range meaning it could strike anywhere on the globe from mainland China, and can carry nearly a dozen nuclear warheads at once, the Global Times reported earlier this week. It has a top speed of more than Mach 10.

"It can carry up to 10 nuclear warheads, each of which can target separately," Xu Guangyu, a senior adviser of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, told China Central Television in Beijing. "Once the Dongfeng-41 goes into service, China's ability to protect its own safety and to prevent wars would greatly increase.”

Xu added that the missile can use decoy devices with the ability to cut through the enemy’s defense systems and that the official deployment could take place in the first half of next year.

However, military analyst Song Zhongping, who is a former member of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, told Phoenix TV in Hong Kong that the Dongfeng-41 very likely is already in service because tests on the missile can be done after it is deployed.

Song said that China is not competing with any country on its nuclear warhead count and that it does not believe in the arms race.

China reportedly tested the Dongfeng-41, first announced in 2012, in an undisclosed desert location in the western part of the country last November. But the U.S. satellite tracking system identified a test in April 2016, supposedly the seventh for the missile.

View image on Twitter

The Chinese have had intercontinental ballistic missiles far longer than North Korea, which continues to threaten the U.S. with a nuclear attack. In a visit to Beijing earlier this month, President Donald Trump asked Chinese President Xi Jinping to pressure North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program. The Pyongyang has launched at least 13 missile tests this year.

Russia by October had tested four intercontinental ballistic missiles and claimed that it could carry a dozen nuclear warheads, according to the South China Morning Post.

1 Comment
Sort by
Newest

Add a comment...

Eternalmaster Ofusmedia
No, it has a top speed of more than mach 20, from the same public source that you're quoting. It's re-entry speed is 25,000 - 30,000 kph, which means mach 20 - 25 if you knew how to do some extremely simple arithmetic. Learn to do basic math, and get an education in something with substance other than creative writing, dumbass.
Like · Reply · 2 hrs

Housecarl · Nov 24, 2017

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.newsweek.com/putin-says-...tm_campaign=rss&utm_content=/rss/yahoous/news

VLADIMIR PUTIN TELLS RUSSIAN DEFENSE COMPANIES TO PREPARE FOR WAR

BY DAMIEN SHARKOV ON 11/23/17 AT 10:48 AM

Russian President Vladimir Putin demanded that his country’s biggest enterprises must show that they can step up arms production and important services on short notice to be war-ready.

“The economic ability to increase the production of defense products and services quickly is a vital element of military security,” Putin told military leaders and senior officials in the defense industrial complex on Wednesday. “All strategic and simply large companies, regardless of the type of ownership, must be able to do this.”

The Russian president raised the issue after listing the country’s successes in raising combat readiness for a hypothetical war scenario. Putin singled out Russia’s large Zapad 2017 exercise with Belarus in September, during which units across Russia practiced for a threat akin to an attack by Western nations.

Putin praised the efficiency of troops and reservists that took part, as well as the transportation infrastructure used, according to the Kremlin’s video recording of the meeting.

“We need to review once again the defense companies’ ability to quickly increase output,” Putin said, reading out a prepared statement for the meeting. “The exercise has exposed certain shortcomings. We must analyze them so as to propose additional measures to enhance mobilization readiness.”

The Russian leader provided no figures and set no targets for defense companies but asked officials to draw up output recommendations for the industry giants.

While Russia has repeatedly dismissed fears that it seeks to start a war with NATO, insisting its broad Western-heavy reinforcement is defensive, the Kremlin’s dubious interpretation of events on the ground in Ukraine and Syria have damaged Western trust in Moscow’s statements.

Since Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014—a military operation it initially denied—it has inconsistently pleaded innocence over causing or interfering the ongoing conflict raging in the eastern Donbass region of its southern neighbor. Western support for Ukraine’s decision to pursue integration with the European Union, as opposed to entangle itself in more deals with Russia, has eroded Moscow’s relationship with the U.S. and much of Europe.

In a bid to showcase strength at a time of political strife, Russia has increased military activity and drills, as well as reforming military units along its western borders.

Comments 4
at Yahoo News Comments (453)

Housecarl · Nov 24, 2017

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.reuters.com/article/rus...r-power-cooperation-with-russia-idUSR4N1NQ02J

#ENERGY
NOVEMBER 23, 2017 / 3:29 AM / UPDATED 18 HOURS AGO

Sudan's Bashir: we want to discuss nuclear power cooperation with Russia

Reuters Staff
1 MIN READ

SOCHI, Russia, Nov 23 (Reuters) - Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir told his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin on Thursday he wanted to discuss nuclear power cooperation with Russia.

Bashir was speaking before talks with Putin in the southern Russian city of Sochi on Thursday. (Reporting by Denis Pinchuk; Writing by Maria Kiselyova; Editing by Jack Stubbs)

Housecarl · Nov 24, 2017

Well this isn't going to end well.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-...o%2FXJrI+(Goo+News+NEW+mediat_en+T+-+World+US)

Pakistan's $10m bounty cleric released

6 hours ago
From the section Asia

Pakistani cleric Hafiz Saeed, who is accused by the US and India of masterminding the 2008 Mumbai attacks, has been released.

Mr Saeed, who carries a $10m (£7.5m) US bounty, had been under house arrest in the city of Lahore since January.

A court this week ordered his release, rejecting the government's arguments that he was a threat to public safety.

The co-ordinated attacks by gunmen in Mumbai left more than 160 dead. Mr Saeed has denied any involvement.

Hafiz Saeed: Pakistan's $10m 'bounty man'
BBC meets Hafiz Saeed

The cleric was released in Lahore, in north-eastern Pakistan, late on Thursday evening.

"India has always levelled allegations of terrorism ... but (Lahore) High Court decision has proved that all of India's propaganda are false," Mr Saeed said in a video message issued after his release.

The decision to put Mr Saeed under house arrest in January was seen as a response to actions by US President Donald Trump's White House against nations deemed linked to terrorism.

The cleric founded the Pakistani-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) militant group in the 1990s and, when that was banned, revived a much older organisation, Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) in 2002.

Mr Saeed maintains JuD is a Islamic welfare organisation, but the US says it is a front for LeT.

In a rare interview in 2014, Hafiz Saeed told the BBC he had nothing to do with the Mumbai attacks, calling evidence against him "just propaganda" by India.

"The people of Pakistan know me and they love me. No-one has tried to approach the American authorities to get this bounty. My role is very clear, and God is protecting me."

India accuses Mr Saeed and his organisation of carrying out several militant attacks on its territory.
Pakistan has maintained there is no evidence to put him on trial.

Mr Saeed was detained for three months after LeT was accused of carrying out the attack on the Indian parliament in 2001.

In August 2006, he was held for activities which the government said were "detrimental" to its relations with other governments. He was released several months later.

In 2008, he was again put under house arrest, this time following the Mumbai attacks.

The Pakistani government later acknowledged that "part" of the conspiracy to attack Mumbai did take place on its soil, and that LeT had been involved.

Several arrests were made in Pakistan in connection with the attacks, but no criminal charges were brought against Mr Saeed. He was freed some six months later.

Housecarl · Nov 24, 2017

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/yemen/us-intensifies-drone-strikes-in-yemen-s-baydha-1.2129393

US intensifies drone strikes in Yemen’s Baydha

Several Al Qaida and Daesh militants have been killed according to local activists in the province

Published: 14:57 November 23, 2017 Gulf News
Saeed Al Batati, Correspondent

Al Mukalla: US drones have carried out a string of strikes in Yemen’s central province of Baydha, killing several Al Qaida and Daesh militants as well as at least five civilians, residents and local media outlets said.

On Thursday morning, residents said that US drones and fighter jets from the Saudi-led coalition launched heavy airstrikes on rugged mountains in Gayfa region in Baydha, apparently targeting Daesh and Al Qaida military camps or fugitive militants hiding there.

Residents said that the US drones hovered over Gayfa for hours on Wednesday evening and intermittently fired missiles at the mountains.

A local activist told Gulf News that US drones killed six militants on Monday when at least two missiles hit their car in Yakla region in Baydha’s Wald Rabea district.

“The targeted men were known as members of Al Qaida,” the activist said on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

Military officials in Yemen believe that hundreds of Al Qaida and Daesh militants who deserted their former bastions in Abyan, Hadramout and Shabwa provinces are hiding in scattered villages or on rough mountains in Baydha.

Local media reports have recently said that three Al Qaida leaders in Shabwa were killed in recent drone strikes in Baydha.

Al Qaida has lost large swathes of land since early 2016 when thousands of UAE-supported Yemeni forces took control of major cities.

The recent US drone strikes have also killed five civilians, displaced residents and caused panic in the two areas.

The activist said that five civilians, mainly farmers, were killed in three separate air strikes this week.

“The air strikes have caused great panic among civilians. The targeted areas have no functioning schools or hospitals,” the activist said.

The US’s military which has long kept its drone missions in Yemen under wraps, announced last month the killing of dozens of Daesh militants in several drone strikes in the province of Baydha.

Also in Gayfa, witnesses said on Thursday that fighter jets from the Saudi-led coalition targeted Al Houthi military sites amid raging fighting with government forces.

The air strikes destroyed ammunition stores, military equipment and Al Houthi militants’ gatherings in the areas.

“Coalition’s fighter jets hit Al Houthi militants who were battling local tribes in Gayfa on Wednesday.” a witness said, adding that the tribesmen managed to take control of Al Houthi positions after the airstrikes. The witness spoke on condition of anonymity because of security concerns.

Despite taking control of Baydha’s main cities, the Iran-backed Al Houthis have failed to defeat local tribesmen who mounted deadly attacks in the province.

WAR 11-18-2017-to-11-24-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

On TB every waking moment

On TB every waking moment

On TB every waking moment

On TB every waking moment

On TB every waking moment

On TB every waking moment

On TB every waking moment

On TB every waking moment

On TB every waking moment

On TB every waking moment

Inactive

Inactive

On TB every waking moment

On TB every waking moment

On TB every waking moment

On TB every waking moment

On TB every waking moment

On TB every waking moment

Has No Life - Lives on TB

On TB every waking moment

On TB every waking moment

On TB every waking moment

On TB every waking moment

On TB every waking moment

On TB every waking moment

On TB every waking moment

On TB every waking moment

On TB every waking moment

WAR 11-18-2017-to-11-24-2017___THEWINDSofWAR