WAR 11-11-2017-to-11-17-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

(294) 10-21-2017-to-10-27-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...0-28-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(295) 10-28-2017-to-11-03-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...1-03-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(296) 11-04-2017-to-11-10-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...1-10-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.thedailybeast.com/as-isis-falls-and-trump-talks-iran-advances-throughout-the-middle-east

IRAN AMOK

As ISIS Falls, and Trump Talks, Iran Advances Throughout the Middle East

Now that the so-called Islamic State has lost virtually all the territory it once occupied in Syria and Iraq, it's Iran's proxies, not America's, that are moving in.

Wladimir van Wilgenburg
11.11.17 11:48 AM ET

ERBIL, Iraq—Kurds in both Iraq and Syria are watching carefully the new ascendance of Iran amid decreasing U.S. influence in the region. The pivotal moment came when Iran-backed Iraqi forces took the town of Kirkuk from Kurds on October 16 and Iranian-backed proxies were able to establish a potential Iranian land bridge through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon.

The Syrian government and Iranian-backed proxies on Thursday claimed they had liberated the town of Abu Kamal. If this holds true, it’s a huge setback for the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that were planning to capture the town to prevent the Iranian land bridge after liberating Raqqa, formerly the capital of the so-called Islamic State.

The sudden move was enabled by Iraqi forces, including the Iranian backed Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) that took the Iraqi town of al Qaim on November 3, and crossed the border, ending the race between the U.S.-backed SDF forces and the Syrian government.

Syrian journalist Saad al Sabr told The Daily Beast that Iraqi Shiite paramilitary group Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba and Iraqi Hezbollah played a major role in the operations in Abu Kamal.

However, PMU spokesperson Karim Nouri denied that PMU units crossed the border. “Hashd Al-Sha'abi [PMU] stopped on the Syrian border in the town of al Qaim,” he said. “There are Iraqi fighters there fighting alongside the Syrian army, but they have nothing to do with the Hashd Al-Sha'abi,” he added.
He also denied accusations that Iran will open a land bridge through Iraq to Syria. “Iran cannot open a land route through the Hashd Al-Sha'abi or any other side, to cross into Syria,” he said. “This is scare-mongering.”

Nevertheless, Western diplomats seem to see the recent developments as a major win by Iran. “This would complete the main Southern land corridor—with work on the northern ones ongoing. It's weird how quietly we all seem to be accepting the fact,” one well-informed Western diplomat told The Daily Beast.

“These corridors won't only act as resupply routes and direct access to the Mediterranean Sea,” the official added. “They divide Syria and prevent any of the non pro-Iranian territories or groups from linking up with each other. *It's the perfection of the Persian divide and rule mastery.”

The effect greatly undermines U.S. policy in both Iraq and Syria, a point confirmed, in its way, by the joint statement of Russia and the United States on Saturday essentially embracing Russian strategy for Syria.

The Iranian victories through proxies raise fears among Syrian and Iraqi Kurds that Iran wants to dismantle any form of Kurdish autonomy in both countries. “Abu Kamal's fall is less about a nail in the coffin of ISIS than the latest chapter in the forging of Iranian hegemony in the region,” Amb. Alberto Fernandez, a former U.S. State Department official, told The Daily Beast. “It is one key part of a broader effort to consolidate power before there is a possible American countermove.”

Fernandez noted that Iranian-backed groups have taken over the oil-rich disputed territories in Iraq, including Kirkuk, since*the Kurdish Regional Government’s ill-conceived independence referendum. Iran completely exploited the situation to expand its own influence. “Of course, nationalist Iraqi feelings were a real part of it, but there is an obvious Iranian hand in the move against the KRG [Kurdistan Regional Government] as there is in events in Syria and Lebanon.”

Now Baghdad reportedly is discussing plans to export Kirkuk’s oil to Iran, and to connect Iran’s power grid to that of Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, thus linking their economies more closely.

Despite all this, the U.S. still firmly supports the Iraqi government and Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi, whom the West sees as an Iraqi nationalist. The hope is that he will rein in Iranian influence after his possible re-election in April next year.
The Iraqi Kurds blame the West and especially the United States and Britain for enabling Iran as it cements its role and claims that Iraqi PM Abadi only plays a minor role in recent operations against the Kurds. This, while Baghdad maintains it played the major role in the pushback against the Iraqi Kurds.

“There is a program to create a Shia crescent from Iran through Iraq, Syria to the south of Lebanon,” Kemal Kerkuki, a Kurdish Peshmerga commander who withdrew his forces from Kirkuk in mid October but whose forces fought the Iran-backed Iraqi proxies. *“Iran supervised the plan [to take Kirkuk], and unfortunately some Western countries were aware of this,” he said.

Also, Syrian Kurds say that Iran now feels more emboldened after the U.S. failed to support the Kurds in Iraq, and will try to push the Syrian government to attack the U.S.-backed forces that are attempting to build a federation in northern Syria with what they hope is U.S. support.

“Iran is pushing them, recently [Syrian officials] are speaking in a more threatening way, especially after the referendum in the Kurdistan region,” says Farhad Patiev, a representative of the Syrian Kurds in Moscow.

“If Iran’s position strengthens, there is a bigger threat to the SDF,” he added. “They want to have a central state, and they are now preparing for Raqqa, that is absolutely a danger for us,” he said. “Iran is now trying to move its battle with Saudi Arabia into areas controlled by SDF.”

For their part, SDF officials say they will fight back, unlike many of the Iraqi Kurds who withdrew from most of the territories disputed between the Kurds and Baghdad.

“There is a prospect that the Iranian and Iraqi militias are entering Abu Kamal city, but if there are any attempts to attack our forces, the SDF will have the right to respond and defend themselves,” Ehmed Dadeli, an SDF official in Syria who works closely with the U.S.-led coalition forces, told The Daily Beast.

“Assad wants all of his country back and does not want to cede any more territory to the U.S.-backed forces. Assad fears a long term U.S. presence in Syria more than he fears anything else,” says Nicholas Heras, Middle East Security Fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington.

The recent offensives by the government of Bashar Assad and its Iranian allies, are to deny the U.S. “more real estate on the monopoly board that is civil war Syria,” and also to grab as much land in eastern Syria as possible.

U.S. officials say they will continue to support the SDF.

“While we do not discuss current or future operations, we can tell you that in Syria we will continue to support our SDF partners on the ground as they provide security that enables stabilization assistance to liberated areas,” says Col. Ryan Dillon, spokesperson for the U.S. backed anti-ISIS coalition.

“This will allow people to voluntarily return to their homes and rebuild after Daesh [ISIS],” he said. “The Coalition remains committed to working with all Syrian people to support a diplomatic resolution to the Syrian conflict, one that can bring about a more representative and peaceful Syria, free of terrorism.”

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/11/11/us-korea-naval-drills-show-force-244803

U.S., S. Korea start drills in show of force against N. Korea

By ASSOCIATED PRESS 11/11/2017 09:01 AM EST

SEOUL, South Korea — The United States and South Korea on Saturday started joint naval exercises that will involve three U.S. aircraft carriers in what military officials describe as a clear warning to North Korea.

The four-day drills that began in waters off South Korea’s eastern coast come as President Donald Trump continues a visit to Asia that has been dominated by discussions over the North Korean nuclear threat.

The battle groups of the USS Ronald Reagan, the Theodore Roosevelt and the Nimitz will successively enter the exercise area during the drills that run until Tuesday, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said.

The three carriers will be likely together in the drills around Monday, according to a South Korean military official, who didn’t want to be named, citing office rules.
The exercises will also involve 11 U.S. Aegis ships and seven South Korean naval vessels, including two Aegis ships. The Aegis technology refers to missile tracking and guidance.

They will aim to enhance combined operation and aerial strike capabilities and also display “strong will and firm military readiness to defeat any provocation by North Korea with dominant force in the event of crisis,” Seoul’s military said in a statement.

It’s the first time since a 2007 exercise near Guam that three U.S. carrier strike groups are operating together in the Western Pacific, according to the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet. The U.S. carriers will also participate in separate exercises with three Japanese destroyers on Sunday, according to Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force.

The United States has been sending its strategic assets, also including long-range bombers, to the region more frequently for patrols or drills amid accelerating North Korean efforts to expand its nuclear weapons program.

In recent months, North Korea has tested intercontinental ballistic missiles that could reach the U.S. mainland with further development and has conducted its most powerful nuclear test. It also flew two new midrange missiles over Japan and threatened to launch them toward Guam, a U.S. Pacific territory and military hub.

Trump continued his tough talk against Pyongyang on Friday in a speech to business leaders at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Danang, Vietnam, saying that the region’s future “must not be held hostage to a dictator’s twisted fantasies of violent conquest and nuclear blackmail,” referring to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

Trump had also delivered a sharp warning to North Korea in a speech at South Korea’s parliament on Wednesday, telling the country: “Do not underestimate us. And do not try us.”

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...ians-and-police-revealed-in-texas-court-files

Mexico drug cartel's grip on politicians and police revealed in Texas court files

Los Zetas pumped money into elections in the border state of Coahuila but the detailed testimonies have been met with official denial and public apathy

David Agren
@el_reportero
Friday 10 November 2017 06.00 EST

The accusations made in three Texas courtrooms were staggering. Witness after witness described how a notorious drug cartel pumped money into Mexican electoral campaigns and paid off individual politicians and policemen in the border state of Coahuila to look the other way as hundreds of people were massacred or forcibly disappeared.

The Texas court testimonies – gathered in a report released this week by the Human Rights Clinic at the University of Texas School of Law and Fray Juan de Larios Diocesan Human Rights Centre in Coahuila – give one of the most complete accounts so far of how organized crime has attempted to capture the institutions of democracy in Mexico’s regions.

Analysis Mexico's war on drugs: what has it achieved and how is the US involved?
Felipe Calderón launched the war after being elected in 2006, and since then the US has donated at least $1.5bn – but the biggest costs have been human
Read more

The report prompted outrage among activists who have worked with victims of violence. But the accusations were met with sharp denials from Mexican politicians and a pointed lack of interest from judicial officials.

The Mexican public, meanwhile, mostly shrugged, even as the country endures its most violent year on record and the crackdown on organised crime seems unlikely to end anytime soon.

“The lack of action from government is to be expected,” said Jorge Kawas, a security analyst in the city of Monterrey. “But the lack of outrage by Mexicans is just disheartening.

“We’ve become numb to excessive violence. There’s no leadership in government or in the streets and Mexican media is practically useless for holding power accountable.”

Allegations that Mexican politicians have acted in cahoots with drugs cartels have been common for decades, though such accusations have seldom resulted in thorough investigations, let alone criminal convictions. Even after sworn testimony in US courts has described corruption, Mexican officials appear unwilling to act.

“For Mexicans, it’s always sad to hear that the real investigations against crime and corruption in Mexico have to be done elsewhere in order for them to actually mean something or obtain a result,” said Esteban Illades, editor of the magazine Nexos.

Mexico’s militarized crackdown on drug cartels over the past decade has cost more than 200,000 lives and left more than 30,000 missing. But by its own terms, it has been a failure: 2017 is shaping up to be the country’s the most violent year on record.

Los Zetas, a band of elite soldiers who became cartel enforcers and then established their own criminal empire, have been weakened in recent years after their senior leaders were kidnapped or killed and the group split into rival factions.

But from 2006 to 2014 the group terrorised swaths of north-eastern Mexico. In Coahuila, an arid state butting up against Texas, Los Zetas killed hundreds of people and burned their bodies before scattering the ashes in the desert.

The cartel carried out a string of massacres, including a 2011 rampage through the town of Allende which left about 300 dead.

They also spent millions on bribery, according to testimony gathered in this week’s report and given in separate criminal trials between 2013 and 2016.

“The Zetas paid bribes and integrated police officers into their hierarchy to ensure the cartel would be able to continue their illicit operations without resistance,” it said.

“Witnesses described a level of Zeta control which extended to city police chiefs, state and federal prosecutors, state prisons, sectors of the federal police and the Mexican army, and state politicians.”

The report also quoted explosive accusations made in US courts that Los Zetas paid off a pair of Coahuila state governors and pumped millions into state elections elsewhere in the country.


Mexico's drugs war: in the city of death
Read more

Some observers urged caution, saying witness statements alone – especially from those cooperating the authorities – were not enough to establish guilt.

“These guys clearly have a motive to blame others, to incriminate others. Whatever they’re saying should be read within this context,” said Alejandro Hope, a security analyst.

“It’s hard to believe that in the Zetas’ peak years [in Coahuila state], 2010, 2011, 2012, they had no connections with the state apparatus in Coahuila,” he added. “Did it go to the top? I’m not sure.”

Javier Garza, former editor of the Coahuila newspaper El Siglo de Torreón said that such questions would probably go unanswered by Mexican authorities. “These statements were told under oath so supposedly what they’re saying is true, but it’s never been corroborated because nobody in Mexico investigated.”

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://aviationweek.com/dubai-air-s...m=email&elq2=7e686b38db0243fc86e6cff62040f153

China’s UAVs Proliferate in Middle East

Nov 11, 2017

Chinese gains could make it difficult for the U.S. to break back into Middle East UAV market.

Reluctance on the part of the U.S. to deliver armed unmanned air systems (UAS) to some of its key allies in the Middle East has resulted in a significant win for China.

Chinese UAS manufacturers have been rewarded handsomely with major contracts from several Middle East and Central Asian governments.

China’s successes in those geographic areas have prompted it to explore other markets further afield.

April, Avic demonstrated a model of its Wing Loong II, an*MQ-9 Reaper-size air system at an exhibition in Mexico—right in the U.S.’s backyard. In June, it debuted at the Paris Air Show, displayed with an array of Chinese-produced weaponry.

It is hard to determine the actual number of Chinese-made armed UAVs now in service with countries in the Middle East, but the platforms are operational with the air forces of Iraq, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and reports suggest they have found their way into Egypt and Jordan as well.

Some of these countries have also used them in combat. Saudi Arabia has employed the systems during the air campaign over Yemen, while Iraq has flown them in its ongoing campaign against the Islamic State group.

The UAE has gone further and deployed several to Libya’s Marj District to support the Libyan National Army against Islamic fighters there.

All these nations had requested to purchase armed versions of the*General Atomics MQ-1*Predator and MQ-9 Reaper, but were denied by the Obama administration due to concerns that selling into the region would break the international Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) rules, which attempt to prevent proliferation of technologies that enable the creation of delivery systems for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

The UAE was granted permission to purchase unarmed exportable versions of the Predator, known as the Predator XP.

Beijing’s success in the region revolves around two almost identical air systems, both virtual copies of the MQ-1 Predator. These are the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp. (CASC) CH-4, known as Rainbow, and the Chengdu or Avic Wing Loong I, designated GJ-1 in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force service. One analysis puts the price of a CH-4 system at one-fifth that of an MQ-1.

In October, it emerged that the Trump administration had begun exploring the loosening of the MTCR and other arms protocols in order to facilitate the export of U.S.-manufactured UAS, but China’s stranglehold could be difficult to break.

In March, it was announced that CASC could open a factory to build as many as 300 CH-4 systems for the Saudi armed forces over the coming years.

 

[Housecarl]

23 EU Member Nations Sign Defense Pact
Started by*Seerý,*Yesterday*12:30 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?527359-23-EU-Member-Nations-Sign-Defense-Pact


For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/13/world/europe/eu-military-force.html

Europe

E.U. Moves Closer to a Joint Military Force

By STEVEN ERLANGER
NOV. 13, 2017

BRUSSELS — The European Union took an important step on Monday toward a substantive defense capacity, as 23 of the 28 member countries signed on to a program of joint military investment in equipment, research and development.

The intention is to jointly develop European military abilities and to make them available for operations separately or in coordination with NATO. The effort also aims to reduce the fragmentation of European military spending and to promote more joint projects to reduce duplication and waste.

At a signing ceremony in Brussels, the European foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, called the deal a “historic moment in European defense.”

Jean-Yves Le Drian, the French foreign minister and a former defense minister, said the agreement was “a commitment for countries to do better together,” noting that it “comes at a time of significant tension” in Europe stemming from a more aggressive Russia after the annexation of Crimea, and from terrorist attacks by Islamist militants.

European leaders have also noted President Trump’s lack of enthusiasm for NATO and other multilateral institutions, and they have apparently decided, as Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany said in May, that “the era in which we could fully rely on others is over to some extent,” and that “we Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands.”

Ms. Merkel did add, however, that European coordination should be taken in partnership with the United States and Britain.

For years, Britain blocked this kind of cooperation, concerned that the creation of a European army would undermine NATO and London’s alliance with Washington. Britain instead favored a bilateral arrangement with France.

But with Britain having voted to leave the European Union, a process known as Brexit, the other countries in the bloc — especially France, Germany, Italy and Spain — saw the long-dormant idea of military cooperation as a way to show their citizens that Brussels could respond to worries about security and terrorism.

Paris had argued for a smaller group of countries that would commit to serious spending on military equipment and capabilities, which Europe mostly lacks outside of NATO, while Berlin argued for a bigger club. France, which will become the most important military power in the European Union after Britain departs, wants to be able to conduct operations in places like Mali with European allies without necessarily having to ask NATO for help.

The German view, as is often the case, won out.

The agreement, known in Brussels-speak as “permanent structured cooperation,” or Pesco, is expected to be formalized by European leaders at a summit meeting in mid-December. But with so many foreign and defense ministers signing on Monday, approval seems a given.

NATO is also supportive of the effort, as European leaders say their intention is not to undermine the Atlantic alliance but simply to act more efficiently on European missions against, for instance, piracy, cyberattacks or hybrid warfare like in Crimea.

Countries would submit a plan of action outlining their military goals, which would be monitored, and national assets would remain under national control. A European Union fund of about 5 billion euros, or $5.8 billion, would be used to buy weapons, with another special fund to finance operations.

The intent is to use increased military spending to “help reinforce the E.U.’s strategic autonomy to act alone when necessary, and with partners whenever possible,” a news statement said. The program is also intended to reduce the number of different weapons systems in Europe and to promote regional military integration, like the existing naval cooperation between Belgium and the Netherlands.

The United States has for many years pressed NATO members to increase their military spending to the goal of 2 percent of gross domestic product. NATO members agreed at a summit meeting in Wales in 2014 to do that by 2024.

The European Union member states that did not sign the new military agreement were Britain, Denmark, Ireland, Malta and Portugal.

Follow Steven Erlanger on Twitter: @StevenErlanger.

Related Coverage
LETTER FROM EUROPE

U.S. Sees Europe as Not Pulling Its Weight Militarily FEB. 6, 2012

Britain Pledges to Hit NATO Military Spending Target JULY 8, 2015

Vast Exercise Demonstrated Russia’s Growing Military Prowess OCT. 1, 2017

 

[Housecarl]

Zimbabwe Rumour
Started by*IronMan 2ý,*Today*11:02 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?527395-Zimbabwe-Rumour

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For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-z...abwe-army-chief-of-treason-idUSKBN1DE1NG?il=0

#World NewsNovember 14, 2017 / 4:43 AM / Updated 6 minutes ago

Soldiers on Harare streets as ruling party accuses Zimbabwe army chief of treason

MacDonald Dzirutwe
5 Min Read

HARARE (Reuters) - Zimbabwe’s ruling party accused the head of the armed forces of treason on Tuesday as troops took up positions around the capital in an escalation of a dispute with 93-year-old President Robert Mugabe over political succession.

Just 24 hours after military chief General Constantino Chiwenga threatened to intervene to end a purge in the ruling party, a Reuters reporter saw six armored personnel carriers on major thoroughfares on the outskirts of the capital.

Aggressive soldiers directing traffic told passing cars to keep moving through the darkness.

“Don’t try anything funny. Just go,” one soldier said on Harare Drive.

The presence of troops, including the movement of at least six armored personnel carriers from a barracks northwest of Harare, sparked rumors of coup against Mugabe, although there was no evidence to suggest Zimbabwe’s leader of the last 37 years had been toppled.

The lead item on the ZBC state broadcaster’s evening news bulletin was an anti-military rally by the youth wing of Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party.

The Southern African nation has been on edge since Monday when Chiwenga, Commander of Zimbabwe Defence Forces, said he was prepared to “step in” to end a purge of supporters of a sacked vice president.

The unprecedented statement represents an escalation of a rumbling political struggle over who will succeed Mugabe, who has been in power since the country gained independence from Britain in 1980.

Mugabe chaired a weekly cabinet meeting in the capital on Tuesday. Afterwards, ZANU-PF said it stood by the “primacy of politics over the gun” and accused Chiwenga of “treasonable conduct... meant to incite insurrection.”

Mugabe fired Vice President Emerson Mnangagwa last week. The veteran of the 1970s liberation war was popular with the military and had been seen as a likely successor to Mugabe.

The army views his removal as part of a purge of independence-era figures to pave the way for Mugabe to hand power to his wife Grace Mugabe.

A Reuters witness saw two armored vehicles parked beside the main road from Harare to Chinhoyi, about 20 km (14 miles) from the city. One, which was pointed in the direction of the capital, had come off its tracks.

Witnesses said they saw four armored vehicles turn before reaching Harare and head towards the Presidential Guard compound in a suburb on the outskirts of Harare.

“There were about four tanks and they turned right here, you can see markings on the road,” one witness on the Chinhoyi highway said, referring to the armored vehicles. He pointed to a road that links to the guard compound.

The troop movements raise tension on a continent where for decades armies regularly overthrew civilian governments.

“DEFENDING OUR REVOLUTION”
Neither the president nor his wife responded in public to the general’s remarks and state media did not publish Chiwenga’s statement. The Herald newspaper posted some of the comments on its Twitter page but deleted them.

The head of ZANU-PF’s youth wing accused the army chief of subverting the constitution. Grace Mugabe has developed a strong following in the powerful youth wing.

“Defending the revolution and our leader and president is an ideal we live for and if need be it is a principle we are prepared to die for,” Kudzai Chipanga, who leads the ZANU-PF Youth League, said at the party’s headquarters in Harare.

Grace Mugabe’s rise has brought her into conflict with the independence-era war veterans, who once enjoyed a privileged role in the ruling party under Mugabe, but who have in recent years been banished from senior government and party roles.

Decades ago, Zimbabwe had one of Africa’s promising economies due in part to its agricultural exports.

Related Coverage

Soldiers take over Zimbabwe state broadcaster: ZBC staff


Zimbabwe's ruling party says will never succumb to army threats

The country is currently struggling to pay for imports due to a dollar crunch, which is also sparking rampant inflation only 10 years after it suffered a financial implosion caused when the central bank began to print money.

Martin Rupiya, an expert on Zimbabwe military affairs at the University of South Africa in Pretoria, said the army appeared to be putting the squeeze on Mugabe.

“There’s a rupture between the executive and the armed forces,” Rupiya said.

Alex Magaisa, a British-based Zimbabwean academic said it was premature to talk about a coup.

“A military coup is the nuclear option. A coup would be a very hard sell at home and in the international community. They will want to avoid that,” Magaisa said.

Additional reporting by Ed Cropley, James Macharia and Joe Brock in Johannesburg; Writing by James Macharia; Editing by Matthew Mpoke Bigg

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/b...s-partners-can-check-chinese-naval-expansion/

Balancing China: How the United States and Its Partners Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion

Michael Beckley
November 15, 2017

For 70 years, the U.S. military has dominated the seas and skies of East Asia, enjoying almost total freedom of movement and the ability to deny such freedom to enemies. Now, however, China has acquired advanced missiles and launch platforms that may be able to destroy U.S. ships, aircraft, and bases within 500 miles of China’s territory and disrupt the satellite and computer networks that underpin U.S. military power throughout East Asia. Many U.S. analysts fear that China could use these anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities to hold the U.S. military at bay while enforcing its expansive territorial claims, which include most of the East and South China Seas. Left unchecked, some fear, China will eventually become the hegemon of East Asia and start projecting military power into other regions, including the Western Hemisphere.

How should the U.S. military respond to China’s A2/AD capabilities? One option would be to gear up by preparing to wipe out China’s offensive forces at the outset of a conflict. Another would be to give up by withdrawing U.S. forces from East Asia, abrogating U.S. alliances in the region and granting China a sphere of influence.

Both of these options have drawbacks.* Preparing for preemptive strikes on Chinese A2/AD forces would not only be expensive, but also might increase the risk of war by encouraging the United States and China to shoot first in a crisis.* Retrenchment, on the other hand, would not only reduce U.S. influence in East Asia, but also might embolden China to try to conquer parts of the region.

Does the United States have a third option? In a new article in International Security, I make the case for what some analysts call an “active denial” strategy that splits the difference between gearing up and giving up. Under this strategy, the United States would abandon efforts to command maritime East Asia outright and, instead, focus on helping the countries around the East and South China Seas deny China sea and air control in the region. In peacetime, the United States would bolster the A2/AD forces of China’s neighbors by providing them with aid and arms. In wartime, the U.S. military would back up China’s neighbors by providing intelligence, logistics, and, if necessary, limited air and missile strikes on Chinese forces operating beyond China’s shores.

This strategy maintains deterrence by denying China the possibility of a decisive military victory while enhancing crisis stability by reassuring China that it will not suffer a massive attack on its homeland on the first day of a war. The potential Achilles’ heel of the strategy, of course, is that it requires China’s neighbors to hold the line against Chinese expansion for extended periods of time and perhaps indefinitely. Are they up to the task?

My main finding is that many of China’s maritime neighbors have, in fact, developed A2/AD capabilities that can plausibly deny China sea and air control throughout most of its near seas. Moreover, China cannot afford the power-projection capabilities it would need to overcome these A2/AD forces, because power-projection forces are more expensive than A2/AD forces by an order of magnitude, China’s economy is losing steam and has racked up massive debt, and homeland security operations consume large shares of China’s military resources. For the foreseeable future, therefore, China is unlikely to be able to redraw the map in East Asia by force – as long as its neighbors remain willing to use their A2/AD forces and the United States continues to bolster and backstop them.

Obstacles to Chinese Naval Expansion

Only two nations in modern history have established regional maritime hegemony: the United States from the 1890s to the present and Japan in the 1930s and early 1940s. Both cases suggest that China would need two things to enforce its own version of the Monroe Doctrine in East Asia: a military presence on the coasts surrounding the East and South China Seas and a regional monopoly of naval power. China, however, is nowhere close to achieving either of those objectives.

First, the United States and Imperial Japan took control of their near seas by occupying the surrounding landmasses, lining the shores with military bases, and barring neighboring states from building independent navies. China today, by contrast, has no prospect of controlling the coasts of East Asia. Its maritime neighbors are densely populated and possess modern militaries, and amphibious invasions have become extremely difficult, if not impossible, in an age of precision-guided munitions.

Second, the United States and Japan built and maintained a monopoly of naval power, accounting for 80 to 99 percent of the naval tonnage in their respective regions. Today, China’s navy accounts for less than 30 percent of Asia’s naval tonnage, and the Asian nations that contest China’s maritime claims have been collectively matching China’s procurement of modern submarines, ships, aircraft, and coast guard cutters over the past two decades.

China’s navy may be the most powerful in Asia, but its maritime neighbors border contested portions of the East and South China Seas whereas China is, in many cases, hundreds of miles away. In most scenarios for war, Chinese air and naval forces would need to cycle between the combat theater and bases on mainland China, a commute that would severely limit the number of military assets China could sustain on the battlefield, whereas China’s neighbors could operate from home bases adjacent to the combat theater and, thus, have their full arsenals at their disposal.

Many of China’s neighbors have capitalized on these geographic advantages by developing A2/AD capabilities comprised of shore-based missile batteries, diesel-powered attack submarines, swarms of small surface combatants, and fighter aircraft armed with anti-ship missiles and mines. As a result, the East China Sea and the western and southern sections of the South China Sea are now bordered by forces potentially capable of denying China sea and air command.

In the East China Sea, Japan maintains a formidable force. Japan has announced plans to string a line of missile launchers along the Ryukyu Islands that can target all naval and air traffic across a 200-to-300 mile band between mainland Japan and Taiwan, an area that includes the Senkaku Islands. Japan is expanding its submarine fleet, acquiring fifth-generation stealth fighters armed with anti-ship cruise missiles, and maintains world-class anti-submarine warfare forces and an extensive network of underwater sensors that can track Chinese ships and submarines as they leave port. The balance of naval tonnage is shifting in China’s favor, but Japan still has nearly twice as many large surface combatants as China. Its 15 smaller coastal patrol craft and frigates, though outnumbered by China’s 57 frigates, would be able to refuel and reload at ports along the Ryukyus and thus maintain a higher tempo of operations in a war in contested areas of the East China Sea than China’s missile boats and frigates.

On the west side of the South China Sea, Vietnam has acquired mobile shore-based anti-ship cruise missile batteries, Kilo-class submarines, advanced surface-to-air missiles, and dozens of fighter aircraft, and surface ships armed with advanced cruise missiles. Collectively, these platforms enable Vietnam to destroy ships and aircraft operating within 200 miles of its coast – an area that encompasses the western third of the South China Sea and China’s military base on Hainan Island.

On the south side of the South China Sea, Indonesia and Malaysia also have developed capabilities to deter Chinese expansion. The two nations’ militaries are not impressive by Chinese standards, but they have dozens of naval and air bases near the southern section of China’s nine-dash line, whereas China is more than 1,000 miles away from that area. In a war, Indonesia and Malaysia could bring the full force of their navy and air force to bear. China, by contrast, would have trouble sustaining more than a dozen ships and submarines and a few dozen combat aircraft in the combat theater.

Limited Opportunities for Chinese Expansion

China faces a budding containment barrier in many parts of East Asia. Nevertheless, there are several areas where it could easily defeat local opposition and establish sea and air control.

One of these areas is the Taiwan Strait. China has 1,500 accurate missiles pointed at Taiwan and more than 1,000 advanced fighter aircraft. If China catches Taiwan off-guard – with its missile batteries, aircraft, and ships parked in the open – it could carry out surprise air and missile strikes and wipe out Taiwan’s long-range air defenses, ground Taiwan’s air force, and sink Taiwan’s large naval ships in a matter of hours. The good news is that China still probably could not conquer Taiwan, even without U.S. intervention, because it lacks the capabilities to pull off an amphibious invasion or sustain a serious blockade. Moreover, the United States has an array of options for disrupting a Chinese invasion or blockade that play to U.S. strengths and would not expose U.S. surface ships or non-stealth aircraft to Chinese A2/AD forces or require U.S. strikes on the Chinese mainland. Taiwan thus probably remains safe from Chinese conquest for now, but it will need to ramp up investments in A2/AD forces and civil defense if it is to remain so in the decades ahead.

A second area of vulnerability is on the northeast side of the South China Sea, which is claimed by the Philippines, a country that has failed to develop any meaningful naval power. While the rest of the region has acquired precision-guided munitions and advanced platforms to fire them, the Philippines has spent its meager military budget on internal security. Evidently, leaders in Manila believe that the United States will bail them out if China parks its navy in their exclusive economic zone. The U.S. military probably could destroy a Chinese naval task force near the Philippines at moderate risk to U.S. forces, but there is no guarantee it would do so. Washington would likely risk serious blood and treasure only if vital U.S. interests were at stake. While a Chinese Monroe Doctrine in East Asia would meet this standard, Chinese infringement on Philippine fishing rights would not. The northeast quarter of the South China Sea thus remains vulnerable to Chinese expansion.

Finally, China may be able to expand on the sly via a “cabbage strategy,” in which it wraps disputed waters in layers of coast guard, maritime militia, and fishing vessels. This tactic has already enabled China to assert a prickly peacetime presence in some small portions of the South China Sea, however it is unlikely to allow China to command significant areas of maritime East Asia. One reason is that China’s neighbors have collectively matched Chinese procurement of coast guard cutters. China’s fleet remains the largest in Asia, but it is spread thin defending China’s expansive claims, which encompass nearly 2 million square miles. China’s neighbors, on the other hand, concentrate their fleets around their more limited claims. More importantly, China’s neighbors have started using military force against China’s civilian vessels, firing on them, chasing them down, and, in the case of Indonesia, blowing them up on national television.

Constraints on Chinese Military Modernization

This balance of military power in East Asia will remain stable for years, because the state of military technology heavily favors the defending nations, China’s economic growth is slowing, and homeland security operations drain China’s military resources.

First, defense is dominant, at least within maritime East Asia, because precision-guided munitions enable even relatively weak countries to sink surface ships and shoot down aircraft near their homelands. Previously, China’s neighbors might have had to contest Chinese sea control symmetrically, by sending battleships to blast away at China’s fleet, a contest they would almost surely lose. Today, these countries can counter Chinese expansion asymmetrically, by launching precision-guided munitions from a variety of simple platforms that are 50 times cheaper, on average, than the Chinese power-projection forces they could credibly threaten to destroy.

Second, China’s economy – the engine powering its military modernization – is losing steam. Since 2007, China’s economic growth rates have fallen by half, and its debt has quadrupled and now exceeds 300 percent of GDP. Theoretically, China could free up money for military modernization growth by gutting social spending. In reality, such cost-cutting will be impossible, because China is about to experience the most rapid aging crisis in human history, with the ratio of workers-to-retirees shrinking from 8-to-1 today to 2-to-1 by 2040. By that point, China will have $10 trillion to $100 trillion in unfunded pension liabilities. Add to this rising medical costs associated with having one of the oldest societies on the planet, and it becomes clear that China would be fortunate just to maintain current levels of military spending in the future, let alone to increase them.

Third, homeland security costs drain a substantial portion of China’s military resources. China shares sea or land borders with nineteen countries, five of which fought wars against China within the last century; its northern and western borders are porous and populated by disaffected minority groups; and its government is bedeviled by significant domestic unrest. To deal with these threats, China’s military devotes more than 1 million troops (roughly 45 percent of the active-duty force) to internal security and border defense. The cost of maintaining these units drains at least 35 percent of China’s military budget, a chronic “domestic drag” that puts robust power-projection forces further out of reach for the PLA.

An “Active Denial” Strategy for the United States

The United States should exploit the existing East Asian military balance by adopting an active denial strategy consisting of two main elements.

First, the United States should bolster the A2/AD capabilities of China’s neighbors by providing them with loans, arms, training, and intelligence. The goal would be to turn China’s neighbors into prickly “porcupines,” capable of denying territory to China but not to take and hold territory themselves. The United States already provides some assistance to its Asian partners, but not enough and not always the right kind. For instance, the United States has donated counter-insurgency capabilities to the Philippines, but not negotiated the deployment of U.S. capabilities that could actually threaten China’s navy and air force, such as U.S. Army anti-air and anti-ship missile batteries. To take another example, during the Obama administration, the United States sold Taiwan a few decommissioned ships and some anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, but not any items that could bolster Taiwan’s surveillance, undersea, air, or long-range strike capabilities – arguably the four most important factors in any China-Taiwan war scenario. The arms sales package recently approved by the Trump administration includes radar upgrades, air-launched missiles, and torpedos, but no tangible assistance for Taiwan’s fledgling submarine-building initiative. In short, the United States could do much more to turn the First Island Chain – stretching from Japan to Indonesia – into a formidable containment barrier.

Second, in wartime, the United States should backstop the local balance of power, but do so gradually. In minor conflicts, the United States would try to convince China to back down by using nonmilitary forms of coercion, including financial sanctions, embargoes, or cyber operations. If the conflict escalated to war, the United States could initially “lead from behind,” supporting local forces with logistics, intelligence, and, if absolutely necessary, limited air and missile strikes on Chinese forces operating in the combat theater rather than those stationed on the Chinese mainland. These strikes could be conducted from submarines, stealth-aircraft, or road-mobile shore-based missile batteries strung along the first island chain – all of which are far less vulnerable to Chinese A2/AD forces than surface ships and non-stealth aircraft. If the United States needed to ratchet up the pain, it could escalate horizontally before doing so vertically; that is, by opening new geographic fronts (e.g., by blockading the Strait of Malacca) rather than pouring U.S. forces into the main combat theater.

This strategy obviously sacrifices military effectiveness for the sake of enhancing crisis stability. The U.S. military could gain a major advantage over China’s military if it simply unloaded on China’s mainland bases at the outset of a conflict. Such an offensive posture, however, is not only expensive to maintain, but also risks turning minor disputes into major wars. China might be tempted to shoot first during a crisis, in a desperate attempt to stun the United States before the U.S. military wipes out China’s offensive forces.

If China were poised to overrun East Asia, it might make sense for the United States to risk major war to check Chinese expansion. My study, however, shows that China is incapable of going on an Imperial Japan-style rampage across East Asia. The stakes for the United States in a war between China and its neighbors, therefore, would be moderate, and the main danger would be doing too much rather than too little. Instead of rushing into a war with China, the United States should pick its battles selectively, escalate gradually, and let local actors do most of the heavy lifting.
*
Michael Beckley is a fellow in the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Tufts University. This draws from his study “The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China’s Neighbors Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion,” published in the Fall 2017 issue of International Security.**

 

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http://www.reuters.com/article/us-m...-islamic-state-targets-in-syria-idUSKBN1DF23Y

#World News November 15, 2017 / 6:49 AM / Updated an hour ago

Russian long-range bombers strike Islamic State targets in Syria

Reuters Staff
2 Min Read

MOSCOW (Reuters) - Six Russian long-range bombers struck Islamic State targets near the town of Albu Kamal in Syria’s Deir al-Zor Province on Wednesday, the Russian Defence Ministry said in a statement.

The TU-22M3 bombers took off from bases in Russia and overflew Iran and Iraq before launching the strike, it said.

The ministry said the planes had bombed Islamic State supply depots, militants, and armored vehicles and that satellite and drone surveillance had confirmed that all of the designated targets had been destroyed.

It said Sukhoi-30SM fighter jets, based at the Hmeymim air base in Syria used by Russian forces, had escorted the bombers while they were in Syrian air space and that all the bombers had safely returned to their bases.

Russia on Tuesday accused the United States of providing de-facto cover for Islamic State units in Syria and of only pretending to fight terrorism in the Middle East.

Specifically, the Russian Defence Ministry said the U.S. air force had tried to hinder Russian strikes on Islamic State militants around Albu Kamal.

Asked about the Russian allegations, Colonel Ryan Dillon, a spokesman for the U.S.-led coalition fighting Islamic State, said:

“The Russian ministry of defense statements are about as accurate as their air campaign and I think that is a reason for them to start, you know, coming out with their latest barrage of lies.”

Writing by Denis Pinchuk; Editing by Andrew Osborn

 

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http://www.defenseone.com/business/...uclear-weapons-faster/142551/?oref=d-topstory

US Air Force Wants to Get New Nuclear Weapons Faster

Just months into the first development contracts, the service’s top general is looking for ways to speed things up.

BY MARCUS WEISGERBER
READ BIO
NOVEMBER 15, 2017

KIRTLAND AIR FORCE BASE, N.M.— Design work is barely underway for the U.S. Air Force’s new ICBMs and nuclear cruise missiles, and already the service’s top general is looking for ways to speed up the process.

Less than three months after the Pentagon awarded contracts to begin designing crucial cutting-edge components for the proposed weapons, Gen. David Goldfein said he’s “comfortable with the technology I’m seeing,” but “not as comfortable with the schedule.” The new ICBMs and cruise missile are expected to be battle-ready in the late 2020s — if Congress and the White House approve the acquisitions, whose cost is expected to approach $100 billion.

“My sense is that we’re in a good place right now in terms of how we’re working with industry going forward,” the Air Force chief of staff said in an interview. “The question I’ll continue to have is: How to I move it left. How do we get this capability earlier. Because if you can actually get it faster, you can get it cheaper sometimes.”

In August, the Air Force chose Boeing and Northrop Grumman to work on the new ICBM, a project called the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent. It is meant to replace the Minuteman IIIs that sit ready in silos spread across Montana, Wyoming, and North Dakota.

Over the next three years, the two companies will collectively build about 20 different prototypes of components for the new ICBM, according to officials at the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center here who are overseeing the project. The Air Force will then evaluate the two firms’ work and — and, if Congress and the Pentagon give the go-ahead — choose one of them to build more than 400 new ICBMs.

When Goldfein asked officials here whether it would be possible to speed things up, Maj. Gen. Shaun Morris, the commander of the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, said, “We’re looking at that.”

As for the new cruise missile — called the Long-Range Standoff weapon — the Air Force has hired Lockheed Martin and Raytheon to develop technology and make parts over the next five years before choosing a winner. The missile is intended to replace the Air-Launched Cruise Missile, which is carried by the B-52 bomber.

Goldfein said the fundamental role of the two new nuclear weapons will not change significantly from their predecessors.

“What changes is the operating environment that they’re going to execute their missions in,” he said.

The Long-Range Standoff is being designed to fly in an anti-access, area-denial environment, the military term for a region where an enemy has air defenses that can detect, shoot down or electronically jam non-stealthy aircraft and weapons.

As for the new ICBM, it “will operate in an environment where cyber vulnerabilities are different than what the Minuteman faced [and] has far more congestion in space than what Minuteman faced,” Goldfein said.

Then there’s the cost. Just last month, the Congressional Budget Office said it could cost $1.2 trillion to operate, maintain and upgrade the Pentagon’s nuclear forces over the next 30 years. That includes buying new stealth bombers, Navy submarines, and command-and-control infrastructure. The Pentagon has said the new ICBM could cost $85 billion. The Air Force is planning to buy about 1,000 new nuclear cruise missile, estimating a price tag of about $10 billion. Experts have questioned whether all of the new weapons are affordable.

The size of the nuclear force and new types of new nuclear weapons are being looked at as the Trump administration conducts a Nuclear Posture Review, which is expected to wrap up as soon as next month or early next year.

Marcus Weisgerber is the global business editor for Defense One, where he writes about the intersection of business and national security. He has been covering defense and national security issues for more than a decade, previously as Pentagon correspondent for Defense News and chief editor of ... FULL BIO

 

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https://breakingdefense.com/2017/11/the-new-u-s-nuclear-triad-will-be-a-bargain/

The New U.S. Nuclear Triad Will Be A Bargain

By REBECCAH HEINRICHS
on November 14, 2017 at 11:20 AM
37 Comments

Is America’s nuclear arsenal too expensive? The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released a report that concludes the Trump Administration’s plans to operate, sustain and recapitalize the aging U.S. nuclear arsenal over 30 years would cost the American people $1.2 trillion in constant dollars.

The report explains ways in which delaying or cancelling the recapitalization of parts of the triad would provide “savings,” including for the land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) leg. The report claims that by delaying the new system, the Ground-based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), and once again refurbishing the 1970s-vintage Minuteman III ICBM, taxpayers would “save” $17 billion through 2046. The report also notes that such a delay would only push the costs of the new ICBM out beyond 2046, requiring Americans to pay $42 billion to make up for the deferred modernization of our land-based missiles.

Members of Congress should not be intimidated by these numbers. They are right to stick with the modernization plan laid out by the Obama Administration and supported in the Trump Administration’s budget for two important reasons. One, nuclear deterrence is the nation’s primary security guarantee in this increasingly complex threat environment, and the current plan will still be more cost effective than alternative ones.

There is broad bi-partisan consensus that nuclear deterrence remains the foremost priority for the Pentagon. Defense Secretary James Mattis said: “One thing’s for certain, the number one priority of the Department of Defense is that we maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent so we make certain those weapons are never used.” Similarly, Defense Secretary Ash Carter said, “America’s nuclear deterrent is the bedrock of our security. While this mission isn’t in the headlines every day, as I see it, we’re in real trouble if it ever is. It remains the highest priority of the Department of Defense.” A reliable and flexible, and therefore credible deterrent requires us to modernize the triad.

The threats facing the United States and U.S. allies today are varied and complex. Great powers are establishing patterns of provocations and demonstrating a willingness to violate international treaties and agreements. Rogue nations with penchants for proliferation have chemical and biological weapons and are pursuing or testing nuclear weapons. Allies on the doorstep of these strategic threats need constant reassurance of the U.S. commitment to the nuclear umbrella.

Following plans developed during the Bush Administration, and supported by Congress, the Obama Administration moved forward with programs for new air and sea-based legs of the nuclear triad in the form of the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine and the B-21 Raider long-range strike bomber. It also proposed replacement of the obsolescent Minuteman ICBM with the GBSD. In its fiscal 2018 budget request, the Trump Administration increased funding for GBSD, which is often referred to as the backbone of the U.S. triad.

Secretary Mattis has emphasized the need for GBSD and has warned about the dangers of failing to fully resource this key component of the strategic deterrent force. However, since the CBO, think tanks, and former government officials have questioned the priority and funding for GBSD, it’s worth reiterating why this specific program is so important to the overall deterrence mission.

The United States currently has 400 Minuteman III ICBMs in silos spread across five states. A key value of America’s ICBM force is its contribution to nuclear stability — the sheer number of missile silos makes it impossible for a nuclear adversary to believe it can carry out a pre-emptive strike against them that will successfully destroy the land-based leg of the triad. Without the ICBM force, however, even small states might be more tempted to consider attempting to disarm the United States by hitting a handful of targets: bomber bases and two nuclear missile submarine ports. The ICBMs are critical to maintaining stability in nuclear deterrence.

To be fully functional, this system requires more than just missiles. As the only leg of the triad on constant alert, the system is composed of launch facilities, sophisticated guidance systems and secure command, control, and communications. Originally fielded in the 1960s and 1970s, these systems have been the subject of multiple “service life extension programs” (SLEPs) to keep them operational – if not fully up to date with current technologies.

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) called for an Air Force Analysis of Alternatives on modernizing the current ICBM fleet. It concluded that developing and fielding a new missile, replacing the obsolescent Minuteman was a prudent path for both strategic and cost reasons.

Cancelling the program entirely or attempting one more time to stretch the service life of the Minuteman are (and should remain) non-starters. Thus, the central issue is continuing the GBSD program of record on schedule or imposing a costly delay. But suggestions supporting that delay by positing that only 400 ICBMs are needed, or that the current inventory can be extended by reducing the number of test each year, are wrong.

First, strategic planners are using 450 missiles as the requirement for the GBSD, one missile for each existing silo. While it is true that under the New START treaty, the United States has capped the fielded ICBM force at 400 missiles, nothing in that Treaty precludes the United States from adjusting the weapons system mix within the triad. Moreover, under current testing schedules, the United States will drop below 450 missiles around 2028. To maintain the 450 threshold, the United States would need to produce new missiles before the dip.

Trying to extend the ICBM inventory over the years by reducing the number of tests per by extending the GBSD program’s timeline by a few years is risky. The Air Force has been asking for more tests, returning to a rate of seven per year, rather than the current four. Indeed, the longer the service life of the Minuteman III is extended – the older the missiles get – the more frequently they will need to be tested. If a program delay were to be considered, it would have to be coupled with an increased number of tests, not fewer.

Far from delaying it, the United States should accelerate GBSD. The objective of deterrence should drive the budget, not the other way around—and the strategy underwriting those objectives includes the prompt modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad. In view of this, $1.2 trillion, or roughly 6 percent of the entire defense budget, to operate, sustain, and recapitalize the nuclear deterrent is a bargain, and one Americans should eagerly accept.

Rebeccah Heinrichs, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, is an expert in nuclear deterrence and missile defense. You can follow Rebeccah on Twitter at @RLHeinrichs

 

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https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/zapad-2017-an-early-assessment/

Zapad 2017: an early assessment

15 Nov 2017|Christian Novak

At a time when NATO–Russia relations are arguably at their lowest ebb since NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, major military exercises are designed to send a message. Russia’s Zapad 2017 military manoeuvres, which took place from 14 to 20 September in Belarus, parts of Western Russia, and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, proved to be no different. The secrecy that cloaked this year’s Zapad not only made the manoeuvres appear more threatening, but highlighted once again the competing values that have long plagued NATO–Russia relations.

Moscow sought to calm its neighbours, calling the war games that pitted Russian and Belarussian forces against fictional Western nations ‘absolutely defensive in nature’. In the words of Russian deputy defence minister Alexander Fomin, the primary aim was to practice combatting ‘terrorism’—featuring a scenario that simulated repelling a terrorist attack on Belarus.

Ukraine, and the NATO members that share a border with Belarus—namely, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia—saw the muscular posturing differently. There were fears that Russia wouldn’t withdraw its troops from Belarus, or that the manoeuvres could be used as a smokescreen to assault neighbouring countries—especially Ukraine.

Zapad 2017 didn’t come close to delivering the alarmist scenarios some media outlets offered, but it’s worth studying because of what it reveals about Moscow’s thinking.

Over the past decade, Russia has demonstrated a willingness to break the OSCE’s (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s) Charter of Paris and its guiding principles for the post–Cold War period; that is, respecting a country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and the inviolability of its borders. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, annexation of Crimea in 2014, and ongoing involvement in the Donbass brazenly violated those norms.

While all nations have the right to exercise their forces, there’s an expectation that those within the OSCE zone will adhere to the organisation’s confidence- and security-building measures. Under the OSCE’s 2011 Vienna document—which is a political agreement, not an international treaty—countries must provide six weeks’ notice for drills that involve more than 9,000 troops. For exercises involving 13,000 troops or more, they’re obliged to invite other OSCE countries to send observers. As one of the cornerstones of the Cold War security order, the agreement is designed to reduce the risk of misunderstandings that could lead to conflict.

To avoid extensive foreign monitoring, Russia declared the participation of just 12,700 troops. There’s enough open-source information, however, to conclude that the overall number of troops reached approximately 48,000. This isn’t the first time that Moscow has been accused of being ‘economical with the truth’. It increasingly takes advantage of the loophole under paragraph 10.3.3—a category not subject to the notification requirement—by conducting unannounced ‘snap’ exercises involving up to 100,000 troops. Between 2013 and 2017, Russia is said to have held 43 of these exercises.

Indeed, the Kremlin’s lack of transparency is at the heart of a much broader clash over the orientation of the post-Soviet states. As researchers from the Brookings Institution (PDF) explain, one of the fundamental points of contestation between the West and Russia centres on the status of countries like Belarus that were once Soviet republics. The West views them as sovereign nations, free to join Western institutions if they please, while Russia considers them part of its exclusive sphere of influence.

Ever since Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the government has put together a narrative to downplay the real cost of Western sanctions—insisting that isolation is actually good for Russia. Despite the Kremlin’s desire to reassert influence over its neighbours, it’s unlikely to reconstitute the Soviet Union anytime soon: the reality is that the Russian economy can no longer subsidise the former Soviet states. What the Kremlin wants instead is to deny its close neighbours the freedom to choose their own foreign-policy course.

The key purpose of Zapad, Emily Ferris writes in Foreign Affairs, ‘was for Russia to remind Belarus who the senior partner in the bilateral relationship is’. In purely strategic terms, Belarus is critical to Russia: the country’s pipelines carry a large chunk of the oil and gas that Russia sells to Western Europe. Because it is almost entirely dependent on subsidised Russian crude for its two oil refineries, Belarus is deep in Moscow’s orbit. Moscow, in turn, has used those subsidies to bolster its political influence. But with Moscow cutting its oil deliveries, and forcing Minsk to pay its debts, the relationship between Vladimir Putin and Belorussian president Alexander Lukashenko has come under increased strain.

Minsk may well be overdependent (PDF) on Russia financially, but its state institutions and foreign policy are not. For the country’s elites, the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine raised fears that Belarus could someday be next. Since then, maintaining Belarus’ sovereignty has become a much more prominent part of Lukashenko’s foreign-policy agenda. On the war in Ukraine, the president has carved out a neutral stance, insisting that he would never allow Belarus to be used as a springboard to attack another state. And, more recently, he even rebuked Russian calls to establish a new air base on Belarussian territory.

In the current geopolitical environment, the Zapad exercises demonstrated the level of distrust that exists between Moscow and NATO members. The necessity of strengthening the Vienna document is beyond question, but the Kremlin still refuses to modernise the agreement. Until such steps are taken—which would go a long way to reassuring its neighbours—it appears that Russia is intent on turning the clock back to a time when great powers decided the fate of smaller nations and Europe was divided into spheres of influence.

AUTHOR
Christian Novak is a research assistant in the University of Sydney’s Department of Government and International Relations. Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

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https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/low-yield-nuclear-weapons-worth-new-look/

LOW-YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE WORTH A NEW LOOK

JOHN R. HARVEY
NOVEMBER 10, 2017

In the 2010 review of U.S. nuclear posture, President Barack Obama’s administration, based on advice from military commanders and the extant global threat environment, concluded that the United States could ensure effective nuclear deterrence without fielding new nuclear warheads or warheads with new military capabilities. But even while foreclosing such options for the Obama administration, the 2010 review made clear, as did the nuclear posture reviews of the two previous administrations, that the nation must retain a capability to develop and field such warheads if they are required in the future.

Recently, a Defense Science Board report has caused a bit of a dustup in national security circles. Among other things, it calls for exploration of nuclear warheads with less explosive force — in the range of a few kilotons compared to the multi-hundred kiloton warheads prevalent in today’s arsenal. This recommendation is controversial in part because some see it as a repudiation of Obama’s position. It has emerged from a realization that the global threat environment has evolved significantly since the 2010 review.

Since then, Russia has rejected the post-Cold War order as reflected by its illegal annexation of Crimea and efforts to destabilize other sovereign states. President Vladimir Putin has not subjected Ukraine to an all-out armored assault as the Soviets did in Hungary in 1956. Rather, he has sought to achieve his political ends by introducing covert forces employing so-called “gray operations” to incite or amplify instabilities and insurgencies among fringe elements in Eastern Ukraine. That, and the progress that North Korea’s rogue regime has achieved in its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, suggests that future major conflict involving the United States and its allies could play out very differently than previously thought.

This is not the Cold War scenario involving a massive global nuclear exchange. Rather, in a conventional conflict, an adversary could resort to limited nuclear use as part of a strategy to maximize gains or minimize losses. Some call this an “escalate to win” strategy. Limited use could be intended to consolidate territorial gains from an initial conventional attack by making it more difficult for the United States to come to the defense of allies. Or it could be intended to end a losing conflict short of regime demise. The Trump administration’s ongoing review of U.S. nuclear posture should explore options, including low-yield warheads, to counter this strategy.

Opponents argue that low-yield nuclear weapons blur the line between conventional and nuclear warfare, undermining deterrence by lowering the nuclear threshold and making nuclear war more likely. This assertion is not based in fact. In previous decades, the United States had thousands more tactical warheads than today, many with much lower yields. (By 1991, nearly all of these warheads had been retired from service and were subsequently dismantled.) The warheads were deployed at the height of the Cold War but never used even in intense regional conflicts such as Vietnam where U.S. use posed little risk of a nuclear response from Russia or China. There is no evidence that the mere possession of these weapons during the Cold War made the United States more likely to use them. Rather, these weapons were never used because nuclear deterrence worked.

Critics also argue that low-yield warheads are for warfighting, not deterrence, and once any nuclear weapon is used, escalation to a global holocaust cannot be controlled. Sen. Dianne Feinstein, responding to the Defense Science Board’s report on low-yield nuclear weapons, argued, “There’s one role — and only one role — for nuclear weapons, and that’s deterrence. We cannot, must not, will not ever countenance their actual use.”

Her statement, while well-meaning, reflects a fundamental misunderstanding. Deterrence is based on the enemy’s belief that the United States has both the capability and the will to employ nuclear weapons in extremis when vital national interests are threatened. A “threat to use” has, therefore, always been a part of the deterrence equation that has prevented any use of nuclear weapons for over 70 years.

Would an initial limited nuclear exchange escalate uncontrollably? Many Americans, including some in the nuclear policy community, believe that it would. If our nuclear-armed adversaries shared this belief, then it might not be necessary to consider low-yield nuclear weapons since the fear of all-out nuclear war would deter all parties from even limited use. Several, however, including Russia, as seen in recent doctrinal changes, modernization efforts and military exercises related to limited-use options, seem to believe that nuclear escalation could indeed be controlled.

Policymakers like Feinstein must remember that it is not what the United States believes that matters for deterrence — after all, we are not deterring ourselves. It is all about what the adversary believes. Exploration of low-yield options, therefore, is about deterrence, not warfighting. Only with a failure to deter, because a potential response is not credible, does U.S. nuclear use come into play.

To deter limited nuclear use, the United States should ensure a nuclear posture, declaratory policy, and set of flexible capabilities to convey to adversaries that no advantage, only unacceptable consequences, would result. What adversaries do or do not consider a credible response will always be uncertain. Consider, however, a hypothetical Russian low-yield strike on a European port that killed few but seriously disrupted U.S. plans to reinforce a Baltic ally under assault. Would the Russians believe that the United States would retaliate with multi-hundred kiloton warheads, creating the potential for substantial casualties? Would U.S. response be more credible if it had a broader spectrum of nuclear strike options?

As a result of such concerns, the United States has retained a few hundred low-yield B61 bombs for delivery on strategic bombers and NATO fighter aircraft. Ongoing modernization programs involving the B61, the new cruise missile, the B-21 bomber, and F-35 nuclear capability will preserve such options for the future.

U.S. strategic land- and sea-based ballistic missiles, however, do not have low-yield warheads. If they did, the United States could strike anywhere in the world, with greatly reduced unintended casualties, within tens of minutes of a president’s decision. This capability could be achieved with a small, relatively low-cost modification to existing warheads without requiring underground nuclear tests. It would help deter aggression by adversaries, for instance, by allowing the United States to place at risk, once located, mobile command posts highly valued by enemy leaders.

Finally, it’s critical that the United States assure allies of its commitment to come to their defense, including with nuclear weapons. Like deterrence, assurance is in the eye of the beholder and allies today are ever more mindful of the dynamic threats in their regions. Some, like South Korea, have shown interest in exploring an increased U.S. regional nuclear presence — potentially, because of collateral damage concerns, involving lower-yield warheads.

The nuclear reviews of the three previous administrations concluded that force numbers and capabilities mattered and that these could be adjusted as adversary behaviors, target sets, and employment doctrines evolved. As part of its ongoing review of U.S. nuclear posture, the Trump team, unburdened by myths and fallacies, should explore options to strengthen deterrence and assurance, including fielding a low-yield warhead for strategic ballistic missiles.


Prior to retiring from government service in 2013, Dr. John R. Harvey held senior positions in the Departments of Defense and Energy overseeing U.S. nuclear weapons programs serving, in his last assignment, as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2...ail&utm_term=0_694f73a8dc-43a9a696fa-81835773

Army Chief: The US Needs More Troops in*Europe

The U.S. is "on track," but additional armored forces, long-range artillery and bridging capabilities would help deter Russia, Milley says.

By Caroline Houck
Staff Correspondent
Read bio
November 15, 2017

In order for the U.S. military to do its primary job in Europe — deter Russian aggression — America will need to send more troops there in the coming years, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley said*today.

Big moves would depend upon decisions made in the forthcoming National Defense Strategy, he said, but a more immediate “slight increase in the size of the force” would help reduce risk and reassure allies on the other side of the*Atlantic.

“We, the Army, think that additional capability is probably needed, in combination with our NATO allies, to ensure deterrence of further Russian territorial aggression,” Milley told a group of defense reporters Wednesday*morning.

In 2016, the U.S. had more than 62,000 troops in Europe, according to calculations by the Pew Research Center — down from a quarter-million in the 1970s. This year, the U.S. sent 1,000 troops to Poland to lead the multinational battle group there as part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, which was launched in response to the Russian annexation of Crimea. There are mixed views about how much EFP contributes to NATO’s deterrent*posture.

In order for the U.S. military to do its primary job in Europe — deter Russian aggression — America will need to send more troops there in the coming years, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley said*today.

Big moves would depend upon decisions made in the forthcoming National Defense Strategy, he said, but a more immediate “slight increase in the size of the force” would help reduce risk and reassure allies on the other side of the*Atlantic.

“We, the Army, think that additional capability is probably needed, in combination with our NATO allies, to ensure deterrence of further Russian territorial aggression,” Milley told a group of defense reporters Wednesday*morning.

In 2016, the U.S. had more than 62,000 troops in Europe, according to calculations by the Pew Research Center — down from a quarter-million in the 1970s. This year, the U.S. sent 1,000 troops to Poland to lead the multinational battle group there as part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, which was launched in response to the Russian annexation of Crimea. There are mixed views about how much EFP contributes to NATO’s deterrent*posture.

That funding to keep the Army brigades deployed and exercising with the EFP “needs to keep coming,” but as the Pentagon drafts a new plan for the European theater, there’s an opportunity to look at a wider array of capabilities, said Magnus Nordenman, an expert on transatlantic security with the Atlantic*Council.

“There’s a growing recognition that the air and maritime domains need some attention too, whether it’s in the Baltic Sea or the north Atlantic or what have you,” he said. “I think there’s a bit of a better balance between the domains; it’s something future iterations of the EDI should take into*account.”

On the Army side, Milley already has a list of capabilities he says the U.S. should consider adding: “A slight increase in some ground maneuver — heavy, armored forces, because they’re best used in that physical environment. And bridging, some long-range artillery and some additional aviation and perhaps some additional ballistic missile*defense.”

But the list could be much longer than that if the other domains are considered. EDI funding can help with a number of them, said Jim Staviridis, a former Supreme Allied Commander at*NATO,

“In order to best deter further Russian adventurism in Europe, we need a balanced mix of all military capabilities including increased Army heavy units, increased maritime deployments to the Baltic and Black Seas, joint NATO air patrols over NATO borders, and more attention to the Arctic, where Russian military activity is increasing dramatically,” Staviridis said. “EDI can help with all of*that.”

Caroline Houck is a staff correspondent at Defense One. She previously was an Atlantic Media fellow. Full bio

Comments

TDog • 11 hours ago
The US needs more troops in Europe?
And pray tell, where are the people going to come from? Retention is already a problem as is recruitment. Needing more and getting more are two different things.
We could always reinstate the draft, but that would mean most Americans would finally actually care about what wars this nations fights...
... and we can't have that, now can we?

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FedUpWithWelfareStates • an hour ago
No, we do not!
The EU is developing their OWN Army, so time to cut Europe loose & remove ALL of OUR troops...

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Goose64 • 2 hours ago
I served in Germany with the Army from 1988-1991 up until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Sounds like we're going to have to get the band back together again!....where's Jake? where's Elwood? I still have my old BDU's in the closet.....

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[Housecarl]

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https://www.yahoo.com/news/iran-russia-turkey-leaders-hold-syria-summit-next-204848510.html

Iran, Russia, Turkey leaders to hold Syria summit next week

AFP • November 16, 2017

Ankara (AFP) - Russian President Vladimir Putin will next week host Turkish and Iranian counterparts Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Hassan Rouhani for summit talks on Syria, officials from Turkey and Russia said Thursday.

With the violence in Syria diminishing but still no political solution in sight, the three presidents will meet at Putin's official residence in the Black Sea resort of Sochi on November 22.

The meeting -- the first such summit between the trio -- comes as Ankara, Moscow and Tehran cooperate with increasing intensity on ending the more than six-year civil war in Syria.

They are sponsoring peace talks in the Kazakh capital Astana and also implementing a plan for de-escalation zones in key flashpoint areas of Syria.

Turkey's presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin said that the three leaders would discuss progress in reducing the violence in Syria and ensuring humanitarian aid goes to those in need.

Describing Iran, Russia and Turkey as the three "guarantor" countries, he said the talks would look at what they could do for a lasting political solution in Syria.

Turkey's top diplomat Mevlut Cavusoglu said the foreign ministers of the three countries would meet in the southern Turkish city of Antalya by the end of the week.

Confirming the summit, Putin's spokesman Dmitry Peskov said it was just these three countries who were the "guarantors of the process of political settlement and stability and security that we see now in Syria".

There was no immediate comment from Tehran.

- 'Six meetings in one year' -

The cooperation comes despite Turkey still officially being on an opposite side of the Syria conflict from Russia and Iran.

Russia, along with Iran, is the key backer of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Moscow's military intervention inside Syria is widely seen as tipping the balance in the conflict.

Turkey, however, has backed the rebels seeking Assad's ouster in a conflict that has left more than 330,000 dead.

But Russia and Turkey have been working together since a 2016 reconciliation deal ended a crisis caused by the shooting down of a Russian warplane over Syria.

In recent months, Turkey has markedly toned down its criticism of the Assad regime and focused on opposing Syrian Kurdish militia seen by Ankara as a terror group.

According to the Anadolu news agency, Putin and Erdogan have already met five times this year and spoken by telephone 13 times.

Erdogan last met Putin for talks in Sochi only days ago on November 13, agreeing on the need to boost elements for a lasting settlement.

Turkey earlier this month said Russia had decided to postpone a planned Syria peace conference with all parties after Ankara objected to the potential inclusion of Kurdish forces.

Moscow denied this was the case, saying a date for the conference had never been set. Peskov told reporters in Moscow that the date for the "Congress of Syrian National Dialogue" had yet to be fixed.

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[Housecarl]

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https://www.yahoo.com/news/thousands-more-us-troops-arrive-afghanistan-general-212604860.html

Thousands more US troops arrive in Afghanistan: general

AFP • November 16, 2017

Washington (AFP) - Approximately 3,000 additional American troops have now deployed to Afghanistan under President Donald Trump's revised strategy for the war-torn country, the Pentagon said Thursday.

The Pentagon had previously put the number of US forces in Afghanistan at about 11,000 but Trump in August authorized an increase requested by the commander on the ground, General John Nicholson.

"We've just completed a force flow into Afghanistan," Joint Staff Director Lieutenant General Kenneth McKenzie told Pentagon reporters.

"The new number for Afghanistan is now approximately 14,000. Might be a little above that, might be a little below that as we flex according to the mission."

The extra troops will help train and advise Afghan security forces, who are struggling to beat back a resurgent Taliban.

Nicholson has said he needs nearly 16,000 troops overall in Afghanistan, and NATO nations have pledged to help make up the difference.

Aside from additional troops, Trump's plan also comprises an open-ended US troop presence in Afghanistan, where his predecessor Barack Obama had ordered a calendar-based draw-down of American forces.

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[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

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http://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-america-topples-north-korea-iran-what-happens-next-23236

If America Topples North Korea and Iran, What Happens Next?

Just say no to regime change. It hasn't worked in the past and it won't now.

George Perkovich
November 16, 2017

On October 19, National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster declared that President Donald Trump was not going to accept the North Korean regime threatening the United States with a nuclear weapon. “He just won’t accept it,” McMaster reported. “There are those who have said, ‘What about accept and deter?’ Well, accept and deter is unacceptable.” McMaster was speaking at a conference organized by the Foundation for the Defense for Democracies—a small but influential Washington think tank. Its leaders advocated the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and now provide intellectual fuel for McMaster, CIA Director Mike Pompeo, and others, such as the Wall Street Journal editorial board, which called for “The Regime Change Solution in Korea.”

Regime change also motivates neoconservative efforts to “renegotiate” the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—a deal struck by the United States, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom in 2015 to keep Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. President Trump announced on October 13 that he would no longer certify that the deal is in the national-security interests of the United States. Congress, by law, now has until mid-December to decide whether and how to respond. Republican Sen. Tom Cotton has taken the lead in designing a more coercive approach in order “to get a better deal.” Cotton has said that if tougher sanctions don’t work, they “will at least buy time for more devastating military action.” The threat, he says, “is not the nature of Iran’s weapons; it’s the nature of Iran’s regime.”

Removing hostile regimes, including by means of military action, is the logical solution if one concludes that a “rogue state” cannot be deterred. This thinking drove the George W. Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq. Many champions of that operation have now reemerged within the Trump administration and on its friendly periphery. North Korea and Iran are the two remaining members of President Bush’s “Axis of Evil.”

The predilection to vanquish the North Korean and Iranian governments may or may not lead to war. But, the perception that the United States is seeking the removal of North Korea’s and Iran’s governments certainly has perverse effects that remain underappreciated and underdebated in Washington and the country at large, notwithstanding the Iraq experience.

History shows that threatening authoritarian governments does not compel them to stop building nuclear weapons and missile systems. Rather, it spurs them to speed the development of these weapons in order to deter foreign attacks and subversion. Close observers of North Korea conclude that threats from the United States hasten North Korea’s development and testing of both nuclear warheads and missiles of ever longer range. North Koreans say that Libya’s Muammar el-Qaddafi would not have met his ignominious defeat and death in 2011 had he not given up his nuclear program in 2003. (Gaddafi, in fact, had no significant nuclear capability; what matters here are the perceptions of the North Koreans). The legendary Indian general, Krishnaswamy Sundarji, famously quipped that the lesson of the 1990 war in Iraq was: “If you are going to fight the United States, you better have nuclear weapons.”

Nearly all American and international experts on North Korea have concluded that it is impossible to compel the Kim Jong-un dictatorship to give up its nuclear arsenal, but that it is possible to deter the regime from committing aggression against South Korea or the United States. North Korea’s regime threatens its neighbors, commits “unspeakable brutality against its own people,” and imprisons or murders “anyone who seems to oppose that regime,” as Lt. General McMaster says. Stalin’s Soviet Union and Mao’s China did all of these things—killing tens of millions of their own people—yet nuclear deterrence worked against those leaders and their successors.

The MIT scholar of deterrence, Barry Posen, cites one of the larger contradictions that dooms the regime change approach: “Kim cannot be both so irrational that he cannot be deterred in general, and so rational that he could be deterred after having been attacked by the United States.” Similarly, if Iran’s leadership is as determined to acquire nuclear weapons and then more aggressively project violence throughout the Middle East, as many in Washington assert, why would Tehran be willing to negotiate more stringent constraints on its nuclear program and other activities? And why would Iranian leaders do this when Washington has lost the backing of Europe, Russia, China and other major international powers that will not support further sanctions and military action against Iran?

President Trump is right that the governments of North Korea and Iran repress their people and menace their neighbors. Their societies and the world would be better off if these countries had benign leaders. But history shows that it is one thing to remove a hostile government and an entirely more difficult project to shape what replaces it.

Fourteen years ago, the United States invaded Iraq, removing Saddam Hussein and the Baathist regime in the name of countering proliferation of “weapons of mass destruction.” What came after that regime change has been disastrous in many ways. The Communist regime of the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, due to internal failings and inability to sustain an over-militarized empire. Much good resulted from this. Yet, twenty-five years later, Russia is run by, and for, the “strong men” of the former Soviet deep state and their associates. These men brandish nuclear weapons as proudly and menacingly as their predecessors did. This summer, exiled Russian chess master Gary Kasparov reflected on the United States’ ongoing struggle over the changes wrought by the Civil War: “We learned in Russia that tearing down monuments isn’t enough. Those who would rebuild them must also be removed.” Lasting, healthy regime change usually occurs slowly and organically from within a country.

Even if Washington could directly or indirectly cause the toppling of despised governments in North Korea and Iran, what would happen next? Would the dysfunction in the executive branch and Congress magically end so that the United States would provide the long-term resources and guidance necessary to enable North Korean and Iranian societies to fare better than Iraqis and Afghans have since 2001? Lamentably and dangerously, the confusions and contradictions of the regime changers are barely recognized and debated in the United States today. As we near the precipice of what could be nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula, it is hard to see what could be more urgent.

George Perkovich is the Olivier and Nomellini Chair and vice president for studies of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.