WAR 10-29-2016-to-11-04-2016_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

(239) 10-08-2016-to-10-14-2016_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...14-2016_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(240) 10-15-2016-to-10-21-2016_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
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(241) 10-22-2016-to-10-28-2016_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...28-2016_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.voanews.com/a/allies-resist-us-plan-to-attack-raqqa/3570491.html

Allies Resist US Plan to Attack Raqqa

October 28, 2016 6:38 PM
Jamie Dettmer

A proposed U.S.-backed offensive on the Islamic State terror group’s Syrian stronghold of Raqqa is encountering problems, because Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan insists the Syrian-Kurdish YPG — the only militia currently up to the task — can play no part.

America’s European allies also are raising objections and expressing strong skepticism about any major role for the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, or YPG. They fear that having the Kurds in the vanguard of an assault on Raqqa, historically a predominantly Arab city, would fuel sectarian rivalries.

Speaking to the news channel France 24, Britain’s defense secretary, Michael Fallon, warned that using anything but an Arab force would court rejection by the Sunni Arab residents of Raqqa. He said the liberation of the city would have to be done by an “essentially Arab” force.

“Otherwise,” he warned, “the liberation is not going to be welcomed by the people of Raqqa” and would worsen tensions between Arabs and Kurds.

U.S. officials are eager to liberate Raqqa sooner rather than later because they fear IS is planning to prolong its already stiff defense of the Iraqi city of Mosul by sending reinforcements from Raqqa — something it may already be doing.

Earlier this week, U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter called for a simultaneous attack on IS’ self-styled capital of Raqqa alongside the push, started more than a week ago, to retake Mosul.

“We want to see an isolation operation begin around Raqqa as soon as possible,” Carter said during a visit to the Iraqi city of Irbil. “We are working with our partners there [in Syria] to do just that.”

Two fronts

In the runup to the launch of the assault on Mosul, some U.S. officials and analysts argued that to speed up the end of the jihadist caliphate, a better strategy would be to attack Raqqa and Mosul at the same time, forcing an already stretched terror group to fight off two major assaults on different fronts.

“I think Raqqa is more important to IS than Mosul is, because of how central Raqqa is to the group’s administration of its declining state,” Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington-based research group, told VOA before the Mosul assault unfolded.

Control of Raqqa and its surrounding province has supplied IS with considerable revenue, from the sale of oil from nearby oil fields and cash the group demanded from the Assad government in Damascus for the electricity generated by the Euphrates and Ba’ath dams.

Only in recent days have U.S. officials started to talk publicly about a Raqqa assault being unleashed within weeks. But as with the planning for the Mosul offensive, with Raqqa, U.S. officials are faced with a host of problems as they try to discipline unruly alliances of local sectarian rivals that mistrust each other and fear they will be outmaneuvered and weakened for what may follow the defeat of IS.

Turkey’s Erdogan has said he told U.S. President Barack Obama in a phone call to exclude the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its militia, the YPG, from the proposed Raqqa offensive.

“We do not need terrorist organizations like the PYD and YPG in the Raqqa operation. Let us work together to sweep Daesh [the Arabic acronym for IS ] from Raqqa, I told him,” Erdogan said.

In a written statement after the phone call, Turkish officials said the two leaders agreed to support the territorial integrity and independence of a post-Assad Syria.

Assad first, IS second

Ankara fears the Kurds are planning to fashion an independent state in northern Syria running along the border with Turkey and sees the PYD as an extension of Turkey’s outlawed separatist group, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, with which it is locked in a vicious conflict in southeastern Turkey.

But without the YPG, it is unclear who could muster a strong enough assault on Raqqa to recapture it from the jihadists.

Since the YPG’s successful 2014-15 defense of the border town of Kobane from IS, Washington has considered the YPG its most reliable ground ally against the jihadists. But backing the Syrian Kurds has damaged Washington’s relations with both Ankara and the mainly Sunni Arab Syrian rebel militias that have battled to oust President Bashar al-Assad for more than five years. Arab insurgents see Assad as their main enemy and IS as a secondary foe that can be defeated once Assad has been driven from power.

Syrian rebel militias have clashed with YPG forces, which took the opportunity to seize traditionally Arab towns north of the city of Aleppo during a Russian-backed Assad offensive last February. Both Kurdish-dominated forces and Syrian rebels backed by Turkey are converging on al-Bab, northeast of Aleppo, in a race to take the town from IS.

Speaking in Ankara to the families of veterans, Erdogan reiterated his determination to maintain the push toward al-Bab. After that, he said, the rebels, with Turkish air, artillery and special forces support, would turn their attention to Raqqa.

“I had a long conversation with Mr. Obama last night and I told him that we’ll take these steps,” he said.

But it remains unclear whether Syrian rebel militias want, at this stage, to be drawn into what would be a prolonged and bloody fight over Raqqa. Rebel commanders working with the Turks told VOA that after al-Bab they want to bolster their comrades in the besieged city of Aleppo, where insurgents Friday announced they were mounting a new offensive to try to break a months-long siege by Assad’s forces, their second bid to do so.

The Turkish and American defense ministers, Fikri Isik and Carter, met in Brussels Thursday on the sidelines of a NATO meeting to discuss the anti-IS battles in Iraq and Syria. Isik told reporters that Ankara was pressing the U.S. to drop the PYD and to embrace the Free Syrian Army as the local force to liberate Raqqa.

“We will be insistent on this issue up to the end,” he said.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://thediplomat.com/2016/10/vietnams-military-modernization/

Vietnam's Military Modernization

After extraordinary growth in military hardware, Vietnam is consolidating its new gains.

By Zachary Abuza and Nguyen Nhat Anh
October 28, 2016

In the past 10 years, there has been a fundamental shift in the capabilities of the Vietnam People’s Army (VPA), which for the first time has the ability to project power and defend maritime interests.* No country in Southeast Asia has put more military hardware online in the same*period of time as Vietnam. This military modernization has been driven almost exclusively by the threat posed by China over territory in the contested South China Sea.*

What we are seeing now is Vietnam entering a period of consolidation and gradually improved capability, and the gradual development of doctrine. Vietnam has many of the assets in place, but so far, no doctrine in a real sense (beyond “people’s war”) or any sense of cross-service jointness. The groundwork is laid for further military development.

Budget

Vietnam’s publicly released defense budget (its official budget is a state secret) has grown from $1.3 billion in 2006 to $4.6 billion in 2015, a 258 percent increase. In local currency, the budget increased from VND*20.5 trillion in 2006 to nearly VND 100 trillion in 2015, a 381 percent increase, but reflective of the dong’s decline in value. In 2015, according to SIPRI, Vietnam’s defense expenditures were the fourth largest in Southeast Asia, behind only Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand; all wealthier or significantly larger economies. It was the first year that Vietnam’s spending surpassed Malaysia’s. The defense budget is an estimated $5 billion in 2016, and it is expected to grow to $6 billion by 2020. This, however, is clearly an underestimation and does not include portions of the budget for R&D that may be in other ministerial lines, or from*revenue generated from defense-owned industries, especially VietTel, the largest internet and cell phone provider in the country.

http://thediplomat.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/thediplomat_2016-10-27_15-09-40-790x441.jpg

In terms of share of government spending in 2015, Vietnam’s defense spending was 8.3 percent, the third highest share in ASEAN after Singapore (16 percent) and Myanmar (13.3 percent), though just below the ASEAN average. Its lowest rate of spending in the decade from*2006-2015 was in 2013 at only 7.1 percent of government spending. Over the decade, it has averaged 7.67 percent.

http://thediplomat.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/thediplomat_2016-10-27_15-09-41-790x556.jpg

Yet, on a per capita basis, Vietnam’s defense spending is quite modest. In 2015, per capita expenditure was only $49 per person, well below the ASEAN average of $388 per person. Even if you removed Singapore, which skews the data, Vietnam still falls well short of the average of $200 per person. Vietnam’s per capita defense spending is the fifth highest in ASEAN, but only above poorer countries: the Philippines, Indonesia, Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia. Nonetheless, between 2006-2015, Vietnam saw a 300 percent increase in per capita spending.

In the period of 2011 to 2015, Vietnam was the 8th largest importer of weaponry in the world, a 699 percent increase from 2006-2010, when it was the 43rd largest. Vietnam accounted for over a third of total ASEAN arms imports in 2015.

http://thediplomat.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/thediplomat_2016-10-27_15-09-38-768x834.jpg

Although the leadership is committed to rapidly modernizing its military, defense spending has been prudent and linked to economic performance. Defense spending was only 2.3 percent of GDP in 2015, slightly ahead of inflation. This figure has been very constant over the past decade. There have been very steady budget increases on an annual basis, but still a similar percent of GDP persists, and the budget is tied to Vietnam’s fast growing economy, which has made the VPA a key stakeholder in Vietnam’s economic development.

Defense White Paper

Vietnam’s last white paper was released in 2009, their third. The VPA was reportedly drafting a new version in mid-2015, but suspended the process until after the quinquennial congress of the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) in January 2016. It was expected that the new leadership would add their imprimatur to the document and that it would be released in mid 2016; but as of the time of writing, there is no discussion of it in the official media. This is most likely due to the fact that VCP General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong was re-elected in January 2016, but was expected to remain in his post for only a half term. As such, political jockeying is already underway, including some high level purges, trials, and crackdowns on dissent.

There are several other reasons to explain the delay. The first is the July 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) on the suit filed by the Philippines challenging China’s territorial claims and nine-dash*line in the South China Sea. Though the PCA’s ruling in most ways benefits Vietnam more than any other country, Hanoi has been silent on the ruling, and has still not released a formal response. Hanoi is clearly alarmed at the inconsistent statements and policies of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, who has sought to distance the Philippines from its traditional ally the United States, and who has pledged to not press China with the PCA ruling, instead calling it a “piece of paper with four corners” and accepting China’s historical rights to the waters.

Second, despite the newly acquired defense platforms, it is evident that Vietnam still has not developed doctrines that reflect these newly acquired capabilities. Doctrine has not even begun to keep pace with acquisition. As such, Vietnam has a patchwork of capabilities, without any integrated or joint defense doctrine. That being said, there have been several joint exercises among the branches in the last few years, such as a combined arms exercise between the air force, armored units, and infantry in 2014, or an undated recent joint marine-air force amphibious landing exercise, which involved amphibious armored vehicles attacking from tank landing ships (LSTs) and marines descending from Vietnam People’s Army Air Force (VPAAF) helicopters. Thus, jointness is increasingly emphasized in the VPA, but a full doctrine has yet to be announced or seen. More importantly, the air force and navy are not independent services, and at the end of they day they are commanded by army generals. There are no signs that this is going to change any time soon.

Third, Vietnam has been repeatedly caught flat-footed in responding to China’s multilayered operations in the South China Sea, including operations of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, People’s Liberation Army Air Force, Chinese Coast Guard, and its increasingly networked maritime militia. While Vietnam has built one of the largest*coast guard forces in the region (much bigger than those of the Philippines, Indonesia, or Malaysia), it has been unable to stop China’s construction of artificial islands and fishing in the disputed region. While the Vietnamese are*aware that this is happening, their existing military doctrine remains too rigid, unable to respond in kind, or incapable of utilizing assets in creative and effective ways.

Navy

No service has benefitted more from modernization than the Vietnam People’s Army Navy (VPAN). Vietnam has acquired six Russian-built Kilo-class submarines, five of which have been delivered, and the sixth will arrive in early 2017. That gives Vietnam the most advanced submarine fleet in the region. Vietnam has already trained nine*of 12 submarine crews and at least one submarine is currently patrolling without its Russian trainers and advisers. Vietnam surprised many when it successfully purchased submarine-launched Klub anti-shore missiles from Russia.

Yet most evidence, to date, is that the ships are spending most of their training time on the surface, with only occasional dives, rather than prolonged underwater training missions.

Vietnam acquired two Gepard-class frigates in 2011, its largest and most modern surface warfare ships. Two more are currently under construction, to*be delivered late 2016 or early 2017; these will be equipped with advanced anti-submarine warfare capabilities. A third pair is currently being negotiated.

Vietnam acquired two fast Molniya missile attack crafts from Russia. More importantly, it purchased the production license for six more that have already been built, and is currently negotiating the license to build four more. The new Molniya-class will have additional capabilities, including being armed with Klub ship-to-shore missiles, in addition to the existing Uran anti-ship missile. These will give Vietnam the ability to target any facilities China has constructed in the Spratly or Paracel Islands.

India provided a $500 million line of credit to Vietnam for the acquisition of Indian defense systems during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Hanoi in September 2016. There has been no information on exactly how that fund will be used, aside from*$99 million allocated*to produce an undisclosed number of patrol craft for Vietnam’s coast guard, including the license for Vietnam to begin local production. Vietnam*may also move*toward the acquisition of the BrahMos anti-ship missile (discussed below), though no agreement was reached during Indian Minister of Defense Manohar Parrikar’s visit to Hanoi in June 2016.

Vietnam is also trying to acquire niche capabilities to make up for shortfalls in its existing arsenal. One example*is the Italian Pluto Plus mine-identification unmanned underwater vehicle, which was revealed in May 2016. It will assist Soviet 1960s Yurka minesweepers currently, but at the very end of their service life, with the VPAN. This acquisition also shows the VPA’s penchant for integrating older Russian systems with new Western weapons and equipment, and for looking westward for new purchases when it needs to. That being said, the skeleton of the VPA’s armory remains Russian, now and at least in the near future. And attempts at integrating Western and Soviet/Russian platforms have historically not gone well.

In sum, Vietnam’s naval developments to date have been impressive. Between 2011 and 2015, naval vessels accounted for 44 percent of defense imports. We expect in the coming years for Vietnam to continue with this trajectory, though at a slower rate as the new focus will be on the ground force. Maritime acquisitions will continue, yet the navy remains a small service arm that is unlikely to grow significantly.

Air Force

Vietnam’s maritime power projection capabilities have not been matched in the air. With extremely costly platforms, Vietnam has lagged in training and maintenance. In 2016 alone, Vietnam suffered the losses of four aircraft (a Su-30MK2 multirole fighter, a CASA 212 patrol/transport turboprop, an L-39 training jet, and an EC-130 helicopter) from its small fleet, killing 13 personnel.

Between 1994-1996 Vietnam acquired a full regiment of Su-27s from Russia. Though it suffered only one loss, they are nearing the end of the airframe lifespans. There are reports that Vietnam is currently overhauling the fleet, both airframes and avionics, to extend their lifespan.

From 2003-2016, Vietnam acquired 36 Su-30s, or three regiments. At least three regiments, one each of Su-27s, Su-30s, and L-39s, are not complete due to crashes and maintenance issues.

Vietnam is currently deliberating the replacement for its large fleet of 1960s era MiG-21s (144) and even the Su-22s, although the latter are still in service. The per-unit cost of modern fourth generation fighters precludes a one-to-one replacement for these aircraft. Vietnam is currently exploring the purchase of the French Rafale and Swedish Gripen (also in the Thai inventory). Though there have been press reports that Vietnam is considering the U.S. F-16 as a possible contender, this is highly unlikely due to U.S. concerns over technology transfer to third parties, as well as Vietnam’s apprehension about purchasing second-hand equipment.

With the lifting of the U.S. arms embargo, further speculation fell on the Vietnamese acquisition of advanced maritime surveillance aircraft from the United States. The VPA sent a team to Hawaii in April 2016 to observe the P-3C in action. Though Vietnam enjoys some high level Congressional support for arms sales, it is unlikely that they will receive approval for new and advanced P-3s, having to settle instead for used aircraft from either the United States or, more likely, Japan. While there are suggestions that Japan, having failed in its bid to sell its Soryu-class submarines to Australia, is keen to enter the global arms market with its Kawasaki P1 maritime surveillance aircraft, it is simply too expensive for Vietnam.

Other than combat aircraft, in 2014, Vietnam also purchased DHC-6 maritime patrol planes from Canada as well as several Casa C-295 military cargo planes from EADS to replace its aging fleet of Soviet An-26s.

The VPAAF also has requirements for additional helicopters. While there are a couple of military helicopter transportation regiments, most of the newest helicopters are assigned to the Ministry of National Defense’s 18th*Corps, or the Vietnam Helicopter Corporation. It is equipped with aircraft*such as the AgustaWestland AW-189, Eurocopter Super Puma and EC-225, and Russian Mi-171. During peacetime, these are used for economic purposes such as VIP transportation or HADR missions. Should war come, the VPA has suggested that the 18th*Corps will be converted into two attack helicopter regiments. This would greatly augment the VPAAF rotary wing force and its close air support capability.

In sum, while strides*have been made and will be made in the near future, air force modernization is falling short compared to naval modernization. Between 2011-15, air acquisitions accounted for 37 percent of total imports, not far below the navy’s 44 percent, which has seen far more hardware brought on line. The costs of the platforms, training, and maintenance have made the high accident rates unsustainable.

Ground Forces

The VPA dominates Vietnam’s defense in manpower, though the size of the force has gradually been cut. It remains wedded to its long history and doctrine of people’s warfare. As such, it has lagged behind in modernization. However, General Vo Van Tuan, VPA vice chief of staff, recently announced that ground force modernization will be the next focus of defense modernization. Under the current defense law, the size of the VPA’s ground forces should be kept at or near the current level.

A main focus is the armored force. Vietnam has already purchased the KZKT-7428 heavy tank tractor from Russia in preparation for the arrival of a new main battle tank and recently the head of the Russian tank producer Uralvagonzavod revealed that Hanoi is currently negotiating with them for the purchase of modern T-90MS tanks, with the final numbers of tanks and price not yet concluded. Yet, due to the price, Vietnam is unlikely to replace its huge corps of T-55 tanks on a one-to-one basis.* As such it is aiming to upgrade its T-55 with a new fire control system and additional armor so as to be more capable in modern warfare.

Vietnam is also studying the French 155 mm CAESAR artillery system. A French website said that Nexter, the producer of CAESAR artillery system, revealed that Vietnam has ordered*18 such systems, of a total 108. This has not been verified. Acquiring a 155 mm-caliber system means moving away from the Soviet 152 mm system, and if the acquisition is true, it presents another challenge and strain for the VPA logistic branch.

The ground force also needs new Infantry Fighting Vehicles and Armored Personnel Carriers, as its arsenal mostly consists of the 1960-era BTR-60s and BMP-1s. However, it needs to compete with the Marine Corps for the funding for this upgrade, as the Marines are also relying heavily on outdated BMP-1s and PT-76s and also need new amphibious IFVs and APCs. It is possible that the ground force has to contend with updates for its vehicles, while the Marines are slated for new ones; the latter has been featured in state media recently, training for island recapture and amphibious landing using APCs and amphibious tanks, showing their importance.

Vietnam has made significant investments in modernizing its small arms for its ground forces. Vietnam has purchased the Galil assault rifle from Israel for general issue for its ground forces, while acquiring Tavor assault rifles, Negev machine guns, and Galatz sniper rifles for the Marine Corps. Vietnam has obtained a production license for the Galil family of weaponry and*is now indigenously producing NATO ammunition (NATO 5.56×45) for them.

While the ground force remains the most favored and politically influential of the service arms, to date the Navy and the Air Force have seen far greater investment in their modernization due to their pertinence to*the South China Sea dispute. The issue for ground force modernization is of course resources. The numbers of pieces of equipment in block modernization programs are enormous. Yet Vietnamese military planners remain concerned about Chinese PLA modernization and ability to make swift small-scale incursions, unlike their costly, large-scale 1978-79 invasion.

Missiles

While most of the attention in the western media has focused on Vietnam’s new maritime capabilities, it is actually their missile force that probably gives Chinese defense planners the greatest cause for alarm. Vietnam has recently negotiated on purchasing advanced hypersonic BrahMos cruise missiles from India/Russia, as well as submarine- and ship-launched Klub missiles to target Chinese facilities in the Spratlys and Paracels. China clearly has lobbied Russia to block the sale of the BrahMos missiles, but it appears that the deal is proceeding.

Vietnam is also in possession of Scud surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, which it imported from North Korea in the 1990s. These are currently based at Bien Hoa, and with a supposed range of 500 km, they can reach the whole of Cambodia and the westernmost Spratly islands. The chief of the artillery branch has said that in the near future, Vietnam will procure a new ballistic surface-to-surface missile, though there are other more pressing acquisitions.

Recently, SIPRI and Vietnamese state media revealed that Vietnam has acquired EXTRA and ACCULAR surface-to-surface guided rockets with extremely high accuracy, with 150 km and 40 km ranges, respectively. These are presumably based around Cam Ranh, but foreign reports have surfaced that this equipment may have been moved to Vietnamese held features in the Spratlys. The accuracy of these reports have not been confirmed, and Vietnam has denied conducting such a move. Recently, there have been articles titled “The duty of EXTRA system in protecting the sea and islands” on the Vietnamese media; yet, even with a range of 150 km and based at Cam Ranh, these systems cannot reach any disputed islands, while being stationed at Spratlys will help Vietnam threaten any Chinese installation nearby. The system adds another layer to Vietnam’s coastal defenses.

Currently, Vietnam is fielding three coastal defense missile units: one in Hai Phong, equipped with the Redut system with a range of 460 km (to counter any Chinese efforts to blockade the Gulf of Tonkin using the Hainan Island bases); one in Da Nang, with the Rubezh system and 80 km range; and the most modern one in Ninh Thuan, just south of Cam Ranh, with the Russian-built Bastion-P system and a 300 km range. A fourth unit is being built at Phu Yen, north of Cam Ranh; it is very probable that this regiment will also be equipped with the Bastion-P system, or maybe even a BrahMos system. The new regiment will cover the last unprotected coastal stretch of Central Vietnam, as well as providing additional protection for Cam Ranh Bay, where the most costly and modern VPAN assets are based.

Vietnam has also acquired a new short-medium range air defense battery from Israel, the SPYDER system. These serve to augment the long range S-300 and the older short-range S-125 and Strela-10 systems that Vietnam currently fields. The SPYDER are positioned close to Hanoi, providing another layer of air defense for the capital. At present, Vietnam has only acquired one regiment from Israel, but news articles say that they want at least four regiments to be deployed across the country. This is a major acquisition from Israel, a country with whom Vietnam hopes to increase defense cooperation.

ISR

Despite the rapid acquisition of kinetic assets, Vietnam’s ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities are relatively poor. It has repeatedly been surprised by Chinese operations in the South China Sea.

Vietnam recently acquired the Coast Watcher 100 Long Range Coastal Surveillance Radar from France, which provides over the horizon surveillance of up to 170 km and can detect approaching ships in all weather. It can also detect low-flying threats such as helicopters. This system is positioned in the Spratlys,*where it*allows Vietnam to have a full surveillance and detection in the islands.

Vietnamese media revealed that Vietnam has purchased a Japanese ASNARO-2 Earth Observation Satellite. It is capable of taking high resolution pictures at night and in cloudy conditions, and can be used for military purposes. The results from this satellite, coupled with access to an Indian satellite following a 2016 agreement to place a satellite tracking and imaging center in Vietnam, will offer the VPA unprecedented tracking capability in the South China Sea. It is expected that ASNARO-2 will be launched in 2017.

VietTel, the VPA-owned telecommunication company, already produces warning radars to support anti-air missile batteries and recently developed a new C4ISR system for the VPA. It has developed several small UAVs and is aiming to manufacture a high-altitude long-endurance drone with Belorussian cooperation. The UAV HS-6L, unveiled in December 2015, has an endurance of 35 hours and a range of 4,000 km and will greatly increase Vietnam ISR capability over the South China Sea. Vietnam is also leasing a Heron long-endurance UAV from Israel, and is clearly seeking to gain technology transfer. These will further support Vietnam’s effort to track new development in the South China Sea.

Conclusion

Vietnam undoubtedly has made great strides in its military and defense capability, yet it remains to be seen how they will absorb these new systems and link them all together in a credible and effective modern doctrine. Training, especially on incorporating and operating new weapon systems, also needs to be improved. Nevertheless, the large investment over the past couple of decades has given the VPA great potential. How defense planners harness these capabilities*and fulfill that potential remains an open question. The forthcoming defense white paper should present crucial details on how the VPA views its roles and responsibilities.

For the near future, we can expect to see more new weaponry and equipment, such as armored vehicles and artillery systems, be purchased and developed for ground forces. However, modernization for the Navy and the Air Force will not slow down much: new surface ships are being negotiated and self-produced, and a new lightweight fighter jet will be chosen. Maritime and aerial capabilities will continue to be augmented, as well as ISR, due to urgent needs in the South China Sea.

But in the final analysis, we still do not know what Vietnam’s current defense strategy is, beyond fielding a minimal credible deterrent. At present the current strategy seems to be simply to sow seeds of concern in the eyes of Chinese military planners. But with the asymmetry in Chinese defense spending, that approach*might not be sustainable.

Zachary Abuza, PhD, is a Professor at the National War College where he specializes in Southeast Asian security issues. The views expressed here are his own, and not the views of the Department of Defense or National War College. Follow him on Twitter @ZachAbuza.

Nguyen Nhat Anh is a graduate of the University of Texas at Dallas, where he focused on International Political Economy. You can follow him on Twitter @anhnnguyen93.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-taiz-idUSKCN12T0EF

World News | Sat Oct 29, 2016 | 10:40am EDT

Air strike kills 17 in Yemen, exiled president rejects peace plan

At least 17 civilians were killed in Yemen's southwestern province of Taiz on Saturday by a Saudi-led coalition air strike that struck a house, local officials and residents said.

The raid targeted a house in the al-Salw district, the sources said, an area of Taiz where Houthi rebels and government forces backed by the coalition are fighting for control. Taiz is Yemen's third largest city with an estimated pre-war population of 300,000.

The Saudi-led coalition has been fighting Houthi rebels and forces loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, who hold much of the north of Yemen including the capital Sanaa, since March 2015 to try to restore the internationally recognized President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi to power.

The exiled Hadi on Saturday rejected a U.N. peace proposal to end the turmoil saying the deal would only be a path to more war and destruction.

Speaking after meeting U.N. envoy Ismail Ould Cheickh Ahmed in Riyadh, Hadi said the agreement would "reward the rebels and penalize the Yemeni people and legitimacy," according to the government-controlled Saba news agency.

According to a copy of the proposal seen by Reuters, the plan would sideline Hadi and set up a government of less divisive figures.

The deal would involve removing Hadi's powerful vice president, Ali Mushin al-Ahmar Ahmar from power and Hadi agreeing to become little more than a figurehead after a Houthi withdrawal from the capital Sanaa.

Hadi fled the armed advance of the Iranian-allied Houthi movement in March 2015 and has been a guest of neighboring Saudi Arabia ever since.

A U.N. Security Council resolution a month later recognized him as the legitimate head of state and called on the Houthis to disarm and quit Yemen's main cities. But the Houthis and their allies in Yemen's army have said he will never return.

The conflict in Yemen has killed at least 10,000 people and unleashed one of the world's worst humanitarian crises.

(Reporting by Mohammed Ghobari; Writing by Maha El Dahan; editing by Richard Balmforth)

Related Coverage
Bomb-laden car explodes near central bank in Yemen's Aden: sources

 

[Housecarl]

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Posted for fair use.....
https://sputniknews.com/military/201610291046868761-hypersonic-warhead-sarmat-missile/

'Object 4202': New Russian Hypersonic Warhead to Be Coupled With Sarmat ICBM

© Sputnik/ Ildus Gilyazutdinov
Military & Intelligence
13:45 29.10.2016

The Russian military has successfully tested a new hypersonic weapon, currently known as "object 4202." Defense analyst Victor Litovkin told Radio Sputnik that the cutting-edge warhead is expected to be fitted onto the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).

"This was the second test of hypersonic warheads for the Sarmat. The first was carried out several months ago on the Kapustin Yar site," he said.

Litovkin explained that the latest test was conducted using the R-36 Voevoda ICBM. The Sarmat liquid-fueled, MIRV-equipped, super-heavy thermonuclear armed ICBM is meant as a replacement for the R-36 family. The first image of the new missile was unveiled earlier this month.

"Technical characteristics of the [new hypersonic weapon] are classified, but I can assume that there are up to 20 independently targetable warheads. Each of them has its own flight program. They fly like cruise missiles but at hypersonic speeds," he detailed. "People in Siberia mistook them for meteorites."

The new Russian-made weapon is capable of accelerating to a maximum speed of 15 Mach (7 kilometers per second). It is intended for the most advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles in Moscow's arsenal. The warhead was created using solely Russian-made components, including on-board equipment, electronic components and the guidance system, an unnamed source at the Roscosmos State Corporation told Izvestiya.

Litovkin further said that "object 4202" has been in development since the Soviet era, but initial concepts and ideas were not completed before the end of the Cold War.

"The fact that all of this has been restored, that it is working is great. We are standing on the shoulders of giants. It's great that we have these founders and we can use their research to ensure national security," he said.

The defense analyst pointed out that Russia is spending ten times less that the United States on defense, including research and development.

"Nevertheless, we have produced weapons that bring the entire US missile defense system to nothing," he said. "Today we have new means of penetrating air defense complexes that we can be proud of. Not a single missile defense system [in the Pentagon's arsenal] will be able to withstand our missiles. Let Americans, if they want, throw money down the drain," he said.

Related:
Russia's 'US Missile Defense-Killing' Hypersonic Rockets Arriving Soon

US Missile Designed to Challenge Russia's Sarmat ICBM a Decade Behind Schedule

Flying High, Flying Fast: Russian Hypersonic Missile's Capabilities Revealed

Russia Among Industry Leaders Researching Materials for Hypersonic Flight


First Image of RS-28 Sarmat, Russia's Largest-Ever ICBM, Unveiled (PHOTO)Read more: https://sputniknews.com/military/201610291046868761-hypersonic-warhead-sarmat-missile/

Sarmat ICBM: 8 Megatons Flying at Hypersonic Speeds, Arriving 2 Years Ahead of ScheduleRead more: https://sputniknews.com/military/201610291046868761-hypersonic-warhead-sarmat-missile/

Report: Russia's Hypersonic 7680MPH Nuclear Glider Armed With ICBMs Almost ReadyRead more: https://sputniknews.com/military/201610291046868761-hypersonic-warhead-sarmat-missile/

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.greatfallstribune.com/st...enators-push-icbm-upgrade-malmstrom/92841464/

Senators push for ICBM upgrade at Malmstrom

FROM STAFF REPORTS
12:22 p.m. MDT October 27, 2016

Sens. Jon Tester and Steve Daines said Tuesday they are pushing the Obama administration to take steps to update the ICBM fleet at Malmstrom Air Force Base.

In a letter to President Barack Obama, they reiterated their support for the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program, which is scheduled to replace the Minuteman III fleet and provide a next-generation land component of the U.S. nuclear triad.

They said modernizing Malmstrom’s ICBM fleet is the best way to ensure that the United States maintains a safe, reliable and cost-effective deterrent that aids national security.

“Given the wide array of strategic challenges facing the United States, we believe that anything less could dramatically degrade the value of our nation’s strategic deterrent, and could unnecessarily hinder our ability to protect this nation from the growing capabilities of our adversaries,” they wrote.

As you know, the ICBM fleet remains a critical cornerstone of our nation’s nuclear triad,” they wrote. “It provides a widely dispersed target set that complicates any adversary plan to threaten the United States, and it serves as an overwhelming barrier against any aspiring nuclear power mounting a nuclear challenge to our nation,” the senators wrote.

They noted that this summer the Air Force gave Congress a cost comparison of extending life of Minutemen missiles with a Ground Based Strategic Deterrent system. They found the Ground Based system would meet requirements to maintain viability against adversaries. They also determined it was less expensive to develop a new system than to extend the life of the old.

“Therefore, GBSD would not provide the warfighter with a more capable weapons system to address both current and future threats, but it would also make sense from a taxpayer perspective,” Daines and Tester wrote.

Last month, Tester, a Democrat, and Daines, a Republican, called on both the House and Senate Armed Services Committee leadership to include ICBM modernization provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act.

In July, they urged Defense Secretary Ash Carter to advance ICBM nuclear modernization as expeditiously as possible, including taking critical steps to develop and procure the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent.

According to manufacturer Northrup Grumman, Ground Based Strategic Deterrent systems incorporate missile technologies to increase performance, security and nuclear safety while reducing life cycle costs and modernizing the infrastructure.

The company said the GBSD represents a recapitalization of the full weapons system.

Also signing the letter were North Dakota Sens. Hedi Heitkamp and John Hoven and Montana Sens. Mike Enzi and John Barrasso.

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Conflict News ‏@Conflicts 15m15 minutes ago

BREAKING: US State Department orders departure of family members of employees of US Consulate in #Istanbul, Turkey
http://pbs.twimg.com/media/Cv9nr68WcAA5RwF.jpg

Conflict News ‏@Conflicts 45m45 minutes ago

BREAKING: #ISIS claims attack outside American Embassy in Nariobi, Kenya, on Thursday - @Rita_Katz

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Conflict News ‏@Conflicts 38m38 minutes ago

GERMANY: Amaq claim that the stabbing attack in Hamburg was carried out in response to ISIS call to target nationals of coalition countries.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopo...n-mosul-falls-will-islamic-state-head-our-way

When Mosul falls, will Islamic State head to Asia?

As US-backed war machine encircles the militant group’s last bastion in Iraq, experts warn battle-hardened foreign fighters will return home to wage jihad

By Bhavan Jaipragas
30 Oct 2016
Comments 6

As Iraqi forces tighten the noose around Islamic State’s last bastion in the country, it’s tempting to hope that actions to wipe out its self-declared caliphate – one that has been characterised by rape, torture and summary beheadings – could deal the group a fatal blow.

Yet even those involved in the offensive on Mosul – described as the biggest battle in Iraq since the 2003 US invasion – acknowledge that rather than being a key step towards the total defeat of IS, it may instead lead to a shift in the theatre of conflict.

There is rising concern among regional counterterrorism officials that the US-backed war machine encircling Islamic State (IS) is inadvertently spawning a jihadist alumni network in Southeast Asia and elsewhere made up of fleeing militants seeking a safe haven in their home countries.

“The threats posed by foreign terrorist fighter returnees are real and imminent,” Jeremy Douglas, the representative for the UNODC in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, told This Week in Asia . “Increasing military pressure on [IS] in Syria and Iraq is now expected to result in more returnees including many that will want to pursue violent jihad in the region.”

Trapped Mosul residents brace themselves as Islamic State digs in for fight: ‘Anyone who flees is shot dead’

The UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) estimates there are 516 Indonesians, 100 Filipinos, 100 Malaysians and two Singaporeans fighting in Syria and Iraq. If even just a handful of these battle-hardened fighters return to home soil, they have the potential to orchestrate large scale attacks either by working in small cells or as “lone wolves”.

“We cannot underestimate the potential of returned IS fighters,” said Noor Huda Ismail, the founder of the Jakarta-based counselling group Institute for International Peace Building, who has been dubbed the “terrorist whisperer” for his efforts in deradicalising militants. “Attacks in Southeast Asia since 2002 have been linked to a single network of fighters [who have returned from Afghanistan] and Filipino Muslim rebels.”

This is not the first time the region has faced an influx of returning militants. In the late 1980s, home-grown veterans of the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan returned to take up leadership positions in the regional militant group Jemaah Islamiah. What has spooked many observers this time, however, is the difference in scale.

The UNODC’s Douglas said this generation of foreign fighters was unlike its predecessors. “The number that has travelled is much larger, is more operationally capable and they have access to resources and international criminal networks,” he said.

The Iraqi forces circling Mosul – about 30,000 soldiers, backed by Kurdish militia and US advisers – are aiming to drive out an estimated 6,000 IS insurgents from the city of 1.5 million people.

Malaysia on alert as Mosul offensive stokes fears of militant influx

French President Francois Hollande this week urged coalition partners involved in the offensive to prepare for the aftermath. “The recapture is not an end in itself…we must also be very vigilant towards the return of foreign fighters,” Hollande said in Paris on Tuesday.

“If Mosul falls, Raqqa will be [IS’] last bastion,” said Hollande, referring to the Syrian city where a further 5,000 IS fighters are thought to be holed up and where a similar US-backed liberation is expected within weeks.

The US State Department estimates the group’s total number in Iraq and Syria at between 18,000 and 22,000. Membership of the militant group, which grew out of al-Qaeda in Iraq, swelled after it seized large swathes of land in Iraq and Syria in a lightning campaign in 2014. Its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi subsequently declared the establishment of an Islamic “caliphate” and urged Muslims around the world to migrate there.

Among the Southeast Asian militants who answered the call are thought to be the Indonesians Bahrun Naim, Abu Muhammad al-Indonesi (“Bahrumsyah”), Salim Mubarok Attamimi (“Abu Jandal”) and Malaysian Muhammad Wanndy Mohamed Jedi (“Abu Hamzah”)

Zachary Abuza, a Southeast Asian security and politics expert at the National War College in Washington, said the four had “considerable influence” and posed a threat to their home regions because of their ability to inspire radicalised individuals to carry out attacks in cells or as “lone wolves”, he said.

Indonesian authorities say Naim was the mastermind behind the January gun and bomb attack in Jakarta that killed eight people and wounded dozens.

He is alleged to have direct links with a group of six Indonesian men who were planning to launch a rocket attack on Singapore’s glittering Marina Bay downtown district from a neighbouring island.

The plan was foiled after the men were arrested in a pre-dawn raid in early August.

Meanwhile, Malaysian police say Wanndy was behind the country’s first IS-linked incident – a grenade attack in June at a bar on the outskirts of the capital Kuala Lumpur. Eight people were injured.

Iraqis flee Mosul fighting, only to arrive in ‘terrible’ camps that are ill-equipped and overflowing

Andrin Raj, the Malaysia-based regional director for the International Association for Counterterrorism and Security Professionals, said a video showed Wanndy calling on supporters who couldn’t afford to travel to Syria and Iraq “to contribute to the IS cause by attacking their home countries”.

Naim, 33, has a prominent public profile because of his activities on social media.

This Week in Asia accessed a website purportedly linked to him that contained articles on bomb-making, covert online surveillance or “sniffing”, and commentaries on the state of Islamic militancy in various Asian countries. There is also an automated broadcast channel linked to him on the ultra-secure mobile messaging app Telegram.

Abuza said the web-savvy Indonesian was “key” to IS recruitment efforts in Southeast Asia. “Naim controls some of the most important social media and has been a key recruiter,” he said.

But “I would doubt that any of [the four] individuals could successfully make it back to Southeast Asia,” he said. “They clearly have significant influence and have proven able to organise or simply inspire attacks back at home. IS will demand far more attacks from its members and loyalists as it suffers on the battlefield, so these four remain very important.”

Some analysts say there is too little focus on IS threats emanating from Southeast Asian countries other than Muslim-majority Malaysia and Indonesia.

Islamic State uses British hostage John Cantlieto in video tour of Mosul

A report this week by the Jakarta-based Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict said Southeast Asian counterterrorism agencies faced a knowledge gap on IS-linked developments in the Philippines.

“The Philippines is important because as far as the ISIS leadership is concerned, it is the extension of the caliphate in the region,” the report said.

“While it has not been formally declared as a province… ISIS has endorsed an Abu Sayyaf leader Isnilon Hapilon, as emir of Southeast Asia, and Southeast Asians in Syria have pledged loyalty to him,” it said.

Abu Sayyaf – ‘bearer of the sword’ – is a southern Philippine Islamist militant group that has amassed millions of dollars from extortions, kidnappings and piracy. Its leader Hapilon has a US$5 million bounty on his head from the US State Department for the kidnappings of Americans in 2001.

Indonesia this week said some of its nationals were travelling to the Philippines to seek training with Islamic militants there.

Thanawan Klumklomchit, the UNODC’s counterterrorism programme officer in Southeast Asia, said Abu Sayyaf’s “abilities to sustain and survive military pressure will be an important factor for [IS]’s development in the region”.

This would be especially so if IS faced “a growing need to redirect its fighters, resources, and operations outside Syria and Iraq,” she said.

WATCH: How does Islamic State get its money?

In Thailand, Thanawan said there were “reports of terrorist suspects and foreign terrorist fighters using the country to disguise travel patterns and transit, and to obtain fake travel documents”.

“While the direct threat of [IS] is limited for the moment, there are concerns that [IS] propaganda may find resonance among violent extremists in the deep south,” she said.

Thailand’s deep south has long been plagued by violence from Muslim insurgents.

Joseph Parkes, Asia security analyst at risk consultancy Verisk Maplecroft, said Singapore and Malaysia stood out for their advanced efforts aimed at “preventing and minimising the impact of an attack”.

Ancient Mosul mosque demolished, the latest holy site militants have destroyed
“Both have acknowledged that attacks on their soil are a matter of when, not if,” he said.

Still, he said the region’s overall threat level should be kept in perspective.

“Support for Islamic State in much of Southeast Asia is very low, and in absolute and relative terms, far fewer citizens have travelled to fight with Islamic State from Southeast Asia than from Europe,” Parkes said.

For terrorist whisperer Noor Huda, a “hearts and minds” campaign aimed at returning foreign fighters and their families could be key to keeping that threat level in check.

He is working on a documentary that will showcase the emotional torment faced by a middle-aged Indonesian woman whose son and husband are fighting alongside IS in Syria.

An earlier documentary he made, Jihad Selfie, which features an Indonesian mother’s efforts to deter her teenage son from taking up arms for IS, received critical acclaim this year for portraying the prominent role families play in turning militants away from violence.

Why are Malaysia, Singapore nervous as Iraq looks to retake Mosul from Islamic State.

“We must counter the narrative of IS, which is attractive to the man on the street…there is a social price to terrorism.

“We cannot just leave counterterrorism to the state,” he said.

Related articles

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US has Raqqa in its cross hairs but disagreement with Turkey is delaying assault on IS capital

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My brother, the ‘Osama bin Laden of Southeast Asia’

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This is Islamic State’s instant messaging app of choice

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Why Duterte’s U.S. split could help Islamic State rise in the Philippines

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US has Raqqa in its cross hairs but disagreement with Turkey is delaying assault on IS capital

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
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http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-dismissals-idUSKBN12U04L

World News | Sun Oct 30, 2016 | 5:34pm EDT

Turkey sacks 10,000 more civil servants, shuts media in latest crackdown

By Humeyra Pamuk | ISTANBUL

Turkey said it had dismissed a further 10,000 civil servants and closed 15 more media outlets over suspected links with terrorist organizations and U.S.-based cleric Fethullah Gulen, blamed by Ankara for orchestrating a failed coup in July.

More than 100,000 people had already been sacked or suspended and 37,000 arrested since the abortive putsch in an unprecedented crackdown President Tayyip Erdogan says is crucial for wiping out the network of Gulen from the state apparatus.

Thousands more academics, teachers, health workers, prison guards and forensics experts were among the latest to be removed from their posts through two new executive decrees published on the Official Gazette late on Saturday.

Opposition parties described the move as a coup in itself. The continued crackdown has also raised concerns over the functioning of the state.

"What the government and Erdogan are doing right now is a direct coup against the rule of law and democracy," Sezgin Tanrikulu, an MP from the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), said in a Periscope broadcast posted on Twitter.

A Turkish court on Sunday formally arrested Gultan Kisanak and Firat Anli, co-mayors of the largely Kurdish southeastern city of Diyarbakir on charges of membership of a terrorist organization after five days in detention, sources said.

Earlier police used rubber pellets to break up several hundred protesters marching against their arrests. The internet has been largely down in the city for several days, witnesses said.

Turkey's southeast has been rocked by the worst violence in decades since the collapse last year of a ceasefire between the state and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), designated a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States and the European Union.

The local prosecutor had said Kisanak, a lawmaker before becoming Diyarbakir's first female mayor in 2014, and Anli had given speeches sympathetic to the PKK, called for greater political autonomy for Turkey's estimated 16 million Kurds and incited violent protests in 2014.

MISUSE

The extent of the crackdown has worried rights groups and many of Turkey's Western allies, who fear Erdogan is using the emergency rule to eradicate dissent. The government says the actions are justified given the threat to the state posed by the coup attempt, in which more than 240 people died.

The executive decrees have ordered the closure of 15 more newspapers, wires and magazines, which report from the largely Kurdish southeast, bringing the total number of media outlets and publishers closed since July to nearly 160.

Universities have also been stripped of their ability to elect their own rectors according to the decrees. Erdogan will from now on directly appoint the rectors from the candidates nominated by the High Educational Board (YOK).

Lale Karabiyik, another CHP lawmaker, said the move was a clear misuse of the emergency rule decrees and described it as a coup d'etat on higher education. Pro-Kurdish opposition said the decrees were used as tools to establish a 'one-man regime'.

The government extended the state of emergency imposed after the coup attempt for three months until mid-January. Erdogan said the authorities needed more time to wipe out the threat posed by Gulen's network as well as Kurdish militants who have waged a 32-year insurgency.

Ankara wants the United States to detain and extradite Gulen so that he can be prosecuted in Turkey on a charge that he masterminded the attempt to overthrow the government. Gulen, who has lived in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania since 1999, denies any involvement.

Speaking to reporters at a reception marking Republic Day on Saturday, Erdogan said the nation wanted the reinstatement of the death penalty, a debate which has emerged following the coup attempt, and added that delaying it would not be right.

"I believe this issue will come to the parliament," he said, and repeated that he would approve it, a move that would sink Turkey's hopes of European Union membership. Erdogan shrugged off such concerns, saying that much of the world had capital punishment.

(Additional reporting by Seyhmus Cakan in Diyarbakir; Editing by Clelia Oziel and Alexandra Hudson)

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-advance-idUSKBN12V0H5

World News | Mon Oct 31, 2016 | 4:03am EDT

Iraqi forces resume offensive towards eastern Mosul

Iraqi troops resumed on Monday a coordinated offensive towards Mosul, the last major city held by Islamic State, targeting the eastern bank of the Tigris river that divides the city, military officials said.

The army's counter-terrorism unit had paused its advance last week after it made ground quicker than forces on other fronts, to allow them to close the gap and get nearer to the city.

Iraqi security forces and Kurdish Peshmerga fighters started the offensive on Oct. 17, with air and ground support from the U.S.-led coalition against the hardline Sunni group.

Pro-Iranian Iraqi Shi'ite militias joined the fighting on Saturday, aiming to cut the route between Mosul and Raqqa, Islamic State's main stronghold in Syria.

The battle for Mosul, still home to 1.5 million residents, is shaping up to be one of the toughest in a decade of turmoil following the U.S-led invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003.

"The operation to liberate the left bank of Mosul has started," said a military statement, referring to the eastern bank of the river that flows from north to south. Another statement said five villages were taken north of Mosul, where Peshmerga fighters are also being deployed.

Islamic State militants has been fighting off the two-week offensive with suicide car bombs, snipers and mortar fire.

They have also set oil wells on fire to cover their movements and displaced thousands of civilians from villages toward Mosul, using them as human shields, U.N. officials and villagers who spoke to Reuters have said.

Worst-case United Nations forecasts see up to 1 million people being uprooted by the fighting, which U.N. aid agencies said had so far forced about 17,500 people to flee -- a figure that excludes those taken into Mosul by the retreating militants.

(Reporting by Maher Chmaytelli and Dominic Evans; editing by John Stonestreet)

 

[Housecarl]

Conflict News þ@Conflicts 38m38 minutes ago

GERMANY: Amaq claim that the stabbing attack in Hamburg was carried out in response to ISIS call to target nationals of coalition countries.

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http://www.breitbart.com/london/2016/10/31/germany-looking-claimed-link-fatal-stabbing/

Germany Looking into Claimed IS-Link after Fatal Stabbing

by Breitbart London
31 Oct 2016
Comments 10

(Reuters) – Germany is looking into a claim by Islamic State that one of its followers was responsible for a fatal stabbing in the German city of Hamburg two weeks ago in which a young couple were attacked.

A spokesman for the Federal Public Prosecutor said on Sunday investigators were checking the claim in a statement published by the militant group’s Amaq news agency over the weekend.

Video: German police hunt refugee suspected of planning bomb attack

“We are looking into this and are evaluating the credibility of the content,” the spokesman said. He noted that it appeared a bit unusual that the claim was published two weeks after the attack. “This differs somewhat from the pattern,” he said.

The Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office, which is responsible for investigating crimes concerning national security, will decide in coming days if it has grounds to take over from local authorities, he added.

In the attack, an unknown perpetrator set upon a young couple sitting under a bridge at the Alster river in central Hamburg. He stabbed the 16-year-old man repeatedly from behind and kicked his 15-year-old female companion into the river.

The stabbing victim died of his injuries shortly afterwards in hospital while the young woman managed to escape.

In its claim of responsibility, the group said: “A soldier of the Islamic State stabbed two individuals in Hamburg city on the 16th of this month. He carried out the operation in response to calls to target the citizens of coalition countries.”

A police spokeswoman in Hamburg said local investigators were checking the statement and its credibility, but she added that the claim of responsibility raised a number of questions.

“At this point, it is important to point out that the murder squad is still investigating in all directions,” she said.

In a statement issued shortly after the attack, police had said the attacker was of “southern appearance”, aged between 23 and 25 years, with stubble. They added the background of the attack was unknown.

Experts say it is not clear how close the connection is between groups and individuals proclaiming allegiance to the Islamic State militant group.

The Islamist organisation is increasingly under pressure from regional and international forces in its Middle East heartland of Syria and Iraq.

In July, the group claimed responsibility for two attacks in the German state of Bavaria – one on a train near Wuerzburg and the other at a music festival in Ansbach that wounded 20 people.

In mid-October, police arrested a Syrian refugee suspected of planning a bomb attack on an airport in Berlin. The 22-year-old man committed suicide in prison shortly after his arrest.

Officials said Jaber Albakr spoke to a member of Islamic State in Syria by telephone about a possible target a day before German police discovered explosives in his apartment.
*

 

[Housecarl]

More gasoline on the fire.....

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http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/geert-wilders-hate-speech-trial-set-begin-43187212

Geert Wilders Boycotts Start of His Hate-Speech Trial

By Mike Corder, Associated Press
AMSTERDAM — Oct 31, 2016, 6:20 AM ET

The politically charged hate-speech trial of Dutch firebrand anti-Islam lawmaker Geert Wilders got underway Monday with Wilders boycotting the opening.

Instead, his lawyer, Geert-Jan Knoops, read out a statement that the lawmaker published last Friday in which he called his case a "political trial" targeting freedom of speech.

It is not the first time Wilders, whose party is riding high in opinion polls ahead of parliamentary elections due next March, has been prosecuted. He was acquitted on hate-speech charges in 2011 after complaints about his fierce criticism of Islam.

The trial, which is scheduled to last more than three weeks, centers on comments Wilders made before and after Dutch municipal elections in 2014. At one meeting in a Hague cafe he asked supporters whether they wanted more or fewer Moroccans in the Netherlands, sparking a chant of "Fewer! Fewer! Fewer!"

"We'll take care of it," he replied, in a video recording played in court.

Reading from evidence in the case, Presiding Judge Hendrik Steenhuis cited policy workers from Wilders' populist Freedom Party as saying that the audience had been instructed beforehand how to react to Wilders' questions.

Wilders has refused to back away from the comments.

"It is my right and my duty as a politician to speak about the problems in our country," Wilders said in the statement read Monday by his lawyer.

As the trial began, Wilders tweeted: "NL has huge problem with Moroccans. To be silent about it is cowardly. Forty-three percent of Dutch want fewer Moroccans. No verdict will change that."

Wilders faces a maximum sentence of two years' imprisonment if convicted of insulting a group based on race, and inciting hatred and discrimination. However, prosecutors say courts mostly sentence people convicted of such offenses to a fine or community service order.

Prosecutor Sabina van der Kallen said she would not ask judges to order Wilders to attend the hearings as he had previously refused to answer investigators' questions.

She rejected the charge that the case is politically driven.

"The motivation of the prosecution is exclusively upholding the democratically established law, independent of politics," Van der Kallen told the court.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.eurasiareview.com/31102016-south-asian-nuclear-brinkmanship-and-recent-tensions-oped/

South Asian Nuclear Brinkmanship And Recent Tensions – OpEd

By Maimuna Ashraf
October 31, 2016

The current tensions between India and Pakistan can be easily traced back to the election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government and now accentuated after the Uri episode; an attack by the militants on the Indian military forces. The issue has become more complicated but knowing Prime Minister Modi and the kind of composition of his government, this kind of situation or deterioration between India and Pakistan could not have been ruled out.

It has been in fact the part of fluctuations that have taken place between India and Pakistan since independence. The South Asian history is interspersed with wars, conflict, crisis and disruption of diplomatic relations and dialogues between the two states, therefore the prevailing tension was quite expected. It is not a cozy situation. There is a kind of conflict growing up which if escalates, either intentionally or inadvertently, will make the situation all the more dangerous, since both India and Pakistan are nuclear weapon states. It needs to be addressed and handled with utmost care. Not just for the sake of peace and stability of both countries but also because the ramification might go beyond the South Asian region.

Regarding the Uri event, India has internationalized this event. This highlights two Indian objectives, first, to malign Pakistan in the world alleging that terrorist attack at Uri was done by Pakistan. Second, India is now trying to make a political capital of local situation and trying to project Pakistan as terrorist state which is also a general objective of Modi’s government. India tried its best to isolate Pakistan and wanted it to be declared a terrorist state at BRICS Summit but failed miserably. China stood with Pakistan and rejected Indian claims. China’s stance was correct as Pakistan remains the worst victim of terrorism despite playing a vital role in suppressing terrorism.

These escalatory trends present a dangerous situation that has the potential to spiral into a limited conventional conflict or may even inadvertently lead to a nuclear catastrophe. Without a doubt Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have maintained deterrence against India. Both the countries know that any misadventure would lead to Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Conventionally, Pakistan is still behind India; however, nuclear weapons have covered that gap to some extent. Pakistan has kept its nuclear doctrine ambiguous so that the element of surprise could be utilized. India introduced Cold-Start Doctrine in order to launch limited war against Pakistan for achieving certain specific objectives. Pakistan in response developed Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs), battlefield nuclear weapons for countering such specific strikes from the Indian side.

The most important factor that will determine the deterrence equilibrium in South Asia is the induction of new nuclear weapon system in South Asia which includes INS Arihant, submarine launched ballistic missiles and acquisition of ballistic missile defense. Pakistan is not unaware of the potential of such kind of deployments and Pakistan is also not unaware of the kind of strategic weapon system based on nuclear warheads which India is developing while Pakistan is not lagging behind in maintaining its national security based on adequate national defense and nuclear weapons capability. Pakistan’s maintenance and advancement of minimum credible deterrence at the moment is well recognized internationally which discourages India to launch a war against Pakistan. After having the full spectrum deterrence, Pakistan now has the capability to cover all kinds of threats. India has very aggressive strategic posture; it is aiming at the nuclearization of Indian Ocean and projecting military power in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. Both these water bodies have traditionally been recognized as very important waters for Pakistan’s national security and should remain a concern for Pakistani military decision makers.

Both Pakistan and India have not signed NPT and there seems less possibility for regional cooperation in the nuclear field, which is a worrisome issue. However, whenever the nuclear factor came into play it did not allow the situation to escalate into a full-fledged war. It is the space for limited war only which keeps putting deterrence stability a bit under stress. Thus the two states need to understand that the dominant thought in deterrence debate is that no nuclear power would be able to control the pace of escalation by threatening another with massive retaliation – and also hoping that it would deter a response.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

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http://www.eurasiareview.com/301020...nd-defense-relations-analysis/#comment-619914

Time To Reset Japan-Taiwan Security And Defense Relations – Analysis

By Geopolitical Monitor
October 30, 2016
By Scott N. Romaniuk and Tobias Burgers

Taiwan’s current government has both a significant and unique opportunity to reset Taiwan’s security goals and strategies: the sweeping election in May 2016 of President Tsai Ing-wen illustrated a major mandate for change from the Taiwanese population. For the first time in history, Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has control over both the executive and legislative branches. As such, the Tsai government has had (for nearly half-a-year) a unique opportunity, which it should use to change some of the strategic and political directions undertaken by the Ma government. In particular, the time has never been better for Tsai to reset Japan-Taiwan relations, which deteriorated significantly during eight years of the Ma Ying-jeou administration.

Both Tsai and the DPP are positioned nicely to conduct a reset and reverse the current not-so-lukewarm relations between the two states, particularly given the change in strategic partnerships taking place in Japan and Taiwan’s backyard. To be sure, the DDP has maintained positive ties with Japan’s major political party – the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) – since the 1950s. During her campaign, Tsai Ing-Wen visited Japan, met with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s brother, Nobuo Kishi, visited the family home, and rumor had it that Tsai even met with Abe himself. Albeit government-to-government politics do not solely depend on interpersonal relations between leaders, it does illustrate the close relations between the two governments. During her campaign, Tsai and the DPP manifested a clear desire to seek closer cooperation with Japan on social, economic, and security issues. The Japanese government, at the same time, was uncharacteristic in their enthusiasm for the election result: both Abe and his foreign minister, Fumio Kishida, publicly stated their satisfaction with the victory of the DPP and spoke about the desire to establish stronger ties with Taiwan. Japan increasingly sees Taiwan as a (new) security partner in the changing geopolitical landscape of East Asia and the greater Pacific region. With its proximity to China as well as the South China Sea, Taiwan could become a valuable ally in possible regional confrontation and even outright conflict. Moreover, relations between Japanese and Taiwanese society have had a long provenance, with Taiwan having been regarded as one of the few pro-Japan countries in the region.

Both states are now staring out the window of real political and social (even economic) opportunity and are well-positioned to (re-)increase diplomatic relations between both nations for years, and even decades to come. In this, an important focus – besides improving economic relations – should be made on security and defense relations, and efforts realize the establishment of a framework for constructive security and defense cooperation. In an era in which China is increasingly growing in power and determination to act globally, increasing its defense spending, and expanding its (maritime) reach beyond the first island chain, Japan and Taiwan ought to begin collaborating to, at least, provide some counterweight to China’s (unchecked) rise, thereby ensuring peace in East Asia. Indeed, such cooperation seems feasible, is well within reach, and would benefit Japan and Taiwan’s security and defense standing given that Japan has recently been undergoing rather surprising and considerable changes in its security and defense posture with striking increases in its defense spending, efforts to reinterpret the famed Article 9 so as to possess broader (military) authority, and a push to enlarge its area of strategic operations. What we can extract from this is the view that Japan is increasingly looking to become a regional security actor which aims to exercise power beyond its national borders, not unlike other states in East Asia and South East Asia.

The possibility of Japanese navy patrols in the South China Sea – the first time the Japanese navy would operate beyond its borders since its Imperial conquests prior to and during the Second World War – is just an initial indication of how, in the coming years and decades, Japan will seek to become a greater regional security actor. It should therefore become incumbent upon Taiwan to seek to benefit from this emerging attitude and establish stronger, more fruitful military-to-military relations with its neighbor. Such a relationship could be based on (further) military exchanges, joint training exercises, possible intelligence sharing and an opening of military facilities – particularly Taiwan’s naval assets – to the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF). The latter could prove particularly valuable for Japan if its forces would initiate freedom of navigation patrols in the South China Sea. If these kinds of patrols were to take place, the possibility exists for Taiwan to participate in joint patrols in addition to opening its naval facilities in the Spratly islands.

A second and further benefit for Taiwan could be found in possible cooperation between both national defense industries. In recent years, Taiwan has iterated its desire to develop a new fleet of diesel submarines, and the United States (US) has promised its support. However, in light of recent US reluctance to provide Taiwan with military hardware and knowledge, and given limited expertise the US has with building diesel submarines, Taiwan can in-turn look to the Japanese defense industry, which has extensive experience building high-class diesel submarines, and that, after its abortive-deal with Australia, could be even more interested in finding new customers. Beyond submarines, the development of Japan’s 5th generation jet – the Mitsubishi X-2 Shinshin – and Japan’s general expertise in robotics could likewise be of great utility for the Taiwan government and defense establishment. Recently it has sought to acquire block C/D upgrades for its fleet of F-16s, unsuccessfully, however, and as result it has considered developing new indigenous fighter jets. In this regard, possible defense cooperation with Japan would help in the development of new defense instruments.

We might even expect Japan to be interested in this sort of cooperation and development, or possibly even the sale of its technology, in order to decrease the ever-rising costs of its X-2 development. As Japan has hinted about its aims to sell its new 5th generation future fighter abroad, Taiwan could step into the position of acquiring its next generation of fighter jets. Likewise in the field of unmanned aerial vehicle (AUV) development, defense cooperation would benefit both nations: Japan’s expertise with advanced robotics can greatly benefit Taiwan’s development of a new generation of unmanned systems, which would be heavily dependent on advanced robotics. Taiwan has already developed UAVs of various size and capabilities, and as such in-depth experience and knowledge on the development, production, and use of these systems – something Japan only moderately possesses, and which it is actively seeking to acquire in order to produce its own domestic unmanned systems.

Beyond the conventional realm, possible defense cooperation could be extended into the cyber world as well. Taiwan possesses significant expertise and knowledge in cyber security, particularly in cyber defense, with a thorough understanding, knowledge, and expertise on China’s cyber dynamics. Here, once more, Taiwan could offer its help and establish a framework for cooperation. Such cooperation could assume many forms, ranging from information exchange, to joint cyber exercises, and even a joint cyber defensive center. Given Japan’s limited effectiveness in cyber defense, its status as a relative late-comer to the “cyber party,” and that it has sought to increase its cyber capabilities, we ought to expect that a profound interest within the Japanese government exists for cyber cooperation – on both military and civil levels. Similarly, intelligence and information on conventional Chinese military capabilities could be of interest to Japan – particularly as Japan, until recently, possessed no foreign intelligence organization, and as such limited possibilities to “spy” on China.

We argue that a distinctive window of opportunity has opened for both states, leading to greater cooperation in terms of security and defense directly, and politically, socially, and economically, indirectly. That numerous opportunities exist for possible cooperation, ranging from defense industry to intelligence to enhancing the military robustness of both nations cannot be gainsaid. In this regard, the benefit for both sides would be even more mutual as a stronger Taiwan would provide strengthening Japan with an additional but absolutely crucial new security actor, and possible aid to ebb the growing influence of China – particularly if China’s Navy, the PLA Navy (PLAN), with its burgeoning plans to take on the US, would be able to break through the first island chain in the next decade. Dynamic defense cooperation would at the same time provide Taiwan with an extra security partner, which in light of China’s ever-increasing military capabilities, its increasing and indeed negative rhetoric toward Taiwan, its behavior in the South China Sea dispute, and steady growing level of nationalism, is something Taiwan will definitely need in the future.

This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com

https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/time-to-reset-japan-taiwan-security-and-defense-relations/

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Steve Herman ‏@W7VOA 5h5 hours ago

Steve Herman Retweeted OSAC

"We urge American citizens considering travel to Constantine to review their plans." #Algeria #ISIS

Steve Herman added,

OSAC @OSACState
���� US Embassy #Algeria cancels staff travel to #Constantine for 2 weeks following terror attack, police operation. https://www.osac.gov/Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=20624 …

 

[Housecarl]

That the French Police are the ones protesting is a real "DOT"....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://en.rfi.fr/france/20161030-french-police-keep-protests-despite-250-million-euro-package

POLICE FRANCE DEMONSTRATION

French police keep up protests despite 250-million-euro package

By RFI Issued on 30-10-2016 Modified 30-10-2016 to 12:07

French police protests continued at the weekend, despite the government's announcement that 250 million euros extra would be made available to the force to buy equipment and spruce up police stations.

About 400 police officers demonstrated in the south-western city of Toulouse and about 200 in the southern port of Marseille on Saturday night.

Firefighters turned up, sirens blazing, in fire engines in Toulouse to the applause of the demonstrators.

On Friday night about 400 police officers demonstrated in Paris and other protests took place in a dozen or so cities on Thursday.

During the day on Saturday about 30 officers were called in to headquarters in Marseille for a reminder of rules that ban them from demonstrating in uniform or in police vehicles, as has been the case in nightly protests on the city's Old Port.

No disciplinary measures were to be taken, officials announced.

Government package fails to satisfy

Following more than a week of demonstrations, the government on Wednesday announced a 250-million-euro package to buy equipment, including 21,700 flak jackets capable of resisting Kalshnikov bullets, 8,000 helmets, 4,700 bullet-proof riot shields and 3,070new vehicles in 2017.

Police stations and gendarmes' barracks will also be renovated. Demostrators at the weekend complained that the measures were not enough and called for more personnel and "clear orders and consideration" from their bosses.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2016/11/01/26/0200000000AEN20161101000200315F.html

'Surgical' U.S. strike on N. Korea would lead to 'bloodbath,' war with China: expert warns

2016/11/01 02:40

WASHINGTON, Oct. 31 (Yonhap) -- A "surgical" U.S. strike aimed at preventing North Korea from perfecting its nuclear capabilities will lead to a "bloodbath" and a full-scale war as China would view such an action as unwarranted and send forces to help the communist neighbor under a defense treaty, an expert said Monday.

John Delury, an assistant professor at Seoul's Yonsei University with expertise on China, made the remark in an article carried by the website 38 North, noting that talk of a military option against the North has gained traction since Pyongyang's fifth nuclear test.

"How might Beijing react to a U.S. pre-emptive or surgical strike on the North? ... North Korea is, after all, China's only defense treaty ally in the world, and is obligated to 'immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal' to defend Pyongyang if attacked," Delury said.

The 1961 treaty, even though often trivialized by Chinese academics, remains in force, the professor said, noting that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un praised the pact as a "firm legal foundation" for the bilateral relationship in a message sent to Chinese President Xi Jinping to mark the treaty's 55th anniversary earlier this year.

"If the United States launches a pre-emptive strike not to prevent a specific, imminent missile attack, but rather to prevent North Korea from perfecting an intercontinental nuclear strike capability, it is unlikely to meet Beijing's standard for jus ad bellum (right to war)," Delury said.

"On the contrary, a strike of this nature could likely drive Beijing to side with the North in accordance with their 1961 treaty," he said. "'Surgery' would rapidly descend into a bloodbath. 'Pre-emption' would start a war."

Delury said China firmly believes that any amount of sanctions and pressure, including the use of military force, will not change Pyongyang's behavior in the way the U.S. wants.

"The firm policy of the Chinese government, supported by most foreign policy experts, is that only dialogue and negotiation can moderate North Korea's behavior, and that the best hope for long-term progress lies in the untapped potential of North Korea's economic transformation and regional integration," he said.

Engagement with the North is the best way to win Chinese cooperation, he said.

"If the next U.S. president adopts an engagement strategy, Xi Jinping's government would likely step up its own work to achieve short-term breakthroughs and long-term solutions. Paradoxically, Washington's best chance of getting China to apply constructive pressure on its errant neighbor is through a major U.S. initiative to negotiate with Kim Jong-un."

jschang@yna.co.kr

(END)

 

[Housecarl]

Talk about a reminder to the regional powers.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.janes.com/article/65051/us-navy-ballistic-missile-submarine-arrives-in-guam

US Navy ballistic missile submarine arrives in Guam

Gabriel Dominguez, London - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly
31 October 2016

USS Pennsylvania, a US Navy Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, arrived on 31 October at Apra Harbor in Guam for a scheduled port visit, according to a statement by the US Joint Region Marianas military command.

"The specific visit to Guam reflects the United States' commitment to its allies in the Indo-Asia-Pacific and complements the many exercises, training, operations, and other military co-operation activities conducted between the US and its partner nations," said the statement.

The port visit comes as North Korea's ongoing development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles threatens US allies in Asia such as Japan and South Korea.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://thediplomat.com/2016/10/indian-army-fire-assault-hits-pakistan-military-outposts/

Indian Army 'Fire Assault' Hits Pakistan Military Outposts

Tensions between India and Pakistan in Kashmir continue to intensify.

By Ankit Panda
October 31, 2016

On Saturday evening, the Indian Army’s Northern Command stated that it carried out a “massive fire assault” against Pakistani outposts across the Line of Control, the de facto border separating India-occupied and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

“Four Pak posts destroyed in massive fire assault in Keran Sector. Heavy casualties inflicted,” the Indian Army’s Northern Command noted on its official Twitter account, providing little other information.

The move was ostensibly retaliation for the killing and mutilation of an Indian solider by unknown militants, who reportedly received support from the Pakistan military.

The Pakistani side has not commented on the Indian Army’s claimed “fire assault” across the Line of Control, as of this report.

Both events underline the ongoing tensions along the Line of Control, which grew out of a volatile summer in the Kashmir Valley following the killing of Burhan Wani, a Hizbul Mujahideen leader, and exploded following a September assault by Pakistan-based militants on an Indian Army outpost in Uri. With 19 soldiers killed in that attack, the Uri attacks represented the single deadliest strike on the Indian Army in well over a decade, sparking public outcry in India and calls for retaliation.

Shortly after the Uri attacks, India staged retaliatory “surgical strikes” across the Line of Control, raising concerns of potential Pakistani retaliation or escalation. Since then, tensions have remained high, with additional militant attacks in India-occupied Kashmir, including a prolonged stand-off near Indian Army 46 Rashtriya Rifles and Border Security Force camps in Baramulla.

Saturday’s “fire assaults” on Pakistani military outposts are particularly concerning for the fragile cease-fire along the Line of Control. The Times of India reported last week, citing anonymous source, that India believes Pakistan may have activated a “Border Action Team” (BAT) to facilitate the encounter that led to the mutilation of an Indian soldier last week.

BAT infiltration across the LoC and support for militant infiltrators makes it considerably likelier that Indian retaliatory actions will begin more explicitly targeting Pakistani military outposts. India’s official statement after its “surgical strikes” sought to make it clear that the retaliation was targeted at militant “launch pads” across the LoC, but clarified that the action was not directed at the Pakistan military. The statement noted, however, that India sought to target “those who are trying to support them.”

While nothing India has done so far suggests a complete shift away from its longer term posture of “strategic restraint” vis-a-vis Pakistan, recent events along the LoC suggest that destabilizing exchanges are likely to continue, straining the ever-more-fragile cease-fire.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://warontherocks.com/2016/10/the-missing-case-for-deterrence-and-resolve-in-asia/

THE MISSING CASE FOR DETERRENCE AND RESOLVE IN ASIA

HUGH WHITE
OCTOBER 31, 2016

American defense analysts and scholars have correctly diagnosed a major problem afflicting American power, but they are perhaps too optimistic when it comes to the prognosis. Brad Glosserman and David Santoro recently exemplified this disconnect at War on the Rocks. They are right when they observe that America suffers from a deterrence deficit in Asia and Europe, and they are right about the key cause of that deficit: America’s rivals doubt its resolve. It is easy to agree that it would be good to fix this problem, but it might not be as easy to do so as the two suggest. America’s rivals may simply be right — maybe the United States is not willing to do what’s needed to resist its challengers. Certainly, no American leader has yet tried to argue convincingly that it should.

At first glance, the solution sounds simple enough. Glosserman and Santoro say that to effectively deter rivals, “the United States should show absolute determination to respond to attacks against its vital interests or those of its allies, even in the face of escalation.” But what exactly does that entail? Let us focus on the case of China.

To deter China, Washington must convince Beijing that it is willing and able to fight a war that would impose greater pain on the Chinese than they are willing to bear to achieve their goals. First, we must be clear that China’s goals are much broader than the immediate issues in contention. Disputes over the “nine dash line” or the Senkaku Islands matter to Beijing mainly as opportunities to display strength and press its claims to replace the United States as the primary power in East Asia. This is a first-order national priority seen in Beijing and beyond as essential to China’s future security, prosperity, and identity. And it is, after all, Beijing’s own backyard. That means we should expect China to be more determined to change the regional order than America is to preserve it.

This is why the timid warnings and modest diplomatic pressure applied by the Obama administration through the “pivot” have not been enough to make China back off. Glosserman and Santoro are correct that America must show more plainly that it is willing to go much further to persuade China to abandon its challenge. It must show that it is willing to go to war. But what kind of war at what level of cost must America show that it is willing to fight? Glosserman and Santoro seem optimistic that conventional conflict might be enough, particularly a large-scale conventional strike campaign. Hence, they suggest that America can do a lot to show resolve and strengthen deterrence by expanding non-nuclear strike capabilities.

It is hard to see how this optimism is justified. It overestimates how much damage can be done to a country of China’s sheer scale by even a massive campaign of conventional strikes. It underestimates the damage China would be willing to absorb rather than abandon its strategic ambitions in Asia, which remain central to how it views its place in the world. And it underestimates China’s capacity to hit back with conventional attacks of its own on U.S. forces, bases, and allies in the Western Pacific, which expanded missile defenses could at best only marginally reduce.

America today no longer has escalation dominance over China at the conventional level of conflict in the Western Pacific. That means America can no longer dissuade China from challenging the U.S. position in Asia by threatening conventional escalation alone. The oft-repeated claim that America’s growing conventional capabilities make nuclear forces less important in deterring major rivals like China is simply wrong.

On the contrary, China’s growing anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) and conventional strike forces make America more dependent than before on the threat of nuclear escalation to deter China from confronting U.S. forces. That is presumably why President Obama has again been persuaded to abstain from making a “no first use” declaration. This means America will only reliably deter China if it can convince Beijing that it is willing to start a nuclear war. And because China can retaliate with nuclear attacks on American cities, that means it must convince China that it is willing to accept the risk of massive U.S. civilian casualties.

This situation is not unprecedented. During the Cold War, America convinced both its NATO allies and Russia that it was willing to accept Soviet nuclear attacks on U.S. cities to deter the Soviets from launching a conventional war in Europe. This was never easy, as Denis Healy most famously made clear. But Healy’s clever line — that it “only takes a 5 percent credibility of American retaliation to deter an attack [from the Soviets], but it takes a 95 percent credibility to reassure the allies” — misses the essential foundation of this success. America’s Cold War threat of nuclear escalation was credible because the issue was plainly and publicly explained by U.S. leaders and evidently accepted by the majority of American voters.

The lesson for today is clear: Before the United States can convince China that America has the stomach to fight a nuclear war over the strategic future of Asia, Washington must first convince the American people. So far, no U.S. leaders have even begun to do this, which presents a stark contrast with the American nuclear deterrent during the Cold War that today’s Asia hands too often ignore. The Obama administration does not even acknowledge the existence of great power competition with China, or that China is a strategic rival to be contained, let alone argue that it might be necessary to fight a nuclear war to do so.

This is hardly surprising, as the question of how far America should be willing to go to resist China’s challenge has not been seriously addressed even in the community of Amercian strategic and foreign policy experts. By underestimating China’s resolve and power, U.S. policymakers and analysts have too readily assumed that China can be deterred and its challenge contained without America paying serious costs, so they have not considered what costs would really be worth paying.

This is the question they must now address. To put it bluntly: Is anything in Asia today worth a nuclear war with China? No one doubts that many things in Asia matter to America: preserving the rules-based order, supporting long-standing allies, protecting democracy in Taiwan, or even perpetuating U.S. leadership for its own sake. But how much do all these matter? Do they matter enough to justify what preserving them from China might cost?

The answer is far from clear. During the Cold War, stopping the Soviets seemed essential to preserving America’s way of life. But China, for all its power and ambition, is not the Soviet Union. China has no chance of dominating Eurasia and no program to rule and transform the world, so it does not threaten America the way the Soviet Union did.

A future Asia in which China plays a bigger leadership role would be an Asia without many things the United States values, but many people would argue that those things are not so valuable that we should contemplate fighting a nuclear war to preserve them. Unless U.S. leaders are willing publically to argue that such people are wrong and plainly convince a majority of Americans that America should and would be willing to fight a nuclear war to preserve U.S. leadership in Asia, Washington will not be able to convince China of its resolve and deter China from pursuing its ambitions. And it is hard to see any American leader stepping up to that task anytime soon.


Hugh White is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University in Canberra, and the author of The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power. He served for many years as a senior Australian defense official.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/tides-eddies-asia-power-shifts/

Tides and eddies of Asia power shifts

31 Oct 2016|Graeme Dobell

Image courtesy of Flickr user John Lamb.

In Asia’s slow-motion power shift, the Philippines has just lurched towards China’s orbit. Now to work out a sense of the import and meaning of the shift.

President Rodrigo Duterte goes to Beijing to declare his ‘separation’ from the US, and that he’s ‘realigned myself in your [China’s] ideological flow.’ The zero sum call is that China wins and the US loses. What, though, does this sum add up to? The scale of win and loss is in flux with a hint of farce. Duterte serves up serious stuff with scatologic sauce.

Duterte heads home from Beijing where the finessing starts: he’s not breaking off relations with the US, merely seeking a more independent foreign policy. And then the President hops on the plane and heads to Japan, announcing: ‘The alliances are alive. There should be no worry about changes of alliances.’ Initial commentary on Duterte’s separation and realigned language predicted disaster for the US, putting the pivot into a death spiral. Far too big a call, I suggest, and far too fast. Rather than the US, the big potential loser in prospect is ASEAN.

Consider the state of the race at this early stage:

-Duterte is out in front doing well, even though he’s zooming all over the track. He’s quickly changed and greatly improved the terms of the bilateral game with China. Plus, he’s having huge Trumpian fun zapping the Yanks; arguments with the great ally and former master are always intense and emotional. How could it be otherwise, given the extraordinary intimacy and history between America and the Philippines?
-China has made gains (although it can’t be sure how reliable) and Beijing is going to have to deliver for Duterte to hold its wins.
-The US has taken rhetorical bruises from Duterte but there’s some strategic upside for Washington.
-Trailing the field, facing lots of hurt, is ASEAN, suffering stress to its purpose and cohesion just from what Duterte has done so far.

The US alliance with the Philippines has faced worse and survived. In 1991, the US lost its great naval jewel, Subic Bay. At the time, that really did look like strategic disaster. The end of US access was the complicated product of a restored Philippines democracy, especially the Philippines Senate which wouldn’t endorse a new lease. The role of the broader Filipino polity, not just the president, is worth remembering. If Duterte wants to act on his big shift, he’s going to have to persuade Congress and a lot of other powerful people in Manila.

Repeat the point that the alliance continued, despite losing Subic. The US broadened its regional view, embracing the idea of ‘places not bases’. Others, particularly Singapore, stepped up to offer new places. If Duterte kicks against the pivot, the rest of Southeast Asia can lift the embrace of America.

As previously discussed, the US draws immediate benefit from the way Duterte has lowered the temperature in the South China Sea. One gain that nobody in Washington will state publicly: the US will not take strategic risks for Duterte that it would have had to contemplate for his predecessor, Benigno Aquino. Aquino’s comparison of China with Nazi Germany, warning against appeasement in the South China Sea, forced the US to ponder the danger that its weak ally could draw it into conflict with China. The US might have to fight because of bad moves by Manila.

The US alliance with the Philippines may be described as ‘iron-clad’, but using Washington argot, the alliance is not a self-licking ice-cream—policy choices are made and actions ordered. Already, Duterte has destroyed a lot of alliance capital. The weak ally has torched its leverage. What Washington will risk for the new man in Manila is heading to zero. The US has plenty of options, whatever Duterte does. For ASEAN, though, Duterte has blown up the Association’s whole script. In announcing the embrace of China, Duterte has abandoned a core ASEAN operating principle: to choose is to lose.

ASEAN’s ideal would be decades more of manoeuvring between the US and China with neither of the giants dominating. The ceaseless dance would give ASEAN plenty of diplomatic space and strategic options. ASEAN’s aim is to stay in the middle and drive regional interactions through its own creations (East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN-plus Defence Minister process), while building an ever-more central and influential ASEAN Community. An ASEAN that can’t find a middle path won’t be able to keep itself and institutions such as the EAS at the centre of the multilateral minuets. To become China’s cat’s-paw is to forgo the chance to dance.

In a sophisticated explanation of ASEAN’s aim and method in navigating between China and the US, Singapore’s ambassador-at-large, Bilahari Kausikan, said the Association must embrace ambiguity, avoid invidious choices and seek a predictable and constructive balance: ‘Not balance in its Cold War sense of being directed against one power or another, but balance conceived of as an omnidirectional state of equilibrium that will enable ASEAN to maintain the best possible relations with all the major powers and thus preserve autonomy. To choose is to compromise autonomy.’

Next year, ASEAN celebrates the 50th anniversary of its founding. And, who is chairing the Association throughout the year of this great milestone? Oh, happy day, ‘tis Rodrigo Duterte.

ASEAN has been quietly grousing that it isn’t getting enough attention or proper priority from the leader of its biggest member, Indonesia’s Joko Widodo. By comparison with Duterte, Widodo looks like the epitome of the ASEAN way. In its 50th year, ASEAN will be led by a maverick whose approach is more ASEAN wayward than ASEAN way.

AUTHOR
Graeme Dobell is the ASPI journalist fellow.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-islamic-state-putting-the-balkans-edge-18229?page=show

How Islamic State Is Putting the Balkans on Edge

The brewing climate of fear and inter-ethnic mistrust has meant national leaders have been unable, and unwilling, to coordinate counterterrorism activities.

Tej Parikh
October 30, 2016

In Europe’s fragile southeast, Islamism threatens to galvanize national rivalries and unravel two decades of cold peace.

For the largely secular, moderate and west-leaning Balkan states, where religious kinship transcends borders, violent extremism is fueling fear, ethnic tribalism and seditious security agendas. And as Islamic State group fighters disband amid the siege against Mosul, the situation only promises to escalate.

In July, footage of Islamists burning Serbian flags to the tune of pro-Bosnia music and gunshots went viral. It followed the murder of a policeman in the Republika Srpska (RS) (Bosnia’s Serbian “entity”) by a lone-wolf Islamist extremist, a similar gunning down of two Bosnian soldiers in a Sarajevo suburb, and deadly clashes between officers and alleged insurgents in Macedonia last year.

A small, yet significant, domestic radical presence, flanked by returning Islamic State fighters are carrying the threat. Salafism, an ultra-conservative strand of Sunni Islam, has been nurtured in the Balkans through Saudi-sponsored preachers, mosques and madrassas ever since the 1990s when the Bosnia and Kosovo wars first lured thousands of jihadists to the defense of fellow Muslims. Poorly governed post-communist and transitions have meanwhile left a legacy of poverty, unemployment and corruption in the former Yugoslav states, which has only pushed the disillusioned further into the path of radical cells.

It’s meant the region has been a significant exporter of fighters for Islamist groups, with official sources claiming around 900 nationals—mainly from Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania—have travelled to Iraq and Syria. But as Islamic State paralyzes in the Middle East, many combatants are slated to return home—some have already done so, aided by the smokescreen of Europe’s refugee crisis. They will possess frontline skills, sharpened ideological beliefs and a desensitization to violence that will intensify and influence the Islamist movement in their homeland.

The concern now is that extremists will conduct further attacks and drive antagonism. Some may also push overtly nationalist strategies. The video in July, which was reportedly filmed in Bosnia, follows an Islamic State propaganda film last year featuring Albanian, Kosovan and Bosnian Islamists who call for Balkan Muslims to create a regional Caliphate by inciting violence on non-believers. The lone-wolf attacks in Bosnia last year and a foiled Islamic State-linked attack in Sarajevo, planned for last New Year’s Eve, also implies a broader intent to spread panic, chaos and destruction.

The magnifying fear of Islamism in turn risks reifying divisions between, and within, the region’s Muslim- and Christian-majority nations, while uniting ethnic groups across borders. The current track record of protests, hate speech and trashing of places of worship among opposing religious groups may snowball amidst the heightened perception of extremism. This happens at a time when Islamophobia is spreading in the region, fuelled by the influx of Muslim immigrants and Islamist attacks on the continent. And it only adds to the hostile ethno-nationalist legacies of the past.

The 1992 to 1995 Bosnian civil war, which brought Bosnian Serbs, Muslims and Croats into conflict, left the status of RS as a focal point of tension between the territory’s majority Orthodox Christian Serbs and minority Bosnian Muslims (or Bosniaks). In Macedonia, the 25 percent largely Muslim ethnic Albanian population have been fighting for better representation in the majority Orthodox Christian state ever since Macedonia’s 2001 armed conflict with the National Liberation Army (NLA)—an ethnic Albanian insurgency originating from Kosovo.

Divisions have in part been stirred by nationalist leaders and the media who have manipulated the Islam and terrorism narrative for their own ends. Anti-Serbia terrorist rhetoric, and the attack in RS last year, have made Serbs in the territory increasingly concerned for their safety and suspicious of Bosniak residents. And RS President Milorad Dodik—who has long held secession ambitions—has used the fear to push away from Bosnia. “Serbs do not want to live in a community where radical Islam flourishes,” he said following the flag-burning incident.

And in Macedonia, the threat of terrorism is suspected of being exploited to detract from a government wiretapping scandal and push nationalism. After a bloody shootout between policemen and a group claiming ties to the NLA in the northern Macedonian town of Kumanovo in May last year, 29 of the alleged gunmen were arrested on contentious “terrorism-related” charges. The incident was linked to radical Islam by media and social networks, while the ongoing trial has continued to stir accusations of a state cover-up with Albania calling for an international inquiry.

Discord has also been sewn by deteriorating regional security dynamics. The brewing climate of fear and inter-ethnic mistrust has meant national leaders have been unable, and unwilling, to coordinate counterterrorism activities. In effect, unilateral actions including state-led investigations and defense exercises, have risked an unnecessary amplification of tensions.

Following the police officer’s murder in RS last year, authorities launched “Operation Ruben” which targeted Bosniaks in the entity with ties to radical Islam. Dodik has also shunned Bosnian security efforts and pushed toward Serbia, conducting a televised joint military anti-terrorist simulation in August. Meanwhile Bosnian authorities have expressed concern that the retributive measures are overly intrusive and marginalizing the Bosniak population.

A similar overspill is possible in Macedonia. “Operation Monster” a 2012 investigation targeting the Albanian community after the murder of five ethnic Macedonians by supposed Albanian fundamentalists, led to often violent demonstrations from ethnic Albanians protesting the force of the operation. It also spurred a rallying call from the NLA, highlighting just how rapidly a single event could escalate.

The growing terrorism and ethnic tension dynamic comes when post-Yugoslav settlements are already brittle, making regional cohesion particularly vulnerable to new incidents. Last month Bosnian Serbs voted in a controversial RS referendum on its national holiday, which was deemed a violation of the civil war-ending Dayton Peace Agreement as it discriminated against Bosniaks and Croats. It was also considered a test run for an independence referendum. The Ohrid Agreement, which ended the NLA insurgency in Macedonia, is also under pressure amid slow progress in promoting ethnic Albanian rights.

With the possibility of spiraling insecurity and contagion of the terror threat to western Europe, stabilizing the region is paramount. The Balkans have already played a part in Islamist attacks on the continent: sourcing the weapons used in last November’s Paris attacks, while some attackers used the so-called Balkan route to enter Europe masquerading as migrants. And so, international support to close the net on returning fighters, bolster nascent deradicalization programs and push leaders away from divisive rhetoric is vital in limiting further incidents.

Though aid for economic, democratic and civil society reforms remain relevant to boost regional prosperity and pluralism, significant immediate investment is required to ensure internal security policies are harmonized, in order to disarm the cycle of discord that terrorism can set off. Establishing a Balkans counterterrorism body would be essential to this. Nations currently lack the trust to work together and require centralized and independent mediation to coordinate arrests, monitor borders and share intelligence across ethnically divided jurisdictions. But much remains contingent on fast action, political will and overcoming a legacy of discord.

Until then, Islamist extremism will continue to embed itself into the narratives of a torn region, embroiling state leaders into a complex and increasingly fragile policy environment. And should national bonds continue to wither—terrorism will be on hand to rub salt on open wounds.

Tej Parikh is an analyst at the Nova Europa political risk consultancy. He is also a global policy analyst and journalist, and received his masters degree from Yale University with a focus on fragile states, ethnic politics and political economy. He tweets @tejparikh90.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://38north.org/2016/10/jdelury103116/

The “China Factor”

By John Delury
31 October 2016

A new round of shadowboxing appears to have begun in Washington over North Korea policy in the wake of Pyongyang’s two latest nuclear tests and unrelenting series of missile tests. For some time, the Obama administration’s policy of “strategic patience” has found few defenders apart from its architects, and there is now a general consensus that the next four to eight years will require a different approach. The North Korean nuclear threat finally has assumed the “urgency of now” in policy circles, but that is where the consensus seems to end. Observers have generally advocated one of three responses: a new strategy based on military force, an intensification of sanctions and pressure, or a return to negotiation and engagement.

There is a lot at stake in this debate. Given the upcoming presidential transition, the winning idea might actually become the basis for policy under a new administration. Indeed, favorites for senior appointments in a Clinton administration such as Kurt Campbell, Michele Flournoy and Wendy Sherman have all weighed in of late. The controversy seems have resonated less with the American public, consumed as it is by a tumultuous presidential campaign that has left very little oxygen for serious foreign policy discussion. (North Korea staged a missile test hours before the third presidential debate, yet it still didn’t earn a mention among the “foreign hot spots” addressed.)

While US officials are consulting intensely with their South Korean counterparts, not enough attention is being paid to Beijing’s perspective, even though China would figure heavily into any prospective US action toward the North. By examining Beijing’s role in each of the three main North Korea policy strategies under debate in the United States, the “China factor” emerges as a decisive one, in ways that policy makers need to weigh carefully.

The Hawks

The most remarkable new feature in the North Korea policy debate is serious contemplation of military force as the only viable option left. Such calls to arms are couched in guarded terms: no one advocates an imminent attack on the Yongbyon nuclear complex, and none dare call this approach for what it would most likely be: the start of a second Korean War. Instead, national security figures such as Mike Mullen, James Stavridis and Victor Cha suggest that a “surgical” or “pre-emptive” strike almost certainly must take place before Kim Jong Un perfects the capability to hit the US homeland with a nuclear missile. During the Obama years, military options were off the table because of the cost that Seoul would have to pay for a strike on Pyongyang. As President Obama put it to Charlie Rose, “we could obviously destroy North Korea with our arsenals but … they are right next door to our vital ally, the Republic of Korea.” But with the South Korean government indulging in extremely bellicose rhetoric, integrated into recent US-ROK joint military exercises, that restraint seems to be vanishing before our eyes.

How might Beijing react to a US pre-emptive or surgical strike on the North? The question is often evaded, perhaps because the answer makes a military solution considerably less attractive. North Korea is, after all, China’s only defense treaty ally in the world, and is obligated to “immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal” to defend Pyongyang if attacked. Their 1961 treaty is often overlooked or trivialized—occasionally by Chinese academics themselves. But the agreement remains in force, underscoring North Korea’s unique place in Chinese foreign relations. To mark the 55th anniversary of the treaty’s signing in July, Kim Jong Un sent Xi Jinping a friendly note praising the pact as a “firm legal foundation” for the bilateral relationship.

To be sure, North Korea would be on its own if it were to attack US allies or assets in the region, let alone US territory. But if the United States launches a pre-emptive strike not to prevent a specific, imminent missile attack, but rather to prevent North Korea from perfecting an intercontinental nuclear strike capability, it is unlikely to meet Beijing’s standard for jus ad bellum. On the contrary, a strike of this nature could likely drive Beijing to side with the North in accordance with their 1961 treaty. In the furious military retaliation that Pyongyang would muster after a US strike, South Korea and the United States could not count on Beijing’s support and indeed may face Chinese intervention on the peninsula, as in October 1950. “Surgery” would rapidly descend into a bloodbath. “Pre-emption” would start a war.

The “Boas”

Despite these risks, or in willful ignorance of them, the military “solution” is no longer an outlier in the US debate over North Korea policy. Still, proponents of force do not hold the mainstream position. That distinction goes to advocates of intensified economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure and hard deterrence, such as Bruce Klingner, Evans Revere and Sung-Yoon Lee and Joshua Stanton. And unlike the hawks, these “boa constrictors” place China front and center, since draconian sanctions rely almost entirely on Beijing for implementation.

The boas’ advice to our next president boils down to three simple steps.

- Early on, the President makes the case to China that it must get onboard the sanctions train. How? By appealing to Xi Jinping’s strategic good sense and apparent dislike of Kim Jong Un. By pushing ahead with theater missile defense, trilateral cooperation with South Korea and Japan, and other additions to the regional security architecture that China dislikes. By dangling the warning that if sanctions don’t work, the train’s next stop is “pre-emption.” And, last but certainly not least, by unleashing the US Treasury Department to slam Chinese firms and banks with secondary sanctions for doing business with Pyongyang.

- Treasury action shuts targeted Chinese entities out of the global financial system. To stave off systemic financial pain, Beijing and provincial governments take bold action against dozens of firms like Hongxiang Industrial. Chinese companies pull out of North Korean joint ventures and investments, and they cancel orders and contracts. Chinese banks shut down DPRK-related accounts. The Chinese government provides no aid. Before long, North Korea is facing crippling shortages in fuel and food, not to mention capital investment and banking access.

- With Kim Jong Un’s choices finally sharpened, he cries uncle and realizes he must give up his “treasured sword” of nuclear deterrence. He takes concrete dismantlement steps, declares a testing moratorium, verbally commits to complete denuclearization, and asks for resumption of the Six Party Talks on the basis of the September 19, 2005 agreement. Thanks to China’s tough love, young Kim learns his lesson: the Americans won’t reward bad behavior, they don’t talk for talk’s sake, and they won’t buy the same horse twice. Kim recognizes the fundamental contradiction in his byungjin strategy of simultaneous progress in developing nuclear weapons and the economy, and decides to abandon the former in hopes of maybe, eventually, achieving the latter.

It’s an alluring idea. There’s just one snag: even under dramatically increased financial pressure from the US government, Beijing will not sign up for comprehensive sanctions that would sever their trade and investment relationship with North Korea and, potentially, shut down their neighbor’s economy (as China’s UN Ambassador recently reminded anyone willing to listen). And Beijing’s main reason for resisting the boa constrictor plan exposes its deeper flaw—namely, the premise that the Kim regime will buckle once the pressure is strong enough.

To understand this point, it is worth stepping back to consider how Chinese and US observers look at North Korea in fundamentally divergent ways. Americans look at the North and see the Other, something irrational and evil—a crazy hereditary ruler, gulags and secret police, dirt poor and self-isolating, a whole country without electricity at night. Meanwhile, the Chinese see themselves a few decades ago, and focus on the ways in which the North is catching up, particularly under Kim Jong Un. To most Americans (including President Obama), the collapse of the DPRK is inevitable, a question of “when,” not “if.” To most Chinese experts, there is no reason why the North Korean system, just like their own, cannot last at least another 70 years.

The Chinese recognize that one of the key ingredients of North Korea’s resilience is the country’s extraordinary capacity to absorb pain. Few nation-states can “eat bitterness,” as Chinese say, like the North, as its 1990s famine tragically proved. The Chinese also believe that North Korea can undergo socioeconomic transformation, including the switch to a less hostile foreign policy, without regime change. In addition, Beijing accepts the North Koreans’ claim that insecurity in the face of US hostility is the main driver behind their nuclear program. And if Kim thinks his country needs a nuclear deterrent for the time being to fend off the overwhelming might of South Korea and the United States, he will let his people starve so the state can survive. Along the way, he will lash out violently at South Korea and perhaps even China, reminding both governments how their citizens want, more than anything else, not to have to think much about North Korea. Beijing therefore fundamentally rejects the premise that “super sanctions” can squeeze North Korea into submission.

Because the Chinese do not believe that Step 3 of the US sanctions strategy can succeed, they will push back hard at Step 1, using the economic and diplomatic leverage available to them in the US-China relationship. Does the next US president want to start a finance war with China during her first year in office over Beijing’s failure to apply sufficient economic pressure on North Korea? The boa constrictors answer a triumphant, “Yes!” But considering the severe stress it would place on Sino-US relations (jeopardizing progress on everything from climate change to bilateral investment to cybersecurity), and given the uncertainty of Kim complying even if Beijing did what we want it to do, one has to question the strategic soundness of the approach, tempting as it might sound.

The Doves

That leaves the third option: swallowing our pride, steeling our resolve and marching back into the negotiation room, as Joel Wit and Jane Harman and James Person have advocated.

Arguments in favor of bilateral talks, economic engagement and cultural exchange are unquestionably the underdogs in this debate. “Munich! Yalta!” the hawks and boas sneer, raising speculative objections that get repeated so often they have become like policy mantras: “There is nothing to discuss since Kim has already made a strategic decision to never give up his nukes. North Korea will make absurd demands, like suspending joint military exercises and discussing a peace treaty, that would undermine the security of the entire region. What’s the point of negotiations since they will cheat on their agreements anyway?” Most damning of all: “Talking to Pyongyang is de facto ‘recognition’ of their nuclear status, which is all they really want, and the one thing we can never, ever grant.”

There is no question that any direct negotiation with Pyongyang will be exhausting and at times maddening. If history is any guide, there will be setbacks, and there will be hedging (on both sides). But history also shows that progress is possible. For the next US administration, negotiating a freeze and return of inspectors is a realistic short-term goal, and the North Korean Foreign Ministry has made multiple unsuccessful attempts to get such talks going with the Obama administration. Yes, it’s true that major North Korean concessions on the nuclear program will demand security compromises by the United States and South Korea. That’s how diplomacy works, especially among parties with profound mutual hostility and distrust. But it is premature to conclude that Kim Jong Un is incapable of flexibility and pragmatism, since we have not tested him through diplomacy at a high level. As to the bogeyman that sitting down with the North Koreans is tantamount to recognition, that is, in the inimitable phrase of then-Senator John Kerry, “an extraordinary canard.” Similarly, the notion that Pyongyang is punished by our refusal to talk to them is, in the words of then-Senator Barack Obama, “ridiculous.”

Fighting for engagement and negotiation with North Korea in the US foreign policy debate is an uphill battle. But proponents of engagement have one trump card: when Washington engages, the China factor becomes an asset in dealing with North Korea, rather than a liability or roadblock. Beijing, after all, is steadfast in its strategy of engaging Pyongyang, and it is perpetually looking for US openness to negotiation. China’s security policy toward North Korea is unwavering: the goal is denuclearization, the preconditions are peace and stability, and the method is dialogue. If the next US president adopts an engagement strategy, Xi Jinping’s government would likely step up its own work to achieve short-term breakthroughs and long-term solutions. Paradoxically, Washington’s best chance of getting China to apply constructive pressure on its errant neighbor is through a major US initiative to negotiate with Kim Jong Un.

Beijing does not think any amount of sanctions and pressure, including the use of military force, will change Pyongyang’s behavior in the way Washington wants. The firm policy of the Chinese government, supported by most foreign policy experts (though not necessarily the ones most quoted by US and South Korean media), is that only dialogue and negotiation can moderate North Korea’s behavior, and that the best hope for long-term progress lies in the untapped potential of North Korea’s economic transformation and regional integration. Many South Koreans, including the leading candidates to become the next ROK president, would seem to agree.

A Hard Choice

The next US President and her core advisers will have to make their own determination whether the hawks, boas or doves have it right. No doubt there will be some combining of the three approaches, as advised by expert groups assembled by the Council on Foreign Relations and Hoover Institute and US-Korea Institute at SAIS. But a hard choice has to be made about which direction to stress in future US policy. Whatever comes after strategic patience, the “China factor” may make the difference between failure and success.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm...The author left out the "experience" gained in Ukraine as well....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/nato-russia-syria-if-fighting-breaks-out-a7387576.html

In the event of a conflict, Nato would face Russian forces re-equipped and re-trained by the Syrian war

Russia’s exercises involving huge numbers of its troops have been accompanied by intensive practice for war in Syria. This includes using as many weapons systems there as possible in order to test them

Keir Giles
Sunday 30 October 2016
82 comments

British troops are to be stationed in Estonia from May 2017, as part of a Nato plan to improve the defences of its front-line states. This is a small but essential step to discourage possible assertive moves by Russia. The geography of the Baltic means that being in place before a crisis is essential – because after it begins is too late. Russia has been practising for years at blocking access to the region, and for Nato to fight its way through to protect its allies would be vastly harder than simply being present to start with.

Local populations in the host countries are pleased to see Nato troops arrive as a concrete demonstration of commitment to their security. According to Estonia’s defence minister, British commitment to European security and collective defence feels stronger after Brexit.

Video

The international units also serve as a concrete indicator of the commitment to European security by Nato’s North American members. A change of government in Canada had led to questions over the depth of this commitment – but Canadian leadership of the battalion to be stationed in Latvia has resolved these questions.

But forward deployment also exposes UK and other Nato soldiers to a wide range of new threats and challenges. In the event of a conflict, they would face Russian forces re-equipped and re-trained based on operational experience in Ukraine and Syria. Russia’s exercises involving huge numbers of its troops have been accompanied by intensive practice for war in Syria. This includes using as many weapons systems there as possible in order to test them, even when they are not the most suitable or efficient for the job. For instance, sailing the carrier Admiral Kuznetsov to the eastern Mediterranean instead of using local airbase facilities. Many member states are now once again realising the importance of high-end fighting for territorial defence, following 20 years of running down their armed forces and focusing on expeditionary warfare.

But as a first step towards Nato defending the front-line states, size is not the only thing that matters. Critically, a multinational presence in these states make it far more complicated for Russia to take any military action against them without immediately involving the rest of Nato.

Although the redeployment of Nato troops most directly affects the host countries and Russia, other states in the region will feel the side effects. Sweden and Finland are continuing their long-running debate over whether they would be safer within Nato or remaining outside. But one key argument against greater Nato involvement in the region – concern that new military deployments there could be provocative – has receded in the face of Russia's intensive drive for mobilisation and militarisation.

New Russian moves like the deployment of Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad, or the arrival in the Baltic of Russian corvettes with cruise missiles, mean that Sweden and Finland’s desire to appear peaceful and unprovocative has been overtaken by reality. When Russia has already made threats of using nuclear weapons in the region, some in Sweden now feel that defensive preparations could hardly make the situation worse.

Belarus, meanwhile, looks at both Russia’s and Nato’s military moves with alarm. Unlike Russia, whose claims of being “encircled” by Nato are based on fantasy, for Belarus this is already a fact: the landlocked country is already surrounded by military buildup and conflict on all sides. How Belarus will respond to this, and to Russian offers of “protection” from Nato, make for another worrying potential flashpoint in eastern Europe.

Fears of Russian escalation in response are misplaced. Nato’s actions have been signalled so far in advance that Russia has had plenty of time to already massively out-escalate Nato, which in turn is now only beginning to catch up. What is important is putting in place counter-measures to the Russian military potential that already exists in the region, in order to reduce the number of options for assertive military action which are available to Russia.

There is no shortage of scenarios and candidates for where Russia might next choose to exercise its growing military potential. But discussion of where and when this might happen often overlooks the fact that Russia is unlikely to initiate any direct confrontation “just because”. What is needed is both an opportunity for Russia to take action unchallenged, and some form of crisis that triggers this action. These new defensive measures by Nato, as and when they take place, will be an important step toward reducing Russia’s opportunities. In this way they make northern Europe a safer place.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.npr.org/sections/paralle...s-russia-tensions-spill-over-to-nuclear-pacts

'A Dangerous Situation' As U.S.-Russia Tensions Spill Over To Nuclear Pacts

Listen· 3:38

October 31, 20163:27 AM ET
Heard on Morning Edition
DAVID WELNA

The U.S. and Russia are the world's two mightiest nuclear powers, and yet over the years, they've made deals to reduce their respective arsenals.

Just like a marriage gone bad, though, things have soured between Washington and Moscow. Bickering over nuclear issues has increased markedly in recent months, with each side accusing the other of cheating.

And that war of words is being matched by actions:

- Russia, in early October, moved a battery of nuclear-capable missile launchers within range of three Baltic states.

- In September, three U.S. long-range bombers — the kind used to drop nuclear weapons — flew over Eastern Europe in NATO military exercises.

- Russia, in late October, unveiled images of a new intercontinental ballistic missile dubbed the Satan 2, whose warhead, it claims, can destroy an area the size of Texas.

"I would have to say that, without question, this is the low point in U.S.-Russian relations since the end of the Cold War," says Steven Pifer, an arms control expert at the Brookings Institution.

According to Pifer, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, things began going downhill after Russia's invasion of Ukraine two years ago. They slid further last year with Moscow's intervention in Syria, and this year, got worse with Russian warplanes buzzing U.S. ships and planes in the Baltic — and Washington accusing Moscow of meddling in the presidential election.

These developments have other nuclear arms experts worried as well.

"We are in a dangerous situation," says Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists. "Certainly a situation that is much more dire or tense than it was 10 years ago."

U.S.-Russian relations have taken a nosedive from where they were even during the dying days of the Cold War.

In 1987, four years before the Soviet Union collapsed, then-President Ronald Reagan welcomed Soviet Union leader Mikhail Gorbachev to the White House to sign a long-negotiated treaty to eliminate the two nations' entire inventories of short- and intermediate-range, land-launched ballistic and cruise missiles and their launchers.

Before the two leaders inked the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces or INF Treaty, Reagan turned to Gorbachev to share a Russian maxim.

"Mr. General Secretary," the former Hollywood actor intoned, "though my pronunciation may give you difficulty, the maxim is: doveryai no proveryai — trust but verify."

Twenty-nine years later, such trust appears to be in short supply.

"Since May 2013, the Obama administration has repeatedly raised concerns with Russia regarding its lack of compliance with the INF Treaty," a senior administration official, who requested anonymity to speak candidly, tells NPR.

According to that official, because a series of bilateral meetings to resolve the matter have been fruitless, Washington has called for a rare meeting of the treaty's Special Verification Commission "in the coming weeks."

"I actually think this is a good step," Brookings' Pifer says of the decision to take to the commission U.S. claims that an unspecified intermediate-range missile being developed by Russia is not in keeping with the INF. "What the administration has said is that they provided enough information to the Russians so that the Russians could identify the missile in question. The Russians thus far have said no, they haven't got enough information, so you're in that kind of war of words."

Part of that war of words was Russia's announcement in early October that it will no longer take part in a joint program with the U.S. to dispose of weapons-grade plutonium.

"That, I believe, was a little bit of a poke at President Obama, who attaches a lot of importance to the nuclear nonproliferation agenda," says Pifer.

Meanwhile, over the next few months, the U.S. and its NATO allies are to move thousands of troops as well as tanks and other heavy equipment to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, countries along and near Russia's border, and to Poland.

"This is a gradual sort of escalation of tensions between the two sides that goes beyond discourse and just disagreements over a treaty," says Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists. "It's getting pretty deep now."

What's really needed now, the nuclear nonproliferation advocate adds, is the kind of ongoing dialogue these nuclear powers once had — and now seem to have lost.

 

[jed turtle]

Thanks for the heavy lifting you have been doing in these threads.

Sure seems convenient for the Russians that o has been so fond of reducing US nuclear forces...

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Nathan J Hunt Retweeted
Steve Herman ‏@W7VOA 6h6 hours ago Washington, DC

#DPRK reportedly preparing another IRBM launch.


Nathan J Hunt Retweeted
NorthKoreaFoundation ‏@NorthKoreaFndn 5h5 hours ago

Another day, another missile launch? U.S. officials say North Korea preparing missile launch - report http://reut.rs/2eavgHO #DPRK

 

[Lilbitsnana]

speculation on above post


Nathan J Hunt ‏@ISNJH 2h2 hours ago

With DPRK missile tests of oct 15 and oct 20 with now report missile test coming in days DPRK, slightly longer turn around for pending test.



Nathan J Hunt ‏@ISNJH 46m46 minutes ago

its more likely test will be aimed to keep #DPRK in the spotlight leading into US elections and hope that test will succeed.


Shelton Bumgarner ‏@migukin 20m20 minutes ago

@ISNJH what is the Eta in your view


Nathan J Hunt
‏@ISNJH

@migukin I think window to watch for is Thursday Late afternoon to evening going by times DPRK likes to test.

 

[Housecarl]

Nathan J Hunt Retweeted
Steve Herman ‏@W7VOA 6h6 hours ago Washington, DC

#DPRK reportedly preparing another IRBM launch.


Nathan J Hunt Retweeted
NorthKoreaFoundation ‏@NorthKoreaFndn 5h5 hours ago

Another day, another missile launch? U.S. officials say North Korea preparing missile launch - report http://reut.rs/2eavgHO #DPRK

speculation on above post


Nathan J Hunt ‏@ISNJH 2h2 hours ago

With DPRK missile tests of oct 15 and oct 20 with now report missile test coming in days DPRK, slightly longer turn around for pending test.



Nathan J Hunt ‏@ISNJH 46m46 minutes ago

its more likely test will be aimed to keep #DPRK in the spotlight leading into US elections and hope that test will succeed.


Shelton Bumgarner ‏@migukin 20m20 minutes ago

@ISNJH what is the Eta in your view


Nathan J Hunt
‏@ISNJH

@migukin I think window to watch for is Thursday Late afternoon to evening going by times DPRK likes to test.

Why is it that I'm getting a bad feeling over reading this?...

 

[fairbanksb]

Iran claims it's sending elite fighters to infiltrate US, Europe

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/1...g-elite-fighters-to-infiltrate-us-europe.html


By Adam Kredo Published November 02, 2016 Washington Free Beacon

The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, the country’s elite military force, is sending assets to infiltrate the United States and Europe at the direction of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, according to recent Farsi-language comments from an Iranian military leader.

The IRGC “will be in the U.S. and Europe very soon,” according to the Iranian military commander, who said that these forces would operate with the goal of bolstering Iran’s hardline regime and thwarting potential plots against the Islamic Republic.

“The whole world should know that the IRGC will be in the U.S. and Europe very soon,” Salar Abnoush, deputy coordinator of Iran’s Khatam-al-Anbia Garrison, an IRGC command front, was quoted as saying in an Iranian state-controlled publication closely tied to the IRGC.

The military leader’s comments come as Iran is spending great amounts of money to upgrade its military hardware and bolster its presence throughout the Middle East and beyond. Iran intends to spend billions to purchase U.S.-made planes that are likely to be converted for use in its air force.

Congressional leaders and others suspect that Iran has used a large portion of the cash windfall it received as a result of last summer’s nuclear agreement to upgrade its fighting capabilities war machine.

“The IRGC is [the] strong guardian of the Islamic Republic,” Abnoush was quoted as saying. “The Fedayeen of Velayat [fighting force] are under the order of Iran’s Supreme leader. Defending and protecting the Velayat [the Supreme Leader] has no border and limit.”

Click for more from the Washington Free Beacon.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-N...rea-landing-rescue-of-refugees/5361478199380/

U.S., South Korea stage military exercise simulating North Korea landing, rescue of refugees

By Elizabeth Shim Contact the Author | Nov. 3, 2016 at 3:49 PM

SEOUL, Nov. 3 (UPI) -- U.S. and South Korean marines conducted an unprecedented joint drill on Thursday that simulated the rescue of North Korean refugees.

The drill was part of a larger U.S.-South Korea joint landing operation exercise and was held in an area near the South Korean city of Pohang, South Korean newspaper Maeil Business reported Thursday.

The exercises began on Oct. 29 and are to conclude on Nov. 6.

South Korea's navy and marines formed a dedicated unit for civilian operations for the first time. The unit practiced duties that covered the reception, management and medical support of North Korean refugees.

Joint U.S.-South Korea forces practiced landing in an operational area in North Korea, and trained in providing North Korean refugees with humanitarian aid once on the territory, according to the report.

More than 130 U.S. military personnel with experience in providing refugee support in Afghanistan participated in the exercise and members of the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa joined them, a South Korean marine corps spokesman said on Thursday.

Other exercises included deploying tents where the injured could receive treatment, and transporting landing equipment and materials by aircraft carrier, a ship capable of conveying helicopters and armored vehicles.

The exercises trained troops to quickly provide reinforcements of tanks and vehicles to those already on shore, the source said.

The United States and South Korea have increased the number of joint exercises conducted in and around the peninsula in 2016.

In October, naval forces of the two countries for the first time conducted drills in waters on both sides of the Korean peninsula to warn North Korea.

Like Us on Facebook for more stories from UPI.com
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[Housecarl]

Can you say "November Sierra Sherlock!...."

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://thewire.in/77597/north-koreas-nuclear-ticket-to-survival/

North Korea’s Nuclear Ticket to Survival

BY EDWARD HUNT ON 03/11/2016

Many in Washington are starting to believe that North Korea is building a nuclear weapons arsenal as a deterrent against the US.

In recent months, a number of US officials have begun to reassess their understanding of why the North Korean government wants nuclear weapons. Rather than repeating the standard claim that the North Korean government is taking extreme measures to intimidate its enemies into making concessions, some officials have begun to suggest that the North Korean government desires nuclear weapons for defencive purposes.

After the North Korean government conducted its fifth underground nuclear test on September 9, 2016, former US official Victor Cha presented the new line of thinking. “This is not a cry for negotiations,” Cha told The New York Times. “This is very clearly a serious effort at amassing real nuclear capabilities that they can use to deter the US and others.”

A few days later, Cha shared the same logic with a subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. “Testing was once interpreted by pundits to be an attention-getting effort for dialogue with the United States,” but “it would be irresponsible today to adhere to such an interpretation,” Cha stated. In today’s world, “North Korea is executing a strategy designed to demonstrate a survivable nuclear deterrent before the next US administration comes into office.” In short, Cha insisted that the North Korean government sought to acquire nuclear weapons for the purpose of deterring its enemies.

Threat or no threat?

Of course, not everyone in Washington agrees with such thinking. Although Cha and other strategic analysts have proposed that the North Korean government is rationally pursuing a nuclear deterrent to defend itself against the US, high-level officials in Washington insist that nothing could be further from the truth.

Notably, secretary of state John Kerry has refuted the idea that the North Korean government needs to take defencive measures. For “any person of common sense,” the answer to the question of whether the North Korean government has to defend itself against the US is “no,” Kerry announced on October 19, 2016. “Everybody knows that.”

After making his point, Kerry then insisted that the US posed no threat to North Korea because the US government has made no recent efforts to destroy the country. “The United States has had the power to wipe out North Korea for years – for years,” Kerry noted. “And if indeed that was our goal, we wouldn’t be sitting around waiting while they’re getting additional nuclear weapons.”

Certainly, US officials have not recently attempted to wipe out North Korea. Although the US had once destroyed most of North Korea during the Korean War, when it spent three years carpet-bombing the country and destroying most North Korean cities, US officials have not resorted to comparable tactics in the country since the armistice ended the fighting in 1953.

At the same time, US officials have continued to take other actions to pressure, marginalise and isolate North Korea. For starters, US officials have worked with their allies to impose restrictive sanctions on the country. Certainly, “we’re always looking at ways we can continue to apply pressure,” state department spokesperson Mark C. Toner acknowledged during a press briefing on July 19, 2016. In fact, “the sanctions are pretty severe right now.”

Two months later, White House official Ben Rhodes made a similar point, only providing more emphasis. “So we’ve passed now through the UN Security Council the strongest sanctions ever on North Korea,” Rhodes stated. The sanctions are “having an impact” and “putting a tighter squeeze on North Korea.”

To put an even tighter squeeze on North Korea, US officials have also made it clear that they are ready to take more direct action. Taking advantage of their extraordinary military power in the region, including the 28,500 US soldiers that are stationed in South Korea, US officials have continually reminded the North Korean government that they are ready to resume the Korean War at a moment’s notice.

On the day that the North Korean government conducted its fifth underground nuclear test, secretary of defence Ashton Carter made the point by stating that “US forces on the Korean Peninsula are always ready and this is true every single day, to fight tonight.”

A few days later, US officials then sent an even more powerful signal of their preparedness, flying two nuclear-capable B-1B bombers over South Korea in a display of military power. As US General Vincent K. Brooks explained at the time, US officials wanted to demonstrate their commitment to using their “full range of military capabilities,” such as nuclear weapons.

Expect serious consequences

By applying constant pressure to North Korea, US officials have sent another powerful message to the North Korean government. Although officials in Washington may deny that they are threatening North Korea, they have made it clear that the North Korean government can expect to face serious consequences for continuing to defy the US with its nuclear weapons program.

“What I can tell you is our policy, with respect to North Korea’s provocations and the resolve of the United States and the international community to try to put adequate pressure on them to change their behaviour, has not changed and remains the same,” state department spokesperson John Kirby confirmed on October 25, 2016.

Even so, some officials are now providing another way of understanding the situation. On the same day that Kirby made his statement, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper indicated that the US has ultimately left the North Korean government with no serious alternatives. “I think the notion of getting the North Koreans to denuclearise is probably a lost cause,” Clapper stated. “They are not going to do that. That is their ticket to survival.” Indeed, Clapper indicated that the North Korean government would find it necessary to maintain a powerful nuclear arsenal in order to deter the constant threats it faces from the US.

“And I got a good taste of that when I was there, about how the world looks from their vantage,” Clapper added. “And they are under siege and they are very paranoid.”

In short, a number of US officials are now beginning to come to terms with one of the main reasons why the North Korean government is making such a major effort to acquire nuclear weapons. These officials are starting to believe that the North Korean government is working to build an arsenal of nuclear weapons to create a powerful deterrent against the US.

Edward Hunt writes about war and empire. He has a Ph.D. in American Studies from the College of William & Mary.

This piece originally appeared in Foreign Policy In Focus.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.thailand-business-news.com/opinion/54698-is-north-koreas-nuclear-tech-for-sale.html

Opinion

Is North Korea’s nuclear tech for sale?

By Jonathan Berkshire Miller - November 3, 2016

Authors: June Park, NUS and Jonathan B. Miller, CFR

As North Korea’s economic position worsens, the risk that it sells its nuclear weapons technology grows. Pyongyang conducted its fifth nuclear test on 9 September, accompanied by claims it has developed a warhead that can be mounted onto rockets. This test is estimated to have been at a yield of 25–30 kilotons — significantly larger than previous tests.

While the magnitude of the test alarmed some US policymakers, Washington’s foreign policy remains focused on the Middle East. Similarly, North Korea’s subsequent missile tests that ended in failure on 15 and 20 October gained little attention.

There appears to be a de facto acceptance by some in the Obama administration that North Korea will not agree to denuclearise — regardless of the concessions. Earlier this month, Obama’s top intelligence chief, James Clapper, remarked at an event hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations that ‘the notion of getting the North Koreans to denuclearise is probably a lost cause’. Despite Clapper’s remarks, the Obama administration as a whole continues to insist that a nuclear North Korea is not an option regardless of their unwillingness to disarm.

Meanwhile, concerns remain about the possible transfer of North Korea’s nuclear technology and knowledge to non-state actors. Hillary Clinton considers their ‘quest for a nuclear weapon’ a grave threat because ‘the greatest threat of all would be terrorists getting their hands on loose nuclear material’. So how likely is North Korea to engage in a nuclear arms sale with a terrorist group?

Up until this point, proliferation of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction seemed to be restricted to sovereign states. But this has not stopped apprehension from some in the intelligence community — spurred by Pyongyang’s connections to Libya’s Gaddafi regime and ties to Syria’s failed nuclear weapons program.

Over the years North Korea has created a web of foreign connections to peddle its missiles and components. As talks on denuclearisation remain non-existent and foreign sanctions against the regime tighten, there are startling concerns that a cash-strapped Pyongyang may resort to dealing with its finances through the black-market with terrorist groups or organised crime syndicates.

While the threat may seem fanciful — even for a state as repugnant to international rules as North Korea — the risks are real. The official and unofficial transfer of nuclear technology has always been a method of global outreach for North Korea. Nuclear proliferation to non-state actors is a viable option for this regime when it feels threatened, economically cornered and politically unstable. Pyongyang is strapped for funds despite China’s less than ideal compliance of UN sanctions — which has kept the little trade they have alive and enabled the state to continue to obtain materials and funds for missile tests.

As tougher sanctions are imposed, North Korea will be pressured into securing funds via alternative channels. When the state’s cash flows and resources dry up, selling nuclear technology to the highest bidder may become a tantalising option for the Kim regime.

In order to prevent such a possibility, the current counter proliferation instruments in place —such as the Proliferation Security Initiative — need to be bolstered by further actions. First, the international community should urge China to fully implement sanctions on North Korea with close observation on the movement of fissile materials across the Sino–North Korean border. An example of this initiative would look like the joint Sino–US probe on the case of Liaoning Hongxiang Group’s extensive trade that allegedly included materials that could be used in the production of nuclear weapons.

Second, the global intelligence community should collaborate and share information regarding the North Korean migrant workers that are spread out across the world — particularly in Russia and the Middle East. They may be the ones who can be incentivised to act as intermediaries for the exchange of North Korea’s nuclear secrets for money. Tracing the potential roots of North Korea’s nuclear transactions through their migrant workers would be the easiest method of detection.

Adequate attention should be given to the potential transfer of weapons of mass destruction technology. This should be in conjunction with information sharing in the intelligence community about Pyongyang’s connections to terrorist groups in order to ensure North Korea does not head down an even more dangerous path.

June Park is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Centre on Asia & Globalisation of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore.

Jonathan Berkshire Miller is an International Affairs Fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations based in Tokyo.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.spectator.co.uk/2016/11/youre-not-hearing-the-whole-story-about-aleppo/

You’re not hearing the whole story about Aleppo

Assad and his allies have carried out war crimes. But so have the rebels

Peter Oborne
5 November 2016
9:00 AM

For the past few weeks, British news-papers have been informing their readers about two contrasting battles in the killing grounds of the Middle East. One is Mosul, in northern Iraq, where western reporters are accompanying an army of liberation as it frees a joyful population from terrorist control. The other concerns Aleppo, just a few hundred miles to the west. This, apparently, is the exact opposite. Here, a murderous dictator, hellbent on destruction, is waging war on his own people.

Both these narratives contain strong elements of truth. There is no question that President Assad and his Russian allies have committed war crimes, and we can all agree that Mosul will be far better off without Isis. Nevertheless, the situations in Mosul and Aleppo are fundamentally identical. In both cases, forces loyal to an internationally recognised government are attacking well-populated cities, with the aid of foreign air power. These cities are under the control of armed groups or terrorists, who are holding a proportion of their population hostage.

In Mosul, fewer than 10,000 Isis fighters control about a million people. In eastern Aleppo, it is estimated that about 5,000 armed men, the majority linked to al–Qaeda, dominate a population of about 200,000. In each case the armed groups use the zones they occupy to attack government areas with rockets, mortars and other weapons.

So Prime Minister al-Abadi in Iraq and President Assad in Syria face the same dilemma. Should they do nothing for fear of killing civilians? Or do they take air action and eliminate the so-called rebels, but at terrible cost in innocent blood as they wage merciless war against ruthless insurgents?

In both cases, enormous bloodshed could be prevented if the terrorist groups let the civilian population leave. Last month the UN special envoy to Syria, Staffan de Mistura, pleaded with Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly al-Qaeda, but now decoupled and rebranded) to do just that: ‘One thousand of you are deciding the destiny of 270,000 civilians.’ He pointedly used the word ‘hostage’ to describe the way these civilians were being held by the rebels and not by Assad.

This episode highlighted the double standard about western reporting of these terrible problems. In Mosul, western reporters travelling with the invading Iraqi army publish pictures of joyful populations liberated from the jihadists. In Aleppo, the attempt to free the city from al-Qaeda control is portrayed as a remorseless attack on the civilian population.

Assad and his allies have carried out war crimes. But that is not the whole story. When I visited the government-held areas of Aleppo earlier this year, I met scores of people who had fled for their lives from al–Qaeda or Isis in the east of the city. They told me hideous stories of how these jihadists, very few of whom were Syrian, had enforced a brutal form of sharia law, abolished education in schools and forced women to wear burkas and stay at home.

In western Aleppo, I found a woman in a government building where she had come to collect her salary as a teacher (government employees in rebel-held areas are still paid by the regime, even though they are no longer allowed to work). She told me how she was preparing to return home to rejoin her husband and children. She had no doubt at all what fate awaited her: ‘The fighters are preparing ambushes with explosives. They are moving their wives and families out. They are keeping us as human shields.’

Western reports about the fighting in Mosul have made much of the liberated churches. Yet exactly the same narrative applies across Syria. Two years ago I joined Syrian government forces as they freed the eastern city of Maaloula (where Aramaic, the language of Christ, is still spoken). The famous monastery above the town had been dreadfully desecrated by al-Qaeda. In Aleppo, the Christian community has collapsed from 200,000 before the war to maybe 25,000 today. This is because Christians in Aleppo know that if the British and US-backed jihadists in the east win the war, they will be slaughtered.

A further double standard concerns the reporting of Russian and Syrian atrocities. Much has — rightly — been made of the so-called barrel bombs dropped on Aleppo by the Russians. Yet rebel commanders in eastern Aleppo use equally hideous weapons. Last April, fighters from Jaish al-Islam, backed by Saudi Arabia and considered moderate enough that American diplomats retain relations with them, admitted to using chemical weapons against the Kurds in Aleppo. This attack received almost no attention from the media, and failed to generate the faintest outrage in Britain.

Jaish al-Islam employ a so-called ‘hell cannon’ to fire gas canisters and shrapnel weighing up to 40 kilograms into civilian areas. These are every bit as murderous as the barrel bombs. Reports in the western press have suggested that hell cannons are examples of the engineering ingenuity of plucky rebels. Few journalists have dwelled on the fact that these improvised weapons have been deliberately used to kill hundreds of Aleppo civilians.

Yet another double standard applies to the destruction of hospitals. When I was in Aleppo, I interviewed Mohamad El-Hazouri, head of the department of health, at the Razi hospital. He told me that when rebel groups entered the city they put six of the 16 hospitals out of service, as well as 100 of the 201 health centres, and wiped out the ambulance service.

An Aleppo eye hospital, which had been one of the greatest treatment centres in northern Syria, had been turned into a jail for detainees by the rebels. He said that his workers went to great lengths to supply hospitals in the rebel areas. Often they were rebuffed.

There is a wider pattern at work here. When opponents of the West try to reclaim urban areas from terrorists, they are denounced. When our allies do the same — think of Israel in Gaza or the Saudis in Yemen — we defend them. We judge Assad by one set of rules, and ourselves and our own allies by another.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/11/02/the_russian_nuclear_weapons_buildup_110294.html

The Russian Nuclear Weapons Buildup and the Future of the New START Treaty

718 Shares
By Mark B. Schneider
November 02, 2016
Issue No. 414

Dr. Mark Schneider is a senior analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy and a former senior official in the Defense Department.

On October 1, 2016 the Department of State released the most recent Russian and U.S. data on their strategic nuclear forces provided in accordance with the New START Treaty. The data indicate that five and a half years into the New START Treaty’s seven year reduction period, the number of accountable deployed Russian strategic nuclear warheads has further increased to 1,796, well above the New START ceiling of 1,550, which goes into effect in February 2018.[1] On the other hand, accountable, deployed U.S. strategic nuclear warheads have declined from 1,800 at New START Treaty entry into force (EIF) in early 2011, to 1,367, well below the New START limit.[2]

Compliance with New START should have been easy for Russia. At New START EIF, it had 1,537 strategic nuclear warheads, below the New START limit of 1,550, 521 deployed delivery vehicles, well below the New START limit of 700, and 865 deployed and non-deployed delivery vehicles, just above the New START limit of 800.[3] The excess Russian non-deployed delivery vehicles were mainly items that were accountable but not operational and, hence, their elimination should not have been painful. For example, by 1999, only one of the five Russian Typhoon class missile submarines was reportedly operational, and this was just as a test platform for the new Bulava-30 SLBM program.[4] The U.S. would have paid for the elimination of these submarines under the Comprehensive Threat Reduction (CTR) program if Russia had wanted it to do so.

As a result of the buildup of its strategic offensive forces, however, Russia is now 246 warheads above the New START Treaty limit on deployed warheads.[5] It now appears unlikely that Russia intends to comply with the New START Treaty ceilings in early 2018 when they come into legal effect. Announced ongoing Russian strategic nuclear modernization programs will substantially increase the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons that would have to be removed from accountability by February 2018. According to Bill Gertz, an Obama administration official told him, “The Russians are doubling their [nuclear] warhead output,” and, “They will be exceeding the New START [arms treaty] levels because of MIRVing these new systems.”[6] This appears to be substantiated by the latest Russian data on their deployed warhead numbers. There are no announced Russian force reduction programs that would put Russian forces in compliance with the 2018 New START limits and time is growing very short.

A dissenting view is voiced by Hans M. Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists. According to Kristensen, “Rather than a nuclear build-up, however, the increase is a temporary fluctuation caused by introduction of new types of launchers that will be followed by retirement of older launchers before 2018. Russia’s compliance with the treaty is not in doubt.”[7] However, Kristensen’s claim that Russia intends to comply with New START is, at best, problematical. Unfortunately, the fact is that Russian warhead growth is a trend, not a routine fluctuation. This is well illustrated by the following chart from a recent blog by Kristensen.[8]

Russia has consistently been above the New START warhead level since mid-2014 while deployed U.S. warheads have significantly declined. The Russian warhead numbers reflect the deployment of both new heavily MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs without compensating reductions in older forces. In 2012, the Obama administration predicted that Russia would deploy “several substantially MIRVed new strategic missiles…”[9] It did not, however, predict that Russian forces would grow. Indeed, measured against the declared Russian number of 1,400 deployed strategic nuclear warheads in mid-2014, the Russian force has increased over 28%.[10] In the same period, U.S. deployed strategic nuclear warheads declined from 1,688 to 1,367, a decline of 19%.

Concerning deployed delivery and non-deployed delivery vehicles, Kristensen states, “Russia and the United States continue to reduce the overall size of their strategic nuclear forces.”[11] This is certainly true for the U.S., but it is not true for Russia as is illustrated by Kristensen’s own chart. There has been little change in the Russian number of deployed delivery vehicles since New START EIF. He does not describe what he believes Russia will do in order to comply with the deployed warhead limit of New START in the limited remaining time for Treaty compliant reductions. Regarding Russian elimination of delivery vehicles, Mr. Kristensen says, “Russia will have to dismantle another 47 launchers to meet the limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers by February 2018. Those launchers will likely come from [the] retirement of the remaining Delta III SSBNs, retirement of additional Soviet-era ICBMs, and destruction of empty excess ICBM silos.”[12] But, there are no announced Russian programs to do any of this. The closer the Russians get to the deadline without action, the less palatable their options will be. Submarine ballistic missile launchers are not removed from accountability by “retiring” them. Under the New START Treaty, the process involves “…removing all missile launch tube hatches, their associated superstructure fairings, and, if applicable, gas generators.”[13] There is also a time consuming verification provision that requires the display of the submarine for 60 days.[14]

It is unlikely that Russia will decide to eliminate the Delta III force anytime soon: one of them reportedly has just been put through an expensive overhaul process, and Russia launched an SS-N-18 SLBM from a Delta III submarine during an unannounced large strategic nuclear exercise in October 2016.[15] Eliminating the Delta III submarines would reduce the Russian Pacific Fleet to two ballistic missile submarines,[16] something Russia would likely want to avoid. Moreover, it is impossible to compensate even for the current overage of 246 deployed strategic nuclear warheads (much less the additional warheads Russia will deploy by February 2018) by removing warheads from Delta III submarines—there simply are not enough of them. Pavel Podvig, a Russian expatriate who probably does the best current order of battle assessments for Russian strategic nuclear forces, says that Russia has three operational Delta III submarines.[17] A 2016 article by Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris credits them with two.[18] Yet, it would take over five Delta IIIs to compensate for 246 warheads currently over the New START ceiling. Announced Russian strategic nuclear modernization programs suggest that Russia would have to compensate for about 100 additional warheads by February 2018.[19] To be in compliance with New START by disarming Delta III submarines would require over seven active submarines to be disarmed. Thus, a route to Russian New START compliance through Delta III disarming is not possible.

Kristensen’s assertion that Russia’s nuclear warhead advantage is going to be temporary is unlikely to be true regardless of what Moscow plans to do with regard to New START Treaty compliance. The Russian advantage in deployed strategic nuclear warheads is probably larger than the New START numbers suggest because New START accounting does not fully reflect Russian enhancements of its heavy bomber capability. Under New START, a bomber load of weapons is counted as a single warhead irrespective of how many warheads it actually carries. Indeed, in 2010, Hans Kristensen told The New York Times that the bomber weapon counting rule was “totally nuts” because it “frees up a large pool of warhead spaces under the treaty limit that enable each country to deploy many more warheads than would otherwise be the case…”[20] RIA Novosti, a Russian government news agency, reported, “Under the Treaty, one nuclear warhead will be counted for each deployed heavy bomber which can carry 12-24 missiles or bombs, depending on its type.”[21] The 2016 article by Kristensen and Norris cited above states that Russia now has about 2,600 real deployed strategic nuclear warheads.[22] Assuming the Obama administration has not increased the number of nuclear weapons at our heavy bomber bases from the 2011 level, the U.S. probably has about 1,550 deployed missile and bomber strategic nuclear weapons today. [23] This suggests a real Russian advantage of approximately 1,000 deployed warheads—hardly a passing blip.

Kristensen also claims that both the U.S. and Russia have the same number of nuclear warheads – 4,500. He cites no source for the Russian number and it is extremely unlikely that the Russian nuclear stockpile is this small. Russia has more deployed strategic nuclear warheads than the United States and ten times the number of tactical nuclear weapons.[24] The Obama administration has described the difference in tactical nuclear weapons as “hundreds” vs. “thousands.”[25] In 2009, the main official Russian news agency ITAR TASS (now called TASS) reported that Russia “probably” had between 15,000 to 17,000 nuclear weapons.[26] The estimate of Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris for 2009 is about half this number.[27] In November 2011, the Obama administration estimated Russia had 4,000-6,500 nuclear weapons.[28] The U.S. nuclear weapons number Kristensen is using is from the Obama administration, but it does not distinguish between active and inactive weapons, which is a significant difference. Thus, Kristensen’s comparison is, at best, misleading because he compares a U.S. number which includes active and inactive weapons to a dubious Russian number which apparently counts only active Russian weapons. Kristensen appears to ignore the fact that Russia has maintained a large and fully functional nuclear weapons complex reportedly capable of producing 2,000 weapons per year, while we have not.[29]

Russia is unlikely to make maximum use of the remaining time for reductions to meet New START ceilings. Instead, it appears to be planning for a major confrontation with the United States over Eastern Europe, economic sanctions imposed upon them over their aggression in Ukraine, and the deployment of missile defenses in Europe. There is a great deal of talk in the Russian State media concerning an imminent nuclear war with the West.[30] Pavel Felgenhauer, a distinguished Russian journalist, has suggested that the Russian military is fanning tensions to protect the Russian military budget from cuts. He writes, “The most effective way to secure greater budgetary allocations, therefore, is to amplify tensions with the US and make all-out war a distinct possibility.”[31] Another distinguished Russian journalist, Alexander Golts, has sarcastically observed, “We have just one need now, dear fellow citizens – how to prepare in the best possible way for the war that, if we analyse the actions of our own chiefs, is on the point of breaking out.”[32] Both noted the ominous implications of recent reported Russian nuclear civil defense actions.

According Russian U.N. Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, U.S.-Russian relations are at the worst point since the 1973 Middle East crisis.[33] This crisis involved a serious risk of military action by the Soviet Union and the U.S. “responded by putting its nuclear forces on worldwide alert…”[34] If Russia is planning for a confrontation with the next U.S. President, it certainly will not reduce its strategic nuclear forces anytime soon. Nuclear threats of many types will be a major part of Russian pressure on the U.S. to accept Russian domination of Eastern Europe and to withdraw missile defense from Europe.

There is precedent for Russian expressions of hostility following U.S. elections. The day after the U.S. election in 2008, then-President Dmitry Medvedev made nuclear related threats in a speech before the Russian Duma. He stated that in response to U.S. deployment of missile defense in Europe:

For example, we had planned to decommission three missile regiments of a missile division deployed in Kozelsk from combat readiness and to disband the division by 2010. I have decided to abstain from these plans. Nothing will disband. Moreover, we will deploy the Iskander missile system in the Kaliningrad Region to be able, if necessary, to neutralise the missile defence system. Naturally, we envisage using the resources of the Russian Navy for these purposes as well.[35]

In 2008, Russia represented a more modest threat to the West than it now does. Today, Russia has much more extensive nuclear modernization programs underway than in 2008. Typical Russian nuclear threats involve the targeting of nuclear missiles and the threat of preemptive nuclear strikes.[36] One of the most explicit threats was made in 2015 when the Russian Ambassador to Denmark declared, “I don’t think that Danes fully understand the consequence if Denmark joins the American-led missile defence shield. If they do, then Danish warships will be targets for Russian nuclear missiles.”[37] Russian nuclear threats may be less restrained after the U.S. election. The deployment of Russian nuclear capable Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad has already happened. Just before the October 2016 Russian exercise in Kaliningrad involving nuclear capable Iskander missiles, TASS reported the Iskander would “deliver a simulated preemptive strike against the missile systems and other remote critical targets of a simulated enemy.”[38] Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevicius said this deployment involved an improved version of the Iskander with a range of 700-km, which also raises the issue of compliance with the INF Treaty.[39] He indicated the purpose of this was to “seek concessions from the West.”[40]

Russia is well aware that there has been no apparent U.S. response to their INF Treaty violations. Absent a major change in policy, there would likely be little or no serious U.S. response to Russian “suspension” of its obligations under the New START Treaty. Russia has little to lose if it initiates a post-election nuclear crisis, assuming of course it does not get out of hand—which is apparently what Russian leaders believe. Putin is a risk taker. In the 1990s, as Secretary of the Russian National Security Council, he developed Russia’s doctrine of nuclear first use during conventional warfare.[41] In September 2016, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter pointed out the danger that Russia may resort to “to smaller but still unprecedentedly terrible attacks…to try to coerce a conventionally superior opponent to back off or abandon an ally during a crisis.”[42] Hopefully, the likely Putin’s post-election provocation will not go beyond words. However, wishful thinking is not an effective deterrence policy. We need to enhance our deterrence posture promptly to minimize the chance of a major Russian miscalculation.

Notes:

[1]. U.S. Department of State, “New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms,” U.S. Department of State, October 1, 2016, available at http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2016/255377.htm.

[2]. Ibid.: Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Russian and US Strategic Offensive Arms (Fact Sheet),” RussianMinistry of Foreign Affairs, June 27, 2011, available at http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/55016EBF86 9728C1C32578BD0058B349.

[3]. “New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Russian and US Strategic Offensive Arms (Fact Sheet),” June 27, 2011, op. cit.

[4]. “941 TYPHOON,” Federation of American Scientists, August 25, 2000, available at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/slbm/941.htm.

[5]. “New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms,” October 1, 2016, op. cit.: Bill Gertz, “Russia Adds Hundreds of Warheads Under Nuclear Treaty,” The Washington Free Beacon, October 4, 2016, available at http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-adds-hundreds-warheads-nuclear-treaty/.

[6]. Bill Gertz, “Russia Doubling Nuclear Warheads,” The Washington Free Beacon, April 1, 2016, available at http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-doubling-nuclear-warheads/.

[7]. Hans M. Kristensen, “New START Data Shows Russian Warhead Increase Before Expected Decrease,” The Federation of American Scientists, October 3, 2016, available at https://fas.org/blogs/security/2016/10/new-start-data-2016/.

[8]. Ibid.

[9]. Madelyn Creedon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 21, 2012, available at http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo media/doc/Madelyn _Creedon_Testimony.pdf.

[10]. U.S. Department of State, “New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms,” U.S. Department of State, October 1, 2013, available at http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/215000.htm.

[11]. Kristensen, “New START Data Shows Russian Warhead Increase Before Expected Decrease,” op. cit.

[12]. Ibid.

[13]. U.S. Department of State, New START Treaty, Protocol, Part Four, Section 4, paragraph 1, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140047.pdf.

[14]. Ibid., paragraph 3 and 4.

[15]. Pavel Podvig, “Project 667BDR/Delta III submarines are alive and well,” Russianforces.org, August 12, 2016, available at http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/08/project_667bdrdelta_iii_submar.shtml.: Pavel Podvig, “Three ballistic missiles launched in one day,” Russianforces.org, October 12, 2016, available at http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/10/three_ballistic_missiles_launc.shtml.

[16]. Pavel Podvig, “Vladimir Monomakh arrived in Vilyuchinsk,” September 26, 2016, available at http://russian forces.org/blog/2016/09/vladimir_monomakh_arrived_in_v.shtml.

[17]. Podvig, “Project 667BDR/Delta III submarines are alive and well,” op. cit.

[18]. Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris, “Russian nuclear forces, 2016,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 72, No. 3, April 16, 2016, p. 226, available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2016.1170359.

[19]. Mark Schneider, “Russia’s Growing Strategic Nuclear Forces and New START Treaty Compliance,” Information Series, No. 407 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, June 21, 2016), p. 2, available at http://www.nipp.org/2016/ 06/21/schneider-mark-russias-growing-strategic-nuclear-forces-and-new-start-treaty-compliance/.

[20]. Peter Baker, “Arms Control May Be Different on Paper and on the Ground,” The New York Times, March 30, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/world/europe/31start.html.

[21]. Ilya Kramnuk, “New START Treaty based on Mutual Russian–U.S. Concessions,” RIA Novosti, April 12, 2010, available at http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20100409/158499862.html. (Emphasis added).

[22]. Kristensen & Norris, “Russian nuclear forces, 2016,” op. cit., p. 126.

[23]. While the Obama administration has not announced the number of nuclear weapons deployed at heavy bomber bases, two 2011 reports of the Obama administration indicate that there were about 250 nuclear warheads at these bases on the last day of the 2002 Moscow Treaty (superseded by New START) and the first day of New START. There is no indication that the Obama administration has increased nuclear bomber capability. The two reports indicate the number of nuclear warheads accountable under the 2002 Moscow Treaty and the New START Treaty on the same day, the first day of New START and last day of the Moscow Treaty. Taking into account the difference in the counting rules for bomber weapons, it is possible to calculate the number of deployed weapons at about 250. If you add 250 to the just released number for U.S. weapons accountable weapons on New START and subtract the about 70 weapons for bombers that are already counted in the New START data, the number is about 1,550. See “2011 Annual Report on Implementation of the Moscow Treaty,” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, June 2, 2011, available at http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/164828. htm.: “New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms,” Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, October 25, 2011, available at http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/176096.htm.

[24]. “Thornberry on Alarming Developments with New START Treaty,” House Armed Services Committee, October 4, 2016, available at https://armedservices.house.gov/new...nberry-alarming-developments-new-start-treaty.

[25]. “Obama Advisor Gary Samore, ‘The Ball Is Very Much in Tehran’s Court,’” Radio Free Europe, April 14, 2011, available at http://www.rferi.org/content_iterview_samore_Russia_Iran_us_poicy/31557 326.html.

[26]. “New RF-US agt to replace START to be concluded before year end – FM,” ITAR-TASS, March 9, 2009, available at http://www.itar-tass.com/eng/level2.html?NewsID=14295189&PageNum=1.

[27]. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists (No date but 2015), available at https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/.

[28]. “James N. Miller, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Statement before the House Committee on Armed Services, November 2, 2011,” available at http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/ serve?File_id=faad05df-9016-42c5-86bc-b83144c635c9.

[29]. Robert Joseph, “Second to One,” National Review, October 17, 2011, available at http://russian forces.org/blog/2007/05/how_many_warheads.shtml.

[30]. “US-Russian row over Syria potentially leads to war – daily,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, October 6, 2016, available at http://search.proquest.com/professional/login.: Fraser Moore, “Putin Wants War: NATO jets from four countries intercept Russian nuclear planes off Europe,” London Express Online, October 6, 2016, available at http://dialog.proquest.com/professional/login.; Lucinda Hannah, “Russia rails against the West and moves missiles to Baltic,” London Times, October 10, 2016, available at http://dialog. proquest.com/professional/login.; “State TV, Duma brass hat keep pace with ‘war’ rhetoric,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, October 16, 2016, available at http://dialog.proquest. com/professional/login.; “West is bent on nuclear war, Russia tells people,” London, Times, October 3, 2016, available at http://dialog.proquest. com/professional/login.

[31]. Pavel Felgenhauer, “Budgetary Fight in Moscow Sends US-Russian Relations Into Deep Crisis,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 13 No. 161 (October 6, 2016), available at https://jamestown.org/program/budgetary-fight-moscow-sends-us-russian-relations-deep-crisis/.

[32]. Alexander Golts, “We will defend al-Asad at any cost,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, October 13, 2016, available at http://dialog.proquest.com/professional/login.

[44]. Edith M. Lederer, “Russia envoy: Tensions with US are probably worst since 1973,” Associated Press, October 15, 2016, available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/russia-envoy-tensions-us-worst-1973-42822802.

34]. Office of the Historian, “Milestones: 1969–1976 The 1973 Arab-Israeli War,” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, no date), available at https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/arab-israeli-war-1973.

[35]. President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev, “Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,” The Kremlin.ru, November 5, 2008, available at http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/11/05/2144_type70029 type82917type127286_208836.shtml.

[36]. “Testimony Prepared By: Dr. Keith B. Payne Professor and Head, Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies Missouri State University Commissioner, Congressional Strategic Posture Commission,” Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, 113th Congress, July 25, 2012, available at http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/July-25-testimony-for-web.pdf.

[37]. Julian Isherwood, “Russia warns Denmark its warships could become nuclear targets,” Telegraph.com, March 21, 2015, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/denmark/11487509/Russia-warns-Denmark-its-warships-.

[38]. “Iskander missile brigade on alert for drill in western Russia,” TASS, October 4, 2016, available at http://tass.com/defense/903968.

[39]. “Russia deploys Iskander-M missile systems on western border,” ParsToday, October 9, 2016, available at http://parstoday.com/en/news/world-..._iskander_m_missile_systems_on_western_border.

[40]. “Russia deploys nuclear-capable missiles on NATO doorstep,” AFP, October 9, 2016, available at http://www.military.com/daily-news/...s-nuclear-capable-missiles-nato-doorstep.html

[41]. Mark Schneider, The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Federation (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2006), p. 20, http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Russian-nuclear-doctrine-NSF-for-print.pdf.

[42]. “Remarks by Secretary Carter to troops at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota,” September 26, 2016, available at http://www.defense.gov/News/Transcr.../957408/remarks-by-secretary-carter-to-troops -at-kirtland-afb-new-mexico.

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