WAR 10-28-2017-to-11-03-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
(292) 10-07-2017-to-10-13-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...0-13-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(293) 10-14-2017-to-10-20-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...0-20-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(294) 10-21-2017-to-10-27-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...0-28-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
(Yes I just realized I messed up the date on the thread...HC)

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For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.washingtonpost.com/worl...97043e57a22_story.html?utm_term=.5436af020226

Pakistan army claims shooting down Indian drone in Kashmir

By Associated Press October 27 at 11:21 AM

ISLAMABAD — Pakistan’s military says it has shot down an Indian unmanned drone after it entered Pakistani airspace in country’s part of the disputed Himalayan region of Kashmir.

In a statement, army spokesman Maj. Gen. Asif Ghafoor says the drone was spying when it was shot down Friday in Rakhchikri village along the Line of Control in Kashmir.

He said Pakistani troops retrieved the wreckage. There was no immediate comment from India.

Kashmir is split between Pakistan and India, who claim the territory in its entirety and have fought two wars over it since their independence from British rule in 1947.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...a-but-say-he-is-not-the-new-mao-idUSKBN1CX005

#China Party Congress 2017
October 27, 2017 / 5:15 PM / Updated 7 hours ago

China's neo-Maoists welcome Xi's new era, but say he is not the new Mao

Christian Shepherd
4 Min Read

BEIJING (Reuters) - A fringe group of hard-line conservatives who long for the way things were under communist China’s founding leader, Mao Zedong, have welcomed President Xi Jinping’s “new era” of socialism and its renewed emphasis on equality.

Their enthusiasm only goes so far, though. They don’t want to put Xi on the same pedestal as Mao.

At the ruling Communist Party’s leadership conclave that wrapped up this week, Xi laid out a confident vision for a proud and prosperous China, with the party firmly in control, and cemented his authority as the country’s most powerful leader since Mao took power in 1949 and declared the founding of modern China.

Delegates praised Xi using Mao-era honorifics, and he became the first serving Chinese leader since Mao to have a named ideology written into the party charter, signaling that it will be in effect beyond his second five-year term, which began this week.

“Their similarity is that they both want to rejuvenate the Chinese nation, they both want an independent, powerful, new China,” Song Yangbiao, a Beijing-based neo-Maoist freelance journalist, told Reuters.

“Chairman Mao freed the Chinese people from the oppression of the West, while Xi Jinping has dedicated himself to giving new China a greater voice on the global stage,” he said.

But Song said that it was “not realistic” to revive Mao’s party chairman title and confer it on Xi. That elevation is a possibility that has been floated, according to some sources with ties to the leadership.

“Chairman Mao’s authority was built from a long and arduous struggle. Xi’s power came from the bureaucracy in a time of peace. The history is totally different,” he said.

Some mainstream party cadres at the congress did not have such reservations. Many called Xi a wise and great “lingxiu”, or leader, an honorific only used for Mao Zedong and his short-lived successor Hua Guofeng.

Bayanqolu, party chief of northeastern China’s Jilin province, went so far as to call Xi “party helmsman”, a term not in general use in senior Communist Party circles since Mao, who was called the “Great Helmsman”.

“Accepting Xi as a powerful leader, accepting him as the most powerful leader since Mao, is a necessary trait of Xi’s new era,” said Sima Nan, a television pundit, blogger and defender of Mao and the Communist Party. “Look at how much he has said, how much he has written, how many people he has met - when does he have time to sleep?” he said in reference to Xi.

AWKWARD LEGACY
*** China has an awkward relationship with Mao’s legacy.

*** Mao is still officially venerated by the Party as the founder, with a huge portrait overlooking Tiananmen Square and his face on every yuan banknote. But he is disliked by many intellectuals and others in China, who consider him personally responsible for the tumultuous decade-long Cultural Revolution and economic policies that caused famine and killed millions.

*** State media sometimes say that what Mao did was 30 percent negative and 70 percent positive.

Neo-Maoists dismiss criticisms of Mao as smears by Westerners and revisionists, and the group vociferously defends Mao and his policies in articles online, with occasional public shaming of those who slight his legacy.

*** In January, a professor in central China was sacked from a university after Maoists protested a social media post in which he said Mao was responsible for millions of deaths.

*** While Xi has not lavished praise on Mao or his policies, he has defended his “mistakes” and has drawn a line against attempts to revise the Party’s official history, pleasing the neo-Maoists.*******

****He has also borrowed from Maoist imagery, rhetoric and campaigns to enforce discipline on cadres, garner public support and strengthen the party’s leading role in society.

*** “Party, government, military, civilian and academic, east, west, south, north and center, the Party leads everything,” Xi said during his speech to open Congress.


Reporting by Christian Shepherd; Editing by Tony Munroe and Martin Howell
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Well if you want to top darting for radio tagging and posing with a Siberian tiger for a photo op.... :vik:

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.realcleardefense.com/ar...satan_2_nuclear_ballistic_missile_112543.html

Putin Himself Fires SATAN 2 Nuclear Ballistic Missile

By Associated Press
October 28, 2017

MOSCOW (AP) — President Vladimir Putin has taken part in major military drills of Russian nuclear forces and personally directed the test-firing of four intercontinental ballistic missiles as part of the exercises, the Kremlin said Friday.

Putin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the drills Thursday involved all elements of the military’s nuclear triad — nuclear submarines, strategic bombers and a land-based launcher. He added that the exercises were routine and not directly linked to any international developments.

Still, the president’s direct involvement in overseeing intercontinental ballistic missile launches is an event that has been rarely reported by the Kremlin in the past.

“The commander in chief conducted the launch of four intercontinental ballistic missiles,” Peskov said in a conference call with reporters.

Peskov wouldn’t elaborate on what specific part Putin played in the war games, saying that the president took “the necessary moves in line with the standard procedure for relevant situations as the commander in chief.”

The Russian Defense Ministry said that in Thursday’s drills, a Topol ICBM fired from the Plesetsk launchpad in northwestern Russia hit a designated target on the Kura firing range on the Kamchatka Peninsula in the far east.

A nuclear submarine in the Barents Sea also launched an ICBM at the same Kura range, while another nuclear submarine in the Sea of Okhotsk fired two ICBM in the opposite direction, hitting targets at the Chizha firing range in the Arkhangelsk region in Russia’s northwest.

As part of the maneuvers, the Tu-160, the Tu-95 and the Tu-22 bomber launched cruise missiles at mock targets at firing ranges on Kamchatka, the Komi region in the far North and in Russia’s ex-Soviet neighbor Kazakhstan.

The maneuvers are the latest in a steady series of war games intended to strengthen the troops’ readiness amid tensions with the West.

In September, the Zapad (West) 2017 drills held jointly by Russia and Belarus have worried some NATO members, who have criticized what they have described as a lack of transparency and questioned Moscow’s intentions. Russia has rejected the criticism.

Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said at a meeting with top brass Friday that the military will continue to strengthen its forces in western Russia in response to a NATO buildup in Poland and the Baltics.

“The military-political situation at our western frontier remain tense and is set to exacerbate,” he said.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.smh.com.au/world/austral...urpass-the-united-states-20171024-gz780x.html

October 28 2017

Australian universities are helping China's military surpass the United States

Clive Hamilton and Alex Joske

In Beijing, President Xi Jinping is systematically reforming and strengthening the military - part of the Strong Army Dream that is intimately tied to his signature slogan "the China Dream".

But it now seems that this Strong Army Dream is being realised with Australian help.

Scientists at Australian universities are collaborating with China's top military technology universities on programs beneficial to the People's Liberation Army which, contrary to its name, is the army of the Chinese Communist Party*rather than the Chinese people.

The scientists' work includes sophisticated computing seen as essential to China's ambition to eclipse the United States in advanced military technology.

The man at the centre of many exchanges with Australian universities is Lieutenant-General*Yang*Xuejun, who has been a Communist Party member since the 1980s and*was a promoted to the*party's powerful Central Committee at this week's 19th Party Congress. The Congress reappointed Xi as party chairman for another five-year term and elevated him to a status alongside Mao Zedong as a great leader.

Until recently Yang*was president of the PLA's National University of Defense Technology (NUDT). One of the*PLA's*leading supercomputer experts, he is now president of the PLA Academy of Military Science, China's foremost military research centre.

Scientists at the University of NSW and the University of Technology Sydney have worked with Yang, whose*research with Australian scientists has resulted in over a dozen scientific papers, mostly on supercomputer technology. In a recent Chinese CCTV propaganda documentary, he highlighted the importance of supercomputer research in China's military plans. NUDT supercomputers are used in advanced aircraft design, combat simulation and the testing of tactical nuclear weapons.

One of Yang's most productive collaborators is Xue Jingling, Scientia Professor of Computing Science and Engineering at the University of NSW. Starting in 2008, their joint research has focused on stream processing technology, one of the foundations of NUDT's record-breaking Tianhe series supercomputers.

Xue has extensive links with NUDT, having published over two dozen papers with NUDT supercomputer experts. In 2009 he also became a professor at NUDT, an affiliation not mentioned on his UNSW profile. Some of Xue's research with NUDT has been funded by grants from the Australian Research Council (ARC) worth over $2.3 million. Three of Xue's current doctoral students at UNSW are graduates of NUDT and are likely all PLA personnel.

A spokesperson said UNSW is aware of the research being undertaken by Xue and his students, and the collaboration with General Yang, and believes it meets the provisions of the Commonwealth Defence Trade Controls Act.

Digging deeper

NUDT has collaborated with Australian researchers on hundreds of papers in high-tech fields like materials science, artificial intelligence and computer science. The PLA university's international collaborations are heavily concentrated in Australia, taking advantage of the large number of Chinese-heritage scientists at Australian universities.

Yang and his team have also been collaborating with former UTS professor Tao Dacheng, an expert in artificial intelligence. Tao's joint research has covered computer vision and speech analysis. Computer vision has many military applications, including automatic target recognition, missile guidance and battlefield assessment and prediction.

Tao has written 19 papers with NUDT researchers, with a focus on computer vision, including technology for tracking targets, and is listed as a doctoral supervisor at NUDT in China.**

Tao now works at the University of Sydney. While he was at UTS, one of his NUDT students visiting UTS, Guan Naiyang, researched technologies used in three of his projects for the PLA's General Armaments Department, including work on a classified*web crawler surveillance*technology*and two projects on cyber-based intelligence-gathering and analysis. Tao has written 11 papers with Guan on an advanced mathematics* technique known as non-negative matrix factorisation, which Guan is using for his General Armaments Department intelligence projects.

When we asked the University of Sydney to respond, Deputy Vice-Chancellor Duncan Ivison said that the university "insists on careful risk assessments for all research partnerships. This includes doing extensive due diligence on any research with national security implications."

Tao's research in collaboration with NUDT is partially funded by ARC grants worth over $1.8 million. His ARC funding totals $3.2 million and in 2017 he was awarded an ARC Laureate Fellowship. Earlier this year it was reported that ARC grants were being used to fund research with China's leading military aircraft manufacturer AVIC and PLA-linked telco Huawei.

Although NUDT recently started accepting civilian postgraduate students, Xue and Tao are shown on its website as willing to supervise only PLA personnel. We asked both professors*about their links to PLA universities and whether they feel any conflict of loyalties in passing on their expertise but they did not respond.

Supercomputing
The contributions by Xue and Tao to Chinese military research are only the tip of the iceberg. Scientists from CSIRO, ANU, Curtin University and the University of Wollongong have also recently engaged in similar work with the PLA.

The optics of Australian scientists working closely with researchers linked to the PLA are a matter of deep concern. The head of the ANU's National Security College, Rory Medcalf, notes that these PLA links may jeopardise future research partnerships with the US defence industry.

Before taking over at the PLA Academy of Military Science, Yang was chief engineer of NUDT's famous Tianhe supercomputer project. The Tianhe supercomputers were the fastest in the world until overtaken by China's Sunway TaihuLight.

Yang recently appeared in an eight-part documentary series screened by Chinese state television. One episode focuses on areas where China's military technology is surpassing that of the United States, including supercomputing.

Yang told CCTV: "Supercomputers are really a strategic commanding aspect of the nation's technology. They are also a fundamental technology for military improvement. The competition within this field is extremely intense."

Among other applications, computer technology is essential to allowing China to improve its military aircraft, which have long lagged behind those of the US. Testing of new aircraft designs has traditionally relied on wind tunnels, but today's supercomputers allow accurate simulation that speeds up the process and cuts costs.
Supercomputers are also indispensable to advanced combat simulation exercises, allowing much better prediction of the range of possible outcomes of complex conflict scenarios. The PLA believes supercomputer-assisted decision-making will boost its successes in potential clashes over the South China Sea or an invasion of Taiwan.

NUDT supercomputers are also used in the simulation and testing of tactical nuclear weapons.

Medcalf cautions that most Chinese research partnerships in Australia are above board, but notes that "China has long had a comprehensive strategy of gathering knowledge globally to increase its technological and military edge, and that ranges from cyber all the way through to orthodox research links with foreign universities".

Academic exchange
Over the years, while heading NUDT, General Yang built an extensive network*in Australia. In addition to working with high-level researchers in Australian universities, the top military college has sent graduates to undertake PhDs here, while also calling on Australian scientists like Xue and Tao to supervise the higher studies of military cadres in China.

Between 2007 and 2012, NUDT sent over 700 scientists and students abroad on exchanges or as visiting scholars, including to Australia. China has for decades used such programs to systematically vacuum up overseas technology for domestic use, especially in military fields.

China's 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-20) puts enormous emphasis on transitioning China's economy from basic manufacturing to high-tech industry. In recent years China has systematically bought, borrowed and stolen massive quantities of technology from the West.

The ANU, Curtin University and the University of NSW are at the forefront of this quiet research collaboration with China's military forces, although there are links to all Group of Eight universities.

At least 14 graduates of the PLA's top technology universities have passed through ANU in the past decade while pursuing their doctorates. Most if not all of those students are PLA cadres who have since returned to Chinese military institutions after working*in advanced fields like robotics, optics, materials science and computer vision while at ANU.

One example is Hu Yonggang, currently investigating acoustics and audio research at the ANU's College of Engineering and Computer Science. PLA records confirm that he is*a graduate of the PLA University of Science and Technology (PLAUST) College of Command Communications.

Speech enhancement is of value in a range of military and intelligence operations, including secure voice communication, military aircraft control and battle management. Hu's collaborators include researchers from the Flight Instructor Training Base of the PLA Air Force University, the PLA's Xi'an Communications Institute and PLA Factory 9373, which specialises in developing artillery technology.

Chang Lei received a PhD in plasma physics at ANU in 2014 after graduating from NUDT. ANU experts are developing a revolutionary plasma engine for use in spacecraft. Building on his studies at ANU, Chang is helping China build its space-based military assets. Since returning to China, he has worked at the PLA Air Force Engineering University and is developing plasma engines for the PLA General Armaments Department.

A third example is Liu Xinwang, a graduate of NUDT who spent some time as a doctoral student at the ANU. His research specialises in machine learning and computer vision and his PhD supervisor at NUDT was a PLA senior colonel. A photo from 2014 shows Liu dressed in his PLA uniform.

Another ANU connection worth noting is that of professor Qin Qinghua, head of the university's Research Group of Engineering Mechanics. A graduate of Huazhong University of Science and Technology, he's an expert in nanomaterials and composite materials, areas of high interest to China's military.

Among his former students is Tong Yonggang, who visited ANU as a PhD student in 2015. Qin and Tong have written at least three papers together on high-tech ceramics. Tong, a PLA cadre, was a doctoral student in aerospace science and engineering at the NUDT, graduating in 2016. He is also affiliated with the Academy of Armoured Forces Engineering in Beijing, the cradle of the PLA's armoured and mechanised forces, which uses ceramics technology to develop tank armour. Wang Xinghua is another NUDT PhD student who has visited Qin's lab.

An ANU spokesman said that the university does not have any agreements with the*NUDT*or with*PLAUST. The university does not comment on individual staff and students but says all foreign nationals at ANU must have an appropriate visa to work or study in Australia.*

Bamboo Curtin
ANU is not alone in this military-related collaboration. Wang Yang, a lecturer at the PLA Information Engineering University, where Chinese military hackers are trained, completed a PhD in cryptography at the University of Wollongong after receiving his master's degree from*NUDT.* (A University of Wollongong spokesman said the university relies on the vetting and visa approval processes of Australian government security agencies.)

In Perth, Curtin University civil engineers are prolific in their work with PLA scientists. Professor Hao Hong heads the Centre for Infrastructural Monitoring and Protection at Curtin University. He is a leading researcher in civil engineering, with a specialisation in blast and impact engineering. From 2013 to 2015, Hao was a member of the ARC College of Experts, which allocates research funds.

Since 2013 Hao, at the time a professor at the University of Western Australia, has been working together with PLA researchers. He has co-authored at least six papers with a group at*PLAUST*including Major-General Fang Qin, an expert in the study of explosions.

Fang is a professor at PLAUST whose recent research includes the study of "projectile penetration into mortar targets", simulations of "shaped charge jet penetration into concrete-like targets", and tests of the resistance of nuclear power plants to aircraft impact.

Hao has brought at least three PLA scientists to his Curtin University centre, including Li Zhan, who is currently visiting Curtin and studying for a doctorate at PLAUST, where enrolment records show him to be Chinese military personnel. Feng Bin, another visiting student and PLA cadre at Hao's centre, is also from PLAUST, where he researches blasts and vehicle armour and works with warheads experts. As in other research we've mentioned, the work carried out at the Curtin lab involves "dual-use technology" with clear military value. ARC grants worth $530,000 have contributed to Hao's collaboration with the PLA.

Curtin University Deputy Vice-Chancellor Chris Moran said that the university is aware of*Hao's research collaboration and is confident it meets its legislated requirements. He says it is "civilian" research.

We asked the ARC about its funding of some of the research we have described. Its chief executive,*Professor Sue Thomas, replied that the "Australian government and the ARC takes national security implications extremely seriously". She referred to various safeguards to protect sensitive and strategic technologies, adding that the ARC treats all allegations seriously and is in regular contact with universities to address matters such as these.

Clive Hamilton is professor of public ethics at Charles Sturt University in Canberra and is writing a book on China's influence in Australia. Alex Joske is a researcher and student at the Australian National University.

More Articles
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Xi Jinping: a man for all committees
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/10/jnim-claims-string-of-attacks-across-mali.php

JNIM claims string of attacks across Mali

By Caleb Weiss | October 27th, 2017 | weiss.caleb2@gmail.com | @Weissenberg7

Over the past two days, al Qaeda’s Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) has released several claims of responsibility for a series of assaults across Mali. Many of these occurred in southern and central Mali, while others took place in the northern region of Kidal.

The first claim released was for the Oct. 23 attack on a gendarmerie post in the village of Dioro in the central Segou region. JNIM claims its forces briefly took over the post, capturing weapons and equipment before retreating. In the same statement, it also claimed an assault on a gendarmerie post in the village of Ouan, also in the Segou region. The last claim in the statement was for an ambush on a Malian vehicle with a landmine near Tenenkou in the Mopti region.

The Malian military confirmed each attack as taking place, confirming several casualties. This includes one killed and two wounded in the assault in Ouan, while two others were wounded in the landmine blast.

In its next claim, JNIM said its fighters clashed with Malian guarding employees of the French company SATOM between the towns of Soumpi and Niafunke in the Timbuktu region. The jihadist conglomerate said that it killed two soldiers and wounded several others. Malian forces confirmed both the attack and the casualties. In the same statement, it also claimed an IED blast on a UN vehicle in Kidal.

In its last statement, it claimed yesterday’s IED attack on UN forces between Aguelhok and Tessalit in the Kidal region. The UN said that three of its peacekeepers were killed in the blast, while two others were wounded. This largely confirms with what JNIM reported in its claim.

At the same time, JNIM also released a statement blaming a French military raid for killing 11 Malian soldiers it was holding hostage near the northern town of Abeibara. However, this has been denied by French forces. In addition, the claim warrants several questions about why and how soldiers kidnapped in the south were all held together in a town in the far north of Kidal. The 11 were supposed to appear in a JNIM video but the video was never publicly released.

While not claimed, JNIM is also suspected in an IED attack occurring on Oct. 25 near the town of Mondoro in the central Mopti region. According to the Malian military, two soldiers were wounded in the blast.

Since the beginning of the year, there have been at least 218 attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger linked to al Qaeda according to data compiled by FDD’s Long War Journal.

Caleb Weiss is an intern at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a contributor to The Long War Journal.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/10/us-military-hits-islamic-state-in-yemen.php

US military hits Islamic State in Yemen

By Bill Roggio | October 27, 2017 | admin@longwarjournal.org | @billroggio

The US military launched two airstrikes against the Islamic State in Yemen yesterday. An estimated 60 Islamic State fighters are thought to have been killed in three US strikes that have targeted the group over the past two weeks.

Nine Islamic State fighters were killed in yesterday’s attacks, which took place in Al Bayda province in central Yemen, The Military Times reported. A US Central Command (CENTCOM) official told the news agency that “approximately 60 ISIS terrorists” were killed in the three combined airstrikes.

Previously, CENTCOM reported that it killed “dozens” of Islamic State fighters in attacks that targeted two training camps that were based in Al Bayda province.
In the announcement on the operation that targeted the two camps, CENTCOM noted that the Islamic State “has used the ungoverned spaces of Yemen to plot, direct, instigate, resource and recruit for attacks against America and its allies around the world.”

“For years, Yemen has been a hub for terrorist recruiting, training and transit,” CENTCOM continued.

The US military has stepped up operations against both the Islamic State and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Since the beginning of 2017, the US has launched more than 100 strikes against AQAP and three against the Islamic State.

The US government has begun to identify key members of the Islamic State’s network in Yemen. On Oct. 25, the US Department of Treasury noted that Abu Sulayman al-Adani serves as the emir of the Islamic State in Yemen. Nashwan al-Wali al-Yafi’i serves as the group’s top financial official, while Khalid al-Marfadi, Radwan Muhammad Husayn Ali Qanan and Khalid Sa’id Ghabish al-Ubaydi serve as key military leaders.

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD's Long War Journal.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
A bit late but I just came across this....HC


For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/islamic-state-networks-in-turkey/

Islamic State Networks in Turkey

Merve Tahiroglu, Jonathan Schanzer
29th March 2017 - FDD Press
Download the full report here.

Introduction
The year 2016 was catastrophic for Turkey. At least 30 terror attacks across the country took more than 300 lives.[1] Ankara survived a bloody military coup attempt in July, which claimed the lives of an additional 290. In a massive purge that ensued, more than 100,000 civil servants, academics and journalists across the political spectrum were either sacked or detained.[2] The economy was downgraded by nearly all of the major credit-rating agencies.[3] The military formally joined the Syrian civil war, primarily to carve out a long-desired “safe zone” across the border. And, in a historic moment in December, a Turkish police officer assassinated the Russian ambassador to Ankara. Turkish citizens spent half of the year under a state of emergency, which is still in effect.

The nation rang in 2017 with another devastating terror attack, this time at an iconic Istanbul nightclub, Reina, on New Year’s Eve. The mass shooting killed 39 people, becoming the deadliest attack that the Islamic State (IS) ever claimed in Turkey,[4] and the eighth mass assault tied to the group since 2015.[5] More than 150 people, many of them tourists, have been killed by IS in Turkey in the last year alone.[6]

Following the Reina massacre, the parliament extended the state of emergency for another three months, the second extension since the July 15 coup attempt. Authorities arrested dozens of people and issued an immediate media ban – as they have after every crisis in Turkey, including the assassination of the Russian ambassador in December. Ankara also announced “all social media accounts are being monitored.”[7] But the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)’s censorship of Turkish media and state of emergency measures have clearly failed to make Turkey safer. The widespread purges of the Turkish military and law enforcement officials have not helped.

To be sure, the Islamic State is just one of the groups that has targeted Turkey in the last two years. In December alone, Kurdish militants conducted three suicide attacks – twin bombings in Istanbul and another one in central Turkey – killing a combined 58 and wounding more than 150.[8]

The rise of renewed Kurdish radicalism was sadly predictable. In July 2015, Ankara’s peace talks with the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a designated terror organization, ended after a two-year ceasefire. The PKK has fought the Turkish state for four decades, but no Turkish government had ever negotiated with the group’s imprisoned leader, Abdullah Ocalan, before the AKP’s reign. The 2013 ceasefire had produced a period of unprecedented calm and socio-economic opportunity. Many younger-generation Kurds were infuriated by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s 2015 change of heart vis-à-vis the pursuit of a peaceful resolution of the country’s Kurdish conflict.

Since the so-called “solution process” ended in 2015, PKK-affiliated Kurds have carried their traditional guerilla warfare in Turkey’s southeast from the villages into the cities, and have detonated suicide vests in major Turkish cities including Ankara and Istanbul. Together with its offshoots, such as the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK),[9] the PKK has claimed more than 300 civilian lives in over 30 bombings since July 2015. Included among their targets was the leader of Turkey’s main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who survived the attack on his convoy in August but has received more threats since.[10]

Between the PKK and its more extreme affiliates in Turkey, Ankara has its hands full. But as both fights drag on, it seems increasingly clear that Turkey’s fight against Kurdish militants is steadily undermining its struggle against the Islamic State.

Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Turkey’s indifference towards and even tacit support for IS and other jihadists battling the Kurds across its borders has alarmed its Western allies, particularly the United States. Knowingly or not, Turkey allowed IS and other jihadist groups to establish their cells in Istanbul, Ankara, and other Turkish cities near the Syrian frontier. Turkey’s own radical Islamists have proved easy for IS and other Syria-based jihadists from groups – such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, also formerly known as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra) and Ahrar al-Sham – to recruit.

Beyond their physical networks in Turkey, the jihadists’ online presence in Turkish is growing. Indeed, social media has become the top recruiting platform for IS and other tech-savvy extremist groups. And while Turkey has imposed draconian media laws, Ankara’s online crackdown on jihadists remains relatively meek, with the AKP showing far greater alarm over anti-government expressions of political dissent.

Until 2015, militants had been preoccupied with the jihad against the Bashar al-Assad regime (and all minority groups) in Syria, sparing the Turks for the large part. Mounting attacks over the last two years, however, make clear that is no longer the case. As Turkey’s territorial designs in northern Syria increasingly clash with those of IS, and the two sides engage in direct military combat with greater intensity, the Islamic State is increasingly inclined to punish the Turks at home. With residual IS networks now spread throughout the country, the worst for Turkey may be yet to come.

Ankara claims that it foiled nearly 350 terror plots last year. If true, that would be an outstanding achievement. But the amount of terror-related bloodshed Turkey has suffered in the last two years is jarring. The prospect of continued violence threatens the country’s security, as well as the stability of its neighbors and allies.
...
[1] Including the suicide bombers, the exact number of deaths for 2016 is 325, based on a tally of the figures listed in “Bir buçuk yýlda 33 bombalý saldýrýda 461 kiþi hayatýný kaybetti; 363’ü sivil (461 people, 363 civilians lost their lives in 33 bombings in a year and a half),” Diken (Turkey), December 12, 2016. (http://www.diken.com.tr/bir-bucuk-yilda-33-bombali-saldirida-461-kisi-hayatini-kaybetti-363u-sivil/)
[2] “Purge in Numbers,” Turkey Purge, February 2, 2017. (http://turkeypurge.com/purge-in-numbers)
[3] S&P and Moody’s downgraded Turkey’s ratings in 2016, while Fitch joined them on January 27, 2017. Mehreen Khan, “Turkey cut to junk by Fitch, losing last major investment-grade rating,” Financial Times (UK), January 27, 2017. (https://www.ft.com/content/feb883bd-577f-31c6-b977-1c8082eccbad)
[4] Thomas Jocelyn, “Islamic State Claims Responsibility for New Year’s Day Attack at Istanbul Nightclub,” FDD’s Long War Journal, January 2, 2017. (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archi...ew-years-day-attack-at-istanbul-nightclub.php)
[5] The bombing at a Diyarbakir police station on November 4, 2016, which killed 11 people, was claimed by both IS and the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK), a Kurdish terror group in Turkey. Based on the target and location of the attack, the author ascribes the attack to TAK. See: Mahmut Bozarslan, “One bomb, three suspects: Who was behind latest Diyarbakir attack?” Al Monitor, November 13, 2016. (http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/11/turkey-diyarbakir-bombing-who-did-it-isis-pkk.html)
[6] See Appendix I.
[7] “Numan Kurtulmuþ'tan Sosyal Medya Uyarýsý (Social Media Warning from Numan Kurtulmuþ),” CNN Türk (Turkey), January 2, 2017. (http://www.cnnturk.com/video/turkiye/numan-kurtulmustan-sosyal-medya-uyarisi)
[8] Daren Butler, “Death toll in Istanbul bombings rises to 44: health minister,” Reuters, December 12, 2016. (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-blast-toll-idUSKBN1410VO); “Kayseri suicide bomber arrived from Kobane in Syria before attack,” Hürriyet Daily News (Turkey), December 19, 2016. (http://www.hürriyetdailynews.com/ka...ack-.aspx?PageID=238&NID=107471&NewsCatID=341)
[9] For a quick overview of TAK, see Aykan Erdemir, “PKK Offshoot Claims Ankara Attack,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, February 19, 2016. (http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/dr-aykan-erdemir-pkk-offshoot-claims-ankara-attack/)
[10] “Turkish main opposition CHP leader survives PKK attack on motorcade,” Hürriyet Daily News (Turkey), August 25, 2016. (http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/tu...cade.aspx?PageID=238&NID=103217&NewsCatID=341)
 

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https://www.voanews.com/a/senior-afghan-official-abducted-in-pakistan/4090081.html

Asia

Senior Afghan Official 'Abducted' in Pakistan

October 28, 2017 8:45 AM
Ayaz Gul

ISLAMABAD —*A senior Afghan government official has disappeared in neighboring Pakistan, where he was seeking medical treatment in a private capacity, officials revealed Saturday.

The deputy governor of the eastern Kunar province, Qazi Muhammad Nabi, was in Peshawar before being “abducted”, his relatives informed the Afghan consulate in the northwestern Pakistani city.

No one has claimed responsibility for the alleged kidnapping.

Local police say they have launched an investigation after receiving information from consulate officials but said they were neither aware nor informed by Afghan authorities about Nabi’s arrival in Peshawar.

An Afghan diplomatic source also confirmed the missing deputy governor was in Pakistan on his “ordinary passport” and they were also unaware of his presence in the country.

There are an estimated three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, half of them undocumented. Most of them are in the Pakistani border province of Khyber Pakhtunkhaw. Peshawar is its capital city.

A large number of Afghan officials belong to the refugee community and often visit Pakistan to visit families and receive medical treatment.

Kunar, where Nabi is the deputy governor, is one of the volatile Afghan provinces bordering Pakistan. Taliban insurgents and members of the Afghan branch of Islamic State have bases in Kunar.

Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have recently deteriorated over mutual allegations of supporting and sheltering anti-state militants to plot terrorist attacks against each other's soils.
 

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Explosions rock Somali capital Mogadishu

1 minute ago
From the section
Africa

The Somali capital has been rocked by two explosions in quick succession, just two weeks after huge bomb killed more than 350 people.

The first explosion was reportedly caused by a car bomb being driven into a hotel, while the second blast took place shortly afterwards, near the former parliament house.

Major Abdullahi Aden told Reuters news agency that militants had stormed the hotel after the blast.

There is no word on casualties yet.

According to Major Aden, a car was driven up to the gates of the Hotel Nasa Hablod Two before exploding.

He told Reuters: "It is a busy hotel frequented by lawmakers, (military) forces and civilians."

The second explosion is understood to have taken place about half-an-hour later, near security forces.

Mogadishu is still coming to terms with the bombing two weeks ago, which left at least 358 dead, and another 56 still missing.

No-one has yet claimed responsibility for the 14 October attack, which the government says was carried out by the Islamist al-Shabab group.

The al-Qaeda-linked group has denied it was behind the bombing.
 

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#Middle East & North Africa
October 27, 2017 / 3:24 PM / Updated 17 hours ago

Islamic State guerrilla attacks point to its future strategy

Angus McDowall, Tom Perry
7 Min Read

BEIRUT (Reuters) - Syrian and Iraqi forces closing in on the last scraps of Islamic State’s caliphate straddling the remote border area between the two countries have already witnessed the jihadists’ likely response.

While their comrades mounted last stands in their Syrian capital of Raqqa and the city of Hawija in Iraq, IS militants seized the Syrian town of al-Qaryatayn and launched its biggest attack for months in Ramadi late last month. That is the kind of guerrilla insurgency both countries foresee IS turning to.

“It is expected that after the Daesh terrorist organisation’s capacity to fight in the field is finished, its remnants will resort to this type of (guerrilla) operation. But for a certain period of time, not forever,” said a Syrian military source, using an Arabic acronym for Islamic State.

The continued ability for IS to mount attacks in areas where it was thought to have been eliminated will hinder efforts to stabilise regions when the fighting wanes.

In Iraq, where Islamic State originated, it has a proven record of falling back upon local networks from which it can rise anew when conditions allow. So far, it has not shown it has the same capacity in Syria, and it might find doing so more challenging there than in Iraq.

The sectarian divisions on which it thrives are less pronounced in Syria, and it faces competition there for jihadist loyalty from other powerful militant groups.

“Daesh is in essence an Iraqi organisation, it will survive to some extent in Iraq. Syrian members will dissolve in other Syrian Salafi jihadist groups,” said Hisham Hashami, an adviser on Islamic State to the Iraqi government.

But in both countries it has shown it can exploit holes left by overstretched enemies to carry out spectacular attacks - the one in Syria’s al-Qaryatayn most clearly - that spread panic and tie down opposing forces.

It has also proved able to carry out bombings and assassinations in areas controlled by the Iraqi and Syrian governments, U.S.-backed Kurdish militias and rival jihadist rebel groups, signalling an ability to survive underground.

A jihadist from a Syrian rebel faction opposed to Islamic State said the group had won enough support among young men to give it a latent capacity to revive.

“I believe that it is possible, given that its ideology has spread widely among the youths, that something new will emerge,” the jihadist said, pointing to the highly effective propaganda machine deployed by Islamic State over the last three years.

TERRIBLE SPEED
The al-Qaryatayn attack began on the evening of 29 September, when up to 250 militants with guns, rockets and mortars spread around the area with “terrible speed”, said Ayman al-Fayadh, a resident.

It was particularly alarming because the government had declared al-Qaryatayn safe months ago, and had helped its residents to move back into their homes.

When the jihadists were finally forced out after three weeks of fighting around the outskirts of al-Qaryatayn, they took their revenge, slaughtering scores of its inhabitants. “They were very bloodthirsty and didn’t spare anyone,” Fayadh said.
The Syrian military source said it took three weeks to retake the town because it was inhabited and the army was trying to avoid civilian casualties.

However, the attack showed how towns in Syria’s deserts, where armed forces can be spread only thinly, are vulnerable to Islamic State and that such operations can tie down opposing armies.

“People are afraid of Daesh returning,” said a Syrian journalist who visited the town this week. “They killed anyone who had taken part in pro-government protests. Bodies had been thrown in streets and in wells.”

Fayadh also said townspeople were among the attackers, indicating that Islamic State used its years of rule to build local support networks and establish sleeper cells for future attacks - something that could be replicated elsewhere in Syria.

“They’re going to continue to have to look for places where they can plan and finance and resource and launch their attacks from,” said Colonel Ryan Dillon, spokesman for the U.S.-led coalition, noting Islamic State had often used “sparsely populated areas”.

The assault on Ramadi took place three days before. Militants attacked Iraqi security forces with suicide car bombs, mortars and machine guns in a city that it had apparently lost months earlier.

GUERRILLA WAR
The big challenge in both Iraq and Syria is to co-opt the Sunni Arab tribes, or risk a revival of jihadist insurgency.

The Suuni-Shi‘ite divide has plagued Iraq since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 that ignited the civil war. Shi‘ite parties backed by Iran have dominated the government and used militia forces against mostly Sunni insurgents.

The Syrian government may have the same problem. It is allied to the region’s main Shi‘ite powers - Iran and militia groups such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah - and led by a president, Bashar al-Assad, from a Shi‘ite offshoot sect.

It will also be a challenge for the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) alliance in northern Syria, which is spearheaded by Kurdish groups. They have sometimes struggled to convince Arabs that it will protect their interests.

“It all depends on the degree to which those fighting under Assad and the SDF incorporate settled tribes into governing structures,” said Andrew Tabler, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East policy.

Even in northwestern Syria, where rebel groups including jihadist factions hold sway, hardship and insurgent infighting might create space for Islamic State to again seize ground.

Beside the al-Qaryatayn attack, a group of Islamic State fighters have managed to take a pocket of territory in rebel-held areas near Hama in recent weeks, battling a rival jihadist group for control of several villages.

It has used bomb attacks and assassinations to target government-held cities in the west, Kurdish security forces in the northeast and Islamist rebel factions in the northwest.

In the isolated enclave it holds in Yarmouk camp south of Damascus, it has also shown renewed aggression, taking over the headquarters of a neighbouring rebel group this month by force.

The jihadist rebel said he believed Islamic State could repeat the strategy it used in Iraq last decade of retrenching when under attack, then rebounding in more virulent form.

“In this period of weakness, Islamic State depends on the ideology that it spread,” the jihadist said.

“It appears that the same experience is being repeated. They could carry out bombings, a guerrilla war.”

Reporting By Tom Perry and Sarah Dadouch in Beirut and Maher Chmaytelli in Baghdad; Writing by Angus McDowall; Editing by Larry King
 

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ALERTS USA 10/28/2017 North Korea Nuclear threat Accelerating
Started by Ben Sunday‎, Today 02:52 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...-2017-North-Korea-Nuclear-threat-Accelerating

The Winds of War Blow in Korea and The Far East
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...-of-War-Blow-in-Korea-and-The-Far-East/page72

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ASIA PACIFIC

North Korea Rouses Neighbors to Reconsider Nuclear Weapons

By DAVID E. SANGER, CHOE SANG-HUN and MOTOKO RICH
OCT. 28, 2017

As North Korea races to build a weapon that for the first time could threaten American cities, its neighbors are debating whether they need their own nuclear arsenals.

The North’s rapidly advancing capabilities have scrambled military calculations across the region, and doubts are growing the United States will be able to keep the atomic genie in the bottle.

For the first time in recent memory, there is a daily argument raging in both South Korea and Japan — sometimes in public, more often in private — about the nuclear option, driven by worry that the United States might hesitate to defend the countries if doing so might provoke a missile launched from the North at Los Angeles or Washington.

In South Korea, polls show 60 percent of the population favors building nuclear weapons. And nearly 70 percent want the United States to reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons for battlefield use, which were withdrawn a quarter-century ago.

There is very little public support for nuclear arms in Japan, the only nation ever to suffer a nuclear attack, but many experts believe that could reverse quickly if North and South Korea both had arsenals.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has campaigned for a military buildup against the threat from the North, and Japan sits on a stockpile of nuclear material that could power an arsenal of 6,000 weapons. Last Sunday, he won a commanding majority in parliamentary elections, fueling his hopes of revising the nation’s pacifist Constitution.

This brutal calculus over how to respond to North Korea is taking place in a region where several nations have the material, the technology, the expertise and the money to produce nuclear weapons.

Beyond South Korea and Japan, there is already talk in Australia, Myanmar, Taiwan and Vietnam about whether it makes sense to remain nuclear-free if others arm themselves — heightening fears that North Korea could set off a chain reaction in which one nation after another feels threatened and builds the bomb.

In a recent interview, Henry A. Kissinger, one of the few nuclear strategists from the early days of the Cold War still living, said he had little doubt where things were headed.

“If they continue to have nuclear weapons,” he said of North Korea, “nuclear weapons must spread in the rest of Asia.”

“It cannot be that North Korea is the only Korean country in the world that has nuclear weapons, without the South Koreans trying to match it. Nor can it be that Japan will sit there,” he added. “So therefore we’re talking about nuclear proliferation.”

Such fears have been raised before, in Asia and elsewhere, without materializing, and the global consensus against the spread of nuclear weapons is arguably stronger than ever.

But North Korea is testing America’s nuclear umbrella — its commitment to defend its allies with nuclear weapons if necessary — in a way no nation has in decades. Similar fears of abandonment in the face of the Soviet Union’s growing arsenal helped lead Britain and France to go nuclear in the 1950s.

President Trump, who leaves Nov. 3 for a visit to Asia, has intensified these insecurities in the region. During his presidential campaign, he spoke openly of letting Japan and South Korea build nuclear arms even as he argued they should pay more to support the American military bases there.

“There is going to be a point at which we just can’t do this anymore,” he told The New York Times in March 2016. Events, he insisted, were pushing both nations toward their own nuclear arsenals anyway.

Mr. Trump has not raised that possibility in public since taking office. But he has rattled the region by engaging in bellicose rhetoric against North Korea and dismissing talks as a “waste of time.”

In Seoul and Tokyo, many have already concluded that North Korea will keep its nuclear arsenal, because the cost of stopping it will be too great — and they are weighing their options.

Capability to Build the Bomb

Long before North Korea detonated its first nuclear device, several of its neighbors secretly explored going nuclear themselves.

Japan briefly considered building a “defensive” nuclear arsenal in the 1960s despite its pacifist Constitution. South Korea twice pursued the bomb in the 1970s and 1980s, and twice backed down under American pressure. Even Taiwan ran a covert nuclear program before the United States shut it down.

Today, there is no question that both South Korea and Japan have the material and expertise to build a weapon.

All that is stopping them is political sentiment and the risk of international sanctions. Both nations signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but it is unclear how severely other countries would punish two of the world’s largest economies for violating the agreement.

South Korea has 24 nuclear reactors and a huge stockpile of spent fuel from which it can extract plutonium — enough for more than 4,300 bombs, according to a 2015 paper by Charles D. Ferguson, president of the Federation of American Scientists.

Japan once pledged never to stockpile more nuclear fuel than it can burn off. But it has never completed the necessary recycling and has 10 tons of plutonium stored domestically and another 37 tons overseas.

“We keep reminding the Japanese of their pledge,” said Ernest J. Moniz, chief executive of the Nuclear Threat Initiative and an energy secretary in the Obama administration, noting that it would take years if not decades for Japan to consume its fissile material because almost all its nuclear plants have remained offline since the 2011 Fukushima accident.

China, in particular, has objected to Japan’s stockpile, warning that its traditional rival is so advanced technologically that it could use the material to quickly build a large arsenal.

Analysts often describe Japan as a “de facto” nuclear state, capable of building a weapon within a year or two. “Building a physical device is not that difficult anymore,” said Tatsujiro Suzuki, former deputy chairman of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission.

Japan already possesses long-range missile technology, he added, but would need some time to develop more sophisticated communications and control systems.

South Korea may be even further along, with a fleet of advanced missiles that carry conventional warheads. In 2004, the government disclosed that its scientists had dabbled in reprocessing and enriching nuclear material without first informing the International Atomic Energy Agency as required by treaty.

“If we decide to stand on our own feet and put our resources together, we can build nuclear weapons in six months,” said Suh Kune-yull, a professor of nuclear engineering at Seoul National University. “The question is whether the president has the political will.”

In Seoul, a Rising Call for Arms

President Moon Jae-in has been firm in his opposition to nuclear weapons. He insists that building them or reintroducing American ones to South Korea would make it even more difficult to persuade North Korea to scrap its own.

Though Mr. Moon has received high approval ratings since his election in May, his view is increasingly a minority one.

Calls for nuclear armament used to be dismissed as chatter from South Korea’s nationalist fringe. Not anymore. Now people often complain that South Korea cannot depend on the United States, its protector of seven decades.

The opposition Liberty Korea party called on the United States to reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea in August after the North tested an intercontinental ballistic missile that appeared capable of reaching the mainland United States.

“If the U.N. Security Council can’t rein in North Korea with its sanctions, we will have no option but to withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty,” Won Yoo-chul, a party leader, said in September.

Given the failure of sanctions, threats and negotiations to stop North Korea, South Koreans are increasingly convinced the North will never give up its nuclear weapons. But they also oppose risking a war with a military solution.

Most believe the Trump administration, despite its tough talk, will ultimately acquiesce, perhaps settling for a freeze that allows the North to keep a small arsenal. And many fear that would mean giving the North the ultimate blackmail tool — and a way to keep the United States at bay.

“The reason North Korea is developing a hydrogen bomb and intercontinental ballistic missiles is not to go to war with the United States,” said Cheong Seong-chang, an analyst at the Sejong Institute near Seoul. “It’s to stop the Americans from intervening in armed skirmishes or full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula.”

The closer the North gets to showing it can strike the United States, the more nervous South Koreans become about being abandoned. Some have asked whether Washington will risk the destruction of an American city by intervening, for example, if the North attempts to occupy a border island, as its soldiers have practiced.

For many in South Korea, the solution is a homegrown nuclear deterrent.

“If we don’t respond with our own nuclear deterrence of some kind, our people will live like nuclear hostages of North Korea,” said Cheon Seong-whun, a former presidential secretary for security strategy.

With nuclear weapons of its own, the South would gain leverage and could force North Korea back to the bargaining table, where the two sides could whittle down their arsenals through negotiations, some hawks argue.

But given the risks of going nuclear, others say Seoul should focus on persuading Washington to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons.

“The redeployment of American tactical nuclear weapons would be the surest way” to deter North Korea, Defense Minister Song Young-moo said last month, but he added that it would be difficult to get Washington to agree to that.

In Tokyo, Cautious Debate

The discussion in Japan has been more subdued than in South Korea, no surprise after 70 years of public education about the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

But Japan has periodically considered developing nuclear weapons every decade since the 1960s.

In 2002, a top aide to Junichiro Koizumi, the prime minister then, caused a furor by suggesting Japan might one day break with its policy of never building, possessing or allowing nuclear arms on its territory.

North Korea has reopened that question.

Shigeru Ishiba, a former defense minister seen as a potential challenger to Prime Minister Abe, has argued that Japan needs to debate its nuclear policy given the threat from North Korea.

Mr. Abe has stopped short of calling for a re-evaluation of the country’s position on nuclear weapons. But he has increased military spending and echoed Mr. Trump’s hawkish position against the North.

Mr. Abe’s administration has already determined that nuclear weapons would not be prohibited under the Constitution if maintained only for self-defense.

The Japanese public is largely opposed to nuclear weapons with polls indicating fewer than one in 10 support nuclear armament.

But Japan’s relations with South Korea have long been strained, and if Seoul armed itself, those numbers could shift.

Some analysts say the discussion is aimed at getting additional reassurance from Washington. “We always do that when we become a little upset about the credibility of the extended U.S. deterrence,” said Narushige Michishita, a professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo.


303 COMMENTS

Tobias Harris, a Japan analyst at Teneo Intelligence, a political risk consultancy, said Japan would rethink its position on nuclear weapons if it suspects the United States would let it down.

“We’re kind of in uncharted waters as far as this goes,” he said. “It’s hard to know exactly what the threshold is that will lead the Japanese public’s switch to flip.”

Correction: October 28, 2017
An earlier version of this article misstated the amount of plutonium Japan stores overseas. It is 37 tons, not 37 million tons.
 

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#Commentary
October 26, 2017 / 12:47 PM / 2 days ago

Commentary: In Sunni North Africa, fears of Iran’s Shi’ite shadow

Jonathan Laurence
10 Min Read

These are challenging times for North Africa’s Muslim governments. Even as Islamic State is ousted from its strongholds in Iraq and Syria, the extremist group is continuing its battle against authorities in countries like Morocco, Algeria and Egypt.

On Oct. 16, the Egyptian military announced that six soldiers and at least 24 IS militants were*killed in attacks on military outposts in North Sinai. That same weekend, Moroccan police*arrested 11 members of an “extremely dangerous” IS-linked cell and seized chemical products used to make bombs. Algerian forces, meanwhile, have killed at least 71 Islamist fighters so far this year – the most since 2014.

The list of arrests, shootouts and seizure of passports from citizens who want to be foreign fighters goes on. But North African leaders have to navigate a particularly tortuous sectarian path. To avoid the perception that fighting extremism amounts to the persecution of the defenders of the faith, their governments have to be seen to be making visible gestures of Islamic piety – while also cracking down on Shi’ite proselytizing so as to rebut IS claims that authorities are complicit with Iran’s “plots and schemes” to carve up the region and spread Shi’ite Islam.


After Islamic State
From new alliances to shifting Sunni-Shi’ite relationships, Reuters columnists examine how Islamic State losses could reshape the Middle East


The Islamist PJD party in Morocco warned recently of a “sectarian Shi’ite invasion;” the Grand Mufti of Mauritania called on his country’s leaders to resist the “rising Shi’ite tide.” One North African government minister I interviewed denounced “the intrusion of Shi’ism through social media, university dormitories, high schools and even qur’anic schools,” concluding gravely, “I ask myself whether the Persians want to dominate the Arab world.”

After Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Lebanon and Bahrein, is North Africa the next realm of a more assertive Iranian foreign policy? These fears come from Iran’s attempt to expand its influence in Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia – and its “backyard:” Senegal, Niger, Guinea and Mali.

Iran’s foreign minister toured the region in June, meeting with heads of government in Algeria, Mauritania and Tunisia in search of improved ties. Iran may simply be looking for new economic partnerships to offset current sanctions, but its outreach is enough to make some local powers nervous. Around the same time, Iran launched satellites beaming Arabic-language Shi’ite religious programming into North African homes.

There are thought to be fewer than 20,000 Shi’ites in Algeria, and the government recently mandated the registration of all of them. The Algerian minister of religious affairs has said that Shi’ites have no right to spread their faith in Algeria, “because that causes sedition and other problems.” "Algeria cannot play host to a sectarian war that does not concern it,” he explained in an interview. “Neither Shi'ism, nor Wahhabism nor any of the other sects are the product of Algerians, nor do they come from Algeria. We refuse to be the battleground for two external and foreign ideologies.” Diplomatic relations resist easy categories, however. Algeria is one of only a handful of countries, along with Iran, to maintain good relations with Yemen’s Houthi rebels, who are Shi’ite. Algiers was Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s first stop in North Africa in June.

Given the tiny number of Shi’ites living in North Africa and the tight control over mosques in the region, widespread Shi’ite religious influence on the ground is unrealistic. Whether or not the scale of proselytism justifies the level of concern, Moroccan and Algerian leaders view Iran’s Africa policy as a threat to their domestic order and regional security. The prospect of sectarian strife exists for “heterodox” – i.e. non-Sunni – minorities scattered across the region, numbering in the millions who live under mainstream Sunni rule. Some of these groups are offshoots of Shi’ite Islam, but are not necessarily the source of conflict. In Algeria, their mere difference – and the government’s toleration of them – sometimes provokes attack from local hardliners.

North Africa’s Sunni governments struggle with the reality that two adversaries – Iran and IS – are the net beneficiaries of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the crushing of Sunni opposition in Syria in 2017. The decline of Saudi influence after the Sept. 11 attacks and the downfall of Sunni Baathist rule in Iraq enhanced Iran’s stature while diminishing Sunni Arab influence in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria – and opening a path for IS.

Officially, there is no Shi’ite minority in Morocco;*unofficial estimates put the number at less than 2 percent. Nonetheless, the foreign ministry in Rabat has accused Iran of trying to alter “the kingdom’s religious fundamentals.” The bad blood is the legacy of a sour relationship between Ayatollah Khomenei and King Hassan II (the father of current Moroccan King Mohammed VI) in the 1980s. The Ayatollah’s claims of Islamic supremacy over all Muslims threatened the Moroccan King’s role as “Emir al Mouamine” – leader of the faithful – of scores of millions of followers across Northwest Africa. Hassan chaired the international council of Islamic scholars that declared the Ayatollah to be an apostate – “if he is Muslim, then I’m not” – and openly supported Iraq in its war with Iran.

In turn, Hassan thought he saw an Iranian hand behind his domestic travails. Tehran provided safe haven to the Moroccan armed opposition group Chabiba Islamiya, and Hassan publicly accused Iran of fomenting riots against rising living costs and the violent uprising in the northern Rif region that is home to many Berbers. Street contestation in the Rif region has again put Rabat off balance in 2017 and revived the accusations a generation later.

The contrast with neighboring Tunisia is significant. Tunis has enjoyed unbroken relations with Iran since 1990, including high-level exchanges before and after the January, 2011 revolution that sparked what became known as the Arab Spring. Trade with Iran increased significantly as a result, but hardly registered compared to much more significant trade with the EU, North Africa, China and Turkey. Tunisia prides itself on being an island of sectarian tolerance in a rapidly polarizing region. Senior religious affairs officials proudly state that they represent all religions, including Christians and Jews, although in reality the country has very few non-Sunni Muslims. After the January 15 revolution, Tunisia signed the United Nations Convention on Human Rights and helped protect religious freedom in Article 6 of its new constitution.

Saudi Arabia has maintained its natural advantage, however. A month after the Iranian foreign minister left Tunis, a Saudi government delegation arrived, including 53 businessmen. They signed agreements with the government worth $200 million in development projects, including several hospitals and the renovations of a historic mosque in Kairouan.

But not all countries in North Africa feel they have that freedom when they perceive a two-front ideological battle against IS and Iran. In response to the State Department’s admonishments on religious freedoms in Algeria, the Algerian Minister said: “If they want to accuse us of defending Islam and our historic traditions, then let them.”

The defeat of IS in Raqqa has bought time for North African governments to consolidate their religious communities. But that same defeat also removes an obstacle to Iranian influence – not unlike the fall of Baghdad almost 15 years ago. Don’t expect the competition for leadership from the Persian Gulf to be resolved anytime soon.

About the Author
Jonathan Laurence is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution, a political science professor at Boston College and the author of Coping with Defeat: Sunni Islam, Roman Catholicism and the Modern State @jonathanlauren6
The views expressed in this article are not those of Reuters News.
 

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Africa

Somali police, Intelligence Chiefs Fired After Deadly Hotel Siege

Last Updated: October 29, 2017 9:44 AM
VOA News

Somalia's police chief and intelligence chief have been fired, after a deadly al-Shabab siege of hotel in the capital Mogadishu.

Officials say at least 26 people were killed in the attack on the popular Nasa Hablod Two hotel in Mogadishu. Dozens more were injured in the explosion.

Militants stormed the hotel Saturday, following a car bomb blast at the hotel’s gate.

Police say they have captured two of the attackers and have killed two more.

The al-Shabab militant group has claimed responsibility for the attack on the hotel.

In the wake of the attack, the Commander of Somali Police, General Abdihakim Dahir Saaid and Intelligence Chief Abdullahi Mohamed Ali Sanbalolshe have been fired, Minister of Information Abdirahman Omar Osman announced on his twitter account.

There was a second car bomb blast Saturday near the former parliament building.The extent of the damage from that explosion was not immediately clear.

WATCH: Mogadishu Rocked By 2 Explosions

The twin bombings came exactly two weeks after a huge truck blast killed at least 358 people at a busy Mogadishu intersection.

Somalia’s government blamed the militant al-Shabab group for the Oct. 14 attack, although the militant group has not claimed responsibility.
 

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SWJ Book Review – “The Muhammad Code: How a Desert Prophet Brought You ISIS, al Qaeda, and Boko Haram”

by Jonathan Zartman
Journal Article | October 29, 2017 - 11:53pm

Bloom has written an extraordinarily thorough and richly descriptive argument, with a variety of supporting themes. Readers should start with the last chapter before the first. This chapter shows his great objective: To understand the thinking of radical Islamic militants like Osama bin laden and Daesh leader al-Baghdadi. Bloom logically takes great pains to trace the historical development of this form of thinking, using the orthodox literature of leading Islamic historians and jurists, because militants like bin Laden and al-Baghdadi claim these sources for their program and methods. He documents his deep, intensive research into the Hadith literature with 1930 footnotes.

This book should not be considered as any form of claim regarding the general beliefs of Muslims, or any argument about Islam itself as a religion (although the casual reader may jump to such a false perspective). This book has a much different objective, which has its own humane and liberal viewpoint.

For example, he bases his argument on social and biological research, attempting to explain the behavior of militant Islamists as the product of continuing psychological and social attributes of human beings, sharing many behavioral patterns with animals. He compares the biological research into the behavior of youth gangs, chickens, and rats subjected to physical stress. He concludes that these cases display a similar pattern: individuals deal with stress by abusing the weakest, or the “nerd” in the group. Leaders target the helpless as a tool for building social cohesion, and promoting the confidence of the group in its competition with other groups. He argues: “Every gang has its leader, its bully, its joker, and its nerd” (82). “The same is true in the pecking order of societies, the pecking order of nations and the pecking order of civilizations” (82). He documents the four times in which Muhammad destroyed a tribe of Jews, and concludes this represents using a strategy of attacking a scapegoat to build group cohesion.

Despite this ostensibly academic content, the eminently engaging, easy-to-read tone and style of the book holds the reader’s attention and interest. Bloom uses a repeated motif of “memes” and “meme hooks” to describe the psychological power of the personal and organizational doctrines and tactics that Muhammad used to build an effective, cohesive militarily force. He summarizes the staggering military victories of Islamic armies, and argues that they constitute an important form of evidence and guidance for Islamist militants today.

Bloom offers a number of well-documented and interesting case studies. For example, an excellent overview of the consequences of the massive recent Muslim migration to Europe and the attendant rise in crime, violence, and mass casualty attacks. He also carefully notes the education and middle-class background of most of the militants. He contrasts the view of Islamic militants seeking “the peace of the grave” and “the peace of the prison” to the European view of peace through trade and political federation. Bloom concludes that the 1,100-year history of peace movements in Western Civilization has had a soporific effect, citing Stephen Pinker’s The Better Angels of our Nature. In contrast, he describes the claim of Islamist militants that pursuing peace requires warfare, following the example of Muhammad.

In another case, this book offers a great deal of detail on the protracted Muslim youth riots in Europe, primarily France, in September 2005. He refutes the arguments that these riots merely reflected poverty, unemployment, discrimination, and racism, using quotations from Muslim websites tajdeed.net and alsaha.com bragging about their attacks as Jihad 3.0. Bloom also notes the efforts to Muslim leaders to calm down the angry teenagers. He cites the South Asia Analysis Group in its claim that the riots may have begun spontaneously, but then were “prodded along by three international extremist groups: Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which operates in 40 countries, Lashkar-e-Toiba, based in Pakistan and Jamaat-ul-Fuqra, a New York and Pakistan-based Jihadist group” (176). Meanwhile the UPI reported that “the radical Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat claimed credit for the rampage” (176).

In other chapters, he traces the development of CAIR, its practice of deception and support for militants (many of its leaders arrested for such support.) He discusses the Nation of Islam, which leads him to document the large and sophisticated efforts to promote Salafi Jihad doctrine in the American prison system.

Bloom makes some interesting claims in his discussion of Sufism: “In Baghdad Abd al-Qadir al Jilani focused on the quest for ecstatic emotions, on summoning those emotions by reciting poetry that praised Muhammad at the top of your lungs, and on practicing kindness and charity.” *He also notes the heroism of Muslims who fight against violence: Munawar Anees, former advisor to the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, and founder of two of the leading journals of Islamic Studies in the Islamic World: Periodica Islamica and the International Journal of Islamic and Arabic Studies; and Kamal Nawash, founder of the Free Muslim Coalition Against Terrorism in Washington DC

Bloom calls Ayaan Hirsi Ali a “Muslim reformer,” when in fact she is openly an atheist.[1] He copies the list of genuine Muslim reformers that she printed in her book Heretic: (p 231).

In sum, despite the danger that a causal reader might extrapolate the argument made here - regarding the way in which radical militants think - to assume some claims regarding the beliefs of Muslims in general, this book offers a great deal of valuable information on a variety of pressing social problems. The clear, fluid writing draws the reader into this colorful and engaging story. Readers should be careful to keep their eye on the forest, the big idea, that radical militants claiming the mantle of political Islam employ extremely powerful psychological and social tools, supported by a rich historical legacy. The thorough documentation from original sources and the rich case studies make this book valuable for anyone seeking greater understanding of some of the most disruptive social movements operating today.

End Note
[1] After reading the Atheist Manifesto by Herman Philipse, she became an outspoken atheist. She was the keynote speaker of the American Atheists convention in 2014. http://www.conservapedia.com/Ayaan_Hirsi_Ali

About the Author

Jonathan Zartman
Dr. Jonathan Zartman is an associate professor in the Department of Research at Air Command and Staff College. He received his Ph. D. in 2004 from the University of Denver. He has served as a Fulbright Fellow to Uzbekistan, a National Security Program Fellow to Tajikistan and has traveled for research and consultations in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Iran, Oman, and Turkey. His published articles and conference presentations cover the topics of social movements, civil wars, conflict analysis, cultural identity, and Islam.

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Senators to Press Tillerson and Mattis on New War Authority

By Richard Lardner
October 30, 2017

WASHINGTON (AP) — President Donald Trump’s national security brain trust faces Congress on the need for a new war authorization as the deadly ambush in Niger is igniting a push among many lawmakers to update the legal parameters for combat operations overseas.

Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson are scheduled to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Monday. They told the panel behind closed doors three months ago that a 2001 law gave the military ample authority to fight terrorist groups.

But that’s a position that won’t wash with a growing number of congressional Republicans and Democrats, many of whom were startled by the depth of the U.S. commitment in Niger and other parts of Africa. They’ve argued that the dynamics of the battlefield have shifted over the past 16 years and it’s well past time to replace the post-Sept. 11 authorization with a law that reflects current threats.

Sen. Tim Kaine, D-Va., said last week he believed most Americans would be surprised by the extent of the operations in Africa that U.S. forces are involved in. Kaine and Sen. Jeff Flake, R-Ariz., are sponsoring legislation to install a new war authority for operations against the Islamic State group, al-Qaida and the Taliban.

“I don’t think Congress has necessarily been completely kept up to date and the American public, I think, certainly has not,” Kaine said after leaving a classified briefing conducted by senior Pentagon officials on the assault in Niger that killed four American soldiers.

Roughly 800 U.S. service members are in Niger as part of a French-led mission to defeat the extremists in West Africa. There are hundreds more American forces in other African countries.

U.S. troops also are battling an enemy — Islamic State militants — that didn’t exist 16 years ago in a country — Syria — that the U.S. didn’t expect to be fighting in. Nor did the 2001 authorization anticipate military confrontations with the Syrian government. Trump in April ordered the firing of dozens of Tomahawk missiles at an air base in central Syria and American forces in June shot down a Syrian Air Force fighter jet.

Beyond that, Trump approved a troop increase in Afghanistan, the site of America’s longest war, and the U.S. backs a Saudi Arabia-led coalition carrying out airstrikes in Yemen.

“As we face a wide array of threats abroad, it is perhaps more important than ever that we have a sober national conversation about Congress’ constitutional role in authorizing the use of military force,” Sen. Bob Corker, R-Tenn., the committee chairman, said in a statement.

But previous attempts to ditch the old authorization and force Congress to craft a new one have failed. Democrats in the House complained that Speaker Paul Ryan used underhanded tactics after an amendment was stripped from a military spending bill that would have repealed the 2001 war authorization 240 days after the bill was enacted. Proponents of the measure said eight months was enough time to approve new war authority.

GOP leaders said voting to rescind existing war authority without a replacement in hand risks leaving U.S. troops and commanders in combat zones without the necessary legal authority they need to carry out military operations.

A similar effort in the Senate led by Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky., also came up well short. Paul, a member of the committee and a leader of the GOP’s noninterventionist wing, has accused his colleagues of surrendering their war-making power to the White House.
 

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https://www.politico.eu/article/finland-russia-nato-wary-finns-take-another-look/

Wary of Russia, Finns take another look at NATO

Moscow’s military assertiveness makes the alliance an issue in the upcoming presidential election.

By Reid Standish 10/30/17, 4:10 AM CET Updated 10/31/17, 4:47 AM CET

HELSINKI — For decades, Finland managed its delicate relationship with Russia by avoiding any move that could provoke the “sleeping bear” on its eastern border.

Now, a retired senior diplomat is pushing his country to risk angering the beast — by joining the NATO military alliance.

“This country deserves an open debate when it comes to foreign and security policy,” said Hannu Himanen, Finland’s ambassador to Russia until 2016.

After four years in Moscow, Himanen became convinced his country should stop worrying about irking Russia and start thinking about ensuring its own security by joining the Western military alliance.

In a newly published book, “West or East — Finland and the return of geopolitics,” he’s also critical of Finnish leaders, who he says avoided a frank public debate on foreign policy for too long — arguments that are stirring up controversy ahead of a presidential election in January.

There are growing signs that Finland may be ready to have that debate — not the least because a rare pro-NATO candidate is running for office.

Nils Torvalds, of the Swedish People’s party, is the only clearly pro-NATO candidate in a crowded pack of seven contenders.

The former journalist and MEP is determined to make his voice heard, with a controversial pitch to get off the fence and become a clear member of the Western military order.

“Any discussion in Finland about foreign policy will have to address NATO,” Torvalds said. “If we don’t discuss now then we can’t be prepared in the future.”

A whiff of war
It’s no fluke Finland is slowly coming around to a debate about NATO.

This presidential vote is the first election since Moscow’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the outbreak of war in Ukraine. Since then, tensions between NATO forces and Russia in the Baltic Sea have grown.

Finland’s neighbors have sounded the alarm that their region could be the next flashpoint with Russia. Repeated incursions into Baltic and Nordic airspace by Russians jets have only added to the unease.

In response to Russia’s perceived provocations, Sweden — Finland’s closest military ally and another non-NATO member — remilitarized the remote island of Gotland in the Baltic Sea for the first time since the end of the Cold War and hosted large-scale military exercises with NATO countries in September.

Meanwhile, NATO deployed four battalion-sized battle groups to Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to deter the Russian military. Officials across the region say they are moving quickly to counter and adapt to the Kremlin’s new generation of war capabilities.

Finland, determined to shore up defenses against its eastern neighbor, has invested heavily in defense and maintaining its large 280,000-person conscript army.

In the Finnish system, the president is in charge of foreign and defense policy, together with parliament.

Despite the heightened security climate, there has been little public debate about NATO membership among presidential candidates.

Himanen attributes this to what he calls a “dismal” debating culture in Finland when it comes to national security issues, which is born out of Finland’s difficult history with the Soviet Union.

After fighting two bloody wars with Moscow, Helsinki walked a delicate tightrope between East and West during the Cold War with a policy of neutrality, allowing it to balance integration with Europe and good relations with Moscow.

This often entailed Finland suppressing internal political debates to accommodate the wishes of its larger neighbor to the east.

After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Finland turned sharply to the West, joining the European Union and adopting the euro.

Alpo Rusi, who served as former Finnish President Matti Ahtisaari’s foreign policy adviser from 1994 to 1999, said NATO membership was discussed during that period. But decision-makers believed they did not need to join the alliance as a new, safer era had begun with the end of the Cold War.

Himanen hopes that the current low-point of relations between Moscow and the West, and his book, will contribute to a more vibrant debate as election season begins.

“People might say that I’m being too loud about this,” Himanen said. “But I am simply using language and talking about things that would be bread-and-butter issues in any other Western European democracy.”

Hedging for election
Still, the vast majority of the candidates in the upcoming election echo the standard positions within Finland’s traditional foreign policy spectrum.

Pekka Haavisto, the Green League candidate who faced off with current President Sauli Niinisto during the last presidential election in 2012, has said he is not in favor of joining NATO.

But, in a hint of openness to the idea, he said Finland should seek membership if Sweden decides to join.

Laura Huhtasaari, the candidate from the right-wing Finns Party, has advocated that Finland remain self-reliant in terms of defense.

In an email, she wrote: “At the moment, in light of current information, I don’t support NATO membership.”

Niinisto, the incumbent who has a commanding 76 percent support ahead of the election, has pushed to keep the prospect of NATO membership open for the future while embracing cooperation with the alliance.

But he said membership needed to be backed by a majority of Finns, possibly via a referendum.

“We should not think that public opinion could be swayed merely by a declaration of intent voiced by the political leadership,” Niinisto said. “It would require facts and phenomena that the majority of the public would recognize as speaking in favor of Finnish membership.”

Support remains low — around 25 percent in favor*as of late 2016.*But the number of Finns who are undecided about joining NATO has risen since the war in Ukraine, hinting at a shift in attitudes.

Torvalds, the pro-NATO candidate, is against a referendum on NATO membership.
“Other politicians hide behind the referendum,” he said. “It’s a way for them not to have to say anything. It’s a cowardly way of politics.”

However, Charly Salonius-Pasternak, a senior research fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, suggests that politicians’ ambiguity on NATO is actually a strategic asset.

Salonius-Pasternak said that by not being clearly in favor or against NATO membership, candidates can court a wider swath of the electorate. And by keeping the door of NATO membership open, Finnish policymakers feel they are better able to balance their relations with Moscow.

“Creating uncertainty in the minds of the Kremlin about what Finland is going to do has been one of the main motifs of Finnish policy over the last few decades,” Salonius-Pasternak said.

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https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/move-one-man-rule-china-and-beyond

Tuesday 31 Oct 2017 | 23:45 | SYDNEY

China

The move to one-man rule in China and beyond

By Erica Frantz @EricaFrantz, Andrea Kendall-Taylor
30 October 2017
12:09 AEDT

The much anticipated 19th Party Congress has come to a close in China after a week of painstakingly constructed public displays of Chinese Communist Party successes, goals, and virtues. Held every five years, the event offers rare insight into the intentions of the Chinese leadership and the future direction of the regime.

Before this year's Congress, there was widespread speculation that Xi Jinping would use the occasion as an opportunity to consolidate his power. This indeed proved to be the case. Xi had his personal philosophy (Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era) put into the national constitution, leaving him in the same company as Mao Zedong. Fuelling speculation that Xi might break with the tradition of ruling for a*ten-year term, the new leadership line-up he unveiled featured no clear successor - those selected to serve on the Politburo Standing Committee*are all in their 60s, meaning there is no one young enough to be eligible to succeed Xi in 2022. Even if Xi should step down after his next five-year term, however, it is possible that he is now so influential that he could rule the country from behind the scenes. The Congress was further evidence of what many observers already suspected: Xi is the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao.

This concentration of power did not occur overnight, of course. Since assuming the leadership in 2012, Xi has slowly worked to increase his personal control over the Chinese regime and move away from the more collective and collegial leadership style characteristic of his predecessors, particularly since the 1990s. For one, Xi initiated an anti-corruption campaign that has enabled him to purge his political opponents and expand his own influence in the party and military.

Xi also restructured the military. He assumed the rank of Commander-in-Chief of the People's Liberation Army, the only Chinese leader to have ever done so, and shifted economic decision-making from the government to the Party, which he runs. As an additional indicator of Xi's rising power, in 2016 the party gave him the title of 'Core' Leader, a title only Mao, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin had previously enjoyed. As one analyst put it, Xi has 'reinstated (one) of the most dangerous features of Mao's rule: personalist dictatorship'.

Xi's consolidation of personal power is not a development unique to China. As we document in a new study, personalist dictatorship – in which leaders face few constraints on their decision-making – is on the rise and part of a changing face of authoritarianism in the post-Cold War era. Leaders such as Russia's Vladimir Putin, Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, and Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdogan chipped away at constraints on their rule over a span of years and ultimately emerged as highly personalised autocrats. Though the Chinese regime has more traditional origins (ie. revolution), it is adapting in ways that are consistent with its authoritarian contemporaries.

The increasing personalisation of the Chinese political system is likely to shape the country's domestic and foreign policies. Personalist dictatorship is associated with a host of negative outcomes, including more assertive and unpredictable foreign policy, greater domestic volatility and chances of miscalculation, and diminished prospects for democratisation. A well-established body of political science research shows that the extent of constraints on executive decision-making dramatically affects both the process of how decisions are made and the policies that result.

If Xi continues to consolidates control and limit his accountability (particularly over military and foreign policy bodies), research suggests that he could be emboldened to accept more risk to assert China's power. Already, Xi's increasingly aggressive posture toward Taiwan and in the South China Sea has occurred alongside the rising personalisation of the political system. Not only do personalist dictatorships pursue aggressive foreign policies, but thanks to limited constraints on decision-making, they also have the latitude to change their minds on a whim, producing volatile and erratic policies. This same lack of constraint, combined with a tendency to promote loyalists and other 'yes men', also increases the risk of miscalculation and misstep.

Finally, personalist regimes are the least likely to democratise. Their propensity to dismantle institutions and side-line competent individuals out of fear of threats to their power tends to bode poorly for democracy. Instead of transitioning to democracy, the collapse of personalist regimes tends to give way to new dictatorships (as in the Democratic Republic of Congo post-Mobutu Sese Seko) or failed states (as in Somalia since Siad Barre).

Xi's decisive win in the Party Congress substantially shifts the balance of power between him and the Chinese elite in his favour. Such asymmetry tends to be difficult to reverse, as the power imbalance makes it increasingly hard for the elite to mobilise opposition that could constrain the leader. The sustained success of Xi's incremental power grabs has probably made elite insiders less willing to oppose his future efforts to consolidate power because they now understand that they too may lose their privileged access to power if they resist. Personalist rule and Xi's 'New Era', in other words, shows no signs of abating.

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Daily News Roundup

China has practiced bombing runs targeting Guam, US says

By: Tara Copp  
7 hours ago

JOINT BASE PEARL HARBOR-HICKAM, Hawaii - China has practiced bombing runs targeting the U.S. territory of Guam, one of a host of activities making U.S. forces here consider Beijing the most worrisome potential threat in the Pacific, even as North Korea pursues a nuclear warhead.

Beyond the well-publicized military build up on man-made islands in the South China Sea, China has built up its fleet of fighters to the extent that it operates a daily, aggressive campaign to contest airspace over the East China Sea, South China Sea and beyond, U.S. military officials here in the region said. China has also taken several other non-military steps that are viewed as attempts to make it much more difficult for the U.S. to operate there and defend allies in the future.

The officials described the escalatory behaviors by China in a briefing they provided to reporters traveling with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford.

The officials said despite increased threats by North Korea as it pursues its nuclear weapons program, a conflict with North Korea is still viewed as “a fight we can win,” they said. With China, they said they “worry about the way things are going.”

China “is very much the long-term challenge in the region,” said Dunford, who was not part of the briefing. “When we look at the capabilities China is developing, we’ve got to make sure we maintain the ability to meet our alliance commitments in the Pacific.”

Over the last year Japan has scrambled 900 sorties to intercept Chinese fighters challenging Japan’s Air Defense Identification Zone, or ADIZ. In 2013 China announced borders for its own ADIZ, borders which overlapped Japan’s zone and included the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Since then, increased interactions between Japanese and Chinese aircraft ultimately resulted in Japan relocating two fighter squadrons to Naha Air Base on Okinawa to more easily meet the incursions, the officials said.

“We now have, on a daily basis, armed Chinese Flankers and Japanese aircraft” coming in close proximity of each other, the officials said.

Intercepts between the U.S. and China are also increasing, the officials said.

“It’s very common for PRC aircraft to intercept U.S. aircraft,” these days, the officials said, referring to the People’s Republic of China.

Chinese aircraft are also testing U.S. air defense identification zones, the officials said.

Chinese H-6K “Badger” bombers upgraded with 1,000 mile range air launched cruise missiles are testing U.S. defense zones around Guam, the officials said.

The Badgers run “not infrequent” flights to get within range of the U.S. territory, they said.

“The PRC is practicing attacks on Guam,” the officials said.

Those bombers are also flying around Hawaii, they said.

The vast majority of the flights occur without an incident, for example, a report of unsafe flying. The officials said they follow U.S. Pacific Command guidance on how to respond in those events, so they do not further escalate.

Military-to-military relationships between the U.S. and China remain open, if guarded, the officials said. Both Chinese and U.S. officials meet twice a year at the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement conference, where the incursions are discussed along with other security topics.

The expanded Chinese fighter and bombers runs are just one part of the country’s effort to “win without fighting” to gradually normalize the gains China has made in the South China Sea, the officials said.

There are other pressures. For example, the officials said they estimate the People’s Liberation Army Navy has placed as many as 150,000 Chinese commercial fishing vessels under its direction, even though they are not official Chinese navy. The Chinese fishing vessels make coordinated attacks on Vietnamese fishermen, the officials said, ramming and sometimes sinking boats near the Paracel Islands. China took the territory from Vietnam in the 1970s and has militarized some of the islands. The area remains a traditional fishing area for the Vietnamese.

Taken together, China’s activities suggest it is preparing to defend expanded boundaries, the U.S. officials worry.

“I think they will be ready to enforce it when they decide to declare the Nine-Dash line as theirs,” one of the officials said, referring to the territorial line China has identified that would notionally put the entire South China Sea under Chinese control if enforced.

If unchallenged, the U.S. officials worry that China could slowly force countries away from what they describe as the “rules based order” -- essentially the standing international treaties and norms -- in the region and make them shift their security alliances to Beijing for their own economic survival.

Dunford said the U.S. would not allow that to happen.

“We view ourselves as a Pacific power,” Dunford said.

“There are some who try to create a narrative that we are not in the Pacific to stay,” he said. “Our message is that we are a Pacific power. We intend to stay in the Pacific. Our future economic prosperity is inextricably linked to our security and political relationships in the region.”

While all of the officials stressed that there is no imminent danger of a conflict with China, U.S. forces in the region are rethinking what a Pacific fight would look like.
“If we find ourselves in conflict out there we will be under air attack,” the official said.

One concept they shared is “Agile Combat Employment” -- dispersing the U.S. advanced fighters concentrated at air bases in Japan and scattering them to 10-15 undeveloped and highly expeditionary airstrips on islands in the region. The dispersion would require the rapid dissemination of logistics support to keep those aircraft operating at their remote locations. The Air Force has already been practicing how to disperse the fuel, most recently in their Arctic Ace exercise, the officials said.

The idea would be that the aircraft would be so dispersed that it would make it difficult for China to prioritize what it would attack.

President Donald Trump will visit the Pacific region later this week, making stops in Japan, South Korea, China, Vietnam and the Philippines. Dunford said he expected that some of the security and economic concerns generated by the increased incursions and economic pressures by China would likely come up.

“If people want to view that as a focus on China they can. But it’s based on a rules-based international order,” Dunford said. “It’s focused on our ability to advance our national interests. We’re not going to compromise in that regard.”

45
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Author

About Tara Copp
Tara Copp is the Pentagon Bureau Chief for Military Times and author of the award-winning military non-fiction "The Warbird: Three Heroes. Two Wars. One Story."
 

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http://www.nationaldefensemagazine....tration-to-examine-equipment-interoperability

NATO Nations Testing Equipment Interoperability

10/31/2017
By Connie Lee

The most recent event in a series of coalition capability demonstrations is helping to ensure that equipment from NATO countries are able to work together, according to military officials from participating nations.

John Miller, the event’s program manager assigned to the U.S. Joint Staff command and control, communications and computers/cyber directorate, told reporters during an Oct. 30 phone call that the setup for Bold Quest 17.2 kicked off at the end of last month. Operations and data collection began two weeks later and is scheduled to run until early November, he said. The demonstration is being held at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and Camp Atterbury-Muscatatuck, Indiana. This year’s Bold Quest includes participation by 16 partner nations in addition to the United States.

“If you go around the Bold Quest community, everybody comes here to link their equipment up with somebody else,” Miller said. The demonstration is focused on performing operations in all domains and requires the use of a variety of platforms and equipment, such as fighter jets and unmanned aircraft systems.

Miller highlighted joint fires support as one of the best examples of ensuring interoperability. Countries have been “working the digital interoperability involved with a call for fire from a joint forward observer or joint terminal tech controller all the way up to the combined joint task force headquarters," he said.

“They have equipment, battle management systems, that represents all of those echelons,” he added. “What they’ve been doing for the last week and a half or two is just . . . making sure that everybody’s system is interoperable with everybody else’s that’s in that line of work here so that regardless of what the nationality of the requester or the fires providers is, it’ll work.”

Industry participation through government sponsorships is also helping countries demonstrate and examine multiple capabilities, Miller said.

For example, Dutch army Maj. Martijn Hadicke said Harris Corp. provided about 20 to 25 radios and two operators for the event to inform a larger procurement process.

“We’re able, as an army, to work with the newest equipment in a very early stage," he said. In return, Harris gets to work with experienced operators and communications architects to develop a concept of operations for the radios. "It's a win-win situation," he added.

Master Sgt. Anders Simonsen, of the Royal Danish Air Force, hopes to use the event to put Denmark’s equipment through its paces.

“Very quickly we can see how robust our equipment is and maybe make some changes,” he said. "We used Bold Quest to do some [interoperability] tests before a deployment to Iraq. We actually tested with some U.S. units over here, so we were sure that our radar was interoperable with the U.S. system.”
 

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https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/us-ignores-sub-saharan-africa-its-own-peril

Assessments
Nov 1, 2017 | 16:58 GMT
5 mins read

U.S. Ignores Sub-Saharan Africa at Its Own Peril

Highlights:

- Despite the historically low-priority status of sub-Saharan Africa to the U.S. military, the U.S. security focus on the region will continue to grow given the systemic weaknesses that militant groups exploit there.

- The use of a light footprint strategy — including special operations forces, drones, and cooperation with local partners and allies such as France — will enable the United States to project force at minimal cost.

- Although President Donald Trump's administration opposes funding multinational efforts such as U.N. peacekeeping missions, the U.S. military will continue to emphasize local partnerships with nations in sub-Saharan Africa.

Sub-Saharan Africa has long been a low priority for the United States. Since taking office in January, U.S. President Donald Trump's administration has confirmed that status, cutting foreign aid budgets that disproportionately affect Africa and turning its focus to other issues and areas. Yet events in recent weeks have magnified the region's prominence in U.S. foreign policy. On Sept. 24, for example, the Trump administration added Chadian nationals to the list of people facing travel restrictions. Four U.S. service members died in Niger the following week during a mission with local troops. Nikki Haley, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, recently visited Ethiopia, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. And on Oct. 20, U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis reportedly told senior members of the Senate Armed Services Committee that the military would increase its counterterrorism activities in sub-Saharan Africa, loosen rules of engagement and give commanders in the field more decision-making power. Despite the Trump administration's actions, the region now appears to be receiving more attention from U.S. policymakers.

A Rising Security Priority
U.S. military investment in sub-Saharan Africa has been quietly growing for years. This October, in fact, marked the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), one of nine unified combatant commands. The continent has been a key testing ground for the U.S. military's "small footprint" strategy, which emphasizes partnerships with local forces and cooperation with allies such as France. The strategy also stresses the role of special operations forces, drones and training facilities known as Cooperative Security Locations or "lily pads" in an effort to avoid the perception of an overbearing, neocolonial U.S. military presence. (Washington tried to establish a permanent headquarters on the continent when it first rolled out AFRICOM but moved its main offices to Germany after populations and governments in Africa pushed back against the idea.)

As the U.S. military's interest in sub-Saharan Africa has grown, its priorities in the region have shifted. The United States initially focused on East Africa — and particularly on the fight against the al-Qaeda affiliated militant group al Shabaab. In Somalia, U.S. military trainers have provided extensive assistance to the Somali army and to the multinational African Union Mission in Somalia, or AMISOM. But over the past several years, West Africa has started drawing more of the United States' attention. The chaos that consumed Libya after the fall of longtime leader Moammar Gadhafi in 2011 spilled over into nearby Mali, along with militants and weapons. In 2013, an offensive from allied jihadist and Tuareg nationalist forces prompted France to intervene to bolster the Malian army and keep the West African country from collapse, with considerable logistical support from the U.S. military. The incident opened the Pentagon's eyes to the glaring security risks in the Sahel, the ecological transition zone between the Sahara and the savannah that traditionally has fallen in France's sphere of influence. Putting aside their Cold War rivalry in the region, Paris and Washington began working together more closely in sub-Saharan Africa.

The U.S. Military's View of Africa
africa-conflict-areas-white.png

https://www.stratfor.com/sites/defa...africa-conflict-areas-white.png?itok=vxf0J5zD

Resistance From Washington
The Trump administration, however, may set a limit on the partnership. For months Washington has oscillated between wariness and hostility at the prospect of backing the Sahel joint force, a counterterrorism effort made up of battalions from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. Though Trump has pledged $60 million to the project, he has also indicated his displeasure with funding multinational efforts. France, which has devoted considerable resources to help establish the force since President Emmanuel Macron came to power, is getting frustrated with the lack of financial and political support from the United States. During a trip to Washington in mid-October, the French defense minister reportedly asked the United States to increase its assistance for the Sahel joint force, stating that Paris was looking for a long-term strategy to ease its security burden in the region.

Trump's distaste for funding programs such as U.N. peacekeeping missions, combined with the reports that the Pentagon wants to increase its activities in Africa, makes for an interesting contradiction. Nevertheless, the current administration is unlikely to break with its predecessors' policies, which tried to minimize U.S. military action in favor of local solutions. Senior officials in the U.S. armed forces overwhelmingly agree on the need to keep investing in local partnerships, even as Trump pushes for more aggressive action against militant groups around the world. Considering that the Sahel — a region whose vast, isolated terrain falls largely under the governance of poor, weak states — will struggle indefinitely with instability, maintaining this strategy is essential. Increased activity in sub-Saharan Africa, moreover, comes with unavoidable risks for U.S. policymakers. To strengthen forces in Niger, for example, U.S. service members will have to accompany their local counterparts on potentially dangerous missions, much as they have in Somalia. And the inherent environmental and logistical challenges that await them in the desolate lands of the Sahel will raise the odds of complications or casualties.

The rise of terrorism has driven home the reality that the United States can't afford to disregard sub-Saharan Africa. Though the continent has long been low on Washington's list of priorities, the recent proliferation of militant groups in the Sahel offers a stark reminder that the United States ignores the region at its own peril.

--

There's No Easy Way Out of Africa for French Forces
Related by West Africa Niger Sahara

French Interventions in Africa Will Endure
Related by France Sahel West Africa

The Niger River Basin: Supporting West Africa's Empires
Related by West Africa Sahara Niger
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.realcleardefense.com/ar..._expansionist_view_of_geopolitics_112566.html

China Takes an Expansionist View of Geopolitics

By Zhixing Zhang
November 01, 2017

Former U.S. national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski managed to capture thousands of years of Chinese history in about 10 words. In his seminal work, The Grand Chessboard, Brzezinski characterized China's geopolitics through the ages as "cycles of reunifications and expansions, followed by decay and fragmentations." The assessment gets at the heart of the the country's recurring struggle to unify an insurmountably vast landmass under a centralized authority — a struggle that continues to this day. Nearly 70 years after its most recent unification, following more than two centuries of decay and five decades of fragmentation, China is now on the verge of another period of expansion. And as its influence on the global stage increases, China will have to adapt to a new view of geopolitics.

The Middle Kingdom: A World Unto Itself
Compared with its counterparts in the West, China historically has taken a narrower view of geopolitics, one that reached scarcely farther than its borders. Part of the reason for its Sinocentric perspective is the country's sheer geographic scale and diversity. China's borders encompass a territory as immense and varied as that of the entire European continent. Though for the most part it has held together as a cohesive nation, the country is a collection of states, each with its own ethnic, cultural and economic characteristics. And whereas the sweeping European Plain is large enough to accommodate the Continent's many competing powers, China's heartland, making up less than one-third of its total area, doesn't lend itself to coexistence.

The strongest of China's rival forces periodically rose from the chaos to bring the country under centralized rule. Each successive dynasty, be it Han, Mongol or Manchu, followed a well-worn path to power, with few exceptions. Up until the 10th century, political power was concentrated largely in the Guanzhong Plain in northwestern China (and sometimes around the Central Plain), as were the wars and conquests aimed at expanding the central leadership's authority. The power eventually drifted eastward as the North China Plain took on increased economic and cultural importance, linking up with the fertile Yangtze Plain. As the empire pushed its frontiers farther to the north and east, the North Plain's prominence grew. The Yangtze Plain, by contrast, produced dynasties that quickly succumbed either to their own weaknesses, as the Southern Song did in the 12th and 13th centuries, or to their northern competitors, as the short-lived Nationalist government did in the 20th century.

And no matter how the power shifted across China's sprawling territory, the same process — competition for the Central Plain, or Zhongyuan — underlay each dynastic transition. The country's various factions understood that control of the heartland would give them control of the entire territory. This principle was laid out later by British geopolitical theorist Halford Mackinder in his "Heartland Theory." As Mackinder might have put it, "Who rules the Central Plain commands the heartland; who rules the heartland commands the Middle Kingdom." The Sinocentric thinkers behind China's geopolitical strategy, however, would take the theory a step further: Who rules the Middle Kingdom commands the world.

china-region-population-density-white_1.png

https://www.stratfor.com/sites/defa...-population-density-white_1.png?itok=j4K4N9ER

This idea guided the country through centuries of unification, expansion, fragmentation and decay, prescribing a distinct approach for managing each stage in the cycle. At times of dynastic decay and rebellion, for instance, military strategy and defense were the answer for aspiring leaders trying to secure the "mandate of heaven." A different set of rituals and rules, interregional links such as the Grand Canal and military forays into the surrounding area helped a dynasty maintain the mandate it had worked so hard to attain. At the same time, subsidiary tiers of government extended the rulers' authority from the heartland to the rest of the Middle Kingdom and beyond. Using a tributary system of appointed officials and, in rare cases, military installations, China's leaders managed to radiate their power from Central Asia to the Korean Peninsula and Indochina, reaffirming their control of the heartland, the kingdom and the world as they saw it.

Facing the Sea
By the 17th century, though, the dawn of the maritime era would shatter China's illusions of the cloistered domain at its command. Maritime intruders began arriving on the country's shores, where the Manchu rulers of the Qing dynasty, China's last imperial dynasty, eventually met them. Though the Manchu boasted what Mackinder called the "superior mobility of horsemen and camelmen," their strategy to repel invasion was no different from that of the ethnic Han rulers that preceded them. Where the Han Ming dynasty built the Great Wall to defend their rule against the Manchus, the Qing Empire erected fortresses along the coastline to keep the intruders at bay. China had yet to develop its naval assets, and its geopolitical theory wouldn't evolve to account for maritime power for three centuries. Even then, the theory gained little attention in the country until Japan used it against China to win the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95. The defeat marked the start of another period of fragmentation in the Middle Kingdom — and the end of the Sinocentric strategy.

It took the so-called century of humiliation for China to realize that its limited worldview was no longer viable. Of course, the broader geopolitical strategy that prevailed in the West didn't serve the European powers much better. After struggling for control of the Eurasian landmass — what Mackinder dubbed the "World Island" — they emerged from two world wars and countless smaller conflicts only to find that the center of global power had shifted across the Atlantic Ocean. The difference is that while Europe had lost some of its clout in world affairs, China, preoccupied as it was with its own problems, was all but irrelevant — at least to many classical geopolitical thinkers of the time. When maritime and land-based power were the rule of the day, the combination of a disjointed territory on the edge of the Eurasian landmass and a hemmed-in coastline seemed to doom China to exist on the margins of the global order.

China-Major-Regions-Core-030816_0.png

https://www.stratfor.com/sites/defa...Major-Regions-Core-030816_0.png?itok=ZNWsAyZd

Casting a Wide Net
Nonetheless, the Middle Kingdom overcame its geographic circumstances and emerged once again as a unified nation. And in the process, its geopolitical thinking evolved. The trials it endured in the second half of the 20th century — including the wars on the Korean Peninsula and in Indochina, a U.S. maritime blockade and the simultaneous threat of pressure from the Soviet Union — helped China realize its strength. The geography that once seemed a curse to Chinese geopolitical theorists now brimmed with possibility. The country's location, after all, gives it maritime access to developed markets abroad and overland access to valuable energy assets in Central Asia and the Middle East, an advantage geopolitical theorist Nicholas Spykman identified in the early 1940s. Having caught on to its good fortune, China's geopolitical objective was now to tap into "the wealth to the east, and energy to the west," as Chinese scholar Zhang Wenmu put it.

Sure enough, China's position has enabled the country to rise to the status of a world power. An unprecedented focus on maritime theory in the 2000s helped the country build a formidable navy to channel its power on the high seas. In the years since, its geopolitical theorists have turned their attention to roads and railways as another conduit for the country's influence. The Belt and Road Initiative combines both tactics, reviving the land and sea routes of the ancient Silk Road to link China to the European continent. Despite its focus on infrastructure development, the project goes beyond economic or even diplomatic strategy; the Belt and Road Initiative is China's plan to expand its empire to suit its new geopolitical theory.

belt-and-road-main-map-obor_2.png

https://www.stratfor.com/sites/defa...lt-and-road-main-map-obor_2.png?itok=6SOrBiwj

Geopolitics With a Familiar Ring
Beijing, however, understands the importance of restraint in this endeavor. As it has throughout history, China is embarking on its latest expansionary course more out of necessity than out of ambition. The Belt and Road Initiative, for example, aims above all to ease the country's economic and logistical dependence on its east coast and to develop its desolate inland regions. Similarly, Beijing's assertive maritime policy is an attempt to secure its access to overseas markets and prevent a challenger from emerging to threaten its multiplying interests around the world. And like the Han and Tang dynasties before it, China today will run up against other empires as it pursues its geopolitical strategy in the surrounding region and farther afield.

China will try to outmaneuver these risks wherever possible. As it does, though, the country will inevitably wind up extending its reach even farther and encountering new dangers along the way. China's expansionist geopolitical theory is a new approach, and one that will take some getting used to after centuries spent in the service of a largely self-contained strategy. But the Middle Kingdom will find its perils and imperatives familiar. China's history won't repeat itself, but it may well rhyme.

This article appeared originally at Stratfor.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphj...itary-and-so-is-its-major-rival/#aaa004b71e42

Nov 2, 2017 @ 02:00 AM 3,770

As China Continues To Expand Its Military, Rival Taiwan Responds In Kind

Ralph Jennings , Contributor
Opinions expressed by Forbes Contributors are their own.

A national security official from Taiwan said this week the government would seek to increase defense spending at least 2% every year. It was more a reminder than*an*announcement, as Taiwan has long paced its military budget with economic growth that comes in around the same percentage. But money particularly matters now as Taiwan is working hard this year on a pair of capital-intensive, homegrown pieces of hardware to sharpen defenses against ever restive political rival China.

China said in March it would spend 7% more on its own military, already ranked the world’s third most powerful. That percentage is also roughly consistent with Chinese GDP expansion. Within the past year, China has finished work on a homemade fighter plane and an indigenous aircraft carrier. Analysts believe Chinese President Xi Jinping also wants to centralize military command so armed forces could better fight offshore if needed. Taiwan is 99 kilometers from China at its nearest point.

Taiwan, a technology hardware manufacturing hub for more than five decades, wants to develop its own weaponry because China’s diplomatic pressure blocks most other countries from selling it arms. The United States approves only occasional arms sales, to wit a $1.42 billion package announced in June, and to assuage anger from Beijing doesn’t give Taiwan everything it might want.

Homemade submarines and a trainer jet
In January and April, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense signed contracts with manufacturers including local shipbuilder CSBC Corp. to develop a $3.3 billion submarine within eight years. The two Dutch-made subs in operation around the island are now some 30 years old. To put the project in perspective, this year’s overall military budget is just $2.92 billion. But Taiwan’s odds are good. Its*shipbuilding experience goes back to 1948 with the establishment of a modern (for that time) company in the northern port city Keelung.

For further development of homegrown defenses, in February the ministry picked Taiwanese Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology to develop the 66 XT-5 Blue Magpie trainer jets, and the institute has found a builder, according to domestic media and ministry spokesman Chen Chung-chi. The jet that's specifically designed to train pilots for flight should be able to fly by 2020 and will slowly phase out older aircraft.

Taiwan has tried off and on for about 35 years to develop weapons including missiles, sea mines and torpedoes. Since 2011, to note one example, the island military has used its own anti-ship cruise missile, dubbed the Brave Wind III. Taiwan’s military ranks world No. 18 in the GlobalFirePower.com database.

The squeeze from China
China claims sovereignty over Taiwan despite 70 years of self-rule. Most Taiwanese say in opinion surveys that they prefer autonomy to unification with Beijing, but China insists the two sides eventually come under one flag and has not ruled out the threat of force, if needed, to get there.

Taiwan's president Tsai Ing-wen rejects Beijing’s dialogue condition that both sides belong to an entity called China. They have not talked since Tsai took office in May 2016. China sailed*an aircraft carrier around Taiwan*at the beginning of 2017, a provocative gesture that raised the local defense ministry's alert. Comments about a 2% military spending hike came on Monday as Tsai was on a trip to visit the United States, despite Chinese objections. She will later visit three diplomatic allies in the South Pacific.

Aerospace and submarine projects are expected to lead homegrown military development under Tsai, whose term ends in 2020 but who could be reelected for another four years. In a speech Oct. 10, National Day in Taiwan, she called indigenous weapons production a key industry.

“I think her plan is to enable or empower Taiwan’s domestic defense industry to become more competitive and to be more viable and to be part of in the international defense industry supply chain,” said Alexander Huang, strategic studies professor at Tamkang University in Taiwan.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Well this puts the Obama Admin's actions towards Iran in an even worse light....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.longwarjournal.org/arch...s-massive-trove-of-osama-bin-ladens-files.php

Analysis: CIA releases massive trove of Osama bin Laden’s files

By Thomas Joscelyn & Bill Roggio | November 1, 2017 | billroggio@gmail.com |

The CIA is releasing hundreds of thousands of documents, images, and computer files recovered during the May 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The newly-available material provides invaluable insights into the terrorist organization that struck America on September 11, 2001.

FDD’s Long War Journal has advocated for the release of bin Laden’s secret cache since 2011, arguing that such transparency would help to better inform the American people, experts and policymakers. Today’s release goes a long way toward satisfying that goal. We applaud the CIA and Director Mike Pompeo for making this material available to the public.

While the world has changed dramatically since the al Qaeda founder’s death more than six years ago, many of the files are still relevant today. Indeed, the CIA has withheld an unspecified number of documents for reasons related to protecting national security. We don’t doubt that some documents are still sensitive, but we hope that everything can be eventually released.

The CIA provided FDD’s Long War Journal with an advance copy of many of the files. It will take years for experts and researchers to comb through this treasure trove of information. However, we offer some preliminary observations below.

Al Qaeda has survived more than sixteen years of war. The group has failed to execute another 9/11-style attack inside the US, despite bin Laden’s continued desire to bring mass terror to America’s shores. Numerous plots have been thwarted by counterterrorism and intelligence professionals. And bin Laden’s organization has suffered setbacks, including the loss of key leaders.

But al Qaeda has adapted and in some ways grown, spreading its insurgency footprint in countries where it had little to no capacity for operations in 2001. The newly-released files help to explain how al Qaeda groomed supporters everywhere from West Africa to South Asia.

With that perspective in mind, here is some of what we’ve already learned from the files posted online today.

The world can see Hamza bin Laden’s face, as a young man, for the first time.
Since 2015, al Qaeda has released a string of audio messages from Osama bin Laden’s son, Hamza. Al Qaeda is clearly attempting to capitalize on the bin Laden brand name and build Hamza’s profile in jihadi circles. Yet, the organization has refused to release current images of Hamza, likely fearing that this would increase the threats to his safety. On the most recent anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks, for example, al Qaeda produced an image of the World Trade Center with a stock photo of Hamza as a young boy superimposed on one of the towers.

Two newly-released videos show scenes from Hamza’s wedding, publicly revealing his face as a young adult for the first time. The images are not current, but they are much more recent than the photo al Qaeda is willing to distribute. That same video footage shows other senior al Qaeda figures, including Mohammed Islambouli, the brother of Anwar Sadat’s assassin. Islambouli lived in Iran for much of the post-9/11 period and, in more recent times, has been in Turkey.

The public can finally examine Osama bin Laden’s personal journal.

One of the newly-available files is a handwritten, 228-page journal kept by Osama bin Laden himself. The notebook contains the al Qaeda master’s private reflections on the world and al Qaeda’s place in it. Some of the pages contain bin Laden’s thoughts on the 2011 Arab uprisings, which bin Laden wanted his men to capitalize on. While al Qaeda did not predict the revolutions that swept through North Africa and the Middle East, it moved quickly to set up operations in countries such as Libya.

Bin Laden was in charge of al Qaeda’s global network.

The Abbottabad repository confirms that bin Laden was anything but retired when US forces knocked down his door. He was not a mere figurehead. During the final months of his life, Osama bin Laden was communicating with subordinates around the globe. Recovered memos discuss the various committees and lieutenants who helped bin Laden manage his sprawling empire of terror.

In fact, al Qaeda’s network was a great deal more cohesive than was widely suspected in May 2011. Groups such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Shabaab (in Somalia) regularly sought and received the al Qaeda master’s direction. Other organizations, such as the Pakistani Taliban, are featured throughout the documents as well. And al Qaeda continued to maintain a significant footprint inside Afghanistan, relocating personnel to the country in 2010 and fighting alongside the Taliban.

Bin Laden wasn’t always pleased with the course his subordinates pursued and his men debated a variety of matters internally. The al Qaeda master sometimes instructed his followers to hide their allegiance to him, calculating that it would cause additional problems if their fealty was acknowledged. The al Qaeda founder also viewed the world through a conspiratorial lens, often misjudging his main adversary: America.

However, bin Laden kept up with current events and studied America’s approach to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. One of his minions even translated sections of Bob Woodward’s 2010 book, Obama’s Wars, so that he could understand the Obama administration’s strategy for those conflicts.

The files provide new details concerning al Qaeda’s relationship with Iran.

One never-before-seen 19-page document contains a senior jihadist’s assessment of the group’s relationship with Iran. The author explains that Iran offered some “Saudi brothers” in al Qaeda “everything they needed,” including “money, arms” and “training in Hezbollah camps in Lebanon, in exchange for striking American interests in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.” Iranian intelligence facilitated the travel of some operatives with visas, while sheltering others. Abu Hafs al-Mauritani, an influential ideologue prior to 9/11, helped negotiate a safe haven for his jihadi comrades inside Iran. But the author of the file, who is clearly well-connected, indicates that al Qaeda’s men violated the terms of the agreement and Iran eventually cracked down on the Sunni jihadists’ network, detaining some personnel. Still, the author explains that al Qaeda is not at war with Iran and some of their “interests intersect,” especially when it comes to being an “enemy of America.”

Bin Laden’s files show the two sides have had heated disagreements. There has been hostility between the two. Al Qaeda even penned a letter to Ayatollah Khamenei demanding the release of family members held in Iranian custody. Other files show that al Qaeda kidnapped an Iranian diplomat to exchange for its men and women. Bin Laden himself considered plans to counter Iran’s influence throughout the Middle East, which he viewed as pernicious.

However, bin Laden urged caution when it came to threatening Iran. In a previously released letter, bin Laden described Iran as al Qaeda’s “main artery for funds, personnel, and communication.” And despite their differences, Iran continued to provide crucial support for al Qaeda’s operations.

In a series of designations and other official statements issued since July 2011, the US Treasury and State Departments have repeatedly targeted al Qaeda’s “core facilitation pipeline” inside Iran. Sources familiar with the intelligence used to justify those designations say they are based, in part, on the Abbottabad files. It is likely that still more revelations concerning al Qaeda’s relationship with Iran remain to be found in the cache made available today.

The files are vital for understanding the history of the Iraqi insurgency and al Qaeda’s role in it.

Since bin Laden’s death, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s Islamic State (ISIS) rose to prominence, becoming an international menace in its own right and al Qaeda’s main jihadi competitor. FDD’s Long War Journal has reviewed dozens of audio files and other documents pertaining to the Iraqi insurgency. This valuable, primary source material provides new details on the history of al Qaeda’s efforts in the Iraq, ranging from Abu Musab al Zarqawi’s earliest days inside the country before the war, to the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and Baghdadi’s appointment as its chief.

One newly-available audio file contains a biography for Zarqawi, placing him in Baghdad before the American-led invasion and tracing his travels to Iran, Syria and elsewhere. Other audio files summarize al Qaeda’s opinions of various Saudi sheikhs, some of whom supported the jihadis’ efforts in Iraq.

An assessment of bin Laden’s support network in Pakistan will require careful analysis.

Many people will be interested in what the files have to say about bin Laden’s network inside Pakistan. He was, of course, hunted down in Abbottabad, near a Pakistani military academy. It is likely that the files contain new details concerning the personalities in Pakistan who supported al Qaeda in one way or another, including jihadists sponsored by the state. Parts of the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment have opposed al Qaeda and helped capture senior operatives. Al Qaeda has also helped direct an insurgency against Pakistani forces in the northern part of the country. Some of the files decry Pakistan’s supposed betrayal of the mujahideen after 9/11.

But Pakistan is a complex country, with multiple competing factions, and it is widely suspected that some in the military and intelligence apparatus were complicit in bin Laden’s operations. There may never be a “smoking gun,” but a meticulous review of the documents will likely shed light on previously unknown aspects of bin Laden’s Pakistani-based network. Specifically, any “former” military and intelligence figures named in the files should be closely examined, as should jihadi personalities who have cozy relations with the state. For instance, the New York Times first reported that American officials found contacts between bin Laden’s most trusted courier and Harakat ul Mujahedin (HUM). The contacts were discovered on the courier’s cellphone, which was seized during the Abbottabad raid. FDD’s Long War Journal does not know if this information is included in today’s release, but similar data can be used to build a composite picture of bin Laden’s Pakistani supporters.

The US service members who raided bin Laden’s compound risked their lives to bring the terror master to justice and did an incredible service by seizing the files released today. They did not have the time to recover everything. Pakistani authorities reportedly scooped up the intelligence left behind. We do not know if any of those files were shared with American officials, or if some of them are included in today’s release. But we hope that material will come to light as well.

Today’s release creates a unique opportunity for experts, researchers and journalists to garner a better understanding of al Qaeda.

We hope they will join us in the effort to learn more.

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD's Long War Journal. Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for FDD's Long War Journal.

Tags: Osama bin Laden's Files
10 Comments

Daniel Gallington says:
November 1, 2017 at 1:23 pm
One would hope the CIA has read this stuff.
Reply
mike rock says:
November 1, 2017 at 4:28 pm
before you did
Reply
SSgt Herrington says:
November 1, 2017 at 1:24 pm
Thanks to our SF guys for your heroic work in capturing these files. Semper Fi.
Reply
SSgt Herrington says:
November 1, 2017 at 1:25 pm
Keep em on the run guys, sorry I can’t be there to help.
Reply
Alvin says:
November 1, 2017 at 3:46 pm
Yah….Stop looking at those boring JFK docs!
You wouldn’t want to start at the beginning.
It will ruin the end!
Reply
J House says:
November 1, 2017 at 4:18 pm
Why would CIA release an unredacted AQ manual with a recipe for making RDX explosives?
That is not smart…
Reply
Susan says:
November 1, 2017 at 5:29 pm
Where can i download the English version?
Reply
CDC says:
November 1, 2017 at 6:18 pm
Trump should release the Bin Laden death photos. He’d probably be reelected. And also- why not expose Bin Laden’s porn? They found his porn, shame him and show the world he wasn’t some holy Godly man, he was just a pathetic wretch like everyone else.
Reply
Dick Scott says:
November 1, 2017 at 7:08 pm
Not mentioned here is that one of bin Laden’s primary goals was to bankrupt the US, and keeping a war going on in Afghanistan for 16 or so years has not bankrupted us but it has not been a cheap operation…and it continues probably with the at least passive support of many of the people of that country…the key reason that the Taliban have been able to continue.
Reply
Jamie says:
November 1, 2017 at 8:29 pm
Where are the documents released? I’ve been looking, and can’t find them.
Reply
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....


For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/201...t-force-eu-and-nato-team/142247/?oref=d-river

Russia’s Hybrid Attacks Should, At Long Last, Force the EU and NATO to Team*Up

Five ways these largely congruent yet poorly coordinated organizations could start putting their collective capabilities to best use.

By Franklin D. Kramer
Distinguished Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security
Read bio
Lauren M. Speranza
Associate director, Atlantic Council's Transatlantic Security Initiative
Read bio
November 2, 2017

Russia is using hybrid attacks to strike throughout Europe and even across the Atlantic: election interference in the U.S. and France; kidnappings and attempted assassinations in Estonia and Montenegro; cyber-attacks in Norway, Poland, Ukraine, and elsewhere. But the transatlantic community’s ability to respond is hindered by the rift between two organizations that should be leading the way: NATO and the*EU.

Despite having 22 member states in common, the organizations have long talked with each other as if the commonality at their core does not exist. While they pay lip service to partnership and cooperation, NATO and the EU have struggled merely to communicate and coordinate, let alone implement anything*together.

Recent years have brought increasing recognition of the need to overcome this impasse. Last year’s Joint Declaration touched off improvements in NATO-EU relations, and notable movement toward collective efforts includes the EU’s Joint Framework and Finland’s new European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid COE). Supported by many NATO and EU nations, the Helsinki-based center will serve as a hub for collective analysis, joint exercises and training, and other*activities.

But more is required. The two organizations must develop a rational, coordinated approach to Russian hybrid attacks, which are rising in frequency and sophistication. Coordination between NATO and the EU may not be easy, but there are several practical steps that the two organizations can*undertake:

- Create a hub to monitor Russian activity, similar to NATO’s new hub for the south. This could be housed in Brussels with a joint NATO-EU unit, or perhaps in conjunction with NATO’s Joint Forces Command Brunsuum. It could also be coordinated at the new Hybrid COE in Helsinki. This hub—and existing hybrid intel units–should incorporate the ever-increasing threat analyses from private companies and non-governmental organizations such as cyber security firms and digital analysis*centers.

- Establish an operational approach to coordinate cybersecurity entities, ranging from militaries and national computer emergency response teams (CERTs) to private players such as Internet service providers and in key sectors like electric grids and finance. This would be particularly important for high-end attacks, such as against multiple countries, where it would be crucial to have coordinated command-and-control processes, rules of engagement, and contingency plans. Given that most nations are unable to forestall Russian cyber efforts on their own, coordinated NATO-EU efforts should use the capabilities of more advanced cyber nations to support less-capable*ones.

- Elevate cyber’s role in exercises. Network warfare’s current peripheral status inhibits the ability to test assumptions, see what works, and take stock of lessons. NATO and the EU should incorporate major cyber elements into exercises and*training.

- Prepare for crisis management. Russia’s actions in Estonia, Ukraine, and Georgia demonstrate the potential for individual hybrid attacks to escalate into low-level conflict. To effectively deter and respond to these activities, NATO, the EU, and their nations should work to coordinate the activities of militaries, special forces, and national police and law enforcement agencies with institutional bodies, such as NATO Force Integration Units, multinational battalions, FRONTEX, and European Border Guard Teams. NATO and the EU should also set out coordinated contingency plans, conduct more integrated and frequent exercises, and establish shared resilience requirements for hybrid*scenarios.

- Set up a NATO-EU Coordinating Council to extend cooperation on hybrid threats beyond today’s informal and limited efforts. Rather than existing as a formal structure that would add to bureaucratic tensions, the concept could be an informal but structured activity, in the same way as the well-established Proliferation Security Initiative. The Council would convene representatives from NATO and EU bodies, transatlantic national governments, and the private sector to discuss shared challenges and develop coordinated responses (i.e., diplomatic, economic, information, security and military actions). It would operate on a voluntary, consensus basis – similar to the Financial Stability Board – providing a much-needed platform for willing NATO and EU nations to engage, share insights and information, and outline action plans, which can then be implemented as chosen in each national*context.

This is just a start. Much more must be done to deconflict and deepen coordination between NATO and the EU, so that their members’ collective capabilities may be put to most effective use against the hybrid challenges of today and*tomorrow.

-

The Honorable Franklin D. Kramer is a national security and international affairs expert and has multiple appointments, including as a member of the Atlantic Council Board of Directors and also a member of its Strategic Advisors Group. Kramer has been a senior political appointee in two ... Full bio

Lauren M. Speranza is the associate director for the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security. Full bio
 

Housecarl

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https://www.defensenews.com/opinion..._term=Editorial - Military - Early Bird Brief

Commentary

Deterring the unthinkable: NATO’s role along the Eastern flank [Commentary]

By: Hans Binnendijk and Anika Binnendijk  
20 hours ago

As NATO defense ministers meet in Brussels next week to set the stage for the 2018 NATO summit, key issues will include defense burden-sharing and NATO’s role to the south in counterterrorism and refugee management. But strengthening deterrence to the East must remain the top priority for the alliance.

Russia’s recent Zapad 2017 and related exercises demonstrate the country’s ability to rapidly deploy up to 100,000 troops near the Baltic states. While many observers doubt the Kremlin would boldly attack a NATO nation, Putin has an aggressive track record, and history is replete with comparable blunders. The stronger NATO’s deterrent posture, the lower the risk of a tragic miscalculation in Moscow.

NATO has improved its military posture in the three years since Russia annexed Crimea and initiated conflict in Ukraine’s Donbas. At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO created a brigade-sized Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, or VJTF, and small force integration unit designed to manage military reinforcement of Poland and the Baltic area. The U.S. separately forward-deployed four company-sized Army units.

At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO took a major step by sending four NATO battle groups to the three Baltic states and Poland while the U.S. rotated an additional armored brigade. In the process, NATO has made important progress toward an effective deterrence by tripwire.

A recent visit to NATO’s Canadian-led battle group northeast of Riga, however, highlighted that steps taken at Wales and Warsaw are inadequate. NATO forces currently have no orders to fight unless NATO leaders take subsequent decisions, leaving troops vulnerable. The combined brigade has inadequate air defense, artillery and armor. Other Latvian units have even more limited capabilities. Faced with a Russian attack, this Latvian brigade would disperse, triggering a major conflict. The situation in the other two Baltic states appears similar.

This illustrates NATO’s current deterrence problem. Today’s ill-reinforced front-line units might hold out for several days against a concerted Russian assault of the kind rehearsed in Zapad. But reinforcements in the form of NATO land units would not arrive in time to prevent a Russian occupation. NATO’s VJTF is intended to be deployed in seven days, but could realistically take up to a month. Some U.S. and Polish troops are in the general region, but adequate ground forces from the U.S., Germany, France and the U.K. would not be in place for many months.

This probable time gap creates what we might call a “pause problem,” which NATO needs to fix at next year’s Brussels Summit. A quick Russian land-based occupation of the Baltic states followed by a pause in fighting and a Russian nuclear threat might be pursued in an effort to divide and freeze the alliance. That path to limited victory might tempt Russian President Vladimir Putin.

It appears unlikely that additional NATO brigades will be sent to the Baltic states to deal with this problem. But the pause problem can be mitigated if the alliance takes four basic steps at next year’s summit.

First, decision-making must be streamlined to avoid delay and division. Indications and warning mechanisms should be enhanced by improvements in national intelligence sharing, and the new NATO assistant secretary general for intelligence should be adequately resourced. The supreme allied commander Europe may need greater authority to deploy troops in time of crisis. NATO forces on the ground need clear rules of engagement on how to address a range of potential scenarios. Command structure reforms designed to control reinforcements are under consideration, and deadlines for political decision-making may be needed to avoid deadly delays.

Second, front-line NATO forces require adequate armor, artillery, air defense and rules of engagement. A robust security assistance package for the Baltic states could provide this. Civilian resilience can also be enhanced, improving the capacity of besieged populations to mount an unconventional defense complementing NATO’s conventional response. That will make it clear to Russia that front-line forces will resist and that an occupation will be costly.

Third, military reinforcements need to be able to get to the battle more quickly. Both the VJTF and national land forces need to improve their readiness. Logistics and legal impediments to forward deployment must be addressed, including the notion of a “military Schengen zone” to eliminate legal barriers to troop movements. Reinforcement capabilities need constant exercise, including from American-enhanced NATO air power, which will be critical to maintaining constant resistance to an attack, thereby reducing the prospect of a debilitating pause.

Outgoing US Army Europe commander pushes for ‘Military Schengen Zone’
As the U.S. Army Europe commander prepares to exit the military stage in September, he’s pushing for better ways for militaries to move freely around the European theater and thinks a military Schengen zone might be the best way to achieve that goal.
By: Jen Judson​

And fourth, NATO must be prepared to deal with Russian high-end threats, including sophisticated air-defense and ground-attack missiles designed to deny NATO forces access to the region. Then there is Russia’s nuclear threat based on its “escalate to de-escalate” nuclear doctrine. NATO will need to be clear that it will not allow Russia to maintain sanctuaries like Kaliningrad if Russia starts a conflict and that NATO has adequate nuclear deterrent plans — and political will — to counter a Russian first nuclear strike.

As this deterrent is built, renewed efforts are needed to avoid Russian misinterpretation. NATO leaders will need adequate authority to discuss defense posture, transparent military exercises, threat assessments and incident management with their Russian counterparts.

With a package like this agreed upon at the 2018 NATO summit, the alliance should be better positioned to deter the unthinkable.

-

Hans Binnendijk is a senior fellow at the School for Advanced International Studies and an adjunct political scientist at the Rand think tank. He has served in several senior U.S. government posts including special assistant to the president for defense policy. Anika Binnendijk is a political scientist at Rand and has served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the U.S. State Department’s policy planning office.
 

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https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/11/03/the_case_for_aegis_at_home_112577.html

The Case for Aegis at Home

By Rowan Allport
November 03, 2017

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2017, signed into law by President Obama shortly before his departure from office, contained provisions which mandated a review of U.S. missile defense strategy. In support of this, President Trump subsequently ordered a Ballistic Missile Defense Review as a route to “strengthening missile-defense capabilities, rebalancing homeland and theater defense priorities, and highlighting priority funding areas." The report, which is required by Congress to also contain an analysis of the defense of the U.S. mainland against cruise missiles, is due to be delivered by the close of 2017.

It was already clear at the time of NDAA 2017’s drafting that North Korea’s ballistic missile program posed a growing threat. In the following months, the situation escalated dramatically, with an apparently successful test by Pyongyang of both an ICBM and what it claimed to be a hydrogen bomb.

These developments subsequently drew renewed focus to the U.S.’ existing missile defense systems. Since the dawn of the year, the U.S. Army has deployed THAAD launchers to South Korea, the Navy has successfully tested a new version of the SM-3 missile, and even the much-maligned Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system has managed to hit something. But for all the progress that has been made over the last two decades, there is a realization that there can be no let-up in the pace of innovation and fielding.

Further under the radar than ballistic missiles (in both the figurative and literal sense) has been the cruise missile challenge. Even before the Russian deployment of such weapons in Syria, the Pentagon had raised concerns about its ability to deal with the threat posed to the U.S. homeland by conventionally armed cruise missiles launched from Moscow’s long-range bombers and submarines. In May 2015, the then Vice Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral James A. Winnefeld said that “homeland cruise missile defense is shifting above regional ballistic missile defense” in his priorities.

Significant attempts have been made to improve U.S. defenses against cruise missiles, but they have met with limited success. Notably, the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) – built around tethered aerostats fitted with surveillance systems – was developed to support fighters and missile batteries in shooting down cruise missiles. However, after billions being spent, the program was canceled after technical problems and the embarrassing escape of one of the aerostats in 2015.

What is needed from the Ballistic Missile Defence Review is a study which identifies future threats and outlines measures to address them in a realistic timescale and budget. However, given the tendencies of the Trump administration, there is a risk that there will be a focus on grandiose schemes over pragmatic solutions. Notably, both Congress and commentators have sought to emphasize the role of space-based interception systems.

Instead of a Reaganesque Star Wars (Strategic Defense Initiative) approach, the priority should be to build on existing systems without requiring disproportionate leaps. Part of this strategy should be what might be termed ‘Aegis at Home.' Based on an evolved version of Aegis Ashore, one of which is already operational in Romania with a second under construction in Poland, it would be designed to provide area and point defense against ballistic and cruise missiles. Congress itself appears open to an Aegis at Home-type approach: the NDAA 2017 contains a requirement that the Department of Defense produce an evaluation of options for “deploying one or more Aegis Ashore sites and Aegis Ashore components for the ballistic and cruise missile defense of the continental United States.” There have also been calls to make the Aegis Ashore test site in Hawaii operational to defend the islands.

Video

Aegis at Home would be centered upon an AEGIS Ashore system fitted with the latest AN/SPY-6 radar and an expanded number of missile silos. An operational date of 2024 would allow time for the development of the SM-3 anti-ballistic missile’s capabilities to include an interim anti-ICBM function and the fielding of a revised JLENS system to track cruise missiles. The kinetic anti-cruise missile capability would rest with the SM-6 missile, with the ESSM acting as a point-defense backup. In time, fuller anti-ICBM engagement would be made possible through further evolution of the SM-3. Initially, the focus would be on the U.S. West Coast, with the main Pacific Fleet homeport of Naval Base San Diego being the obvious first location for fielding.

So against what threat would Aegis at Home be aimed? The challenge that most visibly manifests is North Korea. The country will likely be able to finalize a working ICBM and accompanying warhead by 2020 at the latest and put both into mass production. There is no practical reason that Pyongyang could not field over one hundred such missiles within a decade – something even an expanded and improved GMD system would be unable to cope with alone.

On a day-to-day basis, deterrence will likely work with North Korea. The most likely scenario of a strike against the U.S. would be in the event of the Pyongyang government’s imminent collapse. Such action would be triggered by the regime’s desire to drag as much of the world down with it as possible. Given the nature of the North Korean system and the past fate of similar administrations even without foreign intervention, this risk alone is adequate to justify further investment in missile defense.

However, it may be that concerns over North Korea risk blinding planners to other issues further down the line. As noted, the U.S. military has been vocal in warning of the dangers of Russian cruise missiles, but China’s neighbours are already experiencing a glimpse of a future threat to the U.S. At present, Beijing possesses a powerful but localised land-attack cruise missile capability based upon ground and air-launched weapons such as the DH-10/CJ-10 and its derivatives. In time, these will be supplemented by a new generation of stealth and, eventually, hypersonic missiles. Given that North Korea has broadly limited its cruise missile development to anti-ship variants, it can be seen that the threat from China is the key motivator behind plans by Tokyo to include the SM-6 in its planned Aegis Ashore architecture.

For the most part, it is the launch platforms available to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that constrain longer-range cruise missile delivery. The PLA’s main ‘strategic’ cruise missile platform is the H-6K bomber, a 21st-century reincarnation of a 1950s aircraft that has a combat radius of only 1,900 miles. At sea, the Chinese surface fleet’s first priority is currently survival against the U.S. and its allies. As such, the focus is on anti-ship, anti-aircraft and anti-submarine weapons. The PLA’s best option for delivering cruise missiles would be to focus on nuclear submarines. However, the vast majority of the force’s vessels are conventionally powered, limiting their range. Less than ten attack submarines are available, only the later Type 093 models are actually combat worthy, and their current cruise missile capability is unclear.

Nevertheless, Beijing wishes to considerably expand its fleet of nuclear submarines. The clearest indication of this intent has been the construction of what is reportedly the world’s largest submarine production facility in China’s Liaoning Province. Manufacturing of the new Type 095 submarine is expected to begin shortly, a move which, in the words of a recent briefing on the PLA’s capabilities from the Pentagon, would not only “improve the PLAN’s anti-surface warfare capability but might also provide it with a more clandestine land-attack option.” Indications are that up to fourteen Type 95s are planned.

The option also exists for Beijing to bypass traditional platforms and deliver strikes against the U.S. mainland through asymmetric means. Both Russia and Israel have recently practiced the firing of cruise and ballistic missiles from civilian cargo ships. Clandestinely offensively armed civilian vessels have a long history, and China has in recent years shown an increasing tendency to integrate merchant ships into military operations. Hiding missile-armed vessels – possibly remotely controlled given their inevitable post-attack capture or destruction – in the congested shipping lanes of the Eastern Pacific in a time of tension would be far from impossible.

However, would China be willing to launch strikes against military facilities, such as those in San Diego, on the U.S. mainland? Examining the available literature, it is clear that Beijing places great emphasis on attacking U.S. Navy bases in Japan with conventionally armed missiles in the event of a conflict – the notion being that the U.S. is heavily dependent on forward operating bases to sustain combat operations. This theorizing seems likely to have been matched by practical exercises, with satellite pictures revealing what looks very much like practice strikes against mocked-up military facilities in the Gobi desert.

Attacking the U.S. mainland, even if confining activities to military facilities, would, of course, represent a major escalation on limiting an operation to a regional theater. But would the U.S. retaliation be more severe than it might otherwise be? Even if strikes were limited to U.S. bases in Japan, Guam and possibly South Korea, the end result would still be casualties that exceeded those at Pearl Harbour or on 9/11 – and a U.S. government and population seeking vengeance. From Beijing’s standpoint, it would, therefore, be folly not to seek to disable homeland targets of relevance once the capability is there.

When the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 called for the fielding of a National Missile Defense System, both deliverable nuclear weapons and ICBMs were still clearly years away for North Korea. At the time, many advocates of the initiative were accused of trying to mitigate a non-existent challenge. However, whatever the limits of current U.S. defenses against such capabilities, it is undeniable that the country would be in an even worse position now had the effort to pre-empt the threat not been made. There is now again a need to cast a similar eye toward the horizon.

Rowan Allport is a senior fellow and the head of the security and defence division at the Human Security Centre, a London-based think tank. He holds an MA in Conflict, Governance and Development and a Ph.D. in Politics from the University of York.
 

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https://www.thecipherbrief.com/dead-drop/dead-drop-november-3

Dead Drop: November 3

November 3, 2017 | anonymous

IN THE PICTURE: The big news this week, of course, was the indictment of Paul Manafort and Rick Gates, and the guilty plea of Trump campaign advisor George Popadopolous. While the administration raced to distance themselves from Popadopolous, the media dug up this March 2016 photo of the 30-year-old energy consultant meeting with Trump, then-Senator Jeff Sessions and about ten other members of Trump’s national security team. So, who are the other folks who made it into the photo? They include: J.D. Gordon, a retired Navy commander who worked on Mike Huckabee and Herman Cain campaigns (and who achieved notoriety while serving as a Pentagon escort for media going to Guantanamo Bay – by filing a complaint against a female Miami Herald reporter for making “abusive and degrading comments of an explicitly sexual nature” to him; her newspaper determined she’d merely cursed him out.) Also in the photo: former DOD Inspector General Joseph Schmitz, once accused of making anti-Semitic remarks while in office – an allegation he termed “lies.”

NOT IN THE PICTURE: On Wednesday, the CIA released nearly half a million additional files from the 2011 raid that killed Osama bin Ladin. Among the files was UBL’s personal diary. Handwritten in Arabic, the journal did have a brand name in English – it was called a “Lucky Exclusive” note book. Exclusive, yes. Lucky? Not so much. Some readers kvetched that the Agency did not provide an English translation to accompany UBL’s musings. The data dump did include “79,000 audio and image files” and “10,000 video files.” The release does not include UBL’s personal porn stash which reportedly was among the material scooped up during the raid.

POCKET LITTER: Bits and pieces of interesting/weird stuff we discovered:
Cheap at Twice the Price: Among the fascinating nuggets released by the National Archives last week in their partial dump of JFK assassination-related documents – was a memo which says the U.S. considered offering bounties to Cubans who killed communist leaders on the island. The rewards would have ranged from a high of $100,000 for some officials to just two cents for killing Fidel Castro. Now $0.02 might sound low – but remember, that was in 1962 dollars.

Wax on, Wax Off: Fortunately for the rest of us, the folks at muckrock.com seem to have plenty of time to mine the CIA’s now-declassified archives for fun stuff. They report that they have discovered the reason the files contain a flyer for a creepy wax museum. It seems back in the early 1990s, members of the government’s psychic remote viewer program were being challenged to prove their worth – (no one could have seen that coming!) – so they were given an assignment to describe a random wax museum. They described some tall rectangular structure, some animals and a bald guy. Close enough for government work.

Intelligence Ziti Gritty: Muckrock’s continuing excavation of the CIA’s CREST data base also served up a now declassified (formerly Top Secret) 1973 Agency memo regarding a pasta shortage in Italy.

Leadership Secrets: The Dead Drop hears that former Pittsburgh Steeler coach Bill Cowher was out at the CIA last week sharing leadership lessons with an auditorium full of Agency officers. According to our spies, Cowher, now an analyst on CBS TV’s “The NFL Today”, did not give a speech – but was interviewed by former CIA Director George Tenet. We’d love to give you a little play by play on the session – but for some reason an Agency spokesman punted and refused to confirm or deny the event. CBS did not immediately respond to request for comment.

Who is Watching the Watchdogs? ProPublica is out this week with a story which says two former CIA employees filed complaints against Chrisopher Sharpley, the guy now nominated to be Agency Inspector General. But Sharpley told Congress last month he was unaware of any pending complaints against him. There’s lots of finger pointing in the lengthy story. ProPublica quotes a former CIA official as saying there is a “war” going on between the CIA’s inspector general and the intelligence community IG. That can’t turn out well.

NETWORK NEWS: Not a day goes by when members of The Cipher Brief Network aren’t making news. Here are just a few examples from this week:

Russia 1 – U.S. 0: Former Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, on a Politico podcast, said “The Russians succeeded…beyond their wildest expectations” in sowing “discontent, discord and disruption in our political life.”

“Followed the ISIS playbook perfectly:” Former CIA Acting Director Michael Morell appeared on CBS “This Morning” on Wednesday to discuss the New York terror attack.

Let them train with them but not keep them. Former NSA and CIA Director General Mike Hayden told The Jerusalem Post that Israel should be allowed to buy bunker-buster bombs – with significant restrictions – to deter Iran.

Buy George: Former CIA operations officer (and long-time Russia hand) Steven Hall, writing in the Washington Post explains how Russia’s outreach to George Papadopoulos “went just how spies would have done it.”

WHAT’S ON THEIR NIGHTSTAND?
“I’m continuing to leaven my foreign policy reading with a rich menu from other disciplines. *My latest is A Life in Letters, *edited by Matthew Bruccoli. This is the personal and professional correspondence of F. Scott Fitzgerald. The letters are beautifully and artfully written and chock full of insights about the literary, theatrical, and occasionally political life of the 1920s, 30s and 40s, with insight into other authors such as Hemingway John Dos Passos, Sherwood Anderson, Willa Cather, and many others. “Something totally different”, as Monty Python used to say…
— John McLaughlin, former Acting Director of the CIA

SECURITY QUOTE OF THE WEEK:
Network expert Matt Olsen, former NCTC director and FBI Special Counsel to the Director, did not think much of President Donald Trump’s comments Wednesday calling the U.S. justice system, “a joke and…a laughingstock” and threatening to send the New York suspect to the U.S. military prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

“The way this is being handled right now through the criminal justice system is appropriate and demonstrates that the FBI, the local police department and our criminal justice system is the best way to take someone like this off the street, and ensure that there is swift and certain justice,” Olsen said after the deadly terror attack that killed eight in New York City this week. “We’ve seen that play out right now with the fact that he has apparently provided a full confession in a form that can be used as evidence against him in court.”

IF YOU SEE SOMETHING, SAY SOMETHING: Got any tips for your friendly neighborhood Dead Drop? Shoot us a note at*TheDeadDrop@theCipherBrief.com.
 

Housecarl

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https://www.flightglobal.com/news/a...-missile-project-emerges-in-us-budget-442816/

US BUDGET
New long-range missile project emerges in US budget

02 NOVEMBER, 2017 SOURCE: FLIGHTGLOBAL.COM BY: STEPHEN TRIMBLE WASHINGTON DC

The existence of a two-year-old project to develop a new air-to-air missile capable of intercepting targets at great distances has emerged in US budget documents.

The Office of the Secretary Defense (OSD) launched a two-year engineering assessment of a new long-range engagement weapon (LREW) designed with the goal of “maintaining air dominance”, according to budget documents released last March.

Analyses of the design, engineering and kill chain requirements were expected to be complete in the last fiscal year, although details are classified. “When successful, LREW will transition to multiple services,” the documents show.

Though funded for more than two years, the LREW project had escaped notice in an obscure budget line item for an OSD account named “emerging capabilities technology development”, which is mostly reserved for small electronic warfare projects.

But the programme offers the first indication that the US military is interested in a new missile to replace or surpass the capabilities of the Raytheon AIM-120D AMRAAM.

An unclassified concept image of the LREW was published last April in a presentation by Chuck Perkins, the principal deputy to the assistant secretary of defense for research and engineering.

The image in Perkins’ presentation may not reflect the classified version of the LREW concept, but depicts a large, two-stage missile launched from an internal weapons bay of a Lockheed Martin F-22.

The LREW also emerges as Chinese and Russian militaries reportedly are pursuing new air intercept missiles with ranges significantly longer than the AIM-120D. The range of the AIM-120D is classified, but is thought to extend to about 100mi (160km).

The US Air Force also is developing two short-range weapons – the small advanced capabilities missile (SACM) and the miniature self-defence munition (MSDM).

(UPDATE: The original article was updated with an unclassified image of the LREW concept and a description of that image.)
 

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http://www.nationaldefensemagazine....king-steps-to-modernize-global-strike-weapons

STRATEGIC WEAPONS

Nuclear Triad: Pentagon Taking Steps to Modernize Global Strike Weapons

11/3/2017
By Jon Harper

As potential adversaries enhance their long-range weapons, the United States is moving forward with plans to bolster its own global strike capabilities. The stakes are high as officials try to keep their programs on time and on budget.

Russia, China and North Korea are modernizing their strategic weapon systems, defense officials and independent analysts have noted. At the same time, tensions are boiling in the Asia-Pacific following Pyongyang’s recent tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads that could potentially reach the U.S. homeland.

To bolster deterrence and assure anxious allies, the Air Force has flown long-range bombers such as the B-52 near the Korean Peninsula and conducted an ICBM test without a warhead. The Navy has deployed ballistic missile submarines to the region, and allowed officials from allied nations to tour the USS Pennsylvania while it was docked in Guam.

“A lot of that diplomatically is just a show of force,” Gen. Robin Rand, commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, said during a meeting with reporters at the Air Force Association’s Air, Space and Cyber Conference in National Harbor, Maryland. It signaled that “we’re ready to fight tonight,” he added.

However, the United States’ global strike systems are aging, and the Pentagon is pushing to modernize its arsenal.

The Navy plans to replace its Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines with 12 new Columbia-class boats. Advance procurement funding has already been allocated to the project. The lead vessel is to be procured in fiscal year 2021, and enter service in 2031.

Vice Adm. Terry Benedict, director of Navy strategic systems programs, said industry is enhancing shipbuilding facilities.

“Electric Boat is working very, very hard in creating new infrastructure … to handle the capacity necessary to deliver the Columbia,” he said at a recent nuclear deterrence conference in Washington, D.C. “We can’t do it within the existing footprint.”

The Navy is aiming to reduce technical and schedule risk. That includes building infrastructure to test and validate systems and subsystems.

When the Columbia-class is delivered Navy officials will have high confidence that the new platforms are entering operational service with known reliability and system performance, Benedict said.
However, any disruptions to the program would be problematic, he said.

“There is no slack” in the schedule, he told National Defense. “We’re trying to find ways to intelligently create that [slack] within our integrated master schedule. But … the buffer for when we need it based on the retirement dates for the Ohio, that’s gone.”

The new submarine is the Navy’s top acquisition priority, with a projected program cost of $128 billion. Despite the high price tag, it appears to have strong backing from Congress. The sea-launched ballistic missile platform is expected to take priority when it comes to funding the Pentagon’s nuclear modernization efforts, analysts said.

“Most people agree the SLBMs are kind of … sacrosanct,” said Todd Harrison, director of defense budget analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank. “You’re not going to touch them [with a budgetary ax] because that is the most survivable leg of the triad.”

The Columbia is “very safe” in the Pentagon’s ongoing nuclear posture review, which is expected to wrap up by the end of the year, he said during a briefing with reporters.

Meanwhile, the Air Force has several nuclear modernization programs underway. One is the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, known as GBSD. It is expected to replace the Minuteman III system that has been in operation for decades.

In August the service awarded technology maturation and risk reduction contracts to Boeing and Northrop Grumman.

“We are not just buying a missile,” said Col. Heath Collins, GBSD program manager at the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center. “The GBSD program is a full recapitalization of the weapon system.” It will include a new flight system, a new command-and-control system and modernized launch systems, he noted.

To improve their chances of success, service officials have examined the acquisition woes that have plagued other programs.

The program is not looking for “technology miracles,” Collins said. “We want mature technology right at the get-go to be integrated together.” A significant amount of risk reduction work is expected, he added.

Program officials are looking at missile development efforts by the Navy, the space community and the Missile Defense Agency that could be applied to GBSD.
“We will take, beg, borrow, steal any type of technology, people, processes — anything we can” to improve the program, Collins said.

The first major requirements review with the prime contractors for the TMRR phase was slated to be completed by the end of October. “Every requirement that we have on contract we are taking a look at from a cost-capability trade perspective,” Collins said.

The companies will conduct analyses “to make sure that we’re not over-specing the program, making sure we understand and identify what the largest cost drivers are.”

“If there are particular areas [where] we think that with a little bit of relief we could save big time [or] money, we’ll continue to work that through as we finalize the program,” he added.
The preliminary design review is expected to wrap up in 2020.

“We have the opportunity to make decisions in the next couple years that will save billions and billions of dollars over the lifecycle of GBSD,” Collins said.

Defense Department cost estimates for the program have varied widely, from $62 billion to as much as $140 billion.

“It was unusually difficult to estimate the cost of a new ICBM program because there was no recent data to draw upon, and the older historical data was of very questionable quality or was nonexistent,” the Pentagon’s cost assessment and program evaluation office said in its most recent annual report. “This leads to considerable uncertainty and risk in any cost estimate.”

The service plans to eventually deploy 400 new ICBMs. Initial fielding of GBSD is expected by 2029. Additional missiles are to be procured for periodic testing and to have spares.

However, a number of other major Air Force modernization efforts will also be ramping up in the early to mid-2020s, Harrison noted. The F-35 joint strike fighter, B-21 stealth bomber and KC-46 tanker are the service’s top acquisition priorities. Funding for those programs could crowd out spending on GBSD, he said.

“This is going to require a pretty good increase in … their acquisition funding for major modernization programs,” he said. “If they’re not able to increase funding as they planned, they’re going to have to make choices.”

A schedule slippage — due to budget constraints or technical issues — is probably in the cards, he predicted.
If the nuclear posture review calls for cuts to any leg of the triad, it would probably be the ICBMs because they are the least survivable and they don’t contribute to conventional missions, he added.

In addition to pursuing new ground-based weapons, the Air Force is moving to modernize its bomber fleet.

“Our bread and butter in this command is to be able to take off with ordnance with the support of Air Mobility Command and their phenomenal tankers and go a long way and very precisely deliver [weapons] on time, on target,” Rand said.

The service’s B-2 and B-52 bombers are undergoing upgrades and life-extensions so that they can fly for several more decades, he noted.

Rand and other senior leaders hope to be able to re-engine the B-52 to help keep it operational into the 2050s. But finding the money to do it has been a challenge.

Sen. John Hoeven, R-N.D., a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, was optimistic that the necessary funding would be forthcoming.

“If I have my way, and I think there’s a good chance I will, we’re going to continue to put more money into [the B-52] including new engines, which I know is not a small price tag,” he said.

Hoeven’s home state, North Dakota, hosts B-52s and ICBMs.

The Air Force is also pursuing a next-generation stealth bomber, the B-21.

Rand said he’s “very, very pleased” with the program so far.

“If we do this right… we have an opportunity between the United States Air Force and [prime contractor] Northrop Grumman to make this what I think could be a benchmark acquisition program forour nation,” he said.

“The requirements are tight. … The funds you know are there. So we have the opportunity I think to really march out on this thing,” he added.

The service hopes to learn from the problems that plagued the B-2 stealth bomber program. Production was stopped in the 1990s. Only 21 aircraft were built, and the plane ended up costing about $2 billion each.

The Air Force has put together a team to do a deep dive and assess where things went wrong. But Rand said one lesson is already crystal clear.

“If we’ve learned anything from the B-2 … [being] on time, on cost is really important because we need this capability and we need it in the sufficient numbers,” he said.

“We cannot take our foot off the pedal,” Rand said. “There’s a lot of work to do in the months and years to come.”

The B-21 program has been projected to cost $55 billion to $80 billion. The Air Force hopes to begin fielding the aircraft in the mid-2020s.

The service plans to buy at least 100 bombers, but officials have suggested that more may be needed as the global threat environment becomes more challenging.
Harrison doesn’t expect the dual-mission capable B-21 to suffer from the nuclear posture review. “The size of the bomber force is almost entirely driven by the conventional mission of the bombers. And so the NPR, I think, is highly unlikely to affect that,” he said.

In addition to buying new aircraft, the Air Force wants to acquire next-generation air-launched cruise missiles that could deliver nuclear weapons. The Long Range Stand-Off weapon, known as LRSO, is intended to replace aging legacy systems, which are difficult to maintain.

The Air Force recently awarded technology maturation and risk reduction contracts for LRSO to Lockheed Martin and Raytheon.

Air Force leaders have argued that a new cruise missile is needed to keep B-52s viable as nuclear bombers. The aircraft, which is not stealthy, would have difficulty penetrating sophisticated enemy air defenses, they said.

Legacy cruise missiles are also vulnerable to adversaries’ counter-air capabilities, according to Air Force Gen. John Hyten, commander of U.S. Strategic Command.

“The air-launched cruise missile that was built 40 years ago for a Soviet threat is not the air-launched cruise missile that we need today,” he said during remarks at the Hudson Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank.

Although survivability wouldn’t be as much of a concern for the stealthy B-21, the aircraft would still benefit from the LRSO because it would give the planes the ability to attack multiple targets at once rather than having to fly over each individual target to drop gravity bombs, Hyten noted.

The Air Force wants to procure about 1,100 cruise missiles. The projected cost of the program is about $10 billion, not including warhead modernization work that would likely be required.

However, a number of Democratic lawmakers have come out strongly against the project, arguing that it would be costly and destabilizing. Some observers expect a highly partisan, budgetary fight over the program.

But Sen. Heidi Heitkamp, D-N.D., said there is significant support for LRSO within her party.

“There are people who seem destined to oppose it,” she said.

However, “we’ve had this discussion in groups of Democrats where someone will have said something that is negative [about the program] only to be very aggressively challenged by a number of us. So do not believe that the Democratic caucus is lockstep in any way. In fact, I think at this point … the position to not invest is a minority position,” she added.

The planned modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, including support systems, is expected to cost hundreds of billions of dollars in the coming decades. Retired Air Force Gen. C. Robert Kehler, former commander of Stratcom, is pessimistic about how it will unfold.

“I am skeptical that we are capable of remaining committed to a long-term project like this without basically messing with it and screwing it up,” he said.

If officials keep adjusting the programmatics, “then pretty soon we’re over budget, the time is too long and then it goes further over budget,” he said. “We know what this litany looks like.”

Additionally, the political consensus about the need for nuclear modernization is fragile, he said. “There will be overwhelming temptation to tinker with it or to abandon pieces of it, especially as the world situation ebbs and flows, which it will do over the next 15, 20 years as this recapitalization is going on.”
 
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