WAR 10-09-2021-to-10-15-2021__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
(491) 09-18-2021-to-09-24-2021__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(492) 09-25-2021-to-10-01-2021__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(493) 10-02-2021-to-10-08-2021__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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BRKG Exclusive: Israel May Accept Iran as threshold Nuclear Power
GOV/MIL US Debates Promising 'No First Use' Of Nuclear Weapons
INTL Japan is converting its 2 biggest warships into aircraft carriers
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The United States and Mexico have agreed to restructure their fight against drug cartels.
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BY GEORGE MACKIE ON OCTOBER 9, 2021
WORLD

The United States and Mexico have agreed to restructure their fight against drug cartels.

The US and Mexico agreed on Friday to restructure their drug-trafficking campaign to attack the core causes and increase efforts to combat cross-border arms smuggling.

Instead of deploying helicopter gunships and other weapons to fight formidable drug gangs, Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador wants Washington to invest in regional economic development.

After more than a decade of providing military weaponry, technical support, and security training under the Merida Initiative, both governments declared it was time for a rethink.

On his first visit to Mexico as the top US diplomat, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said more needs to be done in areas such as combating arms trafficking, money laundering, and drug addiction.

“Law enforcement plays a key role in lowering killings and other major crimes,” said Blinken, who was joined by US Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas and a delegation.

“However, it must match its efforts with investments in expanding economic opportunities, particularly for underserved areas and regions,” he told reporters.

Since 2008, the US has paid Mexico roughly $3 billion in the Merida Initiative for police enforcement training and equipment such as Black Hawk helicopters.

At the same time, US officials have focused on assisting Mexico in apprehending drug lords such as Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman and extraditing them to the US for prosecution.

“We’ve already seen that capturing cartel bosses isn’t enough. We must ensure that addictions do not become more prevalent “According to Mexican Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard.

Lopez Obrador praised the start of a “new era” in bilateral relations, repeating an offer to US Vice President Joe Biden to visit Mexico.

The Mexican president claims that investing in regional development projects will help combat not only drug trafficking but also migration flows, which are another big issue facing the two countries.

Mexican police reported Friday that they had apprehended 652 undocumented migrants, more than half of them were minors, who were going toward the US border in refrigerated truck containers, underscoring the gravity of the situation.

Biden, according to Blinken, is asking $4 billion in US financing to address the core causes of irregular migration, particularly in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala.

Since the government deployed the military in the war on drugs in 2006, Mexico has seen more than 300,000 people killed in cartel-related violence.

Many experts believe that the military model failed because it split the cartels into smaller, more dangerous groups. The Washington Newsday Brief News is a daily newspaper published in Washington, D.C.
 
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Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
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As interest fades in Texas border towns, gunfire and drug smuggling crisis quietly continues
Illegal immigration, drug smuggling causes conflict at small Texas town.

By Bethany Blankley
Updated: October 9, 2021 - 4:57pm

In the small Texas border town of Roma, pops of gunfire have been heard over the last several days as people continue to cross the Rio Grande River illegally to enter The state and the country.

Fox News onThursday published footage of conflict on the Mexican side of the border, given to the news outlet by the Texas National Guard.

Fox News’ Bill Melugin said, “Soldiers told us there have been cartel gunfights in Ciudad Miguel Aleman, the Mexican city across from Roma, Texas, frequently in recent days and weeks.

The soldiers heard gunfire and explosions two days ago and showed us this video of smoke billowing after the gunfight.”

The riverbank thick, with tall cane brush, is ideal for hiding and smuggling people and a popular point to smuggle a lucrative narcotics trade.

Gunfire around this town is nothing new, but it’s intensified after the November 2020 Electons.

Last December, a Mexican national recorded gunfire on video of “detonations and clashes were reported between armed groups in various sectors of the Miguel Aleman leaving traces of the battle on the facades of the establishments that were hit by bullets.”

In February, counter-terrorism specialist Jason Jones reported of gun battles there. "This is what I have been trying to warn about," Jones told Fox News. "Another day at the border."

Shooters could be heard exchanging rounds Jones identified as a 40mm grenade launcher.

In March, DailyMail.com reported on a gun battle between the two cartels; and it hasn’t stopped since.

Border Patrol Council President Brandon Judd said this week at a border summit in Mission, Texas, southeast of Roma, that, “Criminal cartels listen to action. They don’t care about words. The actions of the Biden administration are very clear, if you cross the border illegally, you will be rewarded. That is what this administration is doing.

”As they give lip service, as they say the borders are closed, their actions clearly demonstrate otherwise. If we continue to reward criminality, if we continue to reward people crossing the border illegally, people will come.

“If we can control illegal immigration we can then go after the profits of the cartels, we can cut down on the drugs that are coming into the U.S., that are killing so many of our children. If we can’t do that the cartels will continue to control everything that is happening at the border. President Biden has a responsibility to the citizens of this great nation to do right by them not by the cartels to enable them to make the profits they are making.”

The cartels are making an estimated $400 million every month in human smuggling alone, Judd says.

At the border summit, Texas GOP Gov. Greg Abbott discussed how 26 governors sent a letter to Biden requesting to meet to discuss border security solutions, and he never replied. Biden, Abbott noted, has never even been to the border.

The Republican governors called on Biden to rebuild the wall as part of their proposed solutions on Wednesday. Two days later he answered them indirectly by today announcing he was defunding the last leg of the border wall construction in the Rio Grande Valley where Roma is located.

The Department of Homeland Security announced on the same day that gunfire could be heard in Roma that it canceled all border wall contracts in the Rio Grande Valley Sector. Instead, it would begin environmental planning based on recommendations by the Environmental Protection Agency—including biological, cultural and natural resource surveys.

The administration, it states, “Continues to call on Congress to cancel remaining border wall funding and instead fund smarter border security measures, like border technology and modernization of land ports of entry, that are proven to be more effective at improving safety and security at the border.”

Sen. James Lankford, R-Oklahoma, whose governor was at this week’s border summit, said, “Leave it to Biden and his team to cancel border contracts for “environmental reasons” when we have a 21-year high of illegal crossers. It is obvious that they do not want to stop illegal immigration. Everyone sees what’s going on at the border except for this Administration.”

Because contracts are legally in place with the construction companies, taxpayers are paying $3 million every day to not build the wall.

So far this year, Texas taxpayers have funded $3 billion towards border security efforts in the Lone Star State and several governors have sent law enforcement agents to assist with Texas and Arizona border security efforts.
 

jward

passin' thru
Chinese Flying Wing Drones Launch Swarming Decoys At Enemy Warships In Industry Video
A video presentation from the Aviation Industry Corporation of China points to new swarming drone and electronic warfare ambitions.
By Joseph Trevithick October 9, 2021


A screenshot of a segment from China's CCTV-7 showing a portion of a video presentation from state aviation conglomerate AVIC depicting stealth drones swarming a part of warships.
CCTV-7 capture via Twitter


An interesting clip from a Chinese state television segment has emerged online. Shot during the most recent iteration of the country's Zhuhai Airshow, which wrapped up earlier this month, it shows what appears to be a video presentation depicting navalized derivatives of the GJ-11 Sharp Sword stealthy unmanned combat air vehicle employing air-launched decoys to swarm a pair of surface warships.

The state-run Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) had this video running as part of its overall display at Zhuhai. Hongdu Aviation Industry Group, which makes the GJ-11, is a subsidiary of AVIC. The clip in question, seen in full in the Tweet below, also bears the logo of CCTV-7, a China Central Television channel that has been primarily focused on programming related to the country's People's Liberation Army (PLA) since 2019. The CCTV-7 footage does not appear to show the entirety of the AVIC video.

Promotional video for the shipborne version of the GJ-11 drone shown by the AVIC at the China Air Show. pic.twitter.com/RDw8COgPAA
— 彩云香江 (@louischeung_hk) October 7, 2021

What we do see of the AVIC video in CCTV-7's footage begins with one of the apparent GJ-11 derivatives taking off from the deck of what looks to be a Type 075 amphibious assault ship. The first of these ships entered service earlier this year, representing a major milestone for the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and there are already two more in different stages of construction. The PLAN is expected to eventually acquire a fleet of at least eight of these ships in the coming years.


message-editor%2F1633744105816-gj-11-lhd-takeoff.jpg

CCTV-7 capture via Twitter

A screengrab from the AVIC video depicting what appears to be stealthy UCAV based on the GJ-11 taking off from a Type 075 amphibious assault ship.

message-editor%2F1633744222045-type-075-lhd.jpg

VIA @_老年_ FROM WEIBO

The People's Liberation Army Navy's first Type 075 amphibious assault ship.

This is immediately intriguing in that it indicates that the PLAN may be interested in operating fixed-wing unmanned aircraft, including unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV) like the GJ-11, from its Type 075s, in addition to flying them from the decks of its growing fleet of supercarriers. Last year, what looked to be a mockup of a drone helicopter had appeared on the deck of the first of these amphibious assault ships while it was still undergoing initial trials ahead of its commissioning.

L'équipage du porte-hélicoptères 31 Hainan, Type 075, semble avoir opéré, ou du moins testé, un drone hélicoptère de plus d'une tonne lors de leur dernier entraînement en mer de Chine méridionale.

Des images montrent que le nouveau Z-20 fait également parti du voyage. pic.twitter.com/oWR9ehfSts
— East Pendulum (@HenriKenhmann) October 3, 2021

The video then moves on to show a flight of four of these UCAVs deploying air-launched decoys. The general exterior shape of these decoys is extremely similar to that of Raytheon's ADM-160 Miniature Air-Launched Decoy (MALD) series, which you can read all about here. MALDs are essentially small cruise missiles that have electronic warfare suites in lieu of traditional warheads, which, depending on the exact variant, allow them to jam enemy radars or attempt to fool their operators into believing that large groups of aircraft or missiles are coming at them from various directions.

message-editor%2F1633744357540-avic-decoys.jpg

CCTV-7 capture via Twitter

A group of air-launched decoys, with lines running between them to show that they're networked together, seen in the AVIC video.

message-editor%2F1633744437727-adm-160-mald.jpg

Raytheon

The air-launched decoys in AVIC's video look extremely similar to Raytheon's ADM-160 Miniature Air-Launched Decoy (MALD) series, an example of which is seen here,


The AVIC video even mimics those from Raytheon itself promoting the MALD family, which often show the decoys morphing into "ghost" aircraft as a visual representation of the false signatures these decoys pump out. In the case of the Chinese footage, the aircraft depicted may be intended to represent a long-rumored, but still not officially confirmed navalized variant of the FC-31 stealth fighter.


message-editor%2F1633744616125-avic-ghost-aircraft.jpg

CCTV-7 capture via Twitter

"Ghost aircraft" seen in the AVIC video representing the false signatures generated by the air-launched decoys. Their shape may be meant to reflect the FC-31 stealth fighter design, or a navalized variant thereof.

message-editor%2F1633745250941-fc-31.jpg

WC/WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

The first FC-31 prototype takes off at the 2014 Zhuhai Airshow.

The Raytheon promotional videos for MALD seen below show general scenarios that are very similar to what is depicted in the AVIC footage.
Chinese Flying Wing Drones Launch Swarming Decoys At Enemy Warships In Industry Video

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vZyL-zEoMfM&t=2s

The UCAVs and their decoys then approach two enemy warships, one of which fires a surface-to-air missile at one of the faked aircraft. The last bit of footage we see is of six of the drones swarming these ships. Each one is shown aiming a beam of some kind at them, which could represent an onboard electronic warfare system or even a directed energy weapon.



message-editor%2F1633744838587-avic-drone-swarm.jpg

CCTV-7 capture via Twitter

A swarm of stealthy drones hit two warships with "beams," which could represent electronic warfare or directed energy weapon attacks, in AVIC's video.


It is important to note that it's unclear how much AVIC's video presentation reflects aircraft and other systems, as well as concepts of operations to go with them, that the Chinese are actively pursuing now. At the same time, it does depict capabilities that it's hard to believe the PLA would not be interested in. Stealthy UCAVs launching decoys and otherwise capable of conducting swarming operations, which inherently have the ability to overwhelm defenders, would be immensely valuable in support of maritime operations, as well as those over land.

Beyond being able to penetrate to targets themselves using these tactics, they could help neutralize enemy defenses to open a pathway for follow-on strikes, including by non-stealth platforms. GJ-11s, future derivatives, or other similar unmanned designs, could also serve as launch platforms for swarms of smaller drones, as well. This new swarm could carry their own electronic warfare systems to act as stand-in jammers or operate as loitering munitions with the ability to carry out kinetic strikes. In the maritime context, small loitering munitions might not necessarily have the ability to sink enemy ships, but could cause mission kills, or otherwise severely degrade the capabilities of those vessels, by targeting specific systems, such as radar arrays and communications antennas.

The complete capability set outlined in the AVIC video is also just another example of China's long-standing willingness to observe what its principal competitors, especially the United States, are doing and then seek to replicate those technologies, if not outright clone entire systems, often with the aid of very active espionage efforts. The War Zone had already noted this general trend when reporting on the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) FH-97, a stealthy-looking unmanned aircraft design that first appeared at Zhuhai this year that is nearly identical, at least outwardly, to the XQ-58A Valkyrie from U.S. manufacturer Kratos.


message-editor%2F1633745002222-fh-97-mockup.jpg

CHINESE INTERNET VIA TWITTER

A mockup of the FH-97, along with other smaller drone designs, on display at the 2021 iteration of the Zhuhai Airshow.

Beyond the individual components in the AVIC video, such as the MALD-like decoy, what is depicted is what could easily be part of a larger emerging networked electronic warfare ecosystem. For instance, the clip is reminiscent in a number of extremely broad strokes to what is known about the U.S. Navy's shadowy Netted Emulation of Multi-Element Signature against Integrated Sensors (NEMESIS) program, which you can read more about in this War Zone feature. At NEMESIS' core is a 'system of systems' electronic warfare concept that includes things like drone swarms, ships, and submarines, all networked together to maximize their capabilities, with a particular focus on generating fleets of "ghost" aircraft and warships to confuse enemies and upend their decision-making cycles.

Other kinds of swarming capabilities and networked effects, such as enabling groups of precision-guided munitions to operate cooperatively, are now areas of great interest across the U.S. military, as well as among a number of its allies and partners. China itself has already demonstrated significant progress in the development of many relevant technologies, such as swarming capabilities and stealthy unmanned aircraft designs, that it could leverage to support work of the kinds of capabilities seen in the AVIC video.

The Chinese government “increasing inventory levels and the sophistication of their weapons and modernizing redundant systems throughout the kill chains that support their weapons,” Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall said just last month at the annual Air Force Association Air, Space, and Cyber Conference conference in Washington, D.C. “Hypersonic weapons, a full range of anti-satellite systems, plus cyber, electronic warfare, and challenging air-to-air weapons" were among the specific areas where China has been focusing its efforts, he added.

All told, while we can't say how close China may be to acquiring the capabilities seen in the AVIC video, they are certainly in line with the country's general ambitions, as well as its steadily growing ability to turn them into operational realities.
Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com

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jward

passin' thru
This Is The Most Incredible Tour Of A B-52 Stratofortress We Have Ever Seen
A highly experienced B-52 crew gives a very detailed tour of the inside and outside of the iconic Cold War-era jet.

By Tyler Rogoway October 10, 2021


It may be an overused axiom, but the B-52 is truly like a fine wine, it just keeps getting better with age. With the Stratofortress—the youngest of which will hit 60 years old next year—finally getting new engines, the type will have more range and better field performance, payload, maintainability, and economy. This, combined with significant sensor, avionics, survivability, weapons, and networking upgrades, as well as its new internal smart bomb racks, will see the 'BUFF' through to the second half of this century and probably beyond. Yes, 100-year-old B-52s flying in active service isn't just possible, it is becoming more probable with each passing day.
Being such an iconic Cold War-era air combat system, I have discussed the B-52 with those who flew and maintained it, regularly written about it at length, and just generally never stopped learning about it year after year. Yet the video below, posted on aviation photographer Erik Johnston's fabulous Youtube channel, is the most comprehensive tour of a B-52 I have ever seen.

RT 1h45m
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2sHUJnsMC2M





Running nearly two hours in length, the video goes into so many tiny details about the aircraft, which exists today as a hodgepodge of early Cold War engineering and retrofitted modern technology. The tour is led by Lt. Col. Aaron Bohl and his highly experienced crew, based out of Barksdale AFB in Louisiana, as well as a Crew Chief for the B-52 being examined, which carries the nickname "Politically Incorrect" embossed below mushroom cloud nose art. The B-52 community retains its nuclear mission, of course, albeit without nuclear gravity bombs—just nuclear-tipped cruise missiles are used these days. Also, just the idea of being a B-52 Crew Chief sounds overwhelming, doesn't it?

From discussions of a B-52H's tire pressure and 'six engine approaches'—apparently, it can go around on just two engines in some circumstances—to pointing out where the 20mm cannon shells once dropped out of the tail when the type still had a tail gun, this video is as fascinating as it is thorough. We even get a very intimate description of how the B-52's now famous, but once-secretive, swiveling landing gear—which is critical to the type's ability to accomplish crabbed crosswind landings—is set from the cockpit.
Then there is the reality that B-52 Weapons Systems Officers crawl into the weapons bay in flight. Another little door at the other end of the bay is where the gunner would have to squeeze through to get to their lonely station in the tail.

There are so many smaller things, too, like the safety bars installed on the ground in the bay so the doors don't close on anyone standing in it, which could presumably cut a person in half. Oh, and the dumb bomb racks that the B-52 uses internally are the same as the ones used on a WWII B-17!
As for its TF33 engines, they hold 41 quarts of oil, and all eight suck 20,000lbs of fuel an hour at idle. That is nearly the entire fuel load of an F-15C with two drop tanks. Maybe my favorite part is when the Crew Chief smiles lovingly at one point as states, "you're always hearing creeks and pops," as he walks atop the aircraft's wings.
Also of note, the inside of the tail of the jet looks more like what you would find in an engine room of an old ship than on a transonic bomber. In addition, the tour is a reminder that 'B-52ing' is truly a team sport and we are not even seeing the army of maintenance people that keep these aircraft flying, not just at Barksdale AFB, but also at the B-52's depot at Tinker AFB.

Above all else, this video highlights just how complex yet brilliantly engineered these aircraft, which could arguably be considered antiques at this point, truly are.
Author's note: A huge thanks to Erik Johnston for shooting this fabulous video and to @guyplopsky for the heads up that it existed!

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Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm......

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Foreign Policy Essay
Recalibrating U.S. Counterterrorism: Lessons Learned From Spain

By Kim Cragin, Michael Bartlett, Will Crass
Sunday, October 10, 2021, 10:01 AM

Editor’s Note: As the United States recalibrates its counterterrorism policy, law enforcement will play an even greater role. Kim Cragin, Michael Bartlett and William Crass of National Defense University point to Spain’s experience as a source of lessons for the United States. The authors describe Spain’s expeditionary use of law enforcement and identify steps the United States can take to improve coordination with foreign partners.
Daniel Byman

***
As the United States seeks to avoid overreliance on military forces to fight terrorism abroad, law enforcement agencies—international and domestic—will play an even more important role. America can learn much from its allies in this regard. Many U.S. allies, such as the United Kingdom and France, have experienced both foreign and domestic terrorist threats to their homelands, and most lack “over-the-horizon” military capabilities to mitigate these threats. Spain, in particular, has developed new and creative approaches to law enforcement in its struggle against terrorism.

Spain’s Expeditionary Forces: Cops and Lawyers

Understudied compared with the United Kingdom or France, Spain’s efforts against al-Qaeda and the Islamic State provide important lessons for the United States as it recalibrates its counterterrorism strategy. Spain has long been a recruitment and facilitation hub for violent jihadists, beginning with support for the mujahideen in Afghanistan during the 1980s and extending through the conflicts in Algeria, Bosnia, Chechnya, Iraq and Syria. It also has been featured in al-Qaeda and Islamic State propaganda, and these groups and their sympathizers have executed terrorist attacks in the Spanish homeland. The most tragic and notable attack occurred on March 11, 2004, when al-Qaeda operatives placed explosives on four commuter trains in and around Madrid’s city center. These coordinated attacks killed 191 individuals and injured more than 1,800.

The network of al-Qaeda operatives responsible for the Madrid attacks stretched across Spain and Morocco. Geography is important in this regard. The southernmost tip of Spain is approximately 10 short miles from Morocco across the Strait of Gibraltar, and Spain also retains two enclaves—Ceuta and Melilla—in North Africa that share borders with Morocco. Significant trade, travel and immigration occur between these two countries. This shared geography provides Moroccan terrorist operatives with relatively easy access to the Spanish homeland and vice versa.

Like with the United States and 9/11, the Madrid bombings caused Spain to revamp its approach to counterterrorism. But, unlike the United States, Spain does not have extensive over-the-horizon military strike capabilities that it can use against terrorist operatives in foreign countries. Moreover, Spain’s counterterrorism strategy needed to address terrorist cells both at home and abroad. To cope with these challenges, it adopted an expeditionary approach, but rather than employing expeditionary military forces, Spain relies on its judicial and law enforcement instruments of national power. Spain’s approach has been largely successful; it has foiled more than 80 terrorist plots since 2013, with only four successfully executed attacks and only one attack with a significant number of casualties.

In Kim Cragin’s January 2020 research trip to Spain, officials expressed a broad consensus that one of the most successful components of Spain’s approach to preventing terrorist plots has been better cooperation between Spanish and Moroccan law enforcement. Accompanied by the exchange of liaison magistrates between the countries’ ministries of justice and a revised criminal code, Spain has been able to build an effective law enforcement-centric approach to counter both foreign and domestic threats to its homeland.

The foundation of Spain’s expeditionary, law enforcement-centric approach is an enhanced relationship between the Spanish National Police Corps (CNP) and the Moroccan General Directorate for National Security (DGSN). Both law enforcement agencies are responsible for investigating terrorist suspects in their respective countries. CNP also stations its officers in Rabat to coordinate with the DGSN to facilitate information sharing on terrorist cells, suspects and plots. But collaboration between the CNP and DGSN goes well beyond information sharing. They also conduct joint operations: The CNP partners with the DGSN inside Morocco, and the DGSN with the CNP inside Spain, to collect evidence and to arrest and interrogate suspects. According to officials, this close coordination has made it difficult for operatives to flee or destroy evidence, contributing to the overall successful arrest and prosecution of al-Qaeda, Islamic State and other terrorist operatives. Joint operations conducted by the CNP and DGSN since 2014 include the following:
  • On Aug. 25, 2015, Spanish and Moroccan police arrested 14 terrorism suspects as part of a joint operation in Madrid, Spain, and Fez, Casablanca, Nador, Al Hoceima and Driouech, Morocco. Those arrested were accused of being part of a network that recruited fighters and sent them to join the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.
  • On Dec. 22, 2018, Spanish and Moroccan police worked together to arrest a Moroccan national in Barcelona. He was attempting to enter Spain after serving as a foreign fighter with the Islamic State in Syria.
  • On April 9, 2019, Spanish and Moroccan police arrested a 23-year-old man as part of a joint operation in Rabat. The terrorism suspect had plans to conduct a suicide attack in Seville during Holy Week.
  • On June 4, 2019, Spanish and Moroccan police worked together to arrest a 30-year-old Moroccan national in Barcelona. He was accused of financing terrorist activities.
  • On Oct. 14, 2020, Spanish and Moroccan police arrested two Moroccan nationals in Spain as part of Operation Polygamy. The two men were members of a terrorist cell linked to al-Qaeda that attempted to recruit women to marry al-Qaeda fighters abroad.
These joint operations illustrate the nature and degree of coordination between the CNP and DGSN to arrest al-Qaeda and Islamic State members and dismantle terrorist cells. Some of the arrested individuals were clearly part of operational cells, and others were involved in financing terrorist operations. Many of them are best described as recruiters or propagandists. This represents an important difference between the United States and Spain: The Spanish criminal code allows for the arrest of individuals who glorify terrorism. And, according to a report by the Judicial Documentation Centre, Spanish prosecutors have used this approach extensively. The courts handed down 181 judgments on the offense of glorification of terrorism from 2013 through 2019, with many of them being convictions. The United States does not have similar laws; thus, this component of Spain’s counterterrorism strategy cannot be replicated by U.S. law enforcement.

Beyond joint operations, Spanish officials also contend that the exchange of liaison magistrates between Spain and Morocco has contributed significantly to their overall success in preempting terrorist plots. Liaison magistrates come from the respective countries’ ministries of justice. They understand the legal systems in both countries and so their presence in-country helps to speed the exchange of, or requests for, evidence in the prosecution of terrorists. They also process letters rogatory, which are official requests for legal aid between two nations. These requests have provided the legal basis for Spanish officials to oversee arrests and participate in the interrogation of suspects in Morocco.

Of course, Spain’s counterterrorism strategy has not been completely effective. On Aug. 17, 2017, Younes Abouyaaqoub drove a van onto La Ramblas pedestrian promenade in Barcelona, killing 16 people and injuring an additional 22. It was the most significant terrorist attack in Spain since the Madrid bombing. That same night, Abouyaaqoub’s brother, two cousins and another two individuals drove a vehicle through pedestrians in the Spanish seaside resort of Cambrils. Spanish police later linked the attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils with a prior explosion in Alcanar. It was originally believed that the destroyed house in Alcanar was an illegal drug laboratory, but investigators soon realized that Abouyaaqoub and his accomplices had intended to detonate vehicular improvised explosive devices but accidentally destroyed the canisters in Alcanar and so resorted to driving their vehicles through pedestrians instead.

In interviews and conversations three years later, Spanish officials still viewed the series of attacks as a failure and were seeking new ways to augment their approach. Yet this should not undermine the potential of Spain’s approach, which has preempted numerous attacks and saved lives.

Recalibrating U.S. Counterterrorism

The United States should consider Spain’s success as it recalibrates its counterterrorism strategy 20 years after the 9/11 attacks. Spain’s liaison magistrates represent a good first step. The United States should go beyond legal attachés and short-term advisers, exploring new forms of collaboration and partnerships with foreign ministries of justice. For example, the Department of Justice recently has begun to assess ways that it can assist the U.S. military in its efforts to transfer “battlefield evidence” to partner nations. Foreign prosecutors need this evidence as part of their efforts against terrorists returning from conflicts abroad—particularly Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. The Justice Department should consider expanding this program by not only placing U.S. prosecutors in more embassies overseas but also welcoming foreign prosecutors to the United States. Moreover, these prosecutors should address threats beyond foreign fighter returnees to include evidence transfers related to other terrorists involved in the recruitment, facilitation, financing or execution of plots against U.S. interests.

Additionally, the Spanish National Police Corps’ relationship with the Moroccan General Directorate for National Security also presents some lessons for the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI should consider ways that it can expand the nature and extent of its own partnerships abroad, particularly in countries that represent historical transit points (for example, France, Turkey and the Netherlands) for terrorist operatives trying to reach the U.S. homeland. The purpose of these enhanced partnerships should be to speed the transfer of information (and eventually evidence) for preventing cross-border plots and prosecuting their perpetrators. And, along similar lines, the Justice Department, with support from the State Department and Department of Defense, should revisit the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program to see if these partnerships can be modified to better augment existing counterterrorism measures overseas.

The United States is now reevaluating its counterterrorism strategy. At stake is the extent to which it will rely on over-the-horizon military strikes and what the balance should be between military and law enforcement responses to the threat of terrorism. Though U.S. approaches already involve intelligence collection and law enforcement activities, there are other innovative ways to augment over-the-horizon strikes. The Spanish experience suggests that it is possible to adopt a relatively aggressive expeditionary law enforcement approach to counterterrorism and successfully protect the homeland from foreign terrorist threats. No counterterrorism strategy will ever be 100 percent effective, but the United States should take this opportunity to improve its approach.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

Turkey requests to buy 40 US F-16 fighter planes

Just last week Erdogan boasted about potential new defense deals with Russia, including aircraft purchases.

Al-Monitor Staff
October 8, 2021

Turkey has requested to purchase 40 US-made F-16 fighter jets and dozens of modernization kits for aircraft it already owns, according to reports in both the Greek and the Turkish press.

News of the request, which has not been publicly confirmed by the US State Department, comes just days after Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said his government was planning to expand defense ties with Russia.

The United States kicked Turkey out of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program in 2019 after NATO ally Ankara purchased Russia’s S-400 air defense system. US officials have said the Russian hardware poses a threat to the security of the technology included in the Lockheed-Martin-made F-35.

Erdogan has increasingly sought to play on his relationship with Russia to gain concessions from Washington, but the current US administration is having little of it.

Last year the Trump administration imposed limited sanctions targeting Turkey’s main government defense production body. The sanctions block new US export licenses for the Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB), but exceptions can be made.

The Biden administration has promised to add more penalties if Ankara purchases additional major Russian hardware.
Erdogan recently said that his government will go forward with plans to acquire additional S-400 units, defying Washington’s warnings.

During the UN General Assembly summit last month the Turkish president failed to achieve a desired meeting with President Joe Biden, but the two are expected to speak face to face at the end of October at the G-20 summit in Rome.

Ties between the two allies have reached a nadir since the S-400 purchase. US support for Kurdish-led militias in Syria amid the multinational war against the Islamic State only worsened matters with Ankara, which considers the fighters to be terrorists and fears greater Kurdish autonomy.

The latest multi-billion-dollar arms request would likely proceed smoothly under normal circumstances, but Erdogan’s policies, including on domestic human rights, have aroused unprecedented opposition in Congress.

Lawmakers from both parties have encouraged the Biden administration to take a tougher stance towards Ankara, pushing it into a delicate balancing act with its NATO ally on the Bosporus.

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jward

passin' thru
:kat:
Robot Dogs Now Have Assault Rifles Mounted On Their Backs
Robot dogs have been met with equal parts fascination and fear by the public, but their utility for military applications is becoming undeniable.
By Joseph Trevithick October 12, 2021



Ghost Robotics and SWORD International have teamed up to create a rifle-toting "robot dog." Called the Special Purpose Unmanned Rifle, or SPUR, the system adds a 6.5mm Creedmoor rifle from SWORD to one of Ghost Robotics' quadrupedal unmanned ground vehicles, or Q-UGVs.

The SPUR made its debut on the show floor at the Association of the U.S. Army's main annual convention in Washington, D.C., which opened yesterday. Though Ghost Robotics is partnered with a number of other companies to explore defense and security applications, among others, for its Q-UGVs — which you can read more about in this past War Zone feature — this appears to be the first example of one of these unmanned systems with an actual weapon mounted on it. Unarmed examples of the Q-UGV are notably already in limited use with the U.S. Air Force's 325th Security Forces Squadron at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida and are being tested by other units within that service.

SPUR (Special Purpose Unmanned Rifle), @Ghost_Robotics Q-UGV + @SWORDINT 6.5 Creedmoor
CC @august_cole @MelanieRovery pic.twitter.com/S1D25xYwec
— Abraxas Spa (@AbraxasSpa) October 12, 2021

The exact configuration of the 6.5mm gun inside the SPUR module — how much ammunition it contains, and how hard it might be to reload — are all unclear. Ghost Robotics has said that SPUR can be instructed remotely to chamber the first round from an unloaded state, as well as clear the chamber and safe the gun.


More details. Thx @IntelWalrus pic.twitter.com/6bEIW6G8M8
— Felix Woessner (@FeWoessner) October 12, 2021

In terms of the weapon itself, SWORD does offer derivatives of the 5.56x45mm AR-15/M16 family, as well as similar, but larger caliber guns, more akin to the Armalite AR-10 or Knights Armament Company SR-25. Those rifles come in calibers such as 7.62x51mm, 6.5mm Creedmoor, .300 Norma Magnum, .338 Lapua Magnum, and .338 Norma Magnum. The weapon used in the SPUR module looks like it could have a sound suppressor fitted to the front end, which could make it more difficult for opponents to determine where the shooting might be coming from.

message-editor%2F1634069033880-sword-gungnir.jpg

SWORD International

A SWORD International MK-17 Mod 1 Gungnir rifle, which is chambered in 6.5mm Creedmoor.

The 6.5mm Creedmoor is not currently in any kind of widespread use by the military or other security forces, either in the United States or elsewhere around the world. However, U.S. Special Operations Command is notably in the process of acquiring light machine guns and rifles in this caliber, ostensibly to fill an intermediate niche in overall performance between existing 5.56x45mm and 7.62x51mm guns, as you can read more about here. Testing has shown that this 6.5mm round actually offers increased range over the various 7.62x51mm cartridges that are available to the U.S. special operations community now.

There is limited information about the SPUR available now, but The War Zone has already reached out to Ghost Robotics for more information. Ghost Robotics says that SPUR is capable of precision fire out to 1,200 meters, or nearly 3,940 feet. This unmanned system already features impressive stabilization capabilities simply as a result of its quadrupedal design.
"When our robots move around and you shove them, these forces are computed at 2,000 calculations per second per leg," Ghost Robotics CEO and founder Jiren Parikh told The War Zone's Brett Tingley in an interview last year, adding that the system is designed in such a way as to work to ensure it can keep functioning even if various onboard sensors it can use to help move around fail.
"We’re adjusting it to make it like a mammal. Our robot, when you see it climbing stairs or walking or running around, we turn off all the sensors," he continued. "It’s just feeling. It’s completely blind. The reason we do that is because if a warfighter or a mining company, if anybody is using our robot, this robot had better operate 99.99% of the time."
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=coPX3nRngEc



As for targeting, the SPUR module appears to have its own sighting system on top. In past testing the U.S. Air Force has conducted using unarmed Q-UGVs, operators have utilized the Android Team Awareness Kit (ATAK), an app that can be installed on tablet-like devices, to interact with these unmanned systems and view the feeds from their onboard video cameras. It seems likely that ATAK or a similar piece of software could be used to enable a human to aim at targets and engage with them with the robot's 6.5mm rifle. The Air Force has also discussed potentially operating Q-UGVs remotely from centralized command facilities via virtual reality headsets.



message-editor%2F1634068609430-q-ugv-tablet-controller.jpg

USAF

A member of the US Air Force interacts with a Ghost Robotics Q-UGV using a tablet-like controller during a demonstration at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida.

SPUR could also have some degree of additional autonomy, now or in the future, potentially employing artificial intelligence-driven capabilities to at least detect and "lock on" to potential threats, even if an operator ultimately has to give the approval to start shooting. Sighting systems for small arms that offer these kinds of capabilities are available on the open market now.
Regardless, giving the Q-UGV a weapon of its own offers a way for it to immediately prosecute any targets it might come across, if desired. This could be especially valuable given the idea that these "robot dogs," just like their real counterparts, will be able to get into tight spaces that present significant risks for their human "handlers," or just be hard for a person to access all. A 6.5mm Creedmoor gun would give it the option of engaging threats at more extended ranges, as well. This could be highly advantageous for perimeter security tasks, which is already one of its key missions, at least in expeditionary scenarios, as well as for scouting and urban warfare military operations.

“These dogs will be an extra set of eyes and ears while computing large amounts of data at strategic locations throughout Tyndall Air Force Base,” Air Force Major Jordan Criss, the head of the 325th Security Forces Squadron, said in a statement after a test involving the Q-UGVs last year. “They will be a huge enhancement for our defenders and allow flexibility in the posting and response of our personnel.”
The option now of arming the Q-UGVs adds a new tier of capability to these unmanned systems that could increase their flexibility when employed in various roles. At the same time, the idea of arming quadrupedal unmanned systems, which already prompt very different kinds of reactions compared to more traditional unmanned ground vehicles, may sit unfavorably with some. Those types of responses may well increase just as Ghost Robotics' product line, including unarmed types, becomes increasingly more autonomous.

When I tell you I GASPED pic.twitter.com/9uzeM4iIGq
— Haley Britzky (@halbritz) October 12, 2021
At the same time, small armed unmanned ground systems are hardly new, and the military utility of adding weapon systems to quadrupedal designs is obvious.
Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com
:kat:
 

Zagdid

Veteran Member

Aerostat: a Russian long-range anti-ballistic missile system with possible counterspace capabilities
by Bart Hendrickx Monday, October 11, 2021

Russia has been working for several years on a long-range anti-ballistic missile system named Aerostat. The fact that it is being developed by the country’s sole manufacturer of solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles suggests that it may very well have a range allowing it to double as a counterspace system. The oddly named ABM system (“aerostat” is a general term for unpowered balloons and airships) has never been mentioned in the Russian press or openly discussed by Russian military analysts, but its existence and basic design features can be determined through open-source intelligence.

There has been much debate over whether Nudol is primarily an anti-missile system with a complementary counterspace role or vice versa.
Aerostat has shown up in a number of openly accessible official documents, the first being the 2013 annual report of the Almaz-Antey Air and Space Defense Corporation, established in 2002 to unify dozens of companies producing missiles, anti-aircraft systems, radars, naval artillery, and other systems.[1] As can be learned from other publicly available documents, Almaz-Antey was assigned prime contractor for the project by the Ministry of Defense on July 12, 2013. A court document published last July literally describes the purpose of the July 2013 contract as “the development of a long-range intercept complex for the anti-missile defense of the Russian Federation in the period 2013-2018” and identifies the missile as 106T6.[2] Aerostat is not the first such long-range ABM system developed under the supervision of Almaz-Antey. Another one, named Nudol, has been undergoing test flights for several years and is likely seen primarily as a direct-ascent anti-satellite weapon.

Nudol
Nudol (also known as 14Ts033) is named after a small place some 100 kilometers northwest of Moscow that was one of the deployment sites for the long-range missiles of Moscow’s former A-35M missile defense system. Its main element is a road-mobile solid-fuel rocket called 14A042, developed by OKB Novator in Yekaterinburg. This company belongs to Almaz-Antey and has produced a wide range of surface-to-air and cruise missiles. US intelligence data indicate that the 14A042 missile has flown at least ten test flights from the Plesetsk launch site in northwestern Russia since 2014, but no targets seem to have been involved in any of those.

There has been much debate over whether Nudol is primarily an anti-missile system with a complementary counterspace role or vice versa. US intelligence considers it a direct-ascent anti-satellite system, as is clear from statements placed on the website of US Space Command following the latest two Nudol tests in April and December 2020.[3] It has also been characterized as an anti-satellite system by at least two Russian officials, namely the deputy head of a Ministry of Defense research institute and Russia’s deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov.[4] Another factor pointing in the direction of an ASAT role for the 14A042 missile is that the 14A designators are typically used for space launch vehicles (for instance, 14A14 is the Soyuz-2 rocket.) 14A042 is indeed termed a “rocket for space-related purposes” in two official documents that outline safety precautions that need to be taken when the rockets fly over the Nenets Autonomous District east of Plesetsk.[5] Moreover, one court document mentions communications systems needed to connect Nudol with the headquarters of Russia’s space surveillance network in Noginsk-9 (code-named 3006M.)[6]

An analysis of online procurement documents shows that Almaz-Antey was named prime contractor for the project by the Ministry of Defense on August 10, 2009, and awarded a contract to OKB Novator for the development of the 14A042 rocket on the same day. For some reason, Almaz-Antey received a new contract for the project on April 10, 2015.[7]

While OKB Novator is responsible for integrating the rocket, the individual stages are manufactured by NPO Iskra in Perm. The designators 14D807 and 14D809 seen in some documents are likely the ones used for the first and second stage.[8] Nudol appears to have a kinetic kill vehicle that contains a “multispectral electro-optical homing head” (MOEGSN or 14Sh129) developed by KB Tochmash.[9] The State Institute of Applied Optics (GIPO) supplies what is called a “combined frameless television/infrared channel” for 14Sh129.[10] This part of the payload, apparently named TTPS, is presumably described in several technical articles published by GIPO, where the spectral ranges are given as 0.4–0.7 microns (visible) and 3.0–5.0 microns (mid-infrared.)[11] Both KB Tochmash and GIPO also have a role in the air-launched Burevestnik ASAT system.

Aerostat’s organizational background
Almaz-Antey’s main subcontractor for Aerostat is the MIT Corporation (MIT standing for “Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology”), which specializes in solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles. Unlike OKB Novator, it is part of the Roscosmos State Corporation and is a newcomer to the field of anti-ballistic missile defense.

After the break-up of the Soviet Union, the MIT Corporation fielded the Topol-M, YARS, and Bulava ICBMs (the latter a submarine-launched missile.) In the 1990s, it also converted Soviet-era Topol ICBMs into space launch vehicles called Start and Start-1, which were used to launch a number of small satellites into low Earth orbit between 1993 and 2006. The company is also working on the solid-fuel emergency escape system for Russia’s new piloted spacecraft Oryol.

Other subcontractors that can be identified from online sources are:

- KB Tochmash and GIPO: the two companies play the same role as in Nudol, providing the electro-optical system of the missile’s homing head. Actually, some procurement documents indicate that the system is identical or at least very similar to the MOEGSN/14Sh129 system carried by Nudol’s 14A042 rocket.[12] It also includes a diode-pumped laser rangefinder.[13] KB Tochmash has also built laser rangefinders for some of its surface-to-air missiles and several years ago was planning to deliver a laser rangefinder “for spacecraft dockings” to an unidentified foreign partner, most likely China.[14]

- NPTsAP imeni N.A. Pilyugina (further referred to here as the Pilyugin Center): this company produces guidance and control systems for launch vehicles and most likely performs the same task for Aerostat. It has built a test stand called Aerostat that is almost certainly intended for the project.[15]

- GOKB Prozhektor: a company belonging to the MIT Corporation that builds autonomous power supply systems for the corporation’s ICBMs. Aerostat is listed among other MIT Corporation missiles in two of the company’s annual reports.[16]

- PAO Radiofizika: a company under Almaz-Antey, involved among other things in building ground-based radar systems that provide targeting data for anti-missile systems. Aerostat is mentioned in PAO Radiofizika’s annual reports for 2018 and 2019 and in a book dedicated to the company’s 55th anniversary. The 2020 annual report mentions work related to “Product 103T6”, an index similar to 106T6. It is not clear if this is yet another missile or whether there is a typo in one of the two indexes.[17]

- GosNIIAS (State Research Institute of Aviation Systems): this appears to build one or more test stands for Aerostat, including one used to simulate the infrared background against which the missile’s homing head will have to track its targets.[18]

- ÐО VIKor: a company that provides technical support and consulting for various military projects. Its website mentions work done in 2019 on research projects called Aerostat-Ts-MIT and Aerostat-S-MIT-Nadyozhnost (the latter word meaning “reliability”).[19]

Technical features
Aerostat may have been discussed in an article written by Almaz-Antey’s deputy general director Pavel Sozinov in a 2017 issue of the corporation’s quarterly journal.[20] It deals with mathematical modeling techniques to simulate the performance of various “air and space defense systems.” One of those is literally called “an advanced long-range intercept complex,” with Sozinov hinting that it has a range considerably exceeding that of existing systems. The simulations were needed to “justify technical decisions made to develop the system” and “determine its combat efficiency.” It can be learned from the article that its targets will be both “complex ballistic targets” (a term usually used for multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles) and satellites (included in the models were “calculations of satellite orbits” as well as data provided by the ground-based space surveillance network.) It cannot be ruled out that Sozinov was writing about Nudol, but he portrayed the research as being linked to a future system, whereas Nudol was already making test flights at the time of writing.

The computer models simulated the operation of a “central radar complex” to acquire and track the targets and benefited from experience gathered with a mobile radar system named Demonstrator. This was a truck-mounted phased array radar first demonstrated at various air shows in 2013–2014 and described at the time by PAO Radiofizika’s general director Boris Levitan as a prototype of bigger radar stations needed for space surveillance (although it could also be used for detecting airborne targets.)[21]

What can be concluded from the available information is that Aerostat’s 106T6 rocket is probably a multistage solid-fuel launch vehicle that inherits elements from one or more of the MIT Corporation’s ICBMs.
The “central radar complex” could be the Don-2 battle management radar currently used by Moscow’s A-135 anti-ballistic missile system or another one known as 14Ts031 or Object 0746-M that is situated near Chekhov, some 60 kilometers southwest of Moscow. This is a modified version of the Dunai-3U radar complex originally built for the earlier A-35M missile defense system and consists of a transmitting and a receiving antenna separated by about three kilometers. In documentation it is called “a specialized space surveillance radar for the detection and monitoring of small-size space objects”. PAO Radiofizika has been closely involved in modernizing the radar complex since early last decade under a project called Razvyazka. Although the radar system has usually been linked to Nudol, it could obviously support Aerostat as well. According to a brochure distributed by PAO Radiofizika at the recent MAKS-2021 aerospace show near Moscow, the modernization of the radar complex has been completed and the main purpose of the P-band phased array radar is to catalog space objects and detect satellites in high orbits.[22]

In the same article, Sozinov also discussed techniques to simulate the flight of a multistage solid-fuel rocket carrying a “multispectral electro-optical homing head” (possibly the MOEGSN/14Sh129 system jointly developed by KB Tochmash and GIPO.) He didn’t specifically link the rocket to the “long-range intercept complex,” but the computer models took into account Earth limb background effects, suggesting the rocket is designed to operate outside the Earth’s atmosphere. It has a third stage whose flight path can be corrected using tracking information on the target and its homing head is described as a “two-dimensional tracking system with independent control for each channel” needed to determine the angular velocity of the line of sight. Sozinov’s description of this system is virtually copied and pasted in a paper presented in 2018 by a researcher of the Pilyugin Center (a subcontractor for Aerostat) who has also co-authored several articles as well as a patent on a method to control the thrust of a solid-fuel upper stage.[23] Presumably, targeting data obtained by the sensors will be used by the rocket’s guidance and control system to regulate the upper stage’s thrust.

The link with Aerostat is further supported by the fact that the specific Russian term used for “upper stage” in one of these Pilyugin Center articles (dovodochnaya stupen’, sounding somewhat similar to “kick stage” in English) is seen virtually only in publications of the MIT Corporation. Also, one of the co-researchers, Gennadiy Rumyantsev, is a veteran of the Pilyugin Center who was involved in developing the guidance and control system for the MIT Corporation’s Start launch vehicles back in the 1990s.[24]

These rockets, derived from the Topol ICBM and launched from transporter erector launchers, came in four-stage and five-stage configurations (called Start-1 and Start respectively), with both carrying an additional low-thrust kick stage to deliver the payloads to their final orbits (so strictly speaking they were five-stage and six-stage rockets.) The kick stage had а thrust control system as well as a gas reaction control system to ensure accurate orbital injection of the satellites. In earlier publications, Rumyantsev has pointed out that such kick stages can be used either as an ICBM post-boost stage to deploy nuclear warheads or as the upper stage of a space launch vehicle.[25] Most likely, exactly the same type of stage could be modified to guide an exoatmospheric kill vehicle to its target.

The MIT Corporation has recently proposed to revive the Start project using decommissioned Topol ICBMs, at least several dozens of which are left.[26] The renewed interest in Start is also reflected by a handful of patents of the MIT Corporation that have appeared online in recent years.[27] MIT has also studied modified versions of solid-fuel upper stages [28]. Although impossible to prove, it is tempting to believe that these proposals at least partly draw on work done as part of Aerostat since 2013.
 

Zagdid

Veteran Member
Aside from Sozinov’s 2017 article, Almaz-Antey has published two other articles that may be related to Aerostat. One discusses computer simulations of the launch of a “multistage rocket” which “exits the Earth’s atmosphere” and uses both on-board sensors and ground-based radar systems to detect and track its targets. One of its authors has also written an article on modeling the Earth limb’s infrared background radiation as seen by “space-based electro-optical systems.”[29] Considering Almaz-Antey’s background, the research hardly had anything to do with a civilian space project.

There can be little doubt that Russia considers counterspace weapons an integral part of this system, which is often depicted as being targeted against “air-based and space-based attack systems”. From the Russian perspective, one such potential space-based attack system is the US Air Force’s X-37B spaceplane.
What can be concluded from the available information is that Aerostat’s 106T6 rocket is probably a multistage solid-fuel launch vehicle that inherits elements from one or more of the MIT Corporation’s ICBMs (Topol-M, YARS, Bulava, or possibly a lightweight version of YARS known as Rubezh.) Judging by Sozinov’s article, it may use the first two stages of an existing ICBM topped by an exoatmospheric kill vehicle consisting of a solid-fuel “kick stage” (the “third stage” mentioned by Sozinov) and a homing system that relies on data fed by ground-based radars and an on-board visible/infrared sensor.

Situating Aerostat in the Russian ABM program
So where does Aerostat fit in Russia’s anti-ballistic missile program? In May 2016, MIT Corporation general director Yuri Solomonov acknowledged his company’s leading role in a missile defense project, but did not provide additional details other than calling it analogous to the American Aegis system.[30] Aegis is the Navy component of the US missile defense system and is geared toward defending against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles during their midcourse phase. It also has a limited counterspace capability, which was demonstrated in 2008 when an Aegis Standard Missile-3 was used to destroy a derelict US reconnaissance satellite to prevent it from re-entering the atmosphere in one piece and possibly causing harm to people on the ground (or that, at least, was the official explanation.) While Aegis is primarily a sea-based system, it also has a land-based component (Aegis Ashore) which began deployment in Eastern Europe in 2016. This has drawn strong criticism from Russia, which considers it a breach of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, arguing Aegis Ashore can also be used to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles against targets on Russian territory.

The evidence presented above is not consistent with Aerostat being a theater missile defense system like Aegis. Presumably, Solomonov was referring to Aegis as a well-known example of a US missile defense system rather than meaning to say MIT’s missile defense system is in the same category.

Protection against theater missiles is currently provided by the S-300 and S-400 air defense systems. The only ABM system capable of intercepting ICBMs is A-135, deployed around Moscow to intercept incoming warheads targeting the city and its surrounding areas. This was declared operational in 1995 and is the successor to the original A-35 system deployed in the 1970s in compliance with the 1972 ABM Treaty (which limited both the US and the Soviet Union to having only one ABM site, but was abandoned by the US in 2002.) Currently, A-135’s main elements are the Don-2N battle management phased array radar and several dozen short-range 53T6 (NATO reporting name “Gazelle”) endoatmospheric nuclear-tipped missiles developed by OKB Novator. Also part of A-135 was 51T6 (NATO reporting name “Gorgon”), a long-range nuclear-tipped exoatmospheric missile, which has now been retired.

In 2014, Almaz-Antey’s Pavel Sozinov said that Russia’s missile defense system was being considerably upgraded and would comprise equivalents of America’s THAAD and GMD systems. THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) is intended to intercept short- and medium-range missiles at the end of the midcourse stage and in the terminal stage of flight. GMD (Ground-Based Midcourse Defense) is designed to counter ICBMs in the midcourse stage. According to Sozinov, the THAAD-type system would target medium-range ballistic missiles and have a limited capability against ICBMs as well. The other system would be “somewhat similar to GMD”, but would be mobile and have a “higher intercept efficiency.” [31] In 2017, the chief designer of Russia’s missile early warning system, Sergey Boyev, declared that a “multi-layered national missile defense system” would be deployed by 2025, calling it a response to the “direct threat” posed by the US Aegis Ashore missiles deployed in Eastern Europe.[32]

There can be little doubt that Russia considers counterspace weapons an integral part of this system, which is often depicted as being targeted against “air-based and space-based attack systems”. From the Russian perspective, one such potential space-based attack system is the US Air Force’s X-37B spaceplane, which, according to Sozinov, could carry up to three warheads into space and then deliver them to their targets after evading early warning systems.[33] Even President Vladimir Putin himself has alluded to the offensive potential of the X-37B, saying that “re-usable shuttle type spacecraft” can give the US an edge in the militarization of space and that the deployment of what he called “combat complexes” in orbit poses a greater threat to world security than that of medium-range missiles in Europe[34]. In 2017, Sozinov acknowledged Almaz-Antey’s involvement in the development of counterspace weapons, more particularly electronic warfare systems to be used against radar reconnaissance, optical reconnaissance, and communications satellites, as well as systems for “the direct functional destruction of elements deployed in orbit,” an apparent reference to kinetic ASAT weapons.[35]

What Sozinov called “the Russian THAAD” appears to be the S-500 system (also known as Prometey and Triumfator-M). As explained by Sergey Surovikin, the commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces, the S-500 system is aimed against both “aerodynamic targets” (including drones and hypersonic vehicles) and “ballistic targets.” Its main goal, he said, is to destroy medium-range ballistic missiles, but if needed it can also intercept ICBM-launched warheads in the terminal stage. He added that, in the future, it will also be able to destroy low orbiting satellites and “space-based attack systems.”[36] Little has been revealed about S-500, but available information suggests that it includes the 40N6M missile (with a reported range of 400 kilometers) for use against aircraft and cruise missiles and the more powerful 77N6-N and 77N6-N1 (with an estimated range of 500–600 kilometers) to counter ballistic missiles and satellites. All these missiles are products of MKB Fakel.

If used in an ASAT capacity, Aerostat should have a range considerably higher than that of Nudol and, hence, be capable of taking out satellites in higher orbits.
The “Russian GMD” is most likely the upgraded Moscow ABM system known as A-235. Work on this began back in 1991 under the strange code-name “Samolyot-M” (“samolyot” means “aircraft”), but progress has been very slow. The short-range component of A-235 appears to be an improved variant of OKB Novator’s 53T6 missile called 53T6M, which has been making test flights from the Sary-Shagan test range in Kazakhstan since early last decade. The long-range component, the replacement for the decommissioned 51T6, has long been rumored to be Nudol, with numerous sources (including Wikipedia) going as far as claiming that Nudol actually is another name for the entire A-235 system (which is clearly not the case.) In reality, there is no convincing documentary evidence that Nudol will become part of A-235.

The index used for Aerostat’s missile (106T6 or possibly 103T6, the same nomenclature as 53T6 and 51T6) does point to it being a future element of A-235. It would have several advantages over 51T6. Likely having a longer range, it would be able to intercept ICBMs earlier in the midcourse phase than has been possible so far. Rather than being installed in silos, it should be mobile (the MIT Corporation’s ICBMs can be launched from transporter erector launchers) and its advanced homing system should allow it to kinetically destroy its targets instead of disabling them by detonating a nuclear warhead in their vicinity.

Nudol’s place in all this remains uncertain (its exact range is unknown). Possibly, A-235 will be a three-tier system with short-range missiles (53T6M), medium-range missiles (Nudol/14A042) and long-range missiles (Aerostat/106T6). Original plans formulated for A-235 in the 1990s did in fact call for such a three-tier system. It is also possible that Nudol is a specialized ASAT system with no anti-missile role at all (the 14A042 index of the Nudol missile is not indicative of it being part of A-235).

Possible counterspace role
So is Aerostat designed to attack satellites as well? If Sozinov was writing about Aerostat in his 2017 article, then it would appear it is. The fact that Aerostat and Nudol seem to share the same tracking sensors may also point in that direction. If used in an ASAT capacity, Aerostat should have a range considerably higher than that of Nudol and, hence, be capable of taking out satellites in higher orbits. In the absence of more specific information on the design, it is difficult to estimate exactly how much higher.

As a rule of thumb, the apogee that a ballistic missile can reach when launched vertically is approximately one half of its maximum horizontal range.[37] Therefore, a missile like Topol, which has a horizontal range of around 11,000 kilometers, would be able to reach a maximum altitude of roughly 5,500 kilometers. By replacing the nuclear warheads with a much lighter kinetic kill vehicle and adding one or more stages (as done on the Start rockets), that ceiling can be significantly increased. Recall that China conducted a high-altitude missile test in May 2013 that was officially billed as a scientific sounding rocket mission, but was later assessed by the Pentagon to have been a possible “test of technologies with a counterpace mission in geosynchronous orbit.”

However, it is highly questionable that Aerostat would be able to reach such altitudes or even those used by America’s GPS/Navstar navigation satellites (around 20,000 kilometers.) Moreover, it would take hours for a direct-ascent ASAT weapon to reach such targets, giving them ample time to perform evasive maneuvers. A more efficient way of disabling satellites in such orbits is by using electronic warfare systems, several of which are known to have been deployed by Russia. Any other US military satellites that could be worthwhile targets for anti-satellite systems orbit the Earth no higher than about 1,000 kilometers, more specifically the KH-11 optical reconnaissance satellites, the X-37B spaceplanes, the Onyx (Lacrosse) and Topaz radar reconnaissance satellites, and the NOSS-3/Intruder ocean reconnaissance satellites. Also added to the list could be a series of European military observation satellites. All of these would likely fall within the range of Aerostat.

Future tests of Aerostat may be complicated by the fact that Russia’s main test range for anti-missile systems (Sary-Shagan) is located in neighboring Kazakhstan.
In short, within several years Russia may possess as many as three anti-missile systems that could double as direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons (S-500, Nudol and Aerostat), whatever the rationale behind that may be. That goal has, in fact, been officially acknowledged for S-500 and Nudol, with the latter possibly even being a dedicated ASAT system. In addition to those, Russia probably already has operational ground-based electronic warfare and laser systems for counterspace purposes and is also working on co-orbital ASAT systems, which already seem to have made test flights under the Burevestnik and Nivelir projects.[38]

Project status
Some insight into the original test schedule for Aerostat is provided by the earlier mentioned court document published this July. The July 2013 contract between the Ministry of Defense and Almaz-Antey and later supplements to the contract called for finishing the preliminary design by November 2014 and conducting a “live experiment” in October 2017. So-called “preliminary tests” were to be completed by November 2020 and followed by “state tests,” after which the system was to be declared ready for serial production in November 2021.

“Preliminary tests” and “state tests” are terms inherited from the Soviet days denoting the test phases that a military product has to go through before it is declared operational. “Preliminary tests” are defined as tests needed to determine if experimental versions of a military product meet technical specifications. “State tests” are needed to establish whether the product meets technical requirements “in conditions as close as possible to those experienced in the field” and to decide whether it can be approved for operational use and serial production.

According to the document, the “live experiment” was eventually carried out on December 26, 2017. No further details are given, but on that day Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces launched a Soviet-era Topol ICBM on a test flight from the Kapustin Yar test range near Volgograd (most likely toward the Sary-Shagan range in Kazakhstan.) In a statement released the same day, the Ministry of Defense announced the flight was designed to test new ballistic missile defense countermeasures.[39] The same goal has also been reported for other Topol test flights from Kapustin Yar and was not unique to this mission. In this particular case, the test may have been aimed at testing ways of evading countermeasures taken by the enemy to prevent its missiles from being intercepted by ABM missiles. The fact that the Aerostat-related test was carried out with a Topol missile does not at all imply that Aerostat itself will also be based on Topol. The aging Topol missiles are used to demonstrate technology for newer ICBMs.
 

Zagdid

Veteran Member
The court document does not shed any light on further technical progress made in the Aerostat project after the December 2017 test. The subject of the court case was a lawsuit filed by the Ministry of Defense against Almaz-Antey for delays in the “live experiment” and the delivery of design documentation and software for the project (with the MIT Corporation mentioned only as a third party.) The court also granted a request from the Ministry of Defense to terminate the July 2013 contract, but that does not necessarily mean that the project has been canceled. The contract covered work on Aerostat in the 2013–2018 period and its official termination may have been no more than a bureaucratic move. In fact, procurement documents show that the Ministry of Defense signed a new contract with Almaz-Antey for Aerostat on April 26, 2018 and further work seems to have taken place only under that contract. A similar pattern was seen in the Nudol project, where the government contract with Almaz-Antey was renewed after six years.

The work known to have been performed under the new contract does carry the label “NIR”, which is Russian short for the research phase of a project that precedes actual systems development (referred to as “OKR”.) This may indicate that at least some systems have encountered technical problems that have forced designers back to the drawing boards.

Future tests of Aerostat may be complicated by the fact that Russia’s main test range for anti-missile systems (Sary-Shagan) is located in neighboring Kazakhstan. One anonymous “highly-placed source” in the Russian defense industry told a Russian news outlet in June last year that this is causing problems for tests of long-range air and missile defense systems, particularly S-500. To some extent, the source said, this also applied to Nudol, although the main stumbling block for Nudol were “some unresolved technical issues” that were expected to keep it from entering combat duty until 2021 “at the earliest.”[40] Still, if Nudol and Aerostat have a hit-to-kill capability, that likely would have to be demonstrated before they are declared operational. Russia may prefer to do that using ballistic targets rather than orbiting satellites, considering the vast amounts of space debris that would be generated by such tests. Since it uses the same type of tracking sensors, Nudol could also serve as a pathfinder for Aerostat.

What seems to be a new test range for anti-missile systems (Object 2142) is being constructed near the town of Severo-Yeniseiskiy in the Krasnoyarsk region in Siberia. It is part of a project called Ukazchik-KV, which in one document was associated with “a test range and internal flight path for tests of anti-missile systems and anti-missile countermeasures” (“internal flight path” probably meaning a flight path that doesn’t cross Russia’s borders.)[41] Planned for installation at the new test range are radars and optical tracking systems similar to those used at Sary-Shagan. One map of the test range shows (simulated) warheads coming in from the northwest, indicating the new “internal flight path” will be from Plesetsk to Severo-Yeniseiskiy and complement or replace the currently used flight path from Kapustin Yar to Sary-Shagan.[42] Late last year, Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu said the site near Severo-Yeniseiskiy was needed for tests of the new Sarmat liquid-fuel ICBM, but it clearly will be used for other purposes as well.[43]

Ukazchik-KV was assigned to Almaz-Antey on the very same day as Aerostat (July 12, 2013), as was yet another missile defense project called Selektsiya, which seems to be aimed at creating an integrated command structure for Russia’s air and missile defense systems. It is not entirely clear though if there is any connection between these three projects, which were initiated under three different government contracts. But even if Aerostat does not need the new test range, it seems to have fallen far behind the schedule originally set out for it and may still be a long way from reaching operational status.

References (all in Russian unless otherwise noted)
  1. Almaz-Antey annual report for 2013, p. 23, 37.
  2. Document describing a court case between the Ministry of Defense and Almaz-Antey published in 2021.
  3. Press releases published on the website of US Space Command on April 15, 2020 and December 16, 2020.
  4. RIA Novosti report, November 30, 2017 (the deputy head of the 46 TsNII military research institute Oleg Achasov was misquoted as calling the system “Rudolf”) ; Article (in Russian) published in “Voyenno-promyshlennyy kuryer”, July 2, 2018.
  5. Documents published in 2015 and 2016.
  6. Documents describing a court case between the Ministry of Defense and MAK Vympel, published in 2017.
  7. The dates can be determined from various procurement documents, including these ones published in 2016 and 2017.
  8. See, for instance, procurement documentation published in 2016 linking 14D807 and 14D809 to the April 2015 government decree for Nudol.
  9. Procurement documentation published in 2016 links 14Sh129 to Nudol’s 14A042 rocket. KB Tochmash annual reports (in Russian) for 2012 and 2013 link MOEGSN to Nudol.
  10. Biography of a GIPO researcher briefly describing 14Sh129.
  11. Biography of a GIPO researcher mentions his involvement in Nudol-TTPS ; The TTPS system is possibly described in an article (in Russian) published in “Prikladnaya fizika”, 1/2015.
  12. Procurement documentation (in Russian) published in 2017 links 14Sh129 to the July 2013 government contract for Aerostat and lists exactly the same components as in the procurement documentation for Nudol mentioned in Reference 9. Procurement documentation published in 2016 says an acquisition and tracking system for KB Tochmash’s Aerostat payload is based on technical documentation for Nudol. Other procurement documentation also mentions exactly the same components for KB Tochmash’s Aerostat and Nudol payloads. GIPO’s part of the payload is identified as TTPK in procurement documentation published in 2019.
  13. Procurement documentation published in 2019 links the laser rangefinder to a new government contract for Aerostat signed in April 2018.
  14. RIA Novosti interview with KBTochmash director Vladimir Slobodchikov, May 19, 2015.
  15. Procurement and court documentation published in 2017 and 2019 links work done by the Pilyugin Center to the July 2013 government contract for Aerostat ; Biography of a Pilyugin Center researcher mentions his involvement in Aerostat ; Procurement documentation published in 2017 refers to a Pilyugin Center test stand called “Aerostat”.
  16. GOKB Prozhektor annual reports for 2014 and 2015.
  17. PAO Radiofizika annual reports for 2018, 2019 and 2020 ; Book published by PAO Radiofizika in 2015 (“Tekhnologii radiolokatsii”), p. 149-150.
  18. See, for instance, procurement documentation published in 2018. GosNIIAS is known to have built test stands for other missile projects as well.
  19. Press releases on AO VIKor’s website published in March 2019 and August 2019.
  20. Article (published in Russian and English) in “Vestnik Kontserna VKO Almaz-Antey”, 3/2017.
  21. Interfax-AVN interview with PAO Radiofizika general director Boris Levitan, September 2014.
  22. Article on the website VTS Bastion, August 9, 2021.
  23. Paper presented by the Pilyugin Center’s Aleksandr P. Medvedev at a space conference in 2018 on a “two-dimensional tracking system” very similar to the one described by Sozinov. Medvedev also authored papers on thrust control systems for solid-fuel upper stages at space conferences in 2017 (p. 184) and 2019 (p. 94-95) and is also co-author of a patent on the same subject published by the Pilyugin Center in 2020.
  24. Patent published by the MIT Corporation in 1998.
  25. Article co-authored by Rumyantsev in 2007 ; Paper presented by Rumyantsev at a space conference in 2007, p. 362-363.
  26. Interviews with MIT director Yuri Solomonov published by Kommersant, December 10, 2018 and TASS, November 2, 2020. Russia has teamed up with Saudi Arabia for the commercial exploitation the new Start rockets. See: Interfax-AVN report, October 14, 2019.
  27. Patents published by the MIT Corporation in August 2019 and October 2019.
  28. Papers presentend by MIT Corporation researchers (G. Nakhapetyan, A. Andreyev, K. Brazhnikov, A. Bogdanovich) at a space conference in 2018 ; Patent published by the Ministry of Defense in 2020 (the patent holders work for the MIT Corporation).
  29. Article (published both in Russian and English) in “Vestnik Kontserna VKO Almaz-Antey”, 4/2017 ; Article published in “Voprosy radioelektroniki”, 3/2019.
  30. RIA Novosti report, May 13, 2016.
  31. RIA Novosti report, December 8, 2014.
  32. Interview with Sergey Boyev published in “Parlamentskaya gazeta”, June 23, 2017.
  33. Interfax report, December 8, 2014.
  34. TASS report, October 11, 2019.
  35. Interview with Pavel Sozinov published in “Natsionalnaya oborona”, 3/2017.
  36. Interview with Sergey Surovikin published in “Krasnaya zvezda”, July 3, 2020.
  37. D. Wright, L. Grego, L. Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security: A Reference Manual (p. 77, 98-99), American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2005.
  38. Other Russian counterspace projects have been discussed by this author in earlier articles: “Russia’s secret satellite builder”, The Space Review, May 6, 2019 ; “Burevestnik: a Russian air-launched anti-satellite system”, The Space Review, April 27, 2020 ; “Peresvet: a Russian mobile laser system to dazzle enemy satellites”, The Space Review, June 15, 2020 ; “Russia gears up for electronic warfare in space (part 1)”, The Space Review, October 26, 2020 ; “Russia gears up for electronic warfare in space (part 2)”, The Space Review, November 2, 2020.
  39. Ministry of Defense press release, December 26, 2017.
  40. Article on the Gazeta.ru website, June 19, 2020.
  41. Documents describing a court case between the Ministry of Defense and Almaz-Antey, published in 2019-2020.
  42. Procurement documentation published in 2020.
  43. Article published in Izvestiya, February 5, 2021.
Bart Hendrickx is a longtime observer of the Russian space program.
 

jward

passin' thru
China, Asia, and the Changing Strategic Importance of the Gulf and MENA Region

October 14, 2021

The shift in America’s strategic focus from fighting terrorism in the Middle East – specifically in Afghanistan as well as Iraq and Syria – to competition with China has led to a focus on possible confrontation with China in military terms, including dealing with Taiwan and the South China Sea. At the same time, the increases in U.S. domestic natural gas and oil production have led many to believe the U.S. has far less need to ensure the smooth flow of energy exports from the Gulf and the MENA region.

Global and White Area Competition

There are good reasons to challenge both sets of assumptions. First, China’s expansion as a great power is global, not limited to the Eastern Pacific, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. It is seeking to compete directly with the U.S. in virtually every aspect of military development and technology; to develop its own power projection capabilities; and to expand its influence and control in Central Asia, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, the Gulf, the MENA region, Europe, Africa, and Latin America. It does not separate its military or civil efforts, and its “belt and road” economic programs are strategic in character – as well as a form of “white area” competition – and are as serious a challenge to the U.S. as are China’s growing capabilities for gray area warfare and higher levels of conflict.


More generally, the U.S. cannot let itself be trapped into focusing on the areas of direct military competition where China has the greatest advantages in terms of strategic geography and warfighting capability. The U.S. may or may not be able to challenge China indefinitely in an effort to secure the independence of Taiwan or freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, but even today, U.S. studies and wargames find the past U.S. advantage has sharply eroded and that the U.S. can “lose” some possible war scenarios.


If the U.S. is to successfully deter China and coerce it into peaceful competition and cooperation, then the U.S. must compete on a global level – confronting China with the threat of a local confrontation would be more costly in global terms than the victory is worth. It must match – or outmatch – China’s advantages in terms of countervailing powers in the Eastern Pacific with U.S. strategic leverage in other areas and do so in Chinese terms.


This means exploiting advantages in political and economic competition as well as military competition. Such “white area” competition may not be warfare in the literal sense but – as both current Chinese strategic doctrine and Sun Tzu make clear – victory is best achieved by avoiding or limiting war. A reliance on military means not only is costly in ways that have only minimal civil benefits, it presents massive risks in terms of the burden military spending places on the national economy, the cost of any major theater conflict to the U.S. and its strategic partners, and the risk – however limited – of an escalation to nuclear war.

The Growing Importance of Gulf and MENA Exports to China and Asia

Second, direct U.S. dependence on oil imports from the MENA region may have gone down to the point where the U.S. is nearly self-sufficient, but the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) makes it clear that the period of U.S. “independence” is uncertain, and much depends on the success of programs that will substitute renewables for fossil fuels – programs that the current energy crisis makes clear are uncertain in terms of volume of output and price.


More importantly, the latest EIA projections issued in October 2021 make it clear that China and Asia will have a sharply growing dependence on MENA and Gulf petroleum exports that may well extend through 2050. Moreover, the same projections show the limits to Russian and other sources of exports. The degree of U.S. influence and strategic partnerships in the MENA region give the U.S. a major potential strategic advantage – one that may well be more important in practice than the past effort to secure key sources of oil exports to the United States.


The data – as the EIA makes clear in depth – are uncertain, and many different energy futures are possible even with today’s knowledge of energy resources and technology. The EIA projections do, however, precede the current crisis in Chinese coal supplies and the role of renewables in Europe, and even a quick parametric review of the EIA data will make it clear that it is highly unlikely that the EIA projections through 2040 will not be broadly correct unless a truly massive breakthrough takes place in some form of renewable or nuclear energy supply.

Putting Gulf and MENA Energy Production into Perspective

The MENA region has a wide range of energy exporters, including Algeria, Libya, Egypt, and Syria, as well as the states of the Arab/Persian Gulf – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Yemen. The volume of exports varies according to market condition, local conflicts, developments in supply, and, now, the impact of Covid-19 – as do the price of crude oil, petroleum products, and gas exports.


Exports to Asia are largely driven by exports from the Arab/Persian Gulf, and – to the extent there exist hard data on something approaching a “normal” or pre-Covid year – the EIA estimates that they totaled some 20.7 million barrels per day (MMBD) through the Strait of Hormuz in 2018, plus 2.7 MMBD that passed through pipelines from Saudi Arabia and the UAE that went to ports in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. This was a total of 23.4 MMBD or some 37% of all global maritime exports and 23% of all global consumption of crude oil, condensate, and petroleum products.1 The key consumers were China, India, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and “other Asia,” plus a limited continued flow to the United States.

China’s Maritime Silk Road and Current Dependence on Oil Imports

As Figure One shows, this flow was part of a maritime “silk road” of critical strategic importance to China, not only for the flow of energy to China but for the flow of Chinese exports to Asia, the Middle East, and Europe through the Suez Canal. China clearly recognizes the importance of this route, not only for global trade but for trade within Asia and the Indian Ocean region, as the Table in Figure One illustrates port and basing activity in Asia, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea area, and East Africa.


Figure Two puts China’s recent dependence in a more detailed perspective, showing the degree to which it has sought to diversify its sources of petroleum imports. At the same time, this table is based on Department of Defense (DoD) estimates that not only date back to a pre-Covid period, they date back to a time when China had not yet experienced its current crisis in coal supply, the U.S. commitment to limiting nuclear energy, and the U.S. agreement to place so much future strategic dependence on renewables and alternative energy supplies.


Both figures illustrate a level of Chinese dependence that now makes the Gulf region and the maritime routes a vital strategic interest to the United State. Important as freedom of navigation may be in the South China Sea and to preserving the independence of Taiwan, the military capability to dominate the maritime routes west of the Strait of Malacca and in the Indian Ocean is critical to China, and it offers the United States a significant advantage in countervailing power relative to China.

Chinese and Asian Economic Growth Mean Massive Increases in Energy Demand and in Flow of Imports from MENA

It is not China or Asia’s current dependence on energy imports, however, that determines the strategic importance of MENA and Gulf exports. The U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) has just released an updated version of its International Energy Outlook or IEO.2This report is perhaps the most sophisticated estimate of future energy use available, although the International Energy Administration also has excellent modeling capability as do a number of global oil companies, research institutions, and commercial research centers.


Figure Three shows that this IEO report projects a massive increase in Asian economic growth in non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) states, including China. This rise is far smaller for the developed Asian states in the OECD like America’s key strategic partners, but it is striking in the case of India and a wide range of other states – many of which rely on MENA exports.


Figure Four provides a more detailed breakout of the rise in Chinese and other Asian liquid fuel consumption. It projects a sustained rise in Chinese demand through at least 2035 and a far sharper rise in demand from India and other non-OECD states that means if China and/or Russia should displace the U.S. in strategic influence in the Gulf and MENA area, it would result in a major increase in their strategic leverage over much of Asia.3


Both figures project a steady increase in the strategic importance of the Gulf and MENA area directly relating to China and in creating a stable base for U.S. global competition with China in the many parts of the world where China is seeking to expand its “white area” leverage and could attempt to use “gray area” military options.


The narrative section of the IEO report notes that:4


The regions with the fastest-growing economies in the IEO2021 Reference case are non-OECD countries in Asia. India’s growth is greatest, but the WEPS regions7 of Other non-OECD Asia, Africa, China, and Other non-OECD Europe and Eurasia remain leaders in economic growth as well. Although China continues to grow at an average rate equal to Africa and Other non-OECD Europe and Eurasia, its growth notably slows throughout the projection period. Together, these top five growth regions were home to 70% of the world’s population in 2020 and 44% of GDP. By 2050, these shares grow to 73% and 59%, respectively.


Economic growth varies widely among Asian regions in the IEO2021 Reference case. Most notably, the projected GDP growth rate in China slows considerably compared with its growth rate from 2000 to 2010, when GDP increased by an average of over 10% per year. We also project slower economic growth for Japan and South Korea, illustrating the interconnectedness of Asian economies, as the decline in Chinese demand and trade for intermediate and finished goods, in addition to other structural and demographic factors, affects economic growth in these neighboring countries.


It should also be noted that increases in Russian influence in the MENA and Gulf areas relative to the U.S. – particularly a major rise in Russian influence over oil production and prices as a result of its negotiations with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and Gulf oil producers – could increase Russian and potentially Russian-Chinese strategic influence, both in Asia and on a broader global level.

Rising Global and Asian Dependence on Liquid Fuels Through 2050

These increases in the consumption of liquid fossil fuels occur, in spite of the fact that Figure Five shows IEO’s – what very well might be – optimistic assumptions about the future global ability to increase supplies of renewables and natural gas as well as the need to substitute petroleum for coal. It also, however, flags the increasing importance of Russia as a natural gas supplier.


Here, the IEO data raise another issue that needs separate modeling in detail, and this is the combined strategic impact of China as an importer and Russia as a supplier. If energy is treated as a weapon of “white area” influence, Russia and China need to be considered in terms of strategic competition with the United States and U.S. strategic partners – and Russia’s potential strength as a supplier could, in some scenarios, partially balance China’s vulnerability.


As for the broader overview of dependence on liquid fuels in the IEO, the report states that:5


Oil and natural gas production will continue to grow, mainly to support increasing energy consumption in developing Asian economies…Driven by increasing populations and fast-growing economies, consumption of liquid fuels will grow the most in non-OECD Asia, where total consumption nearly doubles by 2050 from 2020 levels in the Reference case.


Because these countries will consume more liquid fuels than they produce in the Reference case, we project that non-OECD Asia will supplement local production with increased imports of crude oil and finished petroleum products. The increased imports will primarily be supported by increased production in the Middle East. In the Reference case, by 2050, non-OECD Asia will become the largest importer of natural gas, and Russia will become the largest net exporter of natural gas.

Gulf versus Other Sources of Petroleum Production

Figure Six supplements the previous data by showing the projected trends in petroleum projection from key sources through 2050. The key role of the MENA region – which is clearly dominated by the Arab/Persian Gulf – is clear. So are the sharp limits to the increases in Russian, U.S., Canadian, and Brazilian production.


The good news is that the U.S. is projected to sustain a high level of independence from petroleum imports if it meets its goals for expanding renewables. The mixed news, however, is just how critical U.S. ties to its strategic partners in the Gulf and MENA areas will remain.

U.S. Competition with China and Russia, the Gulf and MENA Region, and Countervailing Power

Given these trends, the strategic importance of the MENA region and the Gulf is at least as important as it was during the peak period of U.S. dependence on petroleum imports – and may well be higher now. So are America’s ability to deter conflicts and threats to and within the region as well as its ability to protect and work with its strategic partners.


U.S. strategic partnerships in the MENA region have become a critical tool in maintaining U.S. countervailing power against China, in aiding America’s partners in Asia as well as in addressing the continuing threat of instability – and terrorism and extremism – in the MENA region. The strategic priority of the MENA region remains as high as ever. It has shifted, however, from American energy dependence to competing with China and Russia and to maintaining a global economic system that favors the United States.


These trends also illustrate the critical importance of expanding the U.S. approach to competing with China beyond the military dimension to address the “civil” political and economic power as well as influence at a global level. Energy is only one aspect of “white area” competition in technology and STEM research, manufacturing capability, trade, and infrastructure. Taken together, they are at least as important as military power, and they offer far more opportunities to transition from competition and confrontation to some form of viable cooperation. Even in the short term, “military victory” through any serious form of actual warfighting is threatening to become an oxymoron. Effective civil-military efforts have a very different potential outcome.


Figure One: The Maritime Silk Road in the Indian Ocean and Beyond - I








Source: Richard Ghiasy, Fei Su and Lora Saalman, The Maritime Silk Road, Security Implications, SIPRI, 2018, pp. 6, 29, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/the-21st-century-maritime-silk-road.pdf. Map by Christian Dietrich.


Figure One: The Maritime Silk Road in the Indian Ocean and Beyond - II








Source: Open street Map; ESA Sentinel; Washington Post; and Juan Cole, “The Dragon Arrives: 1st Chinese overseas Military Base in Djibouti,” Informed Comment, August 2, 2017.


Figure Two: China’s Strategic Dependence on Gulf and Other Crude Imports in 2019


China’s Rising Dependence on Petroleum Imports 1993-2019






Key Chinese Suppliers in 2019





Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020, Reference Case, August 21, 2020, p. 170; and EIA, “China,” September 30, 2020, International - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).
 

jward

passin' thru
Figure Three: Chinese and Asian Economic Growth Mean Massive Increases in Energy Demand and in Flow of Imports from MENA








Source: EIA, International Energy Outlook 2021, October 2021, International Energy Outlook 2021 - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).


Figure Four: China and Asia’s Growing Strategic Dependence on MENA and Russian Crude Imports Through 2050








Source: EIA, International Energy Outlook 2021, Reference Case, October 2021, .


Figure Five: Rising Global and Asian Dependence on Liquid Fuels, In spite of Increases in Renewables, Through 2050





Source: EIA, International Energy Outlook 2021, October 2021, EIA projects accelerating renewable consumption and steady liquid fuels growth to 2050 - Today in Energy - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).


Figure Six: The Dominant Role of the MENA/Gulf Region in Meeting Global Petroleum Demand








Source: EIA, International Energy Outlook 2021, October 2021, EIA projects accelerating renewable consumption and steady liquid fuels growth to 2050 - Today in Energy - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).


This commentary entitled, China, Asia, and the Changing Strategic Importance of the Gulf and MENA Region, is available for download at https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazon...portance.pdf?_TI5.brPuG23HnWfDuuKNSBw8hX0tEPy


Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Emeritus Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He has served as a consultant on Afghanistan to the United States Department of Defense and the United States Department of State.


Commentary
is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).


© 2021 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.



Please consult the PDF for references.

China, Asia, and the Changing Strategic Importance of the Gulf and MENA Region
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

Ep. 57 — The Emperor Was Nude All Along

By Thomas Joscelyn & Bill Roggio | October 14, 2021 | billroggio@gmail.com |


Hosts Tom Joscelyn and Bill Roggio discuss Tom’s recent testimony before the Senate, why the Islamic State bombed a mosque in Kunduz, and the Pakistani Taliban’s ongoing jihad.

Podcast 52:32
Download: https://api.podcache.net/episodes/a6d3f057-bc38-4694-afab-d51288db3cbe/stream.mp3

Take a look around the globe today and you’ll see jihadists fighting everywhere from West Africa to Southeast Asia. They aren’t the dominant force in all of those areas, or even most of them. But jihadism has mushroomed into a worldwide movement, with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, ISIS and other groups waging guerrilla warfare and launching terrorist attacks on a regular basis.


Each week Generation Jihad brings you a new story focusing on jihadism around the globe. These stories will focus not only on Sunni jihadism, but also Shiite extremist groups. We will also host guests who can provide their own unique perspectives on current events.


Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD's Long War Journal. Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for FDD's Long War Journal.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

The Army Just Tested Its New Ballistic Missiles That Takes Aim At Previously Prohibited Ranges (Updated)
The Precision Strike Missile was expected to fly at least 499 kilometers in the test, just shy of a range limit in a former treaty with Russia.
By Joseph Trevithick October 14, 2021


A PrSM missile shortly after launch during a test in May 2021.
Lockheed Martin
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Lockheed Martin has announced the latest test of its Precision Strike Missile, or PrSM, for the U.S. Army, though the company has not said exactly how far the weapon flew. The distance appears to be close to, if not over, a previous range limitation for ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles that the United States had adhered to until 2019 under the now-defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF, with Russia.

The PrSM test was conducted on Oct. 13, 2021, from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California using an M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) truck-mounted launcher. The missile flew out into the Pacific Ocean. This test had originally been expected to take place in August but was pushed back because of scheduling conflicts.


message-editor%2F1634232083679-prsm-launch.jpg

Lockheed Martin

A Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) during an earlier test launch.




“The Precision Strike Missile continues to validate range and performance requirements,” Paula Hartley, Vice President of Tactical Missiles at Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control, said in a statement. “Achieving this long-range milestone for the baseline missile demonstrates PrSM’s capability to meet our customer’s modernization priorities on a rapid timeline.”





Lockheed Conducts First Test Of Its New Precision Strike Missile For The Army By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone

Army's New Unmanned Missile Launcher Could Target Ships And Air Defenses By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone

The Army Plans To Fire Its Version Of The Navy’s SM-6 Missile From This Launcher By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone

The Army Just Got Its Hands On Its First "Dark Eagle" Hypersonic Missile Launchers By Thomas Newdick Posted in The War Zone

The Iron Dome Air Defense System Is Heading To Guam By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone


In terms of the distance of the flight, Lockheed Martin has only said that it was the "longest flight to date" and that it succeeded in "exceeding [the] maximum threshold" for the PrSM as set by the Army. An earlier test of this missile in May saw it fly approximately 400 kilometers, or around 248.5 miles, and official documents say the Army's current plan is for PrSM’s to be able to hit targets beyond that range.

There were reports earlier this week that the expectation was that the missile would travel at least 499 kilometers, or around 310 miles, in this new test flight. Alerts to airmen and mariners detailing airspace restrictions related to the impending test, which had been issued last month, do show a potential impact area that looks to stretch out to between 400 and 500 kilometers from Vandenberg.




That 499-kilometer distance is significant, as the old INF treaty had prohibited the United States and Russia from deploying ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. That agreement collapsed in 2019 after the U.S. government pulled out unilaterally, ostensibly over Russia's deployment of a banned ground-launched cruise missile system. The Army, which had started the PrSM program before that point, subsequently changed its range requirements for the missile after the elimination of these range restrictions.

The growing range of weapons like PrSM can only be a factor in the Army's new use of Vandenberg for these kinds of tests, something that officials in California only approved in July. The Army's main overland missile test facility, the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, is simply not big enough to handle tests out to these kinds of distances.

At the same time, unfortunately, the U.S. government also has limited options for overwater testing of missiles out to much greater distances, as evidenced by the scheduling issues at Vandenberg that led to the delay in this PrSM test. In addition, test launches into the Pacific are inherently easier for potential American adversaries, particularly China, to observe and try to gather information about the weapon in question.

"If I'm an adversary, I'm looking forward to the notifications to mariners and aircraft of when you're doing that test so I can park [an] AGI [an intelligence-gathering ship] and every one of my spacecraft right there to watch you test that so I can glean as much MASINT [measurement and signature intelligence] information as possible," retired Air Force Major General Jon Norman, who is now Vice President of Customer Requirements & Capabilities, Raytheon Missiles and Defense, had said during a talk at the Air Force Association's 2021 Air, Space, and Cyber conference last month, speaking primarily about the testing of advanced hypersonic weapons. Norman and his fellow panelists made mention of possibly increasing the use of the Australian government's test range at Woomera and similar potential cooperation with Canada to help mitigate these operational security issues.

message-editor%2F1634232889186-hi-fire-woomera.jpg

NASA

A test rocket launch at Woomera in 2013 as part of the US-Australian Hypersonic International Flight Research Experimentation program.


PrSM, which is primarily intended to replace the Army's existing Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) short-range ballistic missile, is the lower end of a three-tier future missile force the service is planning to field in the next few years. The middle tier role will be filled by Typhon, also described as a "Mid-Range Capability" system, which will be capable of firing ground-launched examples of the U.S. Navy's SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles, as you can read more about here. The Dark Eagle Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), which you can find out more about here, will form the upper end of these missile capabilities. The Army views these missiles, collectively, as critical to its ability to fight and win future high-end conflicts against near-peer adversaries, such as China or Russia.

The Army plans to employ PrSM from both HIMARS and tracked M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) launchers, which are already capable of firing ATACMS missiles, as well as 227mm artillery rockets, including guided types. The service is also exploring the possibility of fielding an unmanned launch vehicle derived from HIMARS, seen in the video below, which could also shoot PrSMs in addition to other weapons.







Lockheed Martin is already planning to conduct another PrSM test launch later this year, as part of the Army’s Project Convergence 21 exercise, which will feature various new weapon systems and other technologies the service is in the process of developing. The company is also expecting another contract award from the Army before the year is out, which will fund the development of a moving-target capability for PrSM. There has been talk in the past specifically about the potential use of these missiles in an anti-ship role.

The ability for PrSM to engage ships could be particularly valuable in the context of a future conflict in the Pacific, potentially against China, where operations in and around the maritime domain would be a core focus. The ever-extending range of these missiles that Lockheed Martin has been able to demonstrate will only give them added flexibility in that region and elsewhere.

If nothing else, this latest test of the PrSM makes clear the Army, along with the U.S. military, as a whole, is well on its way to obtaining a mixture of new, longer-range missiles that only a few years ago it had been prohibited from fielding under the INF.

Updated 3:45 PM EST:
Lockheed Martin has confirmed to The War Zone that the Army's "maximum threshold" range for PrSM is 400 kilometers and that yesterday's test flight exceeded that distance. The company could not provide any other details about the range demonstrated in this latest test.
Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com
 

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Escalation to Nuclear War in the Digital Age: Risk of Inadvertent Escalation in the Emerging Information Ecosystem

James Johnson | 10.13.21

Editor’s note: The following is based on an article the author recently published in the European Journal of International Security, entitled “Inadvertent Escalation in the Age of Intelligence Machines: A New Model for Nuclear Risk in the Digital Age.”





We are in an era of rapid disruptive technological change, especially in artificial intelligence (AI) technology. AI technology is already being infused into military hardware, and armed forces are continually furthering their planning, research and development, and in some cases deployment of AI-enabled capabilities. Therefore, the embryonic journey to reorient military forces to prepare for the future digitized battlefield is no longer merely the stuff of speculation or science fiction. This essay revisits Massachusetts Institute of Technology political scientist Barry Posen’s analytical framework to examine the psychological features of the security dilemma to consider how and why the novel characteristics of AI and the emerging digital information ecosystem may impact crisis stability and increase inadvertent escalation risk. Will AI-enabled capabilities increase inadvertent escalation risk? How might AI be incorporated into nuclear and conventional operations in ways that affect escalation risk? Are existing notions of inadvertent escalation still relevant in the digital age?


Escalation theorizing came into prominence during the Cold War with the development of nuclear weapons, particularly the need to conceptualize and control conflict below the level of total war. The Cold War history of nuclear weapons and escalation continues to provide the theoretical basis for escalatory strategies and undergird debates about nuclear deterrence, strategic planning, and how a conventional skirmish could become a nuclear war. On Escalation, Herman Kahn’s seminal work, conceptualizes a forty-four-rung escalation ladder metaphor, which moves from low-scale violence to localized nuclear war to conventional and nuclear attacks against civilian populations.


In Kahn’s analysis, the concept of escalation is, at its core, a fundamentally psychological and perceptual one. Similar to other related concepts such as deterrence and strategic stability, escalation relies on the actor’s unique understanding of context, motives, and intentions—especially in the use of capabilities. How actors resolve these complex psychological variables associated with the cause, means, and effects of a military attack—both kinetic and nonkinetic—remains a perplexing and elusive endeavor.


Kahn’s escalation ladder metaphor, like any theoretical framework, has limitations. Actors do not necessarily move sequentially and inexorably from the lower rungs to the higher rungs—that is, rungs can be skipped and actors can go up as well as down. Instead, there are many pathways and mechanisms between low-intensity conflict and all-out nuclear confrontation. Besides, adversaries can be at different rungs or thresholds along what Kahn describes as the “relatively continuous” pathways to war. Despite its limitations, Kahn’s escalation ladder is a useful metaphorical framework to reflect on the possible available options (e.g., a show of force, reciprocal reprisals, costly signaling, and preemptive attacks), progression of escalation intensity, and scenarios in a competitive nuclear-armed dyad.


Rethinking Escalation in the Digital Age


Barry Posen identifies the significant causes of inadvertent escalation as the security dilemma, the Clausewitzian notion of the fog of war, and offensively oriented military strategy and doctrine. Posen’s causes remain valid sources of inadvertent escalation, even in the AI-enhanced information age.


The Security Dilemma


In his seminal work on the topic, Robert Jervis defines the security dilemma as the “unintended and undesired consequences of actions meant to be defensive.” Elsewhere, Jervis describes how “many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others”—that is, one state’s gain in security can inadvertently undermine the security of others. The security dilemma’s characteristics compound the likelihood of inadvertent escalation in the digital age.


First, while rational nuclear-armed states shares an obvious vested interest in avoiding an existential nuclear war, they also place a high value on their nuclear forces—both as vital national security assets and as symbols of national prestige and status.


Second, escalatory rhetoric or threats—especially in situations of military asymmetry— can easily be misperceived as unprovoked malign intent and not as a response to the initiator’s behavior, thus prompting action and reaction spirals of escalation.


Third, the state of heightened tension and the compressed decision-making pressures during a conventional conflict radically increase the speed at which action and reaction spirals of escalation unravel. With the proliferation of AI, these dynamics are compounded, reducing the options and time for de-escalation and increasing the risks of horizontal (the scope of war) and vertical (the intensity of war) inadvertent escalation.


Clausewitzian Fog of War


Inadvertent escalation risk can also be caused by the confusion and uncertainty associated with gathering, analyzing, and disseminating relevant information about a crisis or conflict—which has important implications for the management, control, and termination of war. The confusion and uncertainty associated with the fog of war can increase inadvertent risk in three ways. First, it can complicate managing and controlling military campaigns at a tactical level. Second, it can further compound the problem of offense-defense distinguishability. And third, it can increase the fear of a surprise or preemptive attack.


Taken together, these mechanisms can result in unintentional, possibly irrevocable, outcomes and thus obfuscate the meaning and the intended goals of an adversary’s military actions. Ultimately, the fog of war increases the risk of inadvertent escalation because misperceptions, misunderstandings, poor communications, and unauthorized or unrestrained offensive operations can impair the ability of defense planners to influence the course of war.


While disinformation and psychological operations in deception and subversion are not a new phenomenon, the introduction of new AI-enhanced tools enables a broader range of actors, both state and nonstate, to manipulate, confuse, and deceive using asymmetric techniques. Disinformation operations might erode credibility and undermine public confidence in a state’s retaliatory capabilities, targeting specific systems that perform critical functions in maintaining these capabilities. For example, cyber operations such as “left of launch” operations—in a revelation that echoes the disruption of Iran’s nuclear program through the Stuxnet cyberweapon—have been allegedly used by the United States to undermine Iranian and North Korean confidence in their nuclear forces and technological preparedness.


The potential utility of social media to amplify the effects of a disinformation campaign was demonstrated during the Ukrainian Crisis in 2016 when several members of Ukraine’s parliament were the victims of Russian information operations via compromised cellular phones. However, using these novel techniques during a nuclear crisis and how they might impact the fog of war is less understood and empirically untested.


During a nuclear crisis, a state might attempt to influence and shape the domestic debate of an adversary to improve its bargaining hand by delegitimizing (or legitimizing) the use of nuclear weapons during an escalating situation or by bringing pressure on an adversary’s leadership to sue for peace or de-escalate a situation. This tactic may, of course, dangerously backfire. Public pressures on decision makers might impel—especially thin-skinned or inexperienced—leaders, operating under the shadow of the deluge of twenty-four-hour social media feedback and public scrutiny, to take actions that they might not otherwise have. Moreover, a third-party actor to achieve its nefarious goals could employ active information techniques—spreading false information of a nuclear detonation, troop or missile movement, or missile launches—during a crisis between nuclear rivals to incite crisis instability.


Offensive Capabilities and Strategies


Because of a lack of understanding between nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed adversaries about where the new tactical possibilities offered by AI-enhanced weapon systems figure on the Cold War–era escalation ladder, the pursuit of new strategic nonnuclear weapons (cyber weapons, drones, missile defenses, precision munitions, and counterspace weapons) increases the risk of misperception. The fusion of AI technology into conventional weapon systems—whether to enhance autonomous weapons, remote reconnaissance sensing, missile guidance, or situational awareness—creates new possibilities for a range of destabilizing counterforce options targeting states’ nuclear-weapon delivery and support systems, such as cyber “kill switch” attacks on nuclear command-and-control systems.


Continued.....
 

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Russia, the United States, China, and North Korea are currently pursuing a range of nonnuclear delivery systems (hypersonic glide vehicles, stealth bombers, and a variety of precision munitions) and advanced conventional weapons that can achieve strategic effects—that is, without the need to use nuclear weapons. The potential threat posed by these counterforce conventional weapons is compounded by the blurring between the employment of dual-use command-and-control systems to manage conventional and nuclear missions. Moreover, these technological advances have been accompanied by doctrinal shifts by certain regional nuclear powers (Pakistan, India, North Korea, and possibly China), which indicate a countenance of the limited use of atomic weapons to deter an attack (“escalate to de-escalate”) in situations where they face a superior conventional adversary and the risk of large-scale conventional aggression, akin to the potential use of tactical atomic weapons to counter a Warsaw Pact invasion along the inner German border during the Cold War.


Given the confluence of secrecy, complexity, erroneous or ambiguous intelligence data (especially from open-source intelligence and social media outlets), AI augmentation will likely exacerbate compressed decision-making processes and the inherent asymmetric nature of cyberspace information. For example, using AI-enhanced cyber capabilities to degrade or destroy a nuclear state’s command-and-control systems—whether as part of a deliberate, coercive counterforce attack or in error as part of a limited conventional strike—may generate preemptive “use it or lose it” situations. These risks should give defense planners pause for thought about using advanced conventional capabilities to project military power in conflicts with regional nuclear powers.


During, in anticipation of, or to incite a crisis or conflict, an actor could employ subconventional information warfare campaigns to sow division, erode public confidence, and delay an effective official response. The public confusion and disorder that followed an erroneous cell phone alert warning residents in Hawaii of an imminent ballistic missile threat in 2018 serve as a worrying sign of the vulnerabilities of US civil defenses against anyone seeking asymmetric advantages vis-à-vis a superior adversary. North Korea, for example, might conceivably replicate incidents like the Hawaii false alarm in a disinformation campaign by issuing false evacuation orders, issuing false nuclear alerts, or subverting real ones via social media in order to cause mass confusion.


During a crisis in the South China Sea or South Asia, for example, when tensions are running high, disinformation campaigns could have an outsized impact on crisis stability with potentially severe escalatory consequences. This impact would be compounded when decision makers heavily rely on social media for information gathering and open-source intelligence and are thus more susceptible to social media manipulation. In an extreme case, a leader may come to view social media as an accurate barometer of public sentiment, eschewing official evidence-based intelligence sources, regardless of the origins of this virtual voice. As an example, in the aftermath of a terrorist attack in India’s Jammu and Kashmir in 2019, a disinformation campaign—conducted by terrorists to gain the support of the population during insurgencies—spread via social media amid a heated national election. The resultant was inflamed emotions and Indian domestic political rhetoric that led to military retaliation against Pakistan, bringing two nuclear-armed adversaries close to an inadvertent conflict caused by disinformation, deception, and misperception.


This crisis provides a sobering glimpse of how information and influence campaigns between two nuclear-armed adversaries can affect crisis stability and the concomitant risks of inadvertent escalation. As seen in South Asia, the catalyzing effect of costly signaling and testing the limits of an adversary’s resolve (which did not previously exist) to enhance security instead increases inadvertent escalation risks and leaves both sides less secure.


The effect of escalatory rhetoric in the information ecosystem can be a double-edged sword for inadvertent escalation risk. On the one hand, public rhetorical escalation can mobilize domestic support and signal deterrence and resolve to an adversary, which makes war less likely. On the other hand, sowing public fear, creating distrust in the robustness of nuclear launch protocols, and threatening a rival leader’s reputation as a strategic decision maker risk escalating the likelihood of war. Domestic public disorder and confusion—caused, for example, by a disinformation campaign or cyberattack—can act as an escalatory force, putting decision makers under pressure to respond forcefully to foreign or domestic threats to protect a state’s legitimacy, self-image, and credibility. Ultimately, states’ willingness to engage in nuclear brinkmanship will depend on intelligence, mis- or disinformation, cognitive bias, and perception of, and the value attached to, what is at stake.


MWI-shield-50x55.png


AI technology is already raising many questions about warfare and shifts in the balance of power, which are challenging traditional arms control thinking. How can decision makers mitigate the inadvertent escalation risks associated with AI and nuclear systems? Possible ways forward include arms control and verification, changes to norms and behavior, unilateral measures and restraint, and bilateral and multilateral stability dialogue.


Traditional arms control and nonproliferation frameworks of nuclear governance are not necessarily obsolete, however. Instead, we need to depart from conventional siloed, rigid, and stovepiped approaches and search for innovative frameworks and novel approaches to meet the challenges of rapidly evolving dual-use technology, the linkages between conventional and nuclear weapons, and the informational challenges in the new atomic age. Specific measures might include prohibiting or imposing limits on AI technology fusion in nuclear command-and-control systems, autonomous nuclear-armed missiles, and atomic weapons launch decisions.


Counterintuitively, perhaps, AI might also offer innovative solutions to revising legacy arms control frameworks or creating new ones that contribute to noninterference mechanisms for arms control verification—reducing the need for boots-on-the-ground inspectors in sensitive facilities. AI technology could also improve the safety of nuclear systems. For instance, it could increase the security and robustness of command-and-control cyber defenses by identifying undetected vulnerabilities and weaknesses. The US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has, for example, already begun to study the ways AI may be used to identify vulnerabilities in conventional military systems. AI might also help defense planners design and manage wargaming and other virtual training exercises to refine operational concepts, test various conflict scenarios, and identify areas and technologies for potential development.


Finally, expanding the topics and approaches for bilateral and multilateral initiatives such as confidence-building measures should include the novel nonkinetic escalatory risks associated with complexity in the AI and the digital domains (e.g., mis- and disinformation, deepfakes, information sabotage, and social media weaponization) during conventional crises and conflict involving nuclear-armed states.




Dr. James Johnson is a lecturer in strategic studies at the University of Aberdeen. He is also an honorary fellow at the University of Leicester, a nonresident associate on the ERC-funded Towards a Third Nuclear Age project, and a mid-career cadre with the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Project on Nuclear Issues. Previously, he was an assistant professor at Dublin City University, a nonresident fellow with the Modern War Institute at West Point, and a postdoctoral research fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California. He is the author of Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare: The USA, China, and Strategic Stability. His latest book project with Oxford University Press is entitled Artificial Intelligence & the Bomb: Nuclear Strategy and Risk in the Digital Age. Follow him on Twitter: @James_SJohnson.


The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
 

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October 14, 2021 Topic: Nuclear Posture Review Region: United States Tags: Nuclear Posture ReviewSymposiumJoe BidenArms ControlArms RaceNuclear Weapons
Symposium: Joe Biden’s Nuclear Posture Review

Should Joe Biden seize the opportunity of his administration’s Nuclear Posture Review to redefine the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security planning? How should U.S. policy change to address the proliferation threats that the United States is facing?


by Adam Lammon Follow AdamLammon on Twitter L Lillian Posner Follow Lillian Posner on Twitter L Sam Abodo Follow sam_abodo on Twitter L Jenna Biter Will Smith

During the 2020 presidential campaign, Joe Biden expressed a desire to redefine U.S. nuclear strategy by reducing the role of nuclear weapons and seeking new arms control arrangements with adversaries like Russia and China. However, once in office, his administration sustained his predecessor’s spending plans for U.S. nuclear modernization—including the development of new nuclear weapons—and now finds itself beset by warnings of increasingly aggressive Russian and Chinese nuclear behavior, rising modernization costs, and slow-burning crises with Iran and North Korea.

The Biden administration’s commencement of its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)—the United States’ fifth since the end of the Cold War—provides it with a unique opportunity to change the trajectory of U.S. nuclear policy. Yet it remains unclear if the administration will seize it and implement the “bold decisions” that its allies in Congress have called for. To help answer what Biden should do, the National Interest has organized a symposium on the administration’s NPR, U.S. nuclear policy, and arms control more broadly. We asked a variety of scholars the following questions: “Should Joe Biden seize the opportunity of his administration’s Nuclear Posture Review to redefine the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security planning? How should U.S. policy change to address the proliferation threats that the United States is facing?”

Below you will find links to each expert’s analysis, and we will be updating this page to compile their responses over the next week.

Contributors
Rabia Akhtar - Christopher Bidwell - Francesca Giovannini - William D. Hartung
Mark Massa - John D. Maurer - Dani Kaufmann Nedal - Stephen Pifer
Anthony Ruggiero - Lynn Rusten - Barbara Slavin

Bidens Nuclear Moment Has Arrived
Rabia Akhtar, Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Policy Research at the University of Lahore and Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council South Asia Center, explains why the Biden administration needs to curtail the advancement of new nuclear weapons and advanced hypersonic vehicle technologies.

Meet the New Players Influencing Arms Control Negotiations
Christopher Bidwell
, Senior Fellow for Nonproliferation Law and Policy at the Federation of American Scientists, discusses the importance of understanding the role of advocacy groups and financial institutions in future arms control negotiations.

Will the Nuclear Posture Review Reveal the Biden Doctrine?
Francesca Giovannini,
Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, posits that the Biden administration should use a lens of defensive realism to shape its Nuclear Posture Review and return the United States to a classical nuclear deterrence posture.

Roll Back Nuclear Modernization Programs, Mr. President
William D. Hartung
, Director of the Arms and Security Program at the Center for International Policy, argues that President Joe Biden should fulfill his campaign pledge to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy by rethinking the nuclear triad and how and when nuclear weapons might be launched.

Nuclear Modernization Remains Important for Arms Control
Mark Massa, Assistant Director in the Forward Defense practice at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, explains why the Biden administration should maintain the bipartisan nuclear consensus by pairing a robust nuclear deterrent with arms control and risk-reduction measures.

Build U.S. Nuclear Capability to Incentivize Arms Control
John D. Maurer
, Professor at Air University and Nonresident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, advocates for the modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal to incentivize Russian and Chinese leaders to negotiate new arms control agreements.

Biden Should Reject Dangerous Dreams of U.S. Nuclear Superiority
Dani Kaufmann Nedal
, Visiting Research Professor at the U.S. Army War College and Lecturer at Carnegie Mellon University, argues that nuclear risk reduction and strategic stability should be the primary goals of the Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review.

Go Bold Or Go Home: The Nuclear Posture Review Must Give Biden Real Options
Steven Pifer
, William J. Perry Fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, advocates for a Nuclear Posture Review that “right-sizes” U.S. nuclear forces, proposes significant reductions with Russia, and adopts a sole-purpose policy.

Biden Must Continue the Bipartisan Nuclear Consensus
Anthony Ruggiero
, Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, asserts that President Joe Biden should continue the bipartisan nuclear consensus and reject calls to unilaterally disarm and reduce funding for nuclear modernization.

Reducing the Role of Nuclear Weapons Will Make America Safer
Lynn Rusten
, Vice President of the Global Nuclear Policy Program at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, supports a Nuclear Posture Review that adopts a sole-purpose policy, reviews the nuclear modernization effort, reduces the risk of nuclear use, and defines objectives for U.S. nuclear relations with Russia and China.

The Last Thing the Middle East Needs Is a Nuclear Arms Race
Barbara Slavin
, Director of the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council, discusses Iranian actions and the state of its developing nuclear program since President Donald Trump pulled out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
 
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