WAR 1-07-2017-to-01-13-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm......

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com...d-chinas-reaction-analysis/article9474120.ece

Why our Agni V launch fired up China

G PARTHASARATHY

China has become increasingly assertive in recent years. It is not prepared to accept any challenge to its dominance

When India first tested its three stage Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Agni V on April 20, 2012, China’s reaction was remarkably restrained. “China and India are both emerging powers. We are not rivals, but cooperative partners. We should cherish the hard-earned momentum of cooperation,” Liu Weimin, China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson said. She added: “The two countries have a sound relationship. During the (recent) fourth BRICS meeting the leadership of the two countries agreed on a consensus to further strengthen cooperation.”

Even the normally aggressive Chinese Government mouthpiece, Global Times, was relatively restrained. It asserted: “India should not overestimate its strength. Even if it has missiles that could reach most parts of China that does not mean it will gain anything from being arrogant during disputes with China. India should be clear that China’s nuclear power is stronger and more reliable. For the foreseeable future, India would stand no chance in an overall arms race with China.”

Change in tune

When India conducted the fourth and final pre-operational test of the Agni V on December 26, 2016, China’s reaction was belligerent and hostile. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Hu Chunying, referred to UN Security Council Resolution 1172 of June 6, 1998, issued after nuclear tests by India and Pakistan. The resolution called on India and Pakistan to immediately stop their nuclear weapons development programmes; to refrain from weaponisation and the deployment of nuclear weapons; to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and end any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Hu also asked India to spell out its “intentions”.

China seemed to have forgotten that the Security Council Resolution was a “Chapter 6” Resolution, which was not binding on India. The reaction of Global Times was vicious. Referring disparagingly to India’s economic potential and pointedly equating India with Pakistan, Global Times observed: “Currently there is a vast disparity in power between the two countries and India knows what it would mean, if it poses a nuclear threat to China”.

Responding to China’s assertion that India’s missile programme affected nuclear stability in South Asia, India’s Spokesman Vikas Swarup noted: “India’s strategic autonomy and growing engagement contribute to strategic stability”.

Challenge to China

There are a number of reasons for the change in the Chinese reactions to Agni V missile tests between 2012 and 2016. China militarily seized the Scarborough Shoal, located within the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Philippines, in 2012. It, thereafter, contemptuously rejected a verdict of the UN Tribunal, which declared its maritime boundary claims along its so-called “Nine Dotted Line” as a violation of International Law. The Tribunal held China’s territorial claims on Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, as similarly being in violation of International Law. China has, in the meantime, converted a large number of rocks across the South China Sea into Islands, where it has based missiles, armed personnel and military aircraft, using its military might.

The Obama administration took virtually no action in response to Chinese belligerence against the Philippines — a longtime military ally. Worse still, the US recently acquiesced in the seizure of one of its unmanned underwater vehicles close to the Philippines. Chinese belligerence is paying off. President Duterte of the Philippines has quietly acquiesced to Beijing’s territorial demands. ASEAN countries such as Malaysia, Brunei, Thailand and Cambodia are following suit.

It is clear that a belligerent China is no longer prepared to tolerate any challenges to its dominance and hegemony across Asia. The Agni IV, currently operational, with a range of 4,000 km can hit targets in Southern China, while the Agni V, with a range of 5,500-8,000 km can hit even at the farthest points in China. The submarine launched Sagarika missile has a range of 750 km. Its variants, currently under development, can hit across China from the Bay of Bengal.

China, in turn, has transferred the designs and knowhow of the Shaheen range of missiles to Pakistan. These missiles can hit targets across India. Moreover, Karachi and Gwadar will be used not only to base the eight submarines China is supplying to Pakistan, but also serve as bases for Chinese nuclear and conventional submarines. The range of missiles being developed by India clearly signals to China that it will find any effort to use Pakistan as a nuclear proxy against India very costly and perhaps unaffordable. The Agni V is virtually invulnerable, as it is mobile and housed in canisters.

The way of dialogue

New Delhi needs to be far more active in insisting that a comprehensive nuclear dialogue with China is essential for strategic stability across Asia. China is loathe to enter into such a dialogue, as it wishes to not formally accord recognition to India’s nuclear weapons status, even as it peddles nuclear weapons and ballistic missile designs and materials to Pakistan, while helping Pakistan to develop both uranium and Plutonium based nuclear weapons. These transfers to Pakistan are in total disregard of China’s responsibilities under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. India has been far too defensive and avoided exposing the Sino-Pakistan nuclear/missile nexus in important world capitals. A far more determined effort on this score would be necessary once the Trump Administration assumes office and settles down to looking at the world.

Within Asia, Chinese hubris and arrogance would need far closer consultations and dialogue with countries such as Japan, Vietnam and Indonesia. There appears to be sentiment growing slowly in Tokyo that in the face of Chinese territorial and geopolitical ambitions, Japan should review its nuclear policies. The incoming Trump Administration has also indicated that allies such as Japan need to do more to defend themselves. A nuclear-armed Japan can certainly play a key role in moderating Chinese behaviour and hubris. This is an issue that needs to be looked at carefully. All this has to be combined with a vigorous dialogue with China.

The writer is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan
(This article was published on January 11, 2017)
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/its-nuclear-race-india-pakistan-catches

In Its Nuclear Race With India, Pakistan Catches Up

Analysis January 11, 2017 | 09:01 GMT

Summary

The nuclear race between India and Pakistan is intensifying, thanks in large part to Islamabad's fear that its military is starting to lag behind New Delhi's. Over the past decade, Pakistan has become alarmed by the widening gap*between its ability to wage conventional war and India's. Pakistan has turned to its nuclear inventory to level the playing field.

But in doing so, Islamabad has spurred its nuclear competition with New Delhi forward even faster, a rivalry that culminated in Pakistan's Jan. 9 test-fire of the Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile. The test of the sea-based nuclear-capable weapon was the first of its kind in Pakistan, underscoring the country's investment in mitigating the threat looming on its eastern border. But as Islamabad takes steps to bolster its nuclear deterrent, New Delhi will almost certainly follow suit, each state engaging in a dangerous contest to stay one step ahead of the other.

Analysis

Unable to match India's massive military expenditures, Pakistan has taken an asymmetric approach to compensate for its comparative weakness: building up its nuclear arsenal. In fact, Islamabad has already begun to design and develop tactical nuclear weapons that could someday be deployed against Indian troops on the battlefield. Now, Pakistan is searching for the second-strike capability that the Babur-3 might provide. With a reported range of 450 kilometers (280 miles), the newest cruise missile could reach most of India's major cities, though much of the country's interior — including the capital of New Delhi — would still be out of range.

Offsetting India's Gains

Pakistan has its reasons for pursuing these capabilities. For one, India is ramping up its investment in anti-ballistic missile defense systems in response to recent advances in the field by Pakistan and China. This, in turn, has prompted Pakistan to shift its attention to producing cruise missiles as an alternative delivery method to ballistic missiles.

India has also begun to develop its own sea-based nuclear deterrent. Based primarily on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, this deterrent would make India's second-strike measures far more credible, pressuring Pakistan to respond in kind by boosting its second-strike capabilities to better discourage a nuclear attack. This objective has become all the more important to Islamabad in recent years, since its introduction of tactical nuclear weapons has lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in the region.

Pakistan's own progress in nuclear weapons is part of the reason India has chosen to modernize its nuclear arsenal. But New Delhi is also becoming concerned by China's attempts to speed up its nuclear program. The fact that India has to account not only for Pakistan's weaponry but also for China's will complicate any efforts to negotiate an arms control deal between New Delhi and Islamabad. As a result, India and Pakistan will continue down their circular path of nuclear buildups and deterrence.

Part of a Dangerous Pattern

Still, creating a plausible sea-based second-strike threat requires a submarine fleet that can fire missiles. As of now Pakistan has only five of these vessels, three of which could be considered fairly modern. Nevertheless, Islamabad plans to dramatically expand its submarine fleet: In 2015, it struck a deal with Beijing to buy eight submarines similar to the Yuan-class model. Pakistan is also in the process of moving its main submarine base to Ormara from Karachi, which is*more vulnerable to attack than the new location because of its proximity to the Indian border.

pak-nuke-facilities.png

https://www.stratfor.com/sites/defa.../images/pak-nuke-facilities.png?itok=d-IeNLfW

But Pakistan's reliance on diesel-electric submarines, rather than dedicated nuclear ballistic missile counterparts, comes with significant risks. For example, Pakistani submarines carrying nuclear weapons could come under attack from Indian anti-submarine forces that are unable to distinguish the vessels based on their mission. This could lead Pakistani commanders, who may think the attack is part of an Indian effort to neutralize Islamabad's sea-based nuclear force, to fire their nuclear missiles during what might otherwise be a conventional conflict.

This links directly to a second danger: the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Because submarines' nuclear-tipped cruise missiles must be ready to launch before they leave port, an enormous amount of responsibility and power is placed on the shoulders of the officers piloting the vessels. Untrustworthy commanders or breakdowns in the chain of command could considerably raise the risk of the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons.

When all is said and done, Pakistan's decision to rely on nuclear weapons as a means of warding off attack from a more powerful India has increased the chance of nuclear warfare breaking out in South Asia. Though Islamabad's quest for a sea-based nuclear deterrent is hardly surprising, it is a conspicuous example of an alarming pattern of posturing between two nuclear powers that have a long and volatile history of hostility toward each other.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Israel Warplanes attack Syrian Army in Damascus
Started by*peacewithin‎,*Yesterday*04:37 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?509665-Israel-Warplanes-attack-Syrian-Army-in-Damascus

Syria vows response after IDF missiles strike capital
Started by*dogmanan‎,*Today*06:34 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...ws-response-after-IDF-missiles-strike-capital

Chinese Media Has Told Rex Tillerson to ‘Prepare for a Military Clash’
Started by*China Connection‎,*Today*04:12 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...x-Tillerson-to-‘Prepare-for-a-Military-Clash’

German court rules synagogue torching is legitimite protest of Israeli acitons in Gaza
Started by*TerryK‎,*Today*12:26 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...legitimite-protest-of-Israeli-acitons-in-Gaza

Germany is Turning Itself in to What it Didn't Want to Be - CDR Salamander
Started by*Dozdoats‎,*01-11-2017*11:15 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...n-to-What-it-Didn-t-Want-to-Be-CDR-Salamander

Half of German Women Feel Unsafe in Their Own Neighbourhoods
Started by*thompson‎,*01-09-2017*03:06 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...Women-Feel-Unsafe-in-Their-Own-Neighbourhoods

U.S.Government Agency To Investigate UNRWA Terror Ties
Started by*dogmanan‎,*Today*07:25 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...nment-Agency-To-Investigate-UNRWA-Terror-Ties

Tanks and troops in Poland
Started by*WisconsinGardener‎,*Yesterday*02:29 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?509654-Tanks-and-troops-in-Poland

US Sends 3,600 Tanks Against Russia
Started by*China Connection‎,*01-07-2017*12:46 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?509293-US-Sends-3-600-Tanks-Against-Russia/page2

Main Russia/Ukraine invasion thread - 8/11/16 Ukraine Military On "Combat" Alert
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...ne-Military-On-quot-Combat-quot-Alert/page457

Gunman screaming 'Allahu Akbar' opens fire in Spanish supermarket
Started by*thompson‎,*01-11-2017*12:34 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...llahu-Akbar-opens-fire-in-Spanish-supermarket

War with Russia and China? Here Are Two New Indicators
Started by*Dozdoats‎,*01-11-2017*09:39 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...-Russia-and-China-Here-Are-Two-New-Indicators

Afganistan's 'Ghost Soldiers' Take Scary Toll On U.S. Taxpayers
Started by*dogmanan‎,*01-11-2017*12:39 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...st-Soldiers-Take-Scary-Toll-On-U.S.-Taxpayers

Obama Okays Massive Shipment of Uranium to Iran that Could Produce 10 Nukes
Started by*thompson‎,*01-10-2017*06:58 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...f-Uranium-to-Iran-that-Could-Produce-10-Nukes

As Paris peace summit nears, Israel makes 'big efforts' to prevent another UN resolution
Started by*Countrymouse‎,*01-09-2017*07:04 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...-big-efforts-to-prevent-another-UN-resolution

ISIS video shows kids killing prisoners in amusement park
Started by*Dennis Olson‎,*01-09-2017*12:17 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...hows-kids-killing-prisoners-in-amusement-park

US misjudged appeal of Western democracy for Middle East during Arab Spring CIA’s Brennan
Started by*Millwright‎,*01-10-2017*05:26 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...-Middle-East-during-Arab-Spring-CIA’s-Brennan

Obama "Gifts" Iran With Massive Uranium Shipment From Russia Sufficient "For More Than 10
Started by*BetterLateThanNever‎,*01-09-2017*10:13 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...-From-Russia-Sufficient-quot-For-More-Than-10

-----

Sorry folks, my "meat world" has got me bouncing around with limited access to anything other than my "smart phone" so updating this thread when I've been coherent has been a little more than problematic....HC

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://38north.org/2017/01/jschilling011217/

How Might North Korea Test an ICBM?

By John Schilling
12 January 2017
Comments 7

In his 2017 New Year’s Address, Kim Jong Un mentioned (among many other things) that North Korea had “entered the final stage of preparation for the test launch of intercontinental ballistic missile.” It should be noted that this was neither the focus of his speech—which, for the most part, was a list of last year’s accomplishments—nor was it an announcement that a test would occur any time soon. Quite possibly, it was a signal to the new dealmaker-in-chief of the United States that North Korea might be ready to make a deal: to not conduct the provocative test for the right price. Still, we should consider the possibility that a test may occur in the near future. In which case, how might this happen and what might it mean?

First, any “test” that takes place so soon after such a high-level political announcement is probably no test at all, but a demonstration. A test is an experiment, an attempt to determine whether or not a new system will work, and if not, why. A demonstration is meant to prove to a skeptical audience that, yes, North Korea does have a workable ICBM. Even if a test ends in failure and the North loses credibility it would still gain valuable information about why it failed and how to fix it. People tend to call their demonstrations “tests” to minimize the impact if they do fail, but Kim’s announcement means North Korean credibility will unavoidably be at stake in any long-range missile launch.

Which brings us to the next question: which ICBM might they test? North Korea has a family of road-mobile ICBMs under development, of which, the KN-08 and KN-14 might be ready for a real test of the sort that often leads to politically embarrassing failures. It also has a proven space launch vehicle, the Unha-3, which could be pressed into service as a crude ICBM. An ICBM variant of the Unha could be sufficiently similar to the space launch vehicle in that it would be very likely to succeed, making it a good candidate for a political demonstration even though the Unha would make for a poor missile.

unha-3ap.jpg

http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/unha-3ap.jpg

A demonstration launch of an Unha-based ICBM would, at first, look very much like a satellite launch. The rocket would be assembled, checked out, and fueled over a period of several days at the Sohae launch facility. The launch would follow a trajectory similar to a satellite launch, probably aligned to avoid overflying any of North Korea’s neighbors. The first technical indication that anything was different would be the low acceleration of the upper stage, carrying a reentry vehicle with enough ballast to simulate a nuclear warhead. Eventually, the simulated warhead would enter the atmosphere and impact some eight to ten thousand kilometers downrange.

The reentry event would be the only part of this exercise that would qualify as a real test, as North Korea has never demonstrated an ICBM-class reentry vehicle before. If they are conservative in the design, there is little chance that it would fail outright, but the accuracy on the first launch is likely to be poor. North Korean engineers would certainly want to have a ship stationed near the impact point to gather data, and we would certainly hope the United States Navy is keeping a close eye on where the North is stationing its ships.

Pyongyang might also test a new upper stage with a more powerful engine, better suited for carrying heavy warheads. They might test an accelerated launch procedure, with hours rather than days of preparation. Such changes would increase risk, however, and even then, they wouldn’t really demonstrate anything we haven’t already known for years. The Unha rocket works, it can be adapted to carry warheads instead of satellites, but it can only be launched from large, fixed sites that can be monitored for signs of an impending launch. If it were seen as a real threat, it could be preemptively destroyed. It is more useful as a space launch vehicle, and North Korea seems to genuinely want a space program as well as an arsenal of missiles.

Missiles-2015-KCNA-AFP-300x198.jpg

http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Missiles-2015-KCNA-AFP-300x198.jpg

If the North Koreans really want to impress anyone, and particularly if they have any hope of their space program being seen as a peaceful endeavor that might escape the political and economic sanctions imposed on North Korea’s missile programs, they will want to demonstrate their ICBM capability using a KN-08 or KN-14 mobile missile. Moreover, it is more likely that they will test when they are ready to test rather than risk repeating the recent experience of demonstrating the Musudan intermediate-range missile which resulted in an embarrassing record of six or seven failures out of eight launch attempts. In any case, the first test of an entirely new multistage missile whose main engine has only recently been demonstrated on the ground will almost certainly end in failure.

Nevertheless, even a failure might put the North on a path to success. This is literally rocket science, one of the archetypal hard problems, and success can only be achieved through perseverance. The first American ICBM, the SM-65 “Atlas,” failed 26 seconds into its maiden flight. Eight tests were conducted over the course of a year, with only two being fully successful. The first all-up test of the competing SM-68 “Titan” was even shorter, exploding on the launch pad. The Titan scored only one success in its first six launches. However, both missiles entered operational service within two years of their initial, disastrous flight tests, and proved adequately reliable in service. Russia’s early experience with ICBMs was similar, though some of the details are still hazy. We should expect North Korean ICBMs to follow a similar path—a series of early failures leading to an operational capability even with a spotty testing record.

There might be a somewhat slower pace of testing with a North Korean ICBM since the high pace of testing in early US and Soviet ICBM programs was a sign of desperation, not wanting to be on the wrong side of a “missile gap” by showing up late to the ICBM party. Even under the best of circumstances, it usually takes an engineering team at least three months to verify that they understand why a long-range rocket exploded and develop a fix they can be confident in. If missiles are being tested every month and usually failing, this means someone is willing to destroy large, sophisticated rockets on little more than an educated guess at a solution to the last test’s problem. That’s a very expensive way to gain a few months’ edge in an arms race.

North Korea has traditionally conducted large rocket tests at intervals of six months to a year, a slower but more efficient process that gives their engineers time to do their jobs properly. Recently, as with the Musudan, the North tested at the sort of pace we demonstrated in the early Cold War. We can guess at what might drive such desperation, but it seems unlikely that Pyongyang can afford to keep up that pace in a full-scale ICBM development program. Its aerospace industry hasn’t demonstrated the production capacity needed to test an ICBM every month. One test every three to six months would be more realistic, at least in the long run, so this is not a process that will be completed in 2017.

If North Korea wants the tests to succeed, or at least to learn as much as possible from the failures, it will also conduct them at existing launch sites and on their usual trajectories. Even if they use a mobile launcher, as the KN-08 and KN-14 likely will in operation, the North will want to have the full support facilities and technical staff of an experimental test facility close at hand for the early flights. And, since at least one of the failed Musudan tests apparently destroyed an expensive mobile launcher, conducting the first few tests from a heavy steel gantry on a concrete pad would be preferable.

It is likely that the North Koreans will launch on a trajectory that accurately represents a long-range missile flight, and with full coverage from tracking radar and telemetry antennas. They might choose a lofted trajectory, firing at a steep angle to reach a high altitude but a short range, as they have on some recent Musudan and KN-11 flights. The Unha’s upper stages don’t have the thrust for such a trajectory, but a KN-14 would and a KN-08 might. At ICBM velocities this would be technically challenging, particularly during the reentry phase, but is the only practical way to conduct such a test at reduced range while avoiding the need to send a tracking ship far out into the Pacific to monitor reentry.

Several reports have suggested that the United States might respond to a North Korean ICBM test by simply shooting down the missile. The more responsible comments along these lines have limited the discussion to missiles whose trajectory directly threatens the US and its allies. However, North Korea is unlikely to “test” an ICBM by firing it at Los Angeles or Hawaii.

In any case, currently the United States and its allies have a very limited ability to shoot down a test or demonstration flight of a North Korean ICBM. The US National Missile Defense system could probably do the job but it is based at fixed sites in Alaska and California and would be of no use in protecting US allies. The US, Japanese and South Korean navies all operate warships with the Aegis, meant for use against shorter-ranged missiles although under ideal conditions could be capable of shooting down an ICBM or even a satellite. However, shooting down something capable of flying as high and as fast as an ICBM would require an Aegis warship to be located very close to the missile’s trajectory during the first or last few minutes of its flight.

If the North Koreans limit themselves to using standard trajectories from fixed launch sites we could probably position Aegis warships to shoot the missile down shortly after launch, albeit close enough that North Korea could easily harass them with its air or naval forces. And that problem gets much worse if the North tests from a mobile launcher at a remote site, or on a lofted trajectory, or if they are willing to overfly other nations. To have any chance at an intercept, Aegis ships would have to be stationed even closer to North Korea, in waters Pyongyang regards as critical to its national security. Do we really want to find out what happens if a US warship fires a large surface-to-air missile while a North Korean MiG is conducting a mock attack run? The MiG pilot may not understand the missile isn’t aimed at him. And even then, the attempt to shoot down the ICBM would probably fail because Aegis was never designed to do that under combat conditions, has never been tested in such a role, and would be operating at the edge of its theoretical capabilities.

In short, North Korea appears to have three options. First, it could conduct a near-term demonstration using a modified Unha space launch vehicle fitted with a reentry vehicle large enough for a nuclear warhead. Such a test would likely work, gathering information related to reentry technology while putting an end to any pretense or hope of a peaceful space program. Second, the North could launch a KN-08 or KN-14 ICBM prototype almost guaranteed to fail, and fail repeatedly if it keeps launching rockets faster than its engineers can understand what is going wrong. Or third, Pyongyang can conduct a serious test program characterized by launches at a reasonable pace, leading to deployments even before a full program is completed. Only in the very unlikely case that the North fires the test at the United States could the US reliably shoot it down.

-

Reader Feedback
7 Responses to “How Might North Korea Test an ICBM?”
J_kies says:
January 13, 2017 at 1:11 pm
Dr Schilling; I am certain that the NAS doesn’t describe the SM3-block 2a as having that capability. I can certainly recheck with Dave Montague but the reference was to the technically fraudulent marketing of the SM3-2b and “early intercept” where that expectation was specifically debunked by both the DSB and the NAS. Kinematics dictate interceptor launch either during or prior to threat boost, so we can refer to the interceptor applying ‘divine guidance’.

As a specific result of analysis feeding on the NAS findings; the EPAA phase IV architecture, the SM3-2b missile and the PTSS satellite programs were cancelled as they had no credible value.

As to the value / likelihood of GMD intercept at this time, I suggest a reading of the DOTE annual report might temper our expectations.

John Schilling says:
January 13, 2017 at 12:34 pm
James: According to the NAS among others, Aegis SM-3 Block II is kinematically capable of intercepting ICBMs in the immediate post-boost phase, though as you note this is not a claimed or tested capability. To cover the range of launch sites and trajectories North Korea might use would require deploying multiple Aegis warships, some of them very much in harm’s way, and would still likely fail due to limited capability and lack of testing. MDA does not claim this as an operational capability, presumably because if they did someone might ask them to actually do it and that would probably end badly.

If North Korea “tests” the missile by firing at or near CONUS, that would put it within the claimed and tested envelope of the GMD system at Ft. Greely; I very much doubt they are going to do that, but this been discussed often enough that I felt it necessary to cover the possibility. But just to be clear, if they launch an ICBM into some empty area of the Pacific, we almost certainly won’t be able to shoot it down and we’re probably not going to try.

Galactic_Penguin_SST says:
January 13, 2017 at 12:11 pm
Einar Fernholt says: “What about a solid fuel ICBM as a test candidate?”

Is is no secret that the Iranian designed solid-fuel four-staged ICBM/SLV called Ghaem has a capability of launching payloads to LEO, MEO and GEO.

The first stage of the Ghaem ICBM has a diameter of 3.5 meters, a length of 20 meters and a mass of 230 metric tons.

This programme succeeded in 2014 under late Dr. Shahid Hassan Tehrani Moghadam and all stages are now flight-ready hardware.

o.m. says:
January 13, 2017 at 11:31 am
If the US were to fire at a DPRK missile/rocket during the boost phase (over North Korean territory), that would surely be perceived as a major escalation by the North.

What is the legal situation? Are there any UNSC resolutions to cover it, or would it be an act of war? And would it make a difference if the predicted impact point was in the US or a third country?

J_kies says:
January 13, 2017 at 10:54 am
John; I believe you left the discussion of what might a DPRK ICBM test look like with the unfortunate speculation about ‘shooting it down’. To date; the US Missile Defense Agency claims no boost phase engagement capabilities with any of their systems in operations or development.

The innate estimation problems of engagement of a thrusting missile are significantly different than the designed and tested capabilities of engagement against ballistic objects. Terminal engagements above the atmosphere are kinematically possible but would have a constrained engagement range placing SM3 essentially at the intended target before threat launch.

Again; if the DPRK wished to have the appearance of a real SLV program instead of a thinly masked military test; they should change propellants to LOX based oxidizers. To date; all DPRK missiles are first or second generation military storable liquids and not really optimized for civil space launch.

John Schilling says:
January 13, 2017 at 10:06 am
Einar,
North Korea only recently developed the technology to build medium-range missiles using solid-fuel motors. Scaling that technology up to the ICBM level will almost certainly take them five to ten years to accomplish, a few years longer still to develop a complete missile, and we have seen no signs of the ground test program that would be necessary. Certainly they would prefer a more robust and responsive solid-fuel missile, and they may eventually develop one, but if they feel they need an ICBM any time in this decade they will be limited to the liquid-fuel technology that their engineers understand today.

Einar Fernholt says:
January 13, 2017 at 1:19 am
Sir,

What about a solid fuel ICBM as a test candidate? Given North Korea’s tests of a solid fuel SLBM last year, I would think it is likely that the country is working on such an ICBM.

Yours sincerely,
Einar Fernholt
 
Last edited:

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.popularmechanics.com/mil...-administration-unilateral-nuclear-arms-cuts/

Obama Administration Cuts Back Size of Nuclear Arsenal

Despite cuts, the U.S. arsenal still has thousands of nukes.

By Kyle Mizokami
Jan 12, 2017
38

With just days left in his presidency, Barack Obama has announced major cuts to the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The cuts, which are not part of any arms control agreement still leave Washington with an impressive arsenal of more than four thousand nuclear warheads.

Speaking at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace yesterday, Vice President Joe Biden announced the U.S. has reduced its stockpile of nuclear weapons by 553 weapons, to a new total of 4,018. The cuts began in September 2015.

The current, post-cut U.S. stockpile of 4,018 nuclear weapons represents both deployed and nondeployed weapons on intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, and nuclear gravity bombs. It's important to note that this represents individual warheads or bombs and not long-range missiles, bombers, and other delivery systems. Each missile or bomber is capable of carrying multiple warheads or bombs.

Deployed weapons include nuclear warheads on missiles on submarines at sea, bombers on alert, and nuclear missiles sitting in silos in Wyoming, North Dakota, and Montana. Nondeployed warheads are sitting in storage, either waiting to go on deployment, awaiting dismantling, or stored in case the U.S. needs to suddenly beef up its arsenal.

Currently, the U.S. has a total of 681 land-based Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles, Trident II D-5 submarine-launched missiles, and B-52 and B-2 strategic bombers deployed. Between them, these platforms pack a total of 1,367 warheads and bombs. Most U.S. nuclear missiles are equipped with MIRVs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles—individual warheads that can strike different targets) and bombers carry more than one Air Launched Cruise Missile or nuclear gravity bomb.

Obama is not the first U.S. President to cut the nuclear stockpile. In fact, as the Federation of American Scientists points out, all presidents since Lyndon Johnson have made cuts, when the stockpile numbered more than 30,000 weapons. Presidents George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush have made the deepest by far.

By comparison, the Obama administration's 1,255 weapon cut is fairly modest. Still, as Hans Kristensen at the Federation of American scientists has pointed out, that's more weapons than "Britain, China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan combined."

It's not clear what weapons were cut and where, but it's safe to say that with tensions with Russia running as they are, the number of deployed weapons has not fallen. The cuts almost certainly came from nondeployed weapons. The U.S. (Russia too) is required to periodically announce the number of deployed weapons as part of the New START—or as Trump calls it, "The Startup"—treaty. The number of deployed U.S. weapons has not fallen enough to account for the cuts so the cuts must have been made to weapons in storage.

The New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) allows for both the U.S. and Russia to have a maximum 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads equipping no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, submarine launched missiles, and bombers. Both sides can have an additional 100 more nondeployed ICBMs, submarine launched missiles and bombers that can rotate in and out of the deployed force to fill in for weapons down for maintenance.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/dead-drop/dead-drop-january-13

Dead Drop: January 13

January 13, 2017| anonymous

SHORTEST HONEYMOON EVER: Last Friday, after the briefing by top U.S. intelligence officials, President-elect Trump said: “I have tremendous respect for the work and service done by the men and women of this community to our great nation.”* On Wednesday, after news reports of Russian collection on him, he referred to it as: “…nonsense that was released by maybe the intelligence agencies — who knows? But maybe the intelligence agencies — which would be a tremendous blot on their record if they in fact did that. A tremendous blot on their record, because a thing like that should never have been written.” In a Tweet and at his press conference Wednesday, Trump implied that leaks he believes came from the intelligence community were something “that Nazi Germany would have done.” On Wednesday evening, outgoing DNI James Clapper issued a press release saying he was dismayed at the leaks and that in a call to the President-elect, he had expressed doubt that the leaks had come from the intelligence community. Détente between Trump and the IC was shorter-lived than a Syrian cease fire.

MAKING A BIGLY DEAL ON HACKING: At his presser on Wednesday, Trump finally conceded that Russia was probably behind the hacking of the DNC and Clinton Campaign Manager John Podesta. But he complained that on things like China hacking OPM, “we lost 22 million names and everything else that was hacked recently, they didn't make a big deal out of that. That was something that was extraordinary. That was probably China.” Apparently, his argument was that the Obama administration did not take action against Beijing comparable to that recently taken against Moscow.* But then Trump went on to also blame the media saying: “…it's not just Russia. Take a look at what's happened. You don't report it the same way; 22 million accounts were hacked in this country by China.” Obviously, the President-elect has not been reading The Cipher Brief where article, after article, after article – and more delved into the significance of the OPM breach.

O TRUMP, WHERE IS THY STING?* Among the many colorful parts of the PEOTUS’s presser on Wednesday was a section where he said that he was trying to find out who was leaking – so he didn’t tell his close personal staff about an upcoming meeting with U.S. intelligence.* When news of the meeting appeared in the press shortly thereafter – he said he knew the leak came from the IC.* A headline in the UK Daily Mail described it thusly, ”Trump conducts his own sting operation to ensnare intelligence briefers – and says he caught them leaking.”* Note to the President-elect: the fact that you are having a meeting is not in itself classified.* It is the content.

POLITICAL HACKS: The release by the Intelligence Community late last week of an unclassified version of their report on possible Russian meddling during the U.S. electoral process saw just about every potential observer weigh in to tell us what it all meant. Unsurprisingly, WikiLeaks honcho Julian Assange announced from his Ecuadorian Embassy in London exile that he was not impressed. Assange said at a press conference that the CIA had issued a “press release” not an intelligence report.* His pique is understandable – after all, isn’t it WikiLeaks’s job to release the highly-classified stuff?* A big chunk of the report (which was issued by the DNI, not the CIA, Julian) was devoted to how Russian-backed propaganda outfits like “RT” (the propaganda artists formerly known as “Russia Today”) regularly carry Putin’s water.* So, it was amusing to see folks like former CIA analyst Larry Johnson quickly appear on RT to denigrate the report and offer their expert opinions.* Johnson worked for the CIA for four years back in the 1980s – so long ago that Russian President Vladimir Putin was still working for the KGB.

LET’S PLAY PASSWORD: *Incoming White House Chief of Staff Reince Priebus placed the blame on some of the hacking squarely on the shoulders of Clinton campaign chief John Podesta, when he appeared on CBS’s Face the Nation on Sunday. Priebus said to Host John Dickerson, “I mean, John Podesta’s password into his system, do you know what his password was? Password.” Except what was hacked was Podesta’s Gmail account – and according to Politifact, Gmail does not allow you to use “password” as your password.* Apparently, Podesta DID use “p@ssword” as his Windows 8 login.* That might have allowed WikiLeaks to replace Podesta’s screensaver with a picture of Putin – but not grant them access to the Gmail.

WHAT THE (BLEEP) JUST HAPPENED? That would be a wonderful title for a book about the 2016 political season.* Instead, it is the title of a 2012 book by Monica Crowley. Once she was named to the Deputy National Security Advisor for Communications position in the Trump NSC, the book suddenly got some scrutiny, and outfits like CNN found that large chunks of it appeared to be plagiarized from other sources.* Then Politico got into the game and found hijacked passages from Crowley’s PhD dissertation. Crowley’s publisher announced on Tuesday that they would withdraw the book from sale, telling CNN, "The book, which has reached the end of its natural sales cycle, will no longer be offered for purchase until such time as the author has the opportunity to source and revise the material." Being accused of plagiarism may not be all that big an impediment for a Trump administration national security spokesperson.* The scary part may be putting out statements that have never been uttered before.

MY THIRD CAREER CHOICE IS CIA DIRECTOR: Outgoing CIA Director John Brennan was interviewed by David Axelrod for the podcast “The Axe Files” late last week.* During the hour-long interview, Brennan talked not only about his observations as CIA Director over the past four years – but also his formative experiences.* Brennan told Axelrod that at one point growing up, he had aspired to be the first American pope – and at another time to be an NBA player.* Turned out, despite considerable leaping ability, Brennan did not have a prayer for the latter position. What’s next for him? Brennan said he hopes to be reintroduced to his family and American culture (having not seen a movie in years) – and plans to not be silent on national security issues and doing some “writing, speaking and commentating from the sidelines.”

WHY DOES THAT DATE SOUND FAMILIAR? We hear the annual World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland is on tap for January 17-20th this year.* There is something else that is going on for January 20th that is having some impact on attendance. Some think tankers and Congressional delegations are lamenting that U.S. inauguration commitments will keep them away from Davos.* Others say they have been looking for an excuse to be out of the country.* The big winner may be the Munich Security Conference slated for February 16-19.* With a ton of international issues on the table – and some leftover travel funds, Munich might draw a bigger crowd than usual.

POCKET LITTER: Bits and pieces of interesting /weird stuff we discovered:

“IF ITS SUNDAY, ITS….” the FBI? Last Sunday night, the FBI released about 300 pages of documents related to the Hillary Clinton email investigation.* We are sure there must be an explanation of why the Bureau elected to put out the material while most of America was watching NFL playoffs, the Golden Globes, and shoveling their sidewalks.

CAN YOU HEAR ME NOW? The Department of Justice announced on Friday that a North Carolina man had pled guilty to hacking a number of senior U.S. officials. In addition to accessing the personal email of folks believed to include CIA Director John Brennan, 24 year old Justin Liverman is said to have sent threatening text messages to another victim’s cell phone and hired a “phonebombing” service to call the victim repeatedly. ArsTechnica says the second victim’s phone was called once an hour for 30 days, leaving a threatening voicemail.

“POWERFUL WOMEN NEEDED” -- That is the headline of an advertisement that the Mossad is running in Israeli publication.* According to BBC News, “Mossad already has a staff that is 40% female, with 24% of them in key senior roles.”

NETWORK NEWS: Not a day goes by when members of The Cipher Brief Network aren’t making news.* Here are just a few examples from this week:

“A very dark place” – Former CIA and NSA Director General Mike Hayden told Britain’s Sky News that U.S. intelligence would be in a “very dark place” if they told the President that they were giving him their very best judgment, *with high confidence, and he told them to “take a hike.”

Adversaries scared – Former NATO Commander, Admiral Jim Stavridis, speaking at the United States Institute of Peace on Tuesday, said that America’s enemies will be “frightened” by President-elect Trump because he is so un-predictable.

Intelligence can take a punch – or a tweet -* Writing in Ozy.com, former CIA acting Director John McLaughlin explains why we need intelligence officers more than ever.

SECURITY QUOTE OF THE WEEK:

“To be a stronger, more resilient nation against cyber and critical infrastructure attacks, we must rely on all elements of national power, not just military institutions. Improving the physical and network security of critical infrastructure is a vital strategic challenge, a national security imperative, and needs to be a top priority for the incoming Trump administration.”

-Todd Rosenblum, IBM Senior Executive and former Acting Assisting Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Deputy Undersecretary of Intelligence for Plans, Policy and Performance Management at DHS.*

IF YOU SEE SOMETHING, SAY SOMETHING:**Got any tips for your friendly neighborhood Dead Drop?* Shoot us a note at*TheDeadDrop@theCipherBrief.com.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-mosul-idUSKBN14X0P1

World News | Fri Jan 13, 2017 | 1:57pm EST

Iraqi forces make rapid gains against Islamic State in Mosul

By Isabel Coles and John Davison | MOSUL, Iraq/BAGHDAD

Iraqi special forces stormed a sprawling university complex in northeast Mosul on Friday and pushed Islamic State back in nearby areas to reach two more bridges across the Tigris River, the military said.

The militants were fighting back at Mosul University, which they seized when they took over the city in 2014. A Reuters reporter saw heavy clashes inside the campus.

Iraqi forces have now recaptured most districts in eastern Mosul, nearly three months into a U.S.-backed offensive, which accelerated at the turn of the year with new tactics and better coordination.

They aim to take full control of the eastern bank of the Tigris, which bisects Mosul from north to south, before launching attacks on the western side still fully in Islamic State hands.

Driving the ultra-hardline Islamist group out of its Mosul stronghold will probably spell the end for the Iraqi side of the caliphate it declared in 2014 which stretches into Syria.

By late on Friday, elite Iraqi forces had taken control of part of the university complex and reached two more of the five bridges that link east and west Mosul, said Sabah al-Numan, spokesman for the counter-terrorism service (CTS).

"God willing, in a very short while we will announce the clearing of the entire left bank ... There are not many areas left (under IS control) on this bank," he told state television.

Iraqi forces have now reached Mosul's three southernmost bridges, having battled their way to the Fourth Bridge several days ago.

The U.S.-led coalition that is backing the offensive with air strikes, training and advice praised Friday's advances.

"Work still needs to be done, but ISIL's days in Mosul are quickly coming to an end," U.S. Air Force Colonel John Dorrian said in a statement, using an acronym for Islamic State, which is also known as ISIS and Daesh.

Related Coverage
Iraqi forces reach Nineveh government building in Mosul: U.S. official

BULLDOZERS
Major General Sami al-Aridi, a senior CTS commander, said the university was the most important Islamic State base in the eastern half of the city.

"Forces are heading into the depths of the university," he said early in the day, after bulldozers had smashed through a wall surrounding the campus and dozens of CTS troops sprinted through carrying rocket-propelled grenade launchers.

An Iraqi officer said army units backed by air strikes had also taken control of Hadba district, north of the university, and would aid the assault on the complex.

Another CTS commander has said the capture of the university would enable further advances, since it overlooks areas closer to the river.

Advances by Iraqi forces have gathered pace in the last two weeks after troops got bogged down in fierce street fighting in late November and December and militants hid among the civilian population.

New tactics employed since the turn of the year, including a night raid and better defences against suicide car bombs, have given the campaign fresh momentum, U.S. and Iraqi military officials say.

Better coordination between military divisions, such as the elite CTS and the regular army, has helped, a senior Western diplomat told Reuters this week.

"As (Islamic State) are pulled away to fight CTS, that's the opportunity for the Iraqi army to attack against a much weaker defense," the diplomat said, adding securing areas along the Tigris would be crucial.

"Once you get to the river, you can then slowly mop it up, because you can then cut the lines of communication."

In separate advances further south in the city, other CTS units reached the Second Bridge, also called Freedom Bridge, and the Old Bridge or Iron Bridge, across the Tigris, Numan said.

Assaults on the western half of Mosul are expected to begin once Iraqi forces have secured the east bank.

All the bridges have been hit by coalition air strikes in an effort to hamper Islamic State's movements. U.S. and Iraqi military officials say Islamic State has further damaged at least two of them to try to hamper an army advance.

The campaign involves a 100,000-strong force of Iraqi troops, Kurdish fighters and Shi'ite militias, in addition to air support by the U.S.-led coalition.

(Additional reporting by Stephen Kalin in Erbil and Saif Hameed in Baghdad; Writing by John Davison; Editing by Larry King)

Next In World News

After 2016 campaign, more Americans consider Russia a threat: Reuters/Ipsos poll

Exclusive: Assad linked to Syrian chemical attacks for first time

Obama administration ends special immigration policy for Cubans

MORE FROM REUTERS
Yazidi woman escapes Islamic State in Mosul as Iraqi forces advance
Commentary: As Russia’s gas market gets weaker, Europe gets stronger
Philippines says any U.S. move against Beijing in S China Sea would be in its own interest
U.S. troops' move to Poland unnerves Kremlin
Hamas sets 'honey traps' to hack Israeli soldiers' phones: army
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.defenseworld.net/news/18..._Can_Carry_12_Ballistic_Missiles#.WHljzYWcHIU

China Develops Nuclear Submarines That Can Carry 12 Ballistic Missiles

Our Bureau
04:51 PM, January 13, 2017

China's new nuclear submarines, whose images have emerged, are possibly able to carry 12 submarine-launched ballistic missiles with a range of over 11,000km (6,835m)

The 'Jin' Type 094A has a large 'hump' concealing 12 submarine-launched ballistic missiles and hence are capable of striking the United States. The 'big waves' are believed to be China's new generation of intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, the JL-3, the South China Morning Post reported.

Having first observed last year, the vessels have been secretly modified to make them more aerodynamic in the water. "The new missile could reach virtually the entire US without leaving the heavily defended Yulin Naval Base (itself complete with underground shelters and docks for submarines) in Hainan Island," Popular Science stated.

This vessel's ability to reach global targets while hiding in heavily defended coastal waters will significantly boost China's second strike capability.

The Federation of American Scientists estimated the China's nuclear arsenal has roughly 260 warheads. However, it is thought that China holds a policy of maintaining a minimum deterrent with a no-first-use pledge.

The communist state is also one of five countries considered "nuclear-weapon states" that have signed the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The US, the UK, France and Russia are also a party to the treaty.

The US Security Review Commission (USSRC) says that China is trying to expand its arsenal to rival US dominance.

In a May 2016 report, Jordan Wilson, policy analyst at the USSRC said, "The Chinese Communist Party perceives that its legitimacy in the eyes of China's citizens is based, in part, on its ability to demonstrate that it is capable of strengthening the nation and safeguarding China's territorial interests and claims.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/its-nuclear-race-india-pakistan-catches

In Its Nuclear Race With India, Pakistan Catches Up

Analysis January 11, 2017 | 09:01 GMT

Summary

The nuclear race between India and Pakistan is intensifying, thanks in large part to Islamabad's fear that its military is starting to lag behind New Delhi's. Over the past decade, Pakistan has become alarmed by the widening gap*between its ability to wage conventional war and India's. Pakistan has turned to its nuclear inventory to level the playing field.

But in doing so, Islamabad has spurred its nuclear competition with New Delhi forward even faster, a rivalry that culminated in Pakistan's Jan. 9 test-fire of the Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile. The test of the sea-based nuclear-capable weapon was the first of its kind in Pakistan, underscoring the country's investment in mitigating the threat looming on its eastern border. But as Islamabad takes steps to bolster its nuclear deterrent, New Delhi will almost certainly follow suit, each state engaging in a dangerous contest to stay one step ahead of the other.

Analysis

Unable to match India's massive military expenditures, Pakistan has taken an asymmetric approach to compensate for its comparative weakness: building up its nuclear arsenal. In fact, Islamabad has already begun to design and develop tactical nuclear weapons that could someday be deployed against Indian troops on the battlefield. Now, Pakistan is searching for the second-strike capability that the Babur-3 might provide. With a reported range of 450 kilometers (280 miles), the newest cruise missile could reach most of India's major cities, though much of the country's interior — including the capital of New Delhi — would still be out of range.

Offsetting India's Gains

Pakistan has its reasons for pursuing these capabilities. For one, India is ramping up its investment in anti-ballistic missile defense systems in response to recent advances in the field by Pakistan and China. This, in turn, has prompted Pakistan to shift its attention to producing cruise missiles as an alternative delivery method to ballistic missiles.

India has also begun to develop its own sea-based nuclear deterrent. Based primarily on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, this deterrent would make India's second-strike measures far more credible, pressuring Pakistan to respond in kind by boosting its second-strike capabilities to better discourage a nuclear attack. This objective has become all the more important to Islamabad in recent years, since its introduction of tactical nuclear weapons has lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in the region.

Pakistan's own progress in nuclear weapons is part of the reason India has chosen to modernize its nuclear arsenal. But New Delhi is also becoming concerned by China's attempts to speed up its nuclear program. The fact that India has to account not only for Pakistan's weaponry but also for China's will complicate any efforts to negotiate an arms control deal between New Delhi and Islamabad. As a result, India and Pakistan will continue down their circular path of nuclear buildups and deterrence.

Part of a Dangerous Pattern

Still, creating a plausible sea-based second-strike threat requires a submarine fleet that can fire missiles. As of now Pakistan has only five of these vessels, three of which could be considered fairly modern. Nevertheless, Islamabad plans to dramatically expand its submarine fleet: In 2015, it struck a deal with Beijing to buy eight submarines similar to the Yuan-class model. Pakistan is also in the process of moving its main submarine base to Ormara from Karachi, which is*more vulnerable to attack than the new location because of its proximity to the Indian border.

pak-nuke-facilities.png

https://www.stratfor.com/sites/defa.../images/pak-nuke-facilities.png?itok=d-IeNLfW

But Pakistan's reliance on diesel-electric submarines, rather than dedicated nuclear ballistic missile counterparts, comes with significant risks. For example, Pakistani submarines carrying nuclear weapons could come under attack from Indian anti-submarine forces that are unable to distinguish the vessels based on their mission. This could lead Pakistani commanders, who may think the attack is part of an Indian effort to neutralize Islamabad's sea-based nuclear force, to fire their nuclear missiles during what might otherwise be a conventional conflict.

This links directly to a second danger: the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Because submarines' nuclear-tipped cruise missiles must be ready to launch before they leave port, an enormous amount of responsibility and power is placed on the shoulders of the officers piloting the vessels. Untrustworthy commanders or breakdowns in the chain of command could considerably raise the risk of the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons.

When all is said and done, Pakistan's decision to rely on nuclear weapons as a means of warding off attack from a more powerful India has increased the chance of nuclear warfare breaking out in South Asia. Though Islamabad's quest for a sea-based nuclear deterrent is hardly surprising, it is a conspicuous example of an alarming pattern of posturing between two nuclear powers that have a long and volatile history of hostility toward each other.

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.stratfor.com/image/search-pakistans-second-strike-capability

In Search of Pakistan's Second-Strike Capability

Media Center, Image January 13, 2017 | 15:26 GMT

pak-nuke-facilities_0.png

https://www.stratfor.com/sites/defa...mages/pak-nuke-facilities_0.png?itok=agc_DMnw

Unable to match India's massive military expenditures, Pakistan has taken an asymmetric approach to compensate for its comparative weakness: Building up its nuclear arsenal. In fact, Islamabad has already begun to design and develop tactical nuclear weapons that could someday be deployed against Indian troops on the battlefield. Now Pakistan is searching for the second-strike capability — the means of threatening nuclear retaliation even after having suffered an overwhelming nuclear strike. The Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile*might provide this. With a reported range of 450 kilometers (280 miles), the missile would be able to reach most of India's major cities, though much of the country's interior — including the capital of New Delhi — would still be beyond the reach of Pakistan's nascent at-sea nuclear delivery program.

Pakistan has its reasons for pursuing such capabilities. For one, India is ramping up its investment in anti-ballistic missile defense systems. This, in turn, has prompted Pakistan to shift its attention to producing cruise missiles as an alternative delivery method to ballistic missiles.

India has also begun to develop its own sea-based nuclear deterrent. Based primarily on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, this deterrent would make India's second-strike measures far more credible, pressuring Pakistan to respond in kind by boosting its second-strike capabilities to better discourage a nuclear attack. This objective has become all the more important to Islamabad, since its introduction of tactical nuclear weapons has lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in the region.

Still, creating a plausible sea-based second-strike threat requires a submarine fleet that can fire missiles. As of now Pakistan has only five of these vessels, three of which could be considered fairly modern. Nevertheless, Islamabad plans to dramatically expand its submarine fleet: In 2015, it struck a deal with Beijing to buy eight submarines similar to the Yuan-class model. Pakistan is also in the process of moving its main submarine base from Karachi to Ormara. (The former is more vulnerable to attack because of its proximity to the Indian border.)

When all is said and done, though, Pakistan's decision to rely on*nuclear weapons as a means of warding off attack from a more powerful India has increased the chance of nuclear warfare breaking out in South Asia. Though Islamabad's quest for a sea-based nuclear deterrent is hardly surprising, it is a conspicuous example of an alarming pattern of posturing between two nuclear powers that have a long and volatile history of hostility toward each other.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm....Recall that the Russians in the past wanted JDAMs and other PGMs classified and restricted in the same manner as nuclear weapons....HC

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.ibtimes.com/russia-milit...uld-replace-nuclear-weapons-deterrent-2474950

Russia Military Weapons 2017: Precision Bombs Could Replace Nuclear Weapons As Deterrent To Avoid Arms Race

By Shreesha Ghosh On 01/13/17 AT 2:02 AM

Russia could replace its nuclear weapons arms with high-precision bombs*as factors of deterrence in order to strengthen world peace and to help decrease international tensions, the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reportedly*said in a public lecture Thursday.

"By 2021, we plan to go beyond quadrupling the combat capabilities of*Russian strategic non-nuclear forces, which will then give us the opportunity to*solve the issue of*non-nuclear deterrence", Shoigu said at the lecture on military manufacturing. He reportedly*also said Russia would maintain its existing level of military but that the country did not want to be dragged into a new arms race in the future, saying: "The*Kremlin plans to maintain the country’s current level of national security, developing its 'general-purpose'*forces to operate in peacetime and in armed conflicts, including missions against international terrorists."

The defense minister's comments seemed to be at odds with Russian President Vladimir Putin's earlier remarks. At a Dec. 22, 2016, meeting of the Defense Ministry Board,*Putin said:*"We need to enhance the combat capability of strategic nuclear forces, primarily by strengthening missile complexes that will be guaranteed to penetrate existing and future missile defense systems."

Shortly after Putin's remark, U.S. President-elect Donald Trump repeated one of his promises from the campaign, calling on U.S. to "strengthen and expand its nuclear capability until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding nukes."
When asked about Trump's comment the next day, Putin had dismissed it, saying that it was "nothing unusual" for Trump to say such things.

A NATO*report*on nuclear deterrence in the 21st century said*Russia had successfully*undertaken a policy of what can be called "aggressive sanctuarization"*with a crucial nuclear component, under which would not hesitate*to use both conventional force and nuclear rhetoric to deter external involvement.

Related Stories
Putin Calls For Strengthening Of Russia’s Nuclear Potential
Moscow Calls US Troops In Poland A Threat

-----

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.pravdareport.com/russia/politics/13-01-2017/136621-nuclear_weapons-0/

Nuclear weapons deterrence status is changing

13.01.2017

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoygu said on Thursday that nuclear weapons may no longer serve for the purpose of strategic deterrence in the future. Another type of weapon will come to replace it, the minister added.*

According to the Defense Minister, it will be high-precision weapons. The move will reduce international tensions and strengthen trust between countries, the minister said during a lecture for the leadership of the Defense Ministry and members of the public.*

According to Shoygu, high-precision guided weapons will be mostly based on ships and submarines by 2021, RIA Novosti reports.

"By 2021, we plan to increase combat capabilities of Russian strategic non-nuclear forces four times, which will give us an opportunity to fully solve problems of non-nuclear deterrence," said Shoygu.

The commander of Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel-General Sergei Karakayev also spoke about a possibility for nuclear weapons to lose their deterrence role. However, this is not a matter of near future, the official said.*

"The Strategic Missile Forces will continue to play their key role to ensure the country's security until nuclear weapons lose their deterrent role a result of either technological progress or changing* nature of international relations, he said in December of 2016. *

At the same time, he added, "the reliance on nuclear deterrence should provide necessary time and balance of power to create new systems and means of warfare."
One may assume that several strategic deterrence factors may emerge as a symbiosis - high-precision nuclear weapons, for example.*

"The first man who spoke about it publicly was Vladimir Putin. He said that in February 2012 in his pre-election article devoted to defense issues. In the article, he wrote that the purpose of nuclear high-precision weapons was changing and the traditional role of strategic nuclear weapons was decreasing," chief editor of Arms Exports Magazine, Andrey Frolov told Pravda.Ru. *

The expert believes that no country will refuse from nuclear weapons completely in the foreseeable future. Engineers will continue their work to make nuclear-capable weapons smaller in size. The work to create weapons with a controlled explosion capacity will also be a priority.

Anton Kulikov
Pravda.Ru
 
Top