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Housecarl

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http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/a...-as-libya-loses-its-chemical-weapons-20160923

Assessing the risk from Africa as Libya loses its chemical weapons

2016-09-23 09:24
Scott Firsing, University of North Carolina Wilmington

Libya’s remaining chemical weapons left over from the Gaddafi regime are now being safely disposed of in a German facility. This eliminates the risk of them falling into the wrong hands. But can these same hands acquire weapons of mass destruction from the rest of Africa?

Weapons of mass destruction are commonly broken into four categories: chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear.

Chemical agents include choking agents (chlorine), blister agents (mustard), blood agents (hydrogen cyanide and nerve agents as well as sarin or VX). Biological weapons involve a microorganism such as bacteria (anthrax is an example), fungi or a virus (such as smallpox) and toxins. Radiological attack material is usually combined with radioactive material in conventional explosives while a full nuclear detention involves fission.

There is limited open source information on African countries' current biological and chemical weapons programmes. And all African countries, with just two exceptions- Egypt and South Sudan - have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention which commits countries to destroy all stockpiles. No African state at the moment possesses nuclear weapons.

State-owned stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction on the continent are therefore not the biggest threat. Rather there is growing concern about dual-use goods. These are materials that are primarily produced for peaceful purposes but can also be used for deadly purposes.

Examples include chemical products used by industry such as herbicides or pesticides that can be turned into weapons or biological agents created using your typical research lab equipment. For example, Australian researchers exploring ways to control the mouse population unexpectedly produced a lethal mousepox virus.

Governments often have limited knowledge of chemical production since it is the preserve of the private sector. Often these facilities are not as well secured as government facilities.

Kenya, with the help of the US, has just taken steps to prevent terrorists laying their hands on biomedical toxins that could be used to make biological weapons. The country has been the target of deadly attacks by al-Shabaab terrorists in recent times.

What is known

Egypt decided to concentrate on increasing conventional forces, and chemical and biological weapons, rather than nuclear weapons. It is also one of the few states to have used chemical weapons in wartime in the 1960s. In the 1980s Egypt intensified its biological activity, working closely with Iraq. Information on its current programmes is limited.

The country has been very vocal on the subject of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It justifies the fact that it has not signed the convention on the grounds that Israel has also not ratified it.

South Sudan is the only other remaining African country that’s not party to the convention. The newly established country was believed to be on the receiving end of chemical weapons attacks in early 2016. The accusation was that the Sudanese Army used such weapons during fighting in the Lanyi and Mundri areas. The UN Mission in South Sudan investigated and declared no signs of chemical weapons and that smoke inhaled by children may have come from either conventional weapons or teargas.

Sudan was believed at one point to be pursuing biological weapons and to possess VX nerve gas. But open source evidence is inconclusive.

The case of Libya

Unlike its chemical weapons programme, Libya’s biological weapons never really came to life.

It allegedly sought assistance for the programme from countries like Cuba and Pakistan, and tried to recruit apartheid era South African scientists. American and British specialists invited to Libya in 2003 found no concrete evidence of an ongoing biological effort.

Libya was more successful in its nuclear programme, which Gaddafi gave up in 2003. The last of Libya’s highly enriched uranium left the country on a Russian chartered plane on December 21 2009.

The country retains a stockpile of natural uranium ore concentrate, also known as yellow cake, which is stored in a former military facility near Sebha in the south of the country. According to the US State Department, (the risk of trafficking and proliferation of this material is low, due to) the bulk and weight of the storage containers and the need for extensive additional processing before the material would be suitable for weapons purposes.

Nuclear on the continent

Today, highly enriched uranium is an extremely rare commodity in Africa. Since Libya’s clean out in 2009, only Ghana, Nigeria, and South Africa still have stocks. Ghana and Nigeria each possess less than 1 kilogram.

During the apartheid era in South Africa the government’s Project Coast focused on the development of chemical weapons and various drugs like mandrax. South Africa developed six and a half nuclear bombs that were eventually dismantled. South Africa’s Pelindaba research centre still houses large quantities of weapons grade material.

Other nuclear facilities in Africa do exist. Of the world’s 243 operational research reactors, only 10 are in Africa. This includes research reactors typically found at universities. Their lower enriched nuclear material can be used to make a dirty radiological bomb.

Non-state actors and less secure spaces

Intelligence reports have indicated that groups such as Al Qaeda in the Maghreb have made multiple attempts to manufacture materials for weapons of mass destruction.

Analysts also envision militants known as suicide infectors visiting an area with an infectious disease outbreak like Ebola to purposely infect themselves and then using air travel to carry out the attack. Reports from 2009 show 40 al-Qaeda linked militants being killed by the plague at a training camp in Algeria. There were claims that they were developing the disease as a weapon.

Islamic State has already produced and used toxic chemicals such as mustard and chlorine gas. In Africa, an Islamic State cell in Morocco was planning an attack involving six jars of sulphur-containing chemical fertiliser which when heated can release a fatally toxic gas and possibly the tetanus toxin. According to Iraqi and US intelligence officials, Islamic State is aggressively pursuing further development of chemical weapons and has set up a branch dedicated to research and experiments using scientists from throughout the Middle East.

The disposal of Libya’s chemical weapons has lowered the risk of weapons of mass destruction in Africa. But we have seen how far non-state actors are willing to go to either produce or steal such weapons.

The threat they pose cannot be ignored. African countries, with help from bilateral partners and the international community, has broadened its nonproliferation focus. It will need to keep doing so if the goal is to effectively counter this threat.

Scott Firsing, Adjunct professor, University of North Carolina Wilmington
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
 

Housecarl

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http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/09/22/the-explosive-india-pakistan-situation/

India-Pakistan

The Explosive India–Pakistan Situation

Walter Russell Mead

The explosive situation in Kashmir is getting worse, and India and Pakistan, the two nuclear powers most likely to find themselves at war with each other, are closer to armed conflict now than in many years. The New York Times reports:

Escalating tension over the contested Kashmir region is presenting a challenge to Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India, who needs regional peace to reach his principal goal of economic revival there. But Indian citizens have been clamoring for a response to what they say is a provocation by Pakistan.

The tension reached a boiling point on Sunday when militants*attacked an army base*in the Indian-controlled side of Kashmir and killed, at last count, 18 soldiers, setting off a war of words between the two nuclear powers, which have fought three wars in recent decades. India accuses the militants of having links to Pakistan.

The situation not only risks economic growth but could also send two nations skidding into a nuclear war.

Tick tick tick.

The last great crisis between the two rivals came early in the Bush Administration when, as Colin Powell puts it, U.S.*diplomacy helped stop a nuclear war. The U.S. has less influence in Pakistan now than it did then, so Washington has less ability than to prevent escalation.

The Pakistani security establishment appears to view the unrest in Kashmir as a major strategic opportunity and is doing what it cam to fan the flames of religious conflict between the Muslim majority Kashmiri population and the Hindu nationalists now ruling India. It is a dangerous game, but it is one that the Pakistani state is addicted to and, as we have seen, one that it thinks will ultimately play to its advantage.

With militants coming from Pakistan attacking Indian positions and killing Indian soldiers, a wave of outraged patriotic emotion is sweeping much of the country. That makes it harder for the Modi government to develop and implement creative political ideas that could lower the political temperature in Kashmir and deprive Pakistani troublemakers of the openings they are currently exploiting to such dangerous effect.

For Indian Prime Minister Modi the crisis comes as a major test of his statesmanship. For Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif it comes as one more reminder of the strict limits on*civilian authority in Islamabad. The more important the issue, the less the opinions and actions of Pakistan’s civilian politicians matter.

In the midst of all of this, Pakistan’s army chief is set to retire this fall, the*WSJ*reports:

Three years ago, Pakistan’s prime minister,*Nawaz Sharif,*took office in his country’s first transfer of power from one elected leader to another. Now, aides say, Mr. Sharif wants to preside over another democratic milestone: the on-time retirement of the army’s top officer, whose term is set to end in November.

Generals have dominated Pakistan’s coup-ridden 69-year history—heading military governments, fomenting opposition against elected governments, and pulling strings behind the scenes during periods of nominal civilian control. If Gen.*Raheel Sharif*steps down as chief of army staff, it would be the first time anyone has left the military’s most powerful job as scheduled in two decades.

The army chief may or may*step down; the system itself cannot. The contempt, much of it justified, with which many in the military view Pakistan’s venal and, on the whole, not particularly competent civilian politicians, and the deep concern they feel for*the future of the country, ensures that the defense establishment will not give the car keys willingly to the civilians.

Posted: Yesterday at 7:16 AM
 

Housecarl

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http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/24/opinion/rising-tensions-in-kashmir.html?_r=0

The Opinion Pages | EDITORIAL

Rising Tensions in Kashmir

By THE EDITORIAL BOARD
SEPT. 23, 2016

Demands for retaliation are growing in India after a deadly attack by armed militants that killed 18 Indian soldiers early Sunday morning at a base in the Kashmir region controlled by India near the border with Pakistan. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has vowed that “those behind this despicable attack will not go unpunished.” For India’s military, there is no doubt where responsibility lies: Pakistan.

Pakistan has denied involvement, but that rings hollow: Its military has long supported terrorist groups intent on attacking India. India’s director general of military operations, Lt. Gen. Ranbir Singh, said the attackers were “foreign terrorists” whose weapons bore “Pakistani markings.”

On Thursday, Indian troops were reported to be fighting militants in Kashmir near the Line of Control that splits the region.

India and Pakistan have fought two wars over Kashmir. Both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers, and Pakistan has been building up its nuclear arsenal faster than any other country. It would be disastrous if the current situation escalated into a full-fledged military confrontation. A retaliatory strike by India against Pakistan risks doing just that. It is highly irresponsible for the national general secretary of Mr. Modi’s governing Bharatiya Janata Party to urge, as he did on Facebook after the attack: “For one tooth, the complete jaw. Days of so-called strategic restraint are over.”

This is also no time for India to damage the confidence of the international investors Mr. Modi has been assiduously wooing; they would certainly be spooked by a widening conflict with Pakistan.

In the meantime, Indian security forces have been battling with civilians protesting India’s military presence in Indian-administered Kashmir since July, with more than 80 people killed and thousands wounded — including many blinded by pellet guns. Mr. Modi’s government further inflamed the situation by blocking a Kashmir rights activist, Khurram Parvez, from flying to Geneva last week to attend a meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Council. Mr. Parvez, who was subsequently detained on spurious charges, should be released and allowed to travel.

Only a durable political solution can bring peace to the Indian side of Kashmir. As for reducing cross-border conflict between India and Pakistan, a lot depends on whether Pakistan, which receives military aid from the United States, can be persuaded to stop expanding its nuclear arsenal and sponsoring terrorist groups that threaten the region.
 

Housecarl

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http://www.dw.com/en/is-kashmir-really-an-international-issue/a-19570326

CONFLICT

Is Kashmir really an international issue?

India and Pakistan clashed over Kashmir at the UN earlier this week. But is the UN the right platform to take up the issue? New Delhi doesn't think so, and some Kashmiris think they are the ones who should be consulted.

Date 23.09.2016
Author Shamil Shams

In his speech at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on Wednesday, September 21, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif mostly talked about the Kashmir conflict. He stressed that Islamabad wanted peace with New Delhi, but that it wouldn't be possible without resolving the Kashmir dispute. He called for an international investigation into the alleged atrocities and human rights violations perpetrated by security forces in India-administered Kashmir.

"These Indian brutalities are well documented," Sharif said in his speech.

Sharif also mentioned the Kashmiri separatist leader Burhan Wani, who was killed by Indian troops on July 8. The situation in the Indian part of Kashmir has been volatile since Wani's killing. Protests against Indian rule in Kashmir and clashes between separatists and soldiers have claimed over 70 lives. Life in the capital Srinagar and parts of the valley has been paralyzed by these protests and a curfew imposed by the state government.

Since 1989, Muslim insurgents have been fighting Indian forces in the Indian-administered part of Kashmir - a region of 12 million people, about 70 percent of whom are Muslim. India and Pakistan have fought two of their three wars since independence in 1947 over Kashmir, which they both claim in full but rule in part.

What is domestic and what is international?

"Burhan Wani, the young leader murdered by Indian forces, has emerged as the symbol of the latest Kashmiri intifada, a popular and peaceful freedom movement lead by Kashmiris, young and old, men and women, armed only with an undying faith and the legitimacy of their cause and the hunger for freedom in their hearts," Sharif said.

But some experts say that if Sharif's argument about an indigenous anti-India movement in Kashmir is correct, then it makes the entire conflict a domestic affair for New Delhi. Of course, the international community should take notice of the rights violations Kashmir, but why does Pakistan want the UN to intervene?

It is true that the UN passed a resolution on Kashmir in 1948, calling on both Pakistan and India to demilitarize their parts of the valley and hold a plebiscite. But that was a long time ago. A number of experts say that the 1948 resolution is not applicable in the present circumstances, which in turn means that the international community has accepted the conflict as India's internal issue - just like the armed insurgency in the Indian state of Assam or a Baloch rebel movement in Pakistan's western Balochistan province.

However, Islamabad differentiates between the separatist movements in Balochistan and in Kashmir.

"Islamabad has always termed Jammu and Kashmir as an unfinished business leftover from India's partition in 1947 even though the princely state acceded to India on October 26, 1947 when its ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, signed the Instrument of Accession with the Union of India," Varad Sharma, an Indian expert on Kashmir, told DW.

But Baloch separatists also believe that the sovereignty of Balochistan was also an unresolved issue from the partition of India. "Balochistan was never a part of Pakistan," Naobat Mari, a young Baloch activist, told DW. "First, our land was invaded by the British, who divided it into three parts. After the partition of India in 1947, the eastern part of Balochistan remained an independent state, which was later forcibly annexed by Pakistan," he added.

'Foreign' militancy

Experts also say that despite Islamabad's claims that its support to Kashmiri separatists has been merely diplomatic, the allegations that Pakistan is supporting armed militants in the valley weakens the Pakistani case in the UN.

On September 18, suspected militants killed at least 17 Indian soldiers and wounded 30 in India-administered Kashmir. Heavily armed militants launched an early morning raid on the Indian army's 12th brigade infantry base housing hundreds of soldiers in Uri, west of the region's main city of Srinagar, the Indian military said. All four gunmen were killed by Indian troops.

The Indian army said the rebels had infiltrated the Indian part of Kashmir from Pakistan. Lt. General Ranbir Singh, the army's director general of military operations, said the initial investigations suggested that the militants belonged to Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad group, which has been active in Kashmir for over a decade.

In response to the Pakistani premier's UN Speech, Eenam Gambhir, India's First Secretary in the Permanent Mission of India to the UN, accused Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism.

India sees Pakistan as "a terrorist state," she said at UNGA, accusing Islamabad of diverting international aid towards training, financing and supporting terror groups as 'militant proxies' against neighboring countries, the Hindustan Times newspaper reported.

"The worst violation of human rights is terrorism," she said. "When practised as an instrument of state policy, it is a war crime. What my country and our other neighbors are facing today is Pakistan's long-standing policy of sponsoring terrorism, the consequences of which have spread well beyond our region," she alleged.

India accuses Pakistan of training and arming the rebels in the portion it controls and sending them to the Indian side, a claim its neighbor denies.

"Pakistan uses terror as a strategic policy despite facing several terror attacks itself and losing thousands of its people. The jihadist infrastructure continues to operate from Pakistani soil. History tells us that the militants who operate in Kashmir are, mostly, either local Kashmiri Muslims or Pakistanis," Sharma added.

Despite the expert's claims of Pakistani interference, anti-India sentiment is strong throughout India's portion of Kashmir. Many resent the deployment of hundreds of thousands of Indian troops, and openly voice support for rebels who have been fighting since the 1990s to demand independence or a union with neighboring Pakistan.

'Let the Kashmiris decide!'

Some analysts argue that had Pakistan allowed an indigenous movement to take root in Kashmir, the issue would have more international resonance. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, they say, can now easily conceal the human rights violations in Kashmir and intensify crackdowns on protesters in the name of fighting terrorism.

Indian activists have already raised concerns about this practice.

Some Indian civil society members believe New Delhi cannot exonerate itself from the responsibility by accusing Islamabad of creating unrest in the valley. A number of rights organizations demand that the Modi government reduce the number of troops in Kashmir.

"The Indian state survives in Kashmir only by using the might of its army, and the force of its guns. The people are no longer scared of the bullet," Sumati Panikkar, a left-wing activist in New Delhi, told DW.

Those in favor of an independent Kashmir want Pakistan and India to step aside and let the Kashmiri people decide their future.

"We demand a solution of the Kashmir conflict based on freely expressed wishes of the people. It is high time India and Pakistan announce the timetable for withdrawal of their forces from the portions they control and hold an internationally-supervised referendum," Toqeer Gilani, the president of Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, told DW.

But most Kashmir observers don't see it happening in the near future. They say that while the Indian strategy to deal strictly with militants and separatists in Kashmir has partly worked out, sooner or later New Delhi will have to find a political solution to the crisis. Secession, they say, does not stand a chance.

DW RECOMMENDS

Opinion: No peace in Kashmir
When India and Pakistan clash with one another we all have to hope that nuclear weapons fulfill the role once ascribed to them during the Cold War: a deterrent that kept both parties in check, says Peter Sturm. (22.09.2016)
Pakistan's PM Nawaz Sharif says India stonewalling Kashmir dialogue
How Indian and Pakistani media are covering Kashmir unrest
 

Housecarl

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http://38north.org/2016/09/jschilling092116/

North Korea’s Largest Engine Test Yet

By John Schilling
21 September 2016

Summary

On September 20, KCNA reported that Kim Jong Un had overseen the testing of a large new rocket engine at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station. They claimed this new engine had a thrust of 80 tons and would be use for a new space launch vehicle. Rocket engine thrust isn’t normally measured in “tons,” and there is some ambiguity in how to interpret that figure. It is also possible that the North Koreans are exaggerating; we can’t directly verify thrust from the images they released. Regardless, we can tell that the engine is substantially larger and more powerful than anything North Korea has tested before, even than the new ICBM engine tested in April, and the thrust may well be in the range of 160,000 pounds or 80,000 kilograms force.

And, while this particular engine may not be slated for an ICBM, we have now seen that North Korea can build large rockets using both solid and high-energy liquid propellants, to their own requirements. Whatever missiles North Korea may roll out in coming years, we can no longer expect to be limited to what can be cobbled together from old Russian cold-war leftovers.

The Engine

The plume coloration indicates that this engine probably uses the high-energy UDMH (unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine) and NTO (nitrogen tetroxide) propellants used by the Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile and the April 9 engine test—both derived from the old Russian R-27 submarine-launched ballistic missile whose technology North Korea illicitly acquired in the 1990s. However, a side view clearly shows the exhaust of a gas generator turbo-pump, rather than the more advanced staged-combustion cycle of the R-27. North Korea has previously used the gas-generator design on its (mostly) home-grown Nodong engine. The new engine does not have either vernier nozzles or jet vanes, suggesting the entire engine may be gimballed for steering purposes. This does not appear to be a copy of any Russian engine, but represents a mix of technologies well suited to a North Korean large engine development program.



(Photo: Rodong Sinmun)
(Photo: Rodong Sinmun)
(Photo: KCTV screengrab)
(Photo: KCTV screengrab)


It is reasonable to wonder whether North Korea might have had help in taking this unprecedented step, and two potential collaborators come to mind. China’s space launch vehicles, and some of their older ICBMs, use an engine called the YF-20 that is of the same size, performance and general technology as the new North Korean engine. However, there are visible differences between the new engine and the YF-20. We shouldn’t assume that China is helping Pyongyang. However, as we know, North Korea can sometimes connive with Chinese merchants to buy goods that are pretty obviously on the military side of the dual-use spectrum. For instance, while they probably couldn’t procure complete rocket engines, they could maybe get blueprints or critical components like turbo-pumps. Iran is another potential collaborator. There have long been ambiguous and difficult to pin down reports that Iranian engineers have been working with their North Korean counterparts on an “80-ton rocket booster.” The two nations have long collaborated in rocketry, with similar goals and technologies, and while their missile programs have diverged in recent years, their space programs are still in some respects a joint effort. Still besides the similarity in size, there is no additional evidence to prove this assertion.

The bottom line is that the North Koreans have the engine, it seems to work, and they can probably build more of them for whatever purpose they see fit. The question is, what are they going to do with it? Given the size of the engine, they probably aren’t going to build an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with it. The engine is too big and powerful for the KN-08 and KN-14 road-mobile ICBMs under development in North Korea.

Space launch vehicles are another matter. North Korea has upgraded its Sohae launch site over the past few years to accommodate new, larger space launch vehicles that we have not yet seen. We may have just seen its engine. Or, more likely, one of its engines—liquid-fuel space launch vehicles typically use more than one engine on the first stage, and North Korean practice so far has been to use four engines. Iran, too, seems to favor a four-engine design. And a launch vehicle using four of these new engines would be about the right size for the upgraded launch pad and gantry tower at Sohae.

North Korea recently announced it plans to launch rockets to the Moon within the next ten years, along with launching increasingly capable satellites into Earth orbit. This engine would be suitable for launching modest unmanned lunar probes, along with geostationary communications satellites and various sorts of reconnaissance satellites in lower orbits. They still have a way to go on the necessary satellite technology, of course, but they are now one step closer to demonstrating a basic operational capability in outer space. We should start thinking about how we might live with a North Korea that has such a capability.

And, while this particular engine may not be slated for an ICBM, we have now seen that North Korea can build large rockets using both solid and high-energy liquid propellants, to their own requirements. Whatever missiles North Korea may roll out in coming years, we can no longer expect to be limited to what can be cobbled together from old Russian cold-war leftovers.

Found in section: WMD
Tags: engine test, icbm, john schilling, rocket engine, satellite, slv, sohae, space-launch vehicle, WMD

Previous Topic: North Korea Tests New Rocket Engine: Test Preparations Seen at SohaeNext Topic: North Korea-Iran Missile Cooperation
Reader Feedback

3 Responses to “North Korea’s Largest Engine Test Yet”

Clay Ramsey says:
September 23, 2016 at 10:07 am
George; yes, you can come very close just by inspection. The only real unknown is the throat diameter, and that measurement is way less than an ‘order of magnitude’ uncertain. I’m sticking with the 80 ton (160,000 ish) value for the nozzle test image, and even more for the full engine image (assuming they are the same nozzle, I only did a rough measurement on it) since that one *is* operating at full design combustion chamber pressure and is not over expanded.

As for being unsubstantiated, all my observations were made using the images provided by *this* website. They can be duplicated by anyone who wishes to check out what I was saying. The turbopump exit thing is on the same level as the ‘disco ball’, I just don’t think it would be made that way if anyone were to actually try and make one for real. They would look at the turbine wheel and say ‘that just doesn’t look right, let’s put an elbow there instead’. Does that mean it’s impossible? No, it probably would work like that, just seems odd to me. Also my same argument from the past still applies here, If pictures are being released to show us that this engine exists in flyable form, why not release videos or images that make it hard (impossible) to deny by showing a clear full duration run.

George William Herbert says:
September 22, 2016 at 10:40 pm
Clay, with all due respect, there is more guesswork involved in trying to tell how big the engine is than supports more than at best an order of magnitude and one significant digit on thrust.

All that’s really unambiguous (assuming as prelim analysis showed little photoshopping and no deceptive changes) is the general scale and that the exhaust behavior comes close to sea level expansion optimized.

Everything else would rely on extrapolating a ridiculous amount and camera foreshortening assumptions unprovable from raw data.

It’s not INconsistent with 80 tons thrust, and both NK statements and US State Dpt notices disclose such a suspected project. But you’ve got a lot of unsupported specificity there.

Clay Ramsey says:
September 22, 2016 at 12:10 pm
Well, the nozzle image and the engine image are not of the same thing, and the description given for the nozzle image a few days ago was stated to be testing of the combustion chamber configuration and valves, consistent with the image. Don’t be too fast to so completely connect the two. If there is a statement regarding this complete engine, I missed it.

You can make pretty accurate thrust calculations just by measuring the nozzle exit and making a wild ass guess at the expansion ratio. I got 160,120 lbs of thrust and subtracted a bit for the over expansion and then added the same amount because it seemed to be a little higher pressure than typical (compared to XLR87-AJ7, which I used for comparison). So yeah, 80 ‘tons’ is totally believable.

Here’s a better image of the complete engine:

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v281/rclayramsey/DPRK engine.jpg

Wow, is that thing real or not? Impressive if it is, and even impressive in a way if it isn’t. Would like to see the plumbing on the other side. Turbopump exhaust layout is kind of odd looking, and small too. Looks more like a pump discharge collector. Never seen anything like that before but who knows, nothing says it wouldn’t work, just kind of restrictive and not in the natural flow of the turbine gas. The whole thing doesn’t seem to be very hot, but the parts that are glowing red are the combustion chamber and bits of the turbopump (neither of which you would expect). But it is super clean, nothing is smoking from the heat or any vent ports or anything. I really don’t want to bad mouth it because it’s really a pretty cool looking engine and I can’t ‘prove’ it isn’t real, but it may be a very short run for demonstration rather than something ready for flight. A video of this one running would be *very* interesting.
 

Housecarl

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http://38north.org/2016/09/melleman092216/

North Korea-Iran Missile Cooperation

By Michael Elleman
22 September 2016

North Korea’s ground test of a powerful, liquid-fueled engine on September 20, and the launch of three modified-Scud missiles earlier this month renewed allegations that Pyongyang and Tehran are collaborating on ballistic-missile development. The accusations are mostly speculative, based largely on the apparent similarities of ballistic missiles and satellite launchers appearing in both Iran and North Korea. A detailed examination of the designs employed by the two countries casts doubt on claims that the two countries are co-developing missiles and satellite launchers, exchanging detailed design data, and testing prototypes for each other. Pyongyang and Tehran may share test data on a limited basis, and perhaps trade conceptual ideas. But there is little evidence to indicate the two regimes are engaged in deep missile-related collaboration, or pursuing joint-development programs.

Background

During its war with Iraq in the 1980s, Iran’s cities and petroleum infrastructure were repeatedly attacked by Baghdad, which possessed a sizable arsenal of Soviet-supplied aircraft and Scud-B ballistic missiles. Lacking reliable access to the skilled technicians and spare parts needed to maintain and fly its Western-supplied aircraft in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran was unable to respond to and punish Iraq for the assaults. Tehran was thusly driven to acquire ballistic missiles and artillery rockets from willing exporters for its counter-strike capabilities. Libya and Syria initially shipped a limited number of Scud-B missiles to Iran, with allowed the Islamic regime to target Baghdad and other large Iraqi cities in the mid-1980s. In need of a much larger arsenal of missiles, Iran turned to North Korea for its longer-term requirements. Pyongyang shipped between 200 and 300 Soviet-built Scud-B and Scud-C missiles to Iran during the latter years of the war and into the early 1990s. Iran renamed the missiles Shahab-1 and -2, respectively.

The transactional relationship between Iran and North Korea continued throughout the 1990s, with Pyongyang providing missile-maintenance infrastructure and training, as well as medium-range Nodong missiles, which Iran dubbed Shahab-3. When Tehran test fired its Shahab-3 in July 1998, it was only the second known launch of the Nodong, with North Korea having successfully flown the missile just once, in 1993. Iran continued to flight test the Shahab-3, as did Pakistan, another recipient of the Nodong, which it calls Ghauri. The preliminary flight trials conducted by Iran and Pakistan showed promise, though Iran was concerned that the Shahab-3’s maximum range was less than 1,000 km. Consequently, Tehran’s engineers and missile specialists modified the Shahab-3 to create the 1,600-km range Ghadr missile, which was initially test flown in 2004.

It is unclear how deeply involved North Korea was in Iran’s program to modify the Shahab-3, and create the Ghadr missile. While it is reasonable to assume that some flight-test data were shared, interviews with Russian and Ukrainian specialists aiding the Iranian missile program during the late-1990s suggest that cooperation between Pyongyang and Tehran was isolated and not comprehensive. Iran’s compartmentalisation of the missile programs would have impeded deep technical collaboration with North Korea, if not preventing it altogether. Moreover, if the security procedures in Iran continue today, it is unlikely Pyongyang and Tehran are actively cooperating on missile and satellite-launcher development, though critical materials and components may continue to flow from one country to the other.

Four Allegations of Possible Collaboration and Cooperation

Those arguing that Iran and North Korea are cooperating on missile development cite four observations. Two of them center on the similarities in the evolutionary versions of Pyongyang’s Nodong missiles and Tehran’s Shahab-3 and Ghadr systems. The third observation focuses on the solid-propellant technology recently used by North Korea to propel its submarine-launched ballistic missile, the KN-11, which some argue is identical to that employed by Iran’s two-stage, medium-range Sajjil missile. The fourth, and most often citied observation, and the one said to be corroborated by official US government sanctions, claims that Tehran and Pyongyang are cooperating on the development of large rockets used to loft satellites into orbit.

As discussed above, to overcome shortfalls in the reliability and reach of the Nodong missiles imported from North Korea, Iran modified the Nodong/Shahab-3 to create the Ghadr missile. The evolution in design was incremental, with several versions of the improved Shahab-3 tested in Iran. North Korea, which launched only one Nodong prior to 2006, presumably retained the original design. There are no publicly available photographs of the Nodongs tested in 2006, so it is impossible to know if any modifications were introduced by North Korea. The first public appearance of the missile occurred in 2010, when the Nodong was seen during in a military parade in Pyongyang. The Nodong that appeared in the parade was a mock-up, though, at first glance, it looked similar to the Ghadr, including the complex shape of the nosecone. This led some to conclude that North Korea and Iran collaborated on its design, and by extrapolation, possibly the flight-trials conducted in Iran during the 2000s.

In August 2016, North Korea’s KCTV aired video of Nodong missiles being fired from their respective mobile launchers near Hwangju and roughly 40-km south of Pyongyang. The missiles resembled those seen in the 2010 parade, with the Ghadr-like nosecone design. It is reasonable to conclude from these occasions that engineers from the two countries shared at least some nosecone-design information. However, a closer examination of 2016 launches reveals definitively that the similarities between the North Korea’s new Nodong missile and Iran’s Ghadr do not extend beyond the shape of their nosecones. Indeed, the external dimensions and features, other than the similar nosecones, are quite different. Figure 1 illustrates two prominent differences. The Ghadr’s rear fins are much smaller than those found on either version of the Nodong, and the Ghadr’s airframe and propellant tanks have been lengthened to carry more fuel. The original and new Nodong airframes appear to be the same, only the nosecone has been altered.

Figure 1. Key differences between North Korea’s Nodong and Iran’s Ghadr missiles.

Iran’s Ghadr missile body is longer than either the original Nodong or Shahab-3. North Korea’s latest version of the Nodong, tested in 2016, incorporates a nosecone very similar to that on the Ghadr, yet it retains the shorter airframe used on the original Nodong design. Note also, the Ghadr has smaller fins mounted on the tail, relative to those seen on either Nodong version. It is unclear if the new Nodong airframe is constructed with an aluminium alloy, like the Ghadr, or with steel, like the original version of the Nodong.
Iran’s Ghadr missile body is longer than either the original Nodong or Shahab-3. North Korea’s latest version of the Nodong, tested in 2016, incorporates a nosecone very similar to that on the Ghadr, yet it retains the shorter airframe used on the original Nodong design. Note also, the Ghadr has smaller fins mounted on the tail, relative to those seen on either Nodong version. It is unclear if the new Nodong airframe is constructed with an aluminium alloy, like the Ghadr, or with steel, like the original version of the Nodong.
It is interesting to note that the minimum distance between North Korean territory and Tokyo is just over 1,000 km. If the new Nodong is a clone of the original version, but with a new nosecone and smaller warhead, it has a maximum range of about 1,000 km, when launched with a 700 kg payload. To ensure pre-launch survival, Pyongyang would presumably want to deploy and fire the missile from deep within its territory, which requires a reach of 1,200 km or greater. In other words, North Korea has great incentive to extend the Nodong’s range, yet it does not appear to have adopted the Ghadr’s design.

In September 2016, North Korea fired three missiles, again from mobile launchers situated on a highway near Hwangju. The missiles travelled about 1,000 km before crashing into the East Sea, though within Japan’s air defense identification zone. Most observers initially suspected that the missiles launched were Nodongs because the longest-range alternative is the Scud-D, which has a range limit of just over 700 km. Pyongyang reportedly developed a Scud-D missile with a range of just over 700 km. Video of the launch appear to show a Scud-B warhead placed on a Nodong airframe, with a short flange connecting the two. An Iranian missile with a similar nosecone and airframe configuration was seen in Tehran a dozen years ago, leading one analyst to conclude that North Korea and Iran collaborated on the design. But again, closer scrutiny of the missiles and an analysis of the trajectories expose a different story (see Figure 2). The missiles were extended range Scud missiles, or Scud-ER, having a diameter of 1.0 m, and an overall length of about 12.6 m. The diameter and length of the Scud-B and –C are 0.88m and 10.944 m, respectively. The Scud-D has the same diameter as the –B and –C versions, though its length is 12.4 m. The Scud-ER is very different than the Shahab-3—with the so-called NRV nosecone—seen in Iran in 2004.

Figure 2. Key differences between North Korea’s Scud-ER and Iran’s Shahab-3 missiles.

Iran’s Shahab-3 missile is outfitted with a Scud-B warhead. The warhead has a base diameter of 0.88 m, and is mated to the 1.25-m diameter airframe by a skirt-like flange section. The North Korean Scud-ER has a 1.0-m diameter airframe, and thus a tighter skirt-like flange. Iran is not known to have flown a Scud-ER missile, though one could appear in the future.
Iran’s Shahab-3 missile is outfitted with a Scud-B warhead. The warhead has a base diameter of 0.88 m, and is mated to the 1.25-m diameter airframe by a skirt-like flange section. The North Korean Scud-ER has a 1.0-m diameter airframe, and thus a tighter skirt-like flange. Iran is not known to have flown a Scud-ER missile, though one could appear in the future.
Iran, unlike North Korea, has pursued both liquid- and solid-fueled missiles since its dual-track approach to missile acquisition started in the early 1980s. Iran now possesses a family of short-range missiles, including the Fateh-110 and Fateh-313, which were developed over a period of at least two dozen years. Tehran is also developing a two-stage, medium-range missile, the Sajjil. The Sajjil program likely began in or about the year 2000. The first ground tests of the 13.5-metric ton, stage-one motor reportedly occurred in 2005. The Sajjil, though dubbed Ashoura at the time, underwent its initial flight test, which failed, in 2007; a successful test occurred in 2008, though only the first stage was active. Flight-testing continued until 2011, when launches abruptly stopped before the missile was fully developed. The reasons behind the halt in testing remain unclear.

North Korea, on the other hand, has limited experience developing and producing solid-fueled missiles. The largest solid-rocket motor manufactured by Pyongyang before 2016 weighs only one-metric ton and propels the KN-02 missile, a copy of the Soviet Tochka. The KN-02 has a maximum range of about 100 km, though versions of the original Tochka can reach beyond 120 km. In April 2016, North Korea conducted a ground test of a large solid-fueled motor and test launched at least two solid-propellant missiles from an underwater platform, likely its GORAE-class submarine. The KN-11, submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) is a two-stage system. Each stage consists of a solid-propellant rocket motor substantially larger than any tested by the North before, excepting the April ground test. Learning to manufacture large-diameter, solid-fueled rocket motors typically requires decades of effort, as illustrated by the history of Iran’s program, as well as others. Yet, with no public reporting of large solid-motor development in North Korea prior to 2016, the KN-11 emerged suddenly and flies successfully to a distance of 500-600 km.

The sudden, unexpected appearance of the solid-fueled KN-11 led to speculation that Iran may have aided Pyongyang’s efforts to design, develop and manufacture large-rocket motors, or perhaps supplied the motors to North Korea outright. Tal Inbar, an Israeli analyst who closely follows the missile and space programs of Iran and North Korea, asserts that the KN-11’s 1.25 m diameter motors are the same as those found on Iran’s Sajjil missile. He further states that the KN-11 is built using a propellant that is “identical to the technology developed in Iran.”

The exact dimensions of the KN-11 are difficult to extract from the photos and videos released by Pyongyang. However, the relative dimensions are readily derived from the photos. Based on the performance of the KN-11, the missile’s diameter is likely between 1.2 and 1.5 m. The length of the KN-11’s first stage is then between 3.5 and 4.4 m; the second stage is between 1.5 and 1.9 m long. The Sajjil has a diameter of 1.25 m, with first- and second-stage lengths of 9 m and 5.6 m, respectively. The relative dimensions—the ratio of the length to the diameter—of the KN-11 stages are clearly different from those of Iran’s Sajjil. Further, the external features of the Sajjil reveal stage separation apparatus that are not visible on the KN-11, indicating differing design philosophies. Both missiles do use jet vanes for steering during the boost phase of flight, though the vanes themselves are slightly different. Finally, it is possible that the propellant formulation used by the KN-11 and Sajjil are very similar, though this should be expected. Most solid-fueled rockets use a variation of what is called a composite propellant formulation, so it would be surprising if the KN-11 and Sajjil differed significantly.

Figure 3. Key differences between North Korea’s KN-11 and Iran’s Sajjil missiles.

Iran’s two-stage, medium-range Sajjil missile employs two solid-propellant motors, as does the North Korean KN-11 submarine-launch ballistic missile, or SLBM. The Sajjil’s diameter is 1.25 m, while the KN-11 is believed to be about 1.5 m in diameter, though it could be less according to some analysts. Regardless of the KN-11’s absolute dimensions, it is obvious that relative dimensions, most notably the ratio of the length to diameter of each stage, are substantially dissimilar to the length-to-diameter ratios of the Iranian Sajjil. The KN-11 does not employ rocket motors similar to those found on the Sajjil.
Iran’s two-stage, medium-range Sajjil missile employs two solid-propellant motors, as does the North Korean KN-11 submarine-launch ballistic missile, or SLBM. The Sajjil’s diameter is 1.25 m, while the KN-11 is believed to be about 1.5 m in diameter, though it could be less according to some analysts. Regardless of the KN-11’s absolute dimensions, it is obvious that relative dimensions, most notably the ratio of the length to diameter of each stage, are substantially dissimilar to the length-to-diameter ratios of the Iranian Sajjil. The KN-11 does not employ rocket motors similar to those found on the Sajjil.
Lastly, many observers note the similarity between the satellite-launch vehicles, or SLVs, used by Iran and North Korea, and speculate that the two countries are collaborating on large rocket development. It is true that the Taepodong-1 SLV launched by Pyongyang in 1998, and Iran’s Safir SLV have first stages powered by the Nodong engine. It is also true that the first stage of the North Korea’s Unha SLV and Iran’s Simorgh SLV use a cluster of four-Nodong engines, and the upper-most stages of both SLVs are propelled by the steering engines originally employed by the now-retired Soviet R-27 SLBM. But a closer look at the SLVs reveals differences inconsistent with close cooperation between Pyongyang and Tehran.

The most obvious difference is that the two North Korean SLVs operate using three stages, whereas Iran’s two SLVs are two-stage systems. This likely reflects the more conservative design approach taken by North Korea, where until late-2015, engineers had limited experience developing new missiles and launchers. The paucity of missile-development testing, and learned knowledge accrued from testing activities, likely led North Korean specialists to over design the Taepodong-1 and Unha launchers to ensure each succeeded in lofting a specified payload to a certain orbit. There may, however, be other reasons behind the decision to employ three rather than two stages. Regardless, the divergent design philosophies argue against deep cooperation.

The decision to power the first stage of the Taepodong-1 and Safir with a Nodong engine was very likely driven by that lack of viable alternatives. Neither North Korea nor Iran have the experience and wherewithal to design and develop a powerful liquid-propellant engine indigenously, so therefore each had to rely on the engines available for use. The roughly 27-ton thrust Nodong engine was a logical engineering choice for small SLVs. The alternative would have been to cluster two or four Scud engines together to form the power unit for a first stage, though such configurations would have required a new and larger diameter airframe.

When North Korea, and later Iran, began the design of the Unha and Simorgh SLVs, respectively, the most powerful engine available was still that associated with the Nodong missile. Again, the lack of viable alternatives drove both countries to design a first stage powered by a cluster of four Nodong engines, with each engine relying on its own turbo-pump assembly to deliver propellant to the combustion chamber. It was, and remains today, beyond the technical capacity of either country to design, develop and build a larger pump capable of simultaneously feeding all four engines.

The Unha and Simorgh both employ four small engines to steer the first stage. Arguably, this feature suggests some level of design cooperation. However, beyond the use of four small engines, the two designs diverge. Each steering engine of the Unha receives its propellant from the turbo-pump of an adjacent Nodong engine by tapping into the fuel and oxidizer lines of the nearby engine and diverting a small portion of the flow. In other words, each Nodong turbo-pump feeds a Nodong engine and a steering engine. Iranian engineers, on the other hand, adopted a different design for the Simorgh. All four steering engines of the Simorgh are supplied propellant by a single Scud-engine turbo-pump assembly placed at the center of the Nodong engine cluster. The Iranian design delivers up to 13 tons of additional thrust compared to the Unha.

Covert Development of Long-Range Rocket Booster

In November 2013, Bill Gertz reported that Iranian missile technicians had visited North Korea in secret to jointly develop a new “80-ton rocket booster” for long-range missiles or SLVs. Two months later the US Treasury Department issued sanctions against several persons and entities, including the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, or SHIG, the firm responsible for development of Iran’s liquid-fueled missiles, and two individuals, Seyed Mirahmad Nooshin and Sayyed Medhi Farahi. The Treasury Department notice specifically mentions that Nooshin and Farahi had travelled to North Korea, and that the two “have been critical to the development of the 80-ton rocket booster.”

It is unclear if the 80-ton rocket booster specified in the media and Treasury Department reports describes the overall size of multi-stage booster rocket, or just that of the single stage of a larger SLV. In either case, the description might apply to the Unha or Simorgh SLV. The overall mass of the Unha SLV is about 87 metric tons, and the Simorgh SLV is roughly 85 metric tons. The first-stage masses of the Unha and Simorgh are approximately 70 and 76 metric tons, respectively. It is within reason to conclude that the reports apply to either the first stages of the two SLVs, or the multi-stage configuration of the Unha or Simorgh. It would not be surprising if Iran and North Korea held discussions about their respective space programs, and the general technical details of their SLVs. Iran has, in the past, presented technical papers about its space program and SLVs at international meetings, so sharing general design and performance information is not unprecedented. However, as discussed above, the significant design differences of the Unha and Simorgh first stages indicate that the two countries are not co-developing rockets and that there may be limits to just how much technical information Tehran and Pyongyang share, or employ.

The recent ground test of an 80-ton thrust engine by North Korea raises additional questions, and might be the focus of the Gertz article and the Treasury Department notice. The engine tested is likely a version of China’s YF-20 design, of which there are several varieties. The YF-20 engine uses high-energy propellants, similar to the combination employed by North Korea’s Musudan, or KN-10, intermediate-range ballistic missile, and generates roughly 80 tons of thrust. North Korea announced that the engine tested produces 80 tons of thrust, and was for lifting satellites into geosynchronous orbit. The Treasury notice specifically mentioned an 80-ton booster; it did not refer to an engine. Nonetheless, perhaps the intelligence reporting that informed the sanctions lacked the necessary detail to distinguish between a rocket and engine, or the authors of the notice did not appreciate the differences. If the report was referring to the amount of thrust produced by the booster’s engine, then it is possible that Iran and North Korea are working together on a new rocket. If so, the booster rocket itself would necessarily weigh fewer than about 65 metric tons, and even less if it is the first stage of a larger system.

Conclusion

Evidence available in the public domain indicates that North Korea has, for several decades, supplied Iran with complete missiles and critical components for larger missiles and SLVs. The transactional relationship very likely results in information exchanges, including the sharing of flight-test data, possibly more. But, the evidence to date is inconsistent with design collaboration or joint-development efforts between the two countries. This could change, especially as North Korea presents new capabilities. Given Pyongyang’s history of shipping missile components to Iran and others, and its willingness to support the secret construction of a nuclear reactor in Syria, it is possible, if not likely, that North Korea would ship advanced engines to Tehran, including the engine most recently tested. Therefore, the international community must remain vigilant and closely monitor the missile and SLV activities in both countries. Signs of deeper collaboration between Iran and North Korea must also be closely monitored, since deeper cooperation has the potential to accelerate the development efforts on both parties.

Found in section: Military Affairs, WMD
Tags: engine test, ghadr, Iran, KN-11, missile, nodong, sajjil, scud, shahab, simorgh, slv, tehran, unha, wmd program

Previous Topic: North Korea’s Largest Engine Test Yet
Reader Feedback

4 Responses to “North Korea-Iran Missile Cooperation”

Clay Ramsey says:
September 23, 2016 at 9:11 am
George; yes, you can come very close just by inspection. The only real unknown is the throat diameter, and that measurement is way less than an ‘order of magnitude’ uncertain. I’m sticking with the 80 ton (160,000 ish) value for the nozzle test image, and even more for the full engine image (assuming they are the same nozzle, I only did a rough measurement on it) since that one *is* operating at full design combustion chamber pressure and is not over expanded.

As for being unsubstantiated, all my observations were made using the images provided by *this* website. They can be duplicated by anyone who wishes to check out what I was saying. The turbopump exit thing is on the same level as the ‘disco ball’, I just don’t think it would be made that way if anyone were to actually try and make one for real. They would look at the turbine wheel and say ‘that just doesn’t look right, let’s put an elbow there instead’. Does that mean it’s impossible? No, it probably would work like that, just seems odd to me. Also my same argument from the past still applies here, If pictures are being released to show us that this engine exists in flyable form, why not release videos or images that make it hard (impossible) to deny by showing a clear full duration run.

Clay Ramsey says:
September 22, 2016 at 9:09 pm
Interesting. Bottom line is, there is and there isn’t. True enough, there are a hundred ways to make a scud, but in the end, how far different could they be.

Problem with this is that it seems it was written by two people. One almost apprehensive and wanting to wash their hands of it, and the other confident and willing and threatening closer cooperation. For me, DPRK’s belligerent rhetoric is aggravating but never worries me all that much. Iran’s does. No doubt though, Iran and DPRK are playing vastly different games.

Galactic_Penguin_SST says:
September 22, 2016 at 8:39 pm
Iran announced in February 2013 the start of the design of two new engines for satellite carrier.

If the first one is really the newly tested 80 tons thrust engine by North Korea, then North Korea should in the coming weeks or months reveal the second one, maybe a more powerful one or a 80 to 100 tons thrust solid-fueled engine, or just a 80 tons thrust 2nd stage engine.

Then we had this public hint: a new paintjob for the traditional Safir-2 mockup paraded in the streets of Tehran on the occasion of Bahman 22 (11 February 2016). While painted in previous years blue and white, this February it has been specially assorted with the North Korean orange and white vertical gantry at Sohae. A vertical assembly gantry still dark green a year ago and also specially repainted (unsure whether this was meant to match with the beginning of the 4713th Chinese Fire Monkey New Year starting on February 8; as “Yang Fire symbolizes a straight-forward and quick temper person more ready to explode” ).

In a nutshell, this would prove the effective cooperation between this two nations in space exploration. Let us wait and see.

Franco says:
September 22, 2016 at 8:19 pm
BOTH Iran and Pakistan are recipients of North’s technology which is really Chinese know how passed on through its agent. People overlook China’s covert involvement but a deeper probe will reveal that say one thing whilst doing another has been China’s clever diplomacy since Deng. Just like China is playing catch up ti the US in many military fields, it only passes on second grade technology to the North which is a leap to the North nonetheless.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
ISIS launches chemical attack on US troops in Iraq
Started by Ordinary Girl‎, 09-21-2016 03:11 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...launches-chemical-attack-on-US-troops-in-Iraq


For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articl...ng-the-isis-occupied-metropolis-of-mosul.html

JUDGMENT DAY

On the Front Lines Approaching the ISIS-Occupied Metropolis of Mosul

Obama wants to take back the second biggest city in Iraq before he’s out of office. These are some of the guys that are going to have to do the fighting.

FLORIAN NEUHOF
09.23.16 10:24 AM ET

GISMA, Iraq — The convoy rumbles through this village along the dusty road that has taken it across the Tigris and to the fraying edges of the Islamic State.

We are now about 60 kilometers, or 40 miles, from Mosul, captured by ISIS in 2014 and by far the biggest city under its control.

By the roadside, children flash broad smiles and wave at the dozen or so Humvees and U.S.-made pick-up trucks bristling with machine guns of all calibers. The line of vehicles swerves past the charred hulk of a burned-out armored personnel carrier before taking a sharp turn and slowly pulling into a walled compound.

The village, Gisma, was retaken from ISIS the previous day, as Iraqi security forces inch towards Mosul, once second most populous city in the country and still in the hands of the jihadist group.

Earlier this week, U.S. President Barack Obama met with Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and declared the fight to retake Mosul could “move forward fairly rapidly.” But that conversation was in New York. The test will come in places like this.

Today, Maj. Gen. Najim al Jabouri, one of the key commanders of the campaign, decided to pay Gisma a visit, dropping in for lunch at the invitation of the villagers.

Stepping out of his Humvee, the general is greeted warmly by the village elders, who usher him into a house where he takes the seat of honor at the head the dining room. Soon, groups of officers and elders sit around huge tin trays laden with meat, flatbread and bulgur wheat. Several sheep have been slaughtered in the morning, an incredible act of hospitality in a village suffering severe shortages after more than two years of ISIS rule.

After months and years of Islamic State terror, the once maligned Iraqi army is welcomed in the Sunni areas near Mosul—at least by those who did not actively join the ranks of the insurgents.

"It’s an honor to receive the army here, because they are our people,” Hamed, the host, tells the Daily Beast. “We were living in darkness, and now the darkness is gone."

When ISIS stormed across the Syrian border to conquer about a third of Iraq in 2014, it was aided by widespread discontent amongst the Sunni population. For years, at least since the American forces in Iraq began to draw down, the Shia-led government in Baghdad had marginalized and discriminated against the Sunni minority, and even sent in the army to shoot up peaceful protests.

In Mosul, the Shia-dominated army was seen as little more than a hostile army of occupation.

But the Islamic State's cruel fanaticism quickly alienated many of those who initially welcomed the insurgents.

In Gisma, everyone has a story to tell about ISIS brutality. Jamal, the septuagenarian head of a 40-strong family, mourns the murder of one of his sons, a police officer. After coming to the village, the jihadists "took him away and sent us a message telling us that they had killed him," says Jamal. Another son, also a police officer, barely escaped with his life by fleeing to the town of Beiji.

Munder, a 14-year-old with a slight frame and bright blue eyes, recounts how ISIS butchered one of the villagers.

"They killed the man and poured gasoline over him so the dogs wouldn’t eat him. They paraded his body around the village on the back of a pick up," he says in disgust.

Gen. Jubouri is keen to build on the present goodwill towards the army and police forces. It is a key reason he is in Gisma today, even as mortar rounds from nearby ISIS positions continue to land in the village.

A Sunni himself, he served as the mayor of the town of Tel Afar during the U.S. occupation of Iraq, working alongside the Americans to expel al Qaeda from the city that is now under the control of ISIS, originally a spin-off of al Qaeda in Iraq.
When the death threats against al Jubouri and his family mounted, he fled to the United States before returning to Iraq to continue the fight against Islamist extremism.

"Up to now, the relationship between the security forces and the people south of Mosul is very good," he says. "We will try and continue to build bridges between the security forces and the people."

That had better work. If the local population in and around Mosul decides to reject the army, then recapturing Iraq's second largest city will be a near impossible task, Al Jubouri believes. But if Mosul's inhabitants turn on the insurgents, the few thousand fighters holding the city will quickly be isolated.

In other towns and villages near Mosul recently liberated from ISIS, Iraqi troops have been well received by the locals just as they were here in Gisma. Under Jubouri's command, soldiers have been keen to avoid civilian casualties, and to treat the population with respect.

But Jubouri's efforts could be in vain if Shia sectarian militia groups join the battle for Mosul. These militias are known as the Popular Mobilization Forces, or PMF, and many them are directly supported by Iran. They have made a valuable contribution beating back ISIS, but also have a track record of killing and torturing Sunni civilians in areas where they operate. Al Abadi’s weak government in Baghdad has only limited control.

Many experts believe that throwing the Shia militia into the battle for Mosul would play into the hands of the Islamic State, as fearful residents would rally around the ISIS fighters. Deploying the PMF would lead to a "sectarian polarization that makes ISIS appear as the least worst option for Sunnis," says Kyle Orton, a Research fellow with the Henry Jackson Society.

Jubouri is guarded when we ask about Shia militia involvement in the Mosul campaign. "I don't know," is his answer as to whether the PMF should take part. "Not all the PMF are bad people," he says.

Even if the Shia militias stay away, the Iraqis that joined ISIS will fight with the desperation of those who have nothing to lose. The villagers of Gisma are furious at the locals who threw in their lot with the insurgents, and who fled with the retreating jihadists.

"Those who joined Daesh cannot come back,” says Hamed, using the Arabic acronym for ISIS. “Their houses will be razed to the ground. What they did to the people is going to happen to them."

Hamed estimates that between 30 and 50 men from the village of around 5,000 souls sided with the Islamic State. There will be no mercy for their families either.

"They can't stay here, because they didn't stop their sons from joining Daesh," he says.

While al Jubouri lunches with the villagers, the men who took the village patrol the streets and guard the compound. Two members of the SWAT police unit that fought its way into Gisma a day earlier stand in the courtyard, their black uniforms and battered Kalashnikovs setting them apart from Jubouri's lavishly equipped security detachment.

The men, Ali and Yasser, say they fought for three hours to retake the village, during which ISIS launched four suicide car bombs against them.

The two are veterans of the struggle against jihadist groups, having battled a string of militants since the U.S. invasion in 2003 kicked off a brutal insurgency in Iraq.

"Al Qaeda, Jaish al Mujahideen, Daesh, we've fought them all," Yasser says wearily.

Their unit hails from Mosul, and was the last to withdraw when ISIS routed the army in the city in 2014, resisting until they were ordered to pull out, according to Ali. To break their defenses, the jihadists drove trucks filled with explosives into their lines.

Since then, they have been deployed across Iraq to first halt and then push back the insurgents. After campaigning in nearby Salahaddin province, they were part of the force that took Qayyarah airbase, were U.S. Marines and Special Forces are helping prepare for the final push on Mosul. (And where ISIS reportedly launched a rocket or artillery shell on Tuesday that contained mustard gas.)

After a string of victories, the morale within the SWAT unit is high. Many have family members in the Mosul, and they are keen to avenge their humiliation two years ago.

"Soon we will return," says Yasser.
 
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