WAR 09-02-2017-to-09-08-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

(284) 08-12-2017-to-08-18-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...8-18-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(285) 08-19-2017-to-08-25-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...8-25-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(286) 08-26-2017-to-09-01-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...9-01-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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Hummm....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.yahoo.com/news/france-seeks-un-sanctions-regime-mali-155043335.html

Bid for UN vote on Mali sanctions gains momentum

AFP • September 1, 2017

United Nations (United States) (AFP) - A bid for a UN Security Council vote early next week on a French-sponsored resolution that would set up a sanctions regime for Mali gained momentum Friday despite resistance from some countries, diplomats said.

Russia and Ethiopia have voiced reservations over the proposal, raising the possibility of a delay of several weeks, but the diplomats said negotiations on holding a vote on Tuesday have accelerated.

That would put it just before Security Council ambassadors leave for an annual meeting with the African Union in Addis Ababa.

Mali's government and coalitions of armed groups signed a peace deal in June 2015 to end years of fighting in the north that culminated with a takeover of the territory by jihadists in 2012.

A French-led military intervention in January 2013 drove out the Islamists, but insurgents remain active, moving to the center where attacks and trafficking of drugs and weapons are on the rise.

France last month circulated a draft resolution to the UN Security Council on establishing a committee tasked with setting up the UN blacklist as fears grow that the West African country is sliding back into turmoil.

The move is backed by Mali's government, which told the council in a letter in early August that repeated violations of a ceasefire since the beginning of June were threatening to derail the peace deal.

Russia, a veto-wielding council member, warned the peace deal could collapse if the council endorses the request and sides with the government, which is one of the parties to the peace deal.

"We are always against the sanctions regime, especially in this particular situation, when one of the parties to the agreement on peace and reconciliation asks for sanctions against the other two parties," said Russian Deputy Ambassador Petr Iliichev.

"When one party asks for another (to be sanctioned), we can expect a collapse of this agreement," he added.

- Mali sanctions blacklist -

The French-drafted resolution would set up a sanctions committee made up of all Security Council members who would designate individuals and entities to be blacklisted by the United Nations.

Those who are blacklisted would be subject to a global travel ban and an assets freeze.

Iliichev suggested that the government in Bamako was having second thoughts about the sanctions after a new ceasefire deal was reached on August 23.

Ethiopia's Ambassador Tekeda Alemu, who is council president this month, told a news conference that the measure was "delayed" because discussions were under way and no meeting was scheduled on the proposal in September.

Mali and four neighboring countries -- Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania and Niger -- are working to set up a counterterrorism force to fight jihadists in the Sahel, which France has warned could become a haven for extremists.

In the latest attack to shake the region, gunmen opened fire on a restaurant in the Burkina Faso capital of Ouagadougou on August 14, killing 19 people, including several foreigners who were dining on a terrace.

The UN peacekeeping force in Mali has come under repeated attacks by insurgents and is now known as its most dangerous UN mission in the world.

Four armed groups active in Mali are already on the UN sanctions blacklist for their ties to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the MUJAO Islamist movement, Al-Mourabitoun and the Ansar Eddine group, along with its leader Iyad Ag Ghali.

The measure would also set up a panel of experts tasked with monitoring compliance with the sanctions and reporting to the council on violations.

The sanctions regime would have a one-year mandate.

7 reactions

 

[Housecarl]

Well the balloon is getting ready to go up....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.yahoo.com/news/top-asian-news-4-22-m-gmt-042252846.html

Top Asian News 3:33 a.m. GMT

Associated Press•September 1, 2017

TOKYO (AP) — Japan is debating whether to develop a limited pre-emptive strike capability and buy cruise missiles — ideas that were anathema in the pacifist country before the North Korea missile threat. With revisions to Japan's defense plans underway, ruling party hawks are accelerating the moves, and some defense experts say Japan should at least consider them. After being on the backburner in the ruling party for decades, a possibility of pre-emptive strike was formally proposed to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe by his party's missile defense panel in March, prompting parliamentary debate, though somewhat lost steam as Abe apparently avoided the divisive topic after seeing support ratings for his scandal-laden government plunge.

TEKNAF, Bangladesh (AP) — Almost 400 people have died in violence in western Myanmar that was triggered by attacks on security forces by insurgents from the Rohingya ethnic minority, Myanmar's military said, as both sides exchanged charges of atrocities and thousands of Rohingya fled across the border to Bangladesh. The death toll, posted on the Facebook page of Myanmar's military commander Friday, is a sharp increase over the previously reported number of just over 100. The statement said all but 29 of the 399 dead were insurgents. The statement said there had been 90 armed clashes, including an initial 30 attacks by insurgents on Aug.

TEKNAF, Bangladesh (AP) — Thousands of Rohingya Muslims are pouring into Bangladesh, part of an exodus of the beleaguered ethnic group from neighboring Myanmar that began when violence erupted there on August 25. Myanmar's military said Friday that almost 400 people died in recent violence in the western state of Rakhine triggered by attacks on security forces by insurgents from the Rohingya ethnic minority. Both sides accuse the other of atrocities as tens of thousands of Rohingya flee to Bangladesh. While border guards on the Bangladeshi side try to keep them out they often relent when pressured. On Friday thousands walked through the slushy paddy fields, many with just the clothes on their backs.

WASHINGTON (AP) — A U.S. ban on Americans traveling to North Korea took effect Friday amid concerns about the fate of those who have been detained there in the past. The U.S. said its citizens can start applying for exceptions, but few will be granted. The ban, announced by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson in July after the death of American student Otto Warmbier following his release from North Korea, makes U.S. passports invalid for travel to the North. Americans who have a valid reason to travel to the North can still go under "extremely limited" circumstances, the State Department said, adding that applicants must prove their trip is in the U.S.

BANGKOK (AP) — As a hit-and-run charge effectively expires, the whereabouts of an heir to the Red Bull energy-drink empire accused of killing a Bangkok police officer five years ago remain unknown. The fugitive, whose family is worth billions, has apparently found a way to disappear. The Associated Press recently confirmed Vorayuth "Boss" Yoovidhya's last known location: Taiwan. Two sources with knowledge of the investigation said he flew there from Singapore, where he had fled shortly before he was supposed to make an April court appearance in Bangkok. The sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to talk to reporters about the case, said Vorayuth stayed at the luxurious Mandarin Oriental in Taipei before leaving the island May 3.

NEW DELHI (AP) — Two massive, rain-soaked cities on opposite sides of the world are struggling with swirling, brackish waters that have brought death and devastation. For Houston, it's unprecedented. For Mumbai, it's painfully common. For India's financial capital and other South Asian cities and farmlands, floods are regular, cataclysmic occurrences made worse by breakneck urban development and population booms that will only become more challenging as climate change increases disaster risk. In the last two months, more than 1,000 people have been killed in flooding events across India, southern Nepal and northern Bangladesh. Some 40 million more have seen their homes, businesses or crops destroyed.

YANGON, Myanmar (AP) — Myanmar's military on Friday dropped criminal charges it had filed against six journalists in cases that drew international criticism for discouraging freedom of expression. The decision to withdraw the cases involving contact with banned organizations and online defamation under a telecommunications law was announced on the Facebook page of the office of military's commander in chief. The journalists work for the newspapers The Daily Eleven, The Voice Daily, and The Irrawaddy and Democratic Voice of Burma, two primarily online news services. The Myanmar Press Council confirmed it has received an official letter from the military and expressed its gratitude.

FRESNO, Calif. (AP) — A recovery team using a helicopter and a winch on Friday dragged a car from the middle of a dangerous California river where it had been stranded for more than a month and freed two bodies inside believed to be a pair of exchange students from Thailand. The car had crashed through a guardrail and plunged 500 feet (152 meters) over a cliff in the Sierra Nevada into the Kings River below, authorities said. After weeks of planning and waiting for the river water to calm, a helicopter lowered members of the recovery team into the gorge.

KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — Afghan President Ashraf Ghani in his Eid al-Adha message has reached out to neighbor Pakistan offering "comprehensive negotiations" to bring peace to their troubled relationship. Like most Muslim countries, Afghanistan celebrates the Islamic holiday on Friday while in Pakistan the holiday is celebrated on Saturday. It commemorates Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son. "Peace with Pakistan is our national agenda," said Ghani while also urging insurgents to lay down their weapons. Afghanistan routinely accuses Pakistan of harboring Taliban insurgents, while Islamabad says its enemies have found sanctuaries in Afghanistan. The two countries also squabble relentlessly over the border that separates their two countries.

BEIJING (AP) — The Vatican's efforts to heal a decades-long rift with China appear to have stalled, with each side still unwilling to accept controversial bishops appointed by the other. In recent months, Beijing has appeared to take a harder line toward believers, and has ordered the country's estimated 12 million Catholics to shun foreign influence and to "Sinosize" their Church. Meanwhile, the ruling Communist Party is again telling members that atheism remains a core value, not to be transgressed. The developments mark a shift from just over a decade ago, when Pope Benedict XVI penned a landmark letter to the church in China that was seen as an impetus toward improving ties.

1 reaction

 

[Housecarl]

More....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.washingtonpost.com/worl...a169beb0953_story.html?utm_term=.c701e77d0903

NKorea missile fear sets pre-emptive strike debate in Japan

By Mari Yamaguchi | AP September 1 at 11:36 PM

TOKYO — Japan is debating whether to develop a limited pre-emptive strike capability and buy cruise missiles — ideas that were anathema in the pacifist country before the North Korea missile threat. With revisions to Japan’s defense plans underway, ruling party hawks are accelerating the moves, and some defense experts say Japan should at least consider them.

After being on the backburner in the ruling party for decades, a possibility of pre-emptive strike was formally proposed to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe by his party’s missile defense panel in March, prompting parliamentary debate, though somewhat lost steam as Abe apparently avoided the divisive topic after seeing support ratings for his scandal-laden government plunge.

North Korea’s test-firing Tuesday of a missile, which flew over Japan and landed in the northern Pacific Ocean, has intensified fear and reignited the debate.

“Should we possess pre-emptive strike capability?” liberal-leaning Mainichi newspaper asked the following day. “But isn’t it too reckless to jump to discuss a ‘get them before they get you’ approach?”


Japan has a two-step missile defense system. First, Standard Missile-3 interceptors on Aegis destroyers in the Sea of Japan would shoot down projectiles mid-flight and if that fails, surface-to-air PAC-3s would intercept them from within a 20-kilometer (12-mile) range. Technically, the setup can handle falling debris or missiles heading to Japan, but it’s not good enough for missiles on a high-lofted trajectory, those with multiple warheads or simultaneous multiple attacks, experts say.

A pre-emptive strike, by Japanese definition, is a step preceding the two-tier defense. Cruise missiles, such as Tomahawk, fired from Aegis destroyers or fighter jets would get the enemy missile clearly waiting to be fired, or just after blastoff from a North Korean launch site, before it approaches Japan.

Japan’s self-defense-only principle under the country’s war-renouncing constitution prohibits its military from making a first strike, and officials discussing a limited pre-emptive strike are calling it a “strike-back” instead. Whichever the language, it further loosens postwar Japan’s pacifist principle and could strain its relations with China, which is suspicious of Tokyo’s intentions. There are gray areas as to how far Japan can go and still justify minimum self-defense.


Some experts are skeptical about how it would work. North Korea’s secretive, diversified and mobile launch system makes it extremely difficult to track down and incapacitate the weapons with Japan’s limited cruise missile attacks, security expert Ken Jimbo at Keio University said in a recent article. A pre-emptive strike capability would also require trillions of dollars to set up spy satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, cruise missiles, as well as training of special units, experts say.

North Korea flight-tested two intercontinental ballistic missiles in July and has threatened to send missiles near the U.S. territory of Guam, home to key military bases. The North already has short-range missiles that cover Japan and possibly has achieved miniaturized nuclear warheads, the Defense Ministry’s annual report says.

“North Korea has demonstrated its capability to hit targets anywhere in Japan,” said Narushige Michishita, a defense expert at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies. “It has become even more important for Japan to improve its missile and civil defense capabilities, and seriously think about acquiring limited but meaningful strike capabilities.”


Timing of the pre-emptive strike debate is seen in favor of supporters of the option in the ruling party and the Defense Ministry because they are just starting to revise Japan’s multi-year defense plans.

Abe called Tuesday’s missile firing “unprecedented, grave and serious threat.” Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera, an advocate of bolstering Japan’s missile and strike-back capability, said more provocations by the North are likely and Tokyo must quickly upgrade its missile arsenal.

The Defense Ministry announced Thursday a record 5.26 trillion yen ($48 billion) budget for fiscal 2018, which would cover purchase of upgraded missile defense systems such as land-based Aegis Ashore interceptors or the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, a mobile equipment Washington and Seoul have installed in South Korea. Beijing, which says THAAD’s powerful radar can reach deep into China and wants it removed, could react sharply if it is installed in Japan.

Abe, since taking office five years ago, has expanded Japan’s military role, allowing it to take on a greater task in international peacekeeping. In 2015, his government allowed Japan to fight for its allies when they come under enemy attack, a condition known as collective self-defense, by re-interpreting part of the constitution and railroading a new security legislation that sparked massive protests.

Pre-emptive strike, however, is even more sensitive and divisive topic and the government may have to prioritize upgrading missile interceptors for now, says Tetsuo Kotani, senior research fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs. Polls show most Japanese fear North Korea’s missile threat and support bolstering Japan’s intercepting capability, but in terms of pre-emptive strike, opponents overwhelmed supporters.

“Prime Minister Abe seems to have turned hesitant about discussing pre-emptive strikes,” Kotani said, suggesting Abe’s declining popularity is causing his reluctance to push the issue. “Public debate of pre-emptive strikes may slow down.”

___

Follow Mari Yamaguchi on Twitter at https://www.twitter.com/mariyamaguchi

Her work can be found in APNews at https://www.apnews.com/search/mari yamaguchi

 

[Housecarl]

Now that I'm off of my "smart phone" and back on a "real computer".....


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[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/an-isis-al-qaeda-merger

An ISIS-Al Qaeda Merger?

by Thomas R. McCabe
Journal Article | September 2, 2017 - 1:42pm

Some reports indicate (or claim) that ISIS and Al Qaeda are discussing a merger.[1] Since the discussions have supposedly been between representatives of “Caliph” al-Baghdadi of ISIS and al Qaeda Central (AQC) head Ayman al-Zawahiri, in the interest of caution we should assume that the discussions are not just about a reconciliation in Syria and Iraq but about a global merger.

If such a reconciliation were to somehow take place, it would obviously be very bad news for the rest of us. It would risk combining the ultraviolence, media savvy and worldwide mobilization of jihadis (including both its efforts to build international terrorist networks, especially in Europe, and its ability to mobilize free-lance terrorists) demonstrated by ISIS with the deliberate planning endorsed by AQC and practiced by various branches of al Qaeda.

However, we should regard such reports with skepticism. The first reason is timing.

At present, neither side is really in a position to impose terms—if either could have done so they would have done it before now. At first glance, this might look like a situation where negotiation would be worthwhile. However, AQC actually has little reason to negotiate, since it is actually in an overall position where it can afford to wait. ISIS, currently in retreat in its core area in Syria and Iraq, is dealing from a position of weakness that can be expected to get weaker over time. Self-proclaimed “Caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi claimed his position as caliph by right of conquest.[2] What will happen to that claim when those conquests are gone, and the ISIS statelet has clearly been lost? ISIS will only be able to spin defeat for so long before it is obviously double talk for having lost.[3] This being the case, why should AQC negotiate at all, unless AQC is exploring the possibility of an ISIS surrender or positioning itself to absorb ISIS assets as the organization is overrun.

In any case, such a reunion would be a tall order, for a variety of other reasons. There are actually significant or major differences between the two organization. These include 1) ISIS and AQC view each other as traitors; 2) theological/ideological differences; 3) differences over strategy; and 4) this is very much a blood feud.

ISIS and al Qaeda regard each other as traitors. The split between ISIS and al Qaeda has, effectively speaking, been a worldwide revolt by ISIS against Al Qaeda Central. AQC regards the revolt as an act of rebellion and betrayal,[4] while ISIS denounces AQC for having betrayed the legacy of Bin Laden and having joined the enemies of Islam.[5] For a reunion to take place, one or the other, or both, will have to admit they were wrong. Since this is also an ego contest between both the leaders and the organizations, don’t expect that to happen.

The split has led to what amounts to a worldwide civil war over leadership of the international jihadi movement.[6] While fighting between ISIS and al Qaeda’s latest permutation in Syria has gotten the most prominent attention, Syria is not the only place they are fighting. They are also fighting in Afghanistan, in North Africa, in Somalia, and in Yemen. In addition, ISIS is fighting other jihadis, such as the Taliban,[7] along with al Qaeda.

In regard to theology/ideology, there are significant differences between al Qaeda and ISIS, especially over how immediately murderous to be toward other Muslims.[8] While both are jihadi organizations with deep roots in the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam, ISIS is even more extreme in their interpretation than al Qaeda. For ISIS, any Muslim that does not follow the Muslim faith in the manner dictated by ISIS is an apostate who deserves to be killed. This included nearly all Muslims, and in particular applies to Shia Muslims, who ISIS considers pagan apostates who should be annihilated.[9]

The major differences in strategy is that ISIS was formed to pursue the immediate establishment of a caliphate, while for al Qaeda the establishment of such a caliphate was considered an ultimate goal to take place at some time in the future, with a more immediate objective of establishing jihadi emirates—local jihadi states. ISIS has ruled as a conquering power, especially in Syria and Iraq, and imposed its rule by force, largely ignoring trying to cultivate local support. Al Qaeda, or at least some of its affiliates,[10] has to a degree learned from its past mistakes and has been pursuing a long game of trying to sink roots into the society where it is operating while pursuing the jihadization of that society from the ground up.[11]

Finally, this is very much a blood feud. ISIS and the Al Qaeda factions in Syria in particular have spent extensive time and effort killing each other, which can be expected to continue if and when either is forced to retreat to an area occupied by the other. Much of Al Qaeda in particular comes from the Middle East, where revenge is an honorable motive and pride is taken in holding grudges. Further, on a more personal level for individual Al Qaeda members, while evidence on the subject is mixed, [12] Al Qaeda factions are likely to view at least some (possibly many) ISIS members--especially those who had previously been members of Al Qaeda factions who defected to ISIS[13]--with hostility. Al Qaeda is likely to consider such ISIS people to be at least traitors who betrayed their religious oath of unconditional allegiance to al Qaeda’s leadership,[14] who are possibly secret allies of the Assad regime, and who cannot be trusted and deserve to be punished.

Conclusions and Implications

For these reasons, a merger between ISIS and AQC looks unlikely at this point. Al Qaeda may well just be positioning itself to pick up as many ISIS assets as possible when convenient.[15] On the global strategic scale, as ISIS is defeated al Qaeda can be expected to reassert its claim to leadership of the global jihadi movement while attempting to selectively annex ISIS personnel and networks. This annexation is most likely to happen if and when Baghdadi is killed, which will automatically dissolve the pledges of personal allegiance (bay’at) given to him as ‘caliph’ and leave the ISIS survivors up for grabs. Some of the ‘wiliyats’ (provinces) of ISIS may carry on as independent groups--several of them were actually previously existing groups with their own agendas and priorities that joined ISIS. These groups were often violently hostile to the Shia, and whether they would join a group that has currently downplayed its hostility to the Shia is also probably unlikely.

To a degree, this means we are probably being lucky and dodging a bullet—this time. But while the ISIS statelet may be eradicated and ISIS as an organization may be eclipsed, the forces and mentality it has unleashed within Islam and for that matter within the jihadis--virulent intolerance and murderous hyper violence targeting the entire world, including other Muslims--must be expected to continue to roil the Middle East, the Muslim world, and the rest of the planet.

Unfortunately, it doesn’t take many people like this to cause a great deal of mayhem.[16] And meanwhile, al Qaeda remains out there, waiting in the shadows.

End Notes

[1] “ Islamic State seeking alliance with al Qaeda, Iraqi vice president says,” Reuters, 17 Apr 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-islamic-state-idUSKBN17J1DT , accessed 18 Apr 2017. Also see Rikar Hussein and Ahed al-Hendi, “Might IS, al-Qaida Team Up in Iraq?”, Voice of America Extremism Watch, 20 Apr 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/might-islamic-state-qaida-team-iraq/3819083.html , accessed 21 Apr 2017.

[2] Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, “This is the Promise of Allah” [Proclamation of the Caliphate], SITE Institute Jihadist News, June 29, 2014, https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jih...aliphate-rebrands-group-as-islamic-state.html , accessed June 29, 2014.

[3] They can be expected to try. Their on-line publication Dabiq proclaimed the importance of the otherwise insignificant village of Dabiq in northern Syria, where the al-Malhamah al-Kubrā (The Grand Battle) against the Crusaders was supposed to take place. See Thomas R. McCabe, “Apocalypse Soon? The Battle of Dabiq,” Small Wars Journal, 12 July 2016, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/apocalypse-soon-the-battle-for-dabiq . They then abandoned the place, and in their on-line publication Rumiyah (which replaced Dabiq after they lost the village) they now claim that the battle for Dabiq was only a precursor to the actual coming Battle of Dabiq which will be part of the al-Malhamah. See “Toward the Major Malhamah of Dabiq,” Al Hayat Media Center, Rumiyah Issue 3, https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2016/11/rome-magazine-3.pdf , accessed 20 Mar 2017.

[4] Kyle Orton, “Al-Qaeda Explains its Split with the Islamic State,” The Syrian Intifada, 6 Dec 2016, https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2016/12/06/al-qaeda-explains-its-split-with-the-islamic-state/ , accessed 2 Jan 2017.

[5] Al Hayat Media Center, “In the Words of The Enemy,” Dabiq Issue 10, P. 66-69, July 2015, https://archive.org/details/Dabiq10_ , accessed 1 Aug 2015.

[6] “Jail, Jihad, and Exploding Kittens,” The Economist, Nov 1, 2014, http://www.economist.com/*news/midd...extreme-even-leading-ideologues-holy-war-jail. Also see Daniel Byman and Jennifer Williams, “Jihadism’s Global Civil War,” The National Interest, March/April 2015, pp. 10-18.

[7] “Islamic State kills senior Afghan Taliban official in Pakistan: militants,” Reuters, 29 Apr 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-islamic-state-taliban-pakistan-idUSKBN17V0GN , accessed 30 Apr 2017.

[8] For a good overview, see Brian Fishman, The Master Plan, Yale University Press, 2016.

[9] For a typical commentary about Shia Muslims, see Al Hayat Media Center, “The Rafidah; From Ibn Saba’ to the Dajjal,” Dabiq, #13, P.32-45, https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2016/01/the-islamic-state-e2809cdacc84biq-magazine-13e280b3.pdf , accessed 11 May 2017. According to this article, Shiism is a Jewish plot.

[10]Charles Lister, “The Dawn of Mass Jihad; Success in Syria Fuels al-Qa`ida’s Evolution,” CTC Sentinel, 7 Sept 2016, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-dawn-of-mass-jihad-success-in-syria-fuels-al-qaidas-evolution , accessed 8 Sept 2016.

[11] AQC may be objecting to this effort to build local roots and demanding its affiliates return to a primary concentration of attacking the West and the United States. See Charles Lister, “Al Qaeda’s Turning Against its Syrian Affiliate,” Middle East Institute, 18 May 2017, http://www.mei.edu/content/article/al-qaeda-s-turning-against-its-syrian-affiliate , accessed 19 May 2017.

[12] It must be noted that Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, then the manifestation of Al Qaeda in Syria, accepted at least some defectors from ISIS. See Sirwan Kajjo, “2 Top IS Commanders Reportedly Flee Raqqa,” VOA News, 7 Dec 2016, http://www.voanews.com/a/two-top-islamic-state-commanders-flee-raqqa/3627238.html , accessed 8 Dec 2016. This may have been done at local initiative.

[13] Jabhat al-Nusra (al Qaeda in Syria at the time) experienced a significant number of defections to ISIS, including some leaders. See Lister, “Al-Qa’ida Plays a Long Game in Syria.” CTC Sentinel, 11 Sept 2015, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaida-plays-a-long-game-in-syria , accessed 12 Sep 2015.

[14] As noted in Charles Lister’s The Syrian Jihad, New York, Oxford University Press, 2015, P. 104.

[15] Sirwan Kajjo, “2 Top IS Commanders Reportedly Flee Raqqa,” Voice of America News, 7 Dec 2016, http://www.voanews.com/a/two-top-islamic-state-commanders-flee-raqqa/3627238.html , accessed 8 Dec 2016. They defected to al Qaeda’s then current manifestation in Syria.

[16] Paul D. Shinkman, “Would-be Attackers Undeterred by ISIS Losses in Iraq, Syria,” US News and World Report, 9 June 2017, https://www.usnews.com/news/world/a...ckers-undeterred-by-isis-losses-in-iraq-syria , accessed 10 June 2017.



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About the Author


Thomas R. McCabe
LtCol Thomas R. McCabe, USAFR (Ret), is a retired career analyst for the U.S. Department of Defense and a retired Lieutenant Colonel from the U.S. Air Force Reserve. He worked for over ten years as a Middle East military analyst for the Air Force and as a counterterrorism analyst for two years. His articles on the Middle East and terrorism have been published in Parameters, Orbis, Middle East Quarterly, and Security and Democracy. This article represents his views only and should not be considered the opinion of any agency of the U.S. Government.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.realcleardefense.com/ar...nst_is_but_post-victory_god_knows_112214.html

Arabs, Kurds Unite Against IS, but Post-victory? 'God Knows'

By Sarah El Deeb
September 03, 2017

RAQQA, Syria (AP) — The two fighters, one an Arab sniper, the other his Kurdish commander, are each driven by a personal grudge against the Islamic State group. They are working side by side in an elite commando unit of the U.S.-backed forces fighting the militants in the Syrian city of Raqqa.

But they have vastly different visions of what happens once they succeed.

Abdullah, the Arab fighter, fears the militants’ fall in Raqqa will only be the start of more turmoil. He worries it will unleash a wave of bloodshed among the area’s Sunni Arab community as residents seek revenge on neighbors who joined the group.

For Erdal, the Kurd and the unit commander, the battle for Raqqa is a step toward realizing his people’s dream of autonomy in the Kurdish heartland of northern Syria. Next, he and many other Kurds believe, will come a fight with their nemesis Turkey, which has sent troops into Syria in part to thwart Kurdish ambitions.

Another danger once IS falls is of a backlash among Raqqa’s Sunni Arab population against the Kurds. Many in the community deeply resent Kurdish ambitions and see their hopes for self-rule as intended to break apart the country.

The two men’s views reflect the differing priorities run through the alliance between Kurdish and Arab fighters in the Syrian Democratic Forces, which the United States forged together to wage the fight against the Islamic State group. The SDF has proven a startling success in bringing together Kurds and Arabs. The more experienced and organized Kurds dominate command and some units are purely Kurd or purely Arab, but most SDF units are mixed, with few signs among the fighters of the tensions plaguing their communities at large as Kurdish influence grows in northern Syria.

It is largely the hands-on U.S. support that ensures that cohesion, raising questions over what happens when the American role eventually pulls back. For Arab fighters, the force is a chance to get vital training, funds and experience from the Americans, working alongside U.S. special forces advisers on the front lines. U.S. officials say the SDF, estimated at 50,000 fighters, is 50 percent Arab, with new recruits coming from liberated areas in Raqqa province.

This week, IS released a grisly video warning Arabs not to join with the Kurds. “You will regret it,” a bearded militant sitting by the banks of a river says, telling Arab tribes they will face “bitter revenge.” The footage then shows militants beheading a captured Arab fighter.

The Kurds, meanwhile, see the alliance with the United States as essential to securing their hold across northern Syria “from the threat of an attack by Turkey or the Syrian regime,” said Noah Bonsey, a Syria expert with the International Crisis Group. Moreover, the more they capture in eastern Syria the stronger their hand is in the future as all sides try to carve out zones of power in the country.

“If they don’t want the confrontation (with Turkey), (Washington) has to find a solution,” Erdal said on a recent afternoon only miles from the frontline in Raqqa.

Abdullah and Erdal spoke to The Associated Press between their unit’s assaults into the city. Both fighters go by one name to protect their identities. Erdal’s name is a nom de guerre, a common practice in the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, known as the YPG, which form the backbone of the SDF.

“What comes after IS, only God knows,” said Abdullah.

THE KURDISH COMMANDER

At 23, Erdal is an experienced veteran of the Syrian Kurds’ campaign to stake their claims. He has fought in the ranks of the YPG since he was 17 and took part in most of the major battles since, whether against Islamic State militants or against rival rebels in northern Syria.

In 2015, Erdal’s uncle was kidnapped by IS after the militants accused him of trying to free women from enslavement. For months, he remained in their custody until they beheaded him earlier this year along with others in a public square in Raqqa.

Erdal’s coming of age was in the 2016 battle with IS for northern town of Manbij. That grueling, 3-month-long fight is a milestone burned into the Kurdish fighters’ consciousness. They lost hundreds of men before capturing the town, while learning key combat lessons. The fight cemented their place as the Americans’ main partner on the ground, but it was also the Kurdish hold on Manbij that prompted Turkey to send troops into Syria to push the YPG back from its borders.

Erdal and his superiors look at the Raqqa battle through the lens of Manbij battle.

“Manbij was much harder,” he said. With their ground shrinking inside Raqqa, the militants are less able to carry out their signature spectacular attacks using car bombs as they did in Raqqa, he said, speaking before heading off for a mission by the unit into the city.

“The next fight is with Turkey, 90 percent,” said Erdal. He accuses Turkey of using the Islamic militants to its advantage at times, to curb the aspirations of Kurdish groups.

Ankara sees the YPG as an extension of Kurdish insurgent groups in Turkey and calls all of them terrorists. Fearing the Syrian Kurdish forces’ newfound confidence, Turkey has picked a fight with them with skirmishes at Afrin, a town more than 200 kilometers (120 miles) away from Raqqa in northwest Syria.

That is where the next battle will be, many Kurds feel — putting the United States in a tough position between two allies. Confrontations have already flared in SDF-controlled Manbij where U.S. forces have deployed to ward off further tension.

“We can finish here and go support Afrin,” said Erdal, who married earlier this year.

THE ARAB FIGHTER

Abdullah gets along well with his Kurdish commander. He and Erdal joke in Arabic, while the Syrian Kurdish language Kurmanji is more commonly heard on the battlefield among the commanders. At his urging, Erdal joined a troop dance ahead of the battle, performing the Arabic version of a traditional dance. Abdullah, meanwhile, wears the same colorful, beaded scarf that Kurdish fighters often wear on the front lines.

Erdal praises Abdullah’s prowess. During a recent thrust into Raqqa, Abdullah detected four IS militants trying to sneak up on the force and killed two of them.

Thin, sun-baked and constantly smoking, Abdullah came into Erdal’s unit with valuable experience: During his required military service years ago, he was in the 4th Armored Division, one of the best trained and equipped units in Syria’s military. Abdullah’s brother had joined the YPG earlier and was killed in battle with IS, something Abdullah and his commanders recall with pride.

“We are going to Raqqa for a reason. Revenge against IS,” Abdullah said.

In his hometown of Ain Issa, north of Raqqa city, he endured IS rule for three years.

In one instance, IS fighters beat him and forced him to beat his wife in public because she wasn’t adhering to IS’s strict dress code for women. It was a personal humiliation he said he can never forgive.

He also smuggled cigarettes into IS-run territory, prompting his arrest by the militants. Hemanaged to escape, but IS in Raqqa still has his personal ID card.

So now, he jokes, he’s fighting to liberate Raqqa to get his card back.

But he said what comes after the Raqqa battle could be frightening: The city’s residents know their tormentors and abusers from the Islamic State group personally since many were local Syrians — and will probably seek individual revenge. He said that after Raqqa falls, he and Arab fighters will “lay down our arms and stay at home. We want to avoid civil war.”

The other potential danger is fallout over who will run Raqqa. Some Arabs are wary of any sign that the Kurds are trying to dominate the region.

“The first fight will be which flag to raise in Raqqa after it is liberated,” said Ali al-Mattar, a 17-year-old Arab fighter in the same unit. He said the problem won’t be the Arab foot soldiers like himself but Arab commanders in the SDF who feel marginalized by Kurdish leaders.

The U.S. is trying to avert frictions by creating a policing force made up of Raqqa residents called the Internal Security Forces. So far hundreds have graduated from American training, and plans are for some 4,000 members of the force to deploy in Raqqa.

Khaled Hendawi, a 23-year old Arab fighter with the SDF for more than a year, said Arabs in the ranks of the force don’t seek leadership yet. “We need to learn organization first if we want to be elevated.”

But that doesn’t mean there isn’t potential for strife.

“Anyone who starts by turning against the other side will be the biggest loser,” he said.

 

[brudog]

Thanks for the updates..

 

[Housecarl]

You're welcome Brudog....

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https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...break-siege-in-deir-al-zor-city-idUSKCN1BF1G0

SEPTEMBER 4, 2017 / 5:38 AM / 2 HOURS AGO

Syrian army, allies thrust east to break siege in Deir al-Zor city

Ellen Francis, Laila Bassam
6 MIN READ

BEIRUT (Reuters) - With a sudden lunge through jihadist lines, the Syrian army and its allies on Monday came to within 3 km of relieving the Euphrates city of Deir al-Zor, where Islamic State has besieged 93,000 civilians and an army garrison for years.

The advance on the eastern city marks another stinging setback for the once-triumphant Islamic State, fast retreating in both Iraq and Syria as its self-declared caliphate crumbles.

Syrian troops were rapidly approaching the city, reaching a point 3 km (2 miles) away, state television said. Dozens of trucks loaded with food stood ready to enter the enclave in the city once government forces break the siege, it said.

(For a graphic on battle for control in Syria click tmsnrt.rs/2wyo0lw)

A military media unit run by Hezbollah, a key ally of Damascus, said the advancing forces were heading to the garrison’s camp on the city outskirts.

Deir al-Zor’s provincial governor told Reuters he expected the army could reach the city within hours.

“Islamic State is in confusion. There is no leadership or centralized control,” said a commander in the military alliance supporting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Hemmed in on all sides, Islamic State, which ruled over millions of people in both Iraq and Syria at its peak in 2014, is falling back on a last Euphrates stronghold downstream of Deir al-Zor city in the towns of al-Mayadin and al-Bukamal, near the border with Iraq.

But as it has lost its core territory - defeated in Iraq’s Mosul now yielding street after street in Syria’s Raqqa - the ultra-hardline group has still been able to launch attacks in the West and maintain a threat in other centers such as Libya.

RELATED COVERAGE
Two Russian soldiers killed by shelling in Syria's Deir al-Zor province: Ifax

Syrian army, allies 3 km from Deir al-Zor enclave: state TV

The fighters have been driven out of nearly all of their territory in Iraq over the past two years by government forces backed by a U.S.-led coalition. In Syria, they are fighting against both Assad’s Russian-backed government and a U.S.-backed Arab and Kurdish militia that has launched an assault on Raqqa.

In the IS-encircled pocket in Deir al-Zor, news of the army’s approach prompted people to take to the streets to celebrate, governor Mohammed Ibrahim Samra said by phone.

The city has been cut off since 2013, after rebel groups rose up against Assad during the first flush of Syria’s six-year war. Islamic State then overran rebel positions and encircled the army’s enclave in the city in 2014.

It was a major prize. Deir al-Zor is the center of Syria’s oil industry, a source of wealth to the group and a serious loss to Damascus. As the army has pushed east in recent months, oil and gas fields have once more fallen to the government.

Islamic State fighters stepped up efforts this year to seize the enclave before the army could arrive. In January, they severed it from the city’s military airbase and took over a nearby hill, further straining its links to the outside.

During the long siege, high-altitude air drops have supplied the city. The United Nations said in August it estimated there were 93,000 civilians in the government’s Deir al-Zor pocket, where conditions were “extremely difficult”.

“Despite all this and despite the shelling and injured, things are running in the city,” governor Samra had said on Sunday. “The institutions are running, the bakeries. Water is also pumped twice a week to our residents, aid is distributed daily.”

RAPID ADVANCE

For Assad, the weekend’s lightning advance caps months of steady progress after government forces turned from their victory over rebels in the northern commercial capital Aleppo last December to push eastwards against Islamic State.

“The army has been advancing in a rapid and calculated way from all directions,” a Syrian military source said, referring to the months-long campaign across the desert.

With Russian jets and an alliance of Shi‘ite militias backed by Iran, including Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the army has captured swathes of the central and eastern deserts in parallel offensives from Palmyra and al-Resafa.

Those offensives have accelerated since linking up last month, taking swathes of land from Islamic State except for a small zone near the town of al-Salamiya. The militants still control much of Deir al-Zor province, including half the city.

Heavy Russian air cover has helped the Syrian military and allied forces march toward the city, Russia’s defense ministry said in a statement on Monday.

A resident of the city reached by telephone, who gave his name only as Mohammad, said he could hear the sound of warplanes in the distance. The army advances over the last two days had sparked “indescribable joy” among people in the enclave after years of siege, he said.

Under attack, Islamic State has pulled reinforcements from al-Mayadin and relied on its usual tactics of booby traps, mines and sudden raids, the commander in the pro-Assad alliance said.

The latest advance came after intense preparatory artillery, a multi-pronged assault and gains in high ground commanding nearby areas, the non-Syrian commander said.

Meanwhile, as the army and its allies have forced other militant pockets to surrender, including an Islamic State enclave on Syria’s border with Lebanon a week ago, they have been able to transfer more troops to the desert campaign.

“It helped a lot to switch the military effort of the Syrian army and the resistance to the eastern Syrian desert,” the commander said, adding that thousands of troops had arrived from the battle on the Lebanon border.

Islamic State fighters and their families evacuated from that enclave as part of a surrender deal were escorted by the Syrian army and Hezbollah to east Syria, but have been stopped by a U.S.-led coalition from reaching Deir al-Zor.

Ten of the original 17 buses are now stuck in no-man’s land between pro-government forces and Islamic State territory and six buses retreated back into government areas, the commander added.

Additional reporting by Kinda Makieh in Damascus and Andrew Osborn in Moscow; Writing by Angus McDowall,; Editing by Mark Trevelyan, Ed Osmond and Peter Graff

 

[Housecarl]

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https://www.yahoo.com/news/afghanistan-double-special-forces-fight-against-taliban-041455204.html

Afghanistan to double special forces in fight against Taliban

Anne CHAON
AFP
September 4, 2017

Commandos armed with RPG-7 rocket launchers aim at a tank hundreds of metres away, fresh recruits to Afghanistan's most skilled fighting force -- an elite group whose growing strength, US generals say, worries the Taliban.

These new members of Afghanistan's Special Operations Command (SOC) will soon be on the frontline of the war that US President Donald Trump has vowed "to win" by putting more American boots on the ground indefinitely.

Camp Morehead, a former Soviet base near Kabul, is one of two training bases where the commandos are drilled by Afghan instructors in a programme overseen by US-led international forces.

"We are hunters, you know. What I'm saying to you is we are killers, we are looking for the bad people to kick them in their arse," one of the commandos, who cannot be identified, told reporters recently at the secondary training base.

While the SOC -- which also includes top special forces -- account for about seven percent of the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces, they have been deployed in nearly 80 percent of offensives and emerged victorious each time, they say -- a claim supported by US and foreign forces.

But as the Taliban gain ground across the country and Islamic State group expands its footprint, there are concerns the fighters are becoming physically exhausted.

"It's true they are tired. They are currently fighting on behalf of the world" against multiple militant groups, said General Dawlat Waziri, spokesman for the defence ministry.

Earlier this year Afghan President Ashraf Ghani ordered a near doubling of their ranks from 17,000 as part of a four-year roadmap that also aims to strengthen Afghanistan's air force.

At Camp Morehead, also previously used by the Taliban as a training ground, commandos are put through several months of training before being sent into battle.

From Kunduz province in the north to Helmand province in the southwest they defend villages threatened by the Taliban and -- their speciality -- launch night raids on insurgent hideouts.

"You better be in good condition. During the week of selection they had to run around with a 25-kilogramme bag and return," said an Afghan sergeant.

- 'Never lose' -

Since US-led NATO troops ended their combat mission in December 2014, Afghan's special forces and commandos have served as a bulwark against attacks launched by the Taliban and other Islamic militant groups.

"The reason why they are so good is because they have been trained by some of the best special forces around the world," said a US general.

"When the special forces are employed they never lose. If we double them that means a significant capability and we know the Taliban are concerned."

The importance of their role in the 16-year war has grown as the embattled Afghan National Army (ANA) is plagued by killings and desertions.

General John Nicholson, the top US commander in Afghanistan, told reporters recently that additional American troops would enhance training of Afghan forces and expand Afghan air and special operations fighters.

"The Taliban cannot win on the battlefield," Nicholson said, expressing confidence in Afghan security forces, even though they are still not ready to fight on their own.

But for now the momentum is with the Taliban.

As of February only about 60 percent of Afghanistan's 407 districts were reported to be under government control, according to the US watchdog agency SIGAR.​

The rest is controlled or contested by the Taliban and other insurgents.

"As their (special operations forces) numbers increase, we will cover more of the country and we can conduct more missions," said Colonel Ahmad Zabihullah, their operational commander.

Waziri remained confident Afghan forces would eventually prevail.

"Can we win this war? Yes, we win this war. Long live Afghanistan," he said.

 

[Housecarl]

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https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/rise-chinas-blue-water-navy-will-pacific-turn-red/

The rise of China’s ‘blue water’ navy: Will the Pacific turn Red?

By Guest Contributor - September 5, 2017

The rise of China as a maritime power was further enhanced by the news that China’s first domestically built aircraft carrier will be transferred from the dry dock of the Dalian shipyard, and will soon undergo trials and be fitted with systems to make her fully operational.

Article by Oliver B. Steward, a Doctoral Candidate in International Security at the University of East Anglia. This article is the opinion of the author and not necessarily that of the UK Defence Journal.

The test of a nation’s strength is its ability to project its power across the oceans, and to become truly a ‘blue water navy’. A definition of a blue water navy is one which can operate globally, in deep waters over open oceans. The term was used by the United Kingdom (a maritime global power) of a ‘blue water navy’ is one possessing maritime expeditionary capabilities globally. This would include moving ships, marines and aircraft to potential hotspots globally if needed.

The undertaking of building a huge aircraft carrier such as China’s Type 001A is a massive undertaking. Requiring expertise in ship design, naval architecture, weapons systems, and naval airpower technology and systems for landing on such a large structure. This is a significant technological step forward for the emerging superpower. But this is also a statement – that the People’s Republic of China wants to achieve global reach and can be a contender for naval dominance.

While the United States still possess at least 10 aircraft carriers, while 19 ships could be technically considered aircraft carriers including amphibious assault ships, President Trump wants to increase the number of ships the US Navy has. It is by no coincidence that President Trump wants to increase the number of surface vessels in light of China’s maritime development. In total, the US Navy objective is to achieve Trump’s target of 355 ships.

However, one cannot help but consider that Trump’s naval build-up will be a massive undertaking, and shipyards across the United States will have to keep up with orders, and it is my opinion that the US will have to recommission some of its ships it has mothballed and bring those back into service. At least in the short term until replacement ships can be found.

So this brings us to China. One can speculate, that its naval build-up in its 10,000 ton Coast Guard cutter, which can be used as a destroyer in times of war is aimed at ensuring sovereignty of its territorial borders. This year, we have witnessed that world’s largest Coast Guard cutter patrol the South China Sea, and has a displacement tonnage of 12,000 tons.

As the diplomat is quoted in saying:

“The China Coast Guard ship outsizes a the U.S. Navy’s Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser by about 50 percent, and is also bigger than an Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer (e.g, the USS Lassen),which displaces around 9,700 tons. In addition, it also outclasses Japan’s 6,500-ton Shikishima-class coast guard cutters.”

What is interesting about this Coast Guard cutter in particular is the heavy armaments it has in comparison to other Chinese Coast Guard ships which have lighter arms, either with light munitions or are just armed with water cannons. In such encounters with other ships, the usual manoeuvre to offset your opponent is the use of ‘ramming’.

We have already seen this in regards to fishing vessels, and other civilian vessels from the People’s Republic of China associated with the so called ‘Naval Militia’ which are small craft that have a paramilitary capability and are state sanctioned by the Communist regime in Beijing.

This means that the Coast Guard Cutter CCG 3901 (12,000 tons), is a formidable force – and if it attempts to ram a ship it could cause considerable amount of damage.

In a show of strength the Chinese are showing its force potential by creating these ‘Monster’ cutters – term used by The Diplomat. Even more astonishing the Chinese Coast Guard have commissioned over a hundred vessels since 2012, and the fleet currently has a total of 220 – 230 vessels.

The People’s Republic of China wants to achieve maritime supremacy either by the use of ‘Monster’ cutters, or by the use of its aircraft carriers, and through its fortifications and airfields on the artificial islands in the disputed South China Sea area. I speculate that in the short to medium term, China will increase its number of ‘monster’ cutters, which can be used as destroyers in times of war, and it will continue to increase its maritime capabilities.

While direct parity with the United States on a maritime military level may not be achievable in the short term; I predict by the 2020s we may see China may be at least in a position to build the same amount of vessels if not create more in its shipyards and be on course to achieve ship-by-ship parity with the US Navy. This will no doubt create security dilemmas for naval planners and military analysts in the Pentagon who no doubt will enact ‘war game’ scenarios to see who will win a war in the region. By improving the basic arithmetic of its fleet, the People Republic of China are increasing its chances of success.

Like the naval arms race before First World War, with the first series of Battleships, we are seeing a new one play out in the Asia – Pacific. China wants to expand its territorial waters, and in doing so, is arming its navy to the teeth with new ships, weaponry, and capabilities.

Not to mention show it has the upper hand when it comes to the disputed territory of Taiwan which could be a flashpoint for a Superpower confrontation (the United States has a treaty guaranteeing it will get militarily involved if Taiwan is invaded).

One thing is for certain, the People’s Republic of China is on the rise and I cannot see its changing trajectory anytime soon.

 

[Housecarl]

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https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/managing-chaos-in-an-era-of-great-power-competition/

MANAGING CHAOS IN AN ERA OF GREAT POWER COMPETITION

AUSTIN LONG, LINDA ROBINSON AND SETH G. JONES
SEPTEMBER 5, 2017

As Washington policymakers seek a new strategic course, we believe there is a growing danger that U.S. national security strategy will focus too much on the conventional aspects of great and regional power competition, neglecting the importance of competition short of armed conflict. Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran all pose both conventional and unconventional threats. Sub-state actors can also pose direct dangers, as the Islamic State has set a new standard for lethality and reach.

The central challenge is that today’s turbulent world does not allow a single strategic focus. Unlike earlier bipolar and unipolar moments in world history, today the United States faces three distinct but significantly interrelated defense and security challenges:

- Renewed competition with great powers, particularly Russia and China. This competition will likely center on the nature of the international order. Russia and China embrace some aspects of the current order but nonetheless seek to alter it significantly through force, coercion, and influence operations.

- Regional challengers, particularly Iran and North Korea. These states lack the ability to shape the international order, but reject America’s role in their region. Iran is equally adept at pursuing its objectives through indirect use of force and influence.

- Chaos within states, which stem in part from the first two challenges but also have many independent causes. Violent sub-state actors, ranging from terrorist organizations to militias to criminal gangs, both feed on and sustain chaos inside states and regions.

Yet U.S. strategy has largely neglected the connection between state-based challenges and that of sub-state actors. The challenges posed by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran have all been highlighted in recent remarks by defense officials, including Secretary of Defense James Mattis. These words have been matched by a variety of deeds, ranging from committing to the modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, to increasing U.S. ground troops in Europe, to shooting down aircraft in the skies over Syria, to conducting freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea.

However, outside of the specific direct threats of the Islamic State and al Qaeda, U.S. policy is showing increasing impatience with the challenge of sub-state actors. This has been most dramatically highlighted by reported heated debate about U.S. posture and strategy in Afghanistan. The president publicly remarked in July that he wanted “to find out why we’ve been there for 17 years.”

The reality is that sub-state challenges cannot simply be downplayed. The boundaries between the challenge of great powers, regional challengers, and sub-state actors are fluid, if they exist at all. Russia, for example, makes great use of sub-state actors — from suborning politicians in Eastern Europe, to arming separatists in Ukraine, to giving haven to criminals in both the physical and virtual world in exchange for their support.

It is worth recalling in this context that successful nuclear and conventional deterrence and containment of the Soviet Union did not end competition. Instead it drove competition into arenas that today would be called the “gray zone” — election rigging, military coup and counter-coup, and sponsoring insurgency, all rife with the use of sub-state actors by both sides. For example, even as Washington refocused on conventional and nuclear deterrence in the mid-1970s, it continued U.S. engagement with sub-state actors in Afghanistan, Angola, Central America, and elsewhere.

While China has not yet shown the same breadth of engagement with sub-state actors as Russia, it is plausible this will change as Chinese ambition becomes more global. The opening of China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti this year may be the first step in this direction, providing a convenient staging area for Chinese engagement with sub-state actors in the Middle East and Africa.

Regional challengers such as Iran make extensive use of sub-state actors. From Hizballah and Hamas to the Popular Mobilization Forces of Iraq and Houthis of Yemen, as well as a veritable Shiite foreign legion drawn from across the broader Middle East, Iran’s strategy is based largely on sub-state actors. Both Iran and North Korea make considerable use of purely criminal groups and, in the case of Iran, even charitable foundations.

Sub-state actors also pose threats by themselves. Some directly target the U.S. homeland, as with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Others target U.S. allies, as Sunni extremists have done in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and elsewhere. Europe has been a major target with attacks in such countries as Spain, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In an era of restricted budgets, every euro spent on domestic anti-terrorism is a euro that could be spent in other ways, including NATO conventional and nuclear deterrence, further highlighting the importance of sub-state threats even in an era of great power competition.

Washington’s response to sub-state actors can also play a role in how states view the United States. While President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines was initially skeptical of the United States and began to shift significantly towards China, U.S. support to the Philippines against Islamic militants in Marawi City on the island of Mindanao seems to have caused him to reassess. In September 2016, he argued publicly that “for as long as we stay with America, we will never have peace in that land,” referring to Mindanao. By July 2017, after U.S. support in the fight for Marawi City, he noted “I cannot enter into military alliances with other nations because I would be violating the US-RP agreement … We stay here with the Americans.” Of course, China also provided substantial emergency arms shipments to the Philippines for the battle (which Duterte also noted).

The foregoing makes clear that U.S. strategy cannot neglect unconventional strategies and tactics, the challenge of sub-state actors, and the chaos these actors spawn. U.S. strategy will likely have to balance the need to address sub-state chaos with the reality of great power competition, fatigue, and limited budgets. With the above in mind, we propose six guidelines for U.S. defense and security strategy to strike the right balance on sub-state chaos:

First, U.S. defense strategy needs to more fully prepare for the possibility of unconventional competition with state adversaries, such as Russia, China, and Iran. This means developing ways to counter the use of sub-state and state actors to expand their power and influence in Europe, Africa, Asia, and even Latin America. While U.S. Special Operations Forces play a critical role in countering sub-state actors like the Islamic State, they can also play an essential role in countering unconventional strategies and tactics by great powers and regional competitors.

Second, U.S. defense strategy must be closely nested within a national interagency approach. Robust military measures to counter these threats are necessary, but they will not be effective if they are not harnessed to capabilities that exist beyond the Department of Defense. While calls for interagency and “whole of government” approaches are a Beltway perennial, the intelligence community, State Department, law enforcement, and Treasury Department must play vital roles if the United States is to successfully rebut advances of peer competitors as well as the sub-state actors who threaten U.S. interests. Adversaries are playing a multifaceted game that must be met with a similarly sophisticated array of measures.

Overreliance on costly military measures are a recipe for draining national coffers without definitive resolution of wide range of threats to U.S. interests. Military operations will likely need to continue in some areas such as the tumultuous Middle East, but unilateral U.S. operations should be just one tool in the toolkit. Russia, China, and other actors heavily invest in nonmilitary means as well. The Islamic State has aspired to state-like and global reach through a similar mix of methods.

Third, strategists could adopt a proactive rather than reactive stance towards the sub-state challenge. New sub-state groups, particularly insurgencies, are typically weak and vulnerable to co-optation or coercion. But many quickly develop robust organizational infrastructure and exploit existing social networks to become powerful and entrenched. Proactive and early engagement can allow the United States to become aware of emerging challenges and deal with them before they gain traction. The military broadly terms such proactive effort “operational preparation of the environment” and it will be vital.

Fourth, strategists could ensure long-term continuity in the individuals and teams managing sub-state actors in different regions and states to leverage the expertise and relationships that will produce results. Much of the ability to manage chaos derives from personal rapport with key individuals and groups along with an understanding of their perspective and history. Continuity, particularly at the operational and tactical level, is therefore crucial.

Fifth, strategists could embrace U.S. allies, partners, and proxies (or surrogates) to do the heavy lifting. Burden-sharing has been a cost-effective approach to international security challenges since World War II, and regional allies were fundamental to stability in the Cold War. The U.S. special operations community uses the term “by, with, and through” as the maxim for this perspective and it has been central to U.S. efforts in Syria and Iraq. Yet this approach has a long history beyond special operations and could be adopted for U.S. efforts against sub-state actors globally. This requires accepting that in many cases U.S. allies, partners, and proxies have their own interests and will not simply adopt U.S. objectives wholesale and without comment.

Sixth, and perhaps most important, strategists should consider that commitments must remain limited and will produce limited (but valuable) results. Most efforts against sub-state actors will require playing for time and “playing for the breaks,” not for an outright or total victory. This is a difficult thing for most Americans to accept and the more limited the commitment the more tolerable it will be. Likewise, even limited commitments add up on a global scale so strategists will likely have to prioritize some regions and assume risk in others.

We conclude with two examples of the kind of proactive and small — but continuous — engagements we think can serve as a model for future engagements. The first is U.S. engagement with Thailand during the Cold War. Thailand became the fulcrum of U.S. foreign and security policy in mainland Southeast Asia in large part due to an alignment of interests between the two states, but also due to careful cultivation of relationships with Thai officials. The Thai became the main ally in the U.S. fight against communist insurgents in Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos.

In the modern context, the U.S. campaign against the Islamic State has prospered on similar relationships with the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service as well as Kurdish Peshmerga in Iraq and Kurdish Popular Protection Units in Syria. U.S. relationships with the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service have remained strong, with U.S. special operations forces remaining engaged for more than decade after helping build the unit after the fall of Saddam Hussein. U.S. relations with the Kurds stretch back even further, with U.S. intelligence community and military personnel working with Kurdish Peshmerga before the 2003 invasion.

None of the above will be simple or easy. Yet as the United States revitalizes its conventional and nuclear deterrence capabilities, it may not have the luxury of ignoring sub-state challenges. A U.S. strategy that incorporates this perspective from the beginning could manage chaos at a reasonable cost.



Austin Long is a senior political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and the author, most recently, of The Soul of Armies: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Military Culture in the US and UK.

Linda Robinson is a senior policy researcher at RAND and the author of One Hundred Victories: Special Ops and the Future of American Warfare.

Seth G. Jones is Director of the International Security and Defense Policy at RAND, an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School for Advanced International Studies, and author, most recently, of Waging Insurgent Warfare: Lessons from the Vietcong to the Islamic State.

 

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http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/0...ram-weapons-export-defense-minister-says.html

MIDDLE EAST

Iran seeking to boost missile program, weapons export, defense minister says

Published September 05, 2017
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Iran is aiming to boost its missile program and export weapons in an attempt to forge allies with neighboring countries, its new defense minister said.

Gen. Amir Atami, who was appointed Iran’s defense minister earlier this month, said in a speech on ISNA News Agency on Saturday the country seeks to arm neighboring allies “to prevent war and conflict,” according to AFP.

"In combat fields, especially in missiles, we have a specific plan to boost Iran's missile power," Hatami said. "God willing, the combat capabilities of Iran's ballistic and cruise missiles will increase in this term.”

He added: "Wherever a country becomes weak, others become encouraged to raid it...Wherever necessary, we will export weapons to increase the security of the region and countries, to prevent wars."

IRAN: OBAMA TRIED TO PLAY NICE AND FAILED. TRUMP SHOULD USE THESE OPTIONS TO TRY TO BRING THE REGIME TO ITS KNEES

Hatami did not specifically name countries it would be supplying weapons to, though Iran has been known to be involved in military conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Israel also see Iran as a threat to the Middle East region. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in August that Iran was “making an escalated effort to base itself militarily in Syria. That presents a danger to Israel.”

"Iran is already in the advanced stages of taking over Iraq and Yemen, and in practice already controls Lebanon," he said.

U.S. State Department announced a fresh round of sanctions in July on 18 Iranian entities and individuals for supporting Iran’s ballistic missile program or military purchases by the nation’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani speaks at a session of parliament before a vote of confidence for his cabinet, in Tehran, Iran, Sunday, Aug. 20, 2017. Iranian lawmakers on Sunday approved 16 Cabinet members nominated by recently re-elected President Hassan Rouhani, including the first defense minister unaffiliated with the elite, hard-line Revolutionary Guard in 25 years. (AP Photo/Vahid Salemi)Expand / Collapse
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani speaks at a session of parliament before a vote of confidence for his cabinet, in Tehran, Iran, Sunday, Aug. 20, 2017. (AP)

Speaking to lawmakers in Parliament, Rouhani threatened to revitalize its nuclear program, though he emphasized he intended to remain loyal to the 2015 nuclear deal brokered during former President Barack Obama’s presidency.

"The U.S. has shown that it is neither a good partner nor a trustable negotiator," Rouhani said. "Those who are trying to go back to the language of threats and sanctions are prisoners of their past hallucinations. They deprive themselves of the advantages of peace."

The Iranian president added, "In an hour and a day, Iran could return to a more advanced [nuclear] level than at the beginning of the negotiations,” predating the 2015 deal.

The Associated Press contributed to this report.

 

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http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/las-pandillas-en-el-salvador-¿un-nuevo-tipo-de-insurgencia

Las Pandillas en El Salvador: ¿Un Nuevo Tipo de Insurgencia?
The Gangs in El Salvador: A New Kind of Insurgency?

by Juan Ricardo Gómez Hecht
Journal Article | September 4, 2017 - 10:19am
San Salvador, August 2017

| …no todos los conflictos armados se pueden categorizar como “guerras”
( ... not all armed conflicts can be categorized as "wars").....(Metz, 2012).

INTRODUCCIÓN

El mundo actual se caracteriza por la emergencia de nuevos actores cuyas actividades se configuran en una seria amenaza a la seguridad nacional de los Estados. La mayoría de países luchan para mantener su integridad política, económica y territorial frente a desafíos de diversos actores no estatales. Estos actores atentan contra la soberanía de los Estados al impedir que se constituyan en la única fuente de autoridad para legislar y hacer cumplir las leyes, así como de hacer valer dentro de su territorio la universalidad de sus decisiones y regular los negocios entre personas.

El fenómeno anteriormente descrito, refleja el fracaso de muchos Estados de satisfacer efectivamente las necesidades y expectativas mínimas de orden, tranquilidad, seguridad y bienestar general de su población. Ante lo expuesto, se puede aseverar, que el problema de seguridad más insidioso que enfrentan los Estados actualmente, se centra en la amenaza a su capacidad para asegurar y controlar su territorio, así como de las acciones de actores no estatales que buscan generar un cambio violento dentro de los Estados mismos (Reed, 2007).

Estos actores no estatales violentos (ANEV) se ven beneficiados por los cambios significativos que caracterizan al mundo contemporáneo y que están alterado la naturaleza del conflicto y el crimen. Los cambios en los ámbitos tecnológicos y organizacionales han permitido aumentar el poder de los ANEV. La revolución de la información les ha permitido ejercer su poder y extender su influencia rápidamente a través de vastas distancias sin limitantes geográficas. Acompañando este acceso y la habilidad para trasladar información por medio de la Internet, telefonía celular y otras tecnologías digitales emergentes, se está dando un cambio de formas jerárquicas de organización a la organización en red (Sullivan, 2000).

La lucha contra los ANEV no es una novedad, a través de la historia, los ejércitos y armadas de los distintos países han pasado más tiempo combatiendo contra el bandolerismo y la piratería que contra cualquier otro tipo de amenaza a la seguridad (Metz, 1993). Actualmente lo interesante resulta ser que algunos de estos ANEV pueden ser categorizados como insurgentes. Éstos, para alcanzar sus objetivos están emprendiendo nuevas formas de insurgencia con el potencial de reconfigurar a los Estados que afectan (Metz, 2012).

El Salvador no es ajeno a esta problemática. En el país se identifican a las pandillas Mara Salvatrucha (MS13) y Barrio 18 como actores no estatales que amenazan la viabilidad del Estado salvadoreño. Este fenómeno debe ser sometido a análisis porque: primero, a través de sus actividades criminales las pandillas generan considerable niveles de violencia, inseguridad e inestabilidad; segundo porque reducen la capacidad efectiva del Estado de controlar segmentos del territorio nacional y; tercero, porque erosionan la legitimidad y soberanía estatal. Además al generar estos efectos perniciosos, las pandillas pueden categorizarse como un nuevo tipo de insurgencia y por tanto, no pueden considerarse más como un fenómeno propio del ámbito de la seguridad pública.

Tradicionalmente, se ha concebido a las pandillas como un problema de seguridad pública y la insurgencia principalmente como una actividad militar. Sin embargo, los movimientos insurgentes y las denominadas pandillas de “tercera generación” están inmersos en un complejo acto político y de guerra política. En estas condiciones, debería la policía y las fuerzas militares proporcionar la seguridad y la tranquilidad personal y colectiva, mientras otras instituciones gubernamentales se incorporan a la lucha contra las causas de la inestabilidad y la guerra política, la injusticia, la represión y la corrupción (Manwaring, 2005). Por lo tanto, es importante determinar si las pandillas en El Salvador representan un nuevo tipo de insurgencia dado que confrontar las nuevas amenazas de seguridad con ideas y estrategias obsoletas o inapropiadas es una receta para el desastre (Metz, 2012). Frente a nuevos tipos de organización, con diferentes estructuras, métodos de operar y objetivos estratégicos se requiere de la formulación de nuevas estrategias y aproximaciones doctrinales (Hoffman, 2007).

En la presente investigación, en relación a la problemática expuesta, se sostiene la siguiente tesis: Las pandillas en El Salvador (MS-13 y Barrio 18) pueden considerarse que son un nuevo tipo de insurgencia criminal que amenaza la viabilidad del Estado salvadoreño al generar inestabilidad en el país, reducir la capacidad estatal de controlar partes del territorio nacional y erosionar la legitimidad y la soberanía nacional, todo con la finalidad de garantizarse la libertad de acción para beneficiarse comercialmente. .......

--

INTRODUCTION

The present world is characterized by the emergence of new actors whose activities constitute a serious threat to the national security of States. Most countries struggle to maintain their political, economic and territorial integrity in the face of the challenges of various non-state actors. These actors violate the sovereignty of States by preventing them from becoming the only source of authority to legislate and enforce laws, as well as enforce the universality of their decisions and regulate business between people within their territory.

The phenomenon described above reflects the failure of many States to effectively meet the minimum needs and expectations of order, peace, security and general well-being of their population. In view of the above, it can be asserted that the most insidious security problem currently faced by States is the threat to their ability to secure and control their territory, as well as the actions of non-state actors seeking to generate change within the States themselves (Reed, 2007).

These violent non-state actors (ANEV) are benefited by the significant changes that characterize the contemporary world and that the nature of conflict and crime are altered. Changes in the technological and organizational domains have allowed to increase the power of the ANEV. The information revolution has allowed them to exert their power and spread their influence rapidly across vast distances without geographical constraints. Accompanying this access and the ability to move information through the Internet, cellular telephony and other emerging digital technologies, there is a shift from hierarchical organizational forms to the networked organization (Sullivan, 2000).

The struggle against the ANEV is not a novelty; throughout history, the armies and armies of the different countries have spent more time fighting against banditry and piracy than against any other type of security threat (Metz, 1993) . At the moment, the interesting thing is that some of these ANEV can be categorized as insurgents. These, in order to achieve their objectives, are undertaking new forms of insurgency with the potential to reconfigure the States that affect them (Metz, 2012).

El Salvador is no stranger to this problem. In the country gangs Mara Salvatrucha (MS13) and Barrio 18 are identified as non-state actors that threaten the viability of the Salvadoran State. This phenomenon must be analyzed because: first, through their criminal activities, gangs generate considerable levels of violence, insecurity and instability; second because they reduce the effective capacity of the State to control segments of the national territory and; third, because they erode state legitimacy and sovereignty. In addition, by generating these pernicious effects, gangs can be categorized as a new type of insurgency and therefore can no longer be considered as a phenomenon of public security.

Traditionally, gangs have been conceived as a public security problem and the insurgency primarily as a military activity. However, insurgent movements and so-called "third generation gangs" are immersed in a complex political act and political war. Under these conditions, police and military forces should provide personal and collective security and tranquility, while other governmental institutions are involved in combating the causes of instability and political warfare, injustice, repression and corruption ( Manwaring, 2005). Therefore, it is important to determine whether gangs in El Salvador represent a new type of insurgency since confronting new security threats with obsolete or inappropriate ideas and strategies is a recipe for disaster (Metz, 2012). In the face of new types of organization, with different structures, methods of operation and strategic objectives, the formulation of new strategies and doctrinal approaches is required (Hoffman, 2007).

In the present investigation, the following thesis is argued: The gangs in El Salvador (MS-13 and Barrio 18) can be considered as a new type of criminal insurgency that threatens the viability of the Salvadoran State in generating instability in the country, reduce the state's ability to control parts of the national territory and erode national legitimacy and sovereignty, all with the aim of guaranteeing freedom of action to benefit commercially. ......

 

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https://qz.com/1069532/brics-is-inadequate-for-xi-jinpings-global-ambitions-he-wants-brics-plus/

“BRICS” is not big enough to capture Xi Jinping’s global ambitions

WRITTEN BY

Zheping Huang
OBSESSION

China's Transition
September 05, 2017

Back in 2001, former Goldman Sachs chief economist Jim O’Neill coined the acronym “BRIC” to refer to the major emerging economy countries of Brazil, Russia, India and China, which, with the addition of South Africa a decade later, were regarded as the next global economic powerhouses.

But with Russia and Brazil struggling in recent years, as O’Neill himself noted, the grouping came to seem outdated (some, of course, were always skeptics). In 2015, Goldman Sachs even shut down its BRICS investment fund after years of losses, marking what Bloomberg called “the end of an era.”

Graph
https://www.theatlas.com/charts/B1hdE3C2x

China’s president Xi Jinping thinks otherwise: rather than dissolving the BRICS, he is calling for an expansion. The Chinese concept of “BRICS Plus,” which was first floated in March, enjoyed a prominent presentation at the ninth BRICS annual summit held this week in Xiamen in southern China. Giving a keynote speech at the Sept. 3 opening ceremony, Xi said:

We should promote the “BRICS Plus” cooperation approach and build an open and diversified network of development partnerships to get more emerging market and developing countries involved in our concerted endeavors for cooperation and mutual benefits.​

“BRICS Plus” is also featured in the joint statement released by BRICS states after the summit concluded, in which they called for greater economic cooperation beyond the five-member bloc, which was first formally established in 2006. In addition, China also invited observer nations including Mexico and Thailand to join discussions about the possible expansion of the BRICS bloc on the sidelines of this year’s summit.

The “BRICS Plus” plan is one of Xi Jinping’s latest attempts to take on a more assertive role on the global stage, as the US turns inward under president Donald Trump’s “America First” policies. At the Davos World Economic Forum meeting at the start of this year, Xi famously rebuked Trump without mentioning his name. Speaking at an international conference attended by the BRICS and observer nations Tuesday (Sept. 5), Xi did that again.

“Some countries have become more inward-looking, and their desire to participate in global development cooperation has decreased,” Xi was quoted by Reuters as saying. He also noted that the Paris climate accord has “met with resistance.” Trump has vowed to pull the US out of the agreement to fight climate change.

Rhetoric aside, Xi announced plans to invest 500 million yuan (about $76 million) to set up an economic and technology cooperation program for BRICS states, and invest another $4 million in the New Development Bank, which was established by the BRICS in 2014 as an alternative to the Western-led World Bank and IMF multilateral organizations. He also pledged to offer $500 million in assistance funds for “South-South cooperation,” a vague, broadly defined term that refers to social and economic exchanges among developing countries.

For Xi, the only problem seems to be that the global commitments are piling up. In May, Xi invited dozens of world leaders to a big forum in Beijing, and touted his trillion-dollar infrastructure spending spree, the “One Belt, One Road (OBOR)” initiative. During the event, Xi pledged $113 billion in extra funding for the the project, which dwarfs his new contributions to the BRICS.

It makes sense given that OBOR is his own pet project.

 

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https://www.yahoo.com/news/poverty-drives-child-soldiers-afghanistans-endless-war-054325180.html

Poverty drives child soldiers into Afghanistan's endless war

Zakria Hashimi
AFP September 6, 2017

The rescue this summer of dozens of Afghan youths destined to be trained as Taliban fighters has spotlighted how entrenched poverty is fuelling a renewable supply of child soldiers to endlessly replenish the insurgents' ranks.

Afghan forces freed almost 40 children during multiple raids near the Pakistani border. Officials said traffickers working with the Taliban had recruited the boys, some as young as four, from poor families by promising to provide them with a religious education.

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In reality they were set to be indoctrinated by hardline mullahs in Pakistan and receive military training to carry out attacks inside war-torn Afghanistan, authorities said.

"Our parents always wanted us to learn Islamic studies but we didn't know that we would be fooled and brainwashed to become suicide bombers," nine-year-old Shafiullah told AFP after being rescued by police.

The use of child soldiers by all sides in the Afghan conflict is well documented, including in pro-government security forces, where the practice of "bacha bazi", or child sex slavery, is said to be institutionalised.

But the incidents this summer in southeastern Ghazni province illustrated a practice the Afghan government and rights groups have long accused the Taliban of: kidnapping children to indoctrinate as fighters at madrassas in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

In a recent speech charting US strategy in Afghanistan, President Donald Trump vowed, among other things, to "dry up" militant recruitment.

But experts say poverty is a significant driving factor, with parents unable to provide for their children delivering them, often unknowingly, into the hands of abusers and extremists.

AFP spoke recently with several of the children rescued at an orphanage in southeastern Ghazni province, where they had been placed as officials tried to track down their parents.

"They talked to my father and he had no objection," said nine-year-old Nabiullah, sobbing as he recalled being taken from his home by recruiters.

- Indoctrination, step by step -

Another child, who told AFP he was eight, said: "Two Taliban came saying they wanted to take us to a madrassa in Quetta. I didn't know more until the men were arrested."

Officials said they had saved the children, most aged between four and 14, from what Mohammad Aref Wahidi, deputy governor of Ghazni, described as "kidnapping gangs" taking them to Pakistan.

The children were "given drugs by their abductors that made them dizzy and confused", provincial police chief Mohammad Mustafa Mayar told AFP, adding that among those freed were 13 youngsters allegedly trained as suicide bombers.

They were later paraded in front of media, with many crying as they stood beside the traffickers.

Afghan elders have denied they intentionally send youngsters to join the Taliban's nearly 16-year insurgency.

"I admit that children are being sent for religious studies in Pakistani madrassas, but I don't think they are trained to become suicide bombers," Haji Mohammad Sharif, a tribal elder from Paktika province which borders Ghazni, told AFP.

The insurgents also deny the claims.

But Afghan authorities routinely report intercepting child soldiers, and Human Rights Watch issued an extensive report on the issue last year, stating that indoctrination begins as young as six.

"According to relatives of boys recruited by the Taliban, by the time they are 13, Taliban-educated children have learned military skills including use of firearms, and the production and deployment of IEDs," the report said.

For Ahmad Shaheer, an expert on Pakistani madrassas at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, poverty is the tinder.

"Many poor families hand over their children to strangers to be trained in Pakistani madrassas because they can't afford to pay for their education," he told AFP.

The HRW report noted the poverty-driven trend has also been increasing at madrassas in Afghanistan, particularly in Kunduz province, and said the Taliban refuses to return children once the parents figure out what is going on.

In June this year officials in Kunduz said they had detained an 11-year-old boy who intended to attack police after being taught at a local madrassa that government forces were a legitimate target as they were either "infidels or serving the infidels".

In his speech last month, Trump said the US was "not nation-building again. We are killing terrorists", and placed responsibility for Afghan society squarely on Afghans.

But absolute poverty in the country is increasing, according to a report issued by the World Bank and the Afghan government in May this year, which said that 39 percent of Afghans are unable to meet their basic needs.

That suggests the trend noted by Shaheer and HRW could continue.

Shaheer estimates that 10,000-20,000 Afghan children have passed through Pakistani religious schools. Once they are cut off from their families the indoctrination begins.

"Life is very hard for them there. They are not given anything to eat and the madrassa becomes like a jail," said Shaheer.

"Step by step they start hating their family... Hatred is fuelled and they feel they have no future in life."

 

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https://www.yahoo.com/news/suspected-al-shabaab-militants-behead-four-northern-kenya-104013933.html

Suspected al Shabaab militants behead four in northern Kenya: official

By Joseph Akwiri, Reuters • September 6, 2017

MOMBASA, Kenya (Reuters) - Suspected militants from the Somalian group al Shabaab beheaded four men in two different attacks in northern Kenya's coastal Lamu County on Wednesday, authorities said, a month after 12 people were killed in similar incidents in the region.

Lamu County Commissioner Gilbert Kitiyo said the attacks took place in Silini-Mashambani and Bobo villages, where about 30 heavily-armed assailants went from house-to-house calling out victims by name before pulling some out and slitting their throats.

"They were dressed in military gear and had AK-47 rifles. They beheaded four men before fleeing into the forest. All the victims are men. Police have already arrived at the scene and taken the bodies to the mortuary," Kitiyo told Reuters by telephone.

He said the attackers surrounded all the victims' houses making it difficult for them to escape.

There was no immediate claim of responsibility but Kitiyo said the attacks bore the hallmarks of al Shabaab.

In August, al Shabaab attackers killed four men in a similar manner while earlier in July, nine men were slaughtered the same way in nearby villages.

After the latest attacks, protesters burned tyres on the roads on Wednesday morning in complaint over insecurity. Riot police to fire teargas and rubber bullets to disperse them.

A government-imposed dusk-to-dawn curfew is in force in the area following past attacks.

The al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab aims to topple Somalia's United Nations-backed government and impose its own strict interpretation of Islam. They have intensified attacks in Kenya since it sent troops into Somalia in 2011.

They have also claimed responsibility for a series of cross-border attacks in recent months, including a spate of roadside bombings targeting security forces.

(Editing by George Obulutsa and Angus MacSwan)

 

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https://www.yahoo.com/news/china-brushes-off-vietnam-protests-over-south-china-084600030.html

China brushes off Vietnam protests over South China Sea drills

Reuters • September 6, 2017

HANOI (Reuters) - China on Wednesday dismissed Vietnamese condemnation of its military live-fire exercises in the disputed South China Sea, saying it was acting within its sovereign rights.

China conducted the drills around the Paracel Islands, which Vietnam claims, prompting Vietnam to say it would "resolutely protect" its "legitimate rights' through peaceful means.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang told a regular briefing that China had done nothing wrong.

"We hope the relevant side can regard the drills calmly and reasonably," he said, without elaborating.

China claims nearly all the South China Sea, through which an estimated $3 trillion in international trade passes each year. Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan also have claims.

Tension between China and neighboring Vietnam is at its highest in three years over the disputed waters.

Vietnam suspended oil drilling in offshore waters that are also claimed by China in July under pressure from Beijing.

China has appeared uneasy at Vietnam's efforts to rally Southeast Asian countries over the South China Sea as well as at its growing defense relationships with the United States, Japan and India.

(Reporting by Mai Nguyen; Additional reporting by Christian Shepherd in Beijing; Editing by Nick Macfie)

 

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https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/pre-emptive-thinking-pre-emptive-strikes/

Pre-emptive thinking about pre-emptive strikes

6 Sep 2017|Jeffrey Robertson

Articles discussing pre-emptive strikes on North Korea are now everywhere. Based on a small number of in-depth analytical studies, they detail military challenges, human costs and likely outcomes. While those articles prepare us for the short term, they ignore the potential long-term strategic change that would result from a conflict on the Korean peninsula.

We’ve seen this before in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Articles discussed the military challenges, human costs and likely outcomes. But the conflict ultimately upset the delicate regional balance of power and led to an outbreak of suppressed identity conflicts, dispersion of military know-how, and an uncontrolled spread in disruptive ideologies. Those effects weren’t unforeseen, but rather ignored in the rush to war.

Before anything happens in Korea, we should be aware of the speculative long-term strategic implications of a pre-emptive strike.

First, conflict on the Korean peninsula could result in a momentous change in China’s role in the region and ultimately the globe. That could range from absolute regional dominance to collapse and disintegration into internal instability.

Regardless of the outcome of the conflict, South Korea could reject a self-interested, value-less, America-first approach to the region and choose to accept China’s dominance as the price to be paid for unification. For most South Koreans, China’s current steady position of reiterating the need for de-escalation, multilateral dialogue, and ultimately denuclearisation—essentially, diplomacy—stands in stark contrast to the incoherence and fecklessness of Donald Trump’s bluster. Throughout history, when China was weak, external states or greater independence came to the Korean peninsula. When China was strong, the Korean peninsula fell under its influence. It was from this point that China’s regional influence grew. China’s dominance on the Korean peninsula could again be a launching pad for dominance in East Asia.

Alternatively, unification could spread dissatisfaction and opposition to authoritarian rule across the region, leading to internal instability in China. Political disruption, economic dislocation and descent into instability are possible outcomes. Even in the most favourable unification scenario, North Koreans with direct or indirect experience of the momentous human rights abuses that China implicitly supported could act as a powerful constraint to China’s long-term influence in a unified Korea. China’s current policies aimed at maintaining the status quo are founded on the fears of such potential outcomes. Regardless of which way the dice fall, China’s regional role will change. A pre-emptive strike in Korea would precipitate that change.

Second, conflict on the Korean peninsula could exacerbate trends in US isolationism. The potential scale of conflict on the Korean peninsula, the uncertainty, and an unavoidable lack of public support in yet another war of questionable merit could exacerbate current trends towards isolationism that have been growing in the US—trends that arguably brought about the election of Trump. Isolationism inherently accepts that major powers have a right to influence their immediate regions. Conflict on the Korean peninsula thus has implications for Taiwan, Hong Kong, the South China Sea, Southeast Asia and India, as well as for peripheral regions to which a major power conflict would ultimately move.

Third, conflict on the Korean peninsula could result in an unbalanced and contested region. Sudden unification of North and South Korea would produce a single state with potentially divided loyalties and a population of around 75 million. A unified Korea would be within the range of major second-tier developed states, such as Germany (80 million), France (66 million) and the United Kingdom (64 million). An often-cited report by Goldman Sachs projects a unified Korean economy to surpass France’s, Germany’s and even Japan’s within 30 to 40 years. The stability of the entire region would depend on the direction in which a unified Korea turns.

For 60 years, division along the 38th parallel stabilised the external struggle to influence the Korean peninsula. Sudden unification could again lead to an ongoing struggle—and potentially a major power conflict—to influence the Korean peninsula. The struggles of external states to influence the Korean peninsula caused the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), the Russo-Japanese War (1905–05), the Korean War (1950–53) and numerous other historical conflicts on the peninsula. While the final result may be unknown, an unbalanced and contested region is a certainty.

All long-term assessments are inherently speculative and based on assumptions that may or may not pan out. But it pays to speculate when the costs are so high. Creativity in analysis is essential. Who would have thought that the Iraq invasion would have led to today’s Middle East and North Africa, as well as regional refugee crises and global terrorist threats? In hindsight, removing a known rogue to replace it with an unknown, unbalanced and contested region wasn’t good policy—and still isn’t.

As part of the region, and a country that has benefited substantially from prolonged stability and American dominance in East Asia, Australia, along with other regional middle powers, has a vested interest in avoiding such outcomes. Any discussion of a potential US pre-emptive strike should also include the speculative long-term economic, political and strategic implications.

AUTHOR
Jeffrey Robertson is a visiting fellow at the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy at the Australian National University and assistant professor at Yonsei University in South Korea. He is the author of Diplomatic style and foreign policy: a case study of South Korea (Palgrave, 2016). Image courtesy of Flickr user włodi.

 

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http://observer.com/2017/09/iran-missile-defense-system-bavar-373/

OPINION

With World Distracted by North Korea, Iran Amasses New Weaponry

By Micah Halpern • 09/06/17 6:00am

While all eyes are on North Korea, Iran is advancing its weapons technology. The country recently tested and announced the success of their new Bavar 373 long range, mobile, anti-missile defense system. Everything in the system is manufactured in Iran; it requires no support from outside sources.

Iran developed the Bavar 373 in response to sanctions slapped on the country in 2010. When it became clear to Iranian leadership that Russia would not be able to deliver the S-300 long range mobile missile defense system they had requested, Iran took the bull by the horns and made its own. At the same time, Iran took Russia to the World Court for breach of contract, arguing that they paid for the weapons in full and Russia failed to deliver the goods.

Iran understood that they needed to improve their anti-missile system. The Bavar 373 is almost an exact replica of the S-300. By the time the sanctions against Iran were lifted in March 2015 and Russia was able to deliver the rest of the S-300 order, Iran was nearly finished with its project. Iranians decided to use the Russian S-300 in addition to their own Bavar 373.

For Iranians, Bavar 373 also has religious significance. Bavar means “believe” in Farsi, the Persian language, and 373 is the numerical value of Mohammed’s name in Arabic, known as Abjad. Abjadiyah means alphabet in Arabic. Like in all ancient languages, Arabic letters correspond to numbers. In Hebrew, this is called Gematria.

The Bavar 373 will be operational in March 2018. By that time, the Russian S-300, which was first produced in 1978, will be outdated and irrelevant. Its systems are poor, its programming is slow, and it does not readjust quickly or well. The Russians’ new version, the S-400, rectified all those problems.

Israel is carefully watching Iran develop its military arsenal. They did not raise the flag when Russia resumed delivering S-300s. They did not go public with their displeasure when the Bavar 373 was introduced. This atypical behavior can be explained by one thing: Israel has found a way to game the S-300. Gaming military systems is not a new sport for Israel. They did it on September 7, 2007, when they successfully attacked the Syrian nuclear plant.

The operators of the Russian anti-missile systems saw a single plane on their screen, then a dozen, and then a swarm. Next thing they knew, their entire screen was covered with Israeli aircraft. The operators assumed it was a malfunction. It didn’t dawn on them that it was an attack that would render the atomic plant unusable.

Interestingly, though Iran has been vocal about the Bavar 373, the Western world has shown little interest. Russian news, Israeli news and Iranian news covered it. These countries all have obvious stake in the game. Additionally, Pakistani press, some British outlets, and serious military sites like Jane’s covered it. For Iran, this is perfect. They will interpret this as a green light to proceed.

Iran is not violating the nuclear deal by creating these weapons. During the embargo, it was forbidden to sell weapons to Iran. Now, after the deal, they are severely limited in their nuclear, biological and chemical weapons production. However, the Bavar 373, like the S-300, is a defensive weapon. Iran is not prohibited from creating these weapons, and there is no law against importing or exporting them to Iran.

Iran understands that North Korea has unintentionally given them the best present they could ask for: They have diverted the world’s attention. Because the world is preoccupied with North Korea, Iran can move ahead, unchallenged and unchecked. And that is exactly what it will do.

Micah Halpern is a political and foreign affairs commentator, author the “The Micah Report,” and host of the weekly TV show “Thinking Out Loud w Micah Halpern.” Follow him on twitter: @MicahHalpern

SEE ALSO: Trump’s Full-Court Press Is Squeezing the Nukes Out of North Korea

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/201...ry-mobilization-zapad/140747/?oref=d-topstory

Russia Has 100K Troops On the Move. Here’s Why NATO Can’t Do the Same

BY ELISABETH BRAW
READ BIO
SEPTEMBER 5, 2017

From mismatched rail lines to red tape, a host of obstacles show why NATO needs its own version of Russia's upcoming Zapad 2017 exercise.

Richard Barrons knows how to move large amounts of military equipment around continental Europe. When he served in Germany as a young British officer in the 1980s, NATO forces worked steadily to hone the skills of theater-wide deployment.

“There were major reinforcement exercises to bring troops from the UK and the U.S. across the continent to the West German border with East Germany,” recalls Barrons, the British Army general who led the UK’s Joint Forces Command before stepping down last year. “We trundled down West German autobahns at 15 kilometers an hour in a vast convoy of armored vehicles. And we had to keep within four hours of our bases to maintain a high level of readiness, which was also regularly exercised without warning.” Such pains were as necessary as they were onerous, he said. “Moving large forces requires a great deal of skill and can only be learned and tested by actually doing it.”

And should the many militaries of a multinational force fail to properly coordinate the transport of troops, arms, and gear from farflung locations over civilian roads and railways, the battle can be lost before it has started.

An exercise involving exactly such large geographical maneuvers is currently getting underway in Russia. Under the name Zapad (“West”), an estimated 100,000 troops will spend the third week of September practicing to defend their western frontier. NATO’s Baltic members worry that the exercises are a rehearsal for invasion, and whether that’s right or not, the alliance is long past due to restart Zapad-type exercises of its own.

For the past couple of decades, NATO has focused on out-of-area missions while giving short shrift to the defense of Europe. The United States has been closing bases in Germany; France withdrew its last forces in 2014, and Britain will do so within the next several years. The alliance’s newest members have not been required to update their infrastructure to support a theater-wide war effort.

To be sure, NATO has a rapid-reaction force that could quickly come to the aid of one of its members, but the alliance would struggle to mobilize and move the larger forces required to repel any serious attack. For the past couple of years, Gen. Ben Hodges, the commander of the U.S. Army in Europe, has visited European capitals with slides that show the alliance’s logistical gaps. One shows the 1987 edition of NATO’s Reforger exercise, in which 115,000 troops from six militaries (and their equipment) travelled up to 600 kilometers by road, rail, or air to reach their mock battlefronts. Another slide shows how the alliance’s multinational defense-of-Europe exercises have dwindled to a fraction of their former size.

Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea was a wakeup call of sorts. Last year, NATO held its largest exercise since the Cold War, gathering some 30,000 troops from 24 countries to Poland for ten days of war games. Yet a broad NATO mobilization would face many obstacles. Some member states still require many days before providing diplomatic clearance – essentially, entry permission – to NATO troops. Several countries have railheads that don’t support the heavy equipment used by the U.S. and other allies, and some countries’ roads don’t support that equipment. Baltic railroads even use a different rail gauge than their NATO allies. More fundamentally, there’s no plan to deal with any of this.

“Today there’s no consensus among the 28 [NATO members] about what the plan should be for the defense of the alliance,” said Barrons. “There is no NATO general deployment plan, so in the heat of the moment you’d have to figure one out as you needed to get moving. Without planning and regular training at scale, we’d end up with massive traffic jams. By contrast, the Russians do practice, and they do so as a single entity.”

The alliance, then, needs its own Zapad. “In light of the volatility of current relations with Russia, the magnitude of Russian forces, and the geographic advantages those forces have in proximity to potential points of conflict compared to the alliance’s main fighting forces, it’s high time for NATO to start testing its readiness for large-scale, rapidly breaking contingencies,” said Ian Brzezinski, a deputy assistant secretary of defense under George W. Bush. “That was a main purpose of the Reforger exercises during the Cold War. Today we need similar exercises but ones that also test, refine, exercise and demonstrate the ability of European allies to rapidly deploy to the alliance’s Eastern front.”

Given that Russia never stopped holding its Soviet-era Zapad exercises, a similar NATO effort could hardly be portrayed as escalation. What’s more, it would allow the Western alliance to address the gaps that have chewed away at its territorial defense capabilities over the past couple of decades. “Even before the capabilities are all in hand, NATO needs to wargame the reinforcement challenge in a scenario of an escalating large-scale, multi-domain conflict with Russia with multiple fronts, for example the Baltics and the Black Sea,” says Alexander Vershbow, who was until last year NATO’s Deputy Secretary-General. “While a lot of this can be done through simulations and CPXs, both the forces and the political authorities in NATO capitals need to be stress-tested as well.”

Planned major exercises would also be an impetus for member states to improve their roads, railheads, and diplomatic clearance procedures. Equally importantly, they would have to make sure their armed forces were capable of exercises involving divisions rather than platoons. Exercises do, of course, involve expense. But with all NATO’s member states having committed to raise their defense spending to 2 percent of GDP, exercises defending the continent seem a sensible way to spend some of that money.

Large exercises are about more than logistics; they are about credibility. It’s long past time to repair the logistical and organizational foundations that support NATO’s cornerstone promise to come to any member’s defense. Even if the U.S. is unlikely grow its European military force back to Cold War strengths, it should push for NATO Zapads.

Elisabeth Braw is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. She lives in London and frequently writes about European security for publications including the Wall Street Journal, Foreign Affairs, and The Times (of London). FULL BIO

 

[northern watch]

Charles Lister‏Verified account @Charles_Lister · 39m39 minutes ago

#Israel has destroyed #Syria's Al-Tala'i facility - linked to SSRC chemical weapons program - in air strikes east of #Masyaf, #Hama tonight.

 

[northern watch]

Intel Crabþ @IntelCrab · 55m55 minutes ago

#Israel has launched multiple airstrikes on a regime-run scientific research center in #Hama, #Syria.

 

[northern watch]

Strategic Sentinel‏Verified account @StratSentinel · 1h1 hour ago

Strategic Sentinel Retweeted F. Jeffery

#BREAKING: Israel reportedly launches multiple airstrikes on Syrian Govt. & Hezbollah Forces at Altalai Research Center - alleged CW plant

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.afp.com/en/news/23/israel-hits-syria-site-reportedly-used-chemical-weapons

News
Israel hits Syria site reportedly used for chemical weapons

AFP/File / JALAA MAREY
7SEP2017

Israeli jets have frequently targeted government-held positions in Syria, including on the Golan Heights as pictured here on June 25, 2017
Syria's army accused Israeli warplanes of hitting one of its positions Thursday, killing two people in an attack that a monitor said targeted a site where the regime allegedly produces chemical weapons.

The site near the Syrian town of Masyaf, between the central city of Hama and a port used by the Russian navy, is reportedly used by forces from Syria's allies Iran and the Lebanese Shiite militia Hezbollah.

Israel has previously carried out strikes believed to be targeting the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah, which fought a devastating war with the Jewish state in 2006.

Thursday's strike hit a training camp and a branch of the Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), an institution that Washington has accused of helping develop the sarin gas used in a deadly attack on the Syrian town of Khan Sheikhun in April.


AFP/File / Mohamed al-Bakour
A Syrian child receives treatment following a chemical attack in Khan Sheikhun on April 4, 2017

President Bashar al-Assad's government has blasted such accusations as "fabrications," and Syria's army on Thursday did not mention the SSRC in its statement on the Israeli strikes.

"Israeli warplanes at 2:42 am today fired a number of missiles from Lebanese air space, targeting one of our military positions near Masyaf, which led to material damage and the deaths of two members of the site," the statement said.

"Syria's army warns of the serious repercussions of such acts of aggression on the security and stability of the region," it added.

The British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights monitoring group said the strikes hit the SSRC, though it could not confirm what weaponry is produced there.

"There are Iranian experts using the research centre there. Hezbollah also uses the facility," said Observatory head Rami Abdel Rahman.

"The research centre was definitely damaged in the strikes. There is a huge fire emanating from a weapons warehouse where missiles were being stored," he added.

- 'Produces chemical weapons' -

Israel has long warned it would not allow the transfer of sophisticated weaponry to Hezbollah and has accused the group's sponsor Iran of building sites to produce "precision-guided missiles" in both Syria and Lebanon.

"Iran is busy turning Syria into a base of military entrenchment," Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said last month.

Israeli officials declined to comment on the raids on Thursday.

Syria's foreign ministry in messages to the United Nations secretary general and the Security Council accused Israel of "protecting terrorists" by carrying out the strikes, state media reported.

"It is unacceptable that the Security Council has not yet taken any action to end these attacks," it added.

Former Israeli military intelligence head Amos Yadlin said the site "produces the chemical weapons and barrel bombs that have killed thousands of Syrian civilians".

He stopped short of saying Israel had carried out the raids, but said that if it did, the action would show "Israel intends to enforce its redlines despite the fact that the great powers are ignoring them".

And Israel's former national security advisor Yaakov Amidror described the facility as a key centre for the research and development of arms including chemical weapons.

He said Israel had made it clear that "we will not allow Iran and Hezbollah to build the capabilities which allow them to attack Israel from Syria."

"And we will not allow them to build the capabilities of Hezbollah under the chaotic umbrella of Syria."

He said there should be an "assumption" that Syria would respond militarily.

Earlier this week, Israel's military began a massive exercise simulating conflict with Hezbollah, the largest drill in nearly two decades.

Hezbollah is a key ally of Assad's regime, and its fighters battle alongside the Syrian army.

Syria's government claims it no longer possesses chemical weapons after a 2013 agreement under which it pledged to surrender its chemical arsenal, following a chemical weapons attack outside the capital.

But in 2016, a UN-led investigative body said the Syrian government was behind at least three chemical attacks in northern Syria in the previous two years.

And on Wednesday, United Nations war crimes investigators announced they had an "extensive body of information" indicating Syrian warplanes were behind the deadly April 4 attack on Khan Sheikhun.

A fact-finding mission by the UN's chemical watchdog, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), concluded earlier this year that sarin gas was used in the attack but did not assign blame.

The attack killed at least 87 people, according to the Observatory, and prompted the United States to launch a cruise missile strike on a Syrian military airport where it said the attack had originated.

Weeks later, the US sanctioned 271 Syrian chemists and other officials affiliated with the SSRC, which it said was behind the Syrian government's efforts to develop chemical weapons.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.voanews.com/a/france-turns-to-armed-drones-in-fight-against-sahel-militants/4016980.html

France Turns to Armed Drones in Fight Against Sahel Militants

September 05, 2017 10:04 PM
Reuters

TOULON, FRANCE —
France has decided to arm its surveillance drones in West Africa as part of counter-terrorism operations against Islamist militants, Defense Minister Florence Parly said on Tuesday.

French President Emmanuel Macron has made fighting Islamist militants his primary foreign policy objective and the move to armed drones fits into a more aggressive policy at a time when it looks increasingly unlikely Paris will be able to withdraw from the region in the medium to long-term.

France has six Reapers

France currently has five unarmed Reaper reconnaissance drones positioned in Niger's capital Niamey to support its 4,000-strong Barkhane counter-terrorism operation in Africa, and one in France.

“Beyond our borders, the enemy is more furtive, more mobile, disappears into the vast Sahel desert and dissimulates himself amidst the civilian population,” Parly said in a speech to the military.

“Facing this, we cannot remain static. Our methods and equipment must adapt. It is with this in mind that I have decided to launch the process to arm our intelligence and surveillance drones.”

A further six of 12 Reaper drones, built by U.S. firm General Atomics and ordered after France's 2013 intervention in Mali to eventually replace its EADS-made Harfang drones, are due to be delivered by 2019.

The defence ministry said on Tuesday the new drones would be delivered with Hellfire missiles while the existing six would be armed by 2020, possibly with European munitions.

Civilian casualties a concern

Previous French administrations have shied away from purchasing armed drones, fearing a possible increase in civilian casualties.

Al-Qaida's north African wing AQIM and related Islamist groups were largely confined to the Sahara desert until they hijacked a rebellion by ethnic Tuareg separatists in Mali in 2012, and then swept south.

French forces intervened the following year to prevent them taking Mali's capital, Bamako, but they have since gradually expanded their reach across the region, launching high-profile attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast, as well as much more frequent, smaller attacks on military targets.

Armed drones offer quick response

At the end of July, at the military base in Niger, officers and pilots had told Reuters it was imperative to arm the drones to be more efficient and quick in tackling jihadist groups.

“In the future, armed drones will enable us to accompany surveillance ... with the capacity to strike at the opportune moment. We will be able to gain in efficiency and limit the risk of collateral damage," Parly said.

France is also working with Germany, Italy and Spain to develop a European drone, which is expected to be ready by 2025.

 

[northern watch]

Gregor Peter‏ @L0gg0l · Sep 6

Iran closes airspace to U.S and Saudi aircraft amid speculation of a huge announcement coming out of Riyadh soon

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm......

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://thebulletin.org/militant-groups-have-drones-now-what11089

COLUMNISTS
7 SEPTEMBER 2017

Militant groups have drones. Now what?

Perry World House

Militant groups have a new way to wage war: drone attacks from above. As recent news reports and online videos suggest, organizations like the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have used commercially-available uninhabited aerial vehicles—better known as UAVs or drones—to drop explosives onto their adversaries in the battle for territory.

That ISIS would weaponize drones shouldn’t be surprising. Militant groups often use the latest consumer technology to make up for capability gaps and level the fight against regular military forces. ISIS broadcasts propaganda through social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook, and plans attacks using encrypted communication platforms like Telegram. This embrace of innovation extends to the way militant groups use military force. Over the last year or so, they have begun to use modified commercial drones for offensive strikes in Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine. These new tools of war provide a way to conduct terror attacks against civilians, and can also pose a threat to ground forces. Stopping drone proliferation is not an option because of the ubiquity of the technology. That means government forces will have to learn to counter drones operated by militant groups, just as they are now training to counter drones used by national militaries.

Already a “daunting” threat. The threat posed by militant groups flying drones is as much about where the threat is coming from—the sky—as it is about the munitions being launched. Militaries fighting militant groups have enjoyed air superiority for decades. US soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, have rarely, if ever, feared attacks from the air. Civilians and humanitarian groups in Syria worry about air strikes from Assad’s regime, but not from militant groups like ISIS. The adoption of drones by militant groups is therefore generating a novel challenge. Speaking at a conference in May, Gen. Raymond Thomas, head of the US Special Operations Command, called commercial drones the “most daunting problem” his troops had faced over the previous year. At one point, he said, the anti-ISIS campaign “nearly came to a screeching halt, where literally over 24 hours there were 70 drones in the air.”

Militant groups using modified commercial drones can threaten militaries in more ways than one. In addition to dropping munitions on unsuspecting soldiers, they can strap explosives to drones to generate devastating effects. For example, militants can crash an explosive-laden drone into a target, creating a sort of MacGyvered cruise missile. Alternatively, militants can booby-trap drones. In one case, Kurdish fighters trying to examine a grounded drone died when it exploded. In Ukraine, Russian-backed separatists use drones to target military infrastructure and cause immense damage. For instance, they used a commercial drone to drop a Russian-made thermite hand grenade on an ammunition depot in Eastern Ukraine, causing an inferno and close to $1 billion in damage. Put simply, commercial drones are enabling militant groups to engage in a more diverse array of missions to advance their goals against militarily superior forces.

To be sure, this threat is unlikely to influence any major military power’s ability to win a war. However, even if commercial drones do not ultimately spell victory for militant groups, they can still have military significance. Consider militant groups’ use of improvised explosive devices, also known as IEDs. During the 2000s, IEDs fundamentally shaped the battlefield in Iraq and Afghanistan. There, IEDs caused about 59 percent of all US casualties—8,680 in total, including deaths and injuries—between 2009 and 2011. Moreover, IEDs undermined US counterinsurgency strategy by forcing soldiers into hulking mine-resistant vehicles, protecting soldiers at the cost of close civilian contact, which US strategy suggested was necessary to win hearts and minds. Responding to the IED threat has required billions of dollars in spending, with uncertain impact.

To be clear, commercial drones and IEDs are not the same—one is a platform and the other is a munition, and drones rely more on repurposing technology available to the retail market. But there are similarities as well. First, both technologies are inexpensive, especially compared to the cost of defending ground forces against them. Second, both technologies can be modified in various ways, placing the onus on the defender to adapt to the various configurations militant groups might construct. These two features make both jury-rigged drones and IEDs a concern for any armed force facing a militarily inferior adversary.

Drone wars of the near future. One worrisome potential source of growing drone capacity might seem benevolent at first: the commercial sector itself. As commercially available technology develops at a rapid pace, the variety of military applications is increasing as well. Goldman Sachs recently estimated that between 2016 and 2020, buyers will spend about $100 billion on drones. Defense spending by militaries will account for about $70 billion of that total, but the remaining $30 billion will be made up by consumers, businesses, and civilian government bodies buying commercially-available products.

Within the drone market, the sensor component segment is forecasted to grow the fastest. Sensors can perform a variety of functions, such as transmitting images or detecting heat signatures. Sensors are built for commercial purposes like search-and-rescue operations and crop analysis, but can also be adapted for military purposes. For example, today it is easy to acquire infrared cameras adapted for use on UAVs. It is plausible to imagine a near future in which militant groups program short- or medium-range drones equipped with these sensors to seek and destroy anything with a heat signature. Furthermore, as the drone market grows, more shapes and sizes will become available for purchase. As drones get both bigger and smaller, the variety of military applications expands. Bigger drones can carry larger payloads; for militant groups, this means dropping larger munitions. On the flipside, smaller drones are harder to detect. Militant groups can use them to their advantage by striking targets with minimal warning.

Advances in autonomous systems that enable coordinated behaviors—such as swarming—could also increase the lethality of commercial drones. Swarming robotics lets multiple drones coordinate to achieve a desired behavior, such as turning in formation or attacking a target simultaneously. The US military is testing swarm principles to conduct aerial surveillance, and there are potential applications for strike missions. Commercially, swarm robotics technology has a number of promising applications, from detecting cancer (using swarming nanoparticles) to finding rescue victims. As swarming robotics is mastered and brought to market, the potential applications for militant groups are numerous. For example, militant groups could use the technology to more comprehensively surveil large portions of the battlefield, or attack targets in bombing raids.

Beyond the dangers posed by the creative use of commercially-available technology, military-grade drones may also further spread to militant groups. This has already happened in some places: In the 2000s, Lebanon-based Hezbollah acquired Iranian drones. Considered one of the most operationally effective militant groups in the world, Hezbollah uses Iranian-made drones to surveil Israeli targets. In 2004 and 2006, Israeli fighter jets shot down an Iranian-made Mirsad-1 UAV. And in 2012, an Iranian-made drone operated by Hezbollah managed to invade Israeli airspace and capture images of sensitive nuclear facilities before being shot down. These cases highlight the proliferation of reconnaissance drones. But more countries, including Iran, also now have armed drones, meaning that these, too, could spread more widely. Iran is the most worrisome source of drone proliferation, but other countries seeking to advance their national interests could theoretically deliver drones into the hands of militant groups—for example, it would not be surprising to see Russia export military-grade drones to Ukrainian separatists.

While hardware spreads to militant groups, the transmission of tactical and operational knowledge can also increase their ability to effectively use drones. Whether through training, partnerships with other groups, or mimicry, knowledge will spread. During the Iraq War, Iran’s Quds Force provided Shiite militias with a special IED called an “explosively formed penetrator” and trained them in its use, to devastating effect. Militant groups can also act as sources of information and training to one another in the effective use of crude technologies. Even though ISIS’ territory is decreasing, its soldiers might not be done fighting. There is little reason to believe that the knowledge culled from battle in Iraq and Syria will be lost, especially when considering the historical propensity of jihadi militant forces to jump from conflict zone to conflict zone—from Afghanistan to Chechnya to the Levant and beyond—as well as their current stated desire to continue the fight elsewhere. It seems likely that militant groups’ deadliest “best practices” will endure and spread between battlefields.

What to do. As drones grow in significance on the battlefield, policy makers are thinking about how to effectively counter the threat. Commercial drones are readily accessible and easily purchased, making it nearly impossible to stem the flow of cheap drones into the hands of militant groups. Moreover, targeting the* experts who can jury-rig simple drones might soon be irrelevant as well. As advanced technologies—like swarming robotics—are mastered and more artificial intelligence is built into even simple commercial systems, “plug and fly” could become the norm for many types of operations. The market will pre-package and directly provide the technical knowledge militant groups need to augment their drones’ capabilities. The engineering skill a particular group needs to effectively use drones will decline. In short, it is not possible to prevent militant groups from getting and using drones. That means nations trying to thwart this threat should focus on defeating it militarily, in particular by detecting, neutralizing, and mitigating the effects of drones in militant hands.

Currently, countries and businesses around the world are grappling with how to best address the challenge in a variety of ways. In Japan, the Tokyo police are using drones equipped with nets to stop potentially hostile drones. The French military and Dutch police are breeding golden eagles to destroy small drones. For its part, the US military tested a “drone-killing laser” and solicited proposals for other solutions to counter unmanned aerial systems. The private sector is developing devices that hack other drones mid-flight, “guns” that jam electromagnetic waves and disrupt enemies’ ability to control their own drones, and compressed-gas-powered launchers that capture targets in a net. To be sure, the Tokyo and Dutch police are unlikely to face off against militant groups, but progress countering drones in one domain is potentially transferable to others. That is why a collective effort by law enforcement, the military, and private sector actors is necessary to mitigate the threat of modified commercial drones used by militant groups or others. It is too early to determine which anti-drone technologies are most promising. However, given the rate at which new drones are entering production, and the many ways militant groups can adapt them for battle, governments should relentlessly pursue any promising lead.

Commercial drones are here to stay—in backyards and battlefields, in the hands of militants and militaries, conducting both surveillance and air strikes. While the advantage belongs to the aggressor in this domain, militaries have good options for addressing the threat.

This column is by Itai Barsade (@ItaiBarsade) and Michael C. Horowitz (@mchorowitz). Barsade is a research fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House, where Horowitz is a professor of political science and associate director.

 

[northern watch]

Egypt to host war games with US after 8-year hiatus

By Samy Magdy, Associated Press
CAIRO September 5, 2017, 3:02 PM ET

Egypt will host war games with U.S. troops this month for the first time in eight years, but the American contingent will be much smaller than in previous exercises, officials said Tuesday.

Army Spokesman Col. Tamer el-Rifai said the 10-day military exercises, known as "Bright Star," would begin September 10 and include anti-terrorism training.

"Operation Bright Star is among the most important joint American-Egyptian exercises as they reflect the depth of relations," el-Rifai said in the statement. He gave no further details.

The bi-annual exercises date back to 1981, but the Obama administration postponed them in 2011, following the uprising that toppled longtime President Hosni Mubarak, and scrapped them in 2013, after Egyptian security forces killed hundreds of protesters while breaking up a mass sit-in.

U.S. President Donald Trump has praised Egypt as a key ally against terrorism, but last month the United States cut or delayed some $300 million in military and economic aid over human rights concerns.

Maj. Adrian J. Rankine-Galloway, a Pentagon spokesman, confirmed the exercises, saying "approximately 200" U.S. forces would participate.

That's a much smaller contingent than in previous years, when thousands of forces took part in the exercises. In 1999, the drill included more than 70,000 troops from 11 countries.

"We have worked closely with our Egyptian partners to ensure the timing and circumstances were right to conduct this valuable exercise," Rankine-Galloway said. "This has been an important series of exercises since 1981, and it's a good thing for our military-to-military relationship to return to Bright Star again."


Associated Press writer Robert Burns in Washington contributed to this report.

http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/egypt-host-war-games-us-year-hiatus-49628359

 

[Housecarl]

Well we all knew this was coming eventually.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20170908/k10011132341000.html

(Autotranslated from Japanese...HC)

Liberal Democratic Party Mr. Kawai Mid-range ballistic missiles, etc.

September 8 20: 10

Liberal Democratic Party's Prime Minister, former Assistant Secretary Kawai, said the reporters within the National Assembly, saying that the security environment surrounding Japan has changed greatly over the situation in North Korea, middle-range ballistic missiles such as the SDF The idea that we should consider holding possession of it is shown.
Among them, former Prime Minister Kawai's aide over the circumstances of North Korea said, "North Korea and China are supposed to have about 200 medium-range ballistic missiles, but the US currently holds one Not to mention the SDF, of course, in the tension areas of the world, both sides have the same degree of missiles and are building a relationship to deter each other. "

In addition, Mr. Kawai said, "We should face the reality that the security environment surrounding Japan has shifted to a phase that is definitely different from the past.In order to protect Japan's peace and prosperity, the SDF's mid-range ballistic missiles and cruise I personally think that it came time to seriously consider holding missiles. "