WAR 08-18-2018-to-08-24-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

(334) 07-28-2018-to-08-03-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...8-03-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(335) 08-04-2018-to-08-10-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...8-10-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(336) 08-11-2018-to-08-17-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...8-17-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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There are reports that both the Turks and the Iranians are giving aid to Boko Haram....

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https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2018/08/18/boko-harams-unending-capacity-to-wreak-havoc/

Boko Haram’s Unending Capacity to Wreak Havoc

August 18, 2018 5:07 am

The embarrassing invasion of a military base in Garunda, Mobar Local Government Area of Borno State, by Boko Haram 13 days ago is a confirmation that the terrorists still have the capacity to wreak havoc anywhere and anytime they so desire. All the talks that they had been decapitated are mere propaganda. Heavily armed Boko Haram members, riding in trucks stormed and looted weapons and vehicles from the Garunda military base. During the attack, at least 17 soldiers were feared killed while unspecified number of soldiers is yet to be accounted for. It is pertinent to state that this is the third attack on a military base by Boko Haram in the last five weeks.

Last month, Boko Haram ambushed a military convoy in Bama, Borno State. In the ensuing fight, scores of soldiers from the 21 Brigade and some Civilian JTF members were feared killed. Military authorities also confirmed the Bama attack but the casualty number is hazy.

Also, on July 14, the terrorists attacked a military base in Jilli village, Geidam, Yobe State, killing dozens of soldiers, with many others injured. Boko Haram simplyoverwhelmed men of the 81 Division Forward Brigade located in the village. Military authorities confirmed the attack on the base in Jilli but as usual, did not give a death toll. They only said that the “troops reorganised and successfully repelled the attack and that normalcy had since returned to the area.” This strange, impervious method negates global best practices for military operations. Nigerians may never find out the number of soldiers killed in the Garunda, Jilli and Bama attacks. Besides, it is perturbing that the military are the ones doing the repelling instead of attacking the terrorists.

Globally, military bases are fortresses. They are supposed to be impenetrable. But the reverse is the case in Nigeria where Boko Haram strolls into military bases and slaughter our ill-equipped and ill-motivated soldiers. This is unacceptable. A very recent confirmation that soldiers on the war front are not motivated could be seen in the protest at Maiduguri Airport by aggrieved soldiers who claimed they had overstayed and resisted redeployment to Marte, one of the towns exposed to Boko Haram attacks.

The protesters are part of the special force deployed to provide air defence and enhance security at the airport. The distressed soldiers barricaded some sections of the airport and fired shots in the air, causing pandemonium, as passengers scampered for safety. One of the soldiers said the planned deployment was against the directives by the Army Headquarters.

That aside, we are persistently confronted by the hypocrisy, ineptitude and corruption dominating the war against Boko under the Buhari administration. The peak of this recklessness was the wild celebration of a fantasy victory over the terrorists in December 2016. A former US Ambassador to Nigeria, John Campbell, was apt when he stated that the Nigerian government had not been transparent about Boko Haram war and that the terror group still had the capacity to operate freely in the country. Evidently, this government is stupidly running away from the fact that the terrorists are still roaming unhindered in many communities in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states. Our gallant soldiers are willing to fight, but they are ill-equipped and ill-motivated.

Just as I remarked in an earlier article, the Buhari administration must show greater commitment to this war against Boko Haram by first sacking Tukur Buratai and other service chiefs. He must retire those in the top hierarchy of this war and appoint fresh hands, so that we can have fresh ideas. The managers of this war have obviously failed our gallant soldiers. Our war commanders have become businessmen. This is why military posts are regularly attacked by Boko Haram.

Additional challenge Nigeria is facing in this war against Boko Haram is that most of those managing the war don’t want it to end. These heartless people are profiting immensely from the blood of our gallant soldiers and that of innocent Nigerians. This is why soldiers on the war front are cruelly denied operation allowances, ill-equipped and ill-motivated. As long as the war is on, there will be more money for these coldblooded war managers. This is the truth that must be told about this war.

I have persistently clamoured for the return of mercenaries. We all saw their impact when they were briefly used by the Jonathan administration. Buhari came and unwisely sacked them. This country must employ the best fighters from anywhere in the world to end this trauma called Boko Haram. The ultimate aim is to genuinely decapitate Boko Haram.

We are yet to see the impact of the $1 billion war chest Buhari gave the military. This money ought to have been used to hire the best mercenaries from Israel, South Africa and Russia. These mercenaries would have stormed the North-east with highly sophisticated war manpower and war machines. Any leader that is genuinely interested in ending the Boko Haram madness must look in this direction. If our President is patriotic enough to take this decision, within few months, Boko Haram will become history.


ETA: Here we go...http://johnbatchelorshow.com/schedules/friday-17-august-2018

Friday 17 August 2018 / Hour 1, Block D: Gregory Copley, editor & publisher, Defense and Foreign Affairs; in re: Nigeria: Corruption in the Villa, presidential offices. Murders. Turkey supplying Boko Haram in northern Nigeria. Players think they can go on stealing, at massive scale, forever without collapsing the state. Fighting over plunder in Abuja. Boko Haram, spreading from the Northeast to across the north. Supplies from Sudan. Nigerian mil: food money stolen by the central govt, so soldiers are extremely dispirited. Many solders dying in fighting, Leadership highly corrupt. Nigerian Defense Intell Agy, now in close contact with US DIA, is rogue.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://thehill.com/opinion/international/401680-the-long-shadow-of-osama-bin-laden-haunts-us

The long shadow of Osama bin Laden haunts us

By Seth J. Frantzman, opinion contributor — 08/17/18 11:00 AM EDT
156 Comments
The views expressed by contributors are their own and not the view of The Hill

“Just when I thought I was out, they pull me back in,” shouts Al Pacino in his role as The Godfather in the third part of the series by the same name. It felt like this when Osama Bin Laden’s mother spoke in an interview published in early August. Not only is she still proud of her son but it turns out that bin Laden’s son, Hamza bin Laden, is on the warpath, seeking revenge for the death of his father in a 2011 U.S. raid in Pakistan.

“When we thought everyone was over this, the next thing I knew was Hamza saying I am going to avenge my father,” Hassan al-Attas, the half brother of Osama, told The Guardian. Hamza is the son of Khairah Sabar, one of bin Laden’s wives who was living with the arch terrorist when he was killed. Hamza is still connected to the al Qaeda leadership and may have crossed from Iran into Afghanistan. So, 17 years after 9/11 another bin Laden may be in Afghanistan among the chaos of forces there, including Islamic State and Taliban fighters, seeking to lay claim to the terror brand.

The story of the bin Ladens today reads more like the “The Godfather” than it does like the story of more modern offshoots of jihadist terrorism, such as Islamic State’s genocidal predations in Iraq and Syria, or the mass kidnapping of young women and bombing of mosques by Boko Haram in Nigeria. Reading back over the events leading up to 9/11, and afterward, conjures up a different, more innocent world. In the recent interview, Alia Ghanem, bin Laden’s mother, says she wasn’t reared as a traditional Muslim. She was born in Latakia, the heartland of the Alawite sect that is loosely related to Shi’ite Islam. (Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is from an Alawite family.)

Alawites have been victims of Islamist attacks. Ghanem moved to Saudi Arabia in the 1950s and gave birth to Osama in 1957. In a family photo from the 1970s in Sweden, family members look like The Beatles more than the stereotype of Saudi Arabia’s conservatism. Osama married a cousin, Najwa Ghanem, also from Latakia, Syria. That means the women in his early life were influenced by the secularism of Syria, not conservative Sunni Islamic views.

Our understanding of the fountainhead of bin Laden’s extremism, and by extension al Qaeda and its offspring, often is slanted by a desire to see them as purists expressing a fundamentalist version of Islamist extremism. The reality — revealed in the new interview and other records — is more complex. Osama bin Laden was an engineering student; engineering provided the background for many of those who turned to jihadist views in the 1970s and 1980s. His turning point, Ghanem says, came at the university where a member of the Muslim Brotherhood began to influence him.

The rest is history. He joined the mujahideen in Afghanistan; fought the Soviets; conspired against the United States; was expelled from Saudi Arabia in 1991; set up camp there and in Sudan; and fled to Pakistan, where he was killed.

Why does this matter today? Because terror groups don’t operate in a vacuum. Just as bin Laden was influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, which waged terror campaigns in Egypt, Syria and other places in the 1970s to 1990s, today’s jihadist terror groups such as ISIS and Boko Haram emerged from the chaotic aftermath of 9/11, influenced by bin Laden. They didn’t arise solely because of poverty or religious devotion; they emerged, more so, from the wealth and privilege, and even secularized background, of people such as bin Laden. A new documentary on al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia in the early 2000s, “Path of Blood,” shows spoiled teenagers thinking that terror is “cool,” not people who are suppressed and resort to terror.

Bin Laden’s al Qaeda still exists. It has been 20 years since the bombings of U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya by al Qaeda in 1998. Its successors, such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) now have influenced a network of groups across the Sahel in Africa, the band of desert and bush that forms the border between North Africa and Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad. The United States is fighting a shadow war there, helping local governments train to fight terror.

Recently, Washington sent armed drones to help fight the extremists.

In Yemen, where bin Laden-era al Qaeda carried out the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is fighting alongside government forces against Houthi rebels. A recent report claimed they were even working with a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia, and that the United States had refrained from using drone strikes against them. In Syria, the extremist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is an offshoot of al Qaeda and runs most of Idlib province, where it is fighting the Assad regime. As in the murky conflict in Yemen, where friends and enemies coexist, Turkey (ostensibly a NATO ally) has been accused of ignoring the role of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and even allowing its convoys to be escorted by the extremists.

The continued existence of these networks shows that almost two decades of war on terror hasn’t defeated the group. It may be even bigger today than in 2001, and its ability to move between terrorism and working with Western allies has allowed it to maintain itself. The question is whether its offshoots in Syria and Yemen are finished with terrorism and have matured, like players in “The Godfather.”

Seth J. Frantzman spent three years in Iraq and other countries in the region researching the war on terror and Islamic State. He is executive director of the Middle East Center for Reporting and Analysis. A former assistant professor of American Studies at Al-Quds University, he covers the Middle East for The Jerusalem Post and is a writing fellow at the Middle East Forum. He is writing a book on the state of the region after ISIS. Follow him on Twitter @sfrantzman.

 

[Housecarl]

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https://www.longwarjournal.org/arch...adly-raid-on-military-base-near-lake-chad.php

Islamic State releases photos from deadly raid on military base near Lake Chad

By Caleb Weiss | August 17th, 2018 | weiss.caleb2@gmail.com | @Weissenberg7

Yesterday, the Islamic State West Africa (ISWA) released photos from last week’s raid on the Garunda military base in northeastern Nigeria in the Lake Chad region. At least 17 Nigerian soldiers were killed in the assault, which saw the militants temporarily control the base.

Last week, Nigerian officials acknowledged the raid and confirmed the high number of casualties in the attack. The Islamic State’s photos confirms that the militants did overrun the base before withdrawing with captured weapons and vehicles. ISWA claims to have battled African Union troops, however, local reporting has only indicated Nigerian troops as being present in Garunda.

The deadly raid is only the latest in a series of recent attacks on military bases committed by ISWA in northern Nigeria. On July 18, the jihadists stormed the base at Jilli on the border between Nigeria’s Borno and Yobe states. Disguised as Nigerian soldiers, ISWA militants were able to kill dozens of troops. Of the 730 Nigerian troops stationed at the base at the time, over 600 were unaccounted for after the assault according to US officials.

On July 26, another military base, this time near Borno’s capital of Maiduguri, was targeted by the jihadist group. According to local sources, ISWA used 30 armed vehicles to briefly overrun the base. One day before, several Nigerian soldiers were killed and nearly two dozen went missing after their convoy was subjected to an ambush near Bama. However, some sources have pinned that attack on the Abubakar Shekau-led Boko Haram.

Shekau’s group is also thought to be behind the July 22 strike on a village in the Lake Chad region near Niger. At least 18 people were killed and 10 girls were kidnapped during the assault. This faction has used at least 379 women and girls as suicide bombers, according to data compiled by FDD’s Long War Journal.

While neither Shekau’s faction nor ISWA controls the territory it once did as a unified force, both factions continue to remain a threat to both Nigerian security forces and the civilian populations in northern Nigeria. The recent assaults on several military bases serve as further evidence for the continual threat of jihadist violence in northeastern Nigeria. Moreover, both also remain a threat to regional security as security forces and civilians have been targeted in several neighboring countries as well.

Photos released by the Islamic State showing its assault on the Garunda military base:

(See gallery at web site...HC)

Caleb Weiss is a contributor to FDD's Long War Journal.

 

[Housecarl]

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https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/worl...-pilots-in-mideast/ar-BBM4G0r?ocid=spartanntp

Laser Beam Attacks Bedevil U.S. Military Pilots in Mideast

Gordon Lubold
1 hr ago

WASHINGTON—Hostile forces in the Middle East are targeting American pilots with laser pointers at a growing rate, imperiling aircrews and reflecting a problem more widespread and longstanding than the Pentagon has previously acknowledged.

American pilots operating in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, the three most prominent conflict zones for American troops, experienced most of the more than 350 lasing incidents reported over the last seven months by aircrews operating across the Middle East, officials at U.S. Air Forces Central Command in Qatar said.

That is a significant increase from the approximately 400 lasing incidents reported for the region during all of 2017, according to officials, and marks an upswing after a decline in recent years.

Lasing attacks appear to be an easy way for enemy combatants to harass and try to distract military pilots, both in planes and helicopters.

The rate of lasing incidents so far this year is on track to top the roughly 600 incidents reported in 2016 and match 2015, when there were a total of about 700 incidents in the Middle East, according to officials. The numbers of lasing incidents had not been previously disclosed.

The Pentagon earlier this year acknowledged a spate of attacks in two other regions. Several incidents occurred in and around an American base in Djibouti in east Africa, where laser beams appeared to come from a nearby Chinese base. A handful of incidents took place in the East China Sea, where U.S. pilots were hit by laser beams that may have come from Chinese personnel or from fishermen operating in the area, according to U.S. military officials. China has denied involvement in the incidents.

Those incidents accounted for comparatively fewer attacks than in the Middle East. The number of incidents may be related to the frequency of U.S. military aircraft operations, officials said. Flight operations against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and against the Taliban in Afghanistan have grown more intense in recent years.

Hostile forces typically point small, hand-held lasers at pilots in flight, especially during landings when they are most visible from the ground, in an attempt to distract them, officials said. Such lasing could result in an accident, though officials said there haven’t been any mishaps as a result of lasing. It is unknown how coordinated or organized the attacks are: officials declined to discuss specific details about the perpetrators.

The attacks against military crews have resulted in minor injuries, including short-term vision impairment and headaches, military officials said. Officials said they were not aware of any permanent injuries resulting from the attacks, most of which occurred near major population centers or military air bases in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan.

“Lasing attacks are dangerous and have the potential to confuse, temporarily interfere with the vision of our aircrew, or to permanently damage the eyesight of our service members,” said Capt. Bill Urban, a U.S. Central Command spokesman, in an email. Central Command is responsible for U.S. military operations in the Middle East.

In many cases, American aircrews take off and land aircraft in places that aren’t accessible to enemy forces, but lasers are a relatively cheap and available weapon used to harass aircrews from afar, even thousands of feet away, officials said.

“It is exceedingly difficult to pinpoint the origin of a short laser engagement, so we can’t definitively source most laser attacks,” Capt. Urban said. “We assess that many likely come from insurgents and terrorist organizations like [Islamic State], al Qaeda and others.”

Lasing attacks have long been a nuisance for commercial pilots.

The Federal Aviation Administration reports thousands of lasing incidents each year, which can range from individuals using small “cat lasers,” or in some cases, more powerful “military grade” lasers.

The FAA reported more than 2,800 lasing incidents in the first six months of 2018, about on par with the more than 2,700 reported incidents between January and June 2017.

Since 2004, there have been at least 55,000 lasing incidents reported by civilian pilots including in the U.S., United Kingdom, Australia, Italy and Canada, said Patrick Murphy, a laser expert and editor of laserpointersafety.com, an educational site that tracks the misuse of consumer-type lasers.

Of those, he said, “there are no documented or proven cases of permanent case of eye injury,” Mr. Murphy said.

But aiming lasers at pilots raises a number of concerns, including “flash blindness,” which can be produced by a small, hand-held laser as far away as a mile, Mr. Murphy said. Lasers can also cause pilots to experience vision-blocking glare up to 5 miles away, he said. The bigger worry is about distraction, targeting an aircrew as it attempts to land a plane.

Laser pointers range widely in power and capability. They include “cat lasers,” marketed primarily for digital presentations and playing with pets, which nonetheless can be used as a visual distraction up to 2 miles away. Larger hand-held lasers, known as “class four” devices, are more powerful and are capable of causing eye damage or even skin burns if used at very close range.

The most damaging laser pointers are green, because the eye sees the color green as the brightest, Mr. Murphy said.

Military officials avoid discussing what they are doing to mitigate against lasing attacks. Mr. Murphy said one of the main things pilots can do is get educated about attacks by lasers, including using them inside flight simulators.

Pilots can train to manage laser attacks, and can use laser glare-protection glasses that can diminish the lasers as a distraction. Commercial firms also offer glare-resistant screens that may help reduce the effects of a laser beam.

Write to Gordon Lubold at Gordon.Lubold@wsj.com

 

[Housecarl]

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http://smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/russia-not-americas-near-peer-threat

Russia is Not America’s Near-Peer Threat

J. Robert Kane
Sat, 08/18/2018 - 12:39am

The U.S. Government has described Russia as a “near-peer” threat. [1] Information warfare by the GRU (Russian military intelligence) seen most prominently in the 2016 Presidential Election has brought fear to the consideration of Russian capabilities and intentions. [2] Russian paramilitary occupation of Crimea in 2014 has brought worry of Russian aggression in Eastern Europe, in particularly the Balkan states. [3] Stated aggression from Russian political as well as diplomatic figures has given the U.S. reason to consider Russia as a threat to the U.S. and the larger world order that has remained in place since the end of the Cold War. [4]

More notably, the U.S. military has re-orientated its efforts to countering and deterring Russia abroad. [5] While American counterintelligence and law enforcement has focused on information warfare from Russian assets both abroad and in country, the military has re-shaped its training and deployment to reflect near-peer armed conflict in Europe. Commanders have lost sight of counterinsurgency (COIN) theory and counterterrorism, replacing it with understanding the Russian way of war. [6]

With exception from certain Special Operations Force (SOF) and specialized intelligence units, the U.S. military doctrine on war has been diverted from counterterrorism operations to countering that of a near-peer threat. [7] By examining U.S. Government allocation of resources and preparation for the future, one would think that the next armed conflict will take place in Eastern Europe against Russia and the threat is imminent. [8]

The problem with this logic that has been adapted by the military is that the potential for armed conflict with Russia is only theoretical at this point. It is not happening. [9] Conventional U.S. forces are being deployed to the Baltic states in order to deter Russian aggression but no conflict is on the horizon at this time. It is possible, although unlikely even at that. But when considering where America’s threats lie, there is no conflict at the moment in this capacity. [10]

As the U.S. military trains for potential land-based operations with Russia that resemble something from many decades past, all indications suggest that armed conflict of this sort is only suggestable in fiction. No indications suggest that Russia will engage in land operations against the U.S. or N.A.T.O. head on. The closest that Russia will get to that would be paramilitary or special purpose forces that invade a Baltic country in order to immediately seize territorial control and then withdraw to be replaced by information warfare complemented by coup-like elements in order to maintain the aggression’s initiative. From the Kremlin’s intentions, it is very unlikely that Russia is interested in a decisive action. Their capabilities are just no match for what would be deployed through coalition forces in N.A.T.O. Rather, Russian interests seem to be more interested in monitoring signs of instability in Eastern Europe in order to launch information warfare campaigns in the targeted countries so that they may gain and spread influence. That is not armed conflict and it surely does not fit into the land-based operations narrative that the military is preparing for.

By the time that U.S. and N.A.T.O. forces arrive to the country in question, any semblance of Russian military action would be long gone. It takes an incredible amount of time to mount a military operation in the first place and that would only be irrelevant when Russian actions would take place in such a short amount of time that it would leave little to no possibility with direct action with N.A.T.O. as the U.S. military prepares unrealistically for force-to-force conflict.

Despite the U.S. military’s preparation for armed conflict with Russia, efforts to combat Russian information warfare are dismal. As depicted in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, Russia is plainly good at conducting misinformation campaigns in such a way as to really exert influence. And this is not new. Look no further than the idea that the AIDS virus was created in a U.S. Army medical research laboratory. That was a KGB misinformation campaign. Russia is continuing to do things like this now and there is a greater threat from Russian bots and social media engineering to conduct information warfare than conventional military action ever will be.

While armed conflict with Russia is not an immediate concern now, it should not even be a foremost concern in the near future. In contrast to popular opinion in the military, Russia is not our near-peer. Military leaders may refer to Russia as a near-peer threat because it warrants importance to the case of Russian hostility and threat of war. [11] But that is only so because it makes the situation seem important to the U.S. military in terms of what it can look forward to in the future. It is important to remember that the military functions by fighting our nation’s present wars and preparing for the future. The military is doing the second portion in the case of Russia but is making the situation sound much more dire than it actually is. [12]

The fact is that Russia is not our near-peer. The only thing near-peer about Russia as an adversary is the fact that the country possesses a conventional army. [13] I know that is something that many of our warfighters have never seen before having only been subject to the realities of the Global War on Terror but it is not something that is novel in the course of our country’s existence. [14] If every country that is antagonistic to the U.S. and possesses a conventional army is “near-peer,” then we would be in a on the verge of a cold war with the majority of the world. [15]

But that is not the case. What determines whether or not a country can be considered near-peer to the U.S. involves the said country’s capabilities. [16] Many confuse capabilities and intentions as indicators of near-peer threat assessment but a country’s intentions are irrelevant when it comes to assessing near-peer capabilities. [17]

Capabilities and intentions are mutually exclusive in this regard. [18] That is why many in our government, and military especially, refer to Russia as a near-peer threat because open-source information would indicate that the country harbors hostile intentions toward the U.S.

It is true that intentions are very important to monitor as they give indication of future potential of threat. Intentions provide the other side the ability to understand what the enemy is thinking, assess their course of action and plan for the enemy strike radius. But unlike capabilities, intentions do not provide indication of what the country in question is capable of. A country may possess very hostile intentions but without adequate capability, the hostile country is relatively benign as far as a threat can be. [19]

Where this is untrue, however, is in the case of state-sponsored terrorism. Nation-states that do not possess reachable capabilities to the U.S. can sponsor terrorist outfits in order to asymmetrically reach U.S. interests and targets without having much military reach. [20] Once used effectively by Libya, state-sponsored terrorism is now used most extensively by Iran. [21] No indications support that Russia has resorted to state-sponsored terrorism. Even if Russia did, conventional deterrence measures would have no effect against it.

We should primarily be concerned with Russian capabilities as such. If we can understand and assess Russian capabilities, we can determine the Russian threat. Fortunately, we know a fair amount about Russian capabilities. The Russians even know a fair amount about our own capabilities and that is actually a good thing because it plays into how the Russians will behave. [22]

The most comprehensive open-source, unclassified assessment of Russian capabilities and intentions can be found in the 2017 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) unclassified report on Russian Military Power. [23] While more classified intelligence that is not available for public consumption can aid decision-makers in acting according to the Russian threat in national security decisions, this DIA report provides a sound framework of general Russian capabilities.

The intelligence estimate provides indication of Russian intention in saying that Russia possess great power aspirations and is seeking to build a military that reflects that. The Russian intent is portrayed as hostile and ambitious. [24] Without a doubt, the Russians seek to advance themselves to the point of becoming a near-peer adversary of the U.S.

However, Russian capabilities are not portrayed as grave as their intentions. Their military relies heavily conscription which is known to be a serious hindrance to affect personnel-driven operations. [25] They simply do not have the personnel power that the U.S. does. The soldier of Russia and the soldier of the U.S. cannot be compared in any functional way. The Russians fight in a way that makes it virtually impossible to counter an all-volunteer, professionally-trained force such as is the case for the U.S.

Much of their equipment remains from the Soviet Union. [26] While they attempt to modernize their technical capabilities, they are behind that of their Western counterparts to such an extent that they would prefer to hide that fact because it represents an embarrassment. It hinders their aspiration for global influence because many of their capabilities are from a bygone era.

Their nuclear capabilities are the only thing that comes close to U.S. capabilities. [27] Since the Cold War, Russia has developed nuclear capabilities to an extent that is worrying and should be monitored extensively. Again, the situation is not as dire as the U.S. military has portrayed it to be. No first-strike capability like that was sought in Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis has been achieved. Moreover, Russian nuclear capabilities serve as a deterrent in the same way that the U.S. maintains nuclear capabilities to serve in a deterrence capacity. Capabilities and intentions are so distant in this regard that most fail to recognize it.

When it comes to competing via military might with the U.S. in the present moment, intelligence would indicate that Russia does not possess much of a chance. Russian capabilities are presently underwhelming in comparison to that of the U.S. While that does provide assurance that Russia is not a near-peer threat at the present moment, it does not underscore the reality of Russian intentions. The Kremlin possesses great ambitions for the country in attaining augmented military power. [28] There is no doubt about that. This will be a point where U.S. intelligence will have to constantly monitor Russia as it makes its climb in terms of military power that will eventually be equated to national prestige. [29]

At the moment, however, Russia does not represent a near-peer threat. It represents a threat, more generally. But so do many other countries and non-state actors. It can be effectively argued that some of these other threats are more dangerous at the present time as they are active threats against the U.S. and American interests. [30] Terrorism is one of these threats that has been discounted as of late. [31]

Meanwhile, counterterrorism operations are on the back burner. Conventional military units are not working to counter violent extremism like they were over the course of the past 15 years. [32] Direct action has no role in conventional military operations at the present moment because all conventional resources and doctrine has pivoted to deterring Russian aggression as opposed to executing the very needed operations against terrorism and insurgencies that are not only ongoing but are getting worse. [33] Only SOF and intelligence units are being applied to direct action counterterrorism operations. As such, a comprehensive strategy to terrorism is impossible to execute. [34] Moreover, such SOF units are being derailed from their original areas of focus and misused to only execute counterterrorism operations. [35]

If all of the conventional military forces of the U.S. are diverted to deterring Russian aggression as a principal concern because of the existence of a near-peer threat, then our country’s resources will not be allocated or used effectively. [36] Because this has been the trend in the U.S. military as of late, SOF are being triaged to handled counterterrorism operations to the point of being overburdened and plainly misused. [37] Upon the inception of SOF, these specially designed units were known to have the potential of being misused. [38] The founders and early pioneers of SOF knew this and warned military leaders of it. [39] That misuse is occurring now and it is hurting the national security of the nation.

Russia represents a threat to our national security. But it does not represent a near-peer threat. The sooner we understand that and orient our national security to reflect it, the safer our nation will be. With striking parallels to the lead up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Russia is being treated as a political issue as opposed to what is really the case. Intelligence that may have some reality is being politicized in order to fit a political agenda and that is what landed the U.S. in a war with Iraq that it did not have to be in. The conflated Russian threat only gives Putin a better hand in the game of geopolitical poker in a way that he only wishes to appear larger and more powerful than he really is. Falsely making Russia out to be a near-peer threat does that for Putin. Meanwhile, this confuses our allies and diverts our focus from greater issues. Certain non-state actors and terrorist groups pose a greater threat to U.S. national security than does Russia. Accordingly, they should receive the attention that they deserve.

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.

End Notes

[1] Galeotti, Mark. "Hybrid, ambiguous, and non-linear? How new is Russia’s ‘new way of war’?" Small Wars & Insurgencies 27, no. 2 (2016): 282-301.

[2] Inkster, Nigel. "Information warfare and the US presidential election." Survival 58, no. 5 (2016): 23-32.

[3] Bukkvoll, Tor. "Russian special operations forces in Crimea and Donbas." Parameters 46, no. 2 (2016): 13.

[4] Sauer, Tom. "The Origins of the Ukraine Crisis and the Need for Collective Security between Russia and the West." Global Policy 8, no. 1 (2017): 82-91.

[5] Metz, Steven. "Has the United States lost the ability to fight a major war?." Parameters 45, no. 2 (2015): 7.

[6] Sanders, Andrew. "The US National Military Strategy." PADECEME 10, no. 19 (2017): 37-47.

[7] Byman, Daniel, and Ian A. Merritt. "The New American Way of War: Special Operations Forces in the War on Terrorism." The Washington Quarterly 41, no. 2 (2018): 79-93.

[8] Osborn, Kris. "The U.S. Army Has Big Plans If a War with Russia or China Ever Went Down." The National Interest, May 1, 2017.

[9] Chivvis, Christopher S. "Understanding Russian “Hybrid Warfare”." The RAND Corporation (2017): 2-4.

[10] Fink, Anya Loukianova. "The Evolving Russian Concept of Strategic Deterrence: Risks and Responses." Arms Control Today 47, no. 6 (2017): 14.

[11] Popescu, Nicu. "Hybrid tactics: neither new nor only Russian." EUISS Issue Alert 4 (2015).

[12] Colby, Elbridge, and Jonathan Solomon. "Facing Russia: conventional defence and deterrence in Europe." Survival 57, no. 6 (2015): 21-50.

[13] Sutyagin, Igor, and Justin Bronk. Russia’s New Ground Forces: Capabilities, Limitations and Implications for International Security. Routledge, 2017.

[14] Johnson, David Eugene. The Challenges of the" now" and Their Implications for the US Army. RAND Corporation, 2016.

[15] Mearsheimer, John. Conventional Deterrence (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs). Cornell University Press, 2017.

[16] Yarhi-Milo, Keren. Knowing the adversary: leaders, intelligence, and assessment of intentions in international relations. Princeton University Press, 2014.

[17] Kent, Sherman. Strategic intelligence for American world policy. Vol. 2377. Princeton University Press, 2015.

[18] Pecht, Eyal, and Asher Tishler. "The value of military intelligence." Defence and Peace Economics 26, no. 2 (2015): 179-211.

[19] Liwång, Hans, Marika Ericson, and Martin Bang. "An examination of the implementation of risk-based approaches in military operations." Journal of military studies 5, no. 2 (2014): 38-64.

[20] Berkowitz, Jeremy M. "Delegating Terror: Principal–Agent Based Decision Making in State Sponsorship of Terrorism." International Interactions 44, no. 4 (2018): 709-748.

[21] Collins, Stephen D. "State‐Sponsored Terrorism: In Decline, Yet Still a Potent Threat." Politics & Policy 42, no. 1 (2014): 131-159.

[22] Chilton, Kevin P. "On US Nuclear Deterrence." Strategic Studies Quarterly 11, no. 4 (2017): 2-14.

[23] Report from Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA): “Russia Military Power 2017.”

[24] Ibid., 46.

[25] Ibid., 11, 58.

[26] Ibid., 31.

[27] Ibid., 44.

[28] Blank, Stephen J. "Imperial ambitions: Russia's military buildup." World Affairs (2015): 67-75.

[29] DIA: “Russia Military Power 2017,” 31.

[30] Boot, Max. "More small wars: counterinsurgency is here to stay." Foreign Affairs 93 (2014): 5.

[31] Kosnik, Mark E. "The military response to terrorism." In United States Military History 1865 to the Present Day, pp. 111-137. Routledge, 2017.

[32] Robinson, Bruce H. "Blood Year: The Unraveling of Western Counterterrorism." Hein (2017): 43.

[33] Byman, Daniel. "Beyond Counterterrorism." Foreign Affairs 94 (2015): 11.

[34] Shamir, Eitan, and Eyal Ben-Ari. "The rise of special operations forces: Generalized specialization, boundary spanning and military autonomy." Journal of Strategic Studies41, no. 3 (2018): 335-371.

[35] Zenko, Micah. "Donald Trump is pushing America’s Special Forces past the breaking point." Foreign Policy 1 (2017).

[36] Johnson, David Eugene. The Challenges of the" now" and Their Implications for the US Army. RAND Corporation, 2016.

[37] Campbell, Jason H., Richard Girven, Ben Connable, Jonah Blank, Raphael S. Cohen, Larry Hanauer, William Young, Linda Robinson, and Sean Mann. Implications of The Security Cooperation Office Transition in Afghanistan For Special Operations Forces: An Abbreviated Report of the Study's Primary Findings. No. RR-1201. RAND Corporation Santa Monica United States, 2017.

[38] Spulak Jr, Robert G. A theory of special operations: the origin, qualities, and use of SOF. No. JSOU-R-07-7. Sandia National Labs Albuquerque NM, 2007.

[39] Winters, Edward G., and Kent A. Paro. The Misuse of Special Operations Forces. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1994.



Categories: Russia
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About the Author(s)
J. Robert Kane
J. Robert Kane studies intelligence and terrorism. He is an intelligence officer and researcher who has worked on Middle Eastern targets. In addition to research funded by the U.S. Government, he has conducted studies at New York University, Northwestern University and the University of Chicago. He can be found on Twitter at @jrobertkane.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm....You've got to wonder what 5 brigades of Gurkas with a looser ROE could do in comparison to the Afghan SF units...

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/erik-p...tize-forces-not-under-consideration-nsc-says/

Erik Prince's proposal to privatize Afghanistan war not under consideration, NSC says

By GRACE SEGERS CBS NEWS August 17, 2018, 3:18 PM

A spokesperson for the National Security Council responded to a proposition by Erik Prince, the Blackwater founder and ally to President Trump, to send a small, privatized force to fight on behalf of the United States in Afghanistan. Prince had claimed that this strategy would save more than $52 billion.

"No such proposal from Erik Prince is under consideration. The president adopted the South Asia strategy after months of deliberation among his key national security advisors," the spokesperson said in a Friday statement to CBS News. "The president, like most Americans, would like to see more progress in Afghanistan. However, he also recognizes that withdrawing precipitously from Afghanistan would lead to the re-emergence of terrorist safe havens, putting American national security and lives in danger."

NBC News reported that Mr. Trump was revisiting Prince's idea, which he proposed last year. It would involve replacing the military presence in Afghanistan with private contractors.

Prince said in an interview with NBC News that he would launch a media "air campaign" to try to convince Mr. Trump to adopt his proposal.

Prince is the brother of Mr. Trump's Education Secretary, Betsy DeVos.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/are-armed-drones-weapon-future-mexicos-cartels

Are Armed Drones the Weapon of the Future for Mexico’s Cartels?

Parker Asmann – InSight Crime
Thu, 08/16/2018 - 12:22am
Originally published by InSight Crime. Republished here in accordance with Creative Commons guidelines.

Mexico’s powerful drug cartels could be using armed drones to attack those impeding their criminal operations, marking the potential expansion of the use of this technology from just transporting drugs or carrying out surveillance.

In July of this year, an armed drone was used to attack the house of Baja California state Public Safety Secretary Gerardo Sosa Olachea in the city of Tecate along the US-Mexico border, Zeta magazine reported.

At least two drones were allegedly used in the strike. The first was armed with audio and video equipment and two improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that did not explode after falling into the official’s yard. A second drone was seen above the house likely performing surveillance, according to Zeta.

The July incident was the first time that a Mexican cartel used a weaponized drone to carry out such an attack, according to Mike Vigil, the former Chief of International Operations at the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). However, the “inoperability” of the IEDs suggests that the attack was more likely a method to intimidate the official rather than to carry out an actual attack, according to Small Wars Journal.

Sosa Olachea told Zeta that he thought the threat likely came from one of the drug cartels operating in the area that officials have dealt serious blows against through seizing drug shipments and dismantling drug laboratories.

The Tijuana Cartel, Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco Cartel New Generation (Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación – CJNG) are all known to be operating in this specific area along the US-Mexico border.

Towards the end of 2017, the Daily Beast reported on the first apparent incident in which an armed drone intended for use in a violent attack was discovered in the arsenal of a Mexican cartel.

InSight Crime Analysis

Drones are gaining popularity throughout Latin America among criminal groups and law enforcement officials for their ability to traffic drugs and carry out surveillance. But their use, or intended use, by organized crime to execute violent attacks is a recent development.

A DEA source explained that since 2014, Mexico’s cartels have hired local workers to construct custom-made narco drones to traffic cocaine and other drugs across the US-Mexico border.

Mexico’s security forces have also relied on drones that transmit images and videos in real-time in order to identify key locations used by the cartels to store drugs and weapons or to carry out other criminal activities. US authorities have also utilized drones in Mexico to aid in the so-called “war on drugs” against the country’s criminal groups.

But the latest evidence suggests that drones might be the “way of the future” for Mexico’s cartels for engaging in “cartel warfare,” according to Vigil.

As Mexico’s criminal world continues to fragment, Vigil told InSight Crime that these groups may start to use drones as an “offensive weapon simply because it will not require the loss of human personnel, which is difficult to replace especially if they are trained and have a full understanding of the cartel’s operations.”

InSight Crime on Mexican cartel use of armed drones.



Categories: Mexico - cartels - drones - El Centro
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About the Author(s)
Parker Asmann
Parker Asmann graduated from DePaul University in Chicago with degrees in Journalism and Spanish, and a minor in Latin American studies. He was a freelance reporter for various publications before joining InSight Crime in 2017.

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Amichai Stein
‏Verified account @AmichaiStein1
2h2 hours ago

#BREAKING: Shots fired at the US Embassy in Ankara #Turkey, possibly targeting the guard booth


Instant News Alerts
‏ @InstaNewsAlerts
5m5 minutes ago

Shots fired at the #US Embassy in #Ankara #Turkey, reportedly targeting the guard booth. Police search ongoing.


ETA:

Guy Elster
‏Verified account @guyelster
24m24 minutes ago

#BREAKING Shots fired at US embassy in Turkish capital, no casualties

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Guy Elster
‏Verified account @guyelster
1h1 hour ago

#Afghanistan president announced on conditional ceasefire with #Taliban at the start of Eid El Adha


Guy Elster
‏Verified account @guyelster
1h1 hour ago

#BREAKING #Taliban takes more than 100 hostages, including women and children, in anambush in northern #Afghanistan

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Amichai Stein
‏Verified account @AmichaiStein1
11m11 minutes ago

Amichai Stein Retweeted Mossos

#BREAKING: Barcelona police shoot knifeman shouting "Allahu Akbar" who tried to attack them

Amichai Stein added,

Mossos
Verified account @mossos
A man armed with knife has acceded this morning to Cornellà's police station with the aim to attack the Police officers. The aggressor has been shot down. The facts happened a few minuts before 6 a.m.

 

[Lilbitsnana]

كَوْن مُوازٍ
‏ @ignis_fatum
5h5 hours ago

كَوْن مُوازٍ Retweeted Медиазона

Russian media : at least 3 policemen hurt in an ISIS ramming attack in Chechnya.
Most of the state owned TV channels “forgot” to update their viewers on this matter
#Russia

كَوْن مُوازٍ added,

Медиазона
Verified account @mediazzzona
О нападениях на полицейских в Чечне пока узнали только зрители НТВ.

Другие телеканалы решили, что есть темы поважнее (вроде приближения осени, встречи Путина с главой Хакасии и, конечно, ареста Марии…

google translation:
added,
Media Zone
Verified account @mediazzzona
Only NTV viewers have learned about the attacks on policemen in Chechnya.

Other TV channels have decided that there are more important topics (like the approach of autumn, the meeting of Putin with the head of Khakassia and, of course, the arrest of Maria ...)

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Instant News Alerts
‏ @InstaNewsAlerts
1h1 hour ago

Coalition helicopter crashes in #Iraq killing 1 #American as they returned from a bombing run against #ISIS.

 

[Housecarl]

Sorry folks the meatworld has been rather demanding the last couple of days....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.yahoo.com/news/moscow-signs-military-cooperation-pact-c-africa-101409802.html

Moscow signs military cooperation pact with C. Africa

AFP 17 hours ago

Moscow (AFP) - Moscow and the Central African Republic signed a military cooperation agreement on Tuesday, less than a month after three Russian journalists were killed in the strife-torn CAR while probing alleged Russian mercenaries.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and his CAR counterpart Marie-Noelle Koyara signed the document on the sidelines of defense expo Army-2018 outside Moscow, Russian agencies reported.

The deal "will help strengthen ties in the defense sphere," Shoigu was quoted as saying after the ceremony.

Russian deputy defense minister Alexander Fomin later told Interfax news agency that the pact was a "framework agreement" about general avenues of cooperation.

"Exchange of delegations, education in Russian military institutes, mutual visits and so forth," he was quoted as saying.

The agreement is set to deepen Moscow's involvement in the impoverished CAR, where the government is desperate to boost its armed forces in the fight against militias which control most of the country.

A UN arms embargo imposed in 2013 was last year lifted exclusively for Moscow.
It has since then sent instructors and some equipment and now provides security for President Faustin-Archange Touadera.

The deal follows the murder in late July of three Russian journalists who were ambushed in CAR while investigating a shadowy Russian mercenary group called Wagner and its possible relation to both government and rebel forces.

The investigation was funded by ex-oil tycoon Kremlin critic Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

Both CAR authorities and Moscow have labeled the killings a robbery, but Khodorkovsky's own inquiry claimed this argument "does not stand up to scrutiny".

Comments (81)

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm…..

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://thehill.com/policy/defense/4..._term=Editorial - Military - Early Bird Brief

Erik Prince hopeful Bolton more open to contractors for Afghan war

By Rebecca Kheel - 08/20/18 04:10 PM EDT
185 Comments

Blackwater founder Erik Prince is hopeful new leadership in President Trump’s national security team will give his plan to replace most U.S. troops in Afghanistan with private contractors a shot at becoming reality.

In an interview with The Hill, Prince pointed to national security adviser John Bolton’s comments Sunday about being "open to new ideas" as a sign Bolton’s thinking may differ from his predecessor, now-retired Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster.

“Look, Gen. McMaster was a three-star serving Army officer who really wanted to be a four-star Army officer, and so the idea of him embracing anything unconventional is absolutely impossible,” Prince said Monday during the phone interview. “That being said, with John Bolton there now, I don’t know that he’s vested in a very conventional Pentagon approach. Maybe he’s willing — supposedly yesterday on the midday news shows he said he was open to exploring options for a solution in Afghanistan.”

Prince said he has not spoken to Trump about his plan recently but that he knows “it’s on his mind.”

“Before we go headlong into another year of the same failed strategy, I think it’s important that the president know that there are different options,” Prince added.
The Hill has reached out to the National Security Council for comment.

A year ago Tuesday, Trump announced his strategy for the war in Afghanistan, now in its 17th year. He took away a timeline for withdrawal, added thousands more troops and loosened some rules of engagement.

At the time, Prince, now the head of Frontier Resource Group, tried to sell Trump on a plan to replace conventional U.S. forces with private contractors. His plan included sending 5,500 private military contractors to embed with Afghan forces at the battalion level. They would be supported by a 90-plane private air force. A “viceroy” would be appointed to oversee the endeavor.

The plan was championed by former White House chief strategist Stephen Bannon, but was opposed by McMaster, Defense Secretary James Mattis, key leaders in Congress and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani.

The United States now has about 16,000 troops in Afghanistan on a dual mission of training, advising and assisting Afghan forces in their fight against the Taliban and conducting counterterrorism missions against groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

In the year since Trump announced his strategy, the Taliban have continued to carry out high-profile attacks and the Afghan government's control of the country has remained largely unchanged. The government controls about 65 percent of the Afghan population, with 12 percent under Taliban influence and 23 percent in contested areas, according to the latest inspector general report, released Monday.

U.S. and Afghan forces also engaged in a fierce fight in recent weeks to prevent the Taliban from taking control of the key provincial capital of Ghazni.

Still, hopes were raised for a breakthrough earlier this year when the Taliban agreed to a three-day ceasefire. U.S. officials have also reportedly met in secret with Taliban representatives in Qatar.

Asked Friday about comments Prince made to NBC that Trump is frustrated with the war effort, Mattis was dismissive.

“I have never had that feeling from the president,” Mattis told reporters traveling with him back to Washington, D.C., from South America.

Bolton, though, expressed an openness to replacing troops with contractors in an interview with ABC on Sunday, though he said it’s ultimately Trump’s decision.

“I’m always open to new ideas,” Bolton said. “But I'm not going to comment on what the thinking is. That'll ultimately be the president's decision.”

On Monday, Prince said that openness is how a National Security Council should work.

“That absolutely should be the policy of any NSC, is to give the president a wide range of options,” he said. “And last year, the NSC only said more money, more troops, the same thing we’ve been doing, or pull out completely.”

Asked about Mattis’s dismissiveness, Prince said he “would encourage anyone to look at the metrics.”

“At what point do we say let’s try something different?” Prince said.

Prince was also hopeful the new commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan may be amenable to his plan. Lt. Gen. Scott Miller, commander of Joint Special Operations Command since 2016, was confirmed by the Senate in June to command of the Afghanistan war. He is expected to officially replace outgoing commander Gen. John Nicholson soon.

“He comes from the right community, from a special operations background,” Prince said of Miller. “And so I think he’s willing to think differently how to make this work, and he saw people from his unit and his background were key roles in making it the first time in 2001 and so hopefully — I’ve never met him or spoken to him, but I certainly hope that that’s on his mind.”

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-says-over-63-000-troops-fought-syria-141424820.html

Russia says over 63,000 troops have fought in Syria

AFP 20 hours ago

Moscow (AFP) - Russia has sent over 63,000 troops to Syria over the course of its involvement in the conflict, the Russian defence ministry said Wednesday.

A total of 63,012 Russian personnel have "received combat experience" in the war-torn country, the ministry said in a video about Russia's campaign to support the Syrian regime dating back to September 2015.

This number includes 25,738 ranking officers and 434 generals as well as 4,349 artillery and rocket specialists, it said.

Previously Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said in December 2017 that over 48,000 military personnel had taken part in the Syrian campaign.

President Vladimir Putin in December last year ordered his armed forces to pull the bulk of troops out of Syria.

But the Russian president later clarified that the military would remain in Syria for "as long as it is beneficial" and was not planning to withdraw yet.

The ministry said Wednesday that Russian airforce had conducted more than 39,000 sorties that killed "over 86,000 militants" and destroyed 121,466 "terrorist targets".

It said its forces had tested 231 types of modern weaponry in Syria including aircraft, surface-to-air systems, cruise missiles and others.

The video made no mention of Russia's civilian or military casualties in the conflict.
Moscow's intervention in the multi-front war in Syria in support of President Bashar al-Assad has been a turning point in the conflict.

Since it started in 2011, Syria's war has killed more than 350,000 and displaced millions.

161 reactions

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1205826/open-silos/

Open Silos

by Catherine Dill | August 22, 2018 | No Comments

As many of you know, the latest annual China Military Power Report produced by the U.S. Department of Defense for Congress came out last week. The reports contains quite a few interesting tidbits, but I spotted one thing that really stood out against the backdrop of expected developments and progress in China’s missile programs.

In addition to noting that China generally is “enhancing its silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),” this year’s report in particular had a fascinating nugget on basing options for the the DF-41 ICBM (aka CSS-X-20).

“Development of the CSS-X-20 (DF-41), a new MIRV-capable and road-mobile ICBM, continued in 2017. China appears to be considering additional DF-41 launch options, including rail-mobile and silo basing.”

This appears to be the first official confirmation of a potential silo basing option for this missile system that I can recall. Naturally, I proceeded to spend a bit of time poking around in imagery of DF-41 bases provided by Planet Labs, and lo and behold, there is a new silo at Wuzhai. And back in March a Planet Labs Skysat just happened to capture it while it was open. The site does not yet appear operational for testing.

Wuzhai is where China tests multiple missile systems in various basing modes, including the DF-41. We would expect to see evidence of experimental basing modes, including the silo option, at Wuzhai.

https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/files/2018/08/Wuzhai-open-silo-1024x985.png

The silo, potentially for the DF-41, is located at 38.888740°, 111.597570°. © 2018 Planet Labs, inc. cc-by-sa 4.0

This beautiful image from 24 March 2018 seems to confirm that China indeed may be considering a silo-basing option for the DF-41. The question of why China may be considering this option is a little less visible and whether China intends to use it as a model for future deployments elsewhere in addition to experimental testing.

Scott "台筒艇" LaFoy
@wslafoy
· Aug 16, 2018

Replying to @wslafoy
The lack of change in missile/launcher count despite the intro of the DF-31AG could indicate that:
A) The DF-31AG has not yet been fully deployed
B) The DF-31AG replaces older DF-31A articulated TELs (as its implied to not be a new missile so much as a new deployment option)

Scott "台筒艇" LaFoy
@wslafoy

It also isn't clear to me that the DF-41 alternative basing modes are being shopped around due to a desire for diversified delivery as opposed to an unexpected engineering issue with the land-mobile option during its long development cycle
3:00 PM - Aug 16, 2018

5

See Scott "台筒艇" LaFoy's other Tweets

Historical imagery in Google Earth indicates that construction began around 2013 and continued in earnest through 2014.

https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/files/2018/08/Screen-Shot-2018-08-22-at-11.21.36-AM-1024x848.png

In an image available in Google Earth from 14 February 2017, a building shrouds the silo, presumably to cover the the construction site. Work on the silo appears to have been completed in late 2017.

https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/files/2018/08/Screen-Shot-2018-08-22-at-11.20.56-AM-1024x847.png

It is very rare to get imagery of an open silo in commercial satellite imagery, especially in China (I can think of only two other instances, but I am happy to hear of any others in the comments!).

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm…..

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.realcleardefense.com/ar..._us_pulls_the_plug_on_afghanistan_113725.html

What If the U.S. 'Pulls the Plug' on Afghanistan?

By Dan Gouré
August 23, 2018

The U.S. may be approaching a crucial decision concerning its military involvement in Afghanistan. Secretary of Defense James Mattis says U.S. activity there won’t end anytime soon. The question is, will President Trump stick with a plan that does not promise victory?

First, understand the mission. After 2014, Afghanistan became responsible for its own security. The Obama drawdown removed U.S advisers from regular Afghanistan units. NATO’s Operation Resolute Support started in 2015. Technically, it is a “non-combat” mission where security assistance advisers train and go out on missions with the Afghan Army.

When President Trump assumed office, Afghanistan was slowly slipping away while the U.S. focused on not losing Iraq. Taliban and ISIS-Khorasan attacks steadily increased to the point where Afghan forces controlled only about 60% of the country by summer 2017. Secretary Mattis convinced the president to try the same tactics that he’d implemented in Syria: letting the U.S. and other NATO advisers go right up to the battle’s edge with the Afghan forces.

The 2017 mini-surge approved by the White House in mid-2017 added 3,500 U.S. forces and redeployed A-10s and other airpower assets to Afghanistan. Airstrikes also targeted financial assets like opium production facilities, mirroring the strategy used in Syria and Iraq where strikes targeted mobile oil refineries and oil smuggling lanes.

The strategy in Afghanistan has a deeper layer. In Iraq, starting in 2005, the U.S. quietly built the Iraq Counter-Terrorism Service. Numbering around 10,000, this mixed force of Shi’a, Sunni and Kurds led the fight to push back ISIS. The idea was also to create elite, loyal forces under the control of Iraq’s prime minister. The force was trained to connect with the advanced intelligence, aerial surveillance and fire support provided by the U.S. and Coalition partners. When President Trump approved allowing U.S. advisers to accompany them closer into battle, they were able to morph into an effective force working against ISIS, although they took casualties in the process.

The U.S. hopes for a similar result in Afghanistan. But a professional security force needs supporting infrastructure and capabilities. To that end, the Pentagon awarded private contractor PAE the contract to support what is called the National Maintenance Strategy for vehicles. This strategy, among other things, provides training and mentoring to the Afghan National Defense Security Forces (ANDSF) in maintenance, supply chain management and warehouse support across 25 locations in Afghanistan. The ANDSF operates a mix of old Soviet armored fighting vehicles and U.S. equipment, including some 8,500 Humvees and hundreds of M117 Mobile Strike Force Vehicles.

The long bet is on building up Afghanistan’s air force. Along with developing a professional Afghan military, the strategy also relies on airpower both to take the offensive and to enact a more fundamental shift in Afghan political culture. From a military perspective, the Afghan Air Force is developing into a lethal advantage for the ASNDF over the insurgents, a strategy that has worked well for the Coalition from 2001 onwards. It is also shifting from Russian and Eastern European aircraft to more U.S.-built platforms.

Flying and maintaining U.S. A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft and Black Hawk helicopters and controlling airstrikes demands training and professionalism and a long-term commitment from Afghan service members. Going forward, U.S. commanders hope a strong, professional air force will also form a bulwark of political stability for the country. But the battlefield situation and the long-term “military in society” experiment depend on the White House not losing patience.

Reports from General Votel at Central Command are upbeat. He even praised the short June 2018 truce, saying it proved all parties, including the Taliban, could stick to an agreement.

Secretary Mattis isn’t promising victory. He said in the spring his aim is to “peel off” Taliban exhausted from fighting. Mattis wants to reduce Taliban strength to the point where Afghan forces can manage their internal security. The difference rests with whether the Mattis tactics that pushed back ISIS in Iraq and Syria can be effective in the mountains of Afghanistan. Also, whether Afghan soldiers and airmen can turn professional skill into a deeper loyalty.

At the White House, the view is different. Trump’s national security strategy centers on shoring up America’s economy, rebuilding the military for peer threats, and attempting to make strong borders a national security issue. There never was a commitment to stay in Afghanistan.

President Trump wonders why America got stuck in Afghanistan and he has been considering pulling out. President Obama felt much the same. Both took their time resetting Afghanistan strategy. For Obama, it was eleven months; Trump took nine. Placed side by side, their Afghanistan speeches from November 2009 and August 2017 are almost interchangeable. They read as if both presidents knew deep down Afghanistan was a loser for the U.S.

Each had reluctantly allowed advisers to make a case for continuing the U.S. commitment. For both presidents, sending more U.S. forces to Afghanistan was a long, long way from their policy preferences. Insiders attest that both Trump and Obama lost their tempers over Afghanistan and felt trapped into agreeing to the surges. Neither man was elected to get deeper into Afghanistan.

Scaling back in Afghanistan is not President Trump’s choice to make alone. NATO has consistently supported training missions. Keeping Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorists has polished up the fighting capabilities of NATO partners, and other close U.S. allies like Australia. NATO is a battle-tested force, with its top military leaders well-versed in modern warfare due to their time together in Afghanistan. It’s been a good training ground and the experience will serve NATO well for decades.

Should the Administration choose to “pull the plug” on the Afghanistan mission, it will need to continue efforts to build the ANSDF into a professional security apparatus with the appropriate command and control, intelligence, logistics and sustainment capabilities. Also, plans will need to be in place to replace equipment and platforms lost in battle or accidents. So even if the U.S. pulls the plug, it will not be able to completely escape from Afghanistan.

Daniel Gouré, Ph.D., is a vice president at the public-policy research think tank Lexington Institute. Goure has a background in the public sector and U.S. federal government, most recently serving as a member of the 2001 Department of Defense Transition Team. You can follow him on Twitter at @dgoure and the Lexington Institute @LexNextDC. Read his full bio here.

 

[Shacknasty Shagrat]

President Trump may be moving the carriers out.
Too late, and likely too little, but I wish our side good luck.
SS

'
MENAnalyst
‏ @jacksanders1965

#US to re-assign carrier group to med, possibly in the next 2-3 weeks, seems this flotilla wil have two main aims, deter #Russia & #Iran & attack Daesh in #Libya, #Iraq & #Syria simultaneously. More news to come over the next week or so.
6:42 AM - 23 Aug 2018

https://twitter.com/jacksanders1965/status/1032624056623869952

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/aug/22/inside-the-ring-china-set-for-north-korea-invasion/

Inside the Ring: China Set for North Korea Invasion

By Bill Gertz - - Wednesday, August 22, 2018

The Pentagon’s latest annual report on China’s military for the first time reveals contingency plans by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to intervene in North Korea.

Relations between the two communist nations remain strained and last year were at the lowest level in decades.

According to the report, China fears North Korea’s provocative nuclear and missile tests will set off a regional conflict. Beijing wants stability, a denuclearized peninsula and no U.S. forces near its borders.

“China’s priority is maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula, which includes preventing a [North Korean] collapse and preventing a military conflict on the peninsula,” the report said.

China’s government has issued strident statements regarding North Korea, including suggestions the PLA will be used to respond to a Korean crisis.

The response could include options ranging from “securing the China-North Korea border to prevent the flow of refugees, to a military intervention into North Korea.”

Beijing also could use a 1961 defense agreement with Pyongyang as a justification for an invasion, but the report said China’s willingness to intervene to defend the regime of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is unclear.

If China does attack North Korea, forces from the Northern Theater, formerly the Shenyang military region, would be deployed.

Three group armies in the China’s Northern Theater contain about 170,000 troops, a naval fleet, two air force bases, one air support division, two naval aviation divisions, and People’s Armed Police (PAP) units that are used to conduct border defense operations. Other forces would be called on from other Chinese theaters to support an invasion.

“In response to a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear incident on the Korean peninsula, the PLA could deploy emergency-response units with specialized equipment and personnel who routinely train for rapid responses,” the report said.

The PLA since 2004 has been increasing its ability to conduct joint operations near North Korea with an emphasis on border defense.

“More recent training has sought to improve the Northern Theater’s civil-military fusion, night training and transport of PLA units across the Bohai [Sea] from the Shandong Peninsula to the Liaoning Peninsula.”

China also has been coordinating with Russia on North Korea since 2015. Eight consultations on regional security were held.

Chinese plans to invade North Korea highlight two imperatives for Washington, said China expert Rick Fisher.

“First, there is now a crisis-level requirement for the United States to deploy a force of hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons with its Asian forces, to deter China from exploiting any Korean Peninsula conflict to also invade Taiwan,” said Mr. Fisher, senior fellow with the International Assessment and Strategy Center.

“Second, it is imperative that Washington make public the full extent of China’s assistance to North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs, to at a minimum embarrass Beijing into taking back that assistance, especially the sophisticated 16- and 18-wheel missile trucks that make it possible for Pyongyang to achieve surprise nuclear strikes against U.S. cities,” he said.

Security clearance furor

President Trump’s decision to revoke the security clearance of former CIA Director John O. Brennan set off a furor among nearly 200 former intelligence and policy officials who revealed their anti-Trump political leanings in signing on to protest letters.

First came the letter from a small group of senior ex-intelligence officials decrying the president’s action against Mr. Brennan. That was followed by another letter signed by 177 former officials, from the intelligence, law enforcement and policymaking communities.

The second letter was billed as “bipartisan,” but a careful reading of the list of signers shows most of those are liberals, including several key officials from the Obama administration, like former Deputy Secretary of State Anthony Blinken. Many of the Republicans on the list are George W. Bush administration veterans including several that while not liberal are known to be anti-conservative.

Also signing was Evelyn Farkas, deputy assistant defense secretary under President Obama, who acknowledged during an MSNBC interview last year that she was part of the frantic effort to gather intelligence on Trump-Russia ties after the November 2016 election.

The protest letters were distributed by former CIA spokesman Bill Harlow, who during his time in government often referred to himself as a “junior administration official.”

When asked by Inside the Ring whether the president has ultimate power to revoke government security clearances, Mr. Harlow said: “Yep, he can. Doesn’t mean it is right.”

The former officials’ letter decried what they regarded as the unjustified removal or threat of removal of clearances for former officials.

“All of us believe it is critical to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure,” the letter states. “But we believe equally strongly that former government officials have the right to express their unclassified views on what they see as critical national security issues without fear of being punished for doing so.”

The president clearly touched a nerve with the security clearance move that the White House said was carried out in response to Mr. Brennan’s frequent and public accusations, mainly on liberal cable news shows, that Mr. Trump is a traitor and tool of the Russian government.

The millions of people granted security clearances during government service have become a kind of secret society. Cleared officials often use their retention of access to secrets after leaving government and continue work as contractors, or to sit on government advisory boards.

Many of these formers are more aptly part of what national security strategist Angelo Codevilla has called “the ruling class” of both Democratic and Republican bureaucrats united mainly in their opposition to the populist Mr. Trump.

“The issue of whether and on what basis security clearances should be granted or removed is one on which one may disagree, but it is wholly distinct from the issue of who has that authority,” Mr. Codevilla said. “About that, no disagreement is possible. The president of the United States has the sole, unquestionable, unrestricted authority.”

Attempts by the former officials to confuse or conflate the two issues — above all by invoking free speech rights — are “dishonest and a sign of ruling-class partisanship against a president elected specifically to cut back on the class’s prerogatives,” Mr. Codevilla said.

“By claiming the authority to grant and withhold clearances, the agencies have presumed to decide with whom the president may or may not take counsel,” he added. “Constitutionally speaking, this is revolutionary.”

“Donald Trump should be faulted for having indulged the intelligence agencies’ abuse of their inherently advisory role in the granting of clearances,” Mr. Codevilla noted.

‘Gray zone’ war

Deputy Defense Secretary Patrick M. Shanahan earlier this month outlined new authorities for special operations forces engaged in “gray zone” warfare — commando, information and intelligence operations below the threshold of regular military combat.

In a Pentagon-wide memorandum sent Aug. 3, Mr. Shanahan published the policies for commandos’ use of irregular warfare.

The policy guidance was required under Section 1202 of last year’s defense authorization act and stipulates what special forces can and can’t do. It also requires regular reports to both the administration and Congress on the activities covered. The memo will be used for backing foreign forces, irregular troops, groups, or people that support U.S. irregular warfare operations by special operations forces. The Pentagon term for the irregulars is “enabled forces.”

The new authority does not allow commandos to engage in covert action that is governed by other laws, or military action empowered by the war powers resolution used in fighting terrorists.

To prevent the military from using foreign proxies improperly, the directive also does not permit support for irregular forces which engage in operations or activities banned for American special forces. Irregulars also are prohibited from carrying out or supporting activities that violate the law of armed conflict.

The operations envisioned under the authority were not discussed in the memo, other than the use of counterintelligence operations to prevent foreign states from planting spies in the operations.

The Pentagon is currently backing Syrian rebels known as the Syrian Democratic Forces in its anti-Islamic State campaign in Syria.

Other potential activities under the new power could include information operations, a major weakness of current special operations troops.

• Contact Bill Gertz on Twitter @BillGertz.

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