WAR 08-13-2016-to-08-19-2016_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.......

For links see article source.....
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http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1201817/donald-trumps-challenge-to-nuclear-orthodoxy/

Donald Trump’s Challenge to Nuclear Orthodoxy

by Michael Krepon | August 15, 2016 | No Comments

The belief system in nuclear deterrence makes the most sense at the most elementary level: nuclear weapons deter use by an adversary for fear of retaliation in kind. Deterrence therefore requires survivable nuclear capabilities. It doesn’t take much by way of force structure to convey the threat that leaves something to chance, which is the essence of nuclear deterrence. From this simple construct, a superstructure of belief has been erected, driving requirements and stockpiles to great heights.

The intricacies of this belief system are too hard and off-putting to explain. Discussions of nuclear targeting strategies and plans must be avoided because they sound so Strangelovian. Public opposition would be fanned if they were revealed. True believers accept these tenets without question and ask others to take them on faith.

We also have faith in national leaders to recognize that it would be crazy to fight a nuclear war whose consequences are all too well understood. Consequently, most of us live with the belief system of nuclear deterrence without complaint – or at least try to avoid thinking about these tenets. It takes the prospect of a person with deeply suspect personality traits becoming President for us to focus on how crazy the extrapolations and expansive requirements of nuclear deterrence are. For this, let us give thanks to the candidacy of Donald Trump.

There are two primary arguments against serious debate over this belief system. One is that huge stockpiles aren’t for actual use; they are for deterrence. The second is that nuclear deterrence works, as was evident by their non-use during the Cold War. The rejoinder to both assertions is the same: What if deterrence breaks down and use is required? How does the belief system in nuclear deterrence and its expansive requirements help us then?

A third argument for holding on to a belief system in expansive requirements for nuclear deterrence is that Russia’s Vladimir Putin sincerely and deeply believes in all this, and if U.S. leaders don’t, deterrence will be weakened. If the United States gets off this treadmill and Russia stays on, more bad things will happen around Russia’s periphery. Or Beijing, which has not gotten on this treadmill, might decide to hop aboard, and bad things will then happen along its periphery, too. (A fourth argument, that it is unwise to wean U.S. allies from their addiction to extended U.S. nuclear deterrence, including first use, has been dealt with earlier.)

There has never seemed to be a good time for serious debate on the assumptions that have generated extreme redundancy in nuclear capabilities. The Cold War nuclear competition was too intense to debate fundamentals. After the Cold War ended, there seemed no reason for debate because deployed force levels and stockpiles were greatly reduced. And it’s not a good time now, according to the defenders of nuclear orthodoxy, with Vladimir Putin disregarding the sovereignty of neighboring states and China’s power on the rise. Donald Trump’s candidacy for President argues that, to the contrary, this is a perfectly good time to reconsider the ornately encrusted requirements for nuclear deterrence.

One reason is that breakdowns in deterrence are common, as Keith Payne (The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice from the Cold War to the Twenty-First Century, 2008) often reminds us. They even occur between nuclear-armed states that have fought two limited border wars – so far. Serious accidents have happened with nuclear weapons. There have been false alarms and close calls, sometimes during severe crises. Mushroom clouds can appear on battlefields due to the aggressive use of airpower against dual-capable weapon systems. Command-and-control arrangements can break down under severe duress.

There are other ways in which nuclear exchanges could occur. If they do, for whatever reason, the other fundamental assumption behind nuclear deterrence – that huge stockpiles aren’t for actual use, but for deterrence – goes by the boards. Once the nuclear threshold is crossed, everything depends on escalation control, not “credible” deterrence and war-fighting options. These upper stories of the edifice of nuclear deterrence make sense only in abstract reasoning, not in the crucible of actual warfare.

Nuclear deterrence theory works until it fails, and then the foremost danger is that it will fail catastrophically. The only circumstance under which nuclear use does not fail disastrously rests on extremely limited use, after which national leaders might somehow be able to intervene to control escalation – even though they have failed to prevent a war. What Bridge Colby calls the “pacifying logic” of deterrence theory implodes with first use. Once the nuclear threshold is crossed, the belief system surrounding nuclear orthodoxy falls like a house of cards.

Orthodoxy-busting leaders like Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev saw through all this and were fine with junking the whole belief system. They didn’t succeed, but they did tear down many stories from the edifice of nuclear deterrence. The path of least resistance (although it still prompts great resistance) for their successors is to take down one story at a time of what’s left. This process is slow going and prone to disruption. Moving faster requires a hard look at the belief system that has produced this monument to wishful thinking – and having a partner to do so.

Nothing in Putin’s behavior of late suggests that he is this partner – although he, like the next U.S. President, will be hard-pressed to fund the full panoply of strategic modernization program. If Putin opts to jointly tear down another story from this edifice for budgetary reasons, its defenders in the United States will be agog, pointing to Putin’s misdeeds as reasons to hold on to force structure and warheads the United States can’t use.

Going it alone – if Putin is unwilling to join in another round of strategic arms reduction – flies in the face of nuclear orthodoxy. President Obama has rejected this option, while keeping in place a wide array of strategic modernization programs. None of this has assuaged critics on Capitol Hill who continue to chip away at remaining treaty constraints, expand the envelop for national missile defenses directed at Russia and China, while opposing implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation deal with Iran.

The next President has the opportunity to revisit these terms of domestic engagement, which have not served the Obama Administration well. A new administration can alter this equation: However much strategic force structure the next President decides to retain, the significant costs of replacement warrant, in return, the Senate’s consent to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Note to readers: For more along these lines, see “Nuclear Orthodoxy after Trump: The Real Requirements of Deterrence,” FOREIGN AFFAIRS, August 15, 2016.
 

Housecarl

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http://abcnews.go.com/International...eople-mexican-resort-city-restaurant-41401770

Mexico: Gunmen Abduct Presumed Gang Members in Resort City

By Christopher Sherman, Associated Press · MEXICO CITY — Aug 15, 2016, 6:51 PM ET

Armed men abducted 10 to 12 presumed members of a crime gang who appeared to be celebrating at an upscale restaurant in the popular Mexican beach resort city of Puerto Vallarta, authorities said Monday.

Jalisco state prosecutor Eduardo Almaguer said at a news conference that preliminary results of the investigation indicated that all involved — kidnappers and kidnapped — were members of criminal organizations.

"They were not tourists or residents who work in legal activities," Almaguer said. "They were people tied to a criminal group we can very clearly presume."

He said authorities believe they know which groups were involved, but declined to name them.

The Jalisco New Generation cartel has become the dominant criminal force in the state. It has battled the powerful Sinaloa cartel for supremacy in other parts of the country, such as Baja California Sur.

Almaguer said two SUVs carrying five gunmen arrived around 1 a.m. at La Leche restaurant on the city's main boulevard, which runs through the hotel zone between the old beach city and the airport.

Witnesses reported that four women in the targeted group were not taken by the gunmen, he said. He said authorities were looking for those women.

All of those abducted were from the western states of Sinaloa, Nayarit and Jalisco, Almaguer said.

He said some of those abducted had been vacationing in Puerto Vallarta for a week and authorities found lots of drinks and luxury items inside the restaurant. Five vehicles were abandoned at the restaurant, among them one with Jalisco license plates, but a false registration.

"Obviously, those who acted (the kidnappers) — we presume with the information we have — also belonged to a criminal group that acted against members of another criminal group they located here in Puerto Vallarta," Almaguer said.

Mexico City-based security analyst Alejandro Hope said that without knowing who was taken, it was impossible to say what the fallout could be.

He recalled some violence last year in Puerto Vallarta but said the city had been quiet recently. He added that while Jalisco New Generation controls the area, it would be possible for another group to enter the city.

Hope also called it odd that a group of alleged cartel members would be taken without a shot being fired.

"It's a bit surprising that in effect they were drug traffickers but didn't have any security," Hope said.

Jalisco Gov. Aristoteles Sandoval said through his official Twitter account that such violence would not be tolerated and that a search was underway for the victims and the kidnappers.

"To the residents and tourists of Puerto Vallarta, I inform you that we have reinforced security so that you can go on as usual," Sandoval wrote.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.ibtimes.com/mexican-gang...e-government-building-guerrero-mexico-2402143

Mexican Gang Leaves Severed Heads Outside Government Building In Guerrero, Mexico

By Clark Mindock @clarkmindock On 08/15/16 AT 2:32 PM

Boxes with a chilling threat were left Sunday outside a government building in Chilpancingo, Mexico. The boxes contained severed heads and a threatening note was left nearby calling the people “traitors” and “blackmailers.”

In nearby streets, three bodies were also found.

The latest violence, in the Mexican state of Guerrero, follows years of drug-related violence in the state. The severed heads created havoc in the city as police the struggled to identify the victims. The gang was identified as Los Jefes, Spanish for The Bosses.

The state has been at the center of fighting between some of Mexico’s most notorious gangs as they fight for the best drug routes along the Pacific coast, according to the BBC. Aside from those larger organizations, smaller groups also operate there, kidnapping people and demanding ransom. The drug violence in Mexico has resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of people in the past 10 years.

The state has been at the center of fighting between some of Mexico’s most notorious gangs as they fight for the best drug routes along the Pacific coast, according to the BBC. Aside from those larger organizations, smaller groups also operate there, kidnapping people and demanding ransom. The drug violence in Mexico has resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of people in the past 10 years.
 

northern watch

TB Fanatic
Russia starts planned exercises in eastern Mediterranean

Monday August 15, 2016 8:00am EDT

MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russia said on Monday it had started planned tactical exercises in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea to test the ability of the Navy to act in crisis situations of a terrorist nature.

A naval strike group would carry out live-fire exercises according to a scenario that was "as close as possible" to a real attack, the ministry said in a statement on its website
.

(Reporting by Lidia Kelly; Editing by Andrew Osborn)


http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCAKCN10Q12U
 

Possible Impact

TB Fanatic
Did China just call it Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK)?

Guess what! China's state-media has just called the Kashmir area under Pakistan,
as Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK).

What’s significant about this is that till now China always referred PoK
as Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

By: FE Online | Published: August 16, 2016 2:21 PM
http://www.financialexpress.com/ind...al&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer

sushma-1.jpg



Guess what! China’s state-media has just called the Kashmir area under
Pakistan, as Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). What’s significant about
this is that till now China always referred PoK as Pakistan-administered
Kashmir.

In an article titled “India should adopt an open attitude toward the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor”, the Global Times says, “…it is
precisely because of the region’s worsening investment environment
that POK’s economy is still heavily reliant on agriculture. Also, the northern
part of India bordering Pakistan and India-controlled Kashmir both lack
basic infrastructure.”

The reference to PoK as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir is also made in context
to an Indian media report. “Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj
voiced India’s concerns over the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),
which passes through Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK), during Chinese
Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s India trip, Indian media reported.” the article
starts. While the second mention is a quote from an Indian media report,
the fact that China has taken it as it is holds significance.

The article states that despite India’s protests, China is “unlikely” to give
up on the $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. “The CPEC is not
a zero-sum game where Pakistan gains and India loses.

If economic cooperation between China and Pakistan can improve infrastructure
in the region, including in the Kashmir area, India will have an opportunity
to expand trade routes to Central Asia,” Global Times says. The article also
indicated that China may want to steer clear of the ongoing conflict
between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.

The article from China’s state-media comes at a time when tensions are
on the boil between India and Pakistan. In an all-party meet on Jammu
and Kashmir, PM Narendra Modi spoke of PoK as a part of Jammu and Kashmir
and called for exposing Pakistan’s atrocities in Balochistan.

“Pakistan forgets that it bombs its own citizens using fighter planes.
The time has come when Pakistan shall have to answer to the world for
the atrocities committed by it against people in Baluchistan and PoK,”
PM Modi had said.

 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realcleardefense.com/art...of_the_inf_and_new_start_treaties_109708.html

August 16, 2016

Russian Violations of the INF and New START Treaties

By Mark B. Schneider

There is new evidence of possible Russian violations of the INF and New START Treaties. Unfortunately, the Obama administration is not open with the American people about Russian noncompliance, despite the legal requirement under U.S. law, 22 U.S.C. 2593a, for an annual report with “a specific identification, to the maximum extent practicable in unclassified form, of each and every question that exists with respect to compliance by other countries with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements with the United States.” In 2014, after considerable media pressure, the Obama administration acknowledged “that the Russian Federation was in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.” Prior to this acknowledgement, State Department compliance reports strongly implied there were no INF Treaty compliance issues. They read, “The Parties to the Treaty last met in the Special Verification Commission in October 2003. There were no issues raised during this reporting period.”[ii] Even now, the Obama administration has not revealed which Russian cruise missile violates the INF Treaty other than to say that it is intermediate-range.[iii] (Congressman Mac Thornberry (R-Texas), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has stated this missile is nuclear.)[iv]

The House Armed Services Committee has put Russian noncompliance into some perspective:

According to the testimony of senior officials of the Department of State, the Russian Federation is not complying with numerous treaties and agreements, including the INF Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Vienna Document, the Budapest Memorandum, the Istanbul Commitments, the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Russian Federation has recently withdrawn from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).[v]

We are clearly dealing with a pervasive problem of noncompliance that involves virtually all of the arms control agreements.[vi] Former Under Secretary of State William Schneider has observed, “A half-century of experience with successive administrations confronting Moscow’s non-compliance suggests that the Treaty-based approach to nuclear stability is fatally flawed.”[vii] It is so because our primary negotiating partner has a consistent stark pattern of cheating on agreements reached.

Since the House Armed Services Committee report was issued in 2015, there have been more reports of possible Russian violations of the INF Treaty and the New START Treaty. In December 2015, Brian McKeon, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the U.S. objective was to “preserve the viability of the INF Treaty by convincing Russia to come back into compliance with those obligations.”[viii] Yet, the Obama administration has so far failed to get Russia to comply with its INF obligations, and it appears that Russia will pay no penalty for its violations of the INF Treaty.

Regarding Russian New START compliance, the Obama administration states that there are “implementation-related questions,” but it won’t say what they are.[ix] In 2014, Brian McKeon (then a senior NSC official) stated that in September 2010 the Senate had been informed of a potential compliance issue that “implicated possibly New START, possibly INF.”[x] The Obama administration has said nothing more about it. In a response to a question by Bill Gertz about whether Russia was violating the dismantling provisions of the New START Treaty, the State Department even asserted, “The New START treaty forbids releasing to the public data and information obtained during implementation of the treaty….This would include any discussion of the results of inspection activities undertaken by the United States or the Russian Federation.”[xi] This assertion is an apparent distortion of a Treaty provision which applies only to arms control inspectors. The Treaty states, “The inspecting Party shall ensure that its inspectors not publicly disclose information obtained during inspection.”[xii] (Emphasis added). The Secretary of State is not an arms control inspector.

The original START Treaty had the same provision as New START regarding inspector confidentiality.[xiii] Yet, in 2005, the U.S. Department of State published a compliance report that concluded Russia was violating START Treaty inspection provisions. It stated: “Russian RV [reentry vehicle] covers, and their method of emplacement, have in some cases hampered U.S. inspectors from ascertaining that the front section of the missiles contains no more RVs than the number of warheads attributed to a missile of that type under the Treaty.”[xiv] Regarding confirmation of missile type during inspections, the report concluded, “Russia prevented U.S. inspectors from exercising their Treaty right to measure launch canisters for SS-24 ICBMs contained in rail-mobile launchers that are located within the boundaries of an inspection site, in contravention of paragraphs 1 and 6 of Annex 1 to the Inspection Protocol.”[xv] These conclusions were obviously based upon information provided to the U.S. government by its inspectors.

The U.S. Department of State has a long history of trying to avoid public disclosure of Soviet/Russian arms control violations. Sven Kraemer, Director of Arms Control in the Reagan administration’s NSC staff, records, “…new interagency efforts to assess Soviet violations of the SALT II agreement were blocked by the Department of State during 1981,” and, after this there were “delaying tactics and resistance within the government bureaucracy, especially in the State Department, ACDA and parts of CIA.”[xvi]

In the Obama administration, decisions with regard to public information release on arms control compliance appear to be made on the basis of the administration’s perceptions of whether informing the public would advance or hurt its arms control agenda. The 2010 State Department compliance report, for example, stated that, “The United States raised new compliance issues since the 2005 Report,”[xvii] but did not say what they were.

Russian Compliance with the INF Treaty

Current Russian apparent INF Treaty non-compliance issues relate to the core prohibitions in the INF Treaty. For example, Russia has announced that it is developing a hypersonic cruise missile called the Zircon. According to state-run RT, the Zircon has “a rumored range of at least 400km (1,000km, according to other reports)…”[xviii] RT (and state-run Ria Novosti) reported that the “Zircon hypersonic missiles are already there, and testing from a ground-based launching site has begun.”[xix] (Emphasis in the original) This may or may not be a violation of the INF Treaty depending on what type of launcher was used. There is also a report that Russia plans to attack U.S. naval vessels with a hypersonic missile launched from the “…Plese[t]sk base of strategic missiles…”[xx] Although the described attacks were of INF-range, the report did not identify the type of missile involved which is critical to a compliance assessment. In light of the pattern of Russian arms control violations, Russian development of a hypersonic GLCM with prohibited range is plausible.

Distinguished Russian journalist Pavel Felgenhauer has noted, “According to the defense ministry’s Star TV channel, Iskander missiles deployed in Crimea can wipe out the US MD [missile defense] base in Romania, but there is a problem: the Tarkhankut Peninsula—the westernmost part of Crimea closest to the base in Deveselu—is still some 700 kilometers away, while the official range of the Iskander-M ballistic missile is 500 km, as mandated by the INF [treaty]. Star TV explains: The range of the Iskander may be easily extended ‘to several thousand kilometers by using long-range Kalibr cruise missiles (Tvzvezda.ru, November 14, 2014)’.”[xxi] In 2015, the Kalibr was launched 1,500-km to attack Syria from Russian ships.[xxii] In December 2015, President Putin revealed the Kalibr and KH-101 cruise missiles, used in these attacks, “can be equipped either with conventional or special nuclear warheads.”[xxiii] This suggests another possible compliance problem because a ground-launched Kalibr using an Iskander mobile launcher would be a violation of the INF Treaty which bans GLCMs with ranges of between 500-5,500 kilometers.

In addition, in July 2016, Interfax, Russia’s main unofficial news agency, reported, “The Bastion coastal defense [cruise missile] system has an operational range of 600 kilometers and can be used against surface ships of varying class and type…”[xxiv] If this report is true, the Bastion would also violate the INF Treaty.

There is some similarity between these types of reports and the early (2008) Russian press reports, which appeared in both state and non-state media, of a Russian GLCM with a range banned by the INF Treaty.[xxv] These reports were seemingly ignored for years by the Obama administration—until 2014.[xxvi] Michael Gordon, writing in The New York Times, said that “by the end of 2011, officials say it was clear that there was a compliance concern.”[xxvii] When asked about this story, the State Department press spokesman confirmed it.[xxviii]

The intermediate-range GLCM that the Obama administration says is an INF Treaty violation may be only the tip of the iceberg. Since 2007, there have been many Russian press reports that another GLCM, the R-500, has a range prohibited by the INF Treaty.[xxix] In 2014, Pavel Felgenhauer “said the missile (R-500) has been tested at a range of 1,000 km,” but the “range could be extended up to 2,000-3,000 km by adding extra fuel tanks.”[xxx] There has been no unclassified State Department compliance report on the R-500. Under Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller has said the R-500 is not the missile determined to be in violation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.[xxxi] This statement, however, is not the same as saying that the R-500’s range is compliant with the INF Treaty.

Pavel Felgenhauer has also reported, “…Moscow plans to covertly quit the 1987 treaty on medium and short-range missiles” because the Russian S-300 and the S-400 air defense missiles, the new S-500 air and missile defense interceptor and the Moscow ABM interceptors are nuclear armed and can function as “dual-use…conventional or nuclear medium- or shorter-range ballistic missiles.”[xxxii] The surface-to-surface capability of the S-300 and S-400 has been confirmed, respectively, by the President of Belarus and TASS, the main official Russian news agency.[xxxiii] The INF Treaty contains an exception to allow for missile defense and air defense interceptors missiles used “solely” for air or missile defense, but that exception would be lost if it also had a surface-to-surface role.[xxxiv] If Felgenhauer is correct, at least two of the missiles he mentions would violate the INF Treaty.[xxxv] Again, there has been no unclassified State Department compliance report on these missiles.

Russia is also developing the RS-26 Rubezh ballistic missile, an apparent intermediate-range missile masquerading as an ICBM (a possible violation or circumvention of both the INF Treaty and the New START Treaty).[xxxvi] According to state-run Sputnik News it carries four 300-kt warheads.[xxxvii] It may not be able to fly to ICBM range with its normal payload.[xxxviii] Indeed, according to Rossiyskaya Gazeta, a Russian Government daily newspaper, it has “a combat radius from 2,000 km.”[xxxix] Once again, there has been no unclassified compliance report by the Department of State. In March 2015, a source in the Russian Defense Ministry told Interfax, “The Americans have not put forth any official complaints with regards to the RS-26 rocket…”[xl]

According to Under Secretary of State Gottemoeller, “…the RS-26 ballistic missile is not the missile of INF concern, as some have speculated.”[xli] Yet, the Obama administration has not prepared an unclassified compliance report or even issued an unclassified legal analysis to support this conclusion. This is important because the INF Treaty was the first Treaty subject to the Biden condition (named for former Senator now Vice President Joseph Biden) which states that a Treaty must be interpreted consistent with how it was authoritatively interpreted to the Senate.[xlii] During the INF Treaty ratification process, the Reagan administration provided the U.S. Senate an authoritative interpretation of the INF Treaty in a letter by Assistant Secretary of State Ed Fox. According to the Biden condition, this interpretation, if applied to the testing of the RS-26, as described by the Russian government and in the Russian press, would result in the finding of a Treaty violation.[xliii] State Department handling of the RS-26 issue is apparently the only breach of the Biden condition in U.S. arms control treaty interpretation since it was established in 1988. The only option available to the State Department is either to apply the Fox letter interpretation or provide a compelling legal analysis explaining why it is wrong. It has done neither.

Russian Compliance with the New START Treaty

The Russian RS-26 missile may also be connected to a potential problem with the New START Treaty. Well-connected Russian journalist Viktor Litovkin, writing in state media, reports, “The new [Russian] rail-based missile systems will be equipped with the MS-26 (sic) Rubezh multiple-warhead missile…”[xliv] The problem with this is that Russian rail-mobile ICBMs may not be numerically limited by the New START Treaty because the previous START Treaty mobile launcher definition was changed in New START to exclude rail-mobile ICBMs.[xlv] The Obama administration has stated that it will consider rail-mobile ICBMs as limited by the New START Treaty, but absent a definition that actually captures them, this has little legal basis. The U.S. Senate resolution of ratification for New START makes up a definition that is not contained in the New START Treaty and requires a Treaty amendment to put language on rail-mobile ICBMs into the New START Treaty. The New START Treaty resolution of ratification states, “…an erector-launcher mechanism for launching an ICBM and the rail car or flatcar on which it is mounted would be an ICBM launcher,” and goes on to require any new Treaty language involving mobile ICBMs must be “considered to be an amendment to the New START Treaty…and will be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent.”[xlvi] During the New START ratification process then-Senator Jon Kyle (R-AZ) stated, “It is clear from the [Senate Foreign Relations Committee] report that the language would not cover rail-mobile systems if Russia were to reintroduce them. It is clear we would have to rely upon the Russians’ good offices, good intentions, to reach some kind of an agreement with us in the Bilateral Consultative Commission. There are no assurances that will be done.”[xlvii] Konstantin Kosachyov, the head of the Russian State Duma’s International Affairs Committee, took very strong exception to the effort by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee “to apply the New START Treaty to rail-mobile ICBMs in case they are built.”[xlviii]

In addition, the December 2015 revelation by President Putin that the Russian KH-101, a 5,000-km range air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), which was supposed to be conventional—only, was actually nuclear capable,[xlix] brings up a number of possible Russian New START Treaty violation issues. Any aircraft that launches a nuclear-capable ALCM of over 600-km range becomes accountable as a heavy bomber under New START.[l] In 2012, the commander of the Russian Air Force Colonel-General Alexander Zelin stated that the Su-34 long-range strike fighter would be given “long-range missiles…Such work is under way and I think that it is the platform that can solve the problem of increasing nuclear deterrence forces within the Air Force strategic aviation.”[li] A single test of a long-range nuclear-capable ALCM from a Su-34 would turn all Su-34s into heavy bombers under New START.[lii] This would dramatically increase the number of delivery vehicles Russia must dismantle in order to comply with New START in 2018. It is obvious that the Russians have no intention of declaring the Su-34 a heavy bomber.

There are also open reports of long-range nuclear ALCMs on the Russian Backfire medium bomber, which raises the same compliance issues as raised by the Su-34.[liii] Neither the Su-34 nor Backfire compliance issues have been subject to an unclassified State Department compliance report.

In addition, in December 2014, Russian ICBM force Commander Colonel-General Sergey Karakayev said, “There are currently around 400 missiles [ICBMs] with warheads on combat duty.” [liv] Yet, Russia’s declared strategic force numbers make it legally impossible for Russia to have more than about 300 ICBMs “with warheads on combat duty.”[lv] The declared number of Russian deployed delivery vehicles in this time period was only in the 515-528 range.[lvi] These numbers must include not only the deployed ICBM force but also the deployed heavy bomber force and the deployed SLBM force.

Indeed, there is now significant evidence that Russia does not plan to comply with the New START limits when they come into effect in February 2018, even ignoring the issue of whether the Su-34 and Backfire are Treaty-accountable heavy bombers.[lvii] The actual number of deployed Russian strategic nuclear warheads has increased considerably; the Russians are now 185 deployed warheads above the Treaty limit, an increase of 198 since New START entry-into-force in 2011.[lviii] Ongoing nuclear modernization, particularly mobile RS-24 ICBMs, will further increase the number of strategic nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles Russia will have to remove from accountability to comply with New START. Indeed, even the oldest existing Russian strategic forces, the Delta III ballistic missile submarines, remain operational and one reportedly is undergoing an overhaul, [lix] which suggests that Russia plans to maintain them for a significant period of time. According to Bill Gertz, “‘The Russians are doubling their [nuclear] warhead output,’ said one [Obama administration] official. ‘They will be exceeding the New START [arms treaty] levels because of MIRVing these new systems’.”[lx]

Even if Russia were to comply with New START, the actual number of deployed Russian warheads will likely far exceed the stated New START ceiling of 1,550—in part because of the bomber counting rule. State-run Sputnik News says Russia will have 2,100 actual deployed strategic nuclear warheads under New START.[lxi] Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, of the Federation of American Scientists, write that Russia will have approximately 2,500 actual strategic nuclear weapons by 2025.[lxii] That conclusion predates Russia’s announced a program to build at least 50 new Tu-160 bombers,[lxiii] which could push this number to over 3,000 deployed warheads when the bombers are completed. It could go even higher. Russia has announced modernization programs now underway that could circumvent the New START Treaty limits including two bomber types, a rail-mobile ICBM, a nuclear-powered nuclear-armed drone submarine and, reportedly, an air-launched ICBM which either do not count under New START or count at a severely discounted level.[lxiv]

The Obama administration appears not to be pressuring Russia to comply with the INF and New START Treaties. There is no indication that the Obama administration has done anything to close the New START loopholes discussed above. It reportedly may offer Russia a five year extension of the New START Treaty,[lxv] apparently without resolving any of the outstanding compliance issues or dealing with the circumvention issues. If so, it would limit the options of the Presidents who will be elected in 2016 and 2020. While the reported offer, if made, will likely be rejected by Russia,[lxvi] the mentality behind it explains why U.S. arms control efforts so frequently fail to achieve positive national security benefits: ignoring arms control violations merely ensures more of the same behavior.

In conclusion, Russia’s aggressive behavior in the international arena, including its consistent violation of agreements, poses a growing threat to our national security as well as that of our friends and allies. As a 2016 report of the National Institute for Public Policy underscored, “Russian foreign military actions, defense initiatives, markedly expanded conventional and nuclear arms programs, internal repression, and egregious arms control non-compliance appear to be elements of an increasingly assertive and threatening agenda.”[lxvii] Russian arms control violations are giving Russia military advantages at a time when they are threatening war in Europe and the first use of nuclear weapons. Russia appears to be regaining the capabilities that were eliminated 25 years ago by the INF Treaty and threatening NATO security. In stark contrast, the U.S. continues to comply with the INF Treaty as well as other arms control commitments which the Russians violate with seeming impunity.

As President Obama rightly said in his famous 2009 Prague speech, “Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean something.”[lxviii] Even well negotiated arms control agreements such as the INF Treaty have no value absent compliance. Yet Russia seems committed to a policy of non-compliance while Washington largely looks away.

NOTES:



. U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, July 2014), p. 8, available at http://www.state.gov.documents/organization/230108.pdf.


[ii]. U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, July 2013), p. 8, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/212096.pdf.; U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, August 2012), p. 8, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/197295.pdf.


[iii]. Bill Gertz, “Defense Nominee Says US Set to Build INF Missile,” The Washington Free Beacon, February 6, 2015, available at http://freebeacon.com/national-security/defense-nominee-says-us-set-to-build-inf-missile/.


[iv]. Bill Gertz, “Report Shows State Department Lied About Russia Arms Violation,” The Washington Free Beacon, June 9, 2015, available at http://freebeacon.com/national-secu...-department-lied-about-russia-arms-violation/.


Continued....
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Continued.....

[v]. “H.R. 1735—FY16 National Defense Authorization Bill Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,” House Armed Services Committee, 114th Congress, April 24, 2014, available at http://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent. aspx?EventID=103288.


[vi]. Keith B. Payne and Mark Schneider, “Russia Always Cheats on Arms Treaties,” The Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2014, available at http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Payne-Schneider-WSJ-8.19.14.pdf.


[vii]. William Schneider, “Arms Control: The Lesson of Russia’s Serial Treaty Violations,” The Hudson Institute, September 16, 2014, available at http://www.hudson.org/research/10613-arms-control-the-lesson-of-russia-s-serial-treaty-violations.


[viii]. Brian McKeon, “Prepared Statement,” House Armed Services Committee, 114th Congress, December 1, 2015,” available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA18/20151201/104226/HHRG-114-FA18-Wstate-McKeonB-20151201.pdf.


[ix]. U.S. Department of State, Annual Report On Implementation Of The New Start Treaty (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, January 2016), available at http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2016/255558.htm.


[x]. “Hearing to consider the nominations of: Hon. Robert O. Work to be Deputy Secretary of Defense; Hon. Michael J. McCord to be Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); Christine E. Wormuth to be Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Brian P. McKeon to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Hon. David B. Shear to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs; and Eric Rosenbach to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense,” Senate Armed Services Committee, 114th U.S. Congress, February 25, 2014, p. 28, available at http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/14-08 - 2-25-14.pdf.


[xi]. Bill Gertz, “Russians Violating New START Arms Treaty,” The Washington Free Beacon, June 9, 2016, available at http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russians-violating-new-start-arms-treaty/.


[xii]. U.S. Department of State, New START Treaty, Protocol, Part 5, Section V, paragraph 3, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140047.pdf.


[xiii]. U.S. Department of Defense, Protocol on Inspection and Continuous Monitoring Activities, Section VI, paragraph 2, available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/start1/protocols/insp_1-6.htm.


[xiv]. U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, August 2005), p. 13, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/52113.pdf.


[xv]. Ibid., p. 14.


[xvi]. Sven F. Kraemer, “The Krasnoyarsk Saga,” Strategic Review, Winter 1990, pp. 27, 29.


[xvii]. U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, July 2010), p. 8, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/145181.pdf.


[xviii]. “Russian Navy to have nigh-unstoppable hypersonic missiles by 2018 – report,” RT, April 20, 2016, available at https://www.rt.com/news/340397-russian-army-goes-hypersonic/.


[xix]. “Russia testing 6-Mach Zircon hypersonic missile for 5G subs – reports,” RT, March 17, 2016, available at https://www.rt.com/news/335993-russia-tests-hypersonic-missiles/.; “Russia Test-Firing New Hypersonic Zircon Cruise Missiles for 5th-Gen Subs,” Defense Airspace.com, March 17, 2016, available at http://www.defense-aerospace.com/ar...res-new-hypersonic-zircon-cruise-missile.html.


[xx]. “Russia sees hypersonic missiles as a counter to current US Naval superiority,” Next Big Future, June 19, 2016, available at http://nextbigfuture.com/2016/06/russia-sees-hypersonic-missiles-as.html.


[xxi]. Pavel Felgenhauer, “INF Treaty Increasingly in Danger, as Russia Balks at New Missile Defense Base in Romania,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 13, No. 93 (May 12, 2016), available at http://www.Jamestown.org/single/?tx_tt news[tt_news]=45425&no_cache=1#.VzXNKuSRF0Q.


[xxii]. “Kalibr: Russia’s Naval System Upping Cruise Missile Game.” Strategic-culture.org, May 24, 2016, available at http://www.strategic-culture.org/ne...-naval-system-upping-cruise-missile-game.html.


[xxiii]. “Meeting with Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu,” Kremlin.ru, December 8, 2015, available at http://en.kremlin. ru/events/president/news/50892.; “In the course of the last 24 hours, aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces have performed 82 combat sorties engaging 204 terrorist objects in Syria,” Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation, December 9, 2015, available at http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12071355 @egNews.


[xxiv]. “Russian Navy to get 5 coastal defense missile systems by end of 2016 - source (Part 2),” Interfax, July 22, 2016, available at http://dialog.proquest.com/professional/login.


[xxv]. Mark B. Schneider, “Confirmation of Russian Violation and Circumvention of the INF Treaty,” National Institute Information Series, No. 360, (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, February 2014), pp. 4-7, available at http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uplo...-of-Russian-Violations-of-the-INF-Treaty8.pdf.


[xxvi]. Michael Gordon, “U.S. Says Russia Tested Missile, Despite Treaty,” The New York Times, January 29, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/30/world/europe/us-says-russia-tested-missile-despite-treaty.html.


[xxvii]. Ibid.


[xxviii]. U.S. Department of State, “Jen Psaki Spokesperson, Daily Press Briefing,” State.gov, January 30, 2014, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/01/221045.htm.


[xxix]. Schneider, “Confirmation of Russian Violation and Circumvention of the INF Treaty,” op. cit., pp. 5-6.


[xxx]. Jerome Cartillier and Jo Biddle, “US calls on Moscow to get rid of banned arms,” Yahoo News, July 29, 2014, available at http://news.yahoo.com/russia-violat...bG8DYmYxBHBvcwMxBHZ0aWQDRkZHRTAxXzEEc2VjA3Ny#.


[xxxi]. “Rose Gottemoeller: We don’t want to see action-reaction cycle like we saw during the Cold War,” Interfax, June 25, 2015, available at http://www.interfax.com/interview.asp?id=600960.


[xxxii]. Pavel Felgenhauer, “Russia Seeks to Impose New ABM Treaty on the US by Developing BMD,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 7, No. 136 (July 16, 2010), available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ Ttnews[tt_news]=36624.


[xxxiii]. Pavel Felgenhauer, “Moscow Is Ready to Supply Iran With Powerful S-300 Missiles,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 12, No. 71 (April 16, 2015), available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]= 43800&no_cache=1#.VTgxxpN4d0Q. The article has a link to one of his sources for its surface-to-surface role; it was the President of Belarus. Belarus has the S-300 and is presumably aware of its capabilities. See also, “Russian Armed Forces will get five S-400 air defense systems in September-October 2016,” TASS, February 29, 2016, available at http://tass.ru/en/defense/859641.


[xxxiv]. U.S. Department of Defense, The INF Treaty, Article VII, paragraph 3, available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/tc/ treaties/inf/text.htm#article4.


[xxxv]. Schneider, “Confirmation of Russian Violation and Circumvention of the INF Treaty,” op. cit., p. 18.


[xxxvi]. Mark B. Schneider and Keith B. Payne, “Russia Appears to Be Violating the INF Treaty,” NationalReview.com, July 28, 2014, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/artic...ing-inf-treaty-mark-b-schneider-keith-b-payne.


[xxxvii]. “Doomsday Weapon: Russia’s New Missile Shocks and Dazzles US, China,” Sputnik News, March 9, 2016, available at http://sputniknews.com/russia/20160309/1036002714/russia-missile-shocker.html.


[xxxviii]. Jacek Durkalec, “Russia’s Violation of the INF Treaty: Consequences for NATO,” No. 107 (702), The Polish Institute for International Affairs, August 13, 2014, pp. 1-2, available at https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=17932.


[xxxix]. “Áàëëèñòè÷åñêàÿ ðàêåòà ÐÑ-26 ‘Ðóáåæ’ áóäåò ïðèíÿòà íà âîîðóæåíèå Ðàêåòíûõ âîéñê ñòðàòåãè÷åñêîãî íàçíà÷åíèÿ â 2017 ãîäó, ñîîáùèë ÐÈÀ Íîâîñòè èñòî÷íèê â ðîññèéñêîì âîåííîì âåäîìñòâå,” Rgu.ru, March 11, 2016, available at http://rg.ru/2016/05/11/raketu-rubezh-postaviat-na-dezhurstvo-cherez-god.html. (In Russian.)


[xl]. “Russia’s new RS-26 missile not violating New START Treaty, INF Treaty - Defense Ministry source,” Interfax, March 26, 2015, available at http://search.proquest.com/professional/login.


[xli]. Gottemoeller, ”We don’t want to see action-reaction cycle like we saw during the Cold War,” op. cit.


[xlii]. Schneider and Payne, “Russia Appears to Be Violating the INF Treaty,” op. cit.


[xliii]. Ibid.


[xliv]. Viktor Litovkin, “Trans-Siberian Firepower - Russia Just Armed Trains with Nuclear ICBMs,” Russia Behind the Headlines, May 17, 2016, available at http://rbth.com/defence/2016/05/17/russia-to-revive-missile-trains-as-us-launch.


[xlv]. Christopher Ford, “Does ‘New START’ Fumble Reloads and Rail Mobile ICBMs?,” Newparadigmsforum.com, April 26, 2010, available at http://www.newparadigmsforum.com/Ne..._Missile_REloads_and_Rail-Mobile_ICBMs.html.; Heritage Foundation “An Independent Assessment of New START Treaty,” Heritage Foundation, April 30, 2010, available at http:// www.heritage.org/ Research/Reports/2010/04/An.hes-european-defense-system_593839.


[xlvi]. U.S. Senate Resolution of Ratification for the New START Treaty, December 22, 2010, understanding 2b and 2d, available at foreign.senate.gov/download/?id=E4C3A1B3-D023-4F58-8690.


[xlvii]. Jon Kyl, “Treaty with Russia on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms—Resumed,” December 21, 2010, available at https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2010/12/21/senate-section/article/s10888-1.


[xlviii]. “Duma committee may decide to reconsider New START Treaty ratification next week,” Interfax, October 29, 2010, available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/russia-nuclear-start-treaty-duma-nov-256.cfm.


[xlix]. Kremlin.ru, “Meeting with Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu,” op. cit.


[l]. U.S. Department of State, New START Treaty, Protocol, Part 1, definition 23, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140047.pdf


[li]. “Russian strategic aviation to be reinforced with Su-34 frontline bombers,” Interfax-AVN, March 19, 2012, available at http://search.proquest.com/professional/login.


[lii]. U.S. Department of State, New START Treaty, Protocol, Part 1, definition 23, op. cit.


[liii]. “Tu-22M3 launching a Kh-32 cruise missile,” June 27, 2013, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= UtsWTuZQhvQ.; David Cenciotti, “New image of a Russian Tu-22M Backfire with cruise missile emerges,” The Aviationist.com, December 16 2013, available at http://theaviationist.com/2013/12/16/tu-22-cruise-missiles/.; “Russia’s Backfire Bomber Is Back!”, War is Boring, June 13, 2014, available at https://warisboring.com/russias-backfire-bomber-is-back-2618703120b7#.yt12goy29; Alexander Fedor, “Flexible Strategic Fist,” Oborona.ru. December 12, 2015, available at http://www.oborona.ru/includes/periodics/armedforces/2015/1214/145317358/detail.shtml. (In Russian.)


[liv]. “Some 400 ICBMs are on combat duty in Russia – RVSN commander,” Interfax, December 16, 2014, available at http://search.proquest.com/professional/login.


[lv]. Pavel Podvig estimated 311 ICBMs were deployed in January 2014. See Pavel Podvig, “Russian strategic forces in January 2014,” RussianForces.org, January 15, 2015, available at http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/01/russian_strategic_forces_in_20.shtml.


[lvi]. U.S. Department of State, “New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms,” State.gov, January 1, 2015, available at http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/235606.htm.; U.S. Department of State, “New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms,” State.gov, July 1, 2015, available at http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/240062.htm.


[lvii]. Mark Schneider, “Russia’s Growing Strategic Nuclear Forces and New START Treaty Compliance,” Information Series, No. 407 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, June 21, 2016), available at http://www.nipp.org/2016/ 06/21/schneider-mark-russias-growing-strategic-nuclear-forces-and-new-start-treaty-compliance/.


[lviii]. Ibid.; Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Russian and US Strategic Offensive Arms (Fact Sheet),” Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 27, 2011, available at http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/55016EBF869728C1C32578BD0058B349.; U.S. Department of State, “New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms,” State.gov, April 1, 2016, available at http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2016/255377.htm.

[59]. Pavel Podvig, “Project 667BDR/Delta III submarines are alive and well,” Russian Forces.org, August 12, 2016, available at http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/08/project_667bdrdelta_iii_submar.shtml.


[lx]. Bill Gertz, “Russia Doubling Nuclear Warheads,” The Washington Free Beacon, April 1, 2016, available at http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-doubling-nuclear-warheads/.; Bill Gertz, “Russia Deployed Over 150 New Warheads in Past Year,” The Washington Free Beacon, April 6, 2016, available at http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-deployed-150-new-warheads-past-year/.


[lxi]. “New START Nuclear Arms Reduction Treaty Between Russia, US in Details,” Sputnik News, April 8, 2015, available at http://sputniknews.com/politics/20150408/1020602118.html.


[lxii]. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2015,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 71, No. 3 (April, 2015), p. 85, available at http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/3/84.full.pdf+html.


[lxiii]. “Russia to Renew Production of Tu-160 ‘Blackjack’ Strategic Bomber,” Sputnik News, April 29, 2015, available at http://sputniknews.com/military/20150429/1021514706.html.


[lxiv]. Mark B. Schneider, “Nuclear Deterrence in the Context of the European Security Crisis and Beyond,” The Heritage Foundation, December 21, 2015, pp. 4-5, available at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/ 12/nuclear-deterrence-in-the-context-of-the-european-security-crisis-and-beyond.; Piotr Butowski, “Russia’s Air Force 2025,” Air International, January 2014, pp. 98-99.; “Russia to Revive Nuclear Missile Trains—RVSN Commander,” Interfax, December 16, 2014, available at http://search.proquest.com/professional/login.; “Russia Speeds Up Development of New Strategic Bomber,” RIA Novosti, November 28, 2013, available at http://en.ria.ru/ military_news/20131128/185110769/Russia-Speeds-Up-Development-of-New-Strategic-Bomber.html.; “Secret Russian radioactive doomsday torpedo leaked on television,” Telegraph.co.uk, November 12, 2015, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wor...-doomsday-torpedo-leaked-on-television.html.; “Russia to Renew Production of Tu-160 ‘Blackjack’ Strategic Bomber,” Sputnik News, April 29, 2015, available at http://sputniknews.com/military/20150429/1021514706.html.


[lxv]. Josh Rogin, “Obama plans major nuclear policy changes in his final months,” The Washington Post, July 10, 2016, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opin...016/07/10/fef3d5ca-4521-11e6-88d0-6adee48be8b

Dr. Mark Schneider is a senior analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy and a former senior official in the Defense Department.

This article originally appeared at The National Institute for Public Policy.

The views in this Information Series are those of the authors and should not be construed as official U.S. Government policy, the official policy of the National Institute for Public Policy or any of its sponsors. For additional information about this publication or other publications by the National Institute Press, contact: Editor, National Institute Press, 9302 Lee Highway, Suite 750 |Fairfax, VA 22031 | (703) 293-9181 |www.nipp.org. For access to previous issues of the National Institute Press Information Series, please visit http://www.nipp.org/national-institute-press/information-series/.
 

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http://www.bloomberg.com/news/artic...-missile-upgrade-said-to-be-stalled-over-cost

Air Force Ballistic Missile Upgrade Said to Be Stalled Over Cost
Anthony Capaccio
t ACapaccio
August 16, 2016 — 2:00 AM PDT

- Cost estimate gap in the billions of dollars, official says
- Lockheed Martin, Northrop and Boeing competing to build ICBMs


The U.S. Air Force’s program to develop and field a new intercontinental ballistic missile to replace aging Minuteman III weapons is stalled over Pentagon concerns the service underestimated the cost by billions of dollars, according to a defense official familiar with the program.

The service is grappling with a substantial gap between the cost estimate its officials prepared for an Aug. 3 meeting of the Pentagon’s Defense Acquisition Board and one crafted by the department’s office of independent cost assessment, said the official, who asked not to be identified because of the internal debate.

The Air Force last year estimated that the new ICBM program would cost $62.3 billion for research, development and production of as many as 400 missiles as well as command and control systems and infrastructure. Lockheed Martin Corp., Boeing Co. and Northrop Grumman Corp. are all competing to build the new ICBMs.

The uncertainty over costs stems from the fact that the U.S. has not built new ICBMs, which are designed to carry nuclear warheads, for decades. The funding dilemma will likely add to debate over whether coming administrations can afford a “bow wave” of surging nuclear and non-nuclear weapons spending after 2021. Nuclear spending alone could surpass $1 trillion over 30 years if operations, support and construction are included.

‘Level of Complexity’

Air Force Secretary Deborah James last week signaled during a “State of the Air Force” news conference that more work needed to be done to prepare the program for Pentagon approval, without giving additional details.

“If there was something that we learned” from the Defense Acquisition Board meeting it is “the magnitude of this type of ICBM work,” James said. “There is a level of complexity that has to be worked through.”

The latest debate is largely about which data is used to estimate the total cost of the program -- older data which includes information based on programs from the 1960s or only the latest estimates compiled by the Pentagon’s cost analysts, the official said. The Pentagon’s separate assessments are mandated in order to prevent a military service from starting a program with insufficient funds that have to be later shifted from other programs or appropriated by Congress over the Pentagon’s objections.

Reconciling Differences

The Pentagon is prepared to go forward with the missile program but the Air Force needs to reconcile the differences between the independent estimate and what the service thinks it will cost in 2020 and 2021 to develop and procure the program, the official said.

The Air Force and Pentagon are working “to try to ensure that we all have a common understanding of the assumptions” behind the service’s cost position, James said. “We’re working that through.”

There are a number of variables in the Pentagon’s estimate, such as different inflation assumptions that make estimating the program’s cost difficult, the official said. Still, the Air Force estimate is more optimistic in its methodology than the Pentagon’s when it comes to future costs, the official said.

Complicating the issue, a new procurement law requires that at this point in a weapons program -- a so-called Milestone A decision -- the military service chief and secretary must concur with Pentagon acquisition officials on cost, schedule, technical feasibility and performance tradeoffs that have been made to keep it affordable.

The Air Force is currently weighing whether to accept the direction to fund the ICBM program at the higher estimate and where to find the extra money, the official said. The service must agree to the higher forecast or it won’t move forward -- unless the Pentagon allows the Air Force to underfund it, which is unlikely.
 

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http://warontherocks.com/2016/08/the-meaning-of-turkeys-five-million-strong-nationalist-moment/

War on the Rocks
Commentary

The Meaning of Turkey’s Five Million Strong Nationalist Moment

Selim Koru
August 15, 2016

Turkey-Parade-Ground-5-Million

Three weeks after the attempted coup in Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called on citizens to gather at the Yenýkapý (“new gate”) Parade grounds in Istanbul. More than five million people across the country showed up to the event on the Bosphorus’ shores.

A helicopter carried Erdogan — the sole speaker — onto an elevated stage. There stood the tall man, overlooking a scarlet sea of flags beneath him. He opened his speech with the words, “the era of secularist tutelage is over.” The grounds heaved with chants of “Allahu Ekber!” and “tell us to die Reis [leader] and we shall die!” The constitution, Erdogan said, was suspended. He waved a new document in his hand that he said would be put up for a nationwide referendum. This new document stipulates a powerful executive presidency with two legislative chambers (one for civil lawmakers, another for Islamic scholars) and an entirely new defense establishment. Experts likened it to Iran’s governing doctrine of Vilayat-e Faqih (“Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist”).

A few days into what was called “Yenýkapý Türkiye,” footage appeared on government television showing a few junta generals on the night of the coup meeting with the U.S. ambassador. Erdogan immediately announced that Turkey was going to leave NATO and that all remaining Westerners had 48 hours to exit the country. He said, “We know who was holding the leash of the coup plotters. We have seen the enemy.” In an emergency address, President Obama announced that U.S. nuclear weapons had safely been evacuated from Incirlik Air base.

In the following days, groups of young men wearing black headbands started going into Alevi and predominantly secular neighborhoods. Twitter, Facebook, and independent media were banned, but gruesome stories began to spread. In a rare video that hit the web, a whole row of apartments was set aflame, and a man with a black headband was pulling a mother away from her children.

Long lines started to form on Turkey’s borders and in airports. It was hard to find a seaworthy boat on the Aegean coast. The government declared a transition to wartime economy, rationed food and fuel, and introduced a curfew.

Meanwhile, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) — with full support from its Syrian affiliate, the PYD — moved ahead unchecked in the southeast, taking one city after another. Erdogan announced that all men of military age were called to renew their registries. Many who already served were recalled. Turkey’s Syrian border was now one battlespace, Erdogan declared, and Turkey would not only retain its territories in the southeast, but extend the nation to encompass its natural borders once again. It would require great sacrifice, Erdogan said, right before he declared that the country was officially in a state of war.

That’s not how things happened of, course.

Kept you reading though, didn’t it?

Turkey is a popular country among political analysts. In their imagination, Turkey often shifts geopolitical axes, ditches democracy, goes to war, or commits genocide. Perhaps post-World War II generations — fed on a steady diet of “Hitler’s Rise” documentaries and Orwell novels — are primed to look for these things. Yet we haven’t seen them happen.

Here is how events really unfolded after the attempted coup.

Rallying in the Squares and at the New Gate

After the attempted coup, the government called all citizens to occupy public squares on “democracy watch.” At first, this call might really have been meant to deter a possible second coup, but at some point it became clear that the government merely wanted as broad a buy-in to anti-coup activity as possible. Millions of people showed up in squares across the country. The majority of people at these rallies were Erdogan supporters, but there were plenty who obviously weren’t. I stood in Kýzýlay, Ankara’s main square, while the presenters asked the crowd to clap for the opposition parties, all of which had come out against the coup in its early hours. This even included the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), the liberal Kurdish nationalist party that has largely been pointedly excluded from the government’s outreach to the opposition.

The supporters of the pan-Turkic Nationalist Movement Party’s (MHP) are an excitable bunch and already mix well with the AK Party crowd, so it wasn’t hard to have them come out to public squares regularly. Participation from secular-leaning folk, however, was still scarce in the first week, so the Republican People’s Party (CHP) staged its own rally in Istanbul’s Taksim square on July 24. Some thought that participation would be limited, but they needn’t have worried. Thousands of people showed up, all condemning the coup in a festive mood. For the first time, the CHP invited its political opponents from the AK Party, and they obliged.

There really was a massive rally at Yenikapý the weekend before last, but it wasn’t some fascist break from Turkey’s republican history. The “Martyrs and Democracy Rally” was attended by a broad spectrum of society, including seculars, non-Muslims and Alevi. Mehmet Görmez, the head of Turkey’s main religious authority, held a touching prayer for the 241 people who died countering the coup. The grounds did heave with shouts of “Allahu Ekber” all afternoon, but it was meant more as “thank God” than “death to America.” There were many other slogans as well, including secular ones, and people were in a festive mood. Attendees made a game of taking photos with people they would otherwise not talk to — like a guy with a typical Islamic outfit posing with a guy in shorts and cool sunglasses. #Turkeyunited and #TekMilletTekYürek, meaning “one nation, one spirit” were trending on Twitter.

The leader of the MHP, Devlet Bahçeli, quickly agreed to attend the rally at Yenikapý, but the secularist CHP was more divided. According to sources in the CHP, there were those who thought that the attendance of Kilicdaroglu, the party’s leader, would give Erdogan undue legitimacy. Others thought that Kilicdaroglu would risk being sidelined by not attending. At first, Kilicdaroglu politely declined the invitation. But in a highly unusual move, Prime Minister Binali Yýldýrým, President Erdogan, and former President Abdullah Gül called on him several times. In the end, they convinced him to attend.

What Was Said at Yenikapý

Bahçeli, Kýlýçdaroglu, Yýldýrým, Speaker of Parliament Ýsmail Kahraman, and Erdogan spoke in reverse order of protocol. The surprise speaker was Chief of the General Staff Hulusi Akar, who spoke after Bahçeli. He was greeted with chants of “our soldiers are the greatest.” The public perception of the military has suffered greatly as a result of the coup attempt, and Akar’s presence was likely aimed to undo some of that damage.

HDP co-leaders Demirtaþ and Yüksekdag were not invited, nor were they included in the other post-July 15 national unity events. In this sense, Yenikapi draws the boundaries of the national consensus as being the political groups who are loyal to the state as it stands. The HDP, which at times acts as the political arm of the PKK, falls outside of that consensus. To Erdogan, the PKK and Gulenist network are one and the same: unlawful groups seeking to undermine the state’s legitimacy through force. If he had ever considered pulling the HDP away from the PKK’s sphere of influence, he seems to have given up on the idea.

Erdogan’s decision is firmly grounded in political reality. HDP rallies seldom include any Turkish flags, for example, and the party’s supporters have few chants and slogans in common with those gathered on Sunday. It is hard to fathom how Demirtaþ or Yüksekdag would have been able to address the Yenikapi crowd without being booed off the stage. Demirtaþ said in a later speech that he would not have been able to answer his own constituency if he had attended.

Note that this does not mean that “the Kurds” as an ethnic group were not represented in Yenikapi. According to Konda polling, 12 percent of anti-coup protesters in three different locations in Istanbul on July 26 were ethnic Kurds (Kurds make up about 14 percent of Turkey’s population, according to Konda). It is unlikely that the Yenikapi rally was different. Figen Yuksekdag said that Yenikapi represents a “Turkish nationalist coalition.” She is right in the sense that Turkish nationalism here is defined by a base acceptance of the state and its continuation under its present symbols and institutions. Kurdish that meet this definition are Kurdish in ethnicity and culture, but politically Turkish, with many voting for the AK Party. The HDP’s Kurdish nationalism clashes with this notion. That, coupled with its perceived association with the PKK, is why it has been left out by the mainstream.

The two opposition leaders who did attend gave very different speeches. Bahçeli, who is dependent on the AK Party to fight off an insurgency within his party, gave a rousing speech touting the valor of those who diverted the coup. In his classic muscular rhetoric, Bahçeli bashed all he perceived as enemies, at times pointing the finger straight at Turkey’s Western allies, and in particular, the United States. This fit seamlessly with the unchecked anti-American rhetoric of post-July 15 atmosphere. Many MHP and AK Party supporters I know praised the speech as the best of his long political career.

The CHP’s Kilicdaroglu was more reserved. He tried to address some of the root problems that led to the attempted coup. “We should teach our children to use their heads” he said, in reference to the Gülenist network, which often recruited children during middle school. This was also a thinly veiled Kemalist criticism of the AK Party government’s breach of secularism. It suggested that the AK Party, which had been in bed with the Gülenists for the better part of its first decade, could have saved itself from embarrassment and the nation from suffering had it followed enlightened principles rather than romantic notions of Islamist politics. Much of the rest of Kilicdaroglu’s speech covered the rule of law and the democratic process in a way that criticized the government, but didn’t tear at the spirit of unity the day called for.

Prime Minister Yildirim may have made the most conciliatory speech, quoting poets across various points of Turkey’s political spectrum and calling for unity above all else. Speaker Kahraman was more Islamist in his references, taking time to give a history of the Islamization of Anatolia. But considering his reputation for polemics, even he took care not to step on the opposition’s toes.

President Erdogan was last to speak, and his words were remarkable only in how unremarkable they were for him. He stuck to tried and true rhetorical devices, harking back to the Selchukids and the early Ottoman period. He gave a nod to Ataturk and the Republic before launching into attacks on the enemies of the people today, be they in the form of the PKK or the more insidious “FETO” (Fetullahist Terror Organization).

Still, the president did his best to summon up some hope, as politicians must. Erdogan averred that Turkey will meet its 2023 economic goals (set in the heyday of the country’s growth, and now seen as near-impossible). Turkey would transcend the level of “muasir medeniyet” (“contemporary civilization”), the goal Ataturk set for the Republic in his 1923 opening speech in parliament. The military would be rebuilt into something stronger and the country would finally rid itself of the Gülenist menace that had been secretly hindering its rise all this time.

Erdogan used less anti-American rhetoric compared to Bahceli. He limited himself to saying “this scenario [the coup attempt] is far bigger than them,” meaning the Gulenists, and “we know whom they were going to serve our country on a golden platter.”

Anti-American rhetoric has always been a hallmark of the Turkish public sphere. Many Westerners wrongly assume anti-Americanism is the preserve of religious actors, but it actually pervades the political spectrum. However, since the failed coup, this sentiment has reached unprecedented heights. Major newspapers accuse American generals of directing the coup, statements at times matched by senior figures in the government. Turkey’s membership in NATO is for the first time in recent memory a topic of mainstream debate. Erdogan could end this with a wag of his finger. That he chooses not to do so could mean that he is trying to build up some sort of leverage against the United States, which harbors Fetullah Gulen.

At the end, all speakers, as well as statesmen such as former Prime Minster Ahmet Davutoglu and former President (and AK Party co-founder) Abdullah Gul, were called on stage for a joint appearance. It was as close to a family photo as Turkish politics is going to get anytime soon.

What Does It Mean?

Having lived through the attempted coup in Ankara, I sat down on July 16 to write a piece for War on the Rocks. I wrote that I had witnessed a new political energy being released on the right. The coup hanging over it for decades had come, and Erdogan had survived it. The country’s religious right was more emboldened than ever before. I wrote:

At worst, the coup will encourage the AK Party’s worst attributes and serve as a stepping-stone to a regime that will make the country inhospitable to others. At best, it will be a uniting force in the country’s politics that leads to a new consensus.

The field is still wide open for either of those scenarios to take place, but it seems that Turkey right now is edging towards the second, more conciliatory one. The coup ripped into the political, economic, and social foundation that Turkey is built upon. Some seem to like that. The pro-government media and fringe groups don’t want to put the country back together the way it was. That is why we are hearing a lot of talk of Turkey leaving NATO and turning its back on the West, which really did fail to match and understand Turkey’s emotional reaction to July 15. Yet the political class – not just President Erdogan, but the prime minister and his cabinet – who have to think through the economic and strategic consequences of such actions, have been holding back their voters. They seem worried by the systemic implications of July 15 and want to instead move things back to normal as much as possible.

That is why the Yenikapý event, despite its massive scale, was remarkable for the continuity it displayed. All speakers except Kahraman made references to the foundation of the Republic and Ataturk. All called for the rule of law, a democratic process, and coexistence between different political groups. Erdogan didn’t have to insist on Kilicdaroglu’s presence, but he did. This wasn’t out of a sense of obligation to democratic norms, but a matter of necessity. Kilicdaroglu represents a quarter of the country that could make a lot of trouble for Erdogan. His presence softened the mood and made the country more governable.

The forces that Turkey led to Yenikapi also rallied foreign investors around the country. They knew they were taking on risk, but they were betting that the government would do its best to climb out of its volatile situation. Turkey’s leaders don’t have the luxury not to. Their trolls on Twitter might have fun with conspiracy theories of the American Central Intelligence Agency being behind the coup, but for them to keep driving their German cars, their leaders have to think about the world more seriously. So far, they have.

Similarly, the government cannot afford to bash the military. They are aware that security will be a big challenge in the months and years ahead and have been doing their best to prevent the military’s reputation from being damaged too badly. That is probably why Erdogan invited Hulusi Akar as a last-minute speaker.

But “if we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change,” as the phrase goes. The government cannot ignore its intelligence failure leading up to July 15 and the massive infiltration of government agencies by the Gulen movement. A country-wide purge and institutional reform is not unreasonable in this context.

To clarify, the term “purge” may invoke Stalin, but there really is no comparison between the Gulag and the current waves of suspensions and arrests. Tens of thousands of civil servants, as well as many in the private sector, NGOs, and some journalists have been swept up in these since July 15.

Though the government has thus far not systematically gone beyond Gulenists, this purge upsets a lot of people. Most of those arrested or who lost their jobs may have had something to do with the Gulen movement. However, many in government today did as well, including Erdogan’s son-in-law (and current energy minister), who went to a Gulenist school. This atmosphere is unsettling even strong AK Party supporters. One such friend who kept his position at an important ministry told me “strange people have appeared” who are “observing who sits with whom during lunch breaks.” He says that nothing gets done, and many are appalled by the injustice of some arrests. Another friend at an important ministry has been fired, and says that he will “definitely appeal in court” if given the chance.

He might be. If the government continues this this process, it will be alienating tens of thousands of white collar workers in major cities, and with them, an exponentially larger number of family members and loved ones. This could hurt the AK Party at the ballot box, especially in mayoral elections. President Erdogan is a tremendously popular politician, but even he cannot count on people’s support if he lets the purge get out of hand.

There is a darker side to the ballot box, too,: Turkish politics continues to revolve around defining very clear “in” and “out” groups. Erdogan and his government still focus their rhetoric on bashing their enemies, real or imaginary. The Yenikapi rally marked a welcome truce with the CHP and focused political toxicity across the Atlantic. Yet the structural problem remains.

The reality of Turkey is not the total opposite of the dystopian picture I paint at the beginning of this article. That’s an accomplishment. The country, after all, is host to a secretive Islamic cult trying to take over its government, neighbor to a decade-old war in Iraq, another civil war in Syria that has driven millions of refugees across its borders, a so-called caliphate bent on world conquest, and a group of Kurdish Marxist-Leninist nation-builders. This is not a boring part of the world, and Turkey may still go down a very dark path.

But it hasn’t yet, because it also gravitates very powerfully toward a “normal,” a kind of equilibrium that looks very much like a globalized, European society. That is what we saw shining through Yenikapý.

Selim Koru is an analyst at the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), where he focuses on Turkey’s relations with the Middle East and Asia. You can follow him on Twitter: @SelimKoru.


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5 thoughts on “The Meaning of Turkey’s Five Million Strong Nationalist Moment”

jkuehn50 says:

August 15, 2016 at 9:08 am


Interesting. Published the day after I heard BBC news story about over 200 judges and prosecutors joining the ranks of the purged elites in Turkey.
Interesting. When was the last time an EU member purged tens of thousands of teachers, lawyers, academics, judges, etc?

Germany 1933-1945.

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dtr says:

August 15, 2016 at 12:14 pm


This post is an attempt at apologia …. the message being, “hey, chill out, it coulda been a lot worse”.

Yes, true, it could have been worse this past month … but it may very well get a lot worse before long.

The same could be said in Germany right after the Nazi party’s elected entry into the Weimar Republic government in early 1933 … well before “Krystalnacht”, Hitler’s land grabs, the invasion of Poland and eventually of the Soviet Union, and the “final solution”. Ditto with the Russian Revolution that was eventually co-opted by the bloody Bolsheviks, and eventually taken over by the bloody minded and paranoid Stalin. Great totalitarian horrors are frequently foreshadowed by early, seemingly non-violent consolidations of power within what was thought at the time to be normal nationalistic expressions of cultural unity. And then inevitably, the next shoes begin to drop.

I am sorry, but any government that has the power to effect a purge of all major national institutions of its enemies list virtually overnight is a government that is too powerful for the good of its own people, and for the good of its regional neighbors.

The author is poo-pooing what looks to many like a contrived fake “coup” staged for the benefit of a paranoid strong man leader now seeking dictatorial powers, the modern Turkish version of the Reichstag Fire … a coup that bore little to no resemblance to prior successful Turkish military coups. The counter-coup response was too well planned and orchestrated to have been an organic response by the masses. The notion of Erdogan “surviving” a real coup is simply not very persuasive at this point.

NATO and the western powers and Turkey’s regional neighbors are not going to poo poo this new strong man regime. More shoes are yet to drop, and stronger responses from others are going to be necessary.

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Ryan Evans says:

August 15, 2016 at 1:29 pm


DTR: While I share many of your concerns about the nature and trajectory of Erdogan’s regime, I have seen zero evidence that this coup was somehow staged and have found all arguments presented to that effect to be unpersuasive. As Aaron Stein has documented here at War on the Rocks and elsewhere, this coup came much closer to succeeding (read: killing or capturing Erdogan) than is commonly understood. The fact that this coup was unlike the Turkish military coups is not a very persuasive observation. The same could have been said about the 1980 coup and 1971 coup, neither of which resembled their predecessors.

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xxPaulCPxx says:

August 15, 2016 at 10:33 pm


I’ve been to Turkey. I like Turkey. I like Turkish people.

Unfortunately, as a culture I find them weak. Why? Because they cannot be insulted. At all. There is no such thing as a Turkish Don Rickles, because he would have been executed at age 5 for crimes against the state. This sounds like it is a minor annoyance – but it’s actually a fundamental weakness.

If you can’t be insulted, then it’s because there is nothing wrong with you. If you can be insulted, it’s either because you did something wrong or it’s because someone conspired against you to make you look bad. Well, obviously a Turkish person cannot do wrong – if you accused them of that you would be insulting them. So when caught in a failure they have to blame outside forces.

How do you run a country if everything wrong with it is due to “terrorists”? If you main competition that you were cozy with previously turns out to be a cult, acknowledge the failure in yourself – don’t come up with patently ridiculous findings of “they are against me, therefor they are terrorists”

When you have to resort to that level of rhetoric, you have proven yourself to be an intellectual child. Erdogan is an intellectual child. Saying that ensures I can no longer travel to Turkey, as I am now an enemy of the state. A simple internet search could link me to my internet ID to my passport at the border. Is that what strong cultures do, or weak ones?

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kansashowdy100 says:

August 16, 2016 at 11:33 am

Unfortunately for Turkey and the rest of the world who enjoyed traveling to Turkey, I only see things getting worse. Turkey is quickly transforming into a fascist totalitarian state, leaving behind the once admired secular society created by Ataturk.

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Housecarl

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https://www.stratfor.com/sample/weekly/chinas-investments-reveal-its-broader-ambitions

China's Investments Reveal Its Broader Ambitions

By Zhixing Zhang & Matthew Bey
August 17, 2016

In November 1979, the Jinghe Share Holding Co. opened its doors in Tokyo, marking China's first overseas investment and the start of the country's transformative economic opening. Today, China has become the world's second-largest investor and biggest supplier of capital. While other markets are in recession, China's economy continues to grow, however slowly. Without question, the gravity of China's economy, coupled with its ever-expanding reach into global affairs, will secure its place of influence in the international system for decades to come.

But the sort of presence Beijing seeks abroad is evolving. For China, as for most countries, investment and acquisition are key components of its strategy for development and, to some extent, national security. Yet as China embarks on the long path leading away from an export-based model of economic growth and toward one dependent on domestic consumption, its investment priorities are shifting. Beijing is gradually replacing its focus on snatching up the developing world's energy and natural resources with an emphasis on acquiring the developed world's value-added industry assets. At the same time, the government's traditional dominance in outward investment is weakening, making room for private enterprises to invest alongside their state-owned peers. Furthermore, China is becoming more careful about its investment decisions, trading a frenzy of hasty purchases for a careful search for quality buys.

By all appearances, China's actions have consistently conformed with these trends for the past two years, even as the scale and size of its investments overseas have steadily risen. But perhaps more important, the new phase of its investment strategy reflects a deeper transformation underway — a change in China's vision of its place in the world.

China 'Goes Out' Into the World

For many years, China's renown as a "global factory" attracted investors from far and wide. Foreign funds were its bread and butter and, in Beijing's eyes, the key to gaining the technology, capital and assistance it needed to build up its fledgling economy. Though China longed to make its mark abroad, Beijing did not begin to systematically invest in or acquire its own projects in other countries until the late 1990s, when it launched its "go out" initiative to expand its economic footprint overseas.

Despite its delayed start, Chinese foreign investment has surged over the past decade. Beijing's insignificant portfolio — worth about $2.9 billion in 2003 and accounting for only 0.45 percent of global investment — climbed to a record-high of $120 billion by 2015 and included many different nations.

For the most part, China's diplomatic relationships and economic needs have determined where and how those funds have been spent. As a country whose development was long driven by low-end manufacturing and exports, China was, for decades, motivated to build up its stock of international commodities and increase its control over their supply chains. At the same time, Beijing sought to cultivate its image as a benign emerging power, which meant not exacting many political concessions from the recipients of its funding. But now that China is transitioning to an economic model that rests on domestic consumption, its investment goals — and targets — are changing.

Different Economies With Different Needs

Gone are the days when Beijing aggressively sought the world's mining, oil and natural gas assets. From 2008 to 2013, China spent some $111 billion on the latter two; since then, that figure has dropped to just $7.8 billion. In fact, the country's three biggest energy firms have not made any significant acquisitions abroad since early 2014. China's mining acquisitions have similarly declined after peaking in 2008.

Instead, software, hardware and biotechnology have risen in their place as China begins to follow its developed peers up the value chain. These industries now receive the bulk of China's attention and funding. Over the past two years, Beijing has completed nearly $15 billion worth of mergers and acquisitions in the semiconductor sector alone, and in 2015 its computer chip imports — nearly 14 percent of its total imports — valued some $231 billion. China hopes that the hardware companies it is purchasing now, like the energy assets before, will eventually enable it to produce such items itself.

China's new interests, unsurprisingly, have set its sights on new destinations as well. Though Beijing continues to invest in infrastructure projects in the developing world, their share of total Chinese foreign investment is diminishing. Meanwhile, the flow of Chinese funds into the developed states of Western Europe, Asia and North America continues to expand; it is expected to reach roughly $150 billion this year. (By comparison, China's deals in the developing world total about $25 billion.) In all likelihood, this trend will hold as China continues to bid aggressively on Western companies in technology-related sectors.

Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of this shift, though, is the type of company moving overseas. Historically, most of the investment flowing from China has come from its state-owned enterprises. Now, private Chinese companies such as Alibaba, Tencent and Baidu are among the firms most assertively buying up foreign assets. In many ways this is a testament to the broader changes underway in China, where an expanding economy has given rise to a flourishing private sector. The active participation of private Chinese companies in the country's investment abroad has imposed some limits on the politicization of Chinese business decisions. Even so, Beijing's investment strategy remains tightly entwined with its broader geopolitical ambitions, particularly in the developing world.

Creating a Global Vision

Contrary to popular belief, a coherent global strategy emerged from China only a few years ago, and it will take many years more to fully solidify. For decades, Beijing's outward-facing policies — those in foreign affairs, trade and investment — were largely guided by domestic priorities, not by a grand strategy. As a result, they were often described as reactive, inconsistent and, at times, contradictory. Nevertheless, this freewheeling approach also granted China the flexibility to navigate its options without the constraints imposed by specific plans or obligations — an especially useful ability as China tried to figure out how to move from the sidelines to the spotlight.

As China stepped onto the world stage, its leaders realized that they needed a cohesive vision to align their country's growth, interests and outreach. The recognition gave rise to a host of grand initiatives, starting in late 2013, that culminated in the One Belt, One Road program and the policies it entailed. The project aims to integrate the Eurasian continent by deepening diplomatic, commercial and financial cooperation and building up infrastructural connectivity within the region.

Of course, Chinese foreign investment will not be bound to these goals alone. The One Belt, One Road initiative is more an evolving concept than a formal strategy. Nevertheless, it is representative of how China perceives its strategic position and priorities abroad within the context of its dramatic transformation at home — and how that perception will shape its decisions moving forward. For one, Beijing clearly has already placed some emphasis on linking China to its neighbors through infrastructure and transport projects. According the PricewaterhouseCoopers, some $250 billion in such projects are already under construction or have been agreed on, including the ambitious China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor. China will likely continue to channel its massive and readily available pool of capital into regional connectivity projects in the short term.

Moreover, Beijing has worked hard to promote advanced manufacturing as a way of boosting China's position in the global value chain and expanding its international presence. High-speed rail and nuclear projects, in particular, have caught Beijing's attention, and it has pursued several related state-led contracts with countries in Central and Southeast Asia as well as Europe. Developing high-value industries is no easy task, however, and it continues to pose a daunting challenge to Chinese leaders.

Solving the Perception Problem

As China remolds its foreign investment to better fit with its developing global strategy, many of its projects could fall victim to the reputation that precedes it. China often pursues, as it has in the past, investments and acquisitions with an eye toward gaining access to the host country. This attitude, however, frequently endangers commercial interests there as well, which could engender local suspicion or resentment of Chinese investment.

Likewise, China has a habit of linking its projects to its relationships with partnering countries. Though this can be beneficial to all parties when projects run smoothly, it can also undermine or even disrupt China's bilateral ties when obstacles arise. For instance, President Xi Jinping hailed the Hinkley Point nuclear plant — of which China owns a one-third stake — as the start of a "golden age" of Sino-British relations during his visit to the United Kingdom in 2015. But when British Prime Minister Theresa May delayed approval of the plant last month, citing national security concerns, Beijing announced that it would not tolerate "unwanted accusations" about its investments. Such pronouncements are often received negatively by other states, hampering China's efforts to expand its international reach.

In more tangible terms, China's perceptual problem has also caused a number of potentially lucrative deals to go awry. China's acquisition of Germany's Kuka Robotics, for example, created an instant political dispute between Beijing and Berlin, centered on questions of China's intentions for the company. The deal eventually went through, but as China's economy continues to develop, it will be forced to compete more directly with the West in areas such as manufacturing. And as foreign concerns over corporate espionage and the theft of technology continue to hang over China and the companies it buys, Beijing will find its negative image increasingly difficult to shake.

Reprinted with permission from Stratfor.
 

Housecarl

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http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-...-69-years-kashmir-is-torn-by-deadly-strife-3/

Nation & World

AP EXPLAINS: For 69 years, Kashmir is torn by deadly strife

Originally published August 16, 2016 at 6:47 pm | Updated August 16, 2016 at 11:42 pm

By AIJAZ HUSSAIN
The Associated Press

SRINAGAR, India (AP) — When news spread in early July that Indian troops had killed a charismatic commander of Indian-controlled Kashmir’s biggest rebel group, the public response was spontaneous and immense. Tens of thousands of angry youths poured out of their homes in towns and villages across the Himalayan region, hurling rocks and bricks and clashing with Indian troops.

A strict curfew and a series of communications blackouts since then have failed to stop the protesters, who are seeking an end to Indian rule in Kashmir, even as residents have struggled to cope with shortages of food, medicine and other necessities. The clashes, with protesters mostly throwing rocks and government forces responding with bullets and shotgun pellets, has left more than 60 civilians and two policemen dead. Thousands of civilians have been injured and hundreds of members of various government security forces. On Wednesday, two soldiers were killed when they were ambushed by suspected rebels near the town of Baramulla, army officials said.

But Kashmir’s fury at Indian rule is not new. The stunning mountain region has known little but conflict since 1947, when British rule of the subcontinent ended with the creation of India and Pakistan.

___


THE HISTORY

In 1947, the kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir was asked to join with either India or Pakistan. But Maharaja Hari Singh, the unpopular Hindu ruler of the Muslim-majority region, wanted to stay independent.

However, local armed uprisings that flared in various parts of Kashmir, along with a raid by tribesmen from northwestern Pakistan, forced Singh to seek help from India, which offered military assistance on condition that the kingdom link itself to India. The ruler accepted, but insisted that Kashmir remain a largely autonomous state within the Indian union, with India managing its foreign affairs, defense and telecommunications.

The Indian military entered the region soon after, with the tribal raid spiraling into the first of two wars between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The first war ended in 1948 with a U.N.-brokered cease-fire. Nonetheless, Kashmir was divided between the two young nations by the heavily militarized Line of Control, with the promise of a U.N.-sponsored referendum in the future.

In Indian-controlled Kashmir, many saw the transition as the mere transfer of power from their Hindu king to Hindu-majority India. Kashmiri discontent against India started taking root as successive Indian governments breached the pact of Kashmir’s autonomy. Local governments were toppled one after another, and largely peaceful movements against Indian control were suppressed harshly.

Pakistan regularly raised the Kashmir dispute in international forums, including in the U.N. Meanwhile, India began calling the region an integral part of the nation, insisting that Kashmir’s lawmakers had ratified the accession to New Delhi.

As the deadlock persisted, India and Pakistan went to war again in 1965, with little changing on the ground. Several rounds of talks followed, but the impasse continued.

In the mid-1980s, dissident political groups in Indian-held Kashmir united to contest elections for the state assembly. The Muslim United Front quickly emerged as a formidable force against Kashmir’s pro-India political elite. However, the United Front lost the 1987 election, which was widely believed to have been heavily rigged.

A strong public backlash followed. Some young United Front activists crossed over to Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, where the Pakistani military began arming and training Kashmiri nationalists.

By 1989, Kashmir was in the throes of a full-blown rebellion.

India poured more troops into the already heavily militarized region. In response, thousands of Kashmiris streamed back from the Pakistani-controlled portion with weapons, staging bloody attacks on Indian security forces and pro-India Kashmiri politicians. Indian soldiers, empowered with emergency laws giving them legal impunity, carried out a brutal military crackdown, leaving Kashmiris exhausted and traumatized. More than 68,000 people have been killed since then.

Kashmir rebels suffered a major setback after 9/11, when the U.S. pressured Pakistan to rein in the militants. Indian troops largely crushed the militancy after that, though popular demands for “azadi,” – freedom – remain ingrained in the Kashmiri psyche.

In the last decade, the region has made a transition from armed rebellion to unarmed uprisings, with tens of thousands of civilians repeatedly taking to the streets to protest Indian rule, often leading to clashes between rock-throwing residents and Indian troops. The protests are usually quelled by force, often resulting in deaths.

___

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

In 2008, a government decision — later revoked — to transfer land to a Hindu shrine in Kashmir set off a summer of protests. The following year, the alleged rape and murder of two young women by government forces set off fresh violence.

In 2010, the trigger for protests was a police investigation into allegations that soldiers had shot three civilians dead, and then staged a fake gun battle to make it appear that the dead were militants in order to claim rewards for the killings.

Over those three years hundreds of thousands of young men and women took to the streets, hurling rocks and insults at Indian forces. At least 200 people were killed and hundreds wounded as troops fired into the crowds, inciting further protests.

The crackdowns appear to be pushing many educated young Kashmiris, who grew up politically radicalized amid decades of brutal conflict, toward armed rebel groups. Young Kashmiri boys began snatching weapons from Indian forces and training themselves deep inside Kashmir’s forests.

Despite that, the number of militants has apparently remained tiny, with security experts estimating there has not been more than 200 for the last several years.

___

ANTI-INDIA GROUPS

The All Parties Hurriyat Conference is a conglomerate of social, religious and political groups formed in 1993. It advocates the U.N.-sponsored right to self-determination for Kashmir or three-way talks that include India, Pakistan and Kashmiri leadership to resolve the dispute.

The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front was one of the first armed rebel groups. It favors an independent, united Kashmir. Currently led by Mohammed Yasin Malik, the group gave up armed rebellion in 1994, soon after Indian authorities released Malik from jail after four years.

Hizbul Mujahideen is Kashmir’s largest and only surviving indigenous armed rebel group. Formed in 1990, the group demands Kashmir’s merger with Pakistan. Its supreme commander, Syed Salahuddin, is based in Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. The group was led in Indian Kashmir by Burhan Wani until his death on July 8, which sparked the current clashes.

Lashkar-e-Taiba is a Pakistan-based group fighting for the merger of Indian-controlled Kashmir with Pakistan. The United States lists it as a terrorist group. Its leader, Hafiz Saeed, is on a U.S. terrorist list, with a $10 million bounty on his head. He’s also one of India’s most wanted men. New Delhi blames the group for several deadly attacks in Kashmir and Indian cities, including the 2008 Mumbai attack that killed 166 people.

___

PRO-INDIA GROUPS

The Jammu Kashmir National Conference is a pro-India political group that has ruled Kashmir for much of the time since 1947. Its most recent leaders, Farooq Abdullah and his son Omar Abdullah, the current opposition leader in the state assembly, are seen as the strongest proponents of India in Kashmir.

The Jammu Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party emerged in the early 2000s as the strongest opponent to the National Conference, strategically using pro-separatist views for electoral gains. It came to power in 2002. It currently rules Indian-controlled Kashmir in coalition with India’s ruling Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party.

___

Follow Aijaz Hussain at www.twitter.com/hussain_aijaz
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/artic...stan-ties-grow?cmpid=yhoo.headline&yptr=yahoo

Modi Sends Warning Shot to China, Pakistan on Territory Spat

Iain Marlow
August 16, 2016 — 2:00 PM PDT
Updated on August 16, 2016 — 10:51 PM PDT

- Comments come after weeks of violence and tension in Kashmir

- Indian PM raised Balochistan, a restive region of Pakistan


From the sandstone walls of the 17th-century Red Fort in India’s capital, Prime Minister Narendra Modi sent a warning shot this week to his counterparts in Islamabad and Beijing.

Modi’s reference to disputed territories on Monday during his annual Independence Day speech -- his most high-profile appearance of the year -- signaled that India would become more aggressive in asserting its claims to Pakistan-controlled areas of Kashmir. The region is a key transit point in the $45 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor known as CPEC that will give Beijing access to the Arabian Sea through the port of Gwadar.


"This is a recalibration" after Modi’s overtures to Pakistan and China failed to yield results, says Harsh V. Pant, a professor of international relations at King’s College London. It’s also a message to China: "You may be investing a lot in Pakistan, and think that CPEC is a done deal, but without India’s approval you might find it difficult to follow through."

A more vocal India threatens to raise tensions in a region rife with deep-seated historical animosity that has made South Asia one of the world’s least economically interconnected regions. Various insurgents and militant groups threaten both China’s investments in Pakistan and progress in India-controlled Kashmir, where recent violence has killed about 60 people.

While India is more likely to redouble efforts on developing transport links with Iran and Afghanistan than sabotage China-Pakistan projects, the saber-rattling may deal a setback to investor confidence in the region, according to Michael Kugelman, senior associate at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington.

“The bottom line is that in a volatile region like South Asia, you don’t need actual aggressive actions to cause economic consequences," he said. “Mere threats can have a very real effect on the economic state of play as well."

In a bold rhetorical move on Monday, Modi overtly referred to the region of Balochistan, a resource-rich, insurgency-riven Pakistani province that is home to the strategic deep-water port of Gwadar. He also mentioned Gilgit, a Pakistan-administered region that borders China and Afghanistan -- the northernmost edge of the planned economic corridor.

‘Expressed Gratitude’

“I want to express my gratitude to some people -- the people of Balochistan, Gilgit and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir -- for the way they whole-heartedly thanked me, the way they expressed gratitude to me, the way they conveyed their goodwill to me recently," Modi said in his speech.

The mention of Balochistan was particularly provocative. Pakistan has long accused India of backing rebels in the region, a charge governments in New Delhi routinely denied even while they blamed Pakistan for backing militants in Kashmir. While Pakistan condemns Indian security forces in Kashmir, human rights groups have expressed concern about disappearances and extrajudicial killings in Balochistan by Pakistan’s military, intelligence and paramilitary forces.

Modi’s comments prove Pakistan’s contention that Indian intelligence agencies are “fomenting terrorism in Balochistan," Pakistan’s foreign ministry said in a statement on Monday. It also said the remarks were meant to divert attention from protests in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, where dozens of protesters have been killed in the past month.

‘Not a Zero-Sum Game’

China has long played a role in developing parts of Kashmir in Pakistan. It helped build a highway through the region that opened in the 1970s, and recently conducted joint patrols with Pakistan in the area.

China’s foreign ministry didn’t reply to faxed questions on Modi’s comments. The ministry has repeatedly said that China hopes India and Pakistan can resolve Kashmir territorial disputes through peaceful means.

"The CPEC is not a zero-sum game where Pakistan gains and India loses," Global Times, a state-owned Chinese newspaper, said on Tuesday. "If economic cooperation between China and Pakistan can improve infrastructure in the region, including in the Kashmir area, India will have an opportunity to expand trade routes to Central Asia."

Decades-Old Dispute

Modi’s remarks tap into historic grievances in a sensitive and contested part of Asia.

The dispute over Kashmir dates from the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. Like Kashmir, the Khanate of Kalat -- which makes up much of modern day Balochistan -- didn’t immediately choose to join India or Pakistan at the time of partition. Gilgit-Baltistan, which borders Jammu and Kashmir, is a majority Shia area in Sunni-majority Pakistan, and has in recent years seen sectarian strife.

Indian and Pakistani armies fought over Kashmir and settled into a stalemate with a de-facto border along the so-called Line of Control. In 1948, Pakistan forcibly annexed Balochistan, and its army has in recent years "crushed" several insurgencies and revolts there, according to Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s former envoy to Washington.

‘Modi Has Upped The Ante’

"By speaking of human rights violations in Balochistan, Prime Minister Modi has upped the ante in India’s tense relations with Pakistan," Haqqani wrote in an e-mail. While Modi probably hopes his comments will dissuade Pakistan from doing the same thing in Indian-controlled Kashmir, such rhetoric is only likely to "exacerbate the paranoia that has characterized Pakistan’s attitude towards India."

Modi’s remarks are the clearest signal yet of Indian concern over Pakistan-China economic cooperation, according to Ashok Malik, head of the New Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation’s Neighbourhood Regional Studies Initiative.

“When a prime minister says something of this nature on Independence Day, he’s not floating a balloon," Malik said. "It means India will use its muscle, its propaganda muscle at least, to talk about Balochistan and trouble in Balochistan."
 

Housecarl

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http://theweek.com/articles/643084/american-bombers-move-within-striking-distance-china-north-korea

Feature

American bombers move to within striking distance of China and North Korea

FROM WAR IS BORING
Joseph Trevithick
August 16, 2016

Talk about unusual. On Aug. 10, the U.S. Air Force announced it had sent its B-2 Spirit stealth bombers to join older, non-stealthy B-52 Stratofortresses and B-1 Lancers on Guam.

It's an extraordinary show of force in the Pacific region, because for the first time ever, America has based all three heavy bomber types on the island at once.

Deborah Lee James, the Air Force secretary, described the deployments as providing a "valuable opportunity for our bomber crews to integrate and train together, as well as with our allies and partners through the region in a variety of missions."

But James did not elaborate on just how unusual the arrangement actually is, nor did she expand on any deeper possible reasons for basing Spirits, Lancers, and Stratofortresses at the same base at same time  —  all within striking distance of China and North Korea.

To be sure, the Pentagon regularly deploys far-reaching bombers to Andersen Air Force Base. However, North Korean nuclear and missile tests, Beijing's expansionism in the South China Sea and the U.S. Air Force's own plans to buy new, long-range weapons have given new weight to these deployments.

The latest deployment began on Aug. 6 when a group of B-1s arrived at Guam to take over from the B-52s. These aircraft were part of what the Pentagon calls the "Continuous Bomber Presence" mission, or CBP. The B-52s will head back to the continental United States at the end of August.

On Aug. 10, the B-2s landed for a separate but similar "bomber assurance and deterrence deployment," or BAAD. We don't know when the stealth bombers and their crews will return home to their base in Missouri.

Each bomber is considerably different from each other. The sleek B-1 can fly faster than the speed of sound while lugging nearly 40 tons of bombs in three internal weapons bays. The jet has a maximum range of nearly 6,000 miles.

The massive B-52 Stratofortress, however, flies much slower with a slightly smaller bomb load, but can travel almost 3,000 miles farther before needing to land. The B-2 Spirit holds much less ordnance, but the unique flying wing shape and other stealth features makes it virtually invisible to enemy radar.

Historically, both the CBP and BAAD missions have been linked to North Korean saber rattling.

On Jan. 29, 2002, then-president George W. Bush famously grouped the reclusive regime together with Iraq and Iran as the "Axis of Evil." More than a year later, the Air Force sent two dozen B-1s and B-52s to Guam to form a new bomber wing at the base. In 2004, this wing took over the CBP mission.

The initial deployment "during spring 2003 was the first glimmer that a new bomber era was dawning at Andersen," historians for the base's 36th Wing wrote in a overview of operations from 2004 to 2006. "Parallels exist between the current bomber situation and Andersen's heyday as a bomber base."

War Is Boring obtained a copy of this historical review via the Freedom of Information Act.

During the Cold War, the United States based nuclear-armed B-52 bombers on Guam in case of war with the Soviet Union or China. While those wars thankfully never broke out, during the Vietnam War the lumbering Stratofortresses flew from the remote base to drop conventional bombs.

The newly arrived bombers in the 2000s practiced for a similarly wide range of missions  —  and war games from Australia and Alaska to Hawaii and the East China Sea. The Air Force gave the training flights colorful nicknames such as "Blue Lightning" and "Polar Lightning."

Between August and September 2004, the aircraft took part in one of the massive annual war games the Pentagon runs with its counterparts in South Korea. Three months later, troops on the ground called in mock B-52 strikes based in part on information scooped up by U-2 spy planes, according to the 36th Wing history.

Separately, BAAD was supposed to provide similar shows of force on world-wide level. Still, the Pacific theater seemed to present some of the most likely potential threats.

However, Washington did send bombers on routine trips to the Middle East to show their displeasure of Iran's nuclear program. After Russia invaded Ukraine's Crimea region in February 2014, the flying branch began sending more and more B-52s for practice sessions in Europe.

But fast forward to the present and the Air Force clearly sees the Pacific as one of the most important domain for bombers. During an Aug. 10 press conference at the Pentagon, Gen. David Goldfein  —  the Air Force chief of staff  —  told a reporter he couldn't imagine a similar situation happening at a base in the Middle East or Central Asia.

"I say that only based on what the bomber contributes to the joint fight," said Goldfein, who previously ran the Air Force's top command in the Middle East from 2011 to 2013. "I don't see in the current operational tempo the requirement for more than one bomber squadron to be there at one time."

In the past, B-52s and B-1s in the Middle East have flown only a handful missions against the most common enemies in the region such as the Islamic State. The huge aircraft otherwise sit on call for potential strikes on a nation-state opponent.

In contrast, the Pentagon's top command in the Pacific must contend with North Korean provocations and Chinese ambitions. In 2016 alone, Pyongyang has tested more than 10 missiles that might be able to carry an atomic bomb.

In July, Beijing sent one of its own H-6K bombers to fly over the disputed Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. That month, among a host of other rulings, a U.N. tribunal declared Chinese ships had illegally blocked Philippine fisherman from entering the area.

China's nominally civilian maritime police force has routinely blocked foreign activities around Scarborough and other small islands to help reinforce Beijing's claims. Chinese officials have also recently boasted about a slew of new, deadly surface to air and ballistic missiles that could challenge American planes and ships.

But sending three different types of heavy bomber to a single base thousands of miles from home is something only the Pentagon can do. Given recent events, it's unlikely this impressive show of military power was merely a coincidence.

With the help of aerial refueling tankers, long-range bombers have an ability to reach hot spots that shorter-range planes or other weapons simply can't go … at least at a moment's notice.

The Air Force also wants to buy expensive new stealth bombers, cruise missiles, and other advanced weapons, and to pressure Congress, has been quick to point out its ability to fly long-distance missions from strategic outposts such as  —  hint hint  —  Guam.

Earlier in 2016, the flying branch found itself in a major squabble with members of Congress over the total cost of its upcoming and still super-secret B-21 bomber.

"Air Force leaders have claimed that disclosing the total contract award value would make it easier for America's adversaries to decipher sensitive information about the B-21," Arizona senator John McCain, an outspoken critic of the contract, wrote in an op-ed for War Is Boring. "Nonsense."

So, perhaps the Air Force hopes the confluence of bombers in the Pacific might send an equally powerful message to American lawmakers in Washington.

Speaking with Gen. Goldfein on Aug. 10, Secretary James asked legislators to fund the full annual defense budget rather than provide funds through so-called "continuing resolutions" that only set aside money for short periods.

James specifically pointed out how this process could stall development of the B-21. Another short-term resolution "would slow everything down and risk a long-term deterrent capability, which we hope to have in the 2020 decade time-frame."

If the Air Force can convince Congress, it's possible that yet another type of American bomber might be showing off in Guam sometime in the next 15 years.
 

Housecarl

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Posted for fair use.....
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2016/08/162_212119.html

Posted : 2016-08-17 17:03
Updated : 2016-08-17 17:12

North Korea's nuclear threat

음성듣기
By Lee Hyon-soo

North Korea seems to have succeeded in producing nuclear weapons. North Korea is now making an all-out effort to miniaturize nuclear warheads while developing both submarine-launched and intercontinental ballistic missiles on which to mount them. It is a matter of time before North Korea deploys nuclear weapons.

Why is North Korea determined to possess nuclear weapons against all odds? One plausible explanation is that North Korean leaders feel that they cannot defend their country by conventional weapons and that they also want to gain hegemony over South Korea by virtue of nuclear weapons.

It is generally accepted that deterrence is the raison d'etre of their nuclear arsenal. But North Korean leaders surprise us by publicly stating that even if their country is not attacked, they may use nuclear weapons against South Korea and even the United States, if they so choose.

Not only does North Korea's nuclear weapons program threaten the security of South Korea but it also disrupts world peace through the weakening of the NPT (Nonproliferation Treaty). Furthermore, there is a possibility that cash-strapped North Korea may sell nuclear weapons to other rogue states or even to terrorists.

The United States and South Korea have tried to talk North Korea out of making nuclear weapons over the past 20-odd years, bilaterally as well as via the six-party talks. But such efforts failed to produce the desired results. That is why harsh sanctions are being imposed on North Korea by the international community. The screws will be tightened until North Korea realizes that it cannot survive under international sanctions and gives up its nuclear weapons program.

As South Korea bears the brunt of North Korea's nuclear threat, it cannot expect the international community to solve North Korea's nuclear problem, while sitting on the sidelines and doing nothing of its own. So South Korea recently bit the bullet by closing the Gaeseong Industrial Complex. This controversial action was taken to cut off the flow of U.S. dollars which can be used for North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

South Korea cannot stay defenseless against North Korea's nuclear threat. So it recently decided to deploy the Lockheed Martin THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) anti-missile system.

Some opinion leaders of South Korea have voiced opposition to the deployment of the THAAD battery on the grounds that it is not foolproof and does not have the capacity to intercept all of the North Korean missiles. Even so, isn't THAAD better than nothing? Also, what makes them think that the South Korean military will stand idly by and let the North Koreans keep launching missiles? When push comes to shove, nothing will prevent South Korea from carrying out a preemptive strike on North Korea.

For reasons best known to itself, China objects to the THAAD deployment. But I don't believe South Korea will buckle under Chinese pressure and compromise its own security. It is unfair for China to attempt to dissuade South Korea from taking a defensive measure, while either acquiescing North Korea's nuclear weapons program or not doing enough to carry out UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea.

Some opinion leaders who should know better argue that dialogue – not sanctions – is the only way North Korea's nuclear problem can be solved. But they seem to forget that talking with the North Koreans turned out to be a waste of time. They never came to the negotiating table in good faith because it was not their intention to abandon their nuclear weapons program, come what may.

South Korea should do everything in its power to defend itself against North Korea's nuclear threat. In addition to THAAD deployment, South Korea will have to ensure that the U.S. nuclear umbrella remains intact as per the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty.

The writer is a retired international banker who lives in Toronto, Canada. His other writings are posted on http://blog.daum.net/tom_hslee.
 

Housecarl

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Hummm.....Chinese sourced article....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.ecns.cn/voices/2016/08-17/222922.shtml

Voices

Abe's true nuclear ambitions laid bare

2016-08-17 10:00Global Times Editor: Li Yan

The Washington Post reported on Monday that the U.S. government is mulling a "no first use" nuclear weapons policy. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe privately communicated his concerns to the White House via the head of the U.S. Pacific Command, Harry Harris, saying the deterrence against North Korea will suffer and the risk of conflicts will escalate.

Due to the lobbying of some worrisome allies, the Obama administration has not put the idea into practice.

Most experts do not believe the change will happen. Obama is simply making a final gesture to the outside, showing his intention to build a nuclear-free world, so he can leave the Oval Office as a fruitful and friendly leader.

It doesn't matter if Tokyo likes it or not, Obama's wish can hardly become reality. He won't even get sufficient support from Congress. But Abe's reaction to this impractical idea deserves our attention.

As the only country that has been attacked by nuclear bombs, Japan, especially Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is still living in a lingering nightmare. Citizens in the two cities keep demanding the Japanese government lobby the U.S. to adopt a "no first use" nuclear policy. Besides, Japan has entitled the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as its national policy for years. Japan should have been firm in its support for the U.S. to make the historic change.

Japan is under the U.S.' nuclear umbrella, fearing the deterrence will be weakened if the U.S. stops using nuclear weapons first. Tokyo hopes every country that threatens Japan has to consider the risk of being nuked by the U.S. In other words, even without nuclear weapons, Japan is still able to launch nuclear strikes.

Does this logic make sense for a so-called pacifist country that is under a pacifist constitution?

If the U.S. adopts a "no first use" policy, this will alter the whole picture of the global situation of nuclear weapons. Other nuclear states will have to follow suit, and the odds of a nuclear arms race will be much lessened. The trend will lead to a nuclear-free world.

Among all the nuclear powerhouses, only China has made the "no first-use" commitment, the second day after its first nuclear test. Obama seems to want to equal China in this case, but he hasn't walked the talk.

Now, if even Abe, the most docile lackey of the U.S., can file a complaint to the U.S. on this case, it seems really difficult for a White House master to overcome barriers and do something good for mankind.

We don't know which Abe really wants to defend against, North Korea and its ill-developed nuclear weapons, or China.

After Obama's term ends, the concept of nuclear-free world might be given the cold shoulder. Abe's response to Obama's last-minute effort to promote the concept has shown his true colors. Japan is fully capable of developing nuclear weapons, and now we know better about its ambitions.

Related news

Abe sends worrying sign of forgetting war past
2016-08-11

Abe looking to build consensus for change to pacifist Constitution
2016-06-27

China urges 'peaceful development path' as Abe gov't passes biggest defense budget
2015-12-25

Japan plans to 'go on offense' with 300 km-range missiles
2016-08-15
 
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Housecarl

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http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/20...-korea-confirms-restart-plutonium-processing/

North Korea confirms restart of plutonium processing

Kyodo, Staff Report
Aug 17, 2016
Article history

PYONGYANG – North Korea confirmed Wednesday it has resumed plutonium production and said it has no plans to stop nuclear tests as long as perceived threats from the United States continue.

“We have reprocessed spent nuclear fuel rods removed from a graphite-moderated reactor,” the Atomic Energy Institute, which holds jurisdiction over North Korea’s main nuclear facilities at its Nyongbyon complex, said in a written interview with Kyodo News.

In its first-ever response to foreign media questions, the institute also said North Korea has been producing highly enriched uranium necessary for nuclear arms and power “as scheduled.”

The institute, however, stopped short of disclosing the amount of plutonium or enriched uranium North Korea has produced, saying it wants to leave that to the assessments of Western experts.

According to foreign officials and security experts, satellite imagery in recent months indicates there had been some renewed activity at the nuclear complex.

In February, U.S. intelligence chief James Clapper said in a report to Congress that North Korea could recover plutonium, a core material used in making nuclear bombs, from the reactor’s spent fuel within weeks to months.

The comments from the Atomic Energy Institute mark the first clear confirmation by North Korea that it has begun reprocessing since it vowed in 2013 to restart the 5 megawatt reactor and other nuclear facilities at the key complex. The nuclear facilities were shut down under an agreement reached in the six-party talks in 2007.

The resumption of the program means that North Korea will be able to produce more nuclear weapons, although it has been subjected to multiple U.N. sanctions for its tests of atomic and missile technologies.

The research center did not rule out the possibility of conducting a fifth nuclear test and claimed that North Korea has already succeeded in “minimizing, making lighter and diversifying” nuclear weapons.

“Under conditions that the United States constantly threatens us with nuclear weapons, we will not discontinue nuclear tests,” it said.

Earlier this month, in an apparent first, North Korea launched a ballistic missile that fell into waters inside Japan’s exclusive economic zone in the Sea of Japan.

A series of North Korean missile launches and attempted launches since the start of the year have raised concern in Japan, South Korea and the U.S.

Tokyo has ordered the Self-Defense Forces to be ready at any time to shoot down any North Korean missiles that threaten to strike Japan, putting its forces on a state of alert for at least three months, a Defense Ministry official and media was reported as saying on Aug. 8.
 

Housecarl

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https://www.nknews.org/2016/08/clai...-cooperation-impossible-to-verify-researcher/

Claims of Pakistan – N.Korea nuke cooperation impossible to verify: Researcher

Timing of Indian media releases – ahead of Nuclear Supplier Group meeting – was notable

Dagyum Ji
August 17th, 2016

Claims in Indian media that Pakistan is still involved in nuclear cooperation with North Korea, despite ratcheting sanctions following its four nuclear tests, have been impossible to prove, a recent study by a British research organization shows.

The study, which looked into Indian reports alleging Pakistani authorities sold Chinese-made nuclear materials to North Korea, used a variety of open source data sources and shipping records, but was unable to confirm the claims.

“In the current case, the combination of relatively opaque nuclear bureaucracies and various commercial entities in South-East China make it a particular challenge to prove or disprove the allegations made in the Indian press,” said Dr. Stephen Blancke, a researcher at Kings College London’s Project Alpha organization.

Those difficulties, Blancke added, were sharpened by the “the opacity of North Korean operations, and the difficulty in tracking trade to the DPRK”.

ELEPHANT IN ROOM

The timing of the Indian media releases, described by Blancke as the “elephant in the room,” were important to consider when analyzing the claims.

“The reports arrived on the eve of the June plenary meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and appear designed to embarrass Pakistan – and more important, Pakistan’s strategic benefactor, China,” he said.

Difficulties between Pakistan and India, who have long had a troublesome relationship, were particularly noticeable at the 26th Plenary Meeting of the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), held in the capital city of South Korea from 20 to 24 June.

At the event, the issue as to whether the NSG would take up a membership request from both Pakistan and India rose to the surface before the closed-door nuke-related meeting kicked off. Both states are currently outside of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, being quasi-recognized nuclear weapons states.

Blancke said the NSG plenary was the “underlying strategic issue” that had “most likely driven the release” of the Indian claims, at “a key moment in international export control diplomacy.”

JOINING THE DOTS

Blancke used shipping records obtained by Project Alpha to verify Indian allegations that a Chinese company – Beijing Suntech Technology Co Ltd – is likely a trading company that supplies furnaces and provided ‘dual-use goods’ to Pakistani entities, including those involved in ‘Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.’

Such dual-use goods can be used in the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear weapon production, and other strategic applications, as well as having utility in civil industries.

But “whether any of this equipment has then been diverted to the DPRK is unknown,” Blancke concluded of his analysis of Pakistani shipping records.

Blancke also investigated a June 24 report from the Daily Mail India, alleging the transportation of nuclear missile materials from Pakistan to North Korea by sea, using cargo ships on unspecified routes.

But data on the SeaRates.com website showed that “the last regular sea cargo route between Pakistan and North Korea was in 2010,” though Blancke said at least one company still offered shipping services between the two countries.

However, Blancke said ship tracking data was not sufficient to prove sanctioned nuclear trade between the two countries. “Besides the technical problems to track a vessel, North Korean vessels are re-named, or they ship under a foreign flag,” Blancke added.

Reports have long swirled that Pakistan contributed towards North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

Featured Image: Ñóõîãðóç / Dry cargo ship by s☼vraskin_k on 2014-08-09 09:48:58
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Tuesday 16 August 2016
Air Date: August 16, 2016.
JOHN BATCHELOR SHOW
Co-host: Larry Kudlow, CNBC senior advisor; & Cumulus Media radio

http://johnbatchelorshow.com/schedules/tuesday-16-august-2016

Hour Two

Tuesday 16 August 2016 / Hour 2, Block A: Stephen F. Cohen, Prof. Emeritus of Russian Studies/History/Politics at NYU and Princeton; also Board of American Committee for East-West Accord (eastwestaccord.com); in re: Crimean Tatars fighting the Moscow Kremlin for independence, perhaps with Kiev. A fleet of Russian bombers is on Iranian soil, to be deployed against Syrian rebels (of whom the US supports some). The Aleppo battle is ferocious. In Aleppo, the citizens living to the west of the city, the middle class, sides with Assad; the eastern-Aleppo citizens, plus the US, UAE, Saudis, others, are fighting Assad and the Russians, who bomb the hospitals. In Russia, the month of August is seen as a month of shock – 1917, 1991, et al. A time for conspiracy: everyone’s at his dacha, so the plotters have the city to themselves. . . . Putin withdraws from the Minsk Accord. Kiev did not implement the accord out of fear of being overthrown by the ultra-right. Ergo, IMF refuses to turn over the large sums it's promised because Kiev is so extremely corrupt.

The Russian Federal Security Service, or FSB, claimed Wednesday that one of its officers was killed over the weekend near the de facto border between Crimea and Ukraine. Russia seized Crimea from Ukraine in early 2014, then backed a violent uprising in Ukraine’s eastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk. The latter continue to simmer with deadly force, but the line between Crimea and Ukraine had been relatively calm. According to the FSB, the infiltrators were armed with bombs and ammunition, intending to destroy infrastructure in Crimea, and a second attempt occurred Monday with support from Ukrainian artillery, killing a Russian army soldier. Ukraine responded that it was all “fantasy,” a provocation from Russia. There is precious little evidence of what really happened, and this conflict has given new meaning to the old adage that in war, truth is the first casualty. But the FSB announcement sounds suspiciously like a gambit by Mr. Putin, who swiftly vowed revenge. On Thursday, Ukraine’s president, Petro Poroshenko, put his troops on combat alert.

Tuesday 16 August 2016 / Hour 2, Block B: Stephen F. Cohen, Prof. Emeritus of Russian Studies/History/Politics at NYU and Princeton; also Board of American Committee for East-West Accord (eastwestaccord.com); in re: President Vladimir Putin of Russia is again playing with fire. This time, it may be a summer bluff, or it may be a pretext to escalation of war with Ukraine. Either way, it reflects Mr. Putin’s determination to deceive and subvert whenever it suits his goals, at home and abroad, taking advantage of a distracted United States and Europe.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opin...1a3564181a1_story.html?utm_term=.62fdad2a819a ; http://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-putin-discusses-additional-security-...

Tuesday 16 August 2016 / Hour 2, Block C: Stephen F. Cohen, Prof. Emeritus of Russian Studies/History/Politics at NYU and Princeton; also Board of American Committee for East-West Accord (eastwestaccord.com); in re: Aleppo.

Tuesday 16 August 2016 / Hour 2, Block D: Stephen F. Cohen, Prof. Emeritus of Russian Studies/History/Politics at NYU and Princeton; also Board of American Committee for East-West Accord (eastwestaccord.com); in re: Paul Manafort. NYT says he was a gun for hire for Yanukovich to clean up his image (with millions of dollars misplaced?).


https://audioboom.com/boos/4941657-...phen-f-cohen-nyu-princeton-eastwestaccord-com

Tales of the New Cold War: Ukraine Commandos in Crimea. Russian Warplanes in Iran. Stephen F. Cohen, NYU, @princeton EastWestAccord.com.

08-16-2016

(Photo: Tupolev Tu-22M3 at Ryazan Dyagilevo: now also reported deployed in Iran in order to attack Aleppo. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4842214,00.html)

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Tales of the New Cold War: Ukraine Commandos in Crimea. Russian Warplanes in Iran. Stephen F. Cohen, NYU, @princeton EastWestAccord.com.

PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN of Russia is again playing with fire. This time, it may be a summer bluff, or it may be a pretext to escalation of war with Ukraine. Either way, it reflects Mr. Putin’s determination to deceive and subvert whenever it suits his goals, at home and abroad, taking advantage of a distracted United States and Europe.

The Russian Federal Security Service, or FSB, claimed Wednesday that one of its officers was killed over the weekend near the de facto border between Crimea and Ukraine. Russia seized Crimea from Ukraine in early 2014, then backed a violent uprising in Ukraine’s eastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk. The latter continue to simmer with deadly force, but the line between Crimea and Ukraine had been relatively calm. According to the FSB, the infiltrators were armed with bombs and ammunition, intending to destroy infrastructure in Crimea, and a second attempt occurred Monday with support from Ukrainian artillery, killing a Russian army soldier. Ukraine responded that it was all “fantasy,” a provocation from Russia. There is precious little evidence of what really happened, and this conflict has given new meaning to the old adage that in war, truth is the first casualty. But the FSB announcement sounds suspiciously like a gambit by Mr. Putin, who swiftly vowed revenge. On Thursday, Ukraine’s president, Petro Poroshenko, put his troops on combat alert.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opin...1a3564181a1_story.html?utm_term=.62fdad2a819a

http://www.wsj.com/articles/russias...ional-security-measures-for-crimea-1470908089

MOSCOW - Russian bombers based in Iran struck militant targets inside Syria, the Russian Defense Ministry said on Tuesday, after Moscow deployed Russian aircraft to an Iranian air force base to widen its campaign in Syria.

The ministry said the strikes by Tupolev-22M3 long-range bombers and Sukhoi-34 fighter bombers were launched from Iran's Hamadan air base.

It is thought to be the first time Russia has struck targets inside Syria from Iran since it launched a bombing campaign to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in September last year.

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4842214,00.html

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https://audioboom.com/boos/4941839-...ers-erictrager18-washinstitute-simonconstable

Three Years After Rabbaa: Egypt Stable, Turkey Unstable, Moslem Brotherhood in Hiding. BREXIT Lingers. @erictrager18. @washinstitute. @simonconstable.

08-16-2016

(Photo: Rabaa al-Adawiya during the dispersal of Morsi supporter sit-ins - 14 August)

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Three Years After Rabbaa: Egypt Stable, Turkey Unstable, Moslem Brotherhood in Hiding. BREXIT Lingers. @erictrager18. @washinstitute. @simonconstable.

“…For the Brotherhood, Rabaa remains an important symbol of its “steadfastness” in resisting Morsi’s overthrow, and those who were killed at Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda Squares are celebrated as holy martyrs on Brotherhood social media pages and elsewhere. Yet, in recent months, Muslim Brothers have started to reassess their leaders’ failed strategy during that period. In this vein, one Morsi supporter recently asked on Facebook why the Brotherhood simply remained in Rabaa al-Adawiya Square after the Egyptian military issued its 48-hour ultimatum to Morsi on July 1, 2013, rather than mobilizing to the Republican Guard headquarters where Morsi was staying to prevent the military from arresting him.

Of course, these types of questions became even more pertinent after last month’s failed coup in Turkey, as Islamists studied how Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan managed to avoid Morsi’s fate. For example, Amr Farrag, who founded the Brotherhood-affiliated news site Rassd, recalled how on the day after Morsi’s ouster, Muslim Brothers were instructed to deal respectfully with soldiers who were entering and exiting a Ministry of Defense building right next to Rabaa al-Adawiya Square. “Our dear brothers were saying, we are peaceful,” Farrag posted on Facebook. “Our peacefulness is stronger than bullets. Fine, so we got smacked on our necks.”

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/middle-east/where-did-they-go-wrong-1091

TheStreet: Brexit-eers Need To Be 'Swashbuckling' on Trade -- It's Made the U.K. Rich Before

https://www.thestreet.com/story/136...g-on-trade-it-s-made-the-u-k-rich-before.html

TheStreet: Gold Rush Fuels 'Best Year Ever' for Precious Metals Funds

https://www.thestreet.com/story/136...best-year-ever-for-precious-metals-funds.html

Forbes Video: Why Stocks Look Way Overvalued -- S&P's Stovall

http://www.forbes.com/video/5081141915001/

https://audioboom.com/boos/4942051-...-bloombergview?playlist_direction=forward&t=0

Rules of Engagement in Syria: “Don’t Get Shot.” @elilake @bloombergview.

08-16-2016

(Photo: Armed men in uniform identified by Syrian Democratic forces as US special operations forces walk in)

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Rules of Engagement in Syria: “Don’t Get Shot.” @elilake @bloombergview.

https://www.bloomberg.com/view/arti...eorge-soros-threatens-to-make-israel-a-pariah

“…Other U.S. defense officials told me, however, that U.S. special operators in Syria were allowed to defend themselves if they came under fire. But they confirmed that the troops were not engaging in offensive missions. "Our mission in Iraq and Syria is to enable local forces in defeating ISIL -- with air support, intel support, training and equipment," Major Adrian J.T. Rankine-Galloway, a spokesman for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, told me Wednesday. "Our forces always have the right to defend themselves, but they do not engage directly in offensive combat operations."

Behind the scenes, the restrictive rules of engagement have met opposition. U.S. military officials tell me key members of Congress as well as officers on the ground in Syria and Iraq have asked for the flexibility to do more. One such lawmaker is Mac Thornberry, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. The communications director for his committee, Claude Chafin, declined to discuss the matter in detail. But he said, "The chairman is concerned about the restrictions placed on our guys which limit their effectiveness in helping others."

https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-08-11/orders-for-u-s-forces-in-syria-don-t-get-shot

https://www.bloomberg.com/view/arti...-are-saying-trump-is-a-democratic-party-plant

 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://warontherocks.com/2016/08/want-to-build-a-better-proxy-in-syria-lessons-from-tibet/

Commentary

Want to Build a Better Proxy in Syria? Lessons from Tibet

Steve Ferenzi
August 17, 2016

Tibet-Map-LOC

Will Washington abandon its rebel proxies in Syria? Outsourcing ground operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to Syrian rebels has become the preferred option to secure national security objectives in the country. But it carries the weight of significant moral hazard and has already created a series of political embarrassments for President Obama’s administration. Continued rebel setbacks and volatile political dynamics may lead to a fate similar to Tibet’s U.S.-backed insurgency during the Cold War. Or we can learn from past mistakes and maximize the effectiveness of our proxy engagements in Syria.

Building a Better Proxy?

Late entry into the Syrian conflict on the ground handicapped the United States’ ability to select the optimal proxy to fight ISIL. This is the paradox of strategic irregular warfare: On the one hand, if you don’t get in early enough, irregular warfare options become less effective over time as other actors crowd out the political space available to manipulate. On the other hand, the optimal point of entry is also when politicians are most hesitant to intervene due to the twin dangers of escalation and unintended consequences. When political necessity finally forced the United States to jump into the fire, it failed with its efforts to create a proxy force, Division 30, from scratch. This drove the current U.S. approach.

If Washington wishes to gain more from its proxy engagements in Syria today, it must focus on improving control over its proxies.

What is the role of incentives and sanctions in establishing control? Can the U.S. government pay the rebels more for greater ISIL body counts or increased territorial seizures? Should it withhold material support or airstrikes if they fail to follow instructions? We have been through this before. The Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) tried this in Tibet. Conditioning aerial resupply on resistance performance failed to achieve the requisite control, similar to the stagnation we see along the Mare’a Line today.

What about the Kurds? The Syrian Democratic Forces has been the most effective fighting force against ISIL, so why not sink all of our resources into this partnership? The United Sates typically defaults to relying on Kurdish units such as the Peshmerga and Syrian Democratic Forces because of their cohesion and fighting prowess. But as the United States experienced in Iraq, the Kurds can only go so far before they encroach on Arab territory and draw backlash from locals. Fear of upsetting the delicate balancing act with Turkey is the primary reason why the United States has devoted so much effort to portray the Syrian Democratic Forces as a multi-ethnic, Arab-inclusive force despite its overwhelming Kurdish composition.

For many of us coming of age in the mid-1990’s, watching Rage Against the Machine and the Beastie Boys rock the Tibetan Freedom Concerts is the extent of our knowledge pertaining to this part of the world. But there is a much deeper and broader story to be told that holds for the fight against ISIL today.

Two dilemmas plague a sponsor’s ability to execute proxy warfare: selecting the optimal proxy, and making it perform as intended. These stem from the principal-agent relationship inherent in outsourcing national security objectives to rebel organizations in order to avoid the prohibitive costs of direct military intervention. Despite lacking complete information about a proxy’s true capabilities and intentions, the sponsor employs the proxy to complete a task that it is either unable or unwilling to execute. This information asymmetry may incentivize the proxy to deviate from the sponsor’s directives in pursuit of its own goals while still receiving the benefits of the relationship.

Lessons from Tibet

The United States executed a covert action campaign, code-named ST CIRCUS, in support of the Tibetan resistance to contain Communist Chinese expansion from 1956 to 1974. The C.I.A. abandoned its support for the insurgency in 1974 due to decreasing returns on its investment and the liability posed by the operation to President Nixon’s rapprochement with China. The Tibetans became the “worthy but hapless orphans of the Cold War.”

Three primary lessons from Tibet concerning the issues of proxy selection and control apply to Syria.

Lack of embedded advisors reduces control over the proxy. A sponsor’s direct advisory presence on the ground increases the opportunity to affect favorable outcomes. However, it also increases the risk of exposure that may lead to casualties and political blowback.

Failure to embed advisors with the Tibetan resistance limited U.S. influence over tactical engagements and operational decisions, ultimately reducing their military effectiveness. Despite the C.I.A.’s emphasis on guerrilla warfare and establishing underground resistance cells in the villages, the Tibetans opted to fight the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in conventional, head-on engagements that resulted in heavy casualties. Resistance leadership also decided to remain in the cross-border sanctuary of Nepal instead of establishing forward elements for persistent operations in Tibet.

Recent failures of U.S. proxy forces in southeastern Syria and inconsistent results from operations in the northwest demonstrate that without embedded advisors, proxy performance may remain marginal at best. The New Syrian Army’s failure to liberate the critical border town of Abu Kamal on June 29, 2016 became yet another black eye for the Pentagon shortly after it publicized the offensive. Progress also remains stagnant along the Mare’a Line of the Azaz Corridor between Turkey and Aleppo. U.S.-backed groups such as the Mu’tasim Brigade have failed to consolidate gains against ISIL and expand eastward towards Dabiq and into the Manbij Pocket, which has served as the main artery for ISIL foreign fighter flows.

Division 30, the first group of Syrian rebels deployed to combat the Islamic State in 2015 under the vaunted “train and equip” program, provides a useful example as well. Without direct control measures, the rebels returned home to take care of personal business and handed their equipment over to al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, who also managed to capture and kill a number of Division 30 fighters.

A counter example comes from the combat partnership with the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces. In this case, the United States embedded special operations forces advisors to great effect. Seizing large swaths of ISIL territory in northern Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces and its partnered Syrian Arab Coalition delivered a trove of intelligence and are now postured to capture Manbij, the strategic city connecting ISIL’s de facto capital of Raqqa to Turkey. But accompanying the Syrian Democratic Forces on the ground has increased U.S. exposure to casualties. Moreover, the direct presence of U.S. advisors adds to the perception of U.S. political support for underlying militia members. For instance, embedded advisors create the appearance of U.S. support to the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which is the “backbone” of the Syrian Democratic Forces. Because the People’s Protection Units are affiliated with the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), this deepened tensions with Turkey.

Using other countries as intermediaries reduces control over proxy forces. A sponsor often attempts to further distance itself from the conflict, spread cost burdens, and/or capitalize on local expertise by working through a regional intermediary. However, goal divergence between the sponsor and intermediary will constrain its ability to make the proxy perform as intended.

The 1962 Sino-Indian War precipitated closer U.S.-Indian cooperation against China. The C.I.A. and the Indian Intelligence Bureau created a Tibetan unit known as the Special Frontier Force, ostensibly to be used to conduct resistance activities in Tibet. However, India intended to use the Special Frontier Force to protect India’s borders if war with China were to break out again. Utilizing India to facilitate proxy training and management resulted in thousands of Tibetans being siphoned off from the resistance for service in India’s Special Frontier Force.

The United States currently relies on partner nations such as Turkey and Jordan for both proxy recruitment and external sanctuary to conduct the train and equip mission and operational coordination, as it did with India during the Cold War. Turkey, a NATO ally, is often at odds with the United States over its partnership with Kurdish forces. In contrast to America’s anti-ISIL emphasis, Turkey is balancing multiple competing objectives that divide its resources: preventing Kurdish expansion along its border, bolstering the anti-Assad opposition in Aleppo, and fighting ISIL. Turkish support for Islamist rebels (which included a long period of at least tolerating the activities of jihadist groups) and its influence over the train and equip program in northwestern Syria ultimately reduce U.S. control over the proxies it employs along the Mare’a Line.

The United States confronts similar issues in southern Syria. With an estimated 1.4 million Syrian refugees adding to instability, Jordan’s overriding concern for border security has pushed the kingdom to balance cooperation with Russia and the United States. American efforts to manage its proxies are also at the mercy of events such as Jordan’s closure of the Rukban border crossing following the recent ISIL suicide attack that killed seven Jordanian troops. This border region contains refugee camps which house the families of Syrian rebels that Russia recently hit with airstrikes. Similar to Turkey’s temporary closure of Incirlik Airbase, a key U.S. hub for supporting the anti-ISIL rebels, partner nation reliability is not guaranteed in support of U.S. objectives. Members of Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate (GID) have even sold weapons intended for the Syrian rebels on the black market.

Utilizing intermediary countries to reduce costs may be fiscally and politically sound and is often essential to gain access to non-permissive environments, but it creates unintended consequences that reduce U.S. control over its proxies.

Building a proxy force scaled to accomplish limited objectives increases the potential for favorable outcomes. A sponsor’s desire for its proxy to accomplish maximalist objectives such as the defeat or overthrow of an adversary during the early stages of engagement may clash with its willingness to devote the resources necessary to secure those objectives. The actual capability of the proxy force itself will also determine the feasibility of the outcome. Neglecting to align these elements at any point during the proxy engagement may reduce effectiveness and ultimately result in failure.

The C.I.A. created and supported scalable proxy elements based on different objectives in Tibet. It utilized small “pilot teams” and “radio teams” to assess the capabilities of existing resistance movements, collect intelligence, conduct sabotage, and serve as force multiplication elements by advising the Tibetans in place of actual U.S. intelligence officers on the ground. The C.I.A. later supported the mass organization of larger resistance elements by reconsolidating fighters that were dispersed by Chinese military operations. This proved ineffective as the new Tibetan formations were unwilling to conduct sustained operations against the Chinese, forcing the United States to terminate the relationship.

This is currently the focus of “train-and-equip 2.0” in Syria, but whether it will deliver results is questionable. The actual mechanics of the Tibetan operation offer insight for Syria. Training smaller teams may be easier to control and resource for the achievement of limited objectives. This may involve similar risks to those faced by the Tibetans. Indeed, the C.I.A. terminated the Tibetan operations due to heavy casualties and decreasing returns on the resources required for their support. Nevertheless, in the absence of U.S. advisors, these teams could provide much-needed human intelligence, identify and organize more effective local resistance elements, and leverage U.S. airpower by facilitating more accurate airstrikes.

Close, but Not Quite the Same

The United States aimed to disrupt China within the framework of the larger policy of containing global Communist expansion by supporting a viable resistance inside Tibet. This proxy engagement achieved moderate success by disrupting Chinese regional plans, tying up the People’s Liberation Army occupation force, and shaping the political discussion concerning Tibet that continues to this day. While the Tibetans were fighting for their freedom, and some ultimately felt betrayed by the C.I.A., the United States sought limited objectives. The operation didn’t accomplish the expulsion of China from Tibet; nor did it result in the collapse of the Chinese Communist regime.

Sometimes limited objectives are the only feasible outcomes when relying on proxy warfare. Absent greater political investments in its Syrian proxies or reevaluation of its overall objectives, the United States will be hard-pressed to “destroy” ISIL by relying on proxies as its ground force. By nature, strategic irregular warfare options employed overtly by a democratic sponsor in an era of increasing transparency can only be as effective as the political capital invested in their preparation and execution.

There are a number of key differences which should induce caution when directly applying the lessons from Tibet. The most significant is Syria’s complex insurgent political landscape. The existence of multiple rebel groups differs significantly from the presence of only one relatively cohesive resistance element in Tibet. The Tibetans were united in opposition to China, but U.S. proxy selection in Syria remains hampered by the fact that most of the opposition prioritizes the fight against Bashar al-Assad over ISIL. To make things more challenging, multiple regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Iran are sponsoring their own proxies in support of their national security objectives, which often do not match those of the United States.

Ideology is also a critical factor. While Tibetan Buddhism didn’t inherently clash with American liberal democracy, the Syrian resistance is dominated by various shades of Islamists at odds with U.S. values. The considerable risk for insider, or “green-on-blue” attacks, by Sunni recruits necessitates rigorous vetting of candidates. Coupled with screening requirements to weed out potential human rights violators, such as those mandated by the Leahy Laws, the situation in Syria presents a recruitment, training, and employment challenge the C.I.A. did not have to face in Tibet.

Finally, the C.I.A. executed ST CIRCUS under covert action authorities. The Syrian train and equip mission is an overt Department of Defense (DoD) operation that mandates additional requirements for transparency under Section 1209 of the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act. It is also subject to separate and distinct laws of war that apply to military forces. The C.I.A. is, according to open source reporting, executing a parallel program to equip Syrian rebels which sometimes creates a conflict of interests, but the United States has devoted the bulk of its material resources and political capital to overt Pentagon efforts. Increased transparency and international legal requirements means reduced flexibility when employing an overt proxy.

Regardless of these differences, dusting off Cold War-era proxy engagements such as support to the Tibetan resistance to extract salient lessons may prevent the United States from making similar mistakes in the future while optimizing limited fiscal and political capital.

Limited Options? Limit the Objectives, or Increase the Investment

So where does the United States go from here if it actually wants to destroy the Islamic State by relying on proxies as its ground force, or reduce its commitment to the Syrian conflict without further embarrassment?
1.Embed American advisors with each proxy element.
2.Reduce reliance on partner nations for recruiting, training, supplying, and employing proxy forces.
3.Scale proxy engagements to reflect both the amount of political capital the United States is willing to invest in the Syrian conflict and the realistic capabilities of the proxies themselves.

These options will sound like common sense from an outsider’s perspective. They will also increase military effectiveness against ISIL. But they will also require significant political risks and tradeoffs that cannot be divorced from both domestic and regional politics. Turkey remains a critical NATO ally for the United States and Jordan plays an outsized role in regional counterterrorism programs. Drastically altering the relationship with either country may undercut U.S. influence and interests.

It may also be politically impossible to scale back the objective of destroying ISIL, even if only in rhetoric. When the American public is constantly bombarded with news headlines such as the ISIL-inspired Orlando shooting and recent string of attacks around the world, this will be a hard sell for President Obama and his successor.

So will Washington abandon its rebel proxies in Syria? Will they become the hapless orphans of a new Cold War between the United States and Russia? These lessons from U.S. support to the Tibetan resistance should inform current and future U.S. policy considerations when outsourcing national security objectives to surrogates as part of an indirect approach to avoid prohibitive military intervention.



Major Steve Ferenzi is an instructor in the United States Military Academy’s Defense and Strategic Studies (DSS) Program and Officer-in-Charge of West Point’s Irregular Warfare Group. He is an Army Special Forces officer with service in the 3rd Special Forces Group and the 82nd Airborne Division in the Middle East and Central Asia. He holds a Master of International Affairs degree from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

Image: CIA, courtesy Library of Congress

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Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-idUSKCN10S0EQ

World News | Wed Aug 17, 2016 7:41am EDT

Turkey set to release 38,000 prisoners, makes space in jails after coup

By Daren Butler | ISTANBUL

Turkey will release 38,000 prisoners under a penal reform announced on Wednesday after the arrests of tens of thousands of people suspected of links to last month's attempted coup added to pressure on overstretched jails.

The reform was one of a series of measures outlined on Wednesday in two new decrees under a state of emergency declared after the July 15 failed putsch during which 240 people, mostly civilians, were killed. The government gave no reason for the reform.

Western allies worry President Tayyip Erdogan, accused by opponents of creeping authoritarianism, is using the crackdown to target dissent, testing relations with a key NATO partner in the war on Islamic State.

Angrily dismissing the West's concerns, Turkish officials say they are rooting out a serious internal threat from followers of a U.S.-based cleric Ankara blames for orchestrating a coup bid.

Wednesday's decrees, published in the Official Gazette, also ordered the dismissal of 2,360 more police officers, more than 100 military personnel and 196 staff at Turkey's information and communication technology authority, BTK.

Those dismissed were described as having links to cleric Fethullah Gulen, a former ally turned enemy whom Erdogan says is behind the attempt by rogue troops using tanks and jets to overthrow the government. Gulen denies involvement in the coup.

Under the penal reform, convicts with up to two years left in sentences are eligible for release on probation, extending the period from one year. The "supervised release" excludes those convicted of terrorism, murder, violent or sexual crimes.

To be eligible for the scheme, prisoners must have served half of their sentences. Previously they were required to have already served two thirds of their sentence.

"This measure is not an amnesty," Justice Minister Bekir Bozdag wrote on Twitter of the penal reform. "Around 38,000 people will be released from... jail in the first stage as a result of this measure."

He did not say why the reform was needed but Turkey's prison population has trebled over the last 15 years. There were 188,000 prisoners in Turkey as of March, some 8,000 more than the existing capacity.

Another measure gave the president more choice in appointing the head of the armed forces. He can now select any general as military chief, one decree said. Previously only the heads of the army, navy or air force could be promoted to the post.

A telecoms authority will also be closed under the moves.

Erdogan, already accused by critics of creeping authoritarianism before the coup bid, says Gulen and his followers infiltrated government institutions to create a 'parallel state' in an attempt to take over the country.

Alongside tens of thousands of civil servants suspended or dismissed, more than 35,000 people have been detained in the purge. Judges, journalists, police, and teachers are among those targeted for suspected links to Gulen's movement.

Turkish police on Tuesday searched the offices of a nationwide retail chain and a healthcare and technology company, detaining executives who authorities accuse of helping finance Gulen's network.


FIRST 'COUP' INDICTMENT

A prosecutor in the western province of Usak has submitted the first indictment formally accusing Gulen of masterminding the coup plot, the state-run Anadolu Agency said.

The 11-month investigation focused on alleged wrongdoing by the Gulen movement from 2013, but includes charges Gulen organized an armed "terrorist" group to topple the government, scrap the constitution and murder Erdogan on July 15.


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The 2,257-page indictment seeks two life sentences and an additional 1,900 years in jail for Gulen, plus tens of millions of lira in fines, Anadolu said. It names a total 111 defendants, including 13 people who are already in custody.

U.S. officials have been cautious on the extradition of Gulen, saying they need clear evidence. He has lived in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania since 1999, but it is not clear Ankara has yet made a formal request.

Western criticism of the purge and Ankara's demands U.S. officials send Gulen home have already frayed ties with Washington and the European Union, increasing tensions over an EU deal with Turkey to stem the flow of migrants.

In another tense exchange, Turkey lashed out at Germany on Wednesday, saying allegations in a media report that Turkey had become a hub for Islamist groups reflected a "twisted mentality" that tried to target Erdogan.

Incensed over a perceived lack of Western sympathy over the coup attempt, Erdogan has revived relations with Russia, a detente Western officials worry may be used by both leaders to pressure the European Union and NATO.

Measures in Wednesday's decrees will also enable former air force pilots to return to duty, making up for a deficit after the dismissal of military pilots in the purge.

Turkey declared a three-month state of emergency on July 21.

Under previous emergency rule decrees, Turkey had already dismissed thousands of security force members as well as ordering the closure of thousands of private schools, charities and other institutions suspected of links to Gulen.


(Additional reporting by Ayla Jean Yackley; Editing by Patrick Markey and Anna Willard)
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37109807

Russia St Petersburg: 'Militants' killed in counter-terrorism raid

4 hours ago
From the section Europe

Four suspected militants have been killed in a shoot-out with Russian special forces during a raid on an apartment block in St Petersburg.

Russia's counter-terrorism committee said at least three of the men had been wanted for links to a series of terror attacks and attempted assassinations.

The men were ordered to surrender but killed when they opened fire, according to an official statement.

Russia has long been battling extremism in the North Caucasus.

But the BBC's Moscow correspondent Sarah Rainsford says it is rare that raids against suspected Islamist militants are carried out in St Petersburg.

Three of the men killed were provisionally named by the counter-terrorism committee as Zalim Shebzukhov, Astemir Sheriev and Vyacheslav Nyrov.

The committee said the three had been leaders of a "terrorist underground" active in Kabardino-Balkharia region of the North Caucasus.

The operation unfolded in daylight after security forces surrounded a 16-storey building - heavily armed and in balaclavas. The apartment building was not evacuated but the counter-terrorism committee said no civilians had been injured.

The committee says weapons and explosive devices were found in the apartment but it is unclear whether officers were acting on intelligence about a possible attack.

In a separate incident which also took place on Wednesday, two gunmen wielding firearms and axes attacked traffic police on the Shchelkovskoye highway in Balashikha, 20km (12 miles) east of Moscow.

The men, reportedly from Central Asia, were shot dead but wounded two policemen.

The insurgency in the North Caucasus followed two bitter separatist conflicts in Russia's Chechnya republic and has occasionally spilled over into violence in other parts of Russia.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-attacks-germany-arrests-idUSKCN10S19E

World News | Wed Aug 17, 2016 5:19pm EDT

German police find IS items at home of man arrested for explosives


A man arrested in Germany on Wednesday on suspicion of storing materials that could be used as explosives had items in his apartment glorifying Islamic State, the regional police chief told broadcaster rbb.

Hans-Juergen Moerke told rbb that no attack plans had been found but a search of the flat had uncovered pyrotechnics, a gas mask, a replica Kalashnikov, camouflage suits and "many other IS trappings i.e. things that glorify IS".

"We don't have concrete connections (linking him to Islamic State) but this person did post photos on the internet in which he posed masked, with this Kalashnikov and Arabic characters," rbb quoted Moerke, Brandenburg state police president, as saying.

Nerves are raw in Germany after a spate of attacks on civilians, including two claimed by the Islamic State group and a mass shooting in Munich by a deranged 18-year-old that was also initially seen as terrorism-related.

Moerke said the suspicion of terrorism against the 27-year-old German arrested in the eastern town of Eisenhuettenstadt - a man who he said had converted to Islam around seven years ago - "has not yet been ruled out".

He said the man was known to police due to drug-related crimes and threats.

Earlier in the day a police spokesman said there were no signs the man had been planning a terrorist attack or any indications that he had an Islamist militant motive.

The website of German news magazine Focus initially reported that the man had a militant Salafist background and was suspected of plotting to attack a festival in Eisenhuettenstadt, near the Polish border, though it later quoted police sources as saying this was not the case.

The annual festival, where there will be a fairground, circus and a variety of musicians performing on stage, will begin with a lantern procession on Aug. 26 and run until Aug. 28.

Organizers of Munich's annual Oktoberfest, the world's biggest beer festival, have decided to tighten security in response to the July attacks, with a ban on rucksacks, security checks at all entrances and new fencing.


(Reporting by Andrea Shalal, Michael Nienaber, Michelle Martin and Reuters TV; Writing by Michelle Martin; Editing by Madeline Chambers and Robin Pomeroy)
 

AlfaMan

Has No Life - Lives on TB
Thanks for the report. I think Russia better get ready for a series of attacks. Sounds like ISIS and their colleagues want to hot things up there.
Didn't hear of either attack on MSM-which is entirely too bad.
Housecarl, just saw film of Backfire bombers doing bombing raids in Syria-the flights originated in Iran??? Reminded me of Arc Light missions.

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37109807

Russia St Petersburg: 'Militants' killed in counter-terrorism raid

4 hours ago
From the section Europe

Four suspected militants have been killed in a shoot-out with Russian special forces during a raid on an apartment block in St Petersburg.

Russia's counter-terrorism committee said at least three of the men had been wanted for links to a series of terror attacks and attempted assassinations.

The men were ordered to surrender but killed when they opened fire, according to an official statement.

Russia has long been battling extremism in the North Caucasus.

But the BBC's Moscow correspondent Sarah Rainsford says it is rare that raids against suspected Islamist militants are carried out in St Petersburg.

Three of the men killed were provisionally named by the counter-terrorism committee as Zalim Shebzukhov, Astemir Sheriev and Vyacheslav Nyrov.

The committee said the three had been leaders of a "terrorist underground" active in Kabardino-Balkharia region of the North Caucasus.

The operation unfolded in daylight after security forces surrounded a 16-storey building - heavily armed and in balaclavas. The apartment building was not evacuated but the counter-terrorism committee said no civilians had been injured.

The committee says weapons and explosive devices were found in the apartment but it is unclear whether officers were acting on intelligence about a possible attack.

In a separate incident which also took place on Wednesday, two gunmen wielding firearms and axes attacked traffic police on the Shchelkovskoye highway in Balashikha, 20km (12 miles) east of Moscow.

The men, reportedly from Central Asia, were shot dead but wounded two policemen.

The insurgency in the North Caucasus followed two bitter separatist conflicts in Russia's Chechnya republic and has occasionally spilled over into violence in other parts of Russia.
 

Housecarl

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http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-idUSKCN10S0XU

World News | Wed Aug 17, 2016 3:45pm EDT

North Korea says it has resumed plutonium production: report

North Korea says it has resumed plutonium production by reprocessing spent fuel rods and has no plans to stop nuclear tests as long as perceived U.S. threats remain, Japan's Kyodo news agency reported on Wednesday.

North Korea's Atomic Energy Institute, which has jurisdiction over the country's Yongbyon nuclear facilities, also told Kyodo it had been producing highly enriched uranium necessary for nuclear arms and power "as scheduled."

"We have reprocessed spent nuclear fuel rods removed from a graphite-moderated reactor," the institute told Kyodo in a written interview.

The institute did not disclose the amount of plutonium or enriched uranium it had produced, Kyodo said, but it has been understood for months that North Korea has resumed plutonium production at the site.

In June, the U.N. nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, said North Korea appeared to have reopened the Yongbyon plant to produce plutonium from spent fuel, and a senior official of the U.S. State Department said North Korea had restarted production of element.

On Wednesday, the U.S. State Department said it was aware of the reported North Korean comments and called such activities "a clear violation" of U.N. resolutions.

"We call on North Korea to refrain from actions and rhetoric that further raise tensions in the region," said Katina Adams, a spokeswoman for the department.

North Korea vowed in 2013 to restart all nuclear facilities, including the main reactor at Yongbyon, which had been shut down. It said last September that Yongbyon was operating and that it was working to improve the "quality and quantity" of its nuclear weapons.

North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January and tested a long-range rocket the following month, prompting a new round of international sanctions.

Despite the sanctions, a Washington-based research institute said in June, North Korea may be significantly expanding its nuclear weapons production and could have added six or more weapons to its stockpile in the previous 18 months.

Joel Wit, of the Washington-based North Korea monitoring project, 38 North, said the latest North Korean statement was likely to be connected to U.S.-South Korean military exercises due to be held this month.

North Korea regularly denounces such drills as preparations for war.

According to Kyodo, the North Korean institute said it had already succeeded in making "lighter and diversifying" nuclear weapons, and that it had no intention of halting nuclear tests.

"Under conditions that the United States constantly threatens us with nuclear weapons, we will not discontinue nuclear tests," it was quoted as saying.

North Korea will also build a 100,000-kilowatt light-water nuclear reactor for experimental use, the institute was quoted as saying, but it did not provide further details.


(Reporting by Elaine Lies in Tokyo; Additional reporting by David Brunnstrom in Washington; Editing by Robert Birsel and Steve Orlofsky)

Also In World News
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Bolivia opens 'anti-imperialist' military school
Argentine judge starts inquiry into death of Spain's Garcia Lorca
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Thanks for the report. I think Russia better get ready for a series of attacks. Sounds like ISIS and their colleagues want to hot things up there.
Didn't hear of either attack on MSM-which is entirely too bad.
Housecarl, just saw film of Backfire bombers doing bombing raids in Syria-the flights originated in Iran??? Reminded me of Arc Light missions.

Yeah, definitely same idea. The problem of course is that the Tu-22M's weapons payload is 53,000 lbs while a B-1B can lug 75,000 lbs internally and another 50,000 lbs externally; and the B-52 can carry over 70,000 lbs.

When you're using "dumb" free fall weapons, unless you've got good tactical intel, those sorts of strikes are akin to using high explosives in the same manner as "Agent Orange" to clear the general area being bombed. Flying out of Iran across Iraq is definitely saving the Russians on fuel and time to target.
 

Housecarl

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For links see article source.....
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https://www.strategypage.com/qnd/iraq/articles/20160817.aspx

Iraq: The Two Front War
…½
August 17, 2016: In the north the Kurds have been on the offensive around Mosul and have used their better training and leadership, as well as American air support, to appear unbeatable to many of the ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) fighters facing them. Not only are ISIL defenders being defeated and destroyed, with little visible loss to the Kurds, but details of these defeats have circulated throughout the ISIL forces defending Mosul. This has led to more desertions including leaders of units. This last item requires swift, strong and public response from senior ISIL leadership and that¡¦s what happened. In the last week there have been several public executions of ISIL field commanders who deserted, often while with units under attack by the Kurds. In the past these executions have caused a momentary decline in desertions but that was mainly because those thinking of deserting sought a less risky way of doing it.

Those fighting the Kurds north of Mosul were particularly disheartened to hear of the recent loss of Manbij in northern Syria. The attackers in Syria were mainly Kurds doing there what they appear to be doing outside Mosul. While ISIL worships the past, they don¡¦t seem to be learning much from it because the Kurds and their American air support took advantage of ISIL inflexibility in Syria at the Kurdish town of Kobane in early 2015. The heavy ISIL losses at Kobane hurt ISIL morale but did not persuade ISIL leadership to avoid making the same mistake again. Like Kobane (a historically Kurdish town near the Turkish border) ISIL is obsessed with Mosul. While ISIL never managed to take Kobane, they are determined not to lose Mosul. Historical experience is against them once more.

The outskirts of Mosul has become a place ISIL fighters go to and never return from. Although they are told they will not be attacking they are not told that they will provide target practice for artillery and an international coalition of warplanes assisting the Iraqi Air Force. Iraqi troops have adopted the same slow but successful and safe tactics the Kurds have long used. Scout thoroughly, use aerial surveillance as much as possible and call in air or artillery strikes as soon as you have located ISIL fighters. Iraqi Army troops often have M1 tanks with them that use their 120mm cannon to destroy ISIL bunkers or even sniper hiding places. The downside of this is tremendous property damage. But in the long run that is easier to repair that than live with bitter memories of poorly trained and led troops being slaughtered because of government fears that well trained troops might become a threat. This is a common problem in the Middle East and even the elected government of Iraq was influenced by it. But now the Iraqi leaders are more influenced by the increasingly visible public anger at continued corruption, mismanagement and gridlock in parliament. Add to that the ISIL threat and suddenly the coup threat from competent Iraqi soldiers shrinks considerably. The improved tactics and leadership are cutting Mosul off from ISIL reinforcement and gradually lowering the morale, numbers and effectiveness of the defenders. Iraqi government assertions that they will retake Mosul by the end of 2016 may actually happen.

There has been little good news lately to encourage ISIL fighters or their leaders. With the recent loss of Ramadi and Fallujah in western Iraq and Manbij in Syria ISIL is now desperately trying to retain control over some of the roads crossing the Iraq/Syria border. Without control of those roads ISIL cannot quickly move anything between Iraq and Syria. Mosul is basically cut off from the outside world and Raqqa, the largest city in eastern Syria and the ISIL ¡§capital¡¨ is also being surrounded. Losing control of so many roads means it is easier to concentrate a very large force against ISIL defenders in a town or military base and quickly defeat the defenders no matter how fanatic they are. This is what the current Kurdish advance is mainly about.

The Mosul Timetable

The Kurdish offensive outside Mosul is a clear indication that the final battle is beginning. That¡¦s because the Kurds take a lot of casualties (by their own standards) when actively attacking ISIL defenders in the dozens of villages outside Mosul. The Kurds made it very clear over the last year that they would not start their offensive until they were assured that the Iraq government forces south of the city were ready and able to do the same. The Kurdish advance is described as a ¡§shaping operation¡¨ to deny ISIL use of key roads for moving their forces or supplies.

The Kurds have found that their security measures still work well and ISIL attempts to take back areas recently lost of the Kurds nearly always end in a lopsided defeat for the attackers. ISIL still depends on suicide bomber (on foot or in vehicles) but the Kurds and other Iraqi security forces have learned how to spot the suicide bombers and kill them before they get close enough to do much damage. The ISIL gunmen that accompany the suicide bombers usually attack anyway and are shot down by the now very alert defenders. These defeats don't do much for ISIL morale either.

Iran Gets Up To Speed

Iran makes no secret of its desire to become the dominant foreign influence in Iraq. It uses religion, aid, diplomacy, threats, bribes and illegal drugs to get that influence. The last item is methamphetamine (¡§crystal meth¡¨ or ¡§speed¡¨) a synthetic narcotic that is manufactured in Iran and smuggled into Iraq with the help of bribes to Iranian and Iraqi border police and coast guards. Unlike opium and heroin from Afghanistan, meth can be made locally and since 2014 it has become a popular business opportunity for many unemployed but technically adept Iranians. The government has been finding and destroying dozens of meth labs each month and executing a growing number of those caught making or distributing the drug. That has not slowed it down because meth is cheaper and faster acting than opium and as a stimulant has legitimate uses for people who have to stay alert for long periods at work. So far not a lot of Iraqis are setting up meth labs but that will change as more Iraqis learn how to do it. Currently about three percent of Iranians are addicted to meth, opium or heroin and Iraq is catching up with that as well.

The Saudis are keen on maintaining a dominating influence in Iraq, which is a largely (80 percent) Arab country that is majority (60 percent) Shia. The religious angle puts Iraq in an awkward position. The Iraqi Shia Arabs don¡¦t want to be dominated by non-Arab Iran (where Arabs are openly despised) but also don¡¦t want to be dominated by their Sunni Arab neighbors and especially not by their own Sunni Arab minority, which created ISIL and has been a major supporter of Islamic terrorism since 2003.

While Iraqi Shia appreciate Iranian support against ISIL, they are constantly reminded that this support comes with dangerous conditions. Case in point is the need for air support during the upcoming battle to push ISIL out of Mosul. Iraqi military leaders know that American air support is crucial to the success of Iraqi forces in talking Mosul. The Americans have offered substantial air support during the final assault on Mosul. The U.S. led air coalition over Iraq and Syria has been averaging about a hundred attacks (using either a guided missile or smart bomb) a day in June and July. About a third of that is in Syria but more will be switched to Iraq when the fighting is heavy inside Mosul. The Americans have brought in more ground controller teams to operate with Iraqi forces and provide timely air strikes. At its peak there will probably be several hundred guided missiles and smart bombs a day used in Mosul. Iran-backed Shia militia refuse to use American air support at the same time the Iran is pressuring Iraq to allow these Shia militias to play a major role in the Mosul battle.

Many in the Iraqi government army leadership do not want any of the 100,000 or so Iran backed Shia militia involved in retaking Mosul. The Iraqi Shia that control the Iraqi government and military do not trust Iran and believe the Iran controlled Shia militias are being prepared to support an armed takeover of the current Shia controlled government. Many of the Shia militia are from Baghdad and there are growing fears that Shia cleric Ayatollah Muqtada al Sadr, an open fan of the Shia religious dictatorship in Iran, is believed planning to use his months long anti-corruption campaign in Baghdad as justification for an armed takeover of the government.

August 16, 2016: In the far west (Anbar) ISIL attacked a border guard base on the Jordan border. The pre-dawn attack was repulsed but eight Iraqi soldiers and one civilian were killed and 17 soldiers wounded. The attack began with heavy mortar fire which apparently caused most of the Iraqi casualties. Several ISIL attackers appear to have been killed but the ISIL force took their dead and wounded with them as they retreated.

Kurds operating north of Mosul confirmed that among the enemy they had killed recently was Abu Ahmed al Shami, the ISIL Minister of Media and ISIL chief spokesman.

August 11, 2016: In the northeast (Erbil province) Iranian artillery fired several dozen shells are rural areas on the Iraqi side of the border. It is believed the Iranians were (for the second time this year) firing on suspected PJAK (the Iranian Kurdish separatist group based in Iraq) camps in Kurdish controlled northern Iraq. Iran recently launched another offensive against PJAK operating on both sides of the border. Dozens of civilians fled the area where the shells were landing but there were apparently no casualties.

August 10, 2016: In the west (northwestern Anbar province) a joint force of American and Kurdish commandos raided a village (Qaim) near the Syrian border and killed the senior ISIL official in charge of natural resources (like oil). The raiders would have preferred to take the guy alive but ISIL leaders rarely cooperate. The other objective of the raid, seizing ISIL documents, apparently did succeed.

August 8, 2016: in western Iraq (Anbar province) local officials announced that only about 30 percent of the province was still controlled or threatened by ISIL forces and urged Anbar refugees to return to their towns, villages and city neighborhoods as soon as they received word that ISIL was gone. The rest of the province is supposed to be ISIL free by the end of 2016. Several hundred thousand civilians have already returned home after they were assured that ISIL fighters and bombs had been cleared out of their recently liberated homes. Ramadi, Fallujah, Hit (or ¡§Heet¡¨) and other urban recently fought over often contain mines and hidden bombs left by ISIL, which the security forces are supposed to find and disable. Iraqi soldiers and Shia militia continue to drive ISIL out of towns and villages in Anbar, where ISIL is trying to maintain a presence if only to support terror attacks in Shia population centers (especially Baghdad) to the east.

August 7, 2016: In the north (outside Kirkuk) the local ISIL field commander (Mohamed Nassif al Hosh) died when a bomb, planted under his car, exploded while he was on the road. The Kurds and American Special Forces have helped organize and equip an anti-ISIL resistance in ISIL occupied areas of northern Iraq. This is mainly to collect information on what ISIL is up to and provide target information for air strikes. In this case a remote control ¡§sticky¡¨ bomb was placed underneath the car and then detonated when the ISIL leader was inside it.

In the west, at the town of Tanf on the Syrian border, FSA (Free Syrian Army) rebels defeated an early morning ISIL attempt to regain control of the border crossing that connects western Anbar province with largely ISIL-held eastern Syria. ISIL used a suicide car bomber (and one on foot with an explosive vest) supported by over a dozen gunmen. The bombers were unable to get close enough to the FSA men before detonating. The FSA return fire they drove off the ISIL gunmen. The FSA forces here are based in Jordan, where they have the support of Jordan and the United States. Holding Tanf is, for all practical purposes, part of the preparations for liberating Mosul. Iraqi Shia militias are defending some of the border posts on the Iraqi side and have also been successful in defeating recent ISIL attacks.

August 4, 2016: In Egypt the government reported that the security forces had killed Doaa Abu Ansari, the head of ISIL in Sinai. Most Egyptians are skeptical because Ansari has been reported as killed several times in the past but always shows up again. There were about 45 people killed in the several days of raids, air strikes and searches for Islamic terrorists in Sinai. Some of the dead may indeed have been ISIL members, but more proof is needed to convince people that Ansari is really, really dead. Other recent reports indicate that the head of ISIL in Afghanistan and Pakistan was also killed. These losses further weaken ISIL boasts that they are on a Mission From God that succeeds because of the spiritual connection. But how do you explain the many failures?

August 1, 2016: Iraqi deaths from terrorist (mainly ISIL inspired) violence increased 15 percent (to 759) in July. This comes after a 23 percent decline (to 662) in June. The July losses are closer to what they were in May ( 867). Civilians accounted for most of the deaths because ISIL is losing on the battlefield and concentrating on terror attacks against civilians, mainly in Baghdad. That¡¦s where 68 percent of the deaths took place in July and most of the dead there were Shia civilians. That¡¦s a major change from the past as civilians accounted for about half the June and May deaths, which was down from 55 percent in April and the 60 percent that had long been the norm. This shift came from increased attacks by the security forces on ISIL, better security to deal with ISIL terror attacks on civilian or military targets and, finally, the diminishing strength if ISIL after nearly a year of defeats. Electronic chatter confirms what ISIL deserters and prisoners report about low morale and fewer recruits. At least a third of the May deaths are believed to be the result of the offensive against ISIL forces in Fallujah that began on May 22nd and ended on June 26th. There were no major battles in July but in early August the advance on Mosul began.

The death toll for all of 2015 was about 13,400, compared to 15,600 in 2014. That¡¦s still a big jump from 2013 when the death toll was 8,900 for all of Iraq and only ten percent of those were terrorists while the majority were Shia civilians killed by Sunni Islamic terrorists. The total 2016 deaths are expected to be at least 20 percent lower than 2015. While 2015 was 14 percent less deadly than 2014 both years were much less than the worst year. That was 2007 when nearly 18,000 died. Then as now the main cause of the mayhem and murder was Sunni fanatics who want to run the country as a Sunni dictatorship. Still Iraq was a lot less violent than neighboring Syria where the 2015 death toll was 55,000, which was down 38 percent from the 76,000 in 2014. That¡¦s over 69,000 dead (down 24 percent from 91,000in 2014) for the two countries where ISIL is most active. The death toll has declined in both Iraq and Syria because ISIL has become less effective and in Syria there is a lot more war weariness. Most of the rebels and government forces in Syria are just playing defense and even ISIL has been less active in attacking compared to 2014. ......
 

Housecarl

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http://dailycaller.com/2016/08/17/us-military-says-there-are-80000-iranian-backed-fighters-in-iraq/

Daily Caller News Foundation

US Military Says There Are 80,000 Iranian-Backed Fighters In Iraq

Russ Read
National Security/Foreign Policy Reporter
2:46 PM 08/17/2016

As many as 80,000 Iranian-backed militia are currently fighting Islamic State in Iraq, according to a U.S. Army spokesman.

Col. Christopher Garver, the spokesman for Operation Inherent Resolve, confirmed to Fox News that of the 100,000 Shiite militia fighters operating in Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), 80 percent are backed directly by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

“The [Iranian-backed] Shia militia are usually identified at around 80,000,” Garver told Fox News’s Lucas Tomlinson.

The PMUs have have straddled the fence where it concerns dual loyalty between Iran and Iraq since they were first integrated into the conventional Iraq Security Forces (ISF). Baghdad essentially deputized the PMUs as a response to the startling rise of ISIS in 2014, but Iran is known to provide military advice and logistical support to the militias.

Iran’s extensive influence among the PMUs has led to serious concern regarding U.S. policy in the region, as well as the safety of U.S. personnel operating in Iraq. Infamous Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr encouraged his followers to target the approximately 4,600 U.S. military forces in Iraq last month.

“The effect of the Obama administration’s policy has been to replace American boots on the ground with the Iranian’s. As Iran advances, one anti-American actor is being replaced with another,” Thomas Joscelyn, a senior fellow with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and editor of the Long War Journal, told Fox.

Iran’s increasing dominance in the region raises questions as to the nature of the U.S.-Iraqi relationship. Garver assured reporters in a briefing Tuesday that the U.S. is not coordinating with Iran in any way when it comes to operations in Iraq, but it would appear that Baghdad is more than happy to accept Iranian aid and advice.

The Iraqi government is believed to have formally requested the help of Iran’s top covert operative, Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the head of the notorious Quds Force, in May. Soleimani is responsible for the deaths of as many as 500 U.S. soldiers, according to Marine Corps Gen. Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
 

Housecarl

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Posted for fair use.....
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/whither-turkey_kpfabian_170816

IDSA COMMENT
Whither Turkey?

K. P. Fabian
August 17, 2016

Turkey is going where President Erdogan wants to take it to, as those who do not agree with him are too intimidated to stand in his way. To figure out Erdogan’s plans, we have to look critically at both what he has done in Turkey after the coup collapsed and his foreign policy moves before and after the failed coup a month ago.

Erdogan invoked the people’s power initially to crush the coup and subsequently to approve the huge purge and other measures to suppress dissent with the aim of concentrating more and power in his hands. Hundreds of thousands of Turks came on the street night after night to show support for Erdogan. His thesis that the followers of Fehtullah Gulen, living in self-chosen exile in the US since 1999, carried out the coup attempt and that Gulen himself masterminded it has been accepted by a majority of Turks. That no convincing proof of Gulen’s involvement has been offered is a different matter.

Erdogan moved fast after the collapse of the coup giving the impression that he had planned it all beforehand. He started a purge, declared a national emergency, shut down dissenting media outlets to intimidate the rest into falling in line, and suspended Turkey’s compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights. On July 16 itself, hours after the coup collapsed, 2745 judges were taken into custody. Obviously, the list was there before the coup attempt. Erdogan has done some ‘purging’ in the past from time to time, but this time it has been truly massive even at the cost of making it difficult for the government to function. For example, 21,000 private school teachers and 1500 university deans have been purged, while 1700 schools have been shut altogether. Naturally, the education sector has been gravely disabled. Can the Finance Ministry function normally when 1500 have been sacked? About 300 in the Foreign Office are under investigation including two ambassadors. About 32 diplomats have refused to return to Turkey and have sought refuge in other countries including the two military attaches in Greece who escaped to Italy. There is hardly any part of the government that has escaped the purge which has affected over 80,000 individuals.

What will be the impact of all this on the economy? Will foreign investment be attracted to a country in such turmoil? On July 17, Bloomberg carried a story with the caption “Turkey set for market turmoil as coup turns investors ‘ice-cold’.” Turkey has worked hard to convince the world that the failed coup has not in any way made investment in the country riskier than it was. A paid advertisement was taken out in the Financial Times of London. The rating agency Moody’s announced on July 18 that it was reviewing the current Baa3 grade and that the finding will be announced in mid-October. On July 20, Standard & Poor’s downgraded Turkey from BB+ to BB, drawing attention to ‘polarization of political landscape’ and erosion of ‘institutional checks and balances’. What Turkey’s government does not seem to or does not want to understand is that while the outside world is glad that the coup attempt failed it is concerned about the future of democracy and the rule of law in Turkey.

The 75,000-strong Turkish military, the second largest in NATO, has lost about half of its 360 generals in the purge. Ever since he became Prime Minister in 2002, Erdogan has consistently tried, not without success, to reduce the clout of the military. It was a happy coincidence for him that Turkey’s bid for admission to the European Union (EU) necessitated raising its democratic credentials by reducing the military’s role in politics, especially since it had staged coups in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997. In its 2004 report on Turkey, the EU said, “A number of changes have been introduced over the last year to strengthen civilian control of the military to aligning it (Turkey) with practice in EU member states.” In 2007, the Army Chief, General Yasar Buyukanit, posted a memorandum on the military’s website objecting to the nomination of Erdogan’s candidate, the then Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gul, for the post of President on the ground that his wife had worn a headscarf and thereby undermined the secular order. Erdogan responded by pointing out that it was none of the military’s business to give an opinion on candidates for the presidency. Gul was elected and the military’s lack of clout was exposed.

The Supreme Military Council met at the Prime Minister’s office on July 28. In the past, the Council always met at the General Staff Head Quarters and the change of venue is significant as an indicator of the primacy of the civilian government. It is also possible that the civilian government deemed the new venue safer. The Council’s recommendations will have to be approved by the President. There is a move to change the composition of the Council by adding more ministers in order to reduce the role of the military. The Army Chief will be deprived of some of his responsibilities.

Predictably, the imposition of emergency, the suspension of the European Convention on Human Rights, the purge, and the suppression of dissent by shutting down media outlets, all in quick succession, alarmed the EU and the US; and they gave vent to their concerns about the erosion of the rule of law, Europe being more vocal than the US. Equally predictably, Turkey reacted with a degree of hostility to that criticism, pointing out that the West did not condemn the coup, its leaders did not personally call Erdogan to show support to the democratically elected government, and that there has been no high level visit after the failed coup.

But the real reason for Turkey’s dissatisfaction with the US is that the latter has not agreed to extradite Gulen. The US is insisting on evidence of Gulen’s involvement and it is doubtful whether Turkey has so far given any evidence that can stand scrutiny. Gulen wrote an article in the New York Times on July 25 titled “I condemn all threats to Turkey’s democracy”. The clear implication is that he condemns the coup and what Erdogan has done in the aftermath. There are signals that the US is willing to be patient and reason with Turkey. A team of US officials is due shortly in Ankara to discuss the matter of Gulen’s extradition. The Turkish media have put out a story that the team will assist Turkey in drafting a memorandum meeting US standards. This story might not be true. US Vice President Biden is due in Turkey on August 24 and the Gulen issue will top the agenda.

Erdogan’s visit to St. Petersburg and meeting with President Putin on August 9 has attracted a good deal of media attention. This was a meeting planned well before the coup attempt. When Turkey shot down a Russian SU-24 war plane in November 2015 ‘for violating its air space’, Putin had broken off economic and trade relations inflicting much pain on Turkey. Erdogan’s initial efforts to talk to Putin were rebuffed. After a while, President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and a prominent Turkish businessman mediated, and Putin relented after Erdogan apologized in June. Putin who was keen to reconcile with Turkey telephoned Erdogan immediately after the coup collapsed. Erdogan told Putin that the call was ‘psychologically important’. There is a report that Russian intelligence gave Erdogan some advance tip off on the coup.

The economic and trade relations broken by Russia to punish Turkey for shooting down its fighter plane are being restored. Russian tourists have already come back, and being received with champagne and flowers. Some commentators in the West have misinterpreted the resumption of relations primarily as an anti-US move. This interpretation is wrong as this is a resumption of what was there before the shooting down of the plane. The Turkish-Russian differences over Syria remain, but one should not be surprised if Erdogan were to over time get closer to the Russian position on Assad. Russia and Turkey have agreed to cooperate in the war against the Islamic State.

Russia and Turkey are not yet allies, but they might get closer as Turkey’s hopes of gaining entry into the EU fades away. Austria has called on the EU to break off talks with Turkey on its admission. The bone of contention between Turkey and the EU is the latter’s delay in granting visa-free entry to Turkish citizens to the Schengen area in return for Turkey taking back illegal migrants who had entered Greece. The deadline for the deal was June 2016. While Turkey is insisting that the deal be formalised by October, the signals from Brussels indicate that it might not happen any time this year. Most probably, the EU is not going to agree to the visa-free entry of Turks in the near future. Erdogan might threaten to inundate the EU with Syrian refugees and might even carry out the threat unless the EU pays a huge amount of money. Europe is vulnerable to such blackmail.

Iran sent its Foreign Minister to Turkey to show solidarity with Erdogan. The two sides agreed on the need to uphold the territorial integrity of Syria and agreed to talk more on Syria to narrow their differences. The opening to Israel signalled by Turkey before the coup will continue.

The Turkish media have been suitably intimidated and subordinated. The media have now ‘divulged’ that it was some Gulenist group in the Air Force that brought down the Russian plane. This is dis-information. Some columnists have threatened the US that its refusal to extradite Gulen might cost its use of Incirlik. It is difficult to take the threat seriously as the air base was built by the US in the 1950s, the US has stored nuclear weapons there, and the two countries have signed a joint use agreement. Nevertheless, Erdogan has cards to play. In 2003, the Turkish Parliament passed a resolution denying the use of the base to US in the War on Iraq. It was Erdogan who talked to his MPs and made them change their stand. Will Erdogan re-enact the same and demand that the US extradite Gulen?

Turkey is seeking more manoeuvring space by reconciling with Russia; the two may work closer in the fight against the Islamic State. Turkey might try to blackmail a vulnerable EU by threatening to inundate it with Syrian refugees. Turkey will play hard ball on Gulen, but short of hard evidence extradition is unlikely. Unless Erdogan takes due care, serious damage can be done to his country’s relations with the US as the latter might reluctantly conclude that Turkey is an unreliable ally. Has the US started looking at alternatives to Incirlik? It has built one and has started building another in Syrian Kurdistan controlled by its Kurdish allies. Russia has announced plans to build an airbase at Khmeimim in Aleppo province to ‘rival Incirlik’. Will Syria, partitioned de facto, if not de jure, have Russian and US airbases?

One wonders whether a phone call from President Obama before Putin’s would have changed the course of history. It might not have, but Obama should have called early knowing Erdogan’s paranoia and that would have made some difference as Erdogan is playing ‘the jilted lover’ with much success. Over time, Erdogan’s pursuit of absolute power and hard-line policy towards the Kurds might boomerang. The EU’s vulnerability should not be exaggerated as it takes 44 per cent of Turkey’s exports. After the general election in Germany around October 2017, Merkel’s successor might be less indulgent towards Erdogan.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
 

Housecarl

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For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/...c-security-partners-and-what-to-do-about-them

World Politics Review
Region øo
Issue øo
August 17, 2016 last updated 14:52 ET

America�fs Four Most Problematic Security Partners and What to Do About Them

Steven Metz |Friday, Aug. 12, 2016


When the next U.S. president takes office in 2017, he or she will move into the White House with a long national security to-do list. One of the most pressing items will be to assess America�fs security partnerships, particularly the problematic ones, to decide which can be repaired, which must be tolerated as is, and which should be abandoned.

Four partnerships will top the reassessment list: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey. Each has a longstanding relationship with the United States harkening back to the Cold War. All four became even more important after the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States. But all four have reached a point where it is no longer obvious that the strategic benefit to the United States outweighs the costs and risks. This justifies a close look by the next president.

The security partnership with Egypt is the newest of the four, forged in the 1970s when Cairo turned away from the Soviet Union. The United States embraced the relationship both to lessen regional security threats to Israel and to leverage Egypt for greater influence across the Arab world. Obsessed with stability, Washington seldom pushed Egypt hard for democratization and showered it with security assistance. A long series of American presidents, both Democrat and Republican, felt that the strategic benefits of the partnership outweighed the costs and risks.

Today that is not so clear. Egypt poses no conventional military threat to Israel, and its influence in the Arab world is withering away, even as domestic repression is increasing. As Michael Wahid Hanna put it, �gThere is no longer any compelling reason for Washington to sustain especially close ties with Cairo.�h

Much the same is true of America�fs partnership with Saudi Arabia. The oil-rich and very conservative kingdom long shared Washington�fs desire for stability in the Persian Gulf and in global petroleum markets. But a recent rift emerged between the two nations over a series of issues, particularly America�fs modest detente with Iran to control the latter�fs nuclear program, but also the U.S. role in the Syrian civil war. Saudi Arabia�fs promotion of religious ideas sometimes exploited by extremists remains a persistent sore point in the relationship.

It may not yet be advisable to write off the four problematic partnerships, but doing so is more viable now than it has been for some time.

America�fs partnership with Pakistan also took shape during the Cold War as Islamabad squared off with an India that then leaned toward Moscow, at least in security affairs. Pakistan became central to U.S. efforts to arm the mujahedeen fighting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, more recently, to the U.S. campaign against al-Qaida and the Taliban. Yet over the past 15 years, the partnership has had festering problems, particularly Pakistan�fs provision of sanctuary to the Afghan Taliban, al-Qaida�fs leadership and other terrorist movements like Lashkar-e-Taiba. The Pakistani public, much of the media and more than a few political leaders also harbor a deep anti-Americanism and an affinity for conspiracy theories that paint Washington as the source of many of the country�fs problems.

America�fs partnership with Turkey is the oldest of the four. It was cemented by Turkey�fs Cold War membership in NATO and the importance of that nation�fs military for the defense of the alliance�fs southern flank. Turkey provided the United States important military basing rights, including for nuclear weapons as part of NATO�fs strategic deterrent. And in recent years, it has been a vital frontline state in efforts to defeat the self-declared Islamic State.

But under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, differences between Ankara and Washington, particularly over the Syrian civil war and Turkey�fs conflict with Kurdish separatists, turned into a chasm. The recent failed military coup in Turkey led to a massive crackdown by Erdogan, which has weakened the Turkish military and unleashed a storm of anti-Americanism among that nation�fs public and media. Now Erdogan is exploring a tilt toward Russia, a nation that has been Turkey�fs primary enemy for five hundred years. This will add even more tension to the relationship with Washington.

As the next U.S. president assesses these four problematic partnerships, the most extreme option would be to simply write them off. A decade ago, that would have been unthinkable: All four were cornerstones of America�fs global strategy. But two things have altered the strategic calculus. First, the United States is close to giving up on former President George W. Bush�fs idea that violent Islamic extremism must be defeated outright and that this requires a revolutionary transformation of the places where terrorist organizations originate. The chances of prosperity, moderation, stability and sustained good governance taking root across the Middle East are slim. If this sort of transformation is unrealistic, it makes no sense for the United States to cling to a strategy focused on it.

The second change is a shift in global energy markets, particularly the decreasing importance of Middle East oil for the United States. Saudi policy still plays a powerful role in world energy supplies, and disruptions in the Gulf continue to reverberate around the world, but this is less true now than it was in the past. Changes in technology may further diminish the importance of Persian Gulf oil to global economic stability, thus making Saudi Arabia less important to U.S. interests.

Given this, it may not yet be advisable to write off the four problematic partnerships, but doing so is more viable now than it has been for some time. The deciding factor will be whether the United States gives up on the eradication of the Islamic State, al-Qaida and the Taliban in favor of more realistic goals like deterrence and containment. If so, the rationale for sustaining the four problematic partnerships collapses.

Today Americans may not be ready for this bold step. In the short term, they are more likely to cling to the hope that a bit more effort and different rhetoric will make the decisive defeat of violent Islamic extremism possible. If so, the next president may try to fix the problematic partnerships. This is unlikely to work: The tension is too ingrained, and the global security system in which they are embedded is undergoing major changes. Ultimately the United States must move toward greater realism in its conflict with violent Islamic extremism. Then the four troubled partnerships might very well fade away.

Steven Metz is the author of �gIraq and the Evolution of American Strategy.�h His weekly WPR column, Strategic Horizons, appears every Friday. You can follow him on Twitter@steven_metz.
 

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Inside the Real US Ground War On ISIS

As the US and its allies prepare to launch a major offensive for Mosul, US service members are on the ground in growing numbers — and increasingly in harm’s way. Mike Giglio reports from the bases and front lines where they work around northern Iraq.

Mike Giglio
BuzzFeed News Middle East Correspondent

Reporting From
Erbil, Iraq

ERBIL, Iraq — The Black Hawk helicopter pushed into ISIS territory through the pre-dawn sky. Joshua Wheeler, a veteran master sergeant with US special operations, was taking his men deep behind enemy lines. As the chopper descended on the ISIS stronghold of Hawija in northern Iraq, back in Washington, US president Barack Obama, who had been notified of the mission, waited for word of its fate.

Wheeler and his team were at the forefront of the hidden war US special operations troops are waging against ISIS. With him in the chopper were fellow members of the US Army’s elite Delta Force and some of the local commandos they had trained. Decked in desert camouflage and equipped with high-tech automatic weapons and night vision, the US and local soldiers looked almost identical.

Their mission, carried out on Oct. 22, was more dangerous than most. It called for the men to infiltrate a guarded compound that ISIS had converted into a prison and rescue dozens of men who, according to intelligence reports, were scheduled to be executed that day.

ISIS militants began firing on the helicopter as it lowered toward the compound. Wheeler shot back from the bay, recalled one of the local soldiers who was beside him, a captain with a specialized Kurdish force called the Counter-Terrorism Unit (CTU), which is run by the security council of Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdish region.

Then — as Wheeler often did, his Kurdish partners said — he led the way.

Wheeler hit the ground first, said the 29-year-old captain, the ranking CTU officer on the chopper. Gunshots and calls of “Allahu Akbar” rang out as the militants tried to repel the commandos, firing with everything they had. The captain said he and Wheeler advanced together, “fighting side by side.”

By the time the operation was over three hours later, around 20 ISIS militants had been killed and 69 prisoners had been saved. And Wheeler was dead, struck down by an ISIS bullet, making him the first US service member to lose his life in the ISIS fight.

When his death became public, US officials painted the combat role of the US commandos on the mission as an anomaly. The Pentagon’s press secretary called it “a unique circumstance.” Defense Secretary Ashton Carter said Wheeler’s engagement with the enemy “wasn’t part of the plan.” These comments pushed Wheeler’s death into line with the narrative Obama had presented to the public when the new fight began. “I ran for this office in part to end our war in Iraq and welcome our troops home, and that’s what we’ve done,” he said in August 2014 as US airstrikes against ISIS began. “And so even as we support Iraqis as they take the fight to these terrorists, American combat troops will not be returning to fight in Iraq, because there’s no American military solution to the larger crisis in Iraq.”

But the Kurdish soldiers who worked with Wheeler tell a different story. They say that Wheeler intended from the start to be up front in the operation — and that elite US troops like him often lead the charge against ISIS on the ground.

On risky missions like Hawija, the US commandos often have a simple command, said a CTU lieutenant: “Let us go first.”

“In those operations, they put their lives ahead of ours,” the lieutenant said. “They are in the lead.”



A member of Kurdish Counter-Terrorism Unit who was in the operation room during the fight for Hawija shows a picture of Master Sgt. Joshua Wheeler on his smartphone screen. Wheeler was killed during that operation.

Interviews in the Kurdish region’s capital of Erbil with three CTU members — the captain, the lieutenant and the unit’s commander — marked the first time sources with direct involvement in the Hawija mission have publicly discussed it in depth. Each requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of their work, believing that ISIS would attempt to assassinate them if it learned their names. The interviews, carried out over two weeks in July, also provided new insight into how these elite US special operations troops are taking the fight to ISIS: often on the front lines, and sometimes beyond them. Joint US and CTU teams have worked together on the ground in more than 50 operations against the militants, the three men said, performing kill-or-capture missions, conducting surveillance, calling in airstrikes, carrying out sniper attacks, and pounding ISIS positions with mortars and artillery.

These elite US forces reflect a pattern in the greater US war on ISIS in Iraq, which has seen US soldiers quietly stepping up their role on the ground, where they work in growing numbers and increasingly in harm’s way. There are currently about 3,830 US service members in the country, according to the Pentagon, an increase of 17 percent in the last year. That figure doesn’t include civilians, contractors, and soldiers on temporary duty, and analysts tracking the conflict often put the total between 5,000 and 6,000. In addition to specialized forces of various stripes, soldiers from the conventional US Armed Forces are posted around the country. Conversations with local soldiers and US officers — along with visits to front lines and military bases around northern Iraq, including the operations room in Erbil that oversees US airstrikes and Camp Swift, the expanding US base some 50 miles south of the ISIS capital of Mosul — showed US service members to be much deeper in the fight than White House officials in Washington commonly portray. These troops, in addition to arming and training local forces and coordinating battle plans, are a regular presence on the front lines, conducting surveillance, firing mortars and artillery, and calling in airstrikes as US warplanes rip through the skies.

In the process, they are putting their lives on the line. Sixteen US soldiers have been wounded in the war on ISIS, according to publicly available data from the Department of Defense, and two more have been killed since Wheeler’s death in late October. On March 19, Louis Cardin, a 27-year-old Marine staff sergeant, was killed by ISIS rocket fire at his base near Camp Swift, where his battalion had been providing artillery support for the Iraqi military. And on May 3, Navy SEAL Charles H. Keating IV died while fighting alongside Kurdish troops in a town called Tel Asqaf after ISIS militants breached the nearby front line.

Obama came to office promising to get the US out of old wars, not into new ones — and to stop the loss of US lives in Iraq. White House officials have often downplayed the role of US soldiers in and close to combat against ISIS, keeping the narrative of US involvement focused on the drones and fighters jets that operate out of range of ISIS’s assault rifles, mortars, and suicide car bombs. But while this new US war, in contrast with the last one, leaves the bulk of combat operations to local forces, for US soldiers, it carries its own set of sacrifices and risks.

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Far removed from the politics in Washington, these troops are well aware of the danger they face. Gen. Gary Volesky, the commander of US ground forces in Iraq, is on his fifth tour in the country. He completed his first four during the Iraq War, leading soldiers first against Saddam Hussein and then against ISIS’s predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq. “The fight here is a little bit different than it has been in the previous times we’ve been here. But let’s make no mistake. We’re in a combat environment,” he said. “So when people talk about the soldiers aren’t at risk — we know we’re at risk.”

Volesky ticked off some of the threats that had faced US soldiers in recent days: 20 ISIS rockets that hit at the international airport a short drive from his base in Baghdad; and a suicide car bomb “just about three kilometers from where I currently am.” Artillery shells can come crashing down even on US bases set back from the day-to-day fighting. As ISIS loses territory, Volesky noted, it has also leaned more heavily on its roots in unconventional war, focusing less on holding land and more on insurgency, meaning asymmetrical tactics like car bombs and attacks on US troops behind the front lines become more of a threat. “There are no real front lines,” Volesky said. “Everyone is at risk.”

Volesky had just returned to Baghdad from a visit to northern Iraq that took him to the base where Cardin, the Marine sergeant, had been killed. “I went out to the place that has our artillerymen out there that are in the fight every single day, living in the desert, and said, ‘Hey, what can I do for you? What do you need?’” he said. “And they just said, ‘We need more targets.’”

The headquarters of the elite Kurdish unit that worked with Wheeler in Hawija is set deep inside an intelligence compound in the mountains on the outskirts of Erbil, along a road that winds past guard towers and barricades. “Warning: Military Personnel Only,” reads a sign nearby. One wall in the single-story building is lined with commendations from foreign government services: the French Foreign Legion, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIA.

Somewhere around Erbil — whether in the intelligence compound or at another place, the CTU officers won’t say — is a base where CTU and US commandos live and train. Officially, the base doesn’t exist, but it has a name: Camp Wheeler.

To his local partners, Wheeler embodied the US commitment to the new war.

Like many US service members in Iraq today, he had deployed there before. The former Army Ranger was transferred to the military’s elite special operations command in 2004 and had been deployed at least 17 times, mostly in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army said after his death. Like its counterpart in the Navy, known as Seal Team 6, which killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, most of what Delta Force does is classified. Its soldiers, termed “operators,” played a key role in the Iraq War, leading the hunt for Saddam Hussein and helping to decimate the leadership of al-Qaeda in Iraq with constant raids. Delta Force left Iraq when Obama pulled out US troops in 2011, and they were among the first to return when the war on ISIS began.

US special operations forces started working with the CTU shortly after its formation in 2012, but their cooperation surged after ISIS poured across the Syrian border and into Iraq in June 2014, capturing Mosul from the Iraqi army. The shock offensive woke the world to the fact that ISIS — which Obama had once called al-Qaeda’s “JV team” — was a global threat. US airstrikes began two months later amid another flurry of international panic: ISIS was now pushing into Kurdish territory, threatening genocide against the Yazidi religious minority concentrated around Mt. Sinjar and closing on Erbil, where the regional government has long been a key US ally.

The operators work with the CTU in three-month rotations, training the commandos, helping them plan operations, and often accompanying them. Wheeler was the team leader on his rotation, the CTU soldiers said, and was near the end of his tour when he went into Hawija. The father of four had recently taken a short trip home for the birth of his newest son. The CTU soldiers remembered Wheeler as demanding during training and warm and open in downtime. He kept a bottle of whiskey on top of his refrigerator, said the CTU lieutenant, and had learned a little Kurdish: Are you ready? Move! Fire!

The lieutenant said that Hawija was not the only operation that saw Wheeler put his life on the line. “Of all the teams I’ve worked with, his was the strongest, and I can tell you that in those three months we did the biggest number of important operations,” the lieutenant said. “He took part in many operations, and I took part in many with him. Our objective was detaining and removing ISIS members from the field.”

When Wheeler touched down in Hawija, the lieutenant was in an operations room watching on a drone feed. He saw Wheeler’s team move toward one of the two houses ISIS militants occupied on the compound as commandos from another chopper moved toward the second. The lieutenant’s account is consistent with drone footage of the raid viewed by a BuzzFeed News reporter in the days following Wheeler’s death. In it, infrared cameras showed commandos, described by Kurdish sources as a mix of Delta operators and CTU troops, departing two helicopters and rapidly approaching the compound’s two houses as they came under enemy fire.

While the captain took some men to secure the house’s ground floor, Wheeler and the others advanced toward the second story, which had its own entrance via a set of exterior stairs. From his perch at a window there, an ISIS militant was firing down on the commandos relentlessly.

Wheeler led the charge, shooting to kill the militant at the window. But a second jihadi got off the shot that killed him, hitting him in the neck. Another US operator then dispatched the assailant, and one of Wheeler’s comrades began, in vain, to perform first aid.

“Josh was a very selfless guy,” said the senior officer who commands the CTU.

In an interview at the CTU’s headquarters, the senior officer, who helped to plan the raid, confirmed details recounted by the captain and lieutenant and provided his own. “The guy on the second floor could have killed everyone,” he said.

Spokespeople for the US military declined to comment on the specifics of the raid.

After Wheeler’s death, the commandos held a service before his remains were sent home, draping an ISIS flag they had taken from Hawija on the casket.

His name is now engraved on a rock at the secret base that was dedicated in his honor.

“It was as if I lost a brother,” the captain said on a recent afternoon in Erbil, rolling up a sleeve to reveal a scar from a shrapnel wound he suffered in Hawija. He said his US partners continue taking risks that their fellow US citizens never see. “He got killed on the ground fighting ISIS. And Josh, if he wasn’t killed, he wouldn’t have wanted anyone to know.”

In an operations room far from the front, clicking keyboards provide the quiet soundtrack for another key front of the US war. It is here, in a cordoned-off building at Erbil’s international airport, that US and Kurdish specialists coordinate US airstrikes across northern Iraq. One day last month, US soldiers in crew cuts and camouflage sat at keyboards facing a wall of high-definition TVs. Seven showed live streams from surveillance drones. An eighth had a muted broadcast of a Dodgers-Brewers game. The airport also hosts a US military base that is growing as the country expands its involvement in the war. It houses roughly 2,500 personnel from the US and its coalition of allies, according to a spokesperson for the coalition based there. Special forces are mixed with conventional troops and US military contractors, sleeping in rows of tents. On a recent afternoon, some soldiers worked out in a covered gym while one, shirtless and sweating, jogged outside in the 110-degree heat. Military helicopters lined a tarmac nearby, and residents in the city beyond see the choppers buzzing back and forth daily.

August 8 marked the two-year anniversary of US airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq. The Obama administration’s request for authorization for a new war has not been granted by Congress, and today’s military engagement has relied on a 2001 authorization for the use of military force granted in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. The US-led coalition fighting ISIS has carried out 9,562 airstrikes in Iraq and another 4,838 in Syria, according to the Pentagon. (US allies such the UK and France also deploy planes, as well as their own special forces, and in the ops room, a photograph of Queen Elizabeth was taped to one wall.) The strikes are coordinated through this ops room and another in Baghdad. They give the US a presence in battles around the country as myriad forces battle ISIS on the ground. US drones and jets batter ISIS positions in places like Fallujah, where the militants suffered their biggest defeat last month as the Iraqi military pushed into the city followed closely by Iran-backed militia. They also assassinate ISIS leaders in targeted strikes.

The airstrikes are frequently launched in support of the Kurdish forces, called peshmerga*, that hold more than 500 miles of front lines with ISIS in northern Iraq. Through an open door in the Erbil ops room, a Kurdish team mans its own bay of computers as they field requests for air support. The Kurdish official who oversees the team — a reserved, middle-aged man who can’t be named for security reasons — recalled a mad scramble to organize the joint US-Kurdish effort in its chaotic early days. “ISIS was coming. They were taking ground,” he said. “Sometimes we didn’t sleep for 72 hours.”

Now the partnership runs smoothly, he said, with teams working around the clock, fueled at times by the Red Bull kept stocked in a refrigerator. As he detailed the process, during a rare visit by a journalist, a subordinate received a call for help from a peshmerga commander who was facing ISIS fire from a heavy machine gun. Silent minutes passed as the men on the keyboards analyzed the request. One wrote out the details and coordinates in English on a form and walked it into the next room, where he handed it to a US officer in a corner. “Froka laraya,” the US officer said in Kurdish: a plane is on the way.

Though the role US troops are playing on the front lines in Iraq is little known at home, Kurdish soldiers see them as a regular presence — calling in airstrikes, flying surveillance drones, firing mortar rounds and hacking ISIS communications, often within range of ISIS fire.

The ops room relies on a steady stream of intelligence from US surveillance and soldiers on the ground. It often comes from US troops who are embedded around the front lines. While Delta Force carries out its sensitive work with the CTU — and with the CTU’s older counterpart, the Counter-Terrorism Group — a constellation of US troops from different specialized units play key roles in the ISIS fight.

US special forces are helping to train the peshmerga as well as the Iraqi military and Sunni Arab militias. They also perform lesser-known and more dangerous tasks under what is broadly termed an “advise and assist” mission.

At a sandbagged post outside the city of Makhmour, about a kilometer from ISIS territory, a peshmerga commander pointed to a spot in the sand where US soldiers had fired mortars at the enemy, seeking to neutralize ISIS’s own mortars, which had been pummeling the area daily. The US mortar team was led by a man the Kurdish soldiers guarding the post remembered for his beard. It can be hard for peshmerga to tell regular US soldiers from special forces — but facial hair is one sign, as special operations troops, in contrast with conventional soldiers who must be clean-shaven, are often afforded what are known as “relaxed grooming standards.” (At another peshmerga position that takes regular mortar fire, dug into the top of Mt. Zartak with ISIS in the valley below, a soldier confused a US journalist for one of the Western troops who frequently fly drones there. “Excuse me sir, is that one of yours?” he asked, as a fighter jet passed overhead.)

In the town of Tel Asqaf, where the front is a long dirt barricade 10 miles from the edge of Mosul and a mile from the nearest ISIS positions, the peshmerga general in charge, Tariq Sulaiman, said he considered the US operators who work in the area to be “not just partners, but brothers.”

It was in Tel Asqaf that Keating, the Navy SEAL, lost his life. His team was based nearby and had been training the peshmerga and working with them to identify targets, call in airstrikes and operate surveillance drones, Sulaiman said. The SEALs were in the area when ISIS breached peshmerga lines early on May 3, breaking through with armor-plated car bombs and some 400 fighters in a mad push to seize control of a strategic highway. Sulaiman said he believed that the SEALs had instruction to avoid direct contact with the enemy, but they drove right to the head of the ISIS advance, halting the militants as they took cover behind their truck in the middle of the road and opened fire. “They stopped ISIS,” he said.

Peshmerga soldiers rallied behind the US operators, who numbered about 10, for what several of those who participated remembered as an intense firefight. “My head was ringing for days,” one said. ISIS militants took up positions in a home along the roadside, which is pocked now with bullet holes. Peshmerga soldiers remembered shrapnel from car bombs raining down, and a US operator holding steady in his fire on a mounted machine gun as bullets hit around him. Keating was killed in the battle, they said, and the rest of the SEALs eventually evacuated on a helicopter.

The spot where Keating was hit was quiet on a recent afternoon as peshmerga pickup trucks and SUVs raced past. Cigarettes and bullet casings littered the sunbaked dirt along the shoulder, and a scorpion dashed across the road. In addition to Keating, Sulaiman said, the battle saw 16 peshmerga killed. “Our blood was mixed,” he said. “You couldn’t tell whose was whose on the ground.”

On a recent afternoon in Washington, DC, a flatscreen TV in the office of Seth Moulton — a Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee who served four tours as a Marine in the Iraq War — greeted visitors with some statistics they had compiled. “Fewer than 1 percent of Americans are willing and able to serve,” it read. “Sixteen percent of Americans currently have a parent who served, compared to 40 percent in 1990. Eighteen percent of members of Congress are veterans today, compared to 64 percent in 1984.”

The result, it adds, is “a longstanding trend: a growing disconnect between American society and the armed forces that claim to represent it.”

Moulton felt the disconnect when he served in the Iraq War, he said, sitting down for coffee in his office — and he thinks the problem has grown worse for the new US war, in part because the Obama administration has been unwilling to level with the public. “And I understand why: this is the president who promised to get us out,” he said. “The president who promised to take us out of Iraq, basically as a condition of his election, has now sent almost 6,000 troops back.”

Moulton visited US troops in Iraq this spring and felt a sense of déjà vu. US commanders spoke of their battle plans against ISIS in the same way they discussed the US military surge in 2007, which saw special operations forces and ground troops partner with Sunni militia fighters to roll back al-Qaeda in Iraq. He believes the US still lacks a comprehensive political plan in a country whose unsettled internal conflicts helped pave the way for ISIS’s rise. “I don’t think we have a long-term political plan to ensure the peace after we’re done defeating ISIS. I don’t think we have a political end game at all,” he said. “So my great fear is that all these troops that we’re sending back to Iraq today, to re-fight battles that we already won, which is once again going to take a lot of lives and resources to defeat a terrorist group, are going to find themselves back there again in five years.”

Moulton noted that the US built its largest embassy in the world in Iraq with the understanding that the country would continue to need major US political and diplomatic investment — and that the embassy now sits half-empty, something he saw as a sign that the Obama administration isn’t fully committed. “We didn’t build that embassy as a tourist attraction, we built it because we needed the capacity,” he said. “Fundamentally this is a problem from the leadership, from the administration. We have to give a clear mission and end game to our troops. The alternative is that we keep sending US troops back to fight and die for battles that we’ve already won.”

When Obama pulled US troops from the country, in late 2011, he declared an end to the Iraq War — fulfilling a core promise of his election campaign.

But when the US decided to return to the country to fight ISIS, recalled Derek Chollet, who was a senior civilian official at the Pentagon at the time, there was little time for sentimentality. “There was the sense that we needed to stop this thing from unraveling,” said Chollet, who is now a senior advisor at the German Marshall Fund, a public policy think tank based in Washington, DC. “What we were seeing was an unraveling of the country — and it was reminiscent of the summer of 1975 when we were watching the fall of South Vietnam after we had left there. So my recollection is not an emotional debate about putting troops on the ground, it was more that the [Iraqi] government wants us there, and we should do it.”

Chollet said the new US involvement in Iraq keeps in line with Obama’s campaign promise. “When the president would say to end the Iraq War, what was meant by that was not that we wouldn’t have a relationship with Iraq and would not do anything there militarily, but that it wasn’t going to be the overwhelming priority for the United States in the world,” he said. “I think that for the president what matters most is that what we’re doing there is sustainable over time: in terms of the resources we’re putting into it, in terms of support in Iraq for what we’re doing, and in terms of the American people’s support for what we’re doing.”

A spokesperson for the Obama administration rejected the idea that it has downplayed the role of US soldiers in combat, and he pointed to portions of an interview Obama gave the military newspaper Stars and Stripes in May. In them, Obama noted the current conflict’s difference in scale and mission from the previous US engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. “Our mission in Iraq, first and foremost, is to support Iraqi forces as they take the lead in fighting [ISIS] on the ground,” Obama said. “This includes our special operations forces in Iraq, and now Syria, who are training, equipping and advising local forces and partnering on counterterrorism missions against [ISIS] leaders and targets. It also includes our air campaign, which, along with coalition partners, has pounded [ISIS] targets and helped local forces in Iraq and Syria push ISIL back from key areas. This is a dangerous mission, and our forces will sometimes face combat situations, as did Master Sergeant Wheeler, Staff Sergeant Cardin and Chief Special Warfare Operator Keating.”

Yet even some within the government feel that the administration has often portrayed the war as one that doesn’t require deep involvement from US troops on the ground — even as their involvement has increased. “Why must everything be forced to fit into the ‘ending the war’ narrative, even when it doesn’t fit?” said one US official involved in anti-ISIS policy, speaking on condition of anonymity to express his critique. “The facts on the ground simply don’t align with the desired storyline.”

Dan Sullivan, a Republican on the Senate’s Armed Services Committee, said that presenting a clear picture of what US troops are doing in Iraq is crucial to the mission’s sustainability. “The lesson that we’ve learned now in this country is that you have to level with the American people about what you’re doing, what the government’s doing, what our military forces are doing,” he said. “Because that’s just the right thing to do, and that’s the best way to get American support, but also because there’s an issue with keeping faith with the troops.”

Sullivan, a lieutenant colonel in the Marine Corps. Reserve who served in Afghanistan and Iraq, said the White House has worked “to spin the fact that our troops are in combat” in the new conflict. “These guys are out there sacrificing and risking their lives,” he said. “And there are spouses and kids back at home who know it.”

On the ground in Iraq, U.S. soldiers are moving with the front lines — preparing for the upcoming offensive to retake Mosul, which will be the largest against ISIS to date. Outside Makhmour, not far from the base where Cardin, the Marine sergeant, was killed by ISIS rocket fire, an artillery convoy of seven U.S. armored vehicles kicked up dust as it rolled through a field behind peshmerga lines. As Iraqi forces have advanced against ISIS in the area, pushing north toward Mosul, U.S. soldiers have too, rolling artillery forward from their bases so they can keep ISIS under fire.

The Mosul offensive will see Iraqi and Kurdish forces working to surround the city, bearing down on it from multiple fronts. “And on every front there’s going to be US special forces calling in air support, reacting to crises, engaging in direct fire,” said Michael Knights, an analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy who has spent time at Iraqi, Kurdish, and US bases across the country. “And eventually this is going to extend into Mosul itself.”

US involvement on the ground promises to increase as the offensive comes to a head. “The front line is shrinking down as we are getting closer to Mosul, and it’s the jaws of this great animal closing on ISIS, and we are going to see a higher and higher concentration of US forces and their [Western] allies on the front lines,” Knights said. “What has so far been a low-visibility effort is going to be a much more intensive one.”

Part of an Army infantry brigade combat team is stationed at the US base in Makhmour, which sits in a joint compound with the peshmerga and the Iraqi military. Carloads of civilians who have fled the nearby fighting pass on the road outside the compound’s guarded gate. Inside, the entrance to the base is marked by a handwritten sign on a fortified metal door: Camp Swift.

Inside Camp Swift, which has largely been off limits to journalists since it opened last year, were signs of expansion. The sandbagged guard posts that once marked the camp’s exterior had been encircled by new ones on walls set further out. ISIS rockets have hit the base, but two US soldiers manning one post said it had been quiet of late. “We’re mostly watching civilians, and there are a lot of dogs,” one said.


The base houses more than 150 US troops, said Col. Brett Sylvia, the senior officer there. “It’s slowly growing,” he said.

Sylvia, 43, is the commander of Task Force Strike, the US Army’s advise-and-assist program in Iraq. His mission is to help local forces — mainly the Iraqi army and peshmerga — to drive ISIS back and ultimately defeat it. Based at nine locations in Iraq and three in Kuwait, Sylvia said, his soldiers advise local forces before and during operations and assist them on the ground with surveillance and artillery. The adjoining Iraqi base holds an ops room, much like the one in Erbil, where US officers were manning computers in one corner while Iraqi officers occupied another.

Trying to coordinate the war on ISIS is a complicated task — and one over which the US doesn’t have total control. The Iraqi military and peshmerga are often at odds, while the US tries to keep its distance from the Iran-backed Shiite militia, many of whom fought US troops during the Iraq War. The Iraqi military, meanwhile, is still trying to regain its footing after its collapse in Mosul, which saw three divisions retreat in the face of a much smaller ISIS force, leaving behind US-provided weapons and armored vehicles.

But ISIS has lost around 45 percent of its territory in Iraq and Syria over the last two years, according to the Pentagon. And from the front lines around Makhmour, Iraqi forces are slowly making their way toward Mosul, where the eventual offensive to retake the city will be the climax of the US efforts. “The main event is getting to Mosul,” Sylvia said, pointing to a military map at the base that was centered on villages to the city’s south. “Very soon what I want to do is take this map and shift it down.”

Sylvia said his soldiers were well aware of the risks they take. “This is a combat environment, and we are here,” he said. “The US here in 2016 is a lot different than the US here in 2007. But it doesn’t mitigate how dangerous it is.”

Sylvia, a father of five, served four tours in the Iraq War and has spent approximately two years in total deployed in the country. Walking through his growing base, he noted that his oldest son, now 18, was about to follow in his footsteps and join the Army. “Everything I do out here is so that my sons don’t have to come out here,” he said.


With additional reporting by Mitchell Prothero in Istanbul and Ali Watkins in Washington, DC.

CORRECTION

An earlier version of this story said that the Obama administration did not request authorization from Congress for a new war. The administration did request it, but was not granted by Congress. We’ve updated the story. Aug. 17, 2016, at 12:40 a.m.

UPDATE

An image showing the entrance to Camp Swift was removed at the request of the US Army. Aug. 17, 2016, at 9:04 a.m.


Mike Giglio is a correspondent for BuzzFeed News based in Istanbul. He has reported on the wars in Syria and Ukraine and unrest around the Middle East. His secure PGP fingerprint is 55F9 0F43 6840 1CED 246D B8AC 7558 4558 23A2 AFC1

Contact Mike Giglio at mike.giglio@buzzfeed.com.
 
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