WAR 08-05-2017-to-08-11-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

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https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/m...ria-strategy-a-turkish-tragedy-in-the-making/

MAKING SENSE OF TURKEY’S SYRIA STRATEGY: A ‘TURKISH TRAGEDY’ IN THE MAKING

BURAK KADERCAN
AUGUST 4, 2017

Following Turkish foreign policy has never been more exciting and terrifying. With its ever-increasing footprint in Syria, Turkey is now a full-fledged party to the civil war. The risks associated with the Turkish presence are multi-faceted. Incursions into Syria can trigger not only a direct war between Turkey and whatever is left of the Assad regime, but an indirect one with Iran and possibly Russia.

The more likely scenario involves Turkey in open conflict (not only occasional shelling and air strikes) with the People’s Protection Units (YPG, sometimes referred to as PYD, its political arm)), the Syrian Kurdish militant group with organic ties to Turkey’s arch-nemesis the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). Such a contingency would not only complicate the already convoluted Syrian conflict, but also spread the Syrian civil war to Turkey, and even Iraq, where the PKK established a strong presence in the strategic Sinjar province.

In addition, if Turkey ends up in open conflict with the YPG in Syria, the United States, with its direct support for YPG in its fight against the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIL), will find itself stuck between a rock and a hard place. In the best-case scenario, already fragile relations between Turkey and the-United States will deteriorate to a point where Turkey’s NATO membership will be questioned either by Ankara or Washington (most likely both). In the worst-case scenario, the Syrian civil war will witness U.S. and Turkish forces, intentionally or unintentionally, targeting each other’s military assets, including personnel, with casualties mounting on each side.

In Turkey, there is an oft-used hyperbole — which would translate roughly as “the deck is being reshuffled in the Middle East” — to highlight shifts in the ever-changing balances of power and alliances. If we end up with the worst-case scenario, the “deck” will not be merely “reshuffled” – it will be burned to ashes. Whatever comes after is anyone’s guess, but the Middle East will never be the same and will become even more unstable. We may soon miss this tension-ridden episode as “days of relative stability.” Unfortunately, this is no hyperbole.

The question that most spectators have in mind, but rarely directly address, is a deceptively difficult one: What is Turkey up to in Syria? The question itself spawns many others. What are Turkey’s policy objectives? What kind of military and political strategies is Ankara pursuing?

The existing answers to these questions suffer from a combination of two tendencies. The first is what can be referred to as “snapshot analysis.” Most analysts focus too much of their attention to recent events. But Turkey’s Syria strategy cannot be fully understood outside of the context of its six-year evolution from the early days of the civil war. In the language of strategic studies, one cannot understand Turkey’s overall posture in Syria by obsessing with operational and tactical details. What is necessary is a big picture perspective at the strategic level. For example, one cannot understand what Turkey is doing in Syria by examining what it is doing now in Afrin, the Kurdish canton in the northeast edge of Syria. Here, Turkey and its Syrian affiliates have lately been shelling the YPG positions and launching screening operations to test the defense lines, with rumors of an “all-out offensive” being circulated in the Turkish media. To understand what Ankara is doing now in Afrin one has to take a broader approach to the question, “what has Turkey been doing in Syria for more than six years?”

The second trend that clouds judgment over Turkey’s involvement in Syria is “reductio ad Erdoganum,” that is, explaining Ankara’s every single choice in terms of Erdogan’s personality traits. Given the rise of Erdoganophobia in the Western media (where, ironically, he was consistently praised over his democratic leanings and leadership skills for a decade), most analyses boil down to either “… because Erdogan is such a bad person” or “… because he is a modern-day sultan.”

For example, many analysts would interpret Turkey’s anti-YPG posture in Syria as part of Erdogan’s struggle against the Kurds. However, the same analysts forget that, only until a few years ago, Erdogan was the first Turkish leader to openly encourage a “peace process” with the PKK. The negotiations with the PKK were coupled with extensive reforms, including changes to the electoral system, broadening of language rights and permission for villages to use their original Kurdish names. Erdogan was even called a “traitor” by not only ultra-nationalists but also many secularists. Further, Erdogan’s appeal to Kurdish voters has been far from negligible; until 2014, for example, he was able to receive almost 40 percent of Kurdish votes. On top of that, under Erdogan, Turkey has struck a thus far sturdy alliance of convenience with Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Government. Erdogan is a master pragmatist. He cannot be explained simply by his autocratic tendencies.

What is a better way to make sense of all this? A starting point is to consider Erdogan’s strategic choices in the context of the evolution of the six-year long Syrian civil war. From such a vantage point, Turkey’s Syria strategy reads more like a Greek tragedy with a Turkish twist. It begins with Ankara’s misplaced quest for glory and gratification in and through Syria, and then evolves into a story of self-entrapment and self-induced tragedy, where each wrong turn further places Turkey against increasingly unfavorable odds and options. The “Turkish tragedy” in Syria begins with Erdogan and his attempts to remake Turkish politics, both domestic and foreign.

Erdogan and Turkish Foreign Policy: Master Breaker, Poor Builder

In so many ways, Erdogan is a revolutionary. Stripped of the positive annotations attached to the term in popular imagination, revolutions are all about breaking the old order, usually violently, in order to create a new one, sometimes from scratch. Just like most revolutionaries, Erdogan proved himself to be a master “breaker.” Over the last decade and a half he has been in power, Erdogan broke the “old” Turkey that was built on the image of its founder, Mustafa Kemal. However, Erdogan faces the same dilemma all revolutionaries face: shattering an old order is easier than building a new one. Among other things, Erdogan also broke the traditional Turkish foreign policy posture.

Apart from the incursions into Cyprus in 1974, pre-Erdogan Turkish foreign policy was built on prudence, which Erdogan saw as passivity. Famously, Erdogan repeatedly called the old Turkey’s diplomatic guard a group of mon chers. In Turkish context, he used the French words for “my dear” to refer to Turkey’s Western-oriented elites (who, in Erdogan’s cosmology, would refer to each other as “mon cher”), criticizing them for being aloof and “Westernized” to the extent that they lost touch with their cultural roots. In doing this, Erdogan sought to frame Turkey’s past prudence in international politics as passivity, or even “strategic effeminateness.” For Erdogan, Turkey should reclaim its cultural heritage and break free from what he perceived to be the idolatry of the West. Broken free from Western influence and self-imposed passivity, Erdogan believed that Turkey could “do more” in regional and, eventually, global politics, claiming the status it deserved in the world.

Erdogan found a partner-in-crime in Ahmet Davutoglu, a scholar of international politics with a strategic vision that matched and probably surpassed Erdogan’s ambition. Fatefully, Davutoglu published his book, Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth) in 2001, just one year before Erdogan assumed power. Davutoglu argued that modern Turkey, built on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, enjoyed a distinct and untapped potential: It could build on the cultural and historical legacies of the deceased empire and establish itself as a model and the silent leader of the region it inhabits, including but not limited to the Middle East. Davutoglu, to his credit, did not favor hard power. Soft power, in Davutoglu’s mind, would suffice to make Turkey great again.

Tragically, Davutoglu’s strategic understanding was built on two misplaced assumptions. First, he believed that Turkey in general, and himself in particular, had a “deep” understanding of the Middle East and its dynamics. Such “knowledge,” if harnessed properly, would help Turkey become the epicenter of political influence in the region. Second, Davutoglu’s strategic vision was built upon the appeal of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East. If only Turkey pursued a more active and more Middle East oriented policy, Ankara would be welcomed by the societies and governments with whom it shared historical, cultural, and even religious bonds.

Aptly dubbed “Neo-Ottomanism” by Davutoglu’s critics, the concept of strategic depth attracted the full attention of Erdogan, who would eventually appoint Davutoglu first as his minister of foreign affairs, then as his prime minister. In the beginning, the marriage of Erdogan’s ambition and Davutoglu’s vision seemed to be working, in fact it seemed to be working very well. With hindsight, it is safe to say that the marriage was working a little too well for the sake of Turkey, feeding the hubris that eventually paved the way for the tragic descent of Turkish foreign policy, into Syria.

With a booming economy and praise about Erdogan’s commitment to democracy from both domestic and international audiences, his popularity as well as Turkey’s influence and attractiveness in the regional sphere exploded. Erdogan’s attitude towards the Mavi Marmara crisis, for example, might have soured Turkish-Israeli relations, but added to the credibility of Erdogan in the Middle East as a capable and daring – and openly devout – Muslim leader who could stand up to Israel for the Palestinian cause. As late as 2012, Turkey was hailed by the West as a model for the rest of the Muslim world. Davutoglu’s “soft power” also seemed to work. If for nothing else, Turkey’s “soap opera industry” became a major vessel of Turkey’s allure and attractiveness across the region. Things looked good.

Then, the Arab Spring happened. Davutoglu, now armed with confidence thanks to his past successes, must have felt exhilarated for a simple reason: His Strategic Depth predicted that the societies of the Middle East and North Africa, long oppressed by authoritarian regimes, would eventually rise up against their oppressors. Davutoglu saw the opportunity of a lifetime. Turkey could play a more active role in this brave new world and exert itself as an even more influential model — and putative leader – for the region. Search for glory and gratification — for the “big” Turkey they had in mind, if not solely for themselves — then pushed Erdogan and Davutoglu into the Syrian civil war. What they could not foresee was what kept Turkish administrations before the AKP painstakingly aloof about regional dynamics: The Middle East is not Las Vegas, a place to gamble. More importantly, Erdogan and Davutoglu ignored a crucial fact: Once you take a dip in the region’s ever-complex environment, you can’t get out.

The Quick Decisive Victory That Wasn’t There

With hindsight, Ankara’s initial incursion into Syria appears as a prime example of “strategic naiveté,” bordering unadulterated foolishness. As of 2011, however, there existed two factors that enabled the dynamic duo, Erdogan and Davutoglu, to indulge their strategic hubris and misplaced optimism.

First, there was the “Libya model.” Just like Afghanistan circa 2003 was usually interpreted as a case of unprecedented success, many saw Muammer Gaddafi’s fall as a model for effective regime-change. The mechanism was simple: Once a dictator is shaken by an uprising, provide native insurgents with material and logistical support, add some airpower into the mix, and watch the dictator fall down and democracy as well as stability will follow. We now know what happened in post-Gaddafi Libya, but drunk on the promising waves of the Arab Spring, many, including Davutoglu, considered the Libya model to be a winning one.

Second, during the initial stages of the civil war, the Western world did not care all that much about Syria. It was only after the rise of the Islamic State and the explosion of the refugee crisis that the Syrian civil war started to make the global news, every day. The initial indifference over the Syrian crisis gave Ankara an opportunity to weigh in as a power-broker. In a war to which few paid serious attention, Turkey could be a “first-mover” and then emerge as not only a kingmaker, who would have the dominant say in Syria’s future and reconstruction, but also a regional heavyweight. Geopolitical gains would also be coupled with reputational ones: Turkey, the much-acclaimed “model” for the healthy marriage of a vibrant democracy and political Islam, would also be hailed as “democracy whisperer” and the champion of a humanitarian cause, that is, ending the suffering of millions of Syrians.

With their eyes fixated on the prize, Erdogan and Davutoglu could not see they were both wrong. The Libya model, even if the sole goal was to topple the dictator, would not apply to Syria, for at least three reasons. First, different from the relatively homogenous Libya, the Syrian population is very diverse with decades-long sectarian and ethnic tensions running underneath. As a result, what began as a struggle for regime change (or survival) quickly evolved into a protracted conflict tainted by sectarian fear and passions. Such conflicts rarely end quickly. A second difference from the Libyan experience only contributed to the protraction of the Syrian conflict: While an overwhelming majority of the Libyan population lives in a handful of urban centers, the settlement patterns in Syria makes total control of the country, either by the Assad regime and anyone interested in forceful regime change, a most daunting task.

Perhaps even more importantly, while Western eyes did not pay all that much attention to the initial stages of the Syrian civil war, others were already watching it closely: Iran, with its geopolitical interests embedded with the Assad regime, and Russia, whose only naval base in the Mediterranean is invested in Syria. Put differently, while Gaddafi had no friends outside Libya, Assad had two powerful and cunning patron saints in his corner. Ankara totally misread the broader strategic environment. Omission of the external actors and their embedded interest in keeping Assad in his iron throne was doubly tragic for Davutoglu. Once hailed as the “Turkish Kissinger” and ever-proud of his “deep understanding” of the regional dynamics, the shallowness of Davutoglu’s strategic calculus fueled Ankara’s belief in a quick and decisive victory over Assad.

Oblivious to the strategic realities on the ground and blinded by ambition, Turkey rushed into Syria. First came the diplomatic break-up. As late as 2008, Erdogan and Assad were close enough to have a family vacation in Bodrum, the so-called Turkish Riviera, posing cheerfully in front of cameras. In 2011, Erdogan launched a public vilification campaign against Assad, with pro-AKP media relentlessly demonizing the Syrian leader. Then, Turkey turned into fighting through auxiliaries. Acting as the patron saint of the anti-Assad coalition in Syria, Ankara provided one blank check after another to the so-called Free Syrian Army (FSA) in the form of training, direct material and logistical support, and what Mao would clearly identify as a “base area” in Turkey. The checks were being cashed by the FSA, but Ankara was not getting its money’s worth. To recover what had been lost, Turkey wrote yet more checks.

As of 2012, Davutoglu’s strategic depth was reduced to two words: sunk costs. Denial, in turn, was the summary of his state of mind. In August 2012, Davutoglu announced that Assad was to go [down] “in a matter of weeks.” Fast forward to 2017 and Assad is still clinging on to the remnants of his regime while Davutoglu has already been sacked by Erdogan and virtually disappeared from the public eye. Assad, ironically, outlasted Davutoglu.

Still, worst was yet to come, and not directly from Assad’s house. Ankara’s strategic blindness was not limited to Assad’s survivability, but also extended to two actors who were about to categorically transform the nature of the conflict: Salafi jihadists and the Syrian Kurds.

Again, the writing was on the wall. As FSA-affiliates were reported to say as early as June 2012, Salafi jihadists were “stealing the revolution [and] working for the day that comes after.”

Enter the Syrian Jihad

ISIL was born in Iraq, but it came of age in Syria. As Brian Fishman highlights in his book, The Master Plan, Salafi jihadists have long identified Syria as a “geopolitical loophole” where global jihad will move into the “next stage,” for at least three reasons.

First, different from Iraq, where Sunnis constitute the minority, the overwhelming majority of Syria’s Muslims are Sunni. Second, the situation in Syria was ripe for weaving a narrative of “Sunni victimhood.” The Assad family, that has ruled the country since 1970, are Alevites and Alevites, despite making up only 14 percent of the population, have been disproportionally represented in state institutions. Assad is married to a Sunni woman, has many Sunni ministers in his government, receives support from Sunni business interests, and is affiliated with the secular Baath party. Regardless, he is an Alevite dictator ruling over a Sunni majority who also happens to be directly backed by the openly-Shia Iran, emboldened by Hezbollah and protected by the infamous and ultra-violent Alevite paramilitary unit (or, gang), the Shabiha. The resulting mix enables Salafi jihadists, especially ISIL, to throw sectarian gasoline into the fires of the Syrian civil war.

Third, and most importantly, Salafi jihadists correctly predicted that if the Assad regime is ever shaken internally, Western powers would be tempted to further destabilize the Baathist rule in the hopes of an agreeable regime change. ISIL’s strategic aptitude is a much-debated topic. But one thing they got right was recognizing the potential that Syria offered for Salafi jihadism.

So, how does Turkey fit into the story of the Syrian jihad? Probably in the worst way possible. ISIL clearly identifies Erdogan and Turkey as enemies and targets in its English and Turkish language online publications. ISIL also launched numerous terrorist attacks in Turkey, killing hundreds. However, its overall Syrian strategy has placed Ankara in a position where it not only receives little credit for being the only external state actor fighting ISIL, with a heavy footprint on the ground, but it also finds itself occasionally accused of being an accomplice with the group.

Why is that the case? First, not only did Ankara fail to predict the growth of ISIL into global public enemy number one, but it also ignored the fear and enmity the group raised in the global collective consciousness, even after it rose to global infamy. As late as August 2014, only a few months after the news broke that ISIL had self-proclaimed its blood-soaked caliphate, Davutoglu went on record to call ISIL just a bunch of angry Sunni youth. Statements like this, not to mention Ankara’s initial passivity regarding the threat ISIL posed, meant that Erdogan and Davutoglu were trying to swim against an overwhelming tide. This was a new zeitgeist where ISIL represented pure evil and anyone, especially those affiliated with political Islam, who did not visibly and actively condemn the group, would be received ungraciously (to put it mildly).

Second, driven by an obsession to topple Assad, it is likely that Ankara both provided support, and turned a blind eye, to those more radical elements in Syria, if not directly ISIL, for so long as the Turkish government believed that these forces could hurt Assad. The extent and nature of the support is still unclear, but a scandal involving the Turkish National Intelligence Agency (MIT) over the so-called “MIT Trucks”, where numerous trucks belonging to MIT were discovered loaded with weapons by Turkey’s internal security services, did not help the Turkish government. Anti-Erdogan groups within or outside Turkey jumped on the case, using it as direct support for their claims that Erdogan, either because he is a closet-radical or simply evil-for-evil’s-sake, has long supported and nurtured ISIL.

Ankara’s response to such claims were, at best, ineffective and counter-productive. With Erdogan’s once glorious image in the West exponentially deteriorating, ISIL-related allegations have only become more popular, even in the absence of direct and incriminating evidence.

Still, it is not ISIL that poses the biggest challenge to Turkey vis-à-vis the Syrian civil war. As far as challenges emanating from Syria go, the Kurdish militant group, YPG, takes the cake.

The Rise of the Kurds

Today, the YPG is universally accepted as the most effective fighting force against ISIS and it has established itself as the darling of Western public opinion. However, things looked much more differently in 2011. At this time the Syrian Kurds, around 10 percent of the Syrian population and concentrated in three non-contiguous cantons in northern Syria, were among one of the most vulnerable groups in the country.

So, the question becomes, how to explain YPG’s meteoric rise? There are two main reasons. The first has to do with Assad’s “strategy of survival.” With his regime about to collapse and under pressure from Turkey, Assad made a clever, and self-serving, strategic move in 2011: letting Syrian Kurds go without a fight. With a single stone, Assad killed three birds. First, by having a truce with the Kurds, he could concentrate his efforts primarily on FSA. Second, having long recognized that the YPG/PYD has established itself the dominant political force among Syrian Kurds, Assad enabled a process that would eventually create a much bigger concern for Turkey than himself. Third, by letting the then-weak Kurds go Assad set up a distraction, and an easy prey, for Salafi jihadists, who might find it more attractive to go after the vulnerable Kurds as opposed to the regime. In fact, it is the last bird that, paradoxically, triggered the rise of the YPG. In particular, the Islamic State came after the Syrian nationalist Kurds with a clear intention: wipe them out.

The second reason behind the rise of the Syrian Kurds is the YPG’s strategic aptitude. In so many ways, ISIL has been both a deadly threat to their very survival and an unprecedented opportunity for the Syrian Kurds. The YPG was able to not only survive the threat, but also use it to push forward its own cause.

In the second half of 2014, most notably, ISIL was on the verge of taking over Kobane, the Kurdish-majority canton in central north Syria. The YPG fought on and, with the help of the U.S. Air Force, inflicted its very first defeat on ISIL. As a turning point, Kobane can perhaps be seen as a “Midway moment” (to invoke a Pacific War reference) in the greater struggle against ISIL, but it was most certainly an Alamo for the Kurds. More precisely, a Kurdish Alamo where the YPG, different from the Alamo experience, held the city and repelled the attack.

Kobane had two strategic effects for the YPG. First, the YPG established itself as the rallying point for not only Kurdish nationalism and for foreign activists who flocked to Syria to fight ISIL. Second, the group achieved wide popularity, not only in the eyes of the United States as an effective military partner, but also in the global media as champions of humanity fighting against pure evil, namely ISIL. The YPG has paid a massive price in blood to accomplish these outcomes, but at the same time it has displayed great skill in “capturing the narrative.” The new zeitgeist portrayed ISIL as pure evil, and it was only, in the eyes of many, the Syrian Kurds with their secular utopia who were both daring enough to rise up to the challenge and capable of defeating the group on the ground. The YPG seized the moment, which was totally misunderstood and missed by Ankara.

So, why is the YPG a concern for Turkey? A popular answer, as mentioned above and favored by the YPG as well as its proponents, boils down to “Reductio ad Erdoganum”: because Erdogan hates the Kurds. In reality, Turkey’s concern for the YPG derives from three factors. The first is the most obvious one: Regardless of branding, the YPG at a minimum has organic ties with the PKK. A more balanced interpretation would portray the YPG as an offshoot of the PKK, with the latter’s cadres exerting overwhelming influence over YPG. In the short term, Ankara is concerned with the YPG channeling some of its personnel and material to PKK operations in Turkey once ISIL is defeated in Syria. In the longer term, the YPG’s increasing popularity and leverage can trigger a process that will “whitewash” the PKK.

The second factor involves the YPG’s ideology. Built on jailed PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan’s teachings and 2005 “KCK” (or the Kurdish Communities Union Compact)” YPG’s ideology is a unique cocktail. Partially inspired by American anarchist and socialist Murray Bookchin, it mixes old-school socialism with, for lack of better words, radical environmentalism and third-wave feminism. A crucial component of this ideology is the cult of leadership. YPG indoctrination refers to Ocalan as Onderlik (Leadership), continuously highlighting his larger-than-life importance and prominence in the group’s ideological vision. At its very core, the YPG is highly motivated to spread its revolution among the Kurds in the region, which also troubles Ankara.

Third, compared with the territorially compact and relatively secure Kurdistan Regional Government, the YPG is both hungrier and more vulnerable. In the past three years the YPG has expanded the areas it controls almost three-fold, and has been able to “patch” the central and eastern Kurdish cantons and, as of summer 2016, was on its way to link up with the third canton in the West. In fact, that was exactly when Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield, to prevent the creation of a YPG-controlled contiguous area in northern Syria, which would cover almost the entirety of the Turkish-Syrian border.

In simple terms, the YPG is building on its newfound popularity and leverage to both minimize its vulnerability and to serve its ideological as well as territorial ambition. Whilst at the same time Turkey is trying to prevent exactly that. Both Turkey and the YPG are trying to use their leverage over regional actors, most importantly the United States, to encircle and outmaneuver each other.

In the light of this complex story, what exactly is Turkey doing in Afrin? In simple terms, Ankara seeks to send at least three signals to the YPG, the United States, and all other regional actors. First, Ankara is not happy about the YPG’s ever-rising influence in the region and will not stand idle. Second, while the YPG is on the rise, it has a critical vulnerability: Afrin is an isolated patch of territory and a hostage of Turkey and its Syrian affiliates. Third, Ankara is willing to rock the boat in Syria in a game of brinkmanship and prefers to take the risk of fighting the YPG/PKK in Syria soon, as opposed to fighting it in Syria and Turkey in the future.

What’s Next: Ankara’s Strategic Nightmare

In sum, propelled by hubris and misplaced ambition, and guided by wrong assumptions about the strategic environment and global zeitgeist, Ankara rushed into Syria to ensure the fall of the Assad regime, only to fail miserably. Ankara’s initial obsession with Assad blinded it to the rise of ISIL and the YPG. The result was a tragedy: The Turkish government is paying a blood price for fighting ISIL on the ground, but is usually portrayed as sympathetic with ISIL and inherently anti-Kurdish. More importantly, armed with direct U.S. support and unprecedented global public relations capital, the YPG is not going anywhere soon.

Turkish foreign policy in Syria is a good reminder that international politics is a different kind of animal than domestic politics, which Erdogan has mastered. You miscalculate yourself and your enemies, as well as the secondary and tertiary effects of your initial strategy, and the world hits back. Turkey has been hit badly as a result of what has been happening in Syria. ISIL has targeted Turkey many times, with likely terrorist attacks to follow in the coming months. The Turkish military, already weakened by the “great purge” that followed the failed coup attempt of July 2016, suffered numerous casualties in Syria, and will most likely suffer more.

The protracted civil war has also resulted in around three million refugees ending up in Turkey, where they were quite literally invited by Erdogan and Davutoglu in the first place. While less visible to outside spectators at the moment, Turkey is on the path to an internal refugee crisis. A haphazard and weakly-monitored injection of three million displaced and therefore economically disadvantaged foreigners into the Turkish society is fueling anti-Syrian xenophobia, which will likely lead to tensions and even instability in the country. To add to this, Turkey has also had diplomatic and military crises with Russia, and relations between the United States and Turkey relations are almost certainly bound to deteriorate further over the YPG debacle. Last but not least, Ankara buried its reputation as a “model for the Middle East” in Syria and will never be able to recover it.

So, what should we expect from Turkey today? Expect Turkey to act as a risk-accepting brinkman, with a lot at stake vis-à-vis the rise of the YPG. To be precise, the challenges posed by the YPG are independent of Erdogan. In a parallel universe where Erdogan magically loses elections tomorrow, and is replaced by the country’s old secular guard, Turkey’s threat perception as of July 2017 would not change a bit. Some might even argue that Erdogan, as of 2017, is acting almost exactly like Turkey’s old secular guard would act if facing the same challenges, but with a twist. The old secular elites would most likely have never had Turkey facing such impossible odds and, good or bad, would have remained painstakingly aloof with regards to the Syrian crisis, even if that meant denying millions of refugees access to Turkish territory.

In this context, Turkey is like the protagonist in a horror movie who, due to some plot device, embarks on a strategic sleepwalk somewhere around 2011. Only to “wake up” and find itself in the last third of the movie around 2016, panicked, yet finally restored of its senses and reason. If nothing else, Erdogan finally let go of his obsession to topple Assad. At least since the summer of 2016, Ankara is focusing on the real threat to Turkish national security, the rise of the YPG. The problem is Ankara discovered its geopolitical realism a little too late to achieve victory, no matter how victory is defined. Yet, it is still determined to do its best by using all all of the leverage Turkey possesses, for effective damage control.

So, what’s next? Left to themselves, both YPG and Turkey would be more willing to fight each other rather than find an agreeable and self-enforcing settlement. Therefore, a lot depends on what the United States will choose to do in post-ISIL Syria. The best outcome for all involved is a U.S.-brokered truce between Turkey and YPG/PKK. On paper, this option involves reigniting the so-called “solution process” of 2013-2015 between Turkey and the PKK (which came to an abrupt end in the summer of 2015, partially due to the changing power relations in Syria and ISIL’s strategic aptitude). This is easier said than done, for two reasons. First, Erdogan’s rhetoric has become exponentially ultra-nationalist and anti-PKK in the last couple of years; it would be difficult, if not impossible, to re-convince his followers that PKK has become – once again – a quasi-legitimate entity to deal with. Second, the PKK, compared with 2013, is infinitely stronger now and will be demanding more, settling for much less.

The more likely scenario, unless Washington conjures a last-minute magic solution to the Turkey-PKK/YPG crisis, is one where the United States will eventually find itself in the extremely uncomfortable position of picking either its NATO ally or its most effective proxies in Syria. No matter how the US chooses, unfortunately, there will be consequences. If Washington does not pick Turkey or waits too long, relations between the United States and Turkey will most certainly deteriorate to a point where a disgruntled Ankara may turn away from the United States and NATO, most likely towards Russia. If the United States picks Turkey over the YPG, in turn, the YPG will not simply go down without a fight, literally and figuratively: it has come too far, achieved too much and paid too steep a blood cost to do that. If nothing else, Russia, Assad, and even Iran might be waiting on the sidelines to leverage a frustrated YPG for their advantage. This is a strategic nightmare, not only for Turkey, but also for the United States.

As the dust surrounding the ISIL crisis is slowly settling, we are now able to clearly see the greater regional tragedy that the Syrian civil war has become. It is high time to move past the over-simplistic and snapshot accounts of what each actor is trying to accomplish and why, as well as how, they have been doing that. In this context, trying to make sense of Turkey’s long-term Syrian posture is a necessary step in doing so.

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Burak Kadercan is an Assistant Professor of Strategy and Policy at the United States Naval War College. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect those of the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

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Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
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http://abcnews.go.com/International...nforces-military-units-syrian-border-49050887

Turkey warns new military moves in Syria imminent

By ZEYNEP BILGINSOY, ASSOCIATED PRESS ISTANBUL — Aug 5, 2017, 2:25 PM ET

Turkey's president reiterated Saturday that new cross-border operations into Syria are in the works as the country boosts its military presence along the border against threats from Kurdish militants in war-torn Syria.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Turkey is determined to launch "new moves" akin to its foray into northern Syria last August. "It's clear that the situation in Syria goes beyond a war on a terror organization," Erdogan said, referring to the Islamic State group, and alluding to Kurdish aspirations for statehood.

He was addressing a large crowd at a stadium opening in eastern Malatya province, and slammed the U.S.-led campaign against IS in Syria.

Turkey has been vehemently opposed to the presence of the People's Protection Units, or YPG, in northern Syria. The Syrian Kurdish militants are a key U.S. ally in the fight against IS in Syria, and the ongoing campaign to retake the extremist group's de-facto capital of Raqqa.

But Turkey, a NATO member, considers the YPG to be a terror group and an extension of Kurdish militants that have waged a three-decades-long insurgency inside its borders. The country fears that the Syrian Kurds will attempt to link its semi-autonomous regions in northern Syria, which Erdogan calls a "terror entity project" that threatens his country.

In last year's cross-border operation dubbed Euphrates Shield, Turkey-backed Syrian opposition groups and the Turkish military cleared an area in northern Syria of IS and prevented the YPG from conjoining its territories.

"We would rather pay the price for spoiling plans against our future and liberty in Syria and Iraq rather than on our own soil," Erdogan said.

"Soon we will take new and important steps," he announced.

Turkey's official Anadolu news agency said Saturday that the military dispatched artillery to the border province of Kilis to reinforce units there.

The six-vehicle convoy included tanks and howitzers to be positioned across from the Kurdish-controlled Syrian region of Afrin, according to the private Dogan news agency.

In late April, Turkey began relocating military units to Sanliurfa province across from another YPG-controlled area.
 

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US, Australia, Japan want coercive acts at sea to be stopped

By JIM GOMEZ AND TERESA CEROJANO, ASSOCIATED PRESS MANILA, Philippines — Aug 7, 2017, 7:04 AM ET

The U.S., Australian and Japanese foreign ministers called Monday for a halt to land reclamation and military actions in the South China Sea and compliance with an arbitration ruling that invalidated China's vast claims to the disputed waters.

U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop and Japan's new top diplomat, Taro Kono, also called on their Southeast Asian counterparts to rapidly negotiate a legally binding maritime code with China aimed at preventing an escalation of conflicts in one of the world's busiest waterways.

In a joint statement, the three expressed serious concerns over the long-seething sea disputes and "voiced their strong opposition to coercive unilateral actions that could alter the status quo and increase tensions."

They urged rival claimant states in the South China Sea "to refrain from land reclamation, construction of outposts, militarization of disputed features, and undertaking unilateral actions that cause permanent physical change to the marine environment in areas pending delimitation."

The contending states should clarify their claims peacefully in accordance with a 1982 maritime treaty and international law, according to the three, who met on the sidelines of annual meetings of Asia-Pacific foreign ministers in Manila, including those from China and Russia.

Their remarks, which are aimed at taming aggression in the disputed waters, are considerably stronger than a joint statement of concern issued by their counterparts in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, a 10-nation bloc whose economies depend heavily on China.

Their stance contrasts with that of China, which opposes what it considers meddling in Asian disputes by the United States and other Western governments. Beijing wants the disputes to be resolved through one-on-one negotiations.

China's territorial disputes in the strategic and potentially oil- and gas-rich waterway with Taiwan and ASEAN member states Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam intensified after Beijing built islands in the disputed waters in recent years and reportedly started to install a missile defense system on them, alarming rival claimant states as well as the U.S. and other Western governments.

China's foreign minister said over the weekend that talks for a long-sought code of conduct in the South China Sea, first mooted in 2002, may finally start this year if "outside parties" don't cause a major disruption.

Adding to the drumbeat of criticism, the commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, Adm. Harry Harris, said Monday that the code of conduct negotiations with an "aggressive" China will be a key challenge for the region.

China's rejection of an international ruling in 2016 that supported the territorial claims of the Philippines "demonstrates to any observer what kind of country China is," Harris said in Jakarta, the Indonesian capital, at a meeting of the U.S.-Indonesia Friendship Society.

"Continuing claims that are in conflict with other countries will demonstrate to all of us what kind of country China will be," he said.

But Harris offered nothing more than moral support to Southeast Asia. The region itself is not a treaty partner of the U.S. and it's up to the 10 Southeast Asian countries to respond firmly to China's posture in the South China Sea, he said.

———

Associated Press writer Josh Lederman contributed to this report.
 

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Iran ridicules US push for inspecting its military sites

By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS TEHRAN, Iran — Aug 7, 2017, 6:45 AM ET

Iran has mocked the U.S. push for inspections of the country's military sites, calling it a "ridiculous dream that will never come true."

This comes after U.S. officials said last month that the Trump administration is pushing for inspections of suspicious Iranian military sites in a bid to test the strength of the nuclear deal that Tehran struck in 2015 with world powers.

Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman, Bahram Ghasemi, told reporters on Monday in Tehran that this request is "possibly something that a satirist wrote up."

The inspections are one element of what is designed to be a more aggressive approach by Washington to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

President Donald Trump has repeatedly described the landmark 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and world powers as "bad."
 

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http://breakingdefense.com/2017/08/contractors-in-afghanistan-what-erik-prince-gets-right/

Contractors in Afghanistan: What Erik Prince Gets Right

By MARK CANCIAN
on August 04, 2017 at 9:31 AM
30 Comments

Eric Prince, the former CEO of Blackwater, argues for expanded use of contractors in Afghanistan. Some of his proposals deserve attention.

The idea apparently resonated with the White House (though not with Secretary of Defense Mattis) and has continued to get attention. Prince is widely regarded as the spawn of Satan because of the many controversies surrounding Blackwater’s conduct in Iraq and Afghanistan, so commentators have lined up to criticize his proposals. Many of his proposals are, indeed, highly debatable, such as creating an army of contractors and establishing a viceroy.

But there are three policy points that Prince gets right, and these deserve more discussion:

- creating long-term country expertise;
- deep embedding with local security forces;
- and reducing the conflict’s visibility to allow the US to play a long game. Shifting the balance of military personnel and contractors might help.

First, as Prince points out, the US needs, and has always lacked, people who stay on the ground for years and really know the turf. The Vietnam War had John Paul Vann, who spent seven years in theater and knew everyone. The Afghan War had Carter Malkasian. In two years working with Afghan leaders, he had enough time to understand their problems and win their trust. (Learning to speak the language also helped.) But these individuals were unique. The military has nothing comparable. Service members rotate quickly because long deployments stress the force and reduce retention, and few speak the language outside of a few foreign area officers. They stay in theater seven months to a year. Thus it is said that the US does not have 16 years of experience in Afghanistan; it has one year of experience 16 times.

Further, the military personnel system discourages building such expertise because such assignments would hurt careers. Military personnel, particularly senior enlisted and officers, need to move through a set series of assignments to be competitive. Captains need to command companies, majors need to be operations officers, lieutenant colonels need to command battalions. Getting sidetracked by a long assignment outside established units makes individuals uncompetitive, irrespective of whatever guidance senior leaders might give promotion boards. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency does not even raise the possibility of such long tours. The military and counterinsurgency community understand this problem. Many commentators, from Tom Ricks to RAND have noted the need for such a cadre, but nothing has ever happened. (Creating roughly half-a-dozen regional regiments is a favorite cause of Breaking Defense’s editor.)

Contractors provide a different and much more flexible personnel system. They can hire people with the right qualifications, often prior military, and put them in place for extended periods because both sides know that that is the deal. They can leverage existing skills and do so without many of the constraints of the military system, like age or the need to retain for a 20-year career. Getting the right contractor into the right billet is not automatic, it takes effort, but the mechanism is there.

Second, creating viable Afghan security forces is the only way we’ll be able to pull our forces out without causing a collapse behind us. Long-term embeds down to the lowest levels, as Price suggests, might be the way to accomplish that. Our current approach of using generalists — however brave and well intentioned — who turn over rapidly is not working. Most Afghan units, outside of special forces, although fighting and dying, are not very effective. The U.S. Army is building regionally aligned security force assistance brigades to provide such capabilities, but that effort is just beginning.

Prince points to the 19th century army of the East India Company as a model. That army failed, revolting in the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857. (In any case, creating a whole contractor army is highly debatable.) But the success of the successor British India Army of the Raj is undeniable. It maintained peace on the subcontinent and fought effectively in both World Wars. One reason the British were so successful with Indian forces was that many military personnel went native, integrated fully, learned the language, and took up local customs, including Indian dress. British officers and NCOs spent entire careers with Indian troops. Deep acculturation also avoids the mirror imaging that Price, and many others, criticize; other militaries don’t need to be structured and equipped like the U.S. military.

Third, if the US really wants to play a long game in Afghanistan, it will need to reduce the war’s visibility. It’s hard to do that with large numbers of Americans wearing uniforms because servicemembers get so much attention, and DOD keeps pointing to them.

Continuous stories about deployments and stress on military personnel remind the public about the war. Thus, the political questions constantly arise: how are we doing and when will the war be over? On the other hand, one of the tenets of counterinsurgency is that it takes a long time and requires “strategic patience”. Some go on for decades. As FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, notes: “Counterinsurgency operations may demand considerable expenditures of time and resources…. The population must have confidence in the staying power of both the affected government and any counterinsurgency forces supporting it.”

In supporting the decades-long Colombian counterinsurgency, the US deployed no military units but instead used contractors extensively. As a result, the war stayed off the public’s radar, and the US was able to sustain a long-term effort that culminated in the 2016 peace agreement and, in effect, surrender of the insurgents. Yes, there is an element of cynicism in substituting contractors for military personnel and capitalizing on the public’s lack of interest in contractors, but the world is what it is and decision-makers must deal with it. Reduced visibility is something every White House looks for, and this White House (like the two previous administrations) is anxious to avoid an endless war.

The US already has a lot of contractors in Afghanistan — 26,000 according to the most recent report — of whom 9,500 are Americans. Two-thirds perform base functions like logistics and communications support, 13 percent are in security, only 3 percent in training. Using contractors is not an either-or proposition, but a question of changing the manpower mix.

If the US were to rely more on contractors, it should apply the painful lessons learned of the last two decades. The early years of the Iraq war were marred by extensive abuses. Although contractors were generally effective, government contracting organizations were overwhelmed and unable to provide the oversight necessary. As a result, many safeguards are now in place, from a beefed-up contingency contracting capability, to regulations holding contractors accountable to military authorities, to doctrine on how to employ contractors.

Prince proposes that the Afghan government employ contractors, which, among other effects, gets around prohibitions on contractors performing “inherently governmental functions” that exist in US law. However, the Afghan government is almost certainly unable to efficiently and effectively exercise control over this much money and capability. The U.S. would need to be in charge.

So we should take these points seriously, even if some of Prince’s other recommendations are debatable, and many people don’t like his past. Yes, the military personnel system might be changed to accomplish some of these goals, but changes during 16 years of war have been modest, so there is no reason to believe that major shifts are near. Maybe a different manpower balance could do better.

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http://www.militarytimes.com/flashp...orce-in-afghanistan-faces-many-legal-hurdles/

Erik Prince’s private air force in Afghanistan faces many legal hurdles

By: Shawn Snow  
21 hours ago

WASHINGTON — Erik Prince’s proposal to bridge the Afghanistan air force’s capability gaps with his own private air force faces a mountain of legal hurdles, government oversight, and raises new questions about private military companies operating in roles typically in the purview of nation states.

On Wednesday, Military Times reported that the former Blackwater CEO had submitted a proposal to the Afghan government to contract services using a private fleet of attack aircraft, gunships, transport planes, and intelligence assets to help the war-torn country’s fledgling air force transition over the next two years.

Video

The White House is currently reviewing the military strategy for Afghanistan. The options on the table include both increasing the number of U.S. troops deployed to America’s longest war by several thousand or drawing down and filling the ensuing void with military contractors — the latter allegedly favored by President Trump and his chief strategist Steve Bannon.

There has been a lot of push back from U.S. defense officials on the proposal to use contractors in lieu of U.S. forces and, according to Afghan defense officials, that plan would likely be rejected by the Afghan government.

According to NBC News, Trump has fumed over the progress of the war, laying some of the blame at his top commander in Afghanistan, Army Gen. John Nicholson.

As political and military officials in Washington continue to wrangle over the contractor plan, there are still a lot of legal and ethical questions about how such a plan would even come to fruition.

Any contracted fighting force “would have to be under Afghan law,” said Ronald Neumann, the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from 2005 to 2007 and now president of the American Academy of Diplomacy.

“They could not be under U.S. law. There’s no U.S. procedure to have them under U.S. law.”

“There’s a bad record of contractors and human rights abuses,” Neumann said. “There’s no legal structure to govern this.”

“Using a contracted force to conduct U.S. war operations is a bad idea that wants to die,” Neumann said.

U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan have immunity protections from prosecution by the Afghan government under the security agreement signed between Afghanistan and the U.S. in 2014. The U.S. pulled its forces out of Iraq in 2011 because of a failure to reach agreement on immunity protections with the Iraqi government.

However, under the current agreement, contractors fall under Afghan jurisdiction.

“Afghanistan maintains the right to exercise jurisdiction over United States contractors and United States contractor employees,” the agreement reads.

Blackwater founder wants to boost the Afghan air war with his private air force

Erik Prince, the former CEO of the private military company formerly known as Blackwater, wants to run the Afghan air war with a private air force capable of intelligence collection and close-air support, according to a recent proposal submitted to the Afghan government.

By: Shawn Snow, Mackenzie Wolf
https://www.militarytimes.com/flash...he-afghan-air-war-with-his-private-air-force/

Any immunity protections for contractors would need to be negotiated – hard to imagine given resistance from the Afghan government, said Debora Avant, the Chair and Director of the Sié Chéou-Kang Center for International Security and Diplomacy at the University of Denver.

Beyond the immunity clause, Prince’s proposal may be in violation of the U.S. Defense Department’s legal framework on the use of military contractors and other international agreements.

According to Department of Defense Instruction 1100.22 (Enclosure 4, Paragraph 1.), the use of combat power against enemy forces or hostile actors is inherently in the purview of the U.S. government and is the actions of a sovereign power not deemed appropriate for military contractors.

While military contractors can provide technical assistance and support, Prince’s plan for Afghanistan goes far beyond that scope. While his proposal lays out technical assistance and general support, it also promises attack aircraft, gunships, and intelligence collection for targeting enemy combatants. The Defense Department did not have this in mind when it laid out its governing framework for private military contractors.

Prince’s proposal may also violate the spirit of the Montreux Document — an international agreement that outlines best practices for private military companies. The “U.S. Government’s support of the Montreux Document is active and continuous, according to the Department of Defense.

“Under best practices outlined in the Montreux Document, a contracting state should both be responsible for the actions of its contractors and take steps to avoid potential disaster,” Avant told Military Times.

“Those steps would include ensuring that they don’t assign to contractors activities that [International Humanitarian Law or the Law of Armed Conflict] assigns to state actors – I think bombing would fall in that category,” she added.

Then there’s the question of government oversight. Just to submit a proposal to a foreign government likely requires a broker’s license issued from the U.S. State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, or DDTC, according to Colby Goodman, the director of the Security Assistance Monitor.

To get an export license, “you have to show Afghanistan wants the equipment…usually have to show a purchase order,” he said.

It’s unclear whether Prince or his companies have such a broker’s licence. A State Department official told Military Times: “U.S. law and regulations prevent us from commenting on specific licensing activity.”

And depending on the sophistication and type of equipment, a large-scale security contract like the one Prince proposed may require some congressional notification.

However, there are caveats. The Obama administration transferred some military equipment under the Commerce Department for oversight instead of the State Department. There could be some aircraft or helicopters without weapons that are not controlled by the DDTC, and therefore would not require a broker’s license.

The State Department official echoed those same regulations, “without speaking to specific cases, under U.S. law, a U.S. person or company (or foreign person/company in the U.S. or foreign person/company outside the U.S. owned/controlled by a U.S. person/company) who acts on behalf of others to facilitate the manufacture or transfer of defense articles or services must (with some exceptions) register as a broker with the U.S. Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, obtain prior approval for brokering of certain articles, and provide an annual report describing their brokering activities.”

The proposal submitted by Erik Prince, on behalf of the Dubai-based company known as “Lancaster6,” includes aircraft, and the description of the capabilities of those aircraft to include weapon systems that could be employed from them. For example, the AN-26G, is described as having twin 30mm cannons and a fire control system.

“Even if he is proposing to transfer foreign-origin arms to Afghanistan that have no connection with U.S. origin, he is still required to obtain a brokering license from the U.S. government if he is a U.S. resident ,” Goodman told Military Times.


A private air force for Afghanistan?

A private security firm known as Lancaster6 has offered to provide the government of Afghanistan with a “turnkey air wing” with range of aviation assets.

By: Military Times
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/2017/08/02/a-private-air-force-for-afghanistan/

Lancaster6 is already operating some of its aircraft in Afghanistan providing air mobility, troop transport, and parachute air drop support for supplies and cargo.

It’s unclear precisely what Prince’s current role is with Lancaster6. The Afghan military official said Prince personally presented the Lancaster6 proposal to Afghan officials.

The current CEO of Lancaster6, according to a personal LinkedIn profile is the former director of operations and director of aviation for Prince’s Frontier Services Group, Christiaan Durrant. Durrant was recruited by Erik Prince to build his private air force, according to a report by The Intercept.

Military Times does not know the company’s affiliation or connection with the U.S.

Neither Prince nor Lancaster6 responded to a Military Times request for comment.

“One of the significant difficulties of the so-called Prince plan is that it flies in the face of much work that DoD has done to establish a governing structure around contractors,” Avant said.

“The people who have been working on this are quite concerned.”

Pentagon bureau chief Tara Copp contributed to this report.

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http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/the-battle-for-the-afghan-border/

The Battle for the Afghan Border

What do Afghanistan’s border guards see as the main obstacles to securing the frontier?

By Bardia Rahmani
August 04, 2017

DUSHANBE, TAJIKISTAN — “I was at war every night for three years… In one day, we lost 10 people. I was there. I was wounded.”

Maj. Raziq Muradi, of the Afghan Border Police (ABP), rolls up his sleeve. Bullet wounds pockmark his forearm. “It was the Taliban.”

Muradi had been stationed in Herat Province when the Taliban attacked his post along the Afghanistan-Turkmenistan border. Four years ago, northern Afghanistan was considered a relatively peaceful area of the country. Now, the Taliban has a presence in all eight of the provinces bordering Central Asia. Many of the militants come from neighboring Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.

Muradi’s experience highlights the growing challenges facing border guards in Afghanistan. As the Taliban expands its territory to an extent not seen since 2001, the ABP, a branch of the Afghan National Army (ANA), is under renewed pressure to clamp down on cross-border drug trafficking and militant activity.

In Afghanistan, border security is inseparable from the larger war effort. The Taliban insurgency thrives off the country’s weak borders. As Imran Sadat, an international coordinator at the Afghan Customs Department (ACD) explains, “Taliban fighters enter Afghanistan, fight, and retreat across the border, where security forces cannot pursue them.”

Meanwhile, poor border security opens the door to drug trafficking, one of the Taliban’s main sources of funding. According to Sadat, “Smugglers use Afghanistan to produce opium, and then send it across the borders through Pakistan and Central Asia to Europe, to Russia.” In return for protecting, and in some cases physically aiding, poppy growers, the Taliban receives a 10 percent cut of sales. The poppy trade is estimated to generate $500 million per year in revenue for the Taliban.

What do Afghanistan’s border guards see as the main obstacles to securing the frontier? And what will it take to turn the tide? To answer these questions, I spoke to 13 members of the Afghan Border Police and five members of the Afghan Customs Department during the UNDP’s annual border management training course in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. The group was diverse – geographically, ethnically, linguistically – yet time and again interviewees hit the same points: Afghanistan’s borders are under-resourced, beset by corruption, and defenseless in the face of foreign meddling.

The interviewees, many of them mid-level officers who have seen combat, had strong opinions about the path forward for Afghanistan. Taking these perspectives into account is critical as the Trump administration prepares to ramp up U.S. involvement in this now 16-year-old war.

***

Of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, 16 are border provinces. The sheer length of the border demands a constant investment of manpower, weapons, equipment, and vehicles. But officials say the resources are simply not there.

“Our problem is that we are under-resourced,” says 1st Lt. Gulrahim Zubair of the ABP, based in Kunduz. Kunduz, a provincial capital in northern Afghanistan, was recaptured by the Taliban in 2015 in a major setback to the NATO-led war effort. “We don’t have enough equipment. Not enough cars. No modern weapons. Not enough tanks and Humvees. We don’t even have replacement tires. And we don’t have enough people,” the first lieutenant says.

Sanaullah Stanikzai, an evaluations officer in the ACD, likens policing the border to plugging up holes in a sinking boat with one finger. “The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is 2,000 km. But there’s not enough forces… When we put police in one part of the border, they just go through another part.”

Afghanistan’s terrain further compounds the problem. The Afghanistan-Pakistan border, or Durand Line, runs along the Hindu Kush mountain range. The region is vast and rugged, with few paved roads or military outposts. “Over there it’s mountainous, it’s hard to patrol,” says Sadat of the ACD. “If you go on foot they will use snipers and shoot you down.”

“With an area that big, you need a sufficient air force,” he says. “Helicopters, F-16s. Then you can monitor it… But we don’t have enough weapons, enough equipment, enough air force. For 34 provinces, we only have ten or 11 helicopters, 15 to 20 jets.”

Sadat believes the answer lies in the United States and NATO assisting Afghanistan to build up its air force. But while the United States has helped train Afghan pilots, it has been slow to donate aircraft to the country. A year-long push to get India to deliver spare aircraft parts has yet to bear fruit.

For now, managing the Durand Line remains the job of Afghanistan’s understaffed ground forces. Desperate to boost troop levels, the ANA recently raised the recruitment age from 35 to 40 and launched an ad campaign aimed at young people. But for Stanikzai, these efforts miss the point. He blames the ANA’s low recruitment on poor wages and lack of compensation for families of soldiers who are injured or killed.

“If a soldier is killed, [the ANA] pay for two months, no more. Their families become beggars. So no one wants to join the police or military.”

***

Of the officers I spoke to, nearly all of them identified corruption as a major challenge to policing the border.

“Within the military, the biggest problem is not ethnic division or incompetence,” says Maj. Syed Mohammad Dawlatzai, of the ABP based in Nangarhar Province. “It’s corruption.”

“Of the border guards, maybe 98 percent will work for their homeland,” says Sadat. “But maybe two percent work only for the money. You can’t guess who it is… You don’t know who to trust.”

Corruption is a double-edged sword for border police. From a security perspective, border guards who accept bribes from militants, drug smugglers, and human traffickers perpetuate insecurity at the border, making their own jobs more difficult. On a more fundamental level, the perception of corruption in the military undermines trust in the state and pushes people into the arms of the Taliban, who are perceived to have always punished corruption harshly.

“When there’s corruption… when leaders take your money, harass you, make problems for you, people will support the Taliban,” says Stanikzai, an ethnic Pashtun who remembers life under Taliban rule. “With the Taliban, there were no problems like this… If you take away corruption, you take away the reason to support the Taliban.”

The reasons for corruption in the military are complex, going beyond mere greed. Soldiers and police officers are aware that engaging in corruption places themselves and their colleagues in greater danger. Nevertheless, some take bribes out of economic necessity.

Zubair, the first lieutenant from Kunduz, is surprisingly candid about his reasons for accepting bribes.

“Where I live, the big problem is living securely,” he says. “In order to support my family, to pay for electricity, to keep my house, I am forced to get extra money. The wages [for the Afghan National Army] are not enough. It’s hard for an honest person to stand on his own feet and provide for himself.”

Sadat of the ACD is sympathetic to this argument.

“If I get 50,000 [Afghani, AFN] a month, I will have no reason to engage in corruption,” he says. “If I get 10,000 [AFN], and I have to spend 15,000 on basic living, then I must engage in corruption. So when you have no economic systems, you will be forced to be corrupt for your family, for your daily life, for your house. The corruption systems will be gone when there is a good economic system.”

Stanikzai of the ACD relates the issue back to poor wages and lack of compensation, which force soldiers to find alternative sources of income.

“If I died, who would take care of my family? How would they eat? If we had a system in which, if you’re killed or hurt, the government will still help you, there won’t be any problems. Corruption would go away.”

In addition to economic pressures, there is pressure from above. When higher-ups in the government and security services lean on those below them, it creates a domino effect in which victims must themselves turn to corruption.

“Say you want something, but your superior asks for 10,000 [AFN],” says Capt. Mohammad Nafir Gholami, of the ABP in Helmand Province, a stronghold for the insurgency. “It forces you to engage in corruption. If I pay 10,000, then I have to find 10,000.”

“Corruption will only go away when we eradicate it from the top,” he says.

Dawlatzai agrees: “Corruption is a problem everywhere, not just the army. It will go away when the top leaders are clean.”

Afghanistan is ranked 169th out of 176 countries in Transparency International’s 2016 Corruption Perceptions Index. In opinion surveys, Afghans consistently identify corruption as one of the biggest challenges facing the country, along with insecurity and unemployment.

***

Afghanistan’s border problems are over 100 years in the making. The country initially served as a buffer zone between Britain and Russia’s colonial holdings in South and Central Asia. In 1893, British diplomat Sir Mortimer Durand and the Afghan emir signed a one-page document establishing a border between Afghanistan and British India, which Pakistan inherited after the 1947 partition. As is so often the case with borders conceived in European offices, the Durand Line failed to take local factors into account.

“There were people living in the region for a long time, but they drew a line right through them,” says Gholami, who polices the Afghanistan-Pakistan border from Helmand Province.

The Durand Line cut through Pashtun tribal areas to the north and Balochistan to the south, politically dividing members of these ethnic groups. As a result, there remains heavy traffic across the border to this day, a fact that militants exploit.

“There are families with relatives on the other side of the border,” says Gholami. “They are on the Afghanistan side, their families are on the Pakistan side. That makes it tough for us… The border is open, [so] the Taliban come and go. Without visas, without passports. With weapons, with supplies. It’s no problem for them.”

The border remains a source of friction between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The countries periodically engage in diplomatic spats and armed clashes, complicating cross-border policing efforts. But it is Pakistan’s illicit support for the Taliban that most threatens the peace.

“The biggest problem we have is with Pakistan,” says Stanikzai. “… [A]ll the terrorism in Afghanistan is supported by Pakistan. The Taliban is nurtured by Pakistan and gets safe haven across the border.”

Maj. Ridi Gul Wahdat of the ABP is based in Paktia province, which shares a border with Pakistan. According to Wahdat, Afghanistan’s relationship with Pakistan is “the biggest challenge.”

“Pakistan works with the enemy. They work with the Taliban, al-Qaeda, all the terrorist groups. They let them come and go because they want to keep Afghanistan weak,” he says.

Stanikzai sees Pakistan’s motivations as two-fold. First, “Pakistan supports the Taliban so that we will retreat from the border.” Second, “Pakistan’s biggest fear is the relationship between Afghanistan and India. Pakistan and India are enemies. [Pakistan] worries that Afghanistan and India will become close.”

A recent Pentagon report identified Pakistan as the most influential external actor affecting Afghanistan’s stability. According to the report, elements of Pakistan’s security service allow the Taliban and Haqqani Network to “to operate in and from Pakistan.”

But Pakistan is not the only neighbor with a presence in Afghanistan.

“With Iran, we have a dispute over the dams in Helmand,” says Gholami. “Iran doesn’t want these to be built. They don’t want the water that comes from Afghanistan to be blocked.”

What happens if Afghanistan builds the dams?

“If we build it, they’ll fight us… They support the Taliban. They give them weapons, just like Pakistan. The best tool for Iran is the Taliban.”

Reports suggest that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has provided weapons and financial aid to militants in Afghanistan’s western provinces. In addition to seeking concessions from the Afghan government, Iran hopes to undercut the U.S. mission in Afghanistan.

The Afghans I spoke to also point a finger at their Central Asian neighbors. Some 30 percent of Afghan opiates pass through Central Asia, and the Tajik government extracts billions of dollars from smugglers in return for looking the other way. Afghanistan is also a major destination for Tajik, Turkmen, and Uzbek militants, with Central Asian governments either unable or unwilling to stem the flow.

Caught between the machinations of their neighbors, it is easy for Afghans feel that their fate is out of their hands.

“Do you know the game buzkashi?” asks Zubair.

Buzkashi, sometimes referred to as “Dead Goat Polo,” is a contact sport popular in Afghanistan and Central Asia in which teams of men on horseback compete to throw a goat carcass into a hole in the ground.

“Afghanistan is the goat.”

***

In June, the Trump administration announced that it would send an additional 4,000 troops to Afghanistan to help train the ANA. The new troops would join 8,400 U.S. soldiers already stationed there.

In his appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee last month, U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis faced criticism from Arizona Senator John McCain regarding the administration’s lack of strategy to accompany this surge. Mattis acknowledged that the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan had entered a “strategy-free time” but promised to produce a comprehensive South Asia plan by mid-July. To date, however, the Trump administration has not released its strategy, reportedly because President Donald Trump is reluctant to sign off on it. It is unclear how the U.S. plans to address issues such as under-resourcing, corruption, and foreign meddling.

The absence of a comprehensive plan has failed to inspire confidence among the Afghans I spoke to. Many expressed frustration with what they perceive as American disinterest in promoting economic and governance reforms or seriously confronting Afghanistan’s neighbors.

“The American government wants to work only on the security forces, instead of thinking about the economics of the border regions,” says Sadat. “The Americans’ priority is to improve the Afghanistan military, and economics is secondary… [But] economics and security are inseparable.”

“America could in one day wipe all the terrorists from Pakistan,” says Stanikzai. “Why doesn’t it?”

With the Taliban ascendant and Afghanistan facing one of its most violent summers in years, members of the ABP have few illusions about the challenge they face.

“The situation is getting worse,” says Muradi. “Daesh [Islamic State] is growing, the Taliban is growing… It’s getting worse every day.”

For Zubair, however, there is reason for optimism.

“Yes, the Taliban’s territory is growing,” he says. “But now people understand what they stand for. Young people have opened their eyes. Before young people didn’t have literacy. Anyone could trick them. But now literacy is growing, they’re going to university, they’re seeing the world. Now the Taliban is less able to control the population.”

We are sitting on a bench in the courtyard of the OSCE Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe. The other trainees are drinking tea and chatting under the shade of a tree. It is a strangely idyllic scene considering the work they will soon return to. I ask Zubair if he really thinks the war can be won.

“Us Muslims are never without hope,” he says. “We always have hope. To the last moment of existence, even if we face great danger, we never let go of our hope.”

***

Names in this article have been changed to protect the individuals who discussed sensitive topics and work in dangerous areas.

Bardia Rahmani is a graduate student at Columbia University, where he focuses on civil wars and post-conflict reconciliation.
 

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Putin Is Thirsty – the Troubling Problem of Kaliningrad

By A. Grace Buchholz
August 07, 2017

Watch Kaliningrad. This oft-forgotten Russian exclave, squeezed between Poland and Lithuania on the Baltic Sea, may be the focal point for a dangerous economic and military conflict between Russia and NATO. In April 2017 a battalion of NATO troops marched up to Poland’s Kaliningrad border, to demonstrate to Russia that NATO is alert to the risk. In September, Russia will amass 13,000 troops for war games in neighboring Belarus. But why should a small place like Kaliningrad, about the size of Trinidad and Tobago, matter? The answer is found in Russia’s 300-year quest for warm-water ports, and the lethal action it has often taken to secure them.

Kaliningrad gives Russia its only port on the Baltic coast that does not freeze during the winter. But President Vladimir Putin has a problem. Kaliningrad is cut off from Russian control by hundreds of miles of Latvian and Lithuanian terrain. This problem should sound familiar. From 1991-2014 Crimea, another warm-water region, was cut off from Russia. Russia’s 2014 march through Ukraine to Crimea gave it swift access to the Mediterranean. Today Vladimir Putin plots to link Kaliningrad to the heart of Mother Russia, provoking shivers in NATO generals. At the G20 Summit on July 6th, 2017 President Donald Trump did pledge to uphold NATO’s Article 5, mutual protection clause. But Kaliningrad is a long way from the concerns of the Oval Office.

Putin’s ambition to link Russia’s vast landmass to warm water is not a newfound passion; past Russian strongmen and strongwomen have shared his thirst for warm water. When Peter the Great ascended to czardom in 1682, he studied the West and soon realized that Russia’s icy waters and frozen docks retarded its naval and maritime dexterity. While Portugal could devote twelve months a year to seafaring, Russian merchants were incapacitated by the winter and hibernated alongside the country’s brown bears.

In response, Peter expanded Russia’s naval might and fought for access to the Baltics, winning Swedish territory. But Peter’s immediate heirs failed to preserve his holdings. Russian influence in the region waned until Catherine II’s reign.

Catherine the Great earned her moniker in part by reinvigorating Russian sea power. She decisively defeated her cousin Gustav III in the Russo-Swedish war (1788-1790), and then looked South. Though she failed in the Mediterranean, she accumulated ports along the northern Black Sea, which had been Ottoman domain. This launched a century-long rivalry between the Ottomans and Russians for control.

Like Peter, Catherine begat successors who were lazy about oceanic exhibition and lost hard-gained territories. Finally, when Nicholas I came to power in 1825, the Ottoman Empire was beginning to crumble, and Nicholas famously called his rival the “sick man” of Europe. Boldly, naively, and expecting to conquer the Black Sea and adjoining Ottoman territory, Nicholas charged into the Crimean War. But Western Europe feared Russian expansion, and aided the Ottomans to secure a balance of powers. The war made a hero of Florence Nightingale and a fool of Nicholas. Once Russia lost these rigged war games, the Black Sea was divided into a polycentric economy benefitting the West, and Russia was forced to demilitarize the Baltics. A half-century later, Nicholas II sought to redeem Russia’s naval failures and link together Russia’s remaining ports, often with terrible results. Vladivostok, on Russia’s Eastern fringe by Korea, was a gateway to Asian markets. Hoping to connect to this vital port, Nicholas II completed the Trans-Siberian railway, helping to spark the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, which he lost decisively. This humiliation humbled the Russian empire and kindled Japanese nationalism. Losing the war spurred mutinies across the country, and fortified peasant revolutions, often led by communists who would later have Nicholas’s head. The Czar’s naval maneuvers created only one winner, and that was director Sergei Eisenstein, whose tale of mutiny, The Battleship Potemkin, would win plaudits in 1925.

Today Vladimir Putin faces challenges similar to the royals before him. How to connect Kaliningrad, his only warm water port on the Baltic, to the Russian mainland for economic and military purposes? Kaliningrad has flourished in the past decade, and Putin desires its dynamism to spill into the motherland. Just as Vladivostok served as a gateway to Pacific markets, Kaliningrad could play a similar role to the Atlantic. Kaliningrad’s industry is booming, and it is home to 90% of the world’s amber deposits. Further, Kaliningrad offers the highest marine economy potential in Russia (including fishing and transportation).

With its strategic location, Kaliningrad could utterly confound the European component of the U.S. defense system. With worsening tensions between Russia and Latvia and Lithuania, the scene looks combustible. If Putin can figure out how to connect his Baltic port to the mainland without relying on his hostile neighbors, he could freely send missiles, weapons, and military personnel.

The answer most likely lies in Belarus, with whom Putin enjoys a friendly border and railroads that link together. Separating Belarus and Kaliningrad is a narrow 60-mile Polish/Lithuanian border. In other words, Putin is a mere 60 miles from mastery of the Baltics and substantial control of Eastern Europe for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union. Linking Belarus to Kaliningrad could simultaneously isolate Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania; spread Russian influence, and improve the Russian economy. NATO’s military understands this, but there is a disconnect between military and political intelligence. How many advisors to Donald Trump, Theresa May, or Justin Trudeau could identify Kaliningrad on a map?

After the 2014 invasion of Crimea, Russia won easy access to the Black Sea. Shocked politicians in the West then discovered that their militaries had been concerned about the threat for years. Of course, historians had been watching for centuries.

Like Peter the Great, Putin recognizes the importance of warm-water ports for amiable trade, as well as for not-so-amiable hegemony. Like Catherine, he has opened his way to the Black Sea by stomping through Crimea. Like Nicholas II, he currently struggles to connect a key port to his homeland. He may yet fulfill a Russian legacy that has guided Russian politics since the late seventeenth century - winning unfettered access to ports in the Pacific, Black Sea, Mediterranean, and Baltics. His ambition forces the West to reconsider its own military might, the resolve of its political leaders, and its fears of Russian expansion. Two questions cannot be avoided: Are Putin’s aspirations an economic and military enterprise for naval security - or a rapacious thirst for land and power? And what can and will the West - and East - do?

Grace Buchholz is a Research Fellow in history at Sproglit, an educational software company, has contributed to the History News Network, and is working on a book about strongman leaders from Edward IV to Vladimir Putin.
 

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http://www.dw.com/en/un-finds-mass-..._term=Editorial - Military - Early Bird Brief

UN finds mass graves in northern Mali town

As renewed infighting among Tuareg groups threatens to derail a 2015 peace agreement, the UN has found mass graves in a northern Mali town. It also found evidence of the forced disappearance of children.

Date 05.08.2017

The UN mission - known as MINUSMA - uncovered "the existence of individual tombs and mass graves" in the village of Anefis, about 100 km (60 miles) southwest of the town of Kidal, the mission said in a statement.

Investigators also uncovered evidence of forced disappearances, kidnapping and robbery around Kidal, it read.

Read more: EU commits 50 million Euros to combat terrorism in West Africa

"As for Anefis, the teams were able to observe on site the existence of individual graves and mass graves but are not able to establish at this stage either the number of people buried or the circumstances of their deaths," MINUSMA said in a statement.

The mission confirmed 34 cases of human rights abuses in the area, including "enforced disappearances" of minors, who have also been involved in the recent fighting.

The UN said there was the "possible presence" of child soldiers among the ranks of both armed groups, which if confirmed would "constitute serious children's rights violations at a time of armed conflict."

Fighting between Tuareg groups has intensified in recent weeks in the north. The pro-government Platform group has been fighting with the former rebels of the Coordination of Movements of Azawad (CMA) since June.

The conflict dates back to 2012, when cities in the north of the country came under the control of jihadist groups linked to Al-Qaeda, which sought to exploit an ongoing ethnic Tuareg-led rebel uprising.

Sources told the French news agency AFP in late July that "dozens" of members of the GATIA militia - part of the Platform group - had been killed in clashes monitored by a UN helicopter that later crashed accidentally, killing two German crew.

While most of the Islamists were ousted by a French-led military operation, attacks have continued on UN forces, civilians and the Malian army.

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Blast kills leader of former Tuareg rebel group
Cheick Ag Aoussa has been killed in a car explosion shortly after attending a meeting at the UN camp in northern Mali. Chancellor Merkel is due in Mali as part of her Africa tour. (09.10.2016)

Bundeswehr soldiers killed in Mali honored in Germany
Family members and dignitaries including Germany's defense minister paid tribute to soldiers who died in a helicopter crash. They'd been conducting surveillance as part of the UN peacekeeping mission in war-torn Mali. (03.08.2017)

Mali's violent years
Despite a UN mission and peace agreements, the situation in Mali hasn't improved. Tuareg rebels and Islamists have been fighting the central government in Bamako since 2012, and foreigners have repeatedly been targeted. (20.11.2015)
 

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http://www.defenseone.com/politics/...-never-had-chance-anyway/140005/?oref=d-river

The US Balance-of-Power Strategy in the Gulf is Collapsing. But It Never Had a Chance Anyway

BY CHRISTOPHER J. BOLAN
PROFESSOR OF MIDDLE EAST SECURITY STUDIES AT THE U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
READ BIO
AUGUST 4, 2017

The Qatar dispute deals a death blow to Trump Administration dreams of an Arab NATO arrayed against Iran.

The ongoing dispute between Qatar and the rest of Arab Gulf Cooperation Council represents perhaps the greatest internal threat to the group since it was created as a bulwark against Shi’a radicalism in the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian revolution. The split all but eliminates any prospect that the United States could forge a regional – let alone an international – coalition to contain and roll back what many consider Iran’s growing regional clout.

The Trump administration can be forgiven for its lofty ambition to recreate a regional coalition of Arab Sunni states to stand against Shi’a Persian Iran, a concept some have dubbed “Arab NATO.” After all, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East has long been grounded in traditional balance-of-power politics. President Truman was determined to quickly recognize Israel after it declared independence in May 1948 in no small measure to lure Israelis into an Anglo-American camp as a balance against the regional influence of the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower supported the creation of the Baghdad Pact that organized Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Great Britain into an anti-communist alliance. President Nixon pursued a “Twin Pillars” policy that relied on Saudi Arabia and Iran to serve as regional American allies to defend against both external and internal threats to the region. President Reagan extended American political and intelligence support to Saddam Hussein as Iraq battled revolutionary Iran from 1980 to 1988. President H.W. Bush marshalled a vast global political and military coalition to restore Kuwait’s sovereignty after Iraq’s invasion in August 1990 in order to deny Saddam’s ability to dominate the region. Later, President Clinton declared his “dual containment” policy designed to directly balance against ‘bad actors’ in both Baghdad and Tehran.

President Obama veered from this U.S. policy preference for playing the zero-sum game of balance-of-power politics in the Middle East. Instead, he irritated America’s traditional Sunni Arab allies by telling them that they would need to find a way to “share” the neighborhood with Iran. Then he committed his greatest sin, at least in the view of the Arab Gulf states, by reaching a deal with Iran that, although it severely limited Tehran’s nuclear program, appeared to suggest Washington was open to abandoning its decades-long regional strategy aimed at containing Iran.

So it is not especially surprising that President Trump, who expressly criticized the Iran nuclear deal and charged Obama with abandoning our traditional allies in the region, would seek to reverse course. Indeed, during his first foreign visit to an Arab-Islamic Summit in Saudi Arabia, President Trump outlined a wholesale return to US regional policies grounded in traditional balance-of-power politics. He urged the Sunni Arab countries to forge an alliance that would “work together to isolate Iran, deny it funding for terrorism, and pray for the day when the Iranian people have the just and righteous government they deserve.”

Unfortunately, for the Trump administration the heated Saudi-Qatari dispute is having the counterproductive effect of increasing opportunities for Iranian influence rather than curbing them. Indeed, Iran has willingly stepped into the storm created by the Saudi-led siege of Qatar by championing a diplomatic resolution, providing tons of food to Qatar, and allowing Doha access to its sea and air corridors for civilian and military traffic.

Some critics have laid the blame for such a failed policy primarily at President Trump’s doorstep. Nonetheless, any U.S. policy grounded in balance-of-power politics in the Middle East was bound to fail for the following reasons:

Instability and uncertainty: Balance-of-power-politics calculations depend on a relatively stable international and regional security environment. The bipolar competition between the U.S. and USSR during the Cold War made such assessments relatively easy. Adding the economic or military power of a state to one side of the ledger meant measureable gains for one side and comparable losses for the other. However, today’s nonpolar or disordered world greatly complicates such calculations. Moreover, the combination of the Arab uprisings that ousted long-time pro-Western autocrats in Tunis, Cairo, and Yemen coupled with the ongoing civil wars raging in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen signal the dawn of a new era in the Middle East likely to be characterized by tremendous uncertainties – uncertainties that will make any balance-of-power calculations tenuous and transient at best.

Problematic allies: The most obvious candidates to provide a foundation for U.S. policies aimed at containing Iranian regional ambitions are themselves tremendously flawed and weak partners. Saudi Arabia is an important counterterrorism partner but its spread of an intolerant version of Wahhabi Islam provides much of the theological fuel for today’s violent radical Islamic terrorist groups. Meanwhile, Egypt’s role as the first Arab country to sign a peace agreement with Israel has made it a linchpin in regional stability for decades, but the combination of its repressive military leadership with high levels of unemployment, poverty, and corruption are a combustible mix that could explode anytime. Finally, as Gen. David Petraeus told Congress in 2010, Israel’s continued occupation of Palestinian territories “limits the strength and depth of U.S. partnerships with governments and peoples in the [region] and weakens the legitimacy of moderate [Arab] regimes.”

Reckless driving: As observed by MIT’s Barry Posen, allies that are (overly) confident of American support can feel emboldened to pursue policies that are counterproductive to U.S. interests. The most obvious example of this in the region today is Saudi Arabia’s inconclusive war in Yemen that has both created the world’s greatest humanitarian disaster and allowed for the resurgence of Al-Qa’eda and its affiliates in the Arabian Peninsula.

Rising sectarianism: Finally, any effort to forge an alliance expressly grounded in Sunni Arab identities can only exacerbate rather than alleviate the heightened sectarian tensions fueling regional conflict. These tensions are exploited by insurgent and terrorist groups to bolster their recruiting ranks among the disenfranchised Sunni communities in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. Moreover, an obviously pro-Sunni anti-Shi’a alliance will likely intensify Iranian security concerns, reinforce the position of hardliners in Iran, and create incentives for even more aggressive Iranian actions to preserve whatever regional influence it retains.
 

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http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/china-to-likely-induct-new-aircraft-carrier-ahead-of-schedule/

China to Likely Induct New Aircraft Carrier Ahead of Schedule

China’s first home-grown carrier could be delivered to the navy as early as the end of 2018.

By Franz-Stefan Gady
August 07, 2017

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) may induct its first indigenously designed and developed Type 001A aircraft carrier Shandong ahead of schedule, according to media reports.

The new 65,000-ton warship, an improved variant of the PLAN’s only operational aircraft carrier, the 60,000-ton Type 001 Liaoning — a retrofitted Soviet-era Admiral Kuznetsov-class multirole aircraft carrier, could join the PLAN as early as 2018, two Chinese military sources revealed to the South China Morning Post last week.

Based on previous reports, the PLAN anticipated a 2020 induction date. The new carrier is expected to serve in the PLAN’s North Sea Fleet or East Sea Fleet. One of the reasons for the likely earlier induction of the ship is better than expected test results of key systems of the carrier including the carrier’s propulsion system.

“Steam turbines of [the carrier] will all start to formally enter the mooring test phase, which will be ahead of our schedule in overall progress,” Hu Wenming, general manager of the Type 001A project, said on state television last Thursday. Furthermore, according to images of the carrier circulating on the internet, equipment installation work on the Shandong has almost been completed.

The Type 001A was launched in April at the Dalian shipyard in Liaoning Province by China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, as my colleague Ankit Panda reported for The Diplomat.

Like its sister ship, the PLAN’s sole operational aircraft carrier, China’s new carrier will be able to accommodate up to 24 Shenyang J-15 multirole fighter jets, a variant of the fourth-generation Sukhoi Su-33 twin-engines air superiority fighter, as well as up to ten rotary wing aircraft such as Changshe Z-18, Ka-31, or Harbin Z-9 helicopters.

The Shandong will be equipped with a so-called ski-jump assisted Short Take-Off But Arrested Recovery (STOBAR) launch system, rather than more advanced catapult-assisted launch system. This brings a number of disadvantages as I noted elsewhere:

Given the STOBAR system, aircraft launched from the carrier will also have a more limited operational range due to the fact that they need to expend a considerable amount of fuel during take-off in comparison to aircraft launched with a catapult system as is the case in the U.S. Navy.

In addition, aircraft launched with a STOBAR system usually also carry lighter armament, reducing the ship’s overall combat power. However, there is speculation that the PLAN’s next carrier, dubbed Type 002, will be using more modern catapult technology.

The PLAN’s plans to field up to six carrier strike groups in the coming decades. Both the Liaoning and Shandong will likely primarily serve as test platforms for Chinese carrier-based naval aviation and technology demonstrators. Nevertheless, China has been stepping up its carrier activities in recent months. In July, the Liaoning entered Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) following a port visit to the former British colony of Hong Kong earlier that month.
 

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https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/southern-asias-escalating-strategic-competition/

SOUTHERN ASIA’S ESCALATING STRATEGIC COMPETITION

SAMEER LALWANI AND TRAVIS WHEELER
AUGUST 7, 2017

Editor’s Note: Welcome to the first installment of “Southern (Dis)Comfort,” a new series from War on the Rocks and the Stimson Center. The series seeks to unpack the dynamics of intensifying competition—military, economic, diplomatic—in Southern Asia, principally between China, India, Pakistan, and the United States.

The United States has spent the first decade of the 21st century consumed by “hot wars” in Afghanistan and Iraq until the Obama administration, in recognition of China’s growing economic and military might, sought to “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific. Now, once again, the potential deployment of more troops to the rapidly deteriorating “stalemate” in Afghanistan, along with the human catastrophe in Syria, the U.S.-led military campaign against ISIL, and North Korea’s rapidly advancing missile program are likely to limit the Trump administration’s bandwidth to recognize some of the larger tectonic shifts over the horizon and the risks they bear.

Though comparatively unnoticed in Washington policymaking circles, “Southern Asia” and the broader Indian Ocean region form one of the most competitive strategic environments in the world. This article is the first installment of “Southern (Dis)Comfort),” a series organized with the Stimson Center’s South Asia Program to unpack the range of competitive dynamics in Southern Asia today.

The region matters a great deal because it hosts multiple major nuclear powers, some of the world’s largest and most powerful conventional militaries, dozens of terrorist organizations, 40 percent of the globe’s population, and one of the highest volumes of trade alongside critical maritime chokepoints. China is increasingly being drawn into Southern Asia’s competition through its expanding arms sales and technology transfers, economic investments, and naval presence. India and Pakistan remain bitter rivals locked in a search for escalation dominance while deepening their respective alignments with great powers. Moreover, during the past year, Southern Asia has witnessed two separate militarized border crises — “surgical strikes” across the Line of Control in Kashmir and the ongoing Doklam standoff — that had (or have) the potential to escalate to full-scale war between nuclear powers.

Competition is a natural byproduct of states navigating an anarchic world, reducing uncertainty, coping with changing military technologies, and countering evolving or intensifying threats. To address these threats to their security, states turn to various types of balancing: converting economic and other national resources into greater military capabilities (internal balancing); building new or deepening existing alignments (external balancing); and leveraging economic and diplomatic tools to stymie adversaries and maximize advantage (soft balancing).

These balancing concepts provide a useful starting point for disentangling and understanding four domains of escalating competition in Southern Asia: strategic doctrines and capabilities, maritime security, great-power partnerships, and diplomatic friction.

Strategic Doctrines and Capabilities

The principal area of Southern Asia competition has revolved around strategic capabilities and doctrine. This cycle of strategic competition appears to increase the risk of accidental or inadvertent escalation with every passing year.

Two crises with Pakistan — the 1999 Kargil Conflict and the 2001 to 2002 “Twin Peaks” Crisis — initially prompted the Indian defense establishment to search for a limited war strategy suitable for a nuclearized environment. The Indian Army decided on a new offensive doctrine, known as Cold Start, which an army chief publicly acknowledged for the first time earlier this year. Cold Start envisions rapidly mobilizing military forces, carrying out limited thrusts across the international border, and capturing portions of Pakistani territory — all without crossing Pakistan’s nuclear-use thresholds. This doctrine’s proponents claim that undertaking such aggressive operations would provide bargaining leverage to compel Islamabad to end its support to militants targeting India.

While the fear of India’s conventional superiority made a more aggressive nuclear posture attractive to Islamabad long before any talk of Cold Start emerged, Pakistan has exploited India’s flirtation with proactive operations to justify its shift to full-spectrum deterrence. Pakistan’s full-spectrum deterrence posture threatens two things: first use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield to deter a conventional Indian advance and third use of long-range, nuclear-armed missiles to deter India from retaliating massively to Pakistan’s first use of tactical nuclear weapons. The Nasr, a 70-km range tactical nuclear weapon, and the Shaheen-III, a 2,750-kilometer ballistic missile, embody this doctrinal shift.

Pakistan’s embrace of full-spectrum deterrence seems to be prompting Indian security managers to consider a change to India’s nuclear targeting strategy. A former senior national-security official has suggested that India might entertain a “comprehensive first strike” to disarm Pakistan in the event that it moved Nasr batteries into the field during a crisis. This might seem like a fantastical proposition today, but New Delhi is steadily acquiring counterforce capabilities and is investing in ballistic missile defense, potentially bolstering confidence in its damage-limitation capabilities.

The fear of Indian damage limitation appears to be incentivizing Pakistan to pursue countermeasures that enhance the survivability of its arsenal and, therefore, the credibility of its third-strike capability. In January of this year, Pakistan tested the nuclear-capable Babur-III submarine-launched cruise missile and the Ababeel, which is capable of lofting multiple independently targetable — re-entry vehicles. Possessing more survivable capabilities — whether sea- or land-based systems — could ameliorate “use it or lose it pressures,” but also could enable the use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield to the extent it convinces Pakistan’s leadership that its nuclear forces will survive India’s retaliatory second strike. What’s more, it is far from clear that Pakistani sea-based platforms will enhance the overall survivability of the country’s nuclear arsenal. Pakistani submarines that have been assigned nuclear missions may be more vulnerable than mobile land-based missiles to an Indian attack because New Delhi will know their peacetime locations and may be incentivized to target them early in a crisis.

Maritime Security

A second area of intensifying competition is the maritime domain, partly due to China’s expanding presence in the Indian Ocean region through substantial port construction and facility management as well as naval deployments.

The strategic necessity of resolving its “Malacca dilemma” — where its sea lines of communication could be choked — seems to be motivating China’s forays into the Indian Ocean. To mitigate this vulnerability, Beijing is in the process of investing more than $1 trillion to connect land and maritime corridors linking the Chinese mainland to the Indian Ocean. The “flagship” project — the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor — is expected to finance $52 billion in energy and infrastructure development in Pakistan.

China’s evolving presence in the Indian Ocean has a military component as well. The People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) is constructing a naval base in Djibouti and deploying conventional and nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean on a regular basis. Chinese assistance may be underwriting Pakistan’s shift from a defensive strategy of sea denial to a more offensive “limited sea control” posture with the export of eight Chinese diesel-electric attack submarines to Pakistan.

The case of Gwadar, a Chinese-operated deep-sea port on the Makran Coast, underscores the blurry line between Beijing’s commercial and military activities in the Indian Ocean. Whereas Chinese strategists may view Gwadar solely as an alternative energy supply route, Pakistani officials are trying to convince Beijing to establish a joint naval presence at the port, which could make it more difficult for India to engage in coercive naval operations against Pakistan during a future crisis. China has rebuffed these requests thus far, but evolving competitive dynamics could cause a reappraisal of this decision.

New Delhi has begun to respond more deliberately to Beijing’s encroachment on its maritime backyard through a buildup of capabilities and collaboration with the United States. In 2015, India’s navy inaugurated a new base on its western coast. The Indian navy regularly uses American-made Poseidon-8I Neptune aircraft to conduct surveillance sorties in search of Chinese submarines, capabilities that could be enhanced with sales of Sea Guardian drones to India. Consistent with these trends, maritime cooperation — exemplified by the annual Malabar exercise — has become the proverbial capital ship in India’s foreign policy. This flurry of maritime-focused balancing suggests that long-held assumptions about Indian advantage over the PLAN in the Indian Ocean could be changing, as the development of Chinese bases would mitigate the vulnerabilities of extended lines of communication.

Strategic Relationships

The third major area of competition has been in the deepening of alignments or alliances with major outside powers — namely the China-Pakistan nexus and the Indo-U.S. relationship.

No partnership has been more consequential to regional security than the China-Pakistan “all-weather” friendship. Beijing and Islamabad have long believed that maintaining close ties could enhance their strategic positions vis-à-vis New Delhi, raise the specter in India of having to fight a two-front war, and prevent India ultimately challenging China’s apex position in Asia. A deepening China-Pakistan strategic relationship also constrains U.S. efforts to coerce Pakistan into cooperating on military objectives in Afghanistan. Nuclear cooperation — including China’s transfer of a nuclear weapon design and weapons grade uranium to Pakistan in the early 1980s — became a major feature of the relationship. Beijing later transferred ballistic missiles to Pakistan, and the two sides have engaged in extensive nuclear commerce with Pakistan in apparent violation of its commitments as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

In contrast to the longevity of the China-Pakistan relationship, the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership is a recent geopolitical phenomenon. For decades, relations between the two countries remained mired in bilateral disputes over Washington’s nuclear-nonproliferation and technology-export policies. The Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal, concluded in 2008, confirmed that the two sides were serious about surmounting this history. India and the United States still find themselves at loggerheads on key foreign-policy matters, but the overall trajectory is unmistakable. New Delhi and Washington robustly affirmed in 2014 their commitment to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea while the most recent joint statement, released during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first bilateral summit with President Donald Trump in June 2017, adopted Indian positions on cross-border terrorism and China’s controversial Belt and Road Initiative.

India and Pakistan have cultivated additional balancing partners in recent years. The Modi government’s “Act East” policy and mutual concern over China’s strategic ambitions have resulted in New Delhi and Tokyo drawing ever closer. India and Japan have called on China to “show utmost respect” for “freedom and safety of navigation and over-flight” in the South China Sea. Last year, the two sides concluded a civilian nuclear deal, a signal that strategic considerations are outweighing nonproliferation concerns, a major shift for Tokyo. Islamabad and Moscow have put aside Cold War enmity to sign a defense-cooperation agreement and, in 2016, conducted joint military exercises for the first time.

Diplomatic Friction

Increased diplomatic friction, particularly in multilateral institutions and settings, offers a final indicator of intensifying competitive dynamics in Southern Asia as exhibited through three diplomatic showdowns in the past year.

New Delhi orchestrated a bold campaign to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a 48-country cartel that sets the international rules of civil nuclear commerce, last year. The bid was unsuccessful, largely due to Beijing’s intransigent opposition. While New Delhi may have simply miscalculated the strength of Beijing’s opposition, its gambit clarifies the nature and stakes of the strategic competition to domestic and foreign audiences, potentially buttressing support for more explicit balancing vis-à-vis China.

Islamabad continues to resist — with Beijing’s diplomatic backing — New Delhi and Washington’s calls to crack down on anti-Indian militants operating within its borders. The U.N. Security Council 1267 Sanctions Committee designated Jaish-e-Mohammed as a terrorist organization after its attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001. New Delhi introduced a resolution in the U.N. Sanctions Committee in 2016 to enact an individual designation against Jaish leader Masood Azhar, but Beijing blocked the effort on Pakistan’s behalf.

Most recently, India snubbed China’s own multilateral efforts by being the only major Asian country not to attend China’s Belt and Road Forum in May 2017. Some speculate this backdrop — plus New Delhi’s drift into Washington and Tokyo’s strategic orbit —may be fuelling the current China-India spat over Bhutan that has the Indian and Chinese militaries squaring off meters apart with significant risks if miscalculation and escalation.

The Bottom Line

The core takeaway for U.S. policymakers and analysts is that Southern Asia’s strategic environment is evolving and discomforting. As competition intensifies at such a breakneck pace, it becomes difficult for states to interpret essential information — such as allies and adversaries’ new capabilities, objectives, strategic decision-making organization, and resolve — that otherwise might help avoid crisis escalation or a more consequential calamity. It is also hard for states in such a context to form accurate threat assessments or to calibrate their balancing efforts accordingly, all of which could result in heightened negative perceptions, security dilemmas, and conflict spirals intensifying among nuclear-armed powers.

A potential silver lining of these dynamics is that they could ultimately clarify the strategic stakes, opportunities, and risks for all parties. Strategic ambiguity or indifference might finally yield to more focused, multilateral efforts to track and manage some of the more dangerous emerging risks.


Sameer Lalwani is a Senior Associate and South Asia Deputy Director at the Stimson Center. Travis Wheeler is a Research Associate with the Stimson Center’s South Asia Program.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russia-finds-new-way-wage-age-old-war

Assessments

Russia Finds a New Way to Wage an Age-Old War

Aug 7, 2017 | 09:15 GMT

Editor's Note
As tension between Russia and the West has mounted in recent years, Moscow has increasingly turned to hybrid warfare to gain and hold ground in their contest for power and clout. This is the first installment of a five-part series exploring the geopolitical context, targets and tools of that strategy, as well as the steps Russia's adversaries are taking to counter it.

War isn't what it used to be. Perhaps nowhere is this clearer than in Russia's ongoing struggle with the West for influence, which now seems to take place in the shadows as often as it does in plain view. With the dawn of the digital age, conflicts between great powers have spread from battlespace to cyberspace, something the Kremlin has embraced with open arms by honing its capabilities in hybrid warfare.

The term "hybrid warfare" may be in vogue these days, but it has been in practice for centuries. The Napoleonic Wars, revolutions across the Americas and the Cold War all featured it in one way or another by combining conventional and unconventional tactics. But the recent evolution of technology and mass media has reinvented the concept, changing its very nature with the introduction of elements like trolls, bots and hacktivists. Though there is some debate about the term's definition, hybrid warfare — at least for the purposes of this analysis — now can include the deployment of any number of tools in the cyber realm, in addition to traditional troops, paramilitary groups, punitive economic measures, political manipulation and the spread of propaganda and disinformation. And as the costs of conventional conflict have risen, so, too, has hybrid warfare's prominence as a tool in international relations.


Pitting the West Against Itself
At the forefront of this movement is Russia. Since recovering from the collapse of the Soviet Union and re-emerging as a regional power in the mid-2000s, Russia has made ample use of hybrid warfare as a central component of its national security strategy, particularly in its dealings with the West. Because it no longer boasts the overwhelming conventional force needed to stare down the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and reclaim the lands it lost in the crumbling of the Soviet bloc, Russia has had to turn to other means to maximize its advantages and minimize its weaknesses.

This strategy has been on full display in Ukraine, where Russia has relied on several hybrid warfare tactics in the country's war-torn east. There the Kremlin has deployed "little green men" — forces that some say are Russian troops, though Moscow has claimed they are organized local self-defense forces — as well as cyberattacks and propaganda campaigns against the government in Kiev. Russia hasn't stopped there, either, launching similar operations against Ukraine's Western allies (including meddling in the U.S. presidential election) and Western-leaning countries in Moscow's backyard.

The Russian government even hinted at its intention to conduct these attacks in advance. In March 2014, just days before Russia annexed Crimea, top Kremlin adviser Vladislav Surkov published a fictional dystopian story under his pseudonym, Natan Dubovitsky, describing the future of warfare. In it he writes,

"It was the first non-linear war. In the primitive wars of the 19th and 20th centuries it was common for just two sides to fight. Two countries, two blocks of allies. Now four coalitions collided. Not two against two, or three against one. All against all."

Power Is Relative
Though the manner and intensity with which Russia uses hybrid warfare has evolved over the years, its motives have not. Because of its geographic location, the country has long been vulnerable on its western flank. After all, Russia is separated from Europe's biggest powers only by the vast Northern European Plain; few other physical barriers stand between them. As a result, the borderlands caught in the middle have traditionally been the site of constant competition and conflict.

In the late 2000s, Russia began to regain some of its former standing, thanks in part to Russian President Vladimir Putin's consolidation of power.
In the late 2000s, Russia began to regain some of its former standing, thanks in part to Russian President Vladimir Putin's consolidation of power.

(Stratfor)
Historically, Russia and Europe's exposure to each other has led to political maneuvering and military invasion in both directions. From Napoleon's 19th-century march toward Moscow to the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union and the Soviets' subsequent reach into Germany during the Cold War, the two have gone back and forth seeking to build their spheres of influence. The United States' ascent on the international stage and its alignment with Western Europe against Russia have only intensified this competition. Though the end of the Cold War removed the immediate threat of military conflict between Russia and the West, it did not eliminate their rivalry. Far from it, in fact: The spread of the European Union and NATO in recent decades has only reminded Russia of the threat — one that could prove existential — looming on its doorstep.

In the late 2000s, Russia began to regain some of its former standing, thanks in part to Russian President Vladimir Putin's consolidation of power, an economic recovery fueled by high oil prices and the United States' distraction in the Middle East. The country's remarkable comeback enabled it to push back against what it viewed as Western encroachment in its periphery. But its success was short-lived, and between Ukraine's Euromaidan uprising and Western sanctions and military buildups, Russia found itself struggling to protect its interests once again. Tensions between it and the West have since mounted, and Moscow has turned to hybrid warfare in search of the upper hand.

And that is precisely how Russia intends to wield such tactics: as a means of strengthening its own power relative to the West's. Moscow hopes to undermine its adversary by creating instability within Western governments, opening rifts among European states, weakening trans-Atlantic solidarity and stalling countries' integration with the West.

All of these efforts are aimed at meeting three of Russia's biggest strategic imperatives. The first is to protect its seats of power in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Moving outward, Russia's second goal is to block foreign influence in its periphery before tackling the third objective: stretching the Kremlin's reach to key geographic anchors like formidable mountain chains or access to the open sea. But since few of these anchors exist in the open terrain between Russia and Europe, there is no end in sight to Moscow's constant push and pull with the West on the Continent. And because Russia is no longer able to project the kind of global power it claimed in the Soviet era, hybrid warfare will increasingly become its best option to compensate for its weaknesses and sap its enemies' strength.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/u-s-sending-more-marines-afghanistan-n790446

NEWS
AUG 7 2017, 5:32 PM ET

U.S. Is Sending More Marines to Afghanistan

by COURTNEY KUBE

The U.S. is sending dozens more Marines to Afghanistan, according to three U.S. defense officials.

Task Force Southwest, based in Helmand Province in southwestern Afghanistan, requested the additional Marines to help with internal force protection, the officials said. U.S. Central Command approved the request but the Marines have not yet moved into the country.

There are currently more than 300 Marines assigned to Task Force Southwest, and the total additional force is less than 100 marines, the officials said. The Marines will deploy from the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force Crisis Response Central Command, already based in the region. The officials would not say where the marines would deploy from specifically, with one saying, "we are redirecting them from where they're at now to help with the mission."

The officials said this deployment is not tied to the Trump administration's long-awaited new South Asia strategy, but instead fulfills a request from the commander on the ground, Marine Brig. Gen. Roger Turner. It was approved by Gen. Joseph Votel at Central Command.

Related: Trump Says U.S. 'Losing' Afghan War in Tense Meeting With Generals

In June President Trump delegated the authority to deploy troops to Afghanistan to Secretary of Defense James Mattis, but in this case Mattis did not need to sign off on the deployment, one of the officials said.

"The commander on the ground has the authority to move people in theater around," the official said.

Related: McMaster Visits Afghanistan Amid Questions About Strategy

A spokesperson for Marine Corps Forces Central Command would not confirm the deployment, saying, "The repositioning and movement of forces in the CENTCOM [area of responsibility], to include presently deployed Marines, happen at the discretion of the CENTCOM Commander," adding "at this time there are no plans to deploy CONUS based Marines into Afghanistan," using the acronym for Continental United States.

The defense officials said there is also a request for more U.S. air support in Afghanistan, but none of them would provide detail on what is needed and why. The additional air assets have not yet been deployed.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Well this ought to be interesting....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.yahoo.com/news/lebanons-army-prepares-clear-border-060243988.html

Lebanon's army prepares to clear border area of IS militants

BASSEM MROUE
Associated Press
August 7, 2017

BEIRUT (AP) — Lebanon's U.S.-backed military is gearing up for a long-awaited assault to dislodge hundreds of Islamic State militants from a remote corner near Syrian border, seeking to end a years-long threat posed to neighboring towns and villages by the extremists.

The campaign will involve cooperation with the militant group Hezbollah and the Syrian army on the other side of the border — although Lebanese authorities insist they are not coordinating with Syrian President Bashar Assad's government.

But the assault could prove costly for the under-equipped military and risk activating IS sleeper cells in the country.

The tiny Mediterranean nation has been spared the wars and chaos that engulfed several countries in the region since the so-called Arab Spring uprisings erupted in 2011. But it has not been able to evade threats to its security, including sectarian infighting and random car bombings, particularly in 2014, when militants linked to al-Qaida and IS overran the border region, kidnapping Lebanese soldiers.

The years-long presence of extremists in the border area has brought suffering to neighboring towns and villages, from shelling, to kidnappings of villagers for ransom. Car bombs made in the area and sent to other parts of the country, including the Lebanese capital, Beirut, have killed scores of citizens.

Aided directly by the United States and Britain, the army has accumulated steady successes against the militants in the past year, slowly clawing back territory, including strategic hills retaken in the past week. Authorities say it's time for an all-out assault.

The planned operation follows a six-day military offensive by the Lebanese Shiite militant group Hezbollah that forced al-Qaida-linked fighters to flee the area on the outskirts of the town of Arsal, along with thousands of civilians.

In a clear distribution of roles, the army is now expected to launch the attack on IS. In the past few days, the army's artillery shells and multiple rocket launchers have been pounding the mountainous areas on the Lebanon-Syria border where IS held positions, in preparation for the offensive. Drones could be heard around the clock and residents of the eastern Bekaa Valley reported seeing army reinforcements arriving daily in the northeastern district of Hermel to join the battle.

The offensive from the Lebanese side of the border will be carried out by the Lebanese army, while Syrian troops and Hezbollah fighters will be working to clear the Syrian side of IS militants. Hezbollah has been fighting alongside Assad's forces since 2013.

Experts say more than 3,000 troops, including elite special forces, are in the northeastern corner of Lebanon to take part in the offensive. The army will likely use weapons it received from the United States, including Cessna aircraft that discharge Hellfire missiles.

Keen to support the army rather than the better equipped Iranian-backed Hezbollah, the U.S. and Britain have supplied the military with helicopters, anti-tank missiles, artillery and radars, as well as training. The American Embassy says the U.S. has provided Lebanon with over $1.4 billion in security assistance since 2005.

But the fight is not expected to be quick or easy.

According to Lebanon's Interior Minister Nouhad Machnouk, there are about 400 IS fighters in the Lebanese area, and hundreds more on the Syrian side of the border.

"It is not going to be a picnic," said Hisham Jaber, a retired army general who heads the Middle East Center for Studies and Political Research in Beirut. "The Lebanese army will try to carry out the mission with the least possible losses."

Jaber said the battle may last several weeks. "It is a rugged area and the organization (IS) is well armed and experienced."

There are also concerns the offensive may subject Lebanon to retaliatory attacks by militants, just as the country has started to enjoy a rebound in tourism.

A Lebanese security official said authorities are taking strict security measures to prevent any attack deep inside Lebanon by sleeper cells. The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity in line with regulations, said authorities have detained several IS militants over the past weeks.

Lebanese politicians say IS controls an area of about 296 square kilometers (114 square miles) between the two countries, of which 141 square kilometers (54.5 square miles) are in Lebanon.

The area stretches from the badlands of the Lebanese town of Arsal and Christian villages of Ras Baalbek and Qaa, to the outskirts of Syria's Qalamoun region and parts of the western Syrian town of Qusair that Hezbollah captured in 2013.

In a televised speech last Friday, Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah said that once the Lebanese army launches its offensive from the Lebanese side, Hezbollah and the Syrian army will begin their attack from the Syrian side. He added that there has to be coordination between the Syrian and Lebanese armies in the battle.

"Opening two fronts at the same time will speed up victory and reduce losses," Nasrallah said, adding that his fighters on the Lebanese side of the border are at the disposal of Lebanese troops if needed.

"I tell Daesh that the Lebanese and Syrians will attack you from all sides and you will not be able to resist and will be defeated," he said, using an Arabic acronym for the extremist group.

"If you decide to fight, you will end up either a prisoner or dead," Nasrallah added.

Some Lebanese politicians have been opposed to security coordination with the Syrian army. The Lebanese are sharply divided over Syria's civil war that has spilled to the tiny country of 4.5 million people. Lebanon is hosting some 1.2 million Syrian refugees.

Prime Minister Saad Hariri is opposed to Assad while his national unity Cabinet includes Hezbollah as well as other groups allied with the Syrian president.

Last week, Hariri told reporters that Lebanese authorities are ready to negotiate to discover the fate of nine Lebanese soldiers who were captured during the raid on Arsal by IS and al-Qaida fighters in August 2014. Unlike their rivals in al-Qaida, the Islamic State group is not known to negotiate prisoner exchanges.

"The presence of Daesh will end in Lebanon," Hariri said, using the same Arabic acronym to refer to IS.

View Reactions (4)
 

Shacknasty Shagrat

Has No Life - Lives on TB
100 feet is way ,way too close.
This should not have been allowed to happen.
A crash while landing could put the Nimitz out of service for a while, in addition to a lot of planes and people.

SS

'Iranian drone comes close to U.S. fighter jet: U.S. official

August 8, 2017 / 8:16 AM / 23 minutes ago
Iranian drone comes close to U.S. fighter jet: U.S. official



WASHINGTON (Reuters) - An unarmed Iranian drone came within 100 feet (31 meters) of a U.S. Navy warplane as it prepared to land on an aircraft carrier in the Gulf, a U.S. official said on Tuesday.

The official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that despite repeated radio calls to stay clear of the U.S. plane, the Iranian drone "executed unsafe and unprofessional altitude changes" close to the U.S Navy F/A-18E. The warplane was in a holding pattern and preparing to land aboard the USS Nimitz aircraft carrier.

The official described the interaction as "unsafe and unprofessional."

Similar incidents between the United States and Iran are not uncommon, however this appears to be the first time an Iranian drone has come dangerously close to a U.S. fighter plane in the Gulf.

This was the 13th unsafe and unprofessional interaction between the United States and Iranian maritime forces in 2017, the official said.

Years of mutual animosity had eased when Washington lifted sanctions on Tehran last year as part of a deal to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions. But serious differences remain over Iran's ballistic missile program and conflicts in Syria and Iraq.

The Trump administration, which has struck a hard line on Iran, recently declared that Iran was complying with its nuclear agreement with world powers, but warned that Tehran was not following the spirit of the accord and that Washington would look for ways to strengthen it.

The United States has a number of military bases in the region, including in Qatar and Kuwait across the Gulf from Iran and the U.S. Fifth Fleet is based in nearby Bahrain.

Earlier this year, a senior commander in Iran's Revolutionary Guards warned the United States that if it designated the group a terrorist organization, its action could be perilous for U.S. forces in the region.

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-drones-idUSKBN1AO1SX
 

Shacknasty Shagrat

Has No Life - Lives on TB
More detail.
The US seems miffed that Iran just about crippled the USS Nimitz aircraft carrier.
SS

DGuPuG2XUAIvaJY.jpg:large


https://twitter.com/search?q= Iranian QOM-1 drone&src=typd&lang=en
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.kitsapsun.com/story/news/2017/08/08/navy-extends-nimitz-stay-middle-east/548972001/

Navy extends Nimitz stay in Middle East

Ed Friedrich, ed.friedrich@kitsapsun.com Published 10:14 a.m. PT Aug. 8, 2017 | Updated 4:40 p.m. PT Aug. 8, 2017

PERSIAN GULF — The Navy informed families Saturday that the USS Nimitz, which was involved in a second incident with Iran Tuesday, will extend its stay in the Persian Gulf.

That will also add to its six-month deployment. The aircraft carrier left Naval Base Kitsap-Bremerton on June 1.

Nimitz is in the gulf supporting the fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. It arrived there in late July and is now expected to remain in the gulf through about mid-October, Nimitz spokeswoman Lt. Cmdr. Theresa Donnelly said in an email.

The Navy prefers to keep at least one aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf at all times, as it did from 2007 to 2015. There have been instances since then when there were none. Extended employments that wear down the force, and maintenance delays because of sequestration have made it more difficult, the Navy has said.

Before heading for the Middle East, the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group participated with the Indian and Japanese navies in Malabar 2017 exercises in the Bay of Bengal.

Navy Times reported a U.S. defense official saying Tuesday that an F/A-18E Super Hornet attached to the Nimitz had to take evasive measures to avoid an Iranian drone that came within 100 feet of it. The Super Hornet was in a holding pattern above the carrier when it nearly collided with the Iranian QOM-1 unmanned aerial vehicle, the official said.

The drone continued despite repeated warnings on the radio to stay clear. As it closed in, the Super Hornet did a rollover to avoid a collision, according to the official.

“If the F/A-18 had not done the maneuver,” the two aircraft would have collided, the official said. At their closest, the two aircraft were 100 vertical feet and 200 lateral feet part from each other.

Hours before the incident, the unarmed drone had been loitering about 4 nautical miles away from the Nimitz at an altitude of about 7,000 feet, the official said.

The Super Hornet landed safely and the drone eventually departed.

The encounter marked the 13th unsafe or unprofessional flight incident involving Iran this year, the official said.

On July 28, a helicopter with the Nimitz saw several Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps boats approaching U.S. ships at a high speed. After they wouldn't respond to attempts to make contact, the helicopter fired flares and the boats turned away. The Iranians said it was an unprofessional encounter. The U.S. disagreed.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/8/9/what-does-victory-look-like-in-afghanistan

What Does Victory Look Like in Afghanistan?

Adam Wunische
August 9, 2017

More U.S. troops are likely headed back to Afghanistan soon, while the Trump Administration is also now considering withdrawal. Before either option––or anything in between––is considered, the U.S. needs to decide what version of victory it wants before it can decide on a strategy.

One of the most shocking statements I’ve heard on Afghanistan in sometime was that the official U.S. policy is to force the Taliban into a negotiated settlement. This statement came from a highly respected scholar of U.S. foreign policy and military strategy. I wondered what veterans like myself should think of such a policy. Almost 17 years of fighting, over 2,000 killed, and countless others wounded or otherwise affected, and our strategy is now to accept peace with the Taliban and see them holding legislative seats in Kabul and contributing to governing Afghanistan?

To be fair, the statement above was somewhat of a misstatement. What he intended to say was that this is the actual policy being pursued by the U.S., if unofficially and inconsistently. It is an unofficial policy because it would be highly unpopular with the domestic audience in the U.S., and it is inconsistent because presidents have been unwilling to commit the political capital necessary to sustain such a policy. Since a possible troop increase was announced in June, journalists and analysts (and Trump’s advisors) have been debating the strategy to which the U.S. should commit itself. However, these debates often consider strategies in isolation, and this is a mistake. Strategies must be judged relative to the realistic alternatives. This article categorizes the most common recent arguments, considers their limitations, and makes an argument for the least bad option, a negotiated settlement with the Taliban.

MILITARY ENGAGEMENT WITHOUT A COHERENT POLICY SHAPING THE STRATEGY BY WHICH THE CAMPAIGN IS CARRIED OUT IS LITTLE MORE THAN ORGANIZED SLAUGHTER.

One potential strategy considers the possibility of a post-World War II arrangement, leaving a permanent contingent of U.S. forces in Afghanistan to keep the Taliban and others at bay and influence other countries with interests in Central Asia. Unsurprisingly, many considering this possibility find the prospect unsustainable and possibly unachievable.

Another strategy considers the complex regional dynamics of the situation and suggests increasingly forceful engagement with neighboring countries, specifically Pakistan. Use of Pakistani territory sustains and strengthens Taliban operations in Afghanistan and the Pakistanis have been notoriously difficult partners for the U.S. and others.

Still another approach considers the folly of sending more troops before a coherent strategy, or even policy, has been agreed upon. Almost 200 years ago, Clausewitz asserted, “War is a mere continuation of policy by other means.” Military engagement without a coherent policy shaping the strategy by which the campaign is carried out is little more than organized slaughter.

A final take on the situation defines victory as an Afghanistan fully restored via so-called nation-building. This argument suggests less reliance on the military and more on civilians and the State Department. Others, like Gary Dempsey, argue the costs so greatly outweigh the benefits that the U.S. should simply cut its losses and withdraw. Withdrawal arguments usually suggest that after ground forces have left the U.S. should send targeted operations into Afghanistan whenever violent non-state actors set up shop again, but this assumes the political will and legal justifications will hold indefinitely––which isn’t a safe assumption.

The problem with all of the above arguments is that they only consider one possible form of victory, or take the form of victory as a given. This can be effective when advocating for certain policies, but it also comes with significant limitations. As an alternative, I will present a variety of potential victories––each different in some critical way––and assess the prospects for achieving each and what they mean for U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.

WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR A TOTAL VICTORY?

It is first necessary to assess the most common assumption for victory and the current state of that possibility. The early stages of the war in Afghanistan were entirely directed at removing the Taliban from power and going after al Qaeda's central structure. This gave Operation Enduring Freedom a specific counterterrorism focus. Therefore, the early objectives necessary for victory were limited: end or degrade al Qaeda and the Taliban. This mission was accomplished, and surprisingly quickly. However, the mission then shifted from counterterrorism to ambitious state-building as the security situation deteriorated and the Taliban began to push back into the country from their sanctuary in Pakistan. NATO troops pushed out from Kabul and sought to extend the new central government’s authority throughout the country.

ASSUMING ANOTHER MILITARY VICTORY OVER THE TALIBAN COULD BE ACHIEVED, THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT WOULD STILL NEED TO ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER A TERRITORY THAT FEW CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS HAVE EVER BEEN ABLE TO CONTROL SINCE MODERN AFGHANISTAN WAS FOUNDED AROUND 1747.

If we assume these more ambitious statebuilding objectives to be the standard by which victory is now measured, each of the following would have to happen before that victory could be considered won: the Taliban would have to be beaten back militarily, the Afghan government would need to establish control over the overwhelming majority of the country, and the U.S. would have no more than a small contingent of trainers and advisors on the ground. Given the length of the effort in Afghanistan thus far, its inconsistent progress, and the present trend, this outcome seems unlikely.

Assuming another military victory over the Taliban could be achieved, the Afghan government would still need to establish control over a territory that few central governments have ever been able to control since modern Afghanistan was founded around 1747. Afghan expert Thomas Barfield argues that attempts to extend control over the whole of Afghanistan like other modern states do is a fundamental flaw in U.S. strategy and is simply not possible in a country like Afghanistan. Instead, Barfield has suggested a “Swiss cheese” model should be used. That is, control the vital areas (the population centers) that can be controlled and ignore the areas that cannot. Unfortunately, this isn’t even a realistic model for Afghanistan today, since the holes in government control would undoubtedly be used as safe-havens for any number of armed anti-government and anti-U.S. groups operating in the country. Such a strategy can only work if sustainable and enforceable treaties can be negotiated with the various armed groups.

Furthermore, even if the government were able to reestablish control over all its territory, the government has a myriad of high-grade issues that significantly inhibit the its ability to exercise and maintain control and authority over said territory. Corruption inhibits the government’s ability to deliver goods and services. Opium continues to flourish in Afghanistan and fund numerous individuals and organizations beyond the control of the central government, criminal and otherwise. Afghanistan’s relationship with its neighbors is complicated, and contributes to the instability. Afghanistan is also plagued by a persistently weak economy that is unlikely to improve to a sufficient level to contribute to stability or even pay the government's bills without foreign aid.

This path to victory also hopes the Afghan government can be encouraged to reform; it cannot. For many non-trivial reasons, it is unreasonable to expect the Afghan government to make the necessary reforms, even if pressured by the U.S. or the international community. Several scholarly articles attempt to explain this phenomenon. Generally speaking, it is clear the interests of the Afghan government will always diverge from those of the U.S. government. Afghan officials will be more interested in crushing coup attempts before they happen or paying off their political rivals; reforming government agencies, especially in the security sector, is more likely to encourage coups and embolden their enemies. No one should hope for government reforms as the path to peace in Afghanistan.

In sum, this vision of victory is unrealistic. Too many variables are too unlikely to be achieved for any reasonable person to think that all of them can be achieved, and at a reasonable cost.

CAN THE TALIBAN BE BEATEN (AGAIN) MILITARILY?

Taliban defeat on the battlefield is given special consideration here. Some might assume victory over the Taliban today should be as easy as it was in 2001. However, the posture and disposition of the Taliban today is very different than it was in 2001. They have been contesting and controlling territory, and that territory could be retaken if subjected to an effort similar to the one in 2001. However, their underground networks and sanctuary support are much more robust than they were. When pushed back from their territory in 2001, it took the Taliban about five years to build the infrastructure of insurgency and push back into Afghanistan. Today, the Taliban wouldn’t skip a beat if denied their territory.

Therefore, all of the issues mentioned in the above section would have to be remedied before the highest possible version of victory could be achieved, and this assumed the Taliban could be defeated anew, which also doesn’t seem likely. A series of unlikely conditions are necessary to sustainably defeat the Taliban. First, total cooperation with Pakistan, who would need to establish control over their own western provinces where these groups are currently afforded safe-haven, would be necessary. Second, Afghanistan would need a robust and functioning security apparatus, which it doesn’t have. Emphasis has been placed on building the Afghan military, but militaries are better at taking and holding territory than they are at defeating insurgencies, which is only step one in a campaign against the Taliban. Furthermore, evidence suggests that terrorist groups are mostly defeated by police and intelligence forces of local governments, not militaries.[1]

There is a surprisingly positive trend in the use of Afghan police and intelligence forces to pressure and dismantle the Taliban. Increases in Afghan National Army regular forces have essentially flat-lined. On the other hand, the Afghan government plans to increase the number of special forces commandos exponentially, as shown in the chart below.[2] Commandos have the tools and training to effectively go after non-state actors like the Taliban, but there are still significant barriers to defeating the Taliban via these means. First, the feasibility and effectiveness of doubling the size of commando forces isn’t certain. New recruits are drawn from conventional forces, so current special forces capabilities wouldn’t necessarily be reduced. However, whether they’re able to effectively train, equip, and support such a large force remains to be seen. Second, the Taliban would still be able to launch attacks from Pakistan; Afghanistan would still need to improve policing capabilities; and social and economic conditions would need to improve so unemployed youth couldn’t be convinced or paid to carry out attacks for the Taliban.

Furthermore, it is unlikely that the vast increase in commando power will go unnoticed by successive governments. As explained above, corrupt governments tend to weaken their military to hedge against coups.

1502164061297

https://static1.squarespace.com/sta...3c15d5db43f25cb581/1502164061297/?format=750w

WHAT DOES A MITIGATED SUCCESS LOOK LIKE?

With a long list of limitations preventing more ambitious victories, it is important to consider what lesser forms of success might look like and whether they are worth pursuing. A mitigated success would at least contain but not defeat the Taliban and focus on areas of higher strategic value, disregarding areas of lesser strategic value (as in the Barfield Strategy). This version of victory would even allow the Taliban to rule certain areas, or establish a power-sharing agreement in those areas not vital to the Government of Afghanistan. Such an approach could achieve core U.S. national interests at lower costs. For example, this would eliminate Afghanistan as a terrorist safe haven, and if Afghanistan were to revert to a safe haven in the future, the circumstance could be addressed more easily in these circumstances. Furthermore, with no powerful armed group opposing it, the Afghan government would be much less likely to collapse and potentially destabilize Pakistan, which is important for keeping nuclear weapons from proliferating into non-state hands.

This strategy would solve one of the weaknesses in Barfield’s strategy by establishing peace with armed groups in exchange for control of their local areas, but how likely is it these armed groups will successfully reintegrate into the legitimate political process? Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the violent political party Hezb-i-Islami, recently attempted this exact transition. There are also reasons to believe some within the Taliban organization are at least willing to consider what is being offered in negotiations. This is perhaps why the members of ISIS in Afghanistan are mostly disaffected Taliban members. There is no way to know for sure why the former Taliban members defected, but several factors indicate that a willingness to negotiate for peace was important.

IF THE TALIBAN ARE TO BE INTEGRATED INTO THE POLITICAL PROCESS, BOTH THEY AND THE AFGHAN PEOPLE WILL NEED TO FIND A PATH TO RECONCILIATION.

The Taliban have attempted negotiations several times since 2001. Taliban leader Mullah Omar died in April of 2013, but top commanders kept it a secret. Writing under Mullah Omar’s name, these top commanders struck a conciliatory tone, advocating for an inclusive Islamic government in Afghanistan. In October 2014, five to six top commanders of the Taliban defected and subsequently pledged loyalty to ISIS. Predictably, the Taliban command claimed they were expelled from the group. Nine months later, the Taliban called for peace talks again. Therefore it seems reasonable that some attribute the rise of ISIS in Afghanistan to disgruntled former Taliban hardliners, and a willingness to negotiate is a likely source of these sentiments.

As is clear by the many failed attempts by the Taliban to negotiate peace, there are limitations to the feasibility of this move for many of the violent groups that forms its ranks. Consider some analogous circumstances. The most powerful violent insurgency group in Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), recently negotiated a peace deal with the government. Successfully transitioning to peace will be difficult, as many Colombians are still scarred from the violence they carried. Similarly, the Basque Homeland and Liberty (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna or ETA) separatist in Spain is attempting the same move, and the legacy of their violence is also an issue. Likewise, many Afghans remember the part Hekmatyar took in the shelling of Kabul during the civil war following the withdrawal of Soviet forces. Many Afghans will not soon forget the pain suffered at the hands of the various violent groups that fall under the aegis of the Taliban.

If the Taliban are to be integrated into the political process, both they and the Afghan people will need to find a path to reconciliation. It is theoretically possible to achieve a deal without this reconciliation, but whatever peace is achieved without it may be tenuous at best. Again, analogy might be useful. Rwanda is engaging in a justice and reconciliation process to deal with the legacies of their genocide. South Africa set up the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to deal with the legacies of apartheid. Alternatively, Indonesia has set up no such commission or process, and their resultant peace has been much more tenuous and fragile.

It is also important to consider domestic opinion in the U.S., where the divergence between its interest and that of Afghanistan is perhaps clearest. Even if the Government of Afghanistan could reconcile with the Taliban, precarious as this would be given the support the U.S. must provide to sustain it, any negotiated settlement would be hugely unpopular domestically. Many would see it as surrendering to the enemy, leaving open a cynical but clear political opportunity. The unpopularity of working with the Taliban was on full display when the Obama Administration announced a prisoner swap with the Taliban that retrieved captured U.S. Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl. It is unlikely current or future U.S. presidents will be willing to expend the political capital necessary to make a negotiated settlement with the Taliban possible, especially considering the uncertainty of success.

IS A MITIGATED FAILURE WORTH CONSIDERING?

Considering all of the limitations of the above strategic alternatives, it should be considered what a mitigated failure would look like. A mitigated failure would probably include some or all of the following outcomes. First, traditionally Pashtun lands would be conceded to the Taliban, and the central government would maintain a tenuous control over other territories. The Taliban are strongest in Pashtun regions, but they have shown an ability to reach beyond these areas. Regions under strong Taliban control would be relatively peaceful, but fighting would remain intense in disputed areas. Pakistan would be keen to avoid this, much like the Turks wanting to resist an independent Kurdish state.

Pakistan’s position in Afghanistan has always been to maintain as much influence over their neighbor as possible. Prior to 9/11, the intelligence and military establishment in Pakistan had established close ties with Mullah Omar and the Taliban. However, Pakistan post 9/11 has been forced to align reluctantly against the Taliban. The Taliban now has bases of operation in Pakistan and it is not certain that a peaceful relationship could be established if they gain some control in Afghanistan at the expense of the government. The possibility of the Taliban gaining power in Afghanistan and looking for more influence east of the Durand Line is too great a risk.

WHAT DOES ABJECT FAILURE LOOK LIKE, AND HOW IS IT AVOIDED?

That leaves one final possibility: abject failure. This could happen if the international community loses patience with Afghanistan and cuts its losses, like the Trump Administration is perhaps considering. This certainly wouldn’t be the first time Afghanistan has been cut loose; there has been a pattern of countless such abandonments throughout history, like the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Importantly, though, the international community has always decided to return. Afghanistan’s strategic importance to the rest of the world is significant, and modern forms of terrorism have compounded the effects of this strategic importance. This significance is evident in the many times that multiple empires have attempted to conquer it. Afghanistan is at the crossroads of the Middle East, Southern Asia, and Central Asia, and it continues to be a vital transit area for land-based commerce and gas and oil pipelines. There is no doubt that cutting strategic losses today might result in a strategic need to return a few decades, or even a few years, later.

CONCLUSION

Previous attempts to define victory in Afghanistan, and therefore advocate a strategy, have often considered various types of victory in isolation. However, the ideal end state for Afghanistan should be considered relative to the alternatives. A total victory is ideal, but needs to solve numerous enormous problems resulting from seemingly endless systemic conflicts. It would also require the greatest degree of political will sustained over the long-term. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the Taliban can be beaten militarily like they were in 2001. The government of Afghanistan and its allies could regain lost territory, but it is already a robust insurgency and terrorist organization; and these types of movements are rarely defeated militarily. Abject failure would be cost efficient in the short-term, but the resultant problems would increase costs over the long-term and would undermine U.S. national interests. A mitigated failure would likely have all the negative costs of abject failure, but with greater U.S. losses on the path to failure. Ultimately, total victory is ideal but highly unlikely. Abject and mitigated failures have long-term costs and endanger U.S. national interests. This leaves us with mitigated success and a negotiated settlement with the Taliban as the most prudent option.

A negotiated settlement would come with high political costs to whichever U.S. president decided to pursue it. However, these political costs would be lower than those required for a total victory. Furthermore, negotiations have mostly failed because there is no concerted effort or strategy to achieve it, just periodic opportunism. There’s no doubt this strategy would be highly unpopular and downright offensive to many Americans––especially veterans of the war. However, the question shouldn’t only be about its popularity; it should also be about its feasibility to bring about the end of America’s longest war.

The path of least resistance in Afghanistan is to contain the Taliban over the long-term. This starts with a continued focus on the building of commando and police capacity while reducing resources for the conventional Afghan National Army, because the Taliban are the problem rather than external invasion. The maintenance of a strategic alliance with the government of Afghanistan to deter foreign military interventions will allow the central government to focus on internal state building and reconciliation. The encouragement of smaller insurgent groups to negotiate transitions into the political process will enable reconciliation. Finally, seeking avenues to allow for a negotiated settlement with the Taliban, and integration into the political process if necessary, are critical.

The other victories mentioned above are certainly possible, but not at acceptable costs. A total victory––while appealing––would require extensive resources, in both blood and treasure, expended over an indeterminate amount of time. In 2012, a majority of Americans wanted to speed up the pace of the 2014 withdrawal. When the war started in 2001, about 90% of Americans said starting the war was not a mistake. Today, that number has decreased by about 40 points. No politician will have the political capital to commit the resources to a total victory. Other types of victories are more ideal and would be more popular, and despite the sentiment against the option, a negotiated settlement is not only more likely to happen in our lifetime, it’s also the most feasible outcome for success.


Adam Wunische is a U.S. Army veteran who has deployed twice to Afghanistan. He is also a PhD student at Boston College and a contributing analyst at Wikistrat.
 

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CBRN Assessment

DF-31AG ICBM can carry multiple warheads, claims China’s state media

Richard D Fisher Jr - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly
08 August 2017

1706921_-_main.jpg

http://www.janes.com/images/assets/971/72971/1706921_-_main.jpg

Key Points
- Chinese media have suggested that China's DF-31AG ICBM could be armed with MIRV warheads
- The DF-31AG uses a 16-wheel road-capable TEL, widening its deployment options and thus increasing its survivability


While official Chinese sources have said almost nothing about the capabilities of the recently identified DF-31AG intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Chinese state media have in recent days offered indications that it might be armed with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) warheads.

An aft image of the DF-31AG ICBM shows the use of a prominent pad at the base of the cold-launch missile tube, also used by the new DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile. (Via Meyet.com)

Although images of this missile first appeared on Chinese webpages in mid-2013, it was not until its mid-July appearance in model form at a new exhibit at Beijing’s Military Museum of the Chinese People’s Revolution that a new variant of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) DF-31A was identified as the ‘DF-31AG’.

Then, on 30 July, 16 DF-31AGs appeared in a major military parade marking the 90th Anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Its appearance in such a parade would indicate that the DF-31AG has entered service with the PLA Rocket Forces.

Previously this ICBM was identified as the ‘DF-31B’ by US government sources in a 2 October 2015 article in the Washington Free Beacon , which also reported that the DF-31B had been tested on 25 September 2015.

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Exclusive: Why Indian Air Force May Best Chinese Jets In An Air Battle Over Tibet

The lower density of air at high-altitude Tibetan bases prevents Chinese Air Force fighters such as the Su-27, J-11 or J-10 from taking off with a full complement of weapons and fuel. These aircraft would, therefore, enter a fight with the IAF at a severe disadvantage in the event of a conflict.

All India | Written by Vishnu Som | Updated: August 09, 2017 08:01 IST
Comments 33

NEW DELHI:
HIGHLIGHTS
IAF has significant operational advantage over Chinese in Tibet: Document
Altitude of China's main airbases restrains performance of aircraft
The Indian Air Force, however, has no such restrictions

Indian Air Force fighter jets will be able to effectively tackle Chinese Air Force fighters over Tibet in the event of hostilities between the two countries. A new yet-to-be-released document, "The Dragon's Claws: Assessing China's PLAAF Today" makes the point that the IAF has significant operational advantages over the Chinese Air Force in operations in the Tibetan Autonomous Region which lies to the North of the Line of Actual Control between the two countries.

Written by Squadron Leader Sameer Joshi, a former Indian Air Force Mirage 2000 fighter pilot and produced by Vayu Aerospace, the document is the first comprehensive Indian assessment of the air power balance between India and China since the crisis in the Doklam plateau broke out last month.

According to Squadron Leader Joshi, "Terrain, Technology and Training, will assuredly give the IAF an edge over the PLAAF (People's Liberation Army Air Force) in Tibet and southern Xinjiang, counterbalancing the numerical superiority of the PLAAF, at least for some years to come."

The altitude of China's main airbases "along with the prevalent extreme climatic conditions seriously restrains the performance of aircraft, which reduces the effective payload and combat radius by an average of 50%." In other words, the lower density of air at high-altitude Tibetan bases prevents Chinese Air Force fighters such as the Su-27, J-11 or J-10 from taking off with a full complement of weapons and fuel. These aircraft would, therefore, enter a fight with the IAF at a severe disadvantage in the event of a conflict. The IAF, on the other hand, operates fighters in the Northeast from bases such as Tezpur, Kalaikunda, Chabua and Hasimara which are located near sea level elevations in the plains. This means "the IAF has no such restrictions and will effectively undertake deep penetration and air superiority missions in the Tibetan Autonomous Region."

What's more, the Indian Air Force is thought to be a more nimble force which "focusses much more on experience in air combat and varied weapon delivery, backed by exposure at multinational exercises, to maintain a 'qualitative' edge over its foes." At the same time, both Air Forces are challenged by the mountainous terrain which makes detection of each other's aircraft difficult. In such a situation "terrain hugging fighters, masked by innumerable mountain valleys of the TAR (Tibetan Autonomous Region), will be a major factor for the both sides, delaying crucial early warning to the defenders."

What's clear though is that while the Indian Air Force can clearly match or better the Chinese Air Force in the event of a limited air-war, China's substantially larger ballistic missile forces makes the IAF's infrastructure distinctly vulnerable to attack. China also operates a host of relatively advanced surface-to-air missile systems such as the S-300, HQ-9 and HQ-12 "all of which pose a grave danger to the IAF although they are reliant on early detection for success."

In the long run however, China's rapidly expanding Air Force which is now in the process of inducting home-grown stealth fighters such as the J-20 will gain meaningful regional air superiority unless the Indian Air Force gets "an adequate number of fighter aircraft to simultaneously protect the western and north-eastern borders."
 

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Meet the DF-31AG and the DF-26: The Big Ballistic Missiles at China’s Military Anniversary Parade

At a recent parade, the People’s Liberation Army showed off new long-range ballistic missiles.

By Eric Gomez
August 08, 2017

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) recently celebrated its 90th anniversary with a large parade of personnel and equipment at the Zhurihe training base in Inner Mongolia. While the vast majority of systems in the parade are for conventional combat, there were two nuclear-capable ballistic missiles on display, the DF-26 and DF-31AG.

China’s approach to nuclear deterrence and changes in its nuclear forces have not received much attention, given the rapid and dramatic development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. But developments in China’s nuclear deterrent should not be ignored given the flash points that could draw the United States into armed conflict with China.

The most important flash point in the near term is the Korean Peninsula, where a conflict between the United States and North Korea risks drawing in China. The South China Sea and Taiwan, two other historic flash points, are relatively calm at the moment, but Trump’s decision to continue the military aspects of Obama’s “pivot to Asia” increases the likelihood these areas will not remain peaceful for long.

China’s nuclear weapons play an important role in these areas of potential conflict. The technical characteristics of the DF-26 and DF-31AG provide valuable insight into the future of China’s nuclear deterrent.

According to the latest Department of Defense report to Congress on China’s military, “The DF-26 is an intermediate-range ballistic missile which is capable of conducting conventional and nuclear precision strikes against ground targets.” A dual-capable ballistic missile can bolster deterrence by increasing the risks of strikes against missile bases. In a conflict with China, it would be relatively easy and operationally beneficial for the United States to strike fixed targets that support China’s combat forces. However, the ambiguity surrounding the DF-26 means that a strike intended for China’s conventional ballistic missiles could end up destroying some nuclear-armed missiles instead, which raises the chance of counter-escalation by China.

The DF-31AG, meanwhile, is a modified version of the DF-31A road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The primary difference between the DF-31AG and DF-31A is transporter erector launcher (TEL) vehicle that transports and fires the missile. While the DF-31A’s TEL could only travel on paved roads, the DF-31AG’s TEL can travel over more rugged terrain. The ability to go off-road improves the survivability of the missile by creating a larger area of potential launching sites. A missile that is not dependent on roads for transport and launch is much more difficult to find and therefore more likely to survive long enough to launch a retaliatory strike. This logic is behind North Korea’s decision to develop tracked TELs for its Pukguksong-2 ballistic missile.

Since China is bound to a no first use nuclear doctrine, leaders in Beijing need to be confident that their nuclear forces can survive a nuclear first strike and retaliate in order for deterrent threats to be credible. After China began modernizing its nuclear forces in the 1990s, its land-based ICBM force has focused on building mobile, solid-fueled missiles in a push to maximize survivability while also keeping the force relatively small. The DF-31AG’s new TEL is a major improvement over the DF-31A because it can travel over more terrain, thereby increasing mobility, complicating adversary targeting, and reducing the number of missiles that are likely to be destroyed in a first strike.

It is important to understand how improvements in U.S. missile defense capabilities influence the development of China’s nuclear forces. China’s nuclear doctrine assumes that its nuclear forces will be degraded by a first strike. If the United States has a robust missile defense capability that can absorb a ragged retaliation then it would have a decisive strategic advantage over China. The steady increase in the number of missile defense systems deployed in East Asia in recent years, ostensibly in response to the North Korean threat, are of great concern to Beijing. Additionally, North Korea’s ICBM creates political support for improvements to the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system, which protects the United States from ICBM attack and reduces the credibility of China’s deterrent.

The DF-26 and DF-31 AG indicate that Beijing will pursue a qualitative approach to bolstering its nuclear deterrent in the face of improved U.S. missile defense capabilities. Rather than building up a large number of nuclear weapons that could absorb losses from a first strike and still overwhelm missile defenses, China hopes to keep its deterrent viable through ambiguity and survivability. The ambiguity of whether or not a DF-26 unit has conventional or nuclear warheads makes it risky to target these missiles in a first strike, and the extra mobility of the DF-31AG’s improved TEL increase the numbers of targets that missile defenses have to defeat.

While there is nothing inherently bad about increasing survivability, intentionally creating ambiguity as a means of bolstering deterrence creates risks in times of crisis. Chinese strategists hope that ambiguity will create unacceptably high risks for the United States, but this does not guarantee that U.S. decision-makers will restrain themselves and behave as the Chinese hope. If U.S. policymakers continues to place a high value on missile defenses as a way to manage the North Korean problem, they must understand the risks that such an approach creates for U.S.-China stability in the long-run.

Eric Gomez is a policy analyst for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute.
 

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https://www.voanews.com/a/china-new-base-djibouti-aid-economic-expansion-africa/3979304.html

AFRICA

Observers: China's New Base in Djibouti to Aid Economic Expansion in Africa

August 09, 2017 6:45 PM
Salem Solomon
Liyuan Lu

China's new military and logistical base in Djibouti has put other foreign powers on edge, but observers believe China's strategy in the region is more about economic growth than military might.

After months of anticipation since announcing plans for its first foreign base, China opened what it calls a logistical facility on August 1. The base will be used mainly to resupply ships moving through the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea, and support humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts in East Africa, China has said.

Satellite photos, however, have led to speculation about a large underground area where unseen equipment may be stored, and the facility could shift the balance of power in the region.

Economic power

Janet Eom, a researcher at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies' China-Africa Research Initiative, said the base is part of China's plan to expand its Belt and Road Initiative, a $1 trillion plan to link China with 68 countries in Africa, Asia and Europe through trade deals and infrastructure projects. The initiative was first announced in 2013 and includes a Chinese presence around the east coast of Africa.

Products that China wants to ship are based in the region, so it makes sense to expand the infrastructure to transport them. But the Djibouti facility is also a sign of China diversifying its engagement and avoiding restrictions on its presence, Eom said.

"This might be the start of some more military, security-related bases," she told VOA.

Currently, China mainly imports minerals and oil from Africa, but its long-term plan is to build factories on the continent and move some of its manufacturing there to take advantage of the cheaper labor and geographic position.

Regional concern

China's ambitions have fueled concern in India, which has watched its neighbor's presence grow in the Indian Ocean. In a strategy known as the "string of pearls," China already has military and commercial links with Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.

"Because India has always viewed the Indian Ocean region as its domain, and as China increasingly has more economic interest and a large military presence in the region, India is going to have deeper and deeper concerns about its presence," said Darshana Baruah, a research analyst with Carnegie India.

Others say the speed with which China is executing its strategy in the region caught India off guard and may prompt countermeasures. "The base in Djibouti is like a game changer in terms of the security environment, and India is worried about it," Baruah said.

China's expansion has also garnered the attention of the U.S., which has its own base, Camp Lemonnier, in Djibouti. France and Japan also have military bases in Djibouti.

92038B0B-C141-4AA3-80A3-C63FC423E14B_w650_r0_s.png

https://gdb.voanews.com/92038B0B-C141-4AA3-80A3-C63FC423E14B_w650_r0_s.png
A Chinese naval base and U.S. base Camp Lemonnier, in Djibouti

"The United States will be concerned about the possibility of espionage, including electronic espionage, but will likely also be very closely observing the Chinese," Dean Cheng, a senior research fellow at the Asian Studies Center Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at the Heritage Foundation, said in an email response to VOA's Mandarin Service.

For China, the Djibouti base represents a shift to a more dual role in its global expansion — one that focuses on economics as well as military and logistics support.

"We're going to see more of these types of facilities in other places," said Lindsey Ford, director of political-security affairs at the Asia Society Policy Institute. "Some of these aren't going to look like bases. They're going to look like dual use, civilian sort of access [facilities] where also you can get access for military vessels as well."


Salem Solomon is a digital journalist at the Voice of America's Africa Division and covers the latest news from across the continent. Salem reports and edits in English, Amharic and Tigrigna. She produced the multimedia and data-driven projects How Long Have Africa's Presidents Been in Office? and Hunger Across Africa. Her work has appeared in The New York Times, Poynter.org, Reuters and The Tampa Bay Times. Salem researches trends in analytics and digital journalism. For tips and inquiries, email: sfekadu@voanews.com.
 

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AFRICA

UN for First Time Links Conflict to Famine in Four Countries

August 09, 2017 1:16 PM
Associated Press

UNITED NATIONS —
The U.N. Security Council for the first time is linking conflict to the threat of famine facing more than 20 million people in Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan and northeast Nigeria.

The council said in a presidential statement Wednesday that it "deplores" that some unnamed parties have blocked vital food and humanitarian aid getting to people in the four countries.

Council members stressed that conflicts and violence "have devastating humanitarian consequences ... and are therefore a major cause of famine" in the four countries.

The Security Council commended donors for providing humanitarian assistance in response to the four crises but said additional resources and funding are needed "to pull people back from the brink of famine."

According to the U.N., only $2.5 billion of the $4.9 billion needed has been received.
 

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ASIA

On Nagasaki Anniversary, North Korea Threat Tests Japan’s Nuclear Taboo

Last Updated: August 09, 2017 3:55 PM
Henry Ridgwell

TOKYO, JAPAN —
As North Korea and the United States increase rhetoric on Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program, long-held taboos are being broken in neighboring Japan – the only country to have suffered nuclear bombardment, at the end of World War II.

Analysts say the debate over whether Tokyo should develop nuclear weapons of its own is moving from the far right fringes to the political mainstream.

A Japanese Defense Ministry White Paper this week echoed reported concerns within the U.S. intelligence community, that Pyongyang has achieved the key final step of miniaturizing nuclear warheads – enabling it to deliver atomic bombs.

Former Japanese Defense Ministry adviser Narushige Michishita, now an analyst at Tokyo’s National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, says the country would have minimal warning in the event of a nuclear missile launch.

“It’s quite likely even that North Korea can attack Tokyo with nuclear weapons today. And so if missiles are launched, it will reach Japan within 10 minutes," said Michishita. "From the time we detect the missile until the time it impacts on Japanese territory, we would have six or seven minutes.”

North Korea is believed by some observers to have more than 200 so-called "No Dong" missiles capable of carrying warheads that put Japan well within range. An attack on a crowded city like Tokyo would put hundreds of thousands of lives at risk.

WATCH: North Korea Threat Tests Japan's Nuclear Taboo
Video

Japan’s constitution allows military action only in self-defense. Some lawmakers want that definition extended to allow Japan to acquire preemptive strike capabilities to counter North Korea.

Hawkish conservatives go further, among them Finance Minister Taro Aso. He has argued that Japan should keep open the option of developing nuclear weapons as a deterrent. The country already has a large stockpile of nuclear fuel from its civilian power program.

The issue is openly debated in South Korea. But polls show just five percent of Japanese want their country to be a nuclear power.

Security analyst Kuni Miyake, with Tokyo’s Canon Institute of Global Affairs, said, “We face the threat from North Korea. But it doesn't mean we will react with nuclear weapons. I don’t think we will go nuclear in the foreseeable future. Even if South Korea might go, we will be the last.”

Narushige Michishita questions whether nuclear weapons would offer Tokyo diplomatic leverage.

“If we possess nuclear weapons and say we would retaliate if North Korea used nuclear weapons against us, is it credible? I don’t think so. And North Korea is not trying to attack us with nuclear weapons. They would be threatening us to do so in order to prevent us from assisting South Korea. That’s their objective," said Michishita.

This week marked the anniversary of the 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombings, which killed hundreds of thousands of people. The commemorations were clouded by renewed fears of war on the Korean peninsula.

“There still are nearly 15,000 nuclear weapons in the world. Tension is mounting when it comes to the international situation surrounding nuclear weapons. Strong fears are spreading that nuclear weapons may be used in the not-so-distant future,” Nagasaki Mayor Taue Tomihisa said in a speech Wednesday to mark the 72nd anniversary of the city’s destruction.

At the same ceremony, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reiterated the country’s long-held position: “Here in Nagasaki, a city that continues to pray for perpetual peace, I reaffirm my commitment to realizing a peaceful world without nuclear weapons."

Some analysts question whether that commitment would be tested if Japan came under attack. For now, the likelihood of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons appears remote.
 

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China, and North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions

By Peter Huessy
August 10, 2017

In late July, North Korea again demonstrated its capability to range the entire U.S. with another ballistic missile test. And just this week, the DIA determined the North Korean regime can indeed make a warhead small enough to fit on a ballistic missile. As a result of these actions, the debate in the U.S. has intensified over the appropriate response.

The range of options is considerable, although all rest on widely different assumptions and understandings of the origin, nature, and purpose of the North Korean rockets. And that is part of the problem facing American policy makers.

We are not all singing from the same sheet of music.

For example, does the North Korean missile program represent Pyongyang’s quest for regime security based on the idea the U.S. is gunning for using military force to secure regime change?

Are the missiles capable of reaching the U.S. reliable, or are they overt propaganda? Is the quest for a denuclearized Korean peninsula a pipe dream, better now jettisoned? Alternatively, is such a prospect within reach if the U.S. shows “maturity” and reaches out to make a deal with Pyongyang?

Is the threat that North Korea would launch a nuclear-armed missile at the U.S. fanciful since an attack would garner massive U.S. retaliation leaving North Korea in ruins? Alternatively, perhaps the missiles are for coercion and blackmail or even an EMP attack that could be launched surreptitiously?

Moreover, finally, isn’t it true that China, as much as the U.S., South Korea, and Japan, wishes the North Korean nuclear program would go away or is the Chinese regime complicit in the North’s nukes and missile development?

Such is the conundrum in which American officials find our North Korean and our nuclear nonproliferation and counter-proliferation policy.

How should the U.S. address the current crisis?

My two years as a student at Yonsei University in Seoul, South Korea, studying under Professor Hahm Pyong Choon, former Ambassador to the United Nations and the U.S., greatly influenced my analysis. In his lectures, he emphasized that North Korea’s premier ambition is to reunify the Korean peninsula under its rule. Sadly, and tragically, he was murdered in a North Korean terrorist attack in Myanmar that killed most of the South Korean Cabinet during a state visit.

Also, important to my perspective is my professional work with General Mike Dunn, the past President of both the National Defense University and the Air Force Association. He developed a ten-step North Korean pyramid which included at its pinnacle the reunification of the Korean peninsula under Pyongyang’s communist rule. General Dunn should know — he served in the Headquarters of the United Nations Command and U.S. Forces Korea and was the lead negotiator for the U.S. at P’anmunjom.

General Dunn had interviewed the highest ranking North Korean defector ever and asked why the North was building nuclear weapons. Showing surprise, the former chief of North Korea's parliament — believed to have been a mentor to Kim Jong Il and a confidant of his father, Kim Il Sung — Hwang Jang-yop told General Dunn the North has nuclear weapons to prevent the U.S. from defending South Korea following an invasion by Pyongyang to seize control over the peninsula.

Korean unification under North Korea.

If the goal of North Korea is to reunify the Korean peninsula, that would require the U.S. to remove its extended nuclear deterrent, U.S. military forces, from South Korea and the region. Not surprisingly, that is exactly what Doug Bandow of the CATO Institute from the far right and David Vine, author of Base Nation, and from the far left, argue we should do.

According to Tom Reed, the former deputy national security adviser to President Reagan and Secretary of the Air Force under President Ford, in his book “The Nuclear Express,” the Chinese in 1980 made a conscious decision to arm its allies with nuclear weapons technology. The Khan “Nukes ‘R Us” network in Pakistan grew out of this Chinese assistance to Pakistan in building its first nuclear weapons. Subsequently, Khan and the Pakistani government helped provide nuclear weapons technology to Iran, Libya, Iraq, and North Korea.

According to unclassified intelligence reports to Congress, there are five key Chinese banks and a specially created holding company that funds the North Korean missile and nuclear technology programs. Chinese companies profit handsomely in this work. As former intelligence officer Bruce Klingner told a Mitchell Institute seminar earlier this spring, the North Korean rockets we recovered showed detailed markings of both Chinese and Russian origins.

What is China up to?

China sees North Korea’s nuclear missile threat as a means to dissolve the U.S.–South Korean alliance, thus creating Korean reunification under an authoritarian North Korean regime.

It is also true that some military elements in China rue the day they helped create this North Korean Frankenstein. These same elements see the possibility that in response to the North Korean threats, Japan and South Korea may decide to build their own nuclear arsenals, completely unacceptable for China.

The U.S. understands that while China does have critical leverage over the North, China is not willing to use it. China wanted to retain North Korea’s newfound nuclear power while assuaging any aspirations for nuclear-armed neighbors in South Korea and Japan.

How to respond?

Pushing China hard on sanctions is the next step and going after banks and industrial elements in China that are critical to North Korea’s missile and nuclear capability. China may call our bluff and dare South Korea and Japan to go nuclear, rather than leaning hard on North Korea.

This will set up a test of wills within the China and the Chinese Communist Party. They will assess whether the U.S. and allies in Japan and South Korea are serious in countering the North Korean threat. Therefore, is China’s strategy of the 100-year marathon to continue to world hegemony, or do they step back from the brink and put on hold the idea of driving the U.S. from the Pacific?

In this light, Chinese actions or relative inaction become clear as part of a broader strategy. The Trump administration’s nuanced strategy combining diplomacy, economic sanctions, and the threat of military force makes sense as well. Will China’s 100-year marathon strategy remain on schedule or will the values of liberal democracies prevail?

Peter Huessy, Ph.D. is President of GeoStrategic Analysis, a defense consulting firm he founded in 1981, and was the senior defense consultant at the National Defense University Foundation for more than 20 years.
 

Housecarl

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https://www.yahoo.com/news/egypt-police-kills-3-jihadists-behind-anti-copt-164425182.html

Egypt shootout kills 3 'jihadists behind anti-Copt attacks'

AFP • August 11, 2017

Cairo (AFP) - Egypt's interior ministry said on Thursday a policeman and three jihadists suspected of involvement in deadly attacks against the country's Coptic Christian minority were killed in a shootout.

Police had arrested one member of the cell who led them to their mountain hideout in the southern province of Qena where the two other jihadists opened fire on Tuesday, the ministry said.

The two suspects, who have not been identified, were killed in the ensuing firefight, along with the informer and a police officer guarding him.

Egypt is battling a local affiliate of the Islamic State jihadist group, which has claimed attacks that have killed more than 100 Copts since December.

At the hideout, police found weapons and "gold jewellery which was probably stolen from some of the Christian victims" of a massacre earlier this year.

On May 26, IS gunmen killed 29 Copts as they travelled in a bus to Saint Samuel monastery in Minya province south of the Egyptian capital.

The bus attack followed two suicide bombings of churches in April that killed 45 Copts. In December, a suicide bomber struck a church in Cairo, killing 29 Copts.

Copts make up about 10 percent of Egypt's 90-million population.

Egypt's IS affiliate is based in North Sinai province, where hundreds of soldiers and policemen have been killed in attacks since the military's ouster in 2013 of Islamist president Mohamed Morsi.
 

Housecarl

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https://www.afp.com/en/news/23/trump-mulling-military-option-venezuela

Trump mulling 'military option' on Venezuela

12 AUG 2017

US President Donald Trump said Friday he was considering military options as a response to the escalating crisis in Venezuela, a move the South American country quickly shot down as "craziness."

Washington has slapped sanctions on President Nicolas Maduro and some of his allies, and branded him a "dictator" over his attempts to crush his country's opposition. Venezuela has in turn accused America of "imperialist aggression."

But Trump's latest comments were the first sign that he is mulling military intervention.

"We have many options for Venezuela, including a possible military option if necessary," Trump told reporters.

"We have troops all over the world in places that are very far away. Venezuela is not very far away and the people are suffering and they're dying."

Trump said Venezuela's political crisis was among the topics discussed at the talks he hosted at his golf club in New Jersey with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and United Nations Ambassador Nikki Haley.

"Venezuela is a mess. It is very dangerous mess and a very sad situation," Trump said.

But if any US military contingency planning is under way, it must be in its early stages. A Pentagon spokesman, Eric Pahon, refused to elaborate on Trump's comments, adding: "As of right now, the Pentagon has received no orders."

Pahon cautioned that "the military conducts contingency planning for a variety of situations. If called upon, we are prepared to support whole-of-government efforts to protect our national interest and safeguard US citizens."

- Quash dissent -

The White House said Trump would only agree to speak with Maduro "as soon as democracy is restored in that country," after the Venezuelan leader requested a phone call with the American president.

Trump's military warning came two days after his administration imposed new sanctions on Venezuela, targeting members of a loyalist assembly installed last week to bolster what Washington calls Maduro's "dictatorship."

General Vladimir Padrino, Venezuela's defense minister, dismissed the threat as "an act of craziness, an act of supreme extremism."

"There is an extremist elite governing the United States and honestly I don't know what's happening, what is going to happen in the world," Padrino said.

The Venezuelan government had previously responded to the sanctions -- which already targeted Maduro himself -- by saying the US was "making a fool of itself in front of the world."

On Thursday, Maduro declared that Venezuela's new Constituent Assembly holds supreme power over all branches of government, even over his position, and that its work -- ostensibly to rewrite the constitution -- would return "peace" to the country.

But the United States and major Latin American nations allege that Maduro is using the body as a tool to quash dissent, by clamping down on the opposition and the legislature it controls.

- Nearly 130 killed -

The crisis has fueled the street demonstrations that have gripped Venezuela for the past four months. Nearly 130 people have been killed in clashes between protesters and security forces.

The protests have lost steam in the past week as security forces have stepped up repression and demonstrators have grown discouraged by the opposition's failure to bring about change.

But hackers have taken up the torch. On Thursday, a group calling itself The Binary Guardians claimed responsibility for a massive cyberattack that cut mobile telephone service to seven million users.

Two renegade officers behind an attack on an army base in the northwestern city of Valencia to raid its armory last weekend have been captured, Padrino said.

"Whoever betrays the nation, whoever takes up arms against the FANB will receive exemplary punishment," he said, referring to Venezuela's armed forces.

Opposition to Maduro among the oil-exporting country's 30 million citizens increased during a long economic crisis that brought food shortages and hyperinflation to what was once one of Latin America's wealthiest countries.

burs-rmb-oh/mtp
 

Housecarl

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http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/aug/11/al-qaeda-targets-us-trains/

Al Qaeda has drawn a bullseye on a new American target: Subway trains

By Rowan Scarborough - The Washington Times - Friday, August 11, 2017
Al Qaeda is about to take on a new target — America’s trains — in an upcoming edition of its terror magazine, Inspire.

Issue No. 17 is headlined, “Train Derail Operations,” and will spell out ways to create rail disasters in a transportation system that lacks the stiff security procedures of airline travel.

It’s competing Sunni extremists group, the Islamic State, for more than a year has advocated using vehicles to mow down innocents. Its murderous followers have weaponized vehicles in Nice, Berlin and London, creating hundred of deaths and injuries.

Adding trains to the terrorist’s priority list would put at risk virtually every mode of transportation and placed added pressure on the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) put out a report on Friday saying al Qaeda has teased the Inspire articles with a trailer appearing on Telegram app channels operated by its fans.

“The trailer highlights that derailments are simple to design using easily available materials, that such a planned attack can be hard to detect, and that the outcome can substantially damage a country’s transportation sector and the Western economy in general,” MEMRI said.

The U.S. maintains over 100,000 miles of rail. But the trailer features scenes of just one system, the subway. Its shows cars flashing through urban tunnels. It quotes from U.S. Government Accountability Office reports on the vulnerability of rail lines to sabotage. It then shows what appear to be rudimentary devices that can be clamped onto a line to cause a derailment.

“Simple to design,” the promo says in English script, mentioning “America” several times. “Made from readily available materials. Hard to be detached. Cause great destruction to the Western economy and transportation sector.”

Al Qaeda in recent months has depicted itself as making a comeback from its headquarters in Yemen. It has created new alliances in North Africa, is using social media to attract adherence and has not given up the idea of another mass-casualty attack such as its commandeered airliner strike on New York and the Pentagon in 2001.

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Housecarl

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http://www.janes.com/article/73028/...recision-guided-version-of-china-s-kd-20-lacm

Air-Launched Weapons

Images indicate possible precision-guided version of China's KD-20 LACM

Neil Gibson and Richard D Fisher Jr - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly
10 August 2017

Key Points
- China may have developed a new optically guided version of the KD-20 land attack cruise missile
- Such a weapon would allow aircraft like the H-6K bomber to conduct attacks from greater stand-off ranges

An image appearing on a People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF)-linked webpage suggests that China has developed a new optical precision-guided version of the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) CJ-10K/KD-20 land attack cruise missile (LACM).

In mid-July the 'Blue Sky' web page, sponsored by the Society of the People's Liberation Army Air Force, featured an image of a Xian Aircraft Corporation H-6K bomber being loaded with two KD-20 and two YJ-63/KD-63 LACMs in which the KD-20s appear to have a protective cover partially covering their nose. This feature is used on some missiles to protect their optical or infrared (IR) seeker windows while in storage or being loaded.

The PLAAF's possible use of a new terminally guided version of the KD-20, perhaps designated the KD-20A, was first suggested by PLAAF analyst Hui Tong in his English- and Chinese-language blogs. He has also noted that as early as 2013, the PLAAF had upgraded the original 180-200 km-range KD-63 TV-based terminal guidance system with a model based on an imaging IR (IIR) seeker.

For guidance, the KD-20 – which is estimated to have a range of 1,500 km – has previously been reported to use an inertial navigation system (INS) aided by a terrain-contour-mapping radar altimeter, and possibly a global navigation satellite system (GNSS). An IIR-seeker-equipped KD-20 could enable the H-6K to conduct strikes from beyond the range of most ground-based air defences.

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