WAR 07-18-2020-to-07-24-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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(427) 07-04-2020-to-07-10-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****



WAR - 07-04-2020-to-07-10-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
(424) 06-13-2020-to-06-19-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** WAR - 06-13-2020-to-06-19-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** Sorry for the delay...

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(428) 07-11-2020-to-07-17-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

WAR - 07-11-2020-to-07-17-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(425) 06-20-2020-to-06-26-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** WAR - 06-20-2020-to-06-26-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** (422)...

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Battle in the Himalayas (Published 2020)

China and India are locked in a tense, deadly struggle for advantage on their disputed mountain border.

www.nytimes.com

Battle in the Himalayas
China and India are locked in a tense, deadly struggle for advantage on their disputed mountain border.
By Jin Wu and Steven Lee MyersJuly 18, 2020

China and India have stumbled once again into a bloody clash over some of the most inhospitable terrain on Earth.
A deadly brawl last month killed 20 Indian border troops and an unknown number of Chinese soldiers, punctuating a decades-old border dispute that has become one of the world’s most intractable geopolitical conflicts. It has inflamed tensions at a time when the world is consumed by the coronavirus pandemic, and it has scuttled recent efforts by the two Asian powers to set aside their historical differences.
In the weeks since, the two sides have tried to walk back from the brink, with military commanders and senior diplomats negotiating quietly to disengage. By late last week, satellite photographs indicated that Chinese troops had pulled out of one disputed area where a brawl sparked the latest tensions.
Even so, the broader dispute between the world’s two most populous nations, both armed with nuclear weapons, remains unresolved and dangerous. It involves a region called Ladakh, a sparsely populated area, high in the Himalayas, with close historical and cultural ties to Tibet. It was divided in the years after India gained independence from Britain in 1947 and the Communist Party established the People’s Republic of China two years later.

Xinjiang



Disputed

borders



china



Line of Actual Control

(approximate)



Highway 219

connecting Xinjiang

and Tibet



Daulat Beg Oldi



Gilgit-Baltistan

Controlled by

Pakistan



Aksai Chin

Controlled by China,

claimed by India



The all-weather DSDBO Road connects India’s remote military camp to the center of Ladakh.



Galwan Valley



Line of Control between India and Pakistan



Tibet



Leh



china



Pangong Lake



Ladakh

Area controlled by India



CHINA



Area of detail



INDIA



India



Bay of

Bengal



Arabian

Sea



During its invasion of Tibet in 1950, Mao Zedong’s China seized the northern part of Ladakh, called Aksai Chin, and has held it ever since — in no small part because a crucial road connecting Tibet with another restive province, Xinjiang, runs through it. In 1962, the two countries went to war over the same terrain, but despite an overwhelming Chinese victory, the de facto frontier — known as the Line of Actual Control — remained roughly the same.
The clashes this spring and summer stemmed from India’s recent efforts to build up the road network on its side of the frontier, catching up — belatedly, critics say — to China’s buildup on its side. Last year, India completed an all-weather road connecting Leh, the capital of Ladakh, to its northernmost outpost at Daulat Beg Oldi. In the last two decades, India has constructed nearly 5,000 kilometers of roads, allowing it to move military forces more easily along the mountainous border region.
China appeared alarmed by that and by India’s decision last year to impose direct national rule over the Ladakh region.
"China is very sensitive to Indian activity in the western sector,” said M. Taylor Fravel, director of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “and it goes back to the reasons why it decided to fight in 1962 — to defend that road that connected Xinjiang to Tibet.”

Galwan Valley



Line of Actual Control

(Approximate)



CHINA



Leads to Daulat Beg Oldi,

India’s military base in Ladakh



More than 1,800 meters

above the valley

(Elev: 6,000+ meters)



INDIA



Shyok

River

CHINA



Galwan Valley



Line of Actual Control

(Approximate)



Leads to Daulat Beg Oldi,

India’s military base in Ladakh



INDIA



Shyok

River

CHINA



Location of the deadly clash

on June 15



Galwan Valley



Shyok River



INDIA

Line of Actual Control

(approximate)



Shyok River



Where China claims

its sovereignty



Galwan River



Location of the

clash on June 15



Indian military

installments

• 
  
• 
  
• 
  

This disputed land near Galwan Valley has some of the most treacherous terrain on Earth. While no border has ever officially been negotiated along the forbidding stretch of land high in the Himalayas that divides the two nations, the truce established a 2,100-mile-long Line of Actual Control.

On the night of June 15, Indian and Chinese soldiers clashed at an area near a sharp bend in the Galwan River, where Chinese forces had set up tents. It was the first deadly clash on the border since 1975 and the deadliest since 1967.

Indian officials have claimed that China was moving farther down the Galwan River than it had in the past. By occupying the valley, the Chinese could easily monitor Indian vehicles passing through on the main road.

A spokesman for China’s Ministry of National Defense, Senior Col. Wu Qian, said last month that China has sovereignty over the entire valley to the point where the Galwan and Shyok rivers meet. He blamed Indian troops for crossing into Chinese territory. “The responsibility lies entirely with India,” he said.
Galwan Valley is not the only hotspot along the frontier. By late April and early May, Indian troops began to observe a buildup of Chinese forces at two other spots along the Line of Actual Control: Pangong Lake and Hot Springs.
While no clashes occurred in Hot Springs, the Chinese brought up significant weaponry. About three kilometers away from the Line of Actual Control, companies of tanks and batteries of towed artillery appeared in existing Chinese positions north and east of Gogra.

Tanks



Artillery batteries



Sources: Satellite image taken by Maxar Technologies on May 22, 2020; Henry Boyd and Meia Nouwens, International Institute for Strategic Studies.
The tensions this year first boiled over on the northern shore of Pangong Lake, a glacial lake split by the de facto border.
In early May, troops from both countries brawled in disputed territory there. There were a number of injuries, some serious, though no deaths. That fight put both sides on edge, contributing to the deadly clash in the Galwan Valley a little more than a month later. Years ago, the two countries agreed that their troops should not shoot at each other during border standoffs. But China seems to be testing the limits. In the June fighting, Indian commanders said that Chinese troops used iron clubs bristling with spikes.

Sirijap



AKSAI CHIN

Controlled by China

Claimed by India



8



7



6



India claims territories

up to Finger 8.



5



4



LADAKH

Area controlled by India



3



Line of Actual Control

(Approximate)



2



1



Pangong Lake

Chinese posts



Indian posts



Chinese posts



Pangong Lake

Many more tents were seen on

satellite images captured on July 10,

compared to one month before.



Indian military

settlements



Bridge drainage



Helicopter pads

Line of Actual Control

(Approximate)



Construction activities

by the Chinese forces



AKSAI CHIN

Controlled by China

Claimed by India



LADAKH

Controlled by India

Line of Actual Control

(Approximate)



No more clear

Chinese constructions



AKSAI CHIN

Controlled by China

Claimed by India



LADAKH

Controlled by India

A map of China has been inscribed on

the disputed banks of Pangong Lake.



Interceptor craft



Tents spread out in this area



Multiple roads have

been constructed



Chinese military

settlements




June 26, 2020

July 10, 2020

• 
  
• 
  
• 
  
• 
  
• 
  

This is Pangong Lake, where the slopes of the mountains jut into the lake from eight directions, referred to as the ‘fingers.’ India and China have different interpretations of where exactly the Line of Actual Control passses.

While military personnel patrol most of the areas by foot, there are several military settlements built along the bank. The first standoff this year occurred here on May 5.

India’s most advanced post in this region was located at Finger 3, which is well connected by a road from deeper within its territory.

Satellite images taken on June 26 showed construction activity by the Chinese in this region.

But in images captured on July 10, the Chinese positions have thinned out, after a troop withdrawal.

Despite the partial withdrawal, Chinese forces continue to dominate the spurs in this region.
China’s actions in the Himalayas have mirrored similar efforts to assert or reinforce its territorial claims, especially in the South China Sea. Chinese warships have this year menaced fishing and research vessels from Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia. In recent weeks, China is reported to have expanded its territorial claims in Bhutan, which has a close defense relationship with India.
Some analysts have argued that China is acting while the world is distracted by the coronavirus pandemic; others say China needs to distract its own population with nationalist propaganda about defending Chinese sovereignty. In any case, the tensions are unlikely to diminish.
Additional reporting by Jeffrey Gettleman. Additional work by Josh Williams and Anjali Singhvi.
Satellite images are from CNES/Airbus, Maxar Technologies via Google Earth Studio, and Planet Labs.

 

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A Cold Peace: New Arms Race in East Asia

On July 16, Japanese government issued “The White Paper” on national defense. As usual, Japanese government accordingly announced that due to

moderndiplomacy.eu

A Cold Peace: New Arms Race in East Asia

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  Published
  12 hours ago
  on
  July 18, 2020

By
Yang Yi-zhong

Authors: Yang Yi-zhong& Hu Yong-heng*

On July 16, Japanese government issued “The White Paper” on national defense. As usual, Japanese government accordingly announced that due to “Uncertainty over the existing order is increasing, and inter-state competition is becoming prominent across the political, economic and military realms,” Japan will do all its efforts to promote a “hybrid warfare” which is a military strategy to blend conventional warfare, irregular warfare and cyber-warfare. In addition, hybrid warfare is used to describe attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, improvised explosive devices and information warfare. Obviously, as an already highly-developed country, Japan aims to continue to take a lead in the domains of space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum. Strategically, Japan also argues that considering emergence of security challenges which cannot be dealt with by a single country alone, Japan will be need to secure stable use of new domains: space and cyberspace; need to ensure security of maritime traffic; response to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs); and response to international terrorism.

Then Japan was not hesitated to argue that China has sustained high-level growth of its defense budget in order to fully transform the people’s armed forces into world-class forces by the mid-21st century. Accordingly, China has consistently and persistently engaged in broad, rapid improvement of its military power in qualitative and quantitative terms with focus on nuclear, missile, naval and air forces. In doing so, Beijing has attached importance to strengthening its operational capabilities in order to steadily acquire information superiority, and also enhanced its capabilities in the domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. For example, it argues that Beijing’s efforts to bolster these capabilities will definitely reinforce China’s “Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD)” capabilities and lead to the establishment of operational capabilities further afield. According to this analysis, Japan insists that China is striving to develop and acquire cutting-edge technologies that can be used for military purposes, and improve its operationalcapabilities. All these efforts have been guided by the elite’s awareness that “intelligent warfare is on the horizon.” In light of China’s recent efforts aiming to build up capabilities for operations in more distant waters and airspace, including those to project armed forces to waters including the so-called second island chain, beyond the first island chain. China has been continuing activities viewed as training of maritime and air forces making forays into the Pacific and the Sea of Japan, being suspected of intending to regularize these activities. In the South China Sea, China is moving forward with militarization, as well as expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritimeand aerial domains, thereby continuing unilateral attempts tochange the status quo by coercion to create a fait accompli.

Needless to say, considering both geopolitical concept and strategic concerns, Japan has kept a line with the United States since 1951 when the two countries signed the treaty of security and alliance. This is why we should have no doubt that Japan will be encouraged to be a strong or one of the key military powers in East Asia and the world as well.Although some people argue for the reasons why Germany which was also a “defeated” power at the end of the WWII has been so cautious to move towards a military power, but Japanhas been able to advance its defense capabilities beyond the defense of itself at all. By making a long history into a short story, we can say that Japan was the first non-European great power in the contemporary age in terms of military and industrial modernization based on the Western norms. Yet, the first half-part of the 20th century saw Japan’s ambition to challenge the West, including its final war against the U.S. and Britain in order to dominate the entire East Asia and beyond. Yet, after the tremendous cost and sufferings during the WWII, Japan’s postwar posture was frequently seen as a new pacifism; in fact it was considerably more complex. As Henry Kissinger argued, the postwar policy pursued by Tokyo has reflected an obvious fact that the governing elite in Japan has accepted the constitution drafted by American occupation authorities—with its stringent prohibitions on military action, acquiesced in American predominance and assessment of the strategic landscape and then to decide or co-decide the imperatives of Japan’s security needs and long-term national goal. As a result, Japan has closely followed the lead of the United States. In terms of national security, Japan has invited American forces to deploy in its territory in substantial numbers, and thus defense commitment were solidified into a mutual security treaty, deterring potentially hostile powers including Russia, North Korea and China particularly.

Since the rise of China has been seen as the dramatic changes in the balance of power in East Asia, the strong national leadership under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has given Tokyo new latitude to act on its assessment. As early as 2013, Japanese government white paper concluded that “as Japan’s security environment becomes even more severe … it has become indispensable for Japan to make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of international cooperation, such as strengthening Japan’s capacity to deter and, if needed, defeat threats. Surveying a changing Asian landscape, Tokyo increasingly articulates a desire to become a “normal country” with a military not constitutionally barred from a war and an active alliance policy. Consider this, Japan is supported and even connived by the United States to rearm itself to meet the so-called challenge in terms of the rise of China. This has been the guideline of Japanese foreign/security policy: continued emphasis on the American alliance; adaptation to China’s assertive policy and reliance on an increasingly national foreign policy. As former U.S. deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter observed, there would be two new strong military powers rather than only one in East Asiathat is China and Japan are equally powerful in the next decades.

Accordingly, a new arm race between China and Japan will be inevitable. In world politics, arms race is termed as intense competition between states in the acquisition of more or superior weaponry in an anarchic world system. At first, arms race appear to take that psychological reaction into account. Then the states proceed by assuming that their own armaments would gain them respect rather than arouse suspicions about their assertive policy and moves. In light of history, a new arms race between the two tigers in East Asiais normal even though it is by no means leading to a total war. Yet geopolitically a Cold Peace between China and Japan is sure to surge on the horizon regionally and then globally. As the United States has badly accused China’s claims as “completely unlawful, including it’s seeking to create a “maritime empire” and a “bullying campaign” in Southeast Asia, Japan is sure to stand by its ally. As the White Paper of 2020 defined three key pillars of national security as follows: Japan’s own architecture for national defense forces; the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and international security cooperation.

It is self-evident that Japan will take all efforts to strengthen capabilities necessary for cross-domain operations, to advance capabilities in the new domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, and meanwhile to promote capabilities in the traditional domains, such as capabilities in maritime and air domains, stand-off defense capability, comprehensiveair and missile defense capability, and maneuver and deployment capability. Be aware of the vital role of high-technologies in the military operations, Japan openly argues for strengthening core elements of defense capability by reinforcing the human resource base, technology base, and defense industrial base. All these efforts have been fully or partially supported by the United States since it has rapidly and openly recognized strategic competition with revisionist powers, namely China and Russia, as the central challenge to U.S. security.Especially, the United States and Japan rank China at the top of its list of priorities and places the greatest emphasis on the security of the Indo-Pacificregion to strengthen deterrence against China. This is exactly welcome by Japan.

In sum, China is a rising power in a strong position, but meanwhile it is also a developing country. Due to this, China has no will or even capacity to replace the United States and its allies’ core interests. Meanwhile, considering that China has not accomplished its national rejuvenation as a great power, Beijing is sure to increase its military capabilities by all means. In this sense, China is a more status quo power than a revisionist power simply because Japan is more ambitious to be regarded as a “normal” power. As a result, China and Japan have to compete with each other in much broader terms. The question arises that if the ruling elite in Beijing and Tokyo can learn the vital lessons from the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. After all, it is the key for China and Japan to be aware of the nature of the Cold War: the confrontation without hot war. Given this, it is hopeful that a new arms race between Beijing and Tokyo should be turned into a cold peace.

*Hu Yonghengis a correspondent majored in Diplomacy at SIPA, Jilin University

 

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Jalisco New Generation Cartel Shows Mexican President Who's Boss

pjmedia.com

Jalisco New Generation Cartel Shows Mexican President Who's Boss



By Rick Moran Jul 18, 2020 2:25 PM EST

(AP Photo/Christian Palma)

Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador visited the states of Guanajuato, Jalisco, and Colima on Friday and received a rather unusual greeting from the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, which considers those provinces their territory.





Needless to say, you have to wonder just who is in charge in this part of Mexico.



Reuters:

In the two-minute clip, members of the fearsome Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) stand in fatigues alongside a seemingly endless procession of armored vehicles.
“Only Mencho’s people,” members of the cartel shout, pumping their fists and flashing their long guns. The cry was a salute to their leader, Nemesio “El Mencho” Oseguera, one of the country’s most-wanted drug lords.
The video’s release coincided with Lopez Obrador’s visit to the states of Guanajuato, Jalisco and Colima, some of the cartel’s strongholds.
“They are sending a clear message… that they basically rule Mexico, not Lopez Obrador,” said Mike Vigil, a former chief of international operations for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.

Lopez Obrador already knows this because it was he who handed the country over to the cartels.

Unlike his predecessors, Lopez Obrador has taken a less confrontational approach on security, preferring to attack what he describes as root causes like poverty and youth joblessness, via social spending.
But the strategy, branded by Lopez Obrador as one of “hugs, not bullets,” has emboldened criminal groups, many security analysts say.
The president’s approach “has only led these cartels to operate with more impunity,” Vigil said.

The cartels in Mexico may be poorly educated and grow up in the worst sort of poverty. But they have the guns and most ordinary people in Mexico don’t, although that’s changing slowly. What they have more than guns is money — money that they spread around liberally to police and local officials to make sure their business enterprise prospers.



Lopez Obrador is one of those earnest liberals who actually believe you can fight crime by addressing the “root causes” of it. In this case, the root cause is a fatal weakness from the president and his government that allows the cartels to trample on his authority with impunity.

Lopez Obrador’s strategy of coddling the cartels hasn’t worked so well. Last year, a record number of 35,000 murders occurred in Mexico, most of them the result of cartel violence.

Last year, U.S. DEA agents, along with the Mexican army, tried to arrest a family member of a prominent leader in the Sinaloa cartel. The Sinaloas easily beat back the army and surrounded them. Only the intervention of a negotiator saved the army unit from destruction.

The Federalist:

The ensuing scene could have been mistaken for Syria or Yemen. Footage posted on social media showed burning vehicles spewing black smoke, heavily armed gunmen blocking roads, dead bodies strewn in the streets, and residents fleeing for cover amid high‐caliber gunfire.
Armed with military‐grade weapons and driving custom‐built armored vehicles, cartel henchmen targeted security forces throughout Culiacan, launching more than one dozen separate attacks on Mexican security forces. They captured and held hostage eight soldiers, then kidnapped their families. Amid the fighting, an unknown number of inmates escaped from a nearby prison. At least eight people were killed and more than a dozen were injured.

Lopez Obrador is in a civil war and doesn’t even know it — or pretends not to. The bodies keep piling up and the president continues to virtually ignore it. The cartels are almost as well equipped as the nation’s military.

Perhaps Lopez Obrador could invite the cartels to negotiate an end to the violence. He can carve up his country into autonomous states where the cartels would be free to operate. Maybe they can solve the problems of poverty and hunger.

They certainly can’t do any worse.

Horror: American Mormon Family Slaughtered in Mexico; Trump Vows to Wage ‘War’ on Drug Cartel ‘Monsters’


Mexico Drug Gangs Had a ‘Spy’ Working in Texas U.S. Attorney’s Office

 

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Military Daily News

Daily updates of everything that you need know about what is going on in the military community and abroad including military gear and equipment, breaking news, international news and more.

www.military.com

Mexico Puts Military in Charge of Customs Operations
18 Jul 2020

The Associated Press | By Mark Stevenson

MEXICO CITY (AP) — Mexico’s president said Friday he is putting the army in charge of customs at border crossings and seaports to combat corruption and the massive smuggling of drugs and precursor chemicals.

President Andrés Manuel López Obrador made the announcement during a visit to the Pacific coast port of Manzanillo, where some of the biggest multi-ton shipments of drug and illicit chemicals have been seized over the last decade.

It was the latest in a series of new roles that López Obrador has entrusted to the nation’s armed forces, which are now involved in everything from construction of government projects to running tree nurseries.

The president said the trafficking through the port accounted for a lot of the violence in the state of Colima, where Manzanillo is located. Colima has the highest per-capita homicide rate in Mexico, in part because drug cartels are believed to be fighting for control of ports and shipments coming through them.

“We have taken this decision about management of the port, because of the mismanagement, the poor administration of the seaports, the corruption, the smuggling of drugs into the country through these ports,” López Obrador said. “This explains to a large extent why there are attacks and homicides in Colima.”

The army and the National Guard, which is mainly staffed with army members, are guarding hospitals and transporting medical supplies for the pandemic, have been given an extended mandate to perform civilian policing roles and are running bulldozers to build a new airport outside Mexico City.

The army is also building thousands of new branch offices for a government-run bank. The Navy has been given control of all port captaincies and is in charge of removing sargasso seaweed choking some beaches at resorts on the Caribbean coast.

Most shipments of the synthetic opioid fentanyl, and precursor chemicals used to make it, are believed to come from Asia through Pacific coast ports like Manzanillo or Lazaro Cardenas, to the south. Cartels use the same route to import chemicals used to make methamphetamines, often on an industrial scale.

In 2010, the Tax Administration Service, which was previously in charge of customs, seized a then-record 200 metric tons of meth precursors at the Manzanillo port.
It would not be the first time the Mexican government has turned to the armed forces to try to solve the thorny problem of corruption and cartel domination at seaports.

In 2013, the government put the Navy in charge of the Lazaro Cardenas seaport of the neighboring state of Michoacan after the Knights Templar drug cartel reached such astonishing levels of control that it was found to be operating bulk freight yards and participating in the iron ore trade at the port.

Mexico has also had a decades-long history of struggling with corrupt customs inspectors. In 1991, Mexico fired nearly all 3,000 of its customs inspectors without warning, replacing them with younger, better-educated personnel in an effort to combat corruption and improve efficiency.

It was unclear whether the tax administration service would remain in charge of customs services at airports. But in any case, many of the inspections at airports and land border crossings — where most illicit weapons are smuggled — are already carried out by the military.

This article was written by MARK STEVENSON from The Associated Press and was legally licensed through the NewsCred publisher network. Please direct all licensing questions to legal@newscred.com.

 

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Is Japan’s Interest in Strike Capabilities a Good Idea? - War on the Rocks

In the span of a month, Tokyo has rapidly gone from canceling a ballistic missile defense system to considering strike capabilities against foreign

warontherocks.com

Is Japan’s Interest in Strike Capabilities a Good Idea?

Jeffrey W. Hornung

July 17, 2020

Commentary


In the span of a month, Tokyo has rapidly gone from canceling a ballistic missile defense system to considering strike capabilities against foreign adversaries. Is Japan on the precipice of dramatically changing the way it uses its military?

In early June, Japanese Defense Minister Tarō Kōno announced Japan would suspend its planned deployment of the Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense system, surprising many in both Tokyo and Washington. Kōno said the government feared the boosters of the interceptors would hit local communities after they separated from the interceptors. While there are questions whether the interceptor issue was the real reason behind the cancellation, Kōno said that the necessary software modifications to correct the problem have not been successful thus far, making a hardware redesign likely necessary to solve the problem. The redesign was projected to cost $1.8 billion and take roughly a decade to implement, a cost and timeline that Tokyo found unacceptable, leading Japan’s National Security Council to agree to cancel the program.

In the short time since Kōno’s announcement, the situation has become more confusing. While Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense David Helvey has stated publicly that the United States intends to continue talks with Japan to move forward with deployment of the Aegis Ashore system, Tokyo has broadened the discussion to ways to strengthen Japan’s deterrence capabilities that include what it calls “enemy base attack,” a euphemism for strike capability, which Japan has eschewed since its defeat in World War II.

Unplanned and not part of any broader strategic dialogue among allies, Japan’s suspension of Aegis Ashore has nevertheless opened a broader discussion over what kind of military Japan wants to have and what kind of roles Japan is prepared to perform. Because this debate has the potential to reshape Japan, the alliance, and broader regional relations, Tokyo can expect to face several challenging issues including altered alliance relations, cost and technological considerations, feasibility, and important legal questions.

Effects on the United States-Japan Alliance

Designed primarily to deal with North Korean threats, Japan’s ballistic missile defense system consists of two layers. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force operates the sea-based tier from its Aegis-equipped destroyers. Currently there are seven destroyers, with an eighth and final one expected in the near future. These destroyers are fitted with Standard Missile-3 interceptor variants that target incoming ballistic missiles in their mid-course phase. The second tier consists of ground-based fire units operated by the Air Self-Defense Force that use the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 interceptor. Seen as a way to augment the sea-based tier, these missiles are intended to intercept missiles in their terminal phase if they should penetrate the sea-based tier. Japan viewed the Aegis Ashore units as a way to supplement the Aegis-equipped ships, particularly because weather or maintenance issues could mean lags in coverage should these ships be forced into port.

While Aegis Ashore is primarily for Japan’s defense and the choice to suspend it is Tokyo’s to make, underemphasized in Japan’s public debate is the negative effect its absence will have on the U.S.-Japan alliance. The United States would have benefited from Japan’s Aegis Ashore system. In addition to improving Japan’s capability and capacity to protect U.S. forces stationed in Japan, Aegis Ashore would have enhanced U.S. homeland defense capabilities. Importantly, U.S. military operators saw Aegis Ashore as a way to free up American Aegis destroyers in the region to shift to other areas where China is active, such as the South China Sea, Indian Ocean, and Philippine Sea. Seen from this perspective, Japan’s deployment of Aegis Ashore would complement U.S. regional strategy. Its cancellation, therefore, complicates America’s approach to the region. For example, Adm. Harry Harris, then-commander of U.S. Pacific Command, told Congress in 2018 that without Japan’s Aegis Ashore deployment, the U.S. Navy would have limited flexibility to take its Aegis-equipped destroyers that are defending Japan and put them elsewhere because of U.S. treaty obligations to defend Japan.

This is not to suggest that Aegis Ashore would meet all of Japan’s security challenges. There are legitimate questions regarding the cost-effectiveness of devoting billions of dollars to a single system that may or may not succeed in intercepting incoming ballistic missiles. Moreover, Japan’s Aegis Ashore was limited to ballistic missiles despite initial considerations that included capabilities to defend against both ballistic and cruise missiles (which were scrapped due to cost concerns). Given China’s existing inventory of cruise missiles and progress on hypersonic boost-glide missiles, however, even Japan’s planned Aegis Ashore sites would not have protected against all potential missile threats.

From Missile Defense to Strikes

Instead of searching for alternative ways to strengthen the nation’s missile defense systems, Japan moved the conversation to enemy base attack capabilities. While it may be a major leap in logic to move from a defensive Aegis Ashore system to an offensive capability to attack enemy bases, this discussion of the capability is not new. In March 2017, the governing Liberal Democratic Party examined the issue but ultimately did not act upon it. After the Aegis Ashore suspension, however, this topic was revived under the broader issue of Japan’s deterrence capabilities. The government has argued that it needs to consider a capability to strike an enemy base with missiles before the enemy can launch as a means to strengthen Japan’s deterrent capabilities. Japan is not seeking a full denial capability that can hold adversaries at bay and threaten to completely neutralize the adversary’s missiles. Rather, Tokyo is looking at how a limited number of strike capabilities can augment the existing ballistic missile defense system to deter adversaries from launching attacks on Japan. The logic is to do enough to complicate enemy planning and hope it reduces the enemy’s willingness to strike. But if the adversary does decide to strike, the goal is to minimize as many incoming missiles as possible before they are launched and knock out the surviving ones in the air.

Beyond this conceptual framework, however, it is not entirely clear what Tokyo is intending to do. Japan is already procuring cruise missiles designed for jet fighters with 500- to 900-kilometer ranges that government officials believe can be used in a capacity to strike enemy forces far from Japanese shores (e.g., JASSM-ER). Japan’s fleet of aerial refuelers and growing number of F-35s help extend the ranges of these missiles even further. Additionally, Japan is developing ground-launched hyper-velocity gliding projectiles that, depending on their range and location, would be able to reach North Korea and even parts of China. What exactly then are officials referring to when they are discussing enemy base strike capabilities? Are they considering extending the ranges of the capabilities they already plan to procure? Is the Aegis Ashore cancellation an opening for hosting U.S. ground-based intermediate range missiles that were prohibited under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty or, at the very least, procuring and operating their own ground-based, intermediate-range missiles?

Moreover, if the disqualifying factors in the Aegis Ashore deployment were the costs and time required to make the changes, it is unclear whether the acquisition of strike capabilities would fare any better. After all, acquiring time-sensitive target strike capabilities will require Japan to develop or procure a new mix of missiles in addition to the supporting infrastructure that is required to find, fix, track, and target what are likely to be mobile and well-hidden targets. It will also require robust cyber, space, and electromagnetic capabilities to degrade an adversary’s defenses before Japan’s missiles are even launched. All of this is likely to be costly and take time to develop or acquire and perfect, even if it is done in close cooperation with the United States.

And it is not clear that all the effort will be worth it. Hunting adversary transporter erector launchers (a type of mobile launcher used for transporting and launching a missile) is difficult, particularly with adversaries that have many mountains and places to hide their launchers. In 1991, the United States had air superiority over Western Iraq, had special operations forces on the ground, and the Iraqis were operating in comparatively open terrain, and yet, despite all of these advantages, there is no proof that the coalition successfully destroyed a single Iraqi launcher. Does Japan think it will face better odds in China or North Korea?

There is also a question of whether this is good for the alliance. While the United States has shown a willingness to support a more forward-leaning Japan, a move toward strike capability promises to change the nature of the alliance. The alliance has always been a shield and spear relationship, with Japan geared toward defense and the United States toward offense. If suddenly Japan also has a spear — even a small one that is limited to self-defensive purposes only — how does this change the roles and missions of the alliance? Is Japan assuming that it can skip the difficult steps of acquiring tracking and targeting capabilities by relying on U.S. intelligence? If so, does the United States have the bandwidth to support Japan’s needs? If it does, is Japan ready to reconsider current alliance command-and-control structures should U.S. cooperation require closer integration over these types of operations, or broader operational command, similar to the integrated command structure that exists in the U.S.-Korea alliance?

Uncharted Territory for the Self-Defense Forces

In addition to alliance relations, what does the decision do to regional dynamics? Japan’s acquisition of strike capability could represent a dramatic shift in Northeast Asia’s military competition. Regardless of what Japan calls its new capabilities, the region will see them as offensive weapons, particularly if the discussion focuses on preemptive use. Even if Japan argues they are designed for North Korea, China will not view it that way. Nor should it given that the public discussion in Japan has included China, and Japanese government publications, including Japan’s most recent defense white paper published earlier this week, regularly cite China as a top security threat. In this environment, China is bound to react negatively, as is North Korea, and maybe even South Korea. And if a crisis erupts, knowing Japan possesses strike capability, North Korea or China may actually have incentives to preemptively attack Japan to ensure early success.

Perhaps most fundamental of all is the fact that acquiring strike capability pushes Japan into uncharted territory. Although there is nothing illegal about Japan acquiring missiles, and the government interprets Japan’s constitutional focus on exclusive self-defense as allowing an enemy base strike if there are no other means available to avoid an attack, it still puts Japan into new territory. Short of an armed attack situation, per Japanese laws revised in 2015, whoever is sitting in the Kantei will have to decide whether activity on an adversary’s launchpad represents an imminent threat to Japan’s survival. If so, will Japan break with past precedent and launch a strike on a country with which it is not at war? Will it strike an adversary if the United States says a strike on U.S. territory is imminent in the name of collective self-defense? This is just the start of what is expected to be a legal Pandora’s box. Other questions Japan will have to face are basic operational and doctrinal questions about what should be attacked and when and how that attack should take place.

The suspension of Aegis Ashore opened a much broader discussion about what kind of military capabilities Japan wants to operate and what type of power it wants to become. This is not to say that consideration of strike capabilities is wrong. But there is a lot of homework Japan has yet to do, not least clearing up what adversary it is planning its deterrent posture around. If Japan moves forward and acquires strike capabilities, the result will be a very different Japanese defense posture and a U.S.-Japan alliance transformed from its shield-and-spear relationship into one of two spears, albeit of different lengths.

Jeffrey Hornung is a political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.

 

[jward]

The US Is Out of Position in the Indo-Pacific Region

• By Nathan Freier Associate Professor, Army War College
• John Schaus Visiting Reseach Professor, Army War College
• Al Lord U.S. Army War College
• Alison Goldsmith
• Col. Elizabeth Martin

8:00 AM ET

A truly joint approach is needed, and the Army has several particular roles to play.


The Secretary of State’s recent dismissal of Beijing’s South China Sea claims is just the latest way U.S. officials are calling out Chinese rhetoric and military activity as a threat to a “free and open Indo Pacific.” But from a military perspective, the United States is not well positioned to affect favorable change or moderate Beijing’s aggressive behavior. Indeed, America’s once-unassailable competitive military advantage is eroding, and nowhere faster than in U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s area of responsibility. Joint forces there are physically out of position, conceptually unprepared, and lacking leverage in deployed and anticipated capabilities for hypercompetition with China’s ever-improving People’s Liberation Army.
Several months after the January 2018 release of the National Defense Strategy, our group of U.S. Army War College researchers began to look at the role of the U.S. Army in INDOPACOM, drawing upon our earlier study of this hypercompetitive environment. Our research suggests that the Joint Force needs fundamental changes — in strategy and operational concepts, forces and capabilities, footprints and presence, authorities and agreements, and theater command and control — to meet the challenges of what the Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning calls the “competition continuum.” In our new report, ”An Army Transformed: USINDOPACOM Hypercompetition and US Army Theater Design,” we recommend that the service help lead this transformation by assuming four roles: the Grid, the Enabler, the Multi-Domain Warfighter, and the Capability and Capacity Generator.

INDOPACOM, now DoD’s priority theater, is home to the states that present U.S. strategists with the most intense and direct military threats: Russia, North Korea, and particularly China, the United States’ regional pacing rival. Beijing’s effective gray zone resistance and aggressive military transformation increasingly allow it to act as a regional peer to U.S. and partner forces.
The region’s security environment is aptly captured by the concept of hypercompetition: “the constant struggle to achieve temporary advantages,” as Dartmouth Professor Richard D’Aveni put it in the mid-1990s. Adapting the concept in our 2017 study of contemporary military rivalry in the Indo-Pacific, we called it the persistent struggle for transient but exploitable advantage across and within highly contested domains and competitive spaces, including air, land, sea, space, cyberspace, the electro-magnetic spectrum, and strategic influence.

Today, we find that China holds the strategic initiative, thanks to a two-decade erosion of U.S. military position. This stems from the post-9/11 wars, excessive U.S. confidence in its own regional military position, and China’s aggressive military transformation and gray zone maneuver to crowd the United States out of its perceived sphere of influence. The PLA has become a formidable “counter-intervention” force, built to oppose the U.S. Joint Force operating in the region. Strategically, it provides a coercive, cost-imposing regional umbrella beneath which China preys on U.S. risk calculations and pursues predatory actions against vulnerable U.S. partners and interests.

U.S. strategists have been trying to refocus on the Indo-Pacific theater for two decades. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, largely written pre-9/11, listed Northeast Asia and East Asia Littoral among its four “critical regions.” Years later, as the Iraq War wound down, the Obama administration made its own attempt to “re-balance” in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. Trump’s NDS and the Defense Department’s 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy represent a third push. Yet none of these well-meaning initiatives has fostered an effective response to the Indo-Pacific’s changing strategic circumstances, with the result that U.S. forces in the region are profoundly out of position—conceptually, physically, and with deployed and anticipated capabilities.

The United States is out of position conceptually because INDOPACOM and its service components are not yet on a common joint path that transfers greater risk to and imposes outsized strategic costs on China. The problem is not lack of effort but lack of coordination. Each service has its own ideas: Multi-domain Operations (Army), Agile Combat Employment (Air Force), Distributed Maritime Operations (Navy), and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (Marine Corps). We must accelerate the ongoing efforts to unify these concepts of operation into an all-domain Joint warfighting concept.
The United States is out of position physically because its regional posture remains largely fixed in Northeast Asia, predicated on discredited advantage, and positioned for the efficient prosecution of a second Korean war. It is not a posture conducive to persistent hypercompetition with China or, in extremis, a cold-start escalation to armed conflict that might emerge from any one of myriad faultlines pitting China against the United States and its partners in the Indo-Pacific (Taiwan, South and East China Seas, etc). We find that achieving a more distributed and agile posture is currently a high-priority aspiration in INDOPACOM. It should remain so.

Finally, the United States is out of position with deployed and anticipated capabilities. The military is not yet equipped for the large-scale, widely distributed all-domain operations that U.S. senior leaders believe are essential to deterring or defeating China. In particular, power projection and access, Joint command and control, sustainment, protection, and intra-theater maneuver and movement are all challenged by the twin tyrannies of distance and an increasingly capable Chinese military.
Having gained strategic initiative, Beijing will continue to limit U.S. freedom of action unless the United States can make meaningful changes to INDOPACOM theater design. Further, China will continue to manipulate U.S. and partner risk calculations through innovative combinations of gray zone capabilities and methods. The latent threat of prohibitive military cost from an increasingly capable PLA will persistently magnify the reach and effectiveness of China’s gray zone maneuver. Finally, without a commitment to transformational INDOPACOM adaptation, we believe, China will increase its military options over the next decade while U.S. and partner options become increasingly more constrained, cost-prohibitive, and risky. The bill payer will be American interests, as the United States’ ability to project force and protect partners becomes increasingly uncertain and vulnerable.

Four Transformational Roles
A hypercompetitive environment demands a hypercompetitive Joint Force approach, one that gets the most out of each service component by combining their strengths. We suggest INDOPACOM’s unique military problem demands fundamental change in the way Joint and Army forces organize, operate, integrate, and employ capabilities. INDOPACOM commander Adm. Philip Davidson has said this approach should be more “agile and distributed,” should achieve “positional advantage,” and should be “interoperable and compatible” with partner forces.
The implications of this vision for all service components are profound, perhaps most of all for the Army. Toward that end, we recommend that the Army adopt four transformational roles over the next decade. The four roles are the Army as the Grid, the Army as the Enabler, the Army as the Multi-Domain Warfighter, and the Army as the Capability and Capacity Generator. The order matters.
The Grid is a distributed, resilient, and mutually reinforcing theater network of Army-enabled expeditionary clusters, hubs, and nodes serving as a foundation for Joint “all-domain operations.” The grid expands options for Joint Force commanders, it enables effective Joint all-domain maneuver and fires, and, in the process, it complicates rival planning and decision making.

The Enabler sees a Joint-focused Army transformation specific to INDOPACOM animate the grid in the areas of command and control, sustainment, protection, movement, and intelligence and information. The role of enabler is not the sum total of Army responsibility vis-à-vis the pacing threat China. It is, however, the Army’s most comprehensive, taxing, and institutionally disruptive role.
The role of Multi-Domain Warfighter sees the Army – on behalf of INDOPACOM and with sister services and regional partners – create and field a land-based multi-domain warfighting capability with theater-wide presence and reach. Army multi-domain capabilities and forces will benefit from the same agile, resilient, and redundant Army-enabled theater grid underwriting Joint and foreign partners. We caution against an over-commitment to innovation in multi-domain warfighting before taking concrete steps to adopt and institutionalize the roles of “grid” and “enabler” first. Joint Force success overall will rely on the Army prioritizing these upfront. Again, the order matters.
Finally, the Army as Capability and Capacity Generator uses an asymmetric U.S. advantage — a strong network of allies and partners — to enhance traditional regional ground force competencies and expand complementary coalition multi-domain capability. Within a unified Joint concept for competition and conflict, Army forces can be the catalyst for a combined land-based multi-domain network that draws on the unique strengths and competencies of regional allies and partners.

Conclusion
We sense both the need and desire for change in the Army’s Indo-Pacific disposition. However, we argue that the most appropriate, effective, and durable change can only occur within the context of a more integrated and unified Joint Force concept for theater competition and conflict. Restoring a new, more favorable and durable military balance in the Indo-Pacific – as called for by NDS18 – depends almost entirely in DoD, Joint, and Army senior leadership continuing to make risk-informed but bold choices. Leaders must spurn service bias, draw upon service strengths, and ensure that the new theater Joint concept not suffer from compromise that favors service component preferences over real operational requirements.

China is acting with newfound confidence and freedom of action in recent regional activism in Xianjang, the Ladakh border region, the South China Sea, and Hong Kong. American allies anxiously eye Chinese activities hoping to see an effective American counterbalance materialize. This would include transformed military concepts, capabilities, and posture. Without regional military transformation, strategic U.S. failure in INDOPACOM grows substantially more likely. Recognizing the region’s high stakes and adapting to hypercompete with China to re-establish a more favorable U.S. military position would be a first step in avoiding it.

This article draws from insights and material in the forthcoming Army War College report “An Army Transformed—INDOPACOM Hypercompetition and U.S. Army Theater Design” and in the recent Parameters, Summer Edition article, Geo-Strategic Net Assessment: INDOPACOM Through 2030. The opinions expressed here are those of the authors and do not represent those of the Department of Defense, the United States Army, or the United States Army War College.


Alison Goldsmith
posted for fair use

The US Is Out of Position in the Indo-Pacific Region

A truly joint approach is needed, and the Army has several particular roles to play.

www.defenseone.com

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm......

Posted for fair use.....

The Military Agreement between Syria and Iran

On July 8 last, Iranian Chief-of-Staff Mohammad Baqeri and Syrian Defence Minister Ali Abdullah Ayub signed an agreement in Damascus - defined as "comprehensive" - to strengthen military cooperation between the two countries. As they both said, this agreement strengthens military cooperation...

www.israeldefense.co.il

The Military Agreement between Syria and Iran

Commentary: An important strategic fact is that this new agreement pushes the traditional relationship between Syria and Russia aside, both defensively and technologically and politically. It is an attempt at strategic "substitution" that could have long-term effects.

Giancarlo Elia Valori | 19/07/2020

On July 8 last, Iranian Chief-of-Staff Mohammad Baqeri and Syrian Defence Minister Ali Abdullah Ayub signed an agreement in Damascus - defined as "comprehensive" - to strengthen military cooperation between the two countries.

As they both said, this agreement strengthens military cooperation between Iran and Syria, especially in relation to the expected increase in U.S. pressure on the region. Furthermore, Iran will strengthen the Syrian air defence systems, in particular, as well as improve the training of troops and the armament currently available to the Syrian military.

On July 1, Erdogan, Putin and Hassan Rouhani had met - by videoconference - within the so-called "Astana format" to regulate their relations within Syrian territory and to plan a future peace treaty with Syria, with the exclusion of the United States and other Western countries.

Meanwhile, the Israeli Prime Minister has said: "We will not allow Iran to establish military presence in Syria". It is an entirely natural choice, but we do not believe that - in a perspective of limited military confrontation between Israel and Iran - the United States would provide more than symbolic help to the Jewish State.

An important strategic fact is that this new agreement pushes the traditional relationship between Syria and Russia aside, both defensively and technologically and politically.
Russia has already made its Pantsir and S-300 missiles operational on Syrian territory, but rumours are rife within the Syrian Armed Forces that these weapon systems have not deliberately been able to hit Israeli weapons and air raids in Jerusalem.

The issue is clear: Russia does not activate its S-300 missiles because it has no intention of hitting the Jewish State. Obviously, however, this is certainly not in the plans of Syria, which regards the air threat from Israel as an existential danger for the Syrian State. Iran’s role will be to hit Israel from Syrian territory or to penetrate the Israeli region with its own special forces.

Certainly the sign of partial disengagement by Assad's Syria from the Russian Federation is significant, although it does not appear to be decisive, considering that both Russia and Iran keep on supporting Syria.

Nevertheless, it is an attempt at strategic "substitution" that could have long-term effects.
Furthermore, some Russian analysts note that - also in the hot phases of the war between Assad and the West-supported "rebels" - the presence of the Iranian troops was scarce, while many Shiite volunteers from various areas, Pasdaran and many military advisors were sent from Iran to Syria.

The Iranian presence in the Syrian war has never been massive but, certainly, it is still very important.

Iran, in particular, has funded and trained the pro-Assad armed groups, but currently the Syrian President needs to stop - certainly without Russian qualms - the Israeli air attacks, which often hit areas where also the Iranian military operate.

Certainly the Israeli operations in Syria have also caused significant damage to Iran’s nuclear networks and systems.

A fire in Natanz, at the beginning of July, as well as the explosion west of Tehran a few days ago, and the further explosions in Garmdareh and Qods. On June 26, 2020, there was a fire in a missile factory in Khojr, and another one in Shiraz, in addition to the explosion in a medical clinic on June 30, with 19 victims, as well as a great fire on July 3, again in Shiraz, and finally a fire and an explosion in Ahwaz.

Such a rational and well-scheduled sequence shows that these incidents, often trivialized by the Iranian government and its propaganda, are anything but random.

Obviously, however, they are important sites for the Iranian nuclear project: for example, the explosion of July 1 hit the Iran Centrifuge Assembly Centre (ICAC) in the Natanz area.
However, all the Iranian nuclear experts and technicians, also those within the Tehran project, assume a delay in the implementation of the entire project by at least one or two years.

Nevertheless, let us see the dates and strategic significance of Iran’s nuclear power: in May 2019 Hassan Rouhani announced that Iran would unilaterally but progressively withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed by Iran in 2015 together with the P5+1, i.e. the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany and the European Union.

It should be recalled that the United States had walked out of the JCPOA a year earlier, in May 2018.

The "maximum possible pressure", i.e. the maximum tightening of sanctions, announced by the United States at the time of its withdrawal from the Vienna Agreement, led to some demonstrations in November, harshly repressed by the Iranian regime, which left as many as 180 dead on the ground.

It is likely, however, that by permanently and systematically breaking the Vienna Agreement of 2015, Iran wants to show signs not of constructing the nuclear bomb, but rather of putting pressure on the international community to lift sanctions.

Butter first, then guns - just to quote an old joke.

Where could Iran launch its nuclear bomb? On Israel, which it certainly wants to "erase from the map", but with the very serious danger of a nuclear counter-operation by Israel against the most important economic and military sites and the most populous Iranian cities?

On Iraq, which has already a Shiite majority, currently well controlled by the Iranian Intelligence Services?

Or on Saudi Arabia? Every abstractly possible choice has many more side effects than positive and rational evaluations. But Iranian decision-makers are not fools or minus habens.

If, however, Iran reduces its JCPOA compliance every two months - as it seems to do today - it will have as many as three opportunities, from now until the next U.S. elections in November, to "harden" its nuclear system.

This will certainly have a significant effect on the U.S. political and electoral debate. This, too, will be a well-organized effect, rationally chosen by the Ayatollahs.

Obviously, President Trump shall strengthen the U.S. military system in the Middle East and this will certainly displease a large part of his voters. Iran will implement its basically non-conventional (but not yet nuclear) strategy, which will consist of attacks on tankers in the Straits of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf; of "heavy" operations by the Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq; of a probable operation in the Shiite area of Afghanistan, capable of shattering the very tenuous agreement between the United States and the Taliban of February, 2020; of a strengthening of the presence of the Houthi Shiite "rebels" or, finally, of another probable Iranian operation in the Lebanon and, precisely, this agreement between Iran and Syria.

Iran’s initial criterion is that of "strategic patience".

This in no way implies the exclusion of nuclear armament, but concerns the use of its conventional forces, while nuclear weapons will be launched on the aggressor or on Israel, only in case of an extreme existential danger for the State.

On the other hand, the Iranian "strategic patience" has a further purpose: to separate the EU from the United States and create an economic corridor between Iran and some European countries.

So far the EU has not shown to be able to react autonomously to the U.S. policy towards Iran: two years have elapsed and hence, with the aforementioned speech, Rouhani has adopted a "tougher" strategy.

Therefore, the Iranian President has announced that Iran will continue to move away from the JCPOA provisions until the other signatories to the 2015 Vienna Agreement ensure Iran free access to the world financial system and the free sale of Iranian oil.

In other words, any "hardening" of the Ayatollah regime on the nuclear issue will be followed by a possible ad hoc opening by Iran to European markets.

If the EU agrees on this project, from then on Iran will stop its withdrawal from the JCPOA, otherwise its leaving the Vienna Agreement will continue at the usual pace.

So far, however, the United States has further strengthened its system of sanctions, while the EU has threatened to initiate the JCPOA dispute settlement system.

Iran's final walking out of the Vienna Agreement has therefore materialized again, but both the United States and the EU - which has the same foreign policy as an ant nest - should realize that the non-nuclear and nuclear threat from Iran is terribly serious and could negatively affect the primary interests of both Western regions.

There is above all the blackmail to Israel, which is also terribly serious, even if Iran were to imagine a "Samson-style" nuclear strategy, i.e. its elimination together with the enemy.
Moreover, the Jewish State rightly considers the EU a den of anti-Semites that does no foreign policy (by now, not even its Member States), while the United States conceives and develops its foreign policy, be it good or bad, only for the time horizon of a mid-term election.

Israel instead has a very stable military and strategic policy, but it inevitably needs equally stable allies.

It is no coincidence, in fact, that over the last two months Iran has strengthened not only the project for leaving the JCPOA, but also its various conventional military operations or those of its proxies in the Greater Middle East: just think about the capture of the British oil tanker about a year ago, as well as the two tankers seized - probably by the Pasdaran - in the Gulf of Oman in June 2019, and the many similar operations carried out by the Navy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Iran’s idea is to make Europeans feel above all the "weight" of being in agreement with the United States as to the sanctions against Iran, as well as hit the supply lines of the European countries - coincidentally of the closest ones to the United States’ positions, such as Great Britain - to make them understand that Iran can significantly harm them without resorting to a conventional or nuclear war.

The Iranian decision-makers’ "policy line" is basically still the one established by Ayatollah Khamenei, shortly after the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, which defines two basic criteria: Iran will continue to implement the Vienna Agreement, although at a very slower pace, but - on the other hand - Iran is ready for a possible definitive withdrawal from the JCPOA.

This is exactly the best definition of “strategic patience”.

Moreover, President Trump's strategic position is non-existent: what will the United States do if Iran leaves the JCPOA definitively? Will it impose other sanctions in addition to the current ones? It is even hard to imagine them.

What would the EU do in the event of a crisis - even only conventional – stopping the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf?

What would be the possibilities of serious and effective political pressure on Iran to stop its conventional operations, which could safely reach even the Eastern Mediterranean region?

As to Iran’s "bimonthly" breaking of the JCPOA, the Iranian leaders have exceeded the limit set by the Vienna Agreement on the production of heavy water. They have also removed all limits to research for centrifuges - in fact, those destroyed in Natanz were of the latest model - and they have finally started again to enrich uranium at the Fordow facility. Indeed, everything seems to have been put in place by Iran to calibrate - slowly but surely - the pressure on the United States and on the inept EU leaders, while it should also be recalled that, due to its geological characteristics, the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant is very hard to wipe out with a targeted attack.

What are the Iranian strategic prospects during the progressive restriction of the JCPOA's validity? Missile attacks on Saudi Arabian territory, as has already happened?

If the United States were to lift sanctions, Iran would demonstrate it can defeat the "great Satan" and Iran’s demands, especially to the EU, would increase. They would concern relations between the United States and Israel.

Professor Valori is President of the International World Group

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Fire in the Caucasus: Can It Be Extinguished?

On July 12, fighting broke out again in Nagorno-Karabakh. This war between Armenia and Azerbaijan remains unresolved. Thus, fighting periodically breaks out, causing loss of lives and prop

www.realcleardefense.com

Fire in the Caucasus: Can It Be Extinguished?

By Stephen Blank
July 18, 2020

On July 12, fighting broke out again in Nagorno-Karabakh. This war between Armenia and Azerbaijan remains unresolved. Thus, fighting periodically breaks out, causing loss of lives and property and inflaming the ever-tense political situation in the Caucasus. Predictably, once the latest episode of firing began, both sides blamed the other as has always happened. But beyond these negative outcomes, a return to outright war could bring Russian forces further into the Caucasus and lead to serious challenges involving Turkey who supports Azerbaijan and Iran who supports Armenia. Indeed, in 1993 when Turkey threatened to intervene. General Evgeny Shaposhnikov, President Yeltsin’s military advisor, warned that it could unleash World War III. The periodic resumption of fighting also reflects the utter impotence of the so-called Minsk Group, established by the OSCE and comprising the U.S. France and Russia, to achieve anything.

Negotiations remain quite stalled. Indeed, Azerbaijan's President, Ilham Aliyev, threatened on July 9 to leave the negotiations because nothing is happening there. From here, it looks like Aliyev had good reason for making this statement. Previously analysts tended to agree that neither Baku nor Yerevan was prepared to reveal to their domestic constituencies the sacrifices they would both have to make for peace to occur. Neither are the great powers inclined to push them to do so. Clearly, no member of the Minsk Group thought this issue deserved serious priority, so it continued to erupt periodically as it did earlier this month. In fact, Russia continues to exploit the situation, selling arms to both sides, aggravating tensions so that it can pose as Armenia's only loyal defender, exercise a chokehold on its economy, and obtain a permanent base there at Gyumri for its own purposes.


However, the Armenia revolution of 23018 that overthrew an autocratic, corrupt government, led by people who won their spurs conquering Azeri territory in the 1990s, should have offered an opportunity for negotiation. Whereas previous Armenian regimes had been hijacked by this war and consequent refusal to negotiate about the future of Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjoining, purely Azeri territories Armenia had won, the new regime's leaders had no connection to the war. Moreover, they were fervent Democrats, pledged to reform. In fact, Azerbaijan’s government gave them the benefit of the doubt for some time and refrained from criticizing them, a clear signal of an openness to talk.

Yet nothing happened. Instead, the new government doubled down on support for the province of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh in Armenian) and has refused to enter into serious negotiations. In conversations with this author and other American observers, leading members of the ruling party stated that they believed in the self-determination of peoples because they were Democrats. Therefore, since Nagorno-Karabakh’s population had declared its independence, Armenia could not negotiate on their behalf. Moreover, the negotiations could only proceed further if representatives of that government participated fully as independent participants. This self-serving attempt to prejudge the negotiations over territories still recognized by the international community as Azerbaijani is either incredibly naïve or incredibly disingenuous. And it is also an obvious effort to torpedo any negotiation.

This approach also is wholly negative beyond the fact that Azerbaijan naturally would never negotiate on that basis and refused to play along. More seriously, it perpetuates this war; it lets it exercise too great an influence upon Armenian politics and benefit those elites who have done well out of it. They have established ties with Moscow and also have, as does Moscow, no interest in democratic reforms in Armenia, which have been slow to materialize. Indeed, occupying foreign lands has always been regarded as contrary to the progress of democratization. And by preserving the state of war, these elites ensure Russian domination and a semi-exclusion from Europe that can only continue to cripple Armenia’s economy. Thus, this negotiating stance works to undercut Armenia’s prospects for democracy and security, not to mention genuine independence in foreign policy and economics. Certainly, the government is not trying to hide its disingenuous approach to negotiations as President Pashinyan’s son has just completed his military service in Nagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, Yerevan was complicit with Iran in obtaining Iranian energy supplies for Nagorno-Karabakh while Iran posed as a mediator. So, President Aliyev’s anger at the failure of negotiations’ is well deserved.

It is not too late for the great powers to put their foot down and help bring about genuine negotiations. Moscow surely will not do so. That leaves the U.S. Washington needs to realize just how dangerous this region that abuts the Middle East and could bring Turkey, Iran, and Russia into confrontation can be. And Washington should use its power to convene a Camp David negotiations and be ready to help them by making what political scientists call side payments to help uphold a new local political order, induce a settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh’s disputed status, compensation to refugees, and a return of non-Karabakh lands to Azerbaijan in return for peace and security for both belligerents. The principles that will allow for such an outcome were already agreed to by both sides. These so-called Madrid principles offer a basis for moving forward, but someone has to push Armenia and Azerbaijan hard to do so, especially Armenia, for its position is particularly self-defeating and disingenuous. We cannot pretend to ourselves anymore that this unfrozen war can be allowed to erupt every 12-18 months and that nothing will change because of it. Years ago, Zbigniew Brzezinski called this area and the greater Middle East, of which it is a part of the Eurasian Balkans. Just as in 1914, some damned foolish thing in the Balkans ignited a World War, failure to address this conflict crates the basis for another such confrontation. And when that happens, what will we say then?


Stephen J. Blank, Ph.D., is Senior Fellow at FPRI’s Eurasia Program. He has published over 900 articles and monographs on Soviet/Russian, U.S., Asian, and European military and foreign policies, testified frequently before Congress on Russia, China, and Central Asia, consulted for the Central Intelligence Agency, major think tanks and foundations, chaired major international conferences in the U.S. and in Florence; Prague; and London, and has been a commentator on foreign affairs in the media in the U.S. and abroad. He has also advised major corporations on investing in Russia and is a consultant for the Gerson Lehrmann Group. He has published or edited 15 books, most recently Russo-Chinese Energy Relations: Politics in Command (London: Global Markets Briefing, 2006). He has also published Natural Allies? Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for Indo-American Strategic Cooperation (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005). He is currently completing a book entitled Light From the East: Russia’s Quest for Great Power Status in Asia to be published in 2014 by Ashgate. Dr. Blank is also the author of The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin’s Commissariat of Nationalities (Greenwood, 1994); and the co-editor of The Soviet Military and the Future (Greenwood, 1992).

 

[jward]

How Russia militarizes minors in occupied Donbas

Posted on July 19, 2020 by veth Leave a comment

The “ministry of state security of the Luhansk people’s republic” (MGB LNR) training child soldiers in the children’s summer camp Lisovi Prostory, Antratsyt Raion, ORLO, 2016. Photo: LNR MGB, source.
2020/07/18 – 11:36 • WAR IN THE DONBAS
Article by: Valentyna Bykova
On 24 June 2020, children and teenagers were forced to take part in military parades in the Russian-occupied territories in the east of Ukraine. Young residents of the so-called “Luhansk people’s republic” are actively taught not only the “hot war” methods but also the hybrid and information-semantic ones.
The policy to militarize children and adolescents in the Russian-occupied territories gains momentum as time is working against Ukraine. From an early age, the rising generation in ORDLO (“separate areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts” – the official euphemism for the occupied territories – Ed.) is indoctrinated with Russian propaganda messages that later become part of their sustainable worldview.
The International Center for Countering Russian Propaganda has provided insight for Promote Ukraine into this dangerous situation.

The necessity to bring up the “Putin’s Jugend” is enshrined in the Russian Federation’s latest military doctrine dated December 2014. In particular, it defines one of the major threats to the “Russian World” as
“the activities [directed] at the informational influence on the population, first of all on young citizens of the country (i.e. Russia – Ed.), aimed at undermining historical, spiritual and patriotic traditions in the field of the Fatherland protection.”
Children and adolescents in the Russian-occupied territories become part of this paradigm through involvement in both regular paramilitary organizations such as “Yunnarmiya,” and engagement in “patriotic” rallies or visiting “military-patriotic camps.” The work on the militarisation of the minors in the Russian-occupied territories of the Donbas intensifies during the long summer vacations from school.

School students, members of Yunarmia, marching at the military parade in occupied Donetsk on 24 June 2020. Source.
Particularly, the recent VE-Day military parades in ORDLO earlier postponed by Russia from 9 May to 24 June due to the COVID-19 pandemic involved the members of the so-called Young Patriotic Military Movement “Yunarmiya,” a carbon copy of the Russian youth organization “Yunarmiya” that is funded by the Russian Government through the Russian Ministry of Defence.
One of the main organization’s objectives is “forming the young generation’s readiness and practical capacity to fulfill the civic duty and constitutional responsibility of defending the Fatherland.”

Intelligence activities and tactical medicine for kids
Recently, [occupation authorities controlled media] – the website Luhansk Information Center and the Patriotic Association of Donbas page on VK [the Russian clone of Facebook] pushed local parents to send their children to the St. George “military-patriotic” training camp. The preferred category of the youngsters were the children from troubled families, including those listed by the “police.”

Military training for children in the Lisovi Prostory summer camp, Antratsyt Raion, ORLO, 2016. Source.
One more propagandist project of this kind targeting children is based on the summer children’s camp Lisovi Prostory (“Forest Spaces”) that operates in ORLO (“separate areas of Luhansk Oblast” i.e. its occupied part, – Ed.) since 2016 takes almost zero fees from the parents for hosting their children. The occupiers planned to pass more than 100 children through the camp in this year’s three sessions. Before the quarantine hit, every camp session involved 250 children.
Here, the children aged 8 and more learn martial arts, handling weapons and explosives, intelligence activities, tactical medicine, and even information warfare.
Weapons training in the Lisovi Prostory summer camp. Antratsyt Raion, ORLO, 2016. Photo: LNR MGB, source.
Their instructors are the employees of the so-called “LNR ministries”: of internal affairs, including the fighters of the Berkut special unit, of emergency situations, of health, and of information, press and mass communications.”
The chief of the “LNR information ministry,” Vyacheslav Stolyarenko, said at the opening of the Lisovi Prostory in 2016,

“For our units of ‘young journalists’ and ‘young cyber fighters’ we are going to purposely equip a computer class; we will give classes in photography and journalism.”

School students in the summer camp Zarnitsa, seized from Rovenkiantratsyt coal company to repurpose it for military training of children. Rovenki, ORLO, 2017. Source.
So the young residents of the so-called “LNR” are taught not only methods of “hot war,” but also of the hybrid and information-semantic ones. Next year, this system of “patriotic upbringing” is set to be imposed in other children’s camps in ORDLO.

Pro-Russian propagandist Oleksiy Akutin, in his greetings for the Youth Day, mentioned some “Valeria Liakhova, who had aged fifteen and died in a battle near Lysychansk in July 2014, when she and the ‘militiamen’ fought against the Ukrainian Armed Forces.”
This is an old fake story that was disseminated in November 2014 on Twitter and the Russian social media VK and ok.ru. According to the narrative, a minor child – Valeria Liakhova, call sign “Beauty,” whose father had died on the frontline, sacrificed herself by blowing up herself under a Ukrainian tank using three anti-personnel F1 grenades to save other militants.
This fake was spread widely, though soon it was refuted by the “deceased” girl herself. A girl named Polina Turchyna wrote that the photo of the girl who allegedly was the Valeria Liakhova is hers, and the author of the fake stole it from her for his post.
An attempt to resuscitate the old fake story, however, is indicative of the occupiers’ plans for the youth in ORDLO. Their only virtue, as per Russian propagandists, should be their readiness to kill and die.The ORDLO’s population consciousness continues to be forcibly militarized, and these actions affecting children and adolescents are of particular concern.
The attempts of the occupation authorities to involve the minors in participation in hostilities are particularly dangerous. Propagandists do not neglect even fake stories to create appropriate patterns of behavior for the sake of educating young people in the “spirit of patriotism” and readiness to die for unrecognized “republics.”
The population of the occupied areas, in general, gets increasingly dipped into the “informational archaism,” as they get indoctrinated with the concept of “a carefree USSR life” that requires strongmen like Stalin and Purin with their NKVD/FSB “falcons” capable of confronting the imaginary “Ukraine’s Fascism.”
(C)EUROMAIDANPRESS 2020


posted for fair use

How Russia militarizes minors in occupied Donbas - Ukraine Today .org

The “ministry of state security of the Luhansk people’s republic” (MGB LNR) training child soldiers in the children’s summer camp Lisovi Prostory, Antratsyt Raion, ORLO, 2016. Photo: LNR MGB, source. 2020/07/18 – 11:36 • WAR IN THE DONBAS Article by: Valentyna Bykova On 24 June 2020, children...

ukrainetoday.org

 

[jward]

Trump announces arrest of MS-13 leaders in Nevada, New York

President Donald Trump participates in a law enforcement briefing on the MS-13 gang in the Oval Office of the White House, Wednesday, July 15, 2020, in Washington. (AP Photo/Patrick Semansky)







By Debra J. Saunders Las Vegas Review-Journal

July 15, 2020 - 9:16 am



Updated July 15, 2020 - 3:38 pm


WASHINGTON — President Donald Trump on Wednesday announced that key figures of the MS-13 international gang were arrested in New York and Nevada, and said the Department of Justice would seek the death penalty for an MS-13 leader.

“We have the MS-13 leader on charges of terrorism — that’s a first,” Trump said during an Oval Office meeting that included Attorney General Bill Barr and other big names in federal law enforcement.
“We believe the monsters who murder children should be put to death,” Trump added.




Trump said that 21 key MS-13 figures had been indicted on charges of murder, kidnapping and drug trafficking in Nevada and New York in the last week. In addition, U.S. Attorney Zachary Terwilliger of the Eastern District of Virginia issued the first charge against an alleged MS-13 member for providing material support for terrorists.
“We took down the Hollywood clique, which operated not only in Nevada, but also in California and in the Eastern District of New York — again, Long Island,” Barr said.
Brutal murders
Prosecutors will seek the death penalty against Alexi Saenz, an alleged MS-13 leader in New York, who, according to Barr, was involved in the murder of seven individuals, including two Long Island teenagers butchered with machetes and baseball bats in 2016.



In 2018, Trump visited the parents of Kayla Cuevas and Nisa Mickens and later invited them to attend his State of the Union address that year where he introduced them as victims of crimes committed by undocumented immigrants who crossed America’s southern border with Mexico.
“These two precious girls were brutally murdered while walking together in their hometown,” Trump said. “Six members of the savage gang MS-13 have been charged with Kayla and Nisa’s murders. Many of these gang members took advantage of glaring loopholes in our laws to enter the country as unaccompanied alien minors — and wound up in Kayla and Nisa’s high school.”
David Ruhnke, an attorney for Saenz, told the Review-Journal he would not respond with a public comment.



Nevada charges
Nevada U.S. Attorney Nick Trutanich, who had been in the Oval Office for the briefing, told the Review-Journal that his office had charged 13 individuals.
“Our MS-13 case does not involve violence,” Trutanich said. Instead, he said his office used a law known as the federal kingpin statute. “The interesting thing about our case is that it’s the command and control of MS-13 nationally. That’s why you saw a briefing with the president and attorney general today.”
Nearly half of the 13 men indicted in Las Vegas live in Los Angeles, Trutanich said, but they often came via “a well-worn path” to Las Vegas, a way station in the international drug trade with hubs in Central America and Mexico.

The 21-count indictment, which was unsealed Tuesday, cited a series of drug transactions and gun trafficking that occurred over 11 months, ending in April. Law enforcement personnel continued the investigation despite the coronavirus pandemic. All but two of the 13 people who were indicted have been arrested.
“During the operation, guns came off the street,” Trutanich added and said that authorities even found a “ghost gun,” a firearm with no serial numbers that cannot be traced to an owner.
The indictment described MS-13 as a “seniority-driven structure” that managed the supply of narcotics; sold firearms, ammunition and silencers; collected money; and recruited members.

Many of those charged have prior convictions, and 11 are immigrants in the country illegally, Trutanich said.

The allegations against the 13 men indicted in Nevada date to early July 2019, a little more than two months after three other suspected MS-13 gang members were indicted on murder and racketeering charges in connection with a kidnapping and slaying of a rival gang member.
The mutilated body of 21-year-old Arquimidez Sandoval-Martinez had been found in February 2018 at a desert area near the Lake Mead National Recreation Area.

The defendants in that case are still awaiting trial.
In the indictment unsealed this week, prosecutors alleged that a high-ranking MS-13 gang member, Escalante-Trujillo, also known as “Buchaca,” and others sold rifles and handguns, methamphetamine, Oxycodone, cocaine and fentanyl out of Las Vegas for the past year, even working around the coronavirus outbreak.
In early July 2019, Escalante-Trujillo told a drug buyer he knew “people in Tijuana, Sonora and Mexico City to help with drug supply,” the indictment alleged.

He showed a “bag of firearms” to the buyer and “claimed he had ‘kids’ running narcotics and firearms for him” before calling a senior-level gang member in El Salvador, the indictment stated. He boasted of ties between MS-13 and the Mexican Mafia and “nearly all the Mexican Cartels.”

Escalante-Trujillo also tried to get the buyer to earn cash by soliciting a female for prostitution in Las Vegas “in an effort to build rapport with a methamphetamine buyer,” the indictment stated.
In April, with much of Las Vegas and the country in lockdown, Escalante-Trujillo connected a drug buyer with Alvaro Ernesto Perez Carias, known as “Toro,” a senior member of MS-13, who “offered access to bulk methamphetamine despite difficulties elsewhere in large drug acquisitions as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic,” according to the indictment.


As recently as July 2, Jose Alfredo Ayala-Flores, known as “Blackie,” and Carlos Lopez-Guzman, known as “Troso,” drove four pounds of meth to Las Vegas from California, while attempting to evade law enforcement vehicles they thought were following them.

The drugs were sold later that day to a buyer for $13,500.

Targeting MS-13
During his first full month in office, Trump signed an executive order aimed at dismantling transnational criminal organizations that listed MS-13 as a priority for the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force. In August 2019, the administration launched Joint Task Force Vulcan, which worked with authorities in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico with a goal of ultimately destroying the international MS-13.
“As a candidate, President Trump promised he would protect the American people from violent illegal immigrants and criminals, secure the country’s borders, and demand order in the streets. Since taking office, he has taken decisive action to deliver on those commitments. Today’s announcement that more than 20 violent MS-13 gang members have been recently indicted and will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law is another win for law-abiding, freedom-loving Americans across the country,” said White House Assistant Press Secretary Karolina Leavitt in a statement sent to the Review-Journal.
Contact DebraJSaunders at dsaunders@reviewjournal.com or 202-662-7391. Follow @DebraJSaunders on Twitter. Review-Journal reporter David Ferrara contributed to this story.

President Trump is taking decisive action to capture and deport MS-13 gang members.
Joe Biden has pledged to STOP deporting these animals. pic.twitter.com/y40eLo0nbN
— Trump War Room – Text TRUMP to 88022 (@TrumpWarRoom) July 15, 2020

Trump announces arrest of MS-13 leaders in Nevada, New York

The president said the Department of Justice would seek the death penalty for MS-13 members convicted of capital crimes.

www.reviewjournal.com

 

[jward]

North Korea’s Foreign Propaganda Takes a Step Towards Modernity

• By: Martyn Williams
• July 17, 2020

One of North Korea’s most popular YouTube channels has quietly removed video documentaries that idolize the life of Kim Il Sung, the father of the modern North Korean state. The surprising move—once considered unthinkable inside the country—is the latest step in an evolving strategy that is bringing North Korea’s overseas propaganda efforts into the 21st century and showing signs of success.

That strategy has seen the creation of several new social media channels that count hundreds of thousands of followers. To get so many followers, the sites have dropped the heavy propaganda of the past and embraced a more contemporary video blogging style that relies on young women to highlight the softer side of life in Pyongyang.

Echo of Truth

In early June, anyone browsing the uploads to the “Echo of Truth” YouTube channel would have seen the “With the Century, Reminiscences of President Kim Il Sung” documentaries mixed in with the more modern content, but now they’re gone from the channel.

In their place, the channel has added a playlist with links to the videos on the North Korean-run “Our Nation School” channel.

The “Echo of Truth” YouTube channel on June 11, 2020.

The “Echo of Truth” YouTube channel on July 15, 2020.
The move appears to be an attempt to raise the profile of the softer content, which is anchored around a series of videos presented by a young North Korean woman identified as “Un A.” Her videos have been considerably more popular: many of the Kim Il Sung videos failed to hit a thousand views while Un A’s videos regularly attract ten times as many clicks.

The videos take viewers along on visits to the Pyongyang Metro, a pizza restaurant, the staff dormitory at the Kim Jong Suk Silk Mill and the Sci-Tech Complex. It’s a world away from the missiles and military parades often seen on TV when North Korea is mentioned. The videos have a much more authentic feel but are obviously state approved and produced—it would be impossible to publish such content independently—and that’s a big change for North Korea.

While other countries have moved to slick 24-hour TV channels and web content to promote themselves, North Korea has remained firmly stuck in the 1980s. It still pumps out 80 hours a day of multilingual shortwave radio broadcasts and publishes monthly magazines that recycle dry domestic news about advances in agriculture, new factories, construction projects and the ever-present updates on the work of the leader and the life of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. The content simply can’t compete in the saturated media landscape of today, but the appearance of Un A’s videos last year was a sign that things might be changing.

Signs of Change

The first shift happened in May 2017 when the @coldnoodlefan Twitter account was launched. It attempted to deliver North Korean news with a slightly more humane tone and touched on softer issues such as fashion and sports in addition to state propaganda. It also claimed a string of different identities, cataloged by NK News, which concluded it is linked to Sogwang, a North Korean website that is run from a server outside of the country. The “Echo of Truth” YouTube channel (which was originally called “Echo DPRK”) appears to also be run by the same team.

Perhaps after seeing the success of “Echo of Truth,” a second YouTube channel called “New DPRK” launched in October 2019. It also presents a softer side to North Korea and has its own hosts who take viewers to places such as a Pyongyang burger restaurant, the stamp museum, a supermarket and a horse-riding club. Like “Echo of Truth,” its videos regularly reach into the tens of thousands of views but unlike its sister channel, “New DPRK” videos are presented only in Korean with English subtitles.

The “New DPRK” video channel on YouTube.
In total, “Echo of Truth” has racked up 1.5 million views on YouTube and “New DPRK” is approaching 600,000 views. Both are impressive but pale in comparison to North Korea’s recent success on Chinese social networks.

New DPRK

The most popular of North Korea’s Chinese accounts is “New DPRK,” which is operated by the team behind the YouTube channel of the same name. But while it has just over 12,000 subscribers on YouTube, its audience is considerably higher on Chinese social media sites. It has an impressive 533,000 followers on Weibo and 65,000 followers on video-sharing site Bilibili. It also publishes on news app Toutiao and WeChat.

Since 2018, “New DPRK” has been posting videos featuring daily life in North Korea. Late last year it launched the same video blog as its YouTube sister channel called “Walk into DPRK” in which a young North Korean woman visited places in Pyongyang, such as a hamburger restaurant, a mobile phone shop and a supermarket.

“New DPRK” “Walk into DPRK” videos on China’s Bilibili.
The video blog proved popular and in April this year added a new character: A 7-year old girl named Ri Su Jin. In her first video, Ri is seen playing the piano at a school sports event and washing her hands with her mother. Subsequent videos have followed with each attracting over 20,000 views each time. One featuring Ri preparing for the new school year has been watched over 370,000 times on Weibo.

Seven-year-old Ri Su Jin in a video on China’s Bilibili.
The operation is drawing a significant audience in China and North Korea is using that reach to push a second agenda. Alongside the slice-of-life videos, the Weibo account posts daily news articles and commentary regarding social issues and problems in mainly Western countries. At present, many of the posts highlight racism in the United States but in the last few days, the account has also covered climate change, attacks on US troops in Iraq, online child pornography in South Korea and child neglect in Japan.

I Take You to Koryo

A second North Korean account on Weibo, called “I Take You to Koryo,” appears to be run by the same group behind the @coldnoodlefan Twitter account and “Echo of Truth” YouTube channel. Since last November, it started carrying the Un A series of Pyongyang lifestyle videos with Chinese subtitles.

When they debuted, a Weibo user asked if the video was made by North Korean authorities. The account replied: “It’s original. I saw the videos had a good effect on foreign social media platforms like YouTube, so I’m uploading them to Weibo as well.”

Like the @coldnoodlefan Twitter account, the identity of the organization behind the Weibo account is unclear. It claims to be run as a personal blog but that’s clearly not possible under North Korea’s Internet and information control regime.

In April this year, the first Chinese language video from Un A appeared. It was a version of “What’s up Pyongyang? Covid19 situation in DPRK,” and it attracted 170,000 views—about double the number that watched it in English on YouTube. The latest video, a tour of the Pyongyang Metro, has so far attracted 30,000 views on YouTube and 337,000 views on Weibo.

Un A takes viewers on a trip to the Pyongyang Metro on Weibo.
The New and the Old

Together, the videos point to an evolution in the way North Korea practices propaganda and outreach to audiences overseas. At a minimum, the teams behind these accounts have realized that simply translating domestic propaganda into foreign languages doesn’t hold any interest for the rest of the world. It also perhaps shows awareness that the image many people overseas have of the country is one of military parades, missile tests and bombastic TV news anchors. The new Internet videos are the complete opposite. At least for now, the videos are tied to several North Korean propaganda sites that are based overseas: Sogwang is run from a Russian server and DPRK Today is run from a server in Germany. The teams behind both sites are likely based in China.

Still, some North Korean propaganda remains stuck in the past. There hasn’t been any change in the methods used by sites based in Pyongyang, such as the KCNA news agency or Rodong Sinmun newspaper. And Voice of Korea continues to broadcast translated domestic news, propaganda songs and readings from Kim Il Sung’s memoirs to a global audience of likely no more than a few hundred people.

Additional reporting by Luz Ding.
posted for fair use

North Korea’s Foreign Propaganda Takes a Step Towards Modernity - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea

One of North Korea’s most popular YouTube channels has quietly removed video documentaries that idolize the life of Kim Il…

www.38north.org

 

[danielboon]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1284913093793984513

View: https://twitter.com/egetulca/status/1284913093793984513

 

[Zagdid]

House to introduce Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act this week | Taiwan News | 2020-07-20 11:17:00

Republican Congressman Ted Yoho to introduce bill authorizing military force if China invades Taiwan | 2020-07-20 11:17:00

www.taiwannews.com.tw

House to introduce Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act this week
By Keoni Everington, Taiwan News, Staff Writer 2020/07/20 11:17

TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — U.S. Congressman Ted Yoho (R-FL) on Friday (July 17) announced that he will introduce a bill this week that would authorize the U.S. to use military force if China invades Taiwan.

In an Friday interview with Lou Dobbs on an episode of Fox Business titled "Red Storm Rising," when Dobbs asked Yoho if the U.S. is doing enough to protect allies such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan from China's aggressive military posture in the region, Yoho described the trilateral arrangement between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan as "one of the strongest relationships in national security." However, when it comes to Taiwan, Yoho asserted that the U.S. is not doing enough.

Yoho, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and co-sponsor of the Hong Kong Autonomy Act, said that since the days of Henry Kissinger, the U.S. has maintained a policy of "strategic ambiguity" between Taiwan and China. Yoho then announced he is introducing a bill in the coming week called the "Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act" that will "lay very clear what our intent is."

The congressman then stated that the law would provide Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) if China invades Taiwan. He said that the AUMF would have a sunset provision of five years that would authorize the commander-in-chief to order military action against China.

He pointed out that going back to the Reagan administration, the U.S. has a policy of providing weapons for Taiwan to defend itself. Yoho then warned that "Xi Jinping has announced that he is ready to draw blood over Taiwan and 'reunify' them. They forgot to ask Taiwan."

Yoho explained that Taiwan has in fact never been part of communist China, "nor do they want to." Indeed, a poll released earlier this month showed that 67 percent of people in Taiwan consider themselves Taiwanese, while 27.7 percent support “maintaining the status quo and moving toward independence,” the highest level reported since 1994, and only 0.7 percent said they would be in favor of immediate unification with China.

The representative called for peaceful negotiations and closed by saying, "we'll see how this pans out."

In response to Yoho's announcement, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) spokesperson Joanne Ou (歐江安) said that the ministry is thankful for "a number of friendly measures passed by the Senate and House in recent years to demonstrate the emphasis placed on the peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait through concrete actions." Ou then added that MOFA will continue to monitor the matter and "maintain close contact with friends in the U.S. Congress and the executive branch to defend Taiwan’s free and democratic lifestyle and jointly promote regional peace, stability, and prosperity."

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

Intel: Trump, Sisi address Nile dam dispute and Libya war

President Donald Trump and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi discussed the Nile dam dispute with Ethiopia as well as the Libya war by phone today.

www.al-monitor.com

Intel: Trump, Sisi address Nile dam dispute and Libya war

Bryant Harris

@brykharris_ALM

Topics covered
Libya conflict
Trump
Water Issues
Jul 20, 2020

President Donald Trump and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi discussed by phone today the Libyan conflict and the Nile dam dispute with Ethiopia.

White House spokesman Judd Deere said that Trump “reiterated the commitment of the United States to facilitating a fair and equitable deal among Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, and expressed well wishes to the Egyptian people in combating the coronavirus pandemic.”

Deere also noted that they “affirmed the need for immediate de-escalation in Libya, including through a cease-fire and progress on economic and political negotiations.”

Why it matters: The Trump administration started mediating between Egypt and Ethiopia over the dam dispute last year at Sisi’s request. Egypt argues that the dam will inhibit its share of the downstream water supply from the Nile River. Neither country came to an agreement as tensions escalated during the latest round of talks, sponsored by the African Union earlier this month. Immediately after the talks, Ethiopia sent conflicting signals as to whether it has actually started to fill up the dam. Amid the dispute, Egypt has made diplomatic overtures to Ethiopia’s rival Eritrea. And Egypt’s regional rival Turkey has shown interest in growing closer to Ethiopia.

Regional rivalries have also inflamed the Libyan civil war, which the United States seeks to de-escalate. Egypt backs Libyan warlord Khalifa Hifter and has threatened to intervene on his behalf should the Turkish-backed Government of National Accord continue its advance on oil-rich Sirte. As the United States seeks to get Libya’s warring factions and their foreign backers to the negotiating table, Trump has also discussed the Libya war with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and French President Emmanuel Macron, who is closer to Hifter.

What’s next: Congress is also weighing in on the dam. Rep. Jeff Fortenberry, R-Neb., has introduced a bipartisan amendment to the annual defense authorization bill that calls on “Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan to immediately reach a just and equitable agreement regarding the filling and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.” The House will vote on the nonbinding Fortenberry amendment later this week.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

Op-ed: The cold war between U.S. and China just got a lot hotter

Some argue that the danger of a U.S.-Chinese war is growing. What that misses, a prominent Asian business leader told me this week, is that China has already decided the war has begun. Like the Cold War before it, the outcome is unlikely to be decided by military means. Also like the contest...

www.cnbc.com

Opinion - Politics
Op-ed: The cold war between U.S. and China just got a lot hotter
Published Sat, Jul 18 2020 8:00 AM EDT Updated Mon, Jul 20 2020 2:06 PM EDT
Frederick Kempe@FredKempe
Key Points

• Some argue that the danger of a U.S.-Chinese war is growing. What that misses, a prominent Asian business leader told me this week, is that China has already decided the war has begun.
• Like the Cold War before it, the outcome is unlikely to be decided by military means. Also like the contest before it, the war will be fought not over days but over decades.

So, this is what life feels like “in the foothills of a new Cold War,” as Henry Kissinger has called it.Though perhaps the better metaphor would be “in the trenches,” for this week one could hear the steady din overhead from the escalating U.S.-Chinese conflict that will define our times.

On Monday, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo blasted China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea as “completely unlawful,” and he pledged U.S. support for those countries that would wish to challenge Beijing.


For its part, China sanctioned Senators Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio, among others, in retaliation for their legislative actions against Chinese officials linked to the detention and repression of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang.

On Tuesday, President Trump signed into law a bill to impose new sanctions on Chinese individuals, banks and businesses that are helping Beijing’s Hong Kong crackdown. On the same day, Prime Minister Boris Johnson made his UK the first European country to ban use of Huawei’s 5G equipment.

Meanwhile, China threatened to sanction Lockheed over its defense sales to Taiwan, a warning shot to defense companies across the world. Beijing military and political officials increasingly share with foreign counterparts their ambition to alter Taiwan’s independent status by the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party in July of next year.

This Thursday, U.S. Attorney General William Barr branded some U.S. entertainment and tech companies – Disney, Google, Microsoft, Yahoo and Apple among them – as “all too willing to collaborate” with the Chinese Communist party. That followed last week’s charge by FBI director Chris Wray that Beijing pursues its ambitions through industrial espionage, theft, extortion, cyberattacks, and malign influence activities.

All this comes in the face of an unprecedented Chinese global propaganda, economic and intelligence blitz to seize the myriad opportunities that present themselves to China as the first major economy to recover from the pandemic it unleashed. China this week announced 3.2% growth in its second quarter, after a 6.8% decline in the first quarter, even as the United States and Europe remain in recession.

Under the cover of the coronavirus fog, China has stepped up its repression of its ethnic Muslim minorities, tightened its grip over Hong Kong, increased its pressure on Taiwan, stepped up tensions in the South China Sea, escalated attacks on Australia for seeking a coronavirus investigation, heightened pressure on Canada for detaining a Huawei executive, unleashed fatal force on the border of India and ratcheted up its propaganda against the United States.

All this comes in the face of an unprecedented Chinese global propaganda, economic and intelligence blitz to seize the myriad opportunities that present themselves to China as the first major economy to recover from the pandemic it unleashed.

“China may simply be taking advantage of the chaos of the pandemic and the global power vacuum left by a no-show U.S. administration,” write Kurt M. Campbell and Mira Rapp-Hooper this week in Foreign Affairs. “But there is reason to believe that a deeper and more lasting shift is underway. The world may be getting a first sense of what a truly assertive Chinese foreign policy looks like.”

Some argue that the danger of a U.S.-Chinese war is growing. What that misses, a prominent Asian business leader told me this week, is that China has already decided the war has begun. Like the Cold War before it, the outcome is unlikely to be decided by military means. Also like the contest before it, the war will be fought not over days but over decades.

The conventional wisdom is that China is a far more formidable peer competitor than the Soviet Union ever was, given its size, its economic might and its technological prowess. The Chinese economy that accounted for less than 2% of global GDP in 1980, now at some 20% of global GDP.

The conventional wisdom follows that the United States is far less equipped in Cold War II to take on this competitor than it was during Cold War I, with its alliances weakened, its domestic politics polarized, its national debt spiraling and its COVID-19 health and economic misery growing worse.

That said, many of the lessons of the last Cold War can be applied to this one. With military deterrence, strategic patience and a renewed effort to galvanize Asian and European allies, the fundamental strengths of democracies and weaknesses of autocracies still would be decisive.

Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, one of the world’s leading experts on China, has called for a “managed strategic competition.” Each side would understand and accept the other’s red lines and core interests, difficult areas for cooperation could be identified (such as trade), and cooperation in easier areas could be advanced (such as for pandemics and climate change).

And though it may appear that China is ascendant, its system has grown more vulnerable as it has become more authoritarian under President Xi.
China’s weak spot

Chinese-American political scientist Minxin Pei notes that during the five decades of Cold War “the rigidity of the Soviet regime and its leaders proved to be the United States’ most valuable asset.”

He argues that Chinese rigidities have been increased by President Xi’s decision in 2018 to abolish presidential term limits, by his heavy-handed purges of prominent party officials, through his suppression of Hong Kong, through the tightest media censorship since Mao, through the incarceration of more than a million Muslim minorities, and through over-centralization of economic and political decision-making.

“The centralization of power under Xi has created new fragilities and has exposed the party to greater risks,” writes Pei. “If the upside of strongman rule is the ability to make difficult decisions quickly, the downside is that it greatly raises the odds of making costly blunders.”

Trump administration officials believe their increasing efforts to counter a more assertive China could prove to be their most significant foreign policy legacy. That will only be true if they can combine it with a strategy that can sustain the effort in concert with allies and far beyond the limits of any single U.S. administration.

CORRECTION: This op-ed has been updated to correct the spelling of Marco Rubio’s name.

Frederick Kempe is a best-selling author, prize-winning journalist and president & CEO of the Atlantic Council, one of the United States’ most influential think tanks on global affairs. He worked at The Wall Street Journal for more than 25 years as a foreign correspondent, assistant managing editor and as the longest-serving editor of the paper’s European edition. His latest book – “Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth” – was a New York Times best-seller and has been published in more than a dozen languages. Follow him on Twitter @FredKempe and subscribe here to Inflection Points, his look each Saturday at the past week’s top stories and trends.
For more insight from CNBC contributors, follow @CNBCopinion on Twitter.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

If Japan Expands Submarine Fleet To 30, It Will Shape The Pacific’s Undersea Defenses

As the U.S. and allied nations in the Pacific work to maintain their shared edge in undersea warfare over China, America’s submarine fleet will soon begin an unavoidable decline in numbers. If Japan were to grow its submarine fleet from 22 to 30, it could fill the gap.

www.forbes.com

Editors' Pick|86,787 views|Jul 19, 2020,09:12am EDT
If Japan Expands Submarine Fleet To 30, It Will Shape The Pacific’s Undersea Defenses
Craig Hooper Senior Contributor

Aerospace & Defense
I evaluate national security threats and propose solutions.

Japan's submarine fleet can grow to 30 subs, making Japan a linchpin of Pacific undersea security
Getty Images
While America’s nuclear submarine fleet is incomparable, the United States is not the only nation with advanced undersea warfare capabilities. During the Cold War, NATO’s ability to counter the Soviet Union’s formidable submarine fleet benefited from the contributions of submarines operated by the United Kingdom and other NATO allies. In coming years, something similar is going to be true in the Pacific, where an expansionist China has been working steadily to create a large and modern submarine force to contest U.S. and allied control of the critical underwater domain.

As the United States and allies in the Pacific begin building the collaborative framework required to maintain their shared edge in undersea warfare over China, America’s submarine fleet will soon begin an unavoidable decline in numbers. The U.S. Navy’s front-line Cold War-era Los Angeles-class submarines are aging out, and America’s fleet of 52 nuclear attack submarines will soon begin to dwindle down to a minimum of about 42 boats in 2027-2028 before the force begins to once again grow in size.

The coming shrinkage of the U.S. Navy’s submarine fleet is not news—the Congressional Research Service has warned about it each year since 1995. To mitigate the decline, the U.S. Navy is now building new Virginia-class attack submarines as fast as it can, and it also plans to refuel and extend the service lives of several Los Angeles-class boats. But at this point, these and other measures can only do so much. The decline in the force will still occur: As Ronald O’Rourke, a renowned naval analyst for the Congressional Research Service, says, this reduction in force is now “baked into the cake.”

By itself, this decline in submarine numbers could create a roughly decade-long situation of weakened conventional deterrence against China. Chinese strategists are aware of the coming decline and have mentioned it in at least one of their own naval journals. But the decline also offers an opportunity for prepared U.S. allies and partners to take up the slack by temporarily increasing their own undersea warfare capabilities. With the start of the decline now almost upon us, it has become increasingly clear that an important option will be for like-minded Pacific nations to help fill the gap and, in the process, become more equitable partners in advancing Pacific security against an expansionist China.

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It is a real opportunity for the right naval force.

The remaining part of the shortfall offers Asian nations their biggest opportunity in decades to align themselves with America’s technical undersea prowess, potentially leveraging American knowledge, skills and resources, just as the United Kingdom did during the Cold War. By offering more of their own submarines to operate in conjunction with the U.S. Navy’s undersea fleet, Japan can not only compensate for the decline in U.S. submarine numbers, but also set the stage for a wider Japanese role in regional collaborative security efforts in coming years.

Demonstrating a deep commitment to a peaceful and prosperous Pacific, governed by the rule of law, is a role that Japan, in particular, is in a position to play, and the oft-underestimated O’Rourke has already done the legwork, identifying Japan’s opportunity to help overcome America’s looming shortfall in undersea platforms.

The Japanese sub fleet is a daunting force
Getty
Japan To The Rescue!

O’Rourke’s observations failed to garner much public notice, coming in early June, at the end of a two-and-a-half-hour House Armed Services Committee hearing. But O’Rourke took a few final minutes of the hearing to focus upon Japan’s potential to field a far larger submarine fleet, noting, “I have tried to scour the world for unrealized Western naval force structure, and the number one opportunity I have identified is the Japanese attack submarine force.”

Japan builds one attack submarine a year, and with a 22-submarine force-size goal, Japan simply retires each submarine after 22 years of service. As O’Rourke mentioned, if Japan “were to simply to make a decision to keep their submarines in service for 30 years—more like our own service—they could grow their submarine force from 22 to 30 without building a single boat more than what they already plan to build.”

The timing could not be better. Should Japan recalibrate from their current 22-submarine goal to 30 boats right away, O’Rourke continued, “They would hit 30 within a year of when we are at the minimum of our own attack submarine valley.” Growing the Japanese sub fleet by eight would make a notable contribution toward offsetting the decline in U.S. submarines and strengthen Japan’s contribution to allied security in the Indo-Pacific.

Japan's naval forces are daunting, but their sub fleet is the strategic "glue" for the region
AFP via Getty Images
Japan’s Quiet Competence:

This relatively painless effort to grow the Japanese submarine fleet to 30 boats offers Japan a chance to achieve an enormous boost to the country’s international standing. Rational American defense leaders are already pondering a closer relationship, and at the House Armed Services Committee hearing, retired Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead echoed O’Rourke, saying, “It’s time that we change the nature of our alliance with Japan,” and, “they have really good stuff and they’re very, very proficient operators.”

In the undersea domain, Japan’s submarine force is deeply respected throughout Asia, and even America’s anti-submarine warfare operators can struggle to track Japan’s modern fleet of super-quiet non-nuclear submarines. Capitalizing on this competence by expanding Japan’s submarine force would send a far better message to the region than the constant hand-wringing by those who are all too eager to paint the U.S. Navy as a spent and broken force.

Certainly, Japan may need to tweak their operational procedures and maintenance strategies to keep submarines in service for 30 years and grow their sub fleet by almost 40 percent. But Japan should have few problems finding the extra six hundred or so sailors (plus some extra shore support personnel) needed to put eight more submarines into the field. Japan already maintains two training boats, and, as a maritime-minded country that meticulously tends to personnel training and vessel maintenance, finding the sailors to support this prestigious opportunity for Japan to demonstrate its commitment to a free and open Pacific is eminently possible. And a hard-pressed U.S. Navy should welcome any additional Japanese submarines, particularly if deeper U.S.-Japanese cooperation in the undersea domain leads to a greater Japanese appreciation for the joint mindset that will be required in coming years to effectively counter China’s improving naval capabilities.


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Craig Hooper


I offer blunt, uncompromising guidance on national security solutions, bringing complex security issues and oft-neglected defense topics to the attention of interested
…

 

[Housecarl]

Remember, the US isn't the only F-15 operator in the area, Japan also operates the F-15 and the US is working on India as well to buy the new model.....Also it appears that the Israelis are rolling their own (stand off air launched ballistic missiles) and is using them.....

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U.S. Air Force F-15EXs Flying From Okinawa Could Fire Hypersonic Missiles At Targets 2,000 Miles Away

We don’t know yet where the U. S. Air Force plans to base its new F-15EX fighters. But if it deploys them to Japan and arms them with the new AGM-183 missile, the F-15s could be the most powerful strike aircraft in the Asia-Pacific region—and a threat to any Chinese attempt to invade Taiwan.

www.forbes.com

Editors' Pick|44,149 views|Jul 19, 2020,08:00am EDT
U.S. Air Force F-15EXs Flying From Okinawa Could Fire Hypersonic Missiles At Targets 2,000 Miles Away

David AxeContributor

Aerospace & Defense

An F-15 Eagle takes off during an Aviation Training Relocation at Misawa Air Base in Japan on Dec. ... [+]
U.S. Air Force photo/Airman 1st Class Jordyn Fetter
We don’t know where the U.S. Air Force plans to base its new F-15EX Eagle fighters. But we know where the flying branch should put at least some of the upgraded F-15s.

Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa. Armed with the new AGM-183 hypersonic missile, the new F-15s could be the most powerful strike aircraft in the Asia-Pacific region—and a huge threat to any Chinese attempt to invade Taiwan.

The Air Force in 2019 surprised observers when it announced it would acquire F-15EXs from Boeing BA -0.7% in order to replace 1980s-vintage F-15C/Ds. The service last bought F-15s—E-models—back in 2001.

The U.S. government in July signed a $23 billion deal that could include as many as 200 F-15EXs. The first planes should enter service in mid-2021.

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The Air Force justified the F-15EX deal on the grounds that the nine existing F-15 squadrons—three in the active Air Force and six in the Air National Guard—could re-equip with the new planes in months. Transitioning to F-35 stealth fighters would take years, service officials said.

“The F-15EX is the most affordable and immediate way to refresh the capacity and update the capabilities provided by our aging F-15C/D fleets,” said Gen. Mike Holmes, commander of Air Combat Command. “The F-15EX is ready to fight as soon as it comes off the line.”

A B-52 captive-carrying an AGM-183.
U.S. Air Force
But there was another reason. The twin-engine F-15 is big, fast and far-flying. It can carry larger weapons greater distances than the smaller, less aerodynamic F-35 can. The Air Force and Boeing expect the F-15EX, with its new mission computer, will be compatible with the AGM-183—the first of an array of Mach-5-plus missiles the Pentagon is developing.

“The F-15EX carries more weapons than any other fighter in its class, and can launch hypersonic weapons up to 22 feet long and weighing up to 7,000 pounds,” Boeing stated. Not coincidentally, the Lockheed Martin LMT -0.8%-made AGM-183 appears to be around ... 22 feet long.

The new missile began captive-carry testing aboard a B-52 bomber back in the summer of 2019. It’s unclear how fast the AGM-183 is and how far it can travel, but Pres. Donald Trump in rambling comments at the U.S. Military Academy in June referred to a hypersonic missile that can strike targets a thousand miles away.

The refueled range of F-15s flying from Okinawa, along with the striking range of AGM-183s they ... [+]
David Axe
A flight of F-15s with heavy payloads and aerial-refueling support can range around a thousand miles. With AGM-183s, the flight could hit targets 2,000 miles from base.

The area AGM-183-armed F-15EXs could hold at risk from Kadena is startling huge. Kadena Eagles could strike bases deep inside China. In the event of war, perhaps beginning with a Chinese attack on Taiwan, F-15s could hit ports, airfields and command centers across China’s industrialized eastern region.

The Air Force hasn’t announced yet whether, or when, the two F-15C squadrons currently in Okinawa will get F-15EXs. There are around 240 F-15C/Ds in Air Force service. Buying 200 F-15EXs might not allow the service to convert all nine of its Eagle squadrons.

But it’s clear that the units at Kadena should be a priority.

 

[Housecarl]

Yeah I know a lot of stuff from Forbes today.....

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Will North Korea’s Nukes Spur Japan To Develop First-Strike Missiles?

Japan may develop missiles that can destroy North Korean nuclear-armed rockets in a first strike.

www.forbes.com

10,860 views|Jul 20, 2020,10:19am EDT
Will North Korea’s Nukes Spur Japan To Develop First-Strike Missiles?

Michael Peck Contributor

Aerospace & Defense
I cover defense strategy and military technology.

North Korean Ballistic Rocket Over The Clouds. 3D Illustration.
Getty
North Korea has developed nuclear warheads small enough to be launched atop ballistic missiles, according to a new Japanese government white paper.

But is this really a warning about North Korean weapons of mass destruction – or an excuse for Tokyo to develop new offensive weapons such as long-range missiles?

North Korea “is assessed to have already miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads,” stated the white paper, titled “Defense of Japan,” which was approved by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s cabinet on July 14. North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests since 2006, and has developed ballistic missiles that can easily reach Japan and potentially hit the U.S. West Coast.

That’s a change from previous white papers that offered more guarded assessments, such as North Korea “appears to have arrived” or “it may be seen as possible” that Pyongyang has developed missile-launchable nuclear warheads, noted South Korean’s Hankyoreh news site.

But hold on. The language in the latest white paper – in which North Korea “is assessed to have already miniaturized nuclear weapons” — is identical to that contained in Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines, or NDPG, which were released in December 2018.

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Japan-watchers point out that while the National Defense Program Guidelines tend to have real significance to Japanese defense policy, the defense white papers do not.

“Japan's Defense White Paper often gets a lot of attention, but it is not a place where the Japanese government publishes groundbreaking positions,” Michael Bosack, special advisor for government affairs at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies, told me. “Instead, the white paper explains policies and positions that are already well-established in the government. As such, it is a great repository for reviewing Japan's defense policy, but not for portending how that policy may change in the future.”

Yet the new white paper’s stronger language regarding North Korean nuclear weapons comes at a crucial time. Japan appears poised to throw off the post-World War II chains that have made the Japan Self-Defense Forces too defensive, in the eyes of some hardliners. Under Article 9 of Japan’s 1946 constitution, drafted under the American occupation government after Japan’s surrender in 1945, the “Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes....Land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.”

That hasn’t stopped Japan from amassing one of the most powerful militaries on Earth, but it has tended to restrict development of “offensive” weapons that could be used outside Japanese territory. But the rapid rise of Chinese military power, and Beijing’s claims on several Japanese-held islands, have fueled Japan’s acquisition of “helicopter-destroyers” that look suspiciously like aircraft carriers, as well as development of long-range cruise missiles with a thousand-kilometer (621 mile) range.

The most recent catalyst is the Japanese government’s decision not to deploy the American-made Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense system. This has spurred talk of Japan developing offensive missiles that could potentially destroy North Korean missiles in a first strike, before North Korean missiles could hit Japan. “I don’t think we are excluding any option before discussions,” Defense Minister Taro Kono told reporters last month.

Corey Wallace, a security policy expert at Kanagawa University in Japan, is skeptical that the new missiles will be fielded. “There's a reasonable amount of doubt about the utility of such a policy change in defense circles, and the coalition dynamics right now are such that the Komeito party [a coalition partner of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party] is less likely to submit to the Prime Minister if he does decide to go through with it,” he told me.

There are other questions, such as whether Japan has the surveillance capabilities to locate North Korean missiles absent U.S. support. Nonetheless, the history of arms races – and the Cold War U.S.-Soviet nuclear contest in particular – suggests that once a government becomes convinced that offensive weapons are its best defense, it’s very likely to build them.


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Michael Peck

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use....

Counterterrorism & counterinsurgency: US strategy in West Africa

This article was written by Ana Maria Baloi and originally published on Grey Dynamics. This report examines the strategic concepts of AFRICOM as applied

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Expert Analysis
Counterterrorism & counterinsurgency: US strategy in West Africa

by Grey Dynamics 14 hours ago
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This article was written by Ana Maria Baloi and originally published on Grey Dynamics.

This report examines the strategic concepts of AFRICOM as applied in West Africa, based on the U.S. interests in the region, military doctrine, and past experiences in other parts of the world. For collection and processing, the author used Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), therefore the report is safe to be further distributed.
Key Judgements
KJ-1. American military strategy in West Africa is to contain the terrorist threat by helping the local forces to develop their own capacities and tactics. AFRICOM is offering training, technical and logistical assistance as well as intelligence and surveillance.

​

KJ-2. U.S.’s involvement in the fight against the Islamist insurgency in the Sahel pushed the regional armies to step up their efforts by increasing military budgets and rethinking Counterinsurgency (COIN) and counter-terrorism strategies.

KJ-3. Despite major operational and tactical improvements, West Sahelian law enforcement agencies lack a coherent strategy capable of containing deeper social issues that contribute to the success of the Islamist insurgency expansion.

























Kanye West Reveals He's Against Abortion

KJ-4. U.S. is likely to minimize its COIN efforts in West Sahel, due to geopolitical shifts. As the regional and French forces rely heavily on U.S. logistical and surveillance support, the efficiency of their operations is expected to decrease.
What is the AFRICOM Strategic Concept in West Africa?

Violence by militant groups in West Africa has spiked 250 percent over the last two years. Constrained resources and manpower have pushed the U.S. forces to switch strategies from degrading terror groups to containment. Resources for the overstretched American troops across Africa may be further limited should the Pentagon decide to cut funds and personnel. The U.S. Secretary of Defense is yet to decide whether the U.S. withdrawal from West Africa will be complete or partial.


Three groups, the Macina Liberation Front, Ansaroul Islam, and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), are responsible for roughly two-thirds of the extremist violence in the central Sahel. Since 2017, the first two alongside other groups merged into the Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin’ (JNIM). Their attacks are largely concentrated in central Mali, northern and eastern Burkina Faso, and western Niger.

AFRICOM in the Sahel is conducting persistent counterterrorism operations that include special operations forces raids, technical assistance, and intelligence collection. The increasing number of jihadists groups in the region determined the U.S. military West Africa to rethink its strategy of degrading the strength and reach of terror groups to containment.

The focus of the U.S. military operations is “African solutions for African problems “, meaning that America’s role is to assist in the development of the indigenous capacity to respond to security threats. AFRICOM Commander Stephen Townsend declared that the U.S.’s strategy is to maintain a light and relatively low-cost footprint on the continent. This consists of a constellation of over two dozen outposts that stretch across Africa. The highest concentration of U.S. forces is in the Sahelian states. In their missions, the American forces are sent advise, assist and train African militaries — and not to take part in combat. However, when needed, U.S. forces have the permission to go into the field with their African partners, as was the case in Niger.

The U.S. military established its Africa Command in 2007, to work closely with African militaries often ill-equipped to deal with emerging extremist threats. While many African countries welcome the U.S. assistance, they usually do not support a high-profile U.S. presence. AFRICOM headquarters are located in Stuttgart, Germany, and not in Africa.

According to the U.S. Defense Secretary, the U.S. military has more than 1,000 personnel in Niger, Mali, and Nigeria. The mission is centered on supporting the French-led and the African troops in their campaign to counter the jihadist threat. The U.S. is providing intelligence and surveillance, as well as logistical assistance (mainly air fuelling). After Camp Lemmonier in Djibouti, the U.S. base in Agadez, Niger is the second largest one in terms of U.S. military personnel deployed there (around 800 according to AFRICOM).

What Positive Changes did the U.S. Involvement in the Sahel Cause?

According to AFRICOM, there are three goals the local forces aim to achieve through their partnership with the U.S.: reform, professionalism, and capacity-building. In the U.S.’s vision, military professionalism is to be developed through joint combined exercise training and capacity building through operational and peacekeeping training. At the same time, the capacity to train must be conferred upon African militaries themselves. Therefore, the U.S. pushes the Sahelian armies to increase their military budget to enhance preparedness and capacity.

The governments of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have mobilized their security structures to respond to the rise in militant Islamist group violence. The budgets dedicated to the armed forces in the three affected countries have doubled since 2013 (from 5.4 percent of government spending, on average, to 10.6 percent.

​

Through Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA), AFRICOM conducts special operations and works closely with component, interagency, and partner nations in West Africa. The command builds tactical and operational counter-VEO (Violent Extremist Organization) capability and assists in developing regional security structures to create stability and combat transregional threats. SOCAFRICA also organizes Flintlock, an exercise focused on improving military interoperability and capacity building of participating militaries from Northern and Western Africa, Europe, and the United States. This way, regional forces in West Africa can observe militaries from other countries throughout operations and develop new tactics and strategies.

The Sahel-Sahara region has seen a major increase in aerial surveillance in the last decade. While the deployment of U.S. and French unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones) since 2013 has garnered most headlines, these are fewer in number than the growing presence of manned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft crisscrossing the Sahara.

There are currently two known UAV bases for external operators in the Sahel and both are used jointly by France and the U.S. N’Djamena International Airport is the headquarters for French counter-terrorism operations in the Sahel-Sahara, as well as hosting French air and ground forces. U.S. liaison officers are posted to the base. Since May or June 2014, the base has also hosted at least one U.S. MQ-1 Predator UAV and possibly MC-12W Liberty (King Air) manned ISR aircraft for use over northern Nigeria, supported by about 80 U.S. personnel.

The U.S. has an official base in Burkina Faso but aircraft and special forces from both countries (and its contractors) have used Ouagadougou International Airport for counter-terrorism operations. France is formalizing this arrangement under Opération Barkhane. U.S. air operations from Ouagadougou appear to be via private contractors but include transport of regular forces. Since 2006 there has been a dedicated hangar for U.S. Joint Special Operations Air Detachment (JSOAD) use.

This has been coupled with bolstered troop levels. In 2019, Burkina Faso announced a 50-percent increase in the number of annual military recruits. Similar efforts have been made by the Malian forces recruiting up to 5,000. Nigerien troop levels have remained at around 10,000 soldiers in recent years but increases in military spending have augmented troop salaries and equipment procurements.

In 2017, the Malian armed forces launched Operation Dambé, deploying 4,000 soldiers to 8 zones in the northern and central regions to counter the jihadist groups. Mobile units are deployed to disrupt militant Islamist group activities through increased patrols. According to the U.S. Defense Department, while threats posed by JNIM in central Mali continue, the increased presence of security forces has curbed the extremist group’s influence in key population conglomerates in the region.

The Burkinabe armed forces launched Operation Otapuanu in March 2019 to counter the jihadist insurgency in the eastern part of the country and Operation Ndofou in May 2019 for the Nord, Centre-Nord, and Sahel regions. Operation Otapuanu managed to limit ISGS’s ability to traverse the territory easily. On the other hand, Operation Ndofou has struggled to reinstate security in the north where militants are familiar with the environment and easily cross the border into Mali taking advantage of the terrain.

In Niger, the military has led several joint special forces operations with the French-led Operation Barkhane, targeting the leaders of militant Islamist groups. In April 2019, Niger provided air support and increased the troops committed to active military operations in the western regions of the country.
Are There Any Negative Consequences of the AFRICOM Support in the Sahel?
The U.S. counter-terrorism strategy in the Sahel is highly focused on containing the threat through military means. However, the success the Islamist insurgency is enjoying is due to complex social problems usually ignored by local governments.

While these deployments have demonstrated noteworthy progress, the threat posed by militant Islamist groups remains a serious concern. Furthermore, the groups have adapted their operational tactics by laying improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as well as ambushing security forces after monitoring their patrol routes. This can be perceived as a response to the modernization of West African countries in the sense that IEDs attacks are time and cost-effective, they cause scores of casualties and do not presume direct engagement in combat.

One strategy used by terrorist groups in the Sahel, which has not been yet approached by the West African governments in partnership with AFRICOM, is the exploitation of grievances for radicalization. The Macina Liberation Front and Ansaroul Islam particularly have incorporated local grievances to create recruitment narratives centered on marginalization. Frequently, these efforts have targeted young Fulani herders by stoking their feelings of injustice and resentment toward the government. While lacking deep local support, the militant groups have used this grievance narrative to radicalize individuals.

This weakness is further exploited by the jihadists using the colonialist rhetoric. Both the American and French presences are boycotted in communities across the Sahel exposed to radicalism. Foreign military presence in general is described by radical groups as threatening to the interests of people. Propaganda stories depict the American forces as natural resources chasers. This aspect could be ameliorated through a better co-operation between armed forces and local humanitarian organizations so that the populations can observe and interact with the AFRICOM forces. Building trust and showing support is crucial in highly destabilized areas where the extremist rhetoric turn communities against each other.

Despite advancements made in terms of military strategy and tactics as well as equipment, the West Sahelian governments do not dispose of a clear approach aimed at containing social rifts. This is particularly relevant as the success of a military operation can bring temporary stability but will not achieve long-term peace. As long as social grievances persist, they will always represent a weakness of the West African security, and the terrorists’ radicalization efforts will continue.

ISGS has exploited anger over cattle theft to exacerbate tensions between Tuareg nomads, seen as cattle rustlers, and the Fulani herders along the Niger-Mali border. Growing animosity between the two groups has increased insecurity in these areas. This type of accusation leads to ethnic clashes in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.

Overall, AFRICOM encourages local governments to upgrade their military capabilities and to improve their tactics. However, conventional measures are not sufficient in the fight against extremism. In this light, a greater emphasis has to be put on social countermeasures, such as enhancing the dialogue between the government and local leaders in areas with greater autonomy. Given the U.S.’s military involvement in the Middle East in areas where jihadists are also exploiting local grievances, AFRICOM could also offer assistance to West African states in economic and social reforms.

Apart from being accused of failing to protect the civilians, the Malian, Burkinabe, and Nigerien governments have also dissented for mass violations of human rights while conducting raids on villages. Intimidated communities have thus grown hesitant to collaborate with security forces. At times, this has fostered suspicion by security forces, particularly in Mali and Burkina Faso, leading to collective reprisals and human rights abuses. This has further deteriorated levels of trust between communities and security forces. Intelligence collection becomes challenging for the national forces as locals refuse to cooperate and their dissent pushes them to support or at least remain tacit about the jihadists’ activities in their area. In this regard, AFRICOM forces could offer assistance and training in good conduct during operations as well as in fostering peaceful relations between the civilians and the military.
What Future Developments are Likely to Emerge in West Africa’s Military Approach?
The U.S. seeks to reorganize its troops across the globe. Its foreign policy focus will shift from violent non-state actors active in the Middle East and the Sahel to state actors – primarily China and Russia.

French troops rely on American-provided intelligence, as well as logistical support and aerial refueling. For France to stay capable of countering the West African jihadists, the country will have to push for a more aggressive European strategy against terrorism. Tensions are expected to rise due to the European Union’s reluctance to deploy troops. The block is already struggling in spending the U.S. requested 2% of the national GDP for defense inside NATO. The costs for the U.S. support are estimated $45 million a year, money the U.S. Defense Department is no longer interested in spending for missions considered to be out of the U.S.’s strategic focus.

AFRICOM troops stationed in the Sahel are expected to face a decreased budget and personnel cuts, meaning that the U.S.-West Africa partnership will have to adjust its military approach in the region. This could lead to revised strategies and tactics, in order to make operations more cost-effective and to avoid a surge in jihadist activity. For now, AFRICOM relies heavily on private contractors to undertake ISR and infiltration/exfiltration activities. In case of budget cuts, it is likely that the U.S. will pressure even more the West African countries to improve their counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism capabilities so that they can take over more tasks fulfilled now by AFRICOM and its private partners.

 

[Housecarl]

This is not going to end well......

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“For Our Enemies, We Have Shotguns”: Explaining China’s New Assertiveness - War on the Rocks

China’s ambassador to Sweden, Gui Congyou, has a colorful turn of phrase to describe his country’s approach to foreign policy: “We treat our friends with

warontherocks.com

“For Our Enemies, We Have Shotguns”: Explaining China’s New Assertiveness

Andrew Small and Dhruva Jaishankar

July 20, 2020

Commentary

China’s ambassador to Sweden, Gui Congyou, has a colorful turn of phrase to describe his country’s approach to foreign policy: “We treat our friends with fine wine, but for our enemies we have shotguns.” The “enemies” he has attacked in the last two years encompass a bewilderingly expansive range of media and political targets, one of the contributory factors behind China’s rapidly deteriorating reputation in Sweden, alongside the Chinese government’s unwillingness to release a Swedish bookseller that it kidnapped. His belligerent behavior has been the subject of some bemusement in Stockholm: Why would Beijing choose so comprehensively to alienate a country that should, given its free-trading tradition, leading technology sector, and unusually successful investment ties with China, be one of its closest European partners?

In recent months, it has seemed like much of the world has been subjected to the same treatment, eliciting similar questions about why Beijing should engage in such self-defeating behavior. By any measure, China’s recent foreign policy has displayed an astonishing level of assertiveness. That Beijing has shed its prior inhibitions in the midst of a devastating global health and economic crisis for which the Chinese leadership itself bears culpability, and a still-fragile economic situation in China itself makes it all the more remarkable.

For those who have observed this pattern of behavior, the reasons remain confounding. Four possible explanations suggest themselves, based on whether Beijing perceives this as a new era in its foreign policy or a temporary phase, and whether its actions are motivated by a sense of strength or vulnerability. Analyzing whether its new foreign policy reflects temporary opportunism, hubris, crisis management, or deeper insecurity is helpful in discerning whether Beijing will ultimately look to wind back its aggressive posture or if there is greater escalation to come. Yet in practice, the most effective policy responses will look very similar, regardless of China’s intentions.

Intensifying Assertiveness on a Global Scale
The most dramatic developments in China’s hardening attitude have been closest to home. On May 22, the National People’s Congress approved a national security law for Hong Kong, which came into force on July 1, undermining Beijing’s treaty commitment to “one country, two systems.” Its breadth and extra-territorial scope surprised even the most pessimistic experts. A major mobilization by the People’s Liberation Army along the disputed border with India in April and May led to clashes and a prolonged military stand-off. Further violence during a de-escalation process on June 15 resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese troops. One month later, Chinese officials and media also made claims to a sizeable tract of territory in Bhutan, an area that had not featured in previous border negotiations.

Treaty allies of the United States have not been spared. In June, the Australian government revealed a sustained cyber attack by China against government agencies, infrastructure, and businesses. This came after Canberra passed laws to increase oversight on foreign lobbying and protect its political system from external interference (moves driven by specific Chinese activity), and disqualified Chinese telecom companies from acting as suppliers for 5G contracts. Beijing also imposed trade curbs on Australia as explicit retaliation for its calls for an independent inquiry into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Other fronts — including the South and East China Seas, and relations with Taiwan — have witnessed continued or worsening frictions, with the pandemic inducing not even a short period of restraint on China’s part. In mid-April, a Chinese vessel tagged a Malaysian drill ship in disputed waters off of Borneo, resulting in a standoff that eventually involved five countries. One month later, another Chinese vessel sank a Vietnamese fishing boat off the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. Military activity around islands disputed with Japan has picked up, despite the prior thaw in relations between Asia’s two largest economies. Several airspace violations by Chinese aircraft were also reported over Taiwan, and the island experienced sustained Chinese disinformation campaigns throughout its recent elections. China also named a number of geographic features in the South China Sea in April and the East China Sea in June, as part of its expansive territorial claims.

Yet the sheer global sweep of China’s diplomatic assertiveness and belligerent economic threats in the midst of a continuing pandemic has also been striking. The unprecedented scale of China’s open criticism of American domestic affairs and conspiracy-theorizing about U.S. origins for the virus could be explained away in the context of worsening bilateral tensions. But virtually every other major power has been caught up in the attacks, too. In Brazil, Chinese diplomats have launched broadsides against elected officials, including the son of President Jair Bolsonaro. The propaganda, disinformation, and written and verbal attacks from Chinese officials in Europe have led to the summoning of the Chinese ambassador in France, pushback against China’s “aggressive” diplomacy from the E.U.’s top foreign policy official, and plummeting views of China among European publics. The United Kingdom has been warned that it will “bear the consequences” over its plans to curtail Huawei’s role in its 5G networks, with barely veiled suggestions that this will involve economic repercussions for U.K. companies. China’s relations with Canada were already strained following its arrest of prominent Chinese businesswoman Meng Wanzhou and Beijing’s retaliatory detention of two Canadians, Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor. In June, they were formally charged with espionage, as Chinese officials openly tied the case to demands for Meng’s release.

These developments occurred even as China began to face pushback for its actions. Recent moves on the part of the United States, such as its revocation of Hong Kong’s special status, sanctions against Chinese officials responsible for human rights abuses in Xinjiang, and hardened South China Sea policy have been partly conditioned by Chinese actions and Sino-American dynamics during the pandemic. Yet it is the long list of China’s deteriorating relationships elsewhere that arguably represents the greater setback. Six months ago, for example, China still had a chance to establish itself in pole position on its emerging technology ties with the United Kingdom and India. But subsequent measures concerning 5G telecommunications and China-based apps by London and New Delhi respectively make that far less likely today, reflecting a sea-change in the debates about China in both countries.

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[Housecarl]

Continued.....

Scrutiny concerning China’s growing leadership role in multilateral organizations has intensified, as have countervailing coalitions in these bodies. Plans for closer cooperation among democracies on issues ranging from supply chains to advanced technologies have been given considerable new momentum. So have plans for formats ranging from the D-10 (a proposed group of ten democracies to cooperate on 5G technologies and other economic security issues) to the new E.U.-U.S. dialogue on dealing with the China challenge. While some of these dynamics were already underway even before the pandemic, China’s recent behavior has accelerated them considerably.

Four Possible Explanations
Although there are proximate causes behind each of the cases, and Chinese foreign policy was already moving in a more adversarial direction, the speed and breadth of the shifts in recent months has gone beyond what even the wariest analysts had predicted. It represents a qualitative shift not just from the phase of Chinese assertiveness that we can date to the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, but the recent phase that we have seen under Xi Jinping’s leadership.

There are a few potential theories as to what exactly has changed in China’s foreign policy — they could be considered opportunistic assertiveness, imperious assertiveness, reactive assertiveness, and insecure assertiveness. The two principal questions are whether China’s leadership perceives this to be a period of vulnerability or an opportunity to expand its power, and whether it is seen as temporary or a lasting strategic reality. For the rest of the world, all of the potential answers are concerning. If Beijing is now prone to lashing out in all directions as the result of political insecurity, this does not necessarily make China any easier to deal with than if it results from a hubristic view of its power position. But it will have ramifications for whether Beijing subsequently seeks to stabilize its relations with other powers again, and how it is likely to respond to concerted collective attempts at pushback.

A first explanation could be considered “opportunistic assertiveness.” Simply put, Beijing is taking advantage of political and economic weaknesses and distractions in the rest of the world, and believes that the U.S.-Chinese relationship under the Trump administration cannot get much worse anyway. It sees the phase following China’s recovery from the pandemic, the struggles elsewhere, and the potential for a partial improvement of relations with the United States after the elections in November as representing a short window of opportunity. This period — when the world is reeling from the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic consequences — offers a moment to make as many gains as possible and get any contentious moves (such as the National Security Law) out of the way before the U.S. presidential election in November. If Chinese policymakers are making such a calculation, they appear willing to risk that the reputational damage that China suffers is not so deep or long-lasting that it cannot be reversed. The growing bipartisan consensus around China in the United States counts against this theory, and it does a weaker job of explaining cases of Chinese assertiveness where the United States does not have alliance commitments (such as with Brazil or India). But it could still reflect the U.S.-centric prism through which Beijing often sees its global position and the attribution of current tension levels to unique features of the Trump presidency.

A second possibility, implying a lasting change rather than a temporary burst of opportunism, might be considered “imperious assertiveness.” China’s leaders have internalized their own success to an inordinate degree. They genuinely believe that China now offers a viable alternative to the United States as a global power and that any criticism is unjustified or hypocritical. The lackluster response by the Western world — specifically the United States and parts of Europe — to COVID-19 stands in contrast to Asian technocratic superiority and the Chinese Communist Party’s capacity to lead the country’s bounce-back from the crisis, further reinforcing this belief. As much as hubris, this could be driven by a changed assessment of the new geopolitical context: There is a “new Cold War” with the United States and its allies, and Chinese officials believe it is not just prepared, but well-positioned to prevail, especially given current U.S. struggles with polarized politics, weakened economic growth, and continued failure to get the pandemic under control. Some critics in China have gently warned against the adverse consequences of this approach (“destroying yourself through excessive praise”), particularly when China’s own challenges — from demographics to debt — remain considerable. Additionally, if the United States and the West are China’s major strategic and ideological competitors, it would still make sense to undercut any moves towards counterbalancing rather than alienating so many U.S. partners and allies simultaneously. In contrast to prior years, there is scant evidence of this. But it may reflect both overconfidence and a belief that the inducements of China’s economic power and its heightened capacity for coercion are sufficient to prevent coalitions from forming.

A third theory implies “reactive assertiveness,” a term first coined by the International Crisis Group to describe China’s behavior in the South China Sea. In the present context, it suggests an escalatory response to the immediate economic, reputational, security, and political challenges China faces through the pandemic and its aftermath. Beijing hopes it can push back against criticism, deter others, achieve whatever advances are possible under the circumstances, and ease up again when the global health and economic situation has somewhat normalized. As went the South China Sea, where China has sought to “use perceived provocations as a chance to change the status quo in its favor — all the while insisting the other party started the trouble” — so now goes almost every other issue. This is in part opportunistic. But the application of the same playbook across multiple policy areas and geographies during this phase reflects the sheer range of fronts that China sees opening up during this period.

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[Housecarl]

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A final possibility — implying concern that China and the Chinese Communist Party are entering an extended period of vulnerability — is “insecure assertiveness.” China’s actions arise not out of a sense of strength, but of weakness, and a belief that its threat environment has changed in a more fundamentally dangerous way. In this account, the internal and external pressures facing the Chinese Communist Party over its handling of the pandemic, and the worsening U.S.-Chinese relationship, have led it to lash out in multiple directions against what it perceives as attacks from all sides. Beijing is steeling itself for a long battle. It sees the pandemic as accelerating the competitive and confrontational dynamics that were already underway and has pessimistically decided to treat not just U.S. allies but partners such as India as being in the same camp. It may believe that coercive means are now the only way to deter new countervailing coalitions from forming. Given that views of China among international publics have become so critical, and Beijing’s unwillingness to make economic reforms means that it can no longer count on its traditional political support in the international business community, China may now just be resigned to dealing with a more hostile context. Beijing’s approach is also more openly ideological, seeing the need not just to defend its own system publicly but to unleash open criticism of “western democracy” through its officials and propaganda machinery rather than confining this language to internal Party documents and speeches.

In both latter theories — reactive and insecure assertiveness — Beijing believes it is responding to moves by others, such as: U.S. trade and technological restrictions, Australia’s criticism of political interference, the United Kingdom’s involvement in Hong Kong, Japan’s “remilitarization,” India’s border infrastructure development, Southeast Asia’s resource extraction in the South China Sea, Taiwan’s pro-independence tilt, or Canada’s detention of a Chinese citizen. Never mind that all of these countries see their own actions as legitimate responses to China’s authoritarian turn, unfair economic practices, or territorial revisionism. In some sense, this would be even more worrisome than hubris or a short-term push for advantage. If Beijing perceives itself as the aggrieved actor, it is even less likely to change course.

“No One Likes Us, We Don’t Care”
It is possible that some combination of the above is at play: China is displaying imperiousness, opportunism, reactiveness, and insecurity all at once. Xi Jinping himself has certainly exhibited all of these traits. The declining quality of leadership under a system that has become ever-more centered around him may be partly responsible for the series of continuing missteps, a product of less deliberation, alternative viewpoints being shut down, and anticipation of leadership preferences by lower-level officials. When confronting resistance abroad, a rigid Chinese foreign policy hierarchy is no longer nimble enough to change tack, and has opted instead to double down on its aggressive approach, notwithstanding limited efforts by Chinese diplomats to place a floor under the rapidly deteriorating U.S.-Chinese relationship. None of these explanations are particularly reassuring: Whatever the balance of factors, Beijing risks some combination of severe reputational damage, premature overreach, systematic overreaction, or self-fulfilling prophecy.

The ramifications for Beijing go well beyond any individual relationship. The collective economic, financial, military, diplomatic and technological resources that can be marshaled by the countries that China has decided to confront continue to dwarf those that Beijing can muster. While the informal process of coalition-building on China remains challenging, it has been made a great deal more straightforward by recent Chinese actions.

Many of the long-term measures that the like-minded democracies — the United States, Europe, Japan, India, Australia, and parts of Southeast Asia among many others — are considering or already pursuing are not contingent on which considerations are driving China’s assertiveness. Putting in place the means to compete more effectively, ensure the resilience of their economies and democracies, reduce China’s capacity for coercion, and establish new structures of mutual cooperation will make sense regardless of the deliberations in Zhongnanhai. These include new defensive economic instruments, measures to reduce excessive dependency on China, rebalancing the level of openness of their economies and societies to Chinese investments and influence activities, strengthening support to third countries in areas such as infrastructure finance, closer coordination in multilateral bodies, intensified security cooperation across multiple domains, and various ambitious plans for new trade, technology, data, standards, and industrial policy partnerships. In their most expansive forms, these would amount to a major reshaping of the strategic landscape in which China operates. In their more limited forms, they are already resulting in a less permissive environment for Beijing to pursue its economic, security, and political goals.

Yet many of the decisions facing these countries also involve calculations about immediate issues with China — border incursions, threats of economic punishment, Hong Kong’s status — that hinge more directly on the nature of the Chinese leadership’s current outlook. If Beijing is in an insecure, defensive mode, one argument would be that the best course of action is to find ways to ease tensions. But this would evidently be the worst path to pursue if other explanations of its behavior hold true, either confirming for China the most hubristic assessment of its own position or encouraging even bolder acts of adventurism. It would also do little good if Beijing’s insecurity has already led it to conclude that it is now in an all-out struggle.

The alternative hypothesis — that carefully treading around the Chinese government’s sensitivities during a period in which it faces intense pressure will elicit a cooler-headed approach — has also been tested out to bruising effect. Indeed, previous governments in the United States, India, and Japan attempted to play down differences to no avail. More recently, the shock in Europe over China’s behavior resulted not just from Beijing’s actions, but from the fact that they followed precisely such an effort on the part of European leaders to provide discreet support to China at the peak of its internal crisis. This was met, in Gui’s words, with shotguns.

Demonstrating to China’s leadership that a wider de-escalation is preferable will instead require others to raise the costs of adverse Chinese behavior and signal further repercussions if Beijing continues down its current path. Initially this could range from symbolic moves, such as suspensions of high-level meetings with China and the launch of new processes among democracies openly focused on China policy coordination, to targeted measures against Chinese Communist Party officials, and a significant tightening of dual-use equipment sales. There is no guarantee that tougher measures will moderate Beijing’s approach — it is entirely possible that China is simply set on its new trajectory, thinking either that it will pay off in the end or that there is no alternative option. But the Chinese Communist Party has repeatedly shown the pragmatic capacity to correct course when absolutely necessary. This is the moment for collective efforts to sharpen that choice.

Andrew Small is a senior transatlantic fellow with the Asia program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States and an associate senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He previously worked as the director of the Foreign Policy Centre’s Beijing office and was a visiting fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
Dhruva Jaishankar is director of the U.S. Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) and a non-resident fellow at the Lowy Institute in Australia. He previously worked at Brookings India, the German Marshall Fund, and the Brookings Institution.
Image: Chinese Ministry of National Defense (Photo by Guo Peng)


Commentary

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• Horns of a Dilemma
  Distortions in the Fabric of Deterrence
  
• Commentary
  Setting the Records Straight in Iraq
  

 

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[danielboon]

HMMMMM

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[jward]

HMMMMM

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POL - Houston fire and police responding to reports of documents being burned at Consulate General of China

Houston fire and police responding to reports of documents being burned at Consulate General of China Houston police and fire officials are responding to reports that documents are being burned at the Consulate General of China in Houston. (KPRC) HOUSTON – Houston police and fire officials are...

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South China Sea: Chinese air force ‘sends warning’ to US Navy with live-fire drills

• Military expert says China was sending a message to the US over its recent activities in the area
• The PLA has also sent more fighter jets to its base on disputed Woody Island in the Paracels, according to satellite images

Minnie Chan
Published: 9:02pm, 21 Jul, 2020
Updated: 11:58pm, 21 Jul, 2020

Why you can trust SCMP

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The PLA’s live-fire drills in the South China Sea on Wednesday and Thursday last week involved JH-7 bombers. Photo: Weibo
China’s air force held live-fire drills and sent more fighter jets to its base on disputed Woody Island in
the South China Sea
last week, as the US Navy steps up drills and freedom of navigation operations in the region.
The People’s Liberation Army Southern Theatre Command conducted the drills on Wednesday and Thursday last week, with more than 3,000 missiles fired at moving targets at sea, state-run China National Radio reported on Sunday. It did not say where in the South China Sea the exercises were held.
Photos from the drills posted on state broadcaster CCTV’s website showed they involved JH-7 bombers and J-11B fighter jets.
It came after Washington last week
formally rejected most of Beijing’s expansive maritime claims
in the strategic, resource-rich South China Sea, through which one-third of global shipping passes, and parts of which are also claimed by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. The tougher US line has worsened tensions between the two superpowers and Chinese military experts say it could push the PLA to conduct more frequent drills in the region.

02:32
Washington’s hardened position on Beijing’s claims in South China Sea heightens US-China tensions

Washington’s hardened position on Beijing’s claims in South China Sea heightens US-China tensions
Hong Kong-based military commentator Song Zhongping said the exercises were aimed at sending a warning to the US Navy over its recent patrols in the area, as the bombers were designed to attack warships at sea.


“China has also developed another bomber, the J-16, which is more powerful than the JH-7,” Song said, adding that he expected the PLA to send more advanced fighter jets to the region for drills.

“Large-scale naval drills in the South China Sea … will become a regular activity as tensions escalate between China and the US.”
South China Sea: beware of US ‘sabotage’, Beijing warns Southeast Asia
21 Jul 2020

Zhou Chenming, a researcher with the Yuan Wang military science and technology institute in Beijing, noted that naval drills in the South China Sea and high-altitude operations were a key part of the PLA’s combat-readiness training.

The USS Ronald Reagan (front) and USS Nimitz (rear) sail in the South China Sea on July 6. Photo: US Navy via AP
State media reports on the Chinese drills followed the US Navy on Friday saying that two of its aircraft carrier strike groups, led by the
USS Nimitz and the USS Ronald Reagan
, had conducted dual exercises in the South China Sea to boost their combat readiness – for the second time in two weeks.
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The last time the US Navy had two aircraft carriers operating together in the region was nearly six years ago.

Satellite images reportedly show the PLA has deployed at least four J-11Bs to Woody Island. Photo: Handout
Meanwhile, recent satellite images show that the PLA has deployed at least four J-11Bs to Woody Island, in the Paracels chain, Forbes reported on Friday.

The fighter jets can be seen on an airstrip on the island, which China calls Yongxing. The J-11B is broadly equivalent to the F-15 Eagle used by the US Air Force.

China’s air force conducted a similar live-fire drill involving its JH-7 bombers in the South China Sea in 2016, after the US supported a ruling in favour of the Philippines by an international tribunal at The Hague. The ruling, which Beijing has refused to recognise, invalidated China’s claims to the waters based on the so-called nine-dash-line that appears on official Chinese maps and encircles much of the South China Sea.

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PLA ‘sends warning’ to US Navy with live-fire drills in South China Sea

Military expert says China was sending a message to US over its recent activities in the area.

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[Housecarl]

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Tehran Continues Its Terror Campaign In Europe - Will Europeans Respond?

Iran is known to be sponsoring assassination attempts against opponents in Europe and other plots without facing any tough reaction by the EU.

en.radiofarda.com

Op-Ed
Tehran Continues Its Terror Campaign In Europe - Will Europeans Respond?
July 22, 2020

• Alireza Nader
• Benjamin Weinthal

The Islamic Republic of Iran is waging an assassination campaign in Europe to silence its critics and pressure European governments to adopt conciliatory measures. The uptick should serve as a wakeup call. Amid popular unrest in Iran and the possibility of a “snapback” of UN sanctions, violence has become an even more attractive tool for a desperate regime. European governments are afraid to get tough on the Islamic Republic, lest they jeopardize the 2015 nuclear deal, yet passivity only encourages more violence.
Europe has long been an unsafe place for Iranian dissidents and opposition figures. The clerical regime has executed more than 60 assassination operations since the founding of the Islamic Republic in 1979.

Former Iranian Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar was murdered in Paris in 1991. Last year, opposition journalist Ruhollah Zam was lured from his hideaway in Paris to Iraq and arrested by regime intelligence agents. Zam currently faces execution in Iran. And just last month, Sadegh Zarza, a 64-year-old former member of the leadership of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, barely survived an assassination attempt in the Netherlands. Zarza’s brother Taher told the Dutch paper Leeuwarden Courant that Sadegh suffered numerous stab wounds to his chest, stomach, neck, and head.

Also in June, Mohammad Davoudzadeh Loloei, a 40-year-old Norwegian Iranian who chaired the Norwegian-Iranian Friendship Association, received a seven-year prison sentence in Denmark for his involvement in a plot to murder an Iranian-Arab dissident in that country. Likewise, the Dutch government last year accused Iran’s regime of assassinating two Iranian dissidents in the Netherlands.

SEE ALSO: Dutch Court Hands Out Life Sentence In Killing Of An Exiled Iranian
The Dutch murders, coupled with Tehran’s plot to bomb a 2018 Iranian exile conference in Paris, did rouse a European response, but it consisted of no more than tame penalties on Khamenei’s regime: Brussels froze the assets of an Iranian intelligence unit and two of its employees.

This timidity is a longstanding European habit. Its leaders are more concerned about protecting the nearly dead 2015 nuclear agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, than punishing the regime for terror attacks on European soil. German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government even failed to punish the regime for its recruitment of a Pakistani man for espionage and possible assassination attempts on behalf of Iran’s Qods Force − a U.S.-designated terrorist organization. The Qods Force agent was reportedly scouting Jewish targets in Germany and France for future attacks.
Making matters worse, Merkel’s government has provided refuge to some of the Islamic Republic’s most violent human rights abusers. Iranian cleric and former judge Gholamreza Mansouri, fearing arrest after being charged with corruption in Tehran, reportedly sought shelter in an infamous Hanover clinic, which at one time hosted another top human rights abuser, the now deceased former judiciary chief Ayatollah Mahmoud Shahroudi. Mansouri, known for imprisoning and torturing journalists, later surfaced in Bucharest, Romania, where he was found dead, most likely pushed out of his hotel window by regime agents.

Former Iranien Prime minister Shapur Bakhtiar answers newsmen in a radio broadcast in Paris, 12Feb1979

Other current and former regime officials roam Europe freely, often maintaining homes in major cities. Ata’ollah Mohajerani, a former minister of culture and Islamic guidance who once defended the religious death sentence on Salman Rushdie, resides in London and is a frequent commentator for BBC Persian. Italy is reported to be a major source of multi-entry visas for regime officials.

How can Europe force the Islamic Republic to rethink its tactics? First, in response to regime assassinations and terrorism, the European Union (EU) and individual member states should suspend diplomatic relations with the regime and withdraw their ambassadors from Tehran. Furthermore, Iranian ambassadors should be expelled from European capitals. In addition, the EU and its member states should impose sanctions against the regime for its assassination campaign and gross human rights abuses. Lebanese Hezbollah, the regime’s terror proxy, should also be banned by all European countries.

One might object that cutting lines of communication to Tehran will only make it harder to resolve tensions. Yet nearly forty years of European diplomacy with various regime presidents has not curtailed Iranian state-sponsored terrorism. After all, Berlin prosecutors accused the late Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani and Khamenei of ordering the murders of Iranian Kurdish dissidents in the West Berlin restaurant Mykonos in 1992. After Mykonos many European countries broke off relations with Tehran. The ultimate perpetrators of the assassination, including former intelligence minister Ali Fallahian, remain at large. If the regime cannot respect the most basic norms of international politics, such as refraining from violence against civilians on foreign soil, then diplomacy serves little purpose but to make additional concessions.

Without European pressure, the Islamic Republic will continue its terror and assassination campaign. A lack of European punishment may even induce the regime to conduct mass casualty attacks on European soil; Hezbollah has a history of terrorist bombings in several European countries, including France and most recently Bulgaria. Ignoring the Islamic Republic’s terrorism is likely to make the problem worse than ever before.

The opinions expressed by the authors are not necessarily the views of Radio Farda

 

[Housecarl]

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Missile Defense Deserves Top Priority

Congress agrees on very little these days. However, one of its time-honored bipartisan efforts has been funding America’s national defense – a strategic and constitutional priority. As the

www.realcleardefense.com

Missile Defense Deserves Top Priority
By John Rossomando
July 21, 2020

Congress agrees on very little these days. However, one of its time-honored bipartisan efforts has been funding America’s national defense – a strategic and constitutional priority. As the full House and full Senate prepare to pass their versions of the National Defense Authorization Act, they should make missile defense a top priority against increasing worldwide threats.

North Korea and Iran threaten America and its allies with missiles, and the looming ability to place nuclear warheads atop them remains a growing threat. However, China and Russia are growing belligerent and are militarizing space with energy and anti-satellite weapons. Meanwhile, America is defenseless against these new-age threats due to congressional inaction and bureaucratic wrangling.


Our current system of ground-based interceptors is aging and fast becoming incapable of countering the threat posed by North Korea’s limited arsenal. It is up to Congress to step in to prolong the life of our current anti-ballistic missile interceptors. Currently, the U.S has 44 silo-based interceptors in Alaska and California aimed at countering the North Korean threat.

Funding in the 2015 NDAA opened the door for environmental studies to base the interceptors on the East Coast, but as of this writing, only the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system offers protection to the U.S. homeland from such North Korea. It also offers the greatest domestic geographic coverage against missile attacks, which is why GMD is a key component of the Trump administration’s $2.2 trillion plan to keep America safe from foreign aggression. It’s an important “America First” defensive technology that has been around since the George W. Bush administration withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001.

Patty-Jane Geller, a policy analyst on Nuclear Deterrence and Missile Defense at the Heritage Foundation, says that funding GMD offers a short-term solution until our Next Generation Interceptor comes online in the late 2020s and early 2030s. The Pentagon and Congress clearly agree; the House version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) would appropriate approximately $1 billion for the 2021 fiscal year to the GMD program and $67 million for testing. The Senate version includes language to preserve GMD until a replacement can come online and likewise would give $1 billion to the program. Meanwhile, Boeing just received a $150 million contract to maintain and upgrade GMD until the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) system comes online around 2028.

But GMD can’t do it all. As Ian Williams, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), wrote in a Defense News column last month, threats against America continue “at an alarming pace.” This requires Congress to step up even more for both GMD and the NGI program, said Williams.

The solution lies in a multi-prong approach to national defense strategy. Ambassador Henry F. Cooper, former director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization under President George H.W. Bush and a leading voice on missile defense and arms control under President Ronald Reagan, told me the Pentagon should look at a reappraisal of the “Brilliant Pebbles” satellite-based interceptors that were technically feasible 30 years ago and could be even more so due to technological improvements since then.

While the cost of these systems are high – a new space-based component could be as much as $20 billion – they are merely an investment in saving thousands or millions of lives and trillions of dollars. The 9/11 attacks cost the U.S. economy $3 trillion; the coronavirus pandemic may cost us $8 trillion. Imagine how much greater the cost of a nuclear weapon wiping out New York, Washington, or Los Angeles would be.

And we are not far from such a possibility. China already threatens U.S. satellites that could be used to monitor nuclear launches with ground-based anti-satellite weapons.

It also is making strides with hypersonic missiles that can sharply maneuver and travel five times the speed of sound. They can be launched from the upper stage of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) then skip along the top of the upper atmosphere at hypersonic speeds. China is actively pursuing ballistic-missile delivered hypersonic weapons and has achieved the most success in testing such devices. The dangerous part about them is these hypersonic weapons are highly maneuverable and can defeat existing defenses.

Russia also has reached milestones in its program.

Reviving the Reagan and Bush administrations’ “Brilliant Pebbles” program in conjunction with GMD and the NGI systems in the coming decades, especially in the face of an increasingly aggressive China, is important – especially since Cooper says China is far more technically capable than the Soviet Union ever was.

It, therefore, makes sense to maintain a ground-based defense against threats from North Korea and Iran and to be able to defend against hypersonic attack from China or Russia.

As the old saying goes, “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” Congress should fund and guide the Pentagon to make this official U.S. missile policy by funding today’s missile defense and tomorrow’s space defense.


John Rossomando was a Senior Analyst at The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT) for eight years. He also served as senior managing editor of The Bulletin, a 100,000-circulation daily newspaper in Philadelphia and received the Pennsylvania Associated Press Managing Editors first-place award in 2008 for his reporting.

 

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Taliban attempts to cover up images posted by an Uzbek jihadist group in Afghanistan | FDD's Long War Journal

The Taliban denies that an Uzbek jihadist group, Katibat Imam al-Bukhari (KIB), operates in Afghanistan. The Taliban falsely asserts that photos recently posted by the KIB were "falsified by anti-peace circles."

www.longwarjournal.org

Taliban attempts to cover up images posted by an Uzbek jihadist group in Afghanistan
By Caleb Weiss | July 8, 2020 | weiss.caleb2@gmail.com | @Weissenberg7

Photo released by Katibat Imam al-Bukhari yesterday, claiming a joint raid with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Yesterday, FDD’s Long War Journal reported on new images released by the Afghanistan branch of Katibat Imam al-Bukhari (KIB), an Uzbek jihadist group loyal to the Taliban that fights under its banner.

The Taliban, which has consistently lied about the presence of foreign fighters in Afghanistan, was not happy with our coverage.

In a tweet released earlier today by its spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid, the Taliban claimed that “these images have been stolen from our archive.”

Mujahid tweets that the images were “falsified by anti-peace circles for propaganda.” The same photo produced by KIB, but without the group’s watermarks, was also tweeted out by Mujahid.

Taliban’s spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid’s tweet regarding FDD’s Long War Journal’s reporting of KIB’s claims.

Zabihullah’s assertions are noteworthy for several reasons.

First, the Taliban is, in effect, accusing KIB of “falsifying” the images, because KIB’s media team produced the photos with its watermarks.

The photos in question were originally posted on Telegram by the overall emir of KIB’s Syrian wing, Abu Yusuf al-Muhajir. KIB’s channels are routinely banned on the platform. But Muhajir’s channel is relatively stable and he has taken on the task of publishing the group’s media from both Syria and Afghanistan.

The original Telegram post by Abu Yusuf al-Muhajir, the emir of KIB’s Syrian wing, as republished by another KIB-linked account.

Abu Yusuf’s post yesterday clearly indicated the photos are from the KIB’s Afghanistan wing, while also mentioning that the photos were from a joint raid with the “Ansar Mujahideen,” a term for local Taliban fighters.

The images were then circulated by KIB’s media network and other Uzbek jihadist channels and even by al Qaeda’s Thabat News Agency.

As of earlier today, after FDD’s Long War Journal reported on the photos, Abu Yusuf deleted the post from his Telegram channel. When trying to access the specific post, one now gets a “message doesn’t exist” notification as seen below.

Abu Yusuf al-Muhajir’s current Telegram page showing an error message when attempting to redirect to his original post regarding the photos from Afghanistan.

Additionally, reverse image searches for Zabihullah’s alleged “archived original image” on Google, Yandex, and TinEye produced zero results.

If anyone “falsified” the images, it was clearly KIB itself.

Second, the Taliban spokesman does not dispute that the images are from Afghanistan. Indeed, Zabihullah makes it clear that this is from a Taliban operation. But this does not cancel out KIB’s claim of a joint raid.

The KIB, which has pledged allegiance to the Taliban’s emir, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, sees itself as part of the group. Indeed, KIB often refers to itself as the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan – Katibat Imam al-Bukhari,” a nod to the official name used by the Taliban.

Zabihullah may have inadvertently confirmed KIB’s reporting by releasing the “original” image.

Third, there is no real dispute over the presence of KIB inside Afghanistan. In fact, the group has released sporadic photos and videos from the country without rebuke from the Taliban since 2016.

That year, the group released two videos from the northern part of the country depicting training camps for both general indoctrination and lessons on the manufacturing of IED’s, along with combat footage.

The promotion of its activities in Afghanistan that year correlates to when fighters from its Syrian wing began redeploying to the country, as confirmed by the United Nations.
Since then, other releases have focused on combat footage or captured weapons from Afghan forces. The group has also claimed smaller sporadic attacks, such as sniper operations.

In addition, a monitoring team that works for the United Nations Security Council reported earlier this year that KIB, a splinter of the former Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, “participates actively in hostilities against Afghan government forces.”

Yesterday’s images were the first material published by KIB’s Afghanistan branch since the Taliban and the United States signed a withdrawal agreement earlier this year. The last image released by KIB from Afghanistan was in October 2019.

Following the announcement of the deal, KIB’s Abu Yusuf congratulated the Taliban on its “victory” in Afghanistan.

During negotiations with the U.S. and thereafter, the Taliban has sought to deny the existence of KIB, and other foreign jihadist groups, inside Afghanistan. Just last week, the Taliban again repeated its false narrative that al Qaeda does not exist in Afghanistan.

The Taliban is pretending that KIB, al Qaeda, and other foreign jihadist groups do not operate in Afghanistan in order to give the appearance that it is in compliance with the “peace” deal struck with the U.S. Under that agreement, the Taliban supposedly offered assurances that it will not allow al Qaeda and other international terrorist organizations to operate alongside its men.
The KIB would beg to differ.

Caleb Weiss is a contributor to FDD's Long War Journal.

 

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US launches airstrike on Islamic State in Somalia | FDD's Long War Journal

Yesterday's drone strike was the first US airstrike on the Islamic State in Somalia this year.

www.longwarjournal.org

US launches airstrike on Islamic State in Somalia

By Caleb Weiss | July 22, 2020 | weiss.caleb2@gmail.com | @Weissenberg7

Photo released by Puntland Security Forces from yesterday’s battle with Islamic State militants.

The United State’s Africa Command (AFRICOM) reported earlier today that it launched a drone strike on Islamic State militants in Somalia’s northern Puntland region yesterday.

AFRICOM stated that it “conducted an airstrike against ISIS-Somalia terrorists after they attacked partner forces in a remote location near Timirshe, Somalia, July 21.” That area of Puntland sits around 90 miles southeast of Somalia’s northern city of Bosaso.

The US military also adds that “it is assessed this airstrike killed seven (7) ISIS-Somalia terrorists,” though this has not been independently verified.

As alluded to by AFRICOM, the airstrike was conducted as Puntland Security Forces (PSF) mounted an offensive against the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) in the Cal Miskaat mountain range of Puntland.

Local reporting has said that the PSF engaged in a multi-hour gunfight with the ISS militants, which led to the supporting US airstrike.

AFRICOM’s statement today confirmed that US troops were alongside the PSF in order to “advise and assist Somali and partner forces,” though no explicit mention of US troops engaging in combat was made.

In its own statement, the PSF claimed that “more than 20 members of Da’esh [the Arabic acronym for the Islamic State]” were killed in the military operation.

It also adds that this number includes foreign fighters and a foreign official in the group, who was allegedly a military trainer and coordinator between ISS and other Islamic State branches.

Photos released by the PSF show at least three dead bodies among ISS’ ranks.

The Islamic State has also commented on the battle, releasing an exaggerated statement claiming that its men killed and wounded “seven American soldiers and members of Puntland security.”

A follow up statement released by the Islamic State’s Amaq News Agency also added the claim that its men “thwarted the fighters [referring to the PSF] and blocked them from entering” the group’s base.

The aforementioned photos released by Puntland security dispute this version of events, however.

The Islamic State’s numbers also directly mirror the number of dead ISS fighters given in AFRICOM’s statement.

According to Voice of America, this is the 42nd US airstrike in Somalia this year. The overwhelming majority, however, have been directed against al-Qaeda’s branch in the country, Shabaab.

As a result, yesterday’s drone strike also marks the first such hit on the Islamic State in Somalia this year. Last year, AFRICOM launched at least 6 airstrikes on ISS in Puntland according to data kept by FDD’s Long War Journal.

This includes an April 2019 drone strike that killed the group’s deputy emir, Abdulhakim Dhuqub.

Islamic State in Somalia
ISS continues to suffer severe setbacks to its organization. Since the beginning of the year, Puntland and Somali security forces have launched several raids on ISS bases and hideouts across the country.

And based on reports from Somali media, ISS has now lost at least 4 senior leaders of its organization since January.

That said, ISS has shown the capability to retain its bases in Puntland’s mountains and claim sporadic attacks in both Puntland and southern Somalia.

For instance, it has claimed at least 21 operations across the country so far this year according to data kept by FDD’s Long War Journal. The vast majority of these claims have taken place inside Mogadishu or its surrounding suburbs.

Earlier this year, the group also highlighted a training camp Puntland, while the UN noted in January that ISS’ bases in the northern mountains have acted as a “command center” for the Islamic State’s Central African Province.

Article updated with new information regarding the July 21 battle.

Caleb Weiss is a contributor to FDD's Long War Journal.

 

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Trump, Russia's Putin, discuss arms control, Iran, coronavirus: statements

President Donald Trump told Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin on Thursday he wanted to avoid a costly arms race with Russia and China and hoped for progress in arms control negotiations, the White House said.

www.reuters.com

World News
July 23, 2020 / 10:21 AM / Updated 4 hours ago

Trump, Russia's Putin, discuss arms control, Iran, coronavirus: statements

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - President Donald Trump told Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin on Thursday he wanted to avoid a costly arms race with Russia and China and hoped for progress in arms control negotiations, the White House said.

“President Trump reiterated his hope of avoiding an expensive three-way arms race between China, Russia and the United States and looked forward to progress on upcoming arms control negotiations in Vienna,” White House spokesman Judd Deere said.

The two leaders also discussed Iran’s nuclear program, the Kremlin said in its statement on the call.

“The need for collective efforts to maintain regional stability and the global nuclear non-proliferation regime has been emphasized on both sides,” the Kremlin said.

The White House did not mention Iran but said Trump and Putin discussed ways to defeat the coronavirus pandemic while continuing to reopen global economies.

The United States says that, as a growing nuclear weapons power, China should join it and Russia in a new treaty. But China’s estimated 300 warheads are dwarfed by the arsenals of Russia and the United States.

China has balked. A top Chinese diplomat said earlier this month that China would be happy to hold arms control talks with the United States and Russia, but only if Washington was willing to cut its nuclear arsenal to China’s level, which is about 20 times smaller.

(This story corrects reference in paragraph 3 to ‘Iran’s nuclear program’, not ‘Iran’s nuclear arms program’.)

Reporting by Steve Holland in Washington and Polina Devitt in Moscow; Writing by Doina Chiacu; Editing by Jonathan Oatis

 

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Trump Wants China on Board With New Arms Control Pact

Obama’s New START arms treaty limited Russian and American nukes. Now, U.S. officials want to rope in Beijing.

foreignpolicy.com

Report
Trump Wants China on Board With New Arms Control Pact
Obama’s New START arms treaty limited Russian and American nukes. Now, U.S. officials want to rope in Beijing.

By Jack Detsch | July 23, 2020, 5:24 PM


With the clock ticking to extend the Obama-era New START agreement that sets limits on U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, the Trump administration is favoring a fresh arms control deal that includes China over a straight-ahead reauthorization of the agreement, officials said.

The Trump administration fears that China will more than double its nuclear arsenal over the next decade, senior defense officials said, as it is likely to move away from its traditional “minimum deterrence” approach toward a full array of nuclear-armed bombers, submarines, and ballistic missiles.

“Extending New START at this point would probably be the easy thing to do, but it may not be the right thing to do,” a senior defense official told Foreign Policy on a press call this week. “Getting China involved in some sort of an arms control framework is what’s needed today in order to stave off a potential three-way arms race in the future.”

“Why not agree to some restraint today instead of spending all the money [to] build up your nuclear capabilities,” the senior defense official added. “At the end of the day you’re no better off because now you’ve forced Russia and the United States to build up its capabilities.”

But China has been reluctant to come to the table, failing to appear for talks arranged last month by State Department arms control envoy Marshall Billingslea. Some experts fear that by seeking to expand the scope of the talks, the Trump administration is seeking to blow up a third major arms-control treaty.

Last year, the Trump administration pulled out of the Reagan-era Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty that slashed the number of midrange missiles held by both Russia and the United States. Earlier this year, at the urging of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, the United States ditched the Open Skies Treaty that allows 35 nations to conduct unarmed overflights to survey one another’s weapons stockpiles.

At a time of heightened international tensions, some arms control experts wonder about the wisdom of trying to rope in China rather than renew the deal with Russia, America’s major nuclear rival.

“Is holding New START hostage the way to get China to come to the table and give up something?” said Pranay Vaddi, a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former State Department official. “What incentive does China have to stay a smaller nuclear power relative to the U.S.?”

Billingslea, the arms control negotiator, said in May that the United States would be prepared to spend Russia and China “into oblivion” to win an arms race, despite Democrats in Congress hinting at shrinking Pentagon budgets in the future as the coronavirus pandemic has taken a toll on the U.S. economy.

But Washington acknowledged that Moscow remains in compliance with the 2010 New START deal in a report to Congress earlier this year. Though the treaty sets limits on each country’s long-range nuclear weapons, administration officials concerned with the rise of China appeared to openly question the utility of a bilateral pact that doesn’t include Beijing.
Read More


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Democrats suspect the weapons sales are sending jobs to Saudi Arabia.


Trump Fixates on China as Nuclear Arms Pact Nears Expiration
The administration insists any future START treaty has to include Beijing as well as Moscow, but experts say there is almost no chance China will agree.


Pentagon Legislative Chief Calls It Quits
Robert Hood’s departure leaves the U.S. Defense Department at a high-water mark for vacancies under the Trump administration.

“Whether or not New START is extended or not, we believe that the real problem facing the United States is the growth of China,” the senior defense official said. “Even if it is extended, you’re dealing with a Russia-U.S. problem,” the official added, making the case that the current treaty would not address China’s growing nuclear arsenal.

The seeming solidification of the U.S. approach toward China comes as the Trump administration is still adding new officials, amid anger from Congress over perceived administration stonewalling of transparency requirements.

It also comes as Esper, the Pentagon chief, has made a point of checking on U.S. nuclear forces amid the spread of the coronavirus pandemic, which forced the Defense Department to institute a stop-movement order for all American troops earlier this year.

On Wednesday, Esper visited Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, home to the Pentagon’s B-2 bomber fleet, for a classified update on the impact of COVID-19 on American nuclear forces. While the B-2 is set to be retired as the Air Force fields sufficient B-21 stealth bombers to replace it, the Pentagon plans to spend nearly $1.4 billion to upgrade the 1980s-era bomber with modernized digital displays, a second senior defense official said. The Air Force plans to deliver the first operational B-21s by the middle of this decade, the official said, with the first flight planned for the fall of 2022.

Meanwhile, the United States is hoping to use the New START negotiations to make the case to China that it can rise as a responsible great power.

“We would argue that China has a responsibility, even under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, to negotiate in good faith and they just haven’t done so up until today,” the first senior defense official said. “Whether that’s persuasive to the Chinese, we’ll have to see.”




Jack Detsch is Foreign Policy’s Pentagon and national security reporter. Twitter: @JackDetsch


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U.S. gives China 72 hours to shut Houston consulate, Trump says other closures 'always possible'

The United States gave China 72 hours to close its consulate in Houston amid accusations of spying, marking a dramatic deterioration in relations between the world's two biggest economies.

www.reuters.com

World News
July 22, 2020 / 12:53 AM / Updated 20 hours ago
U.S. gives China 72 hours to shut Houston consulate, Trump says other closures 'always possible'

Cate Cadell, David Brunnstrom
6 Min Read

BEIJING/WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States gave China 72 hours to close its consulate in Houston amid accusations of spying, marking a dramatic deterioration in relations between the world’s two biggest economies.

The U.S. State Department said on Wednesday the Chinese mission in Houston was being closed “to protect American intellectual property and Americans’ private information.”
President Donald Trump said in answer to a question at a news briefing it was “always possible” other Chinese missions could be closed too.

“We thought there was a fire in one that we did close,” Trump said. “I guess they were burning documents, or burning papers, and I wonder what that’s all about.”
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Overnight in Houston, firefighters went to the consulate after smoke was seen. Two U.S. government officials said they had information that documents were being burned there.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said the consulate was operating normally.

The ministry said Washington had abruptly issued the demand to close the consulate on Tuesday and called it an “unprecedented escalation.”

The Chinese Embassy in Washington had received “bomb and death threats” because of “smears & hatred” fanned by the U.S. government, spokeswoman Hua Chunying wrote in a tweet.

“The U.S. should revoke its erroneous decision,” she said. “China will surely react with firm countermeasures.”

Communist Party rulers in Beijing were considering shutting the U.S. consulate in the central city of Wuhan in retaliation, a source with knowledge of the matter said.

U.S.-based China experts said Beijing could also opt to target more important consulates in Hong Kong, Shanghai or Guangzhou, something that could hurt American businesses.

Richard Grenell, who served until recently as acting director of U.S. national intelligence, suggested the United States could close the Chinese consulate in tech-heavy San Francisco.
“It’s a close call. I would have done both (Houston and San Francisco) but it also makes sense to start with one,” he told Reuters by text.


China’s national flag is seen waving at the China Consulate General in Houston, Texas, U.S., July 22, 2020. REUTERS/Adrees Latif

The Houston move comes in the run-up to the November U.S. presidential election, in which Trump and his Democratic rival, Joe Biden, have both tried to look tough towards China.

Speaking on a visit to Denmark, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo repeated accusations about Chinese theft of U.S. and European intellectual property, which he said were costing “hundreds of thousands of jobs.”

While offering no specifics about the Houston consulate, Pompeo referred to a U.S. Justice Department indictment on Tuesday of two Chinese nationals over what it called a decade-long cyber espionage campaign that targeted defense contractors, COVID-19 researchers and hundreds of other victims worldwide.

Pompeo also referred to recent speeches by the head of the FBI and others that highlighted Chinese espionage activities.

“President Trump has said: ‘Enough. We are not going to allow this to continue to happen,’” he told reporters.

Republican Senator Marco Rubio, acting chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, described the Houston consulate on Twitter as the “central node of the Communist Party’s vast network of spies & influence operations in the United States.”

The New York Times quoted the top U.S. diplomat for East Asia, David Stilwell, as saying that the Houston consulate had been at the “epicenter” of the Chinese army’s efforts to advance its warfare advantages by sending students to U.S. universities.

“We took a practical step to prevent them from doing that,” Stilwell told the Times.
Stephen Biegun, the State Department’s number two diplomat, told the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee the decision was made in response to “longstanding areas of concern.”

He said these included intellectual property theft and commercial espionage, as well as unequal treatment of U.S. diplomats, exporters, investors and media in China and abuse by China’s security services of the welcoming U.S. posture toward Chinese students and researchers.

Slideshow (4 Images)
A Chinese diplomat, speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity, denied the spying allegations and said the Houston mission acted like other Chinese consulates in the United States - issuing visas, and promoting visits and businesses.

‘RACE TO THE BOTTOM’
U.S.-China ties have worsened sharply this year over issues ranging from the coronavirus and telecoms-gear maker Huawei to China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and clampdown on Hong Kong.

Jonathan Pollack, an East Asia expert with the Brookings Institution, said he could not think of anything “remotely equivalent” to the move against the Houston consulate since the U.S. and China opened full diplomatic relations in 1979.

“The Trump Administration appears to view this latest action as political ammunition in the presidential campaign... It’s part of the administration’s race to the bottom against China,” he said.

A source with direct knowledge of the matter said China was considering closing the U.S. consulate in Wuhan, where the State Department withdrew staff and their families early this year due to the coronavirus outbreak that first emerged in the city.

China’s foreign ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment on whether it would shut the consulate.

Wang said the U.S. government had been harassing Chinese diplomats and consular staff for some time and intimidating Chinese students. He said the United States had interfered with China’s diplomatic missions, including intercepting diplomatic pouches. The State Department did not respond to a request for comment on the Chinese accusations.

Reporting by Cate Cadell in Beijing and David Brunnstrom in Washington; additional reporting by Nikolaj Skydsgaard in Copenhagen, Patricia Zengerle, Daphne Psaledakis, Mark Hosenball, Steve Holland, Jeff Mason and Arshad Mohammed in Washington, Michelle Nichols and Echo Wang in New York and Rama Venkat in Bengaluru; Writing by David Brunnstrom and Nick Macfie; Editing by Peter Graff and Rosalba O'Brien

 

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U.S. Says Its F-15s Intercepted Iranian Airliner That Made Erratic Maneuvers (Updated)

The Iranian Airbus made abrupt maneuvers, supposedly as a result of the intercept, that left some onboard injured.

www.thedrive.com

U.S. Says Its F-15s Intercepted Iranian Airliner That Made Erratic Maneuvers (Updated)
The Iranian Airbus made abrupt maneuvers, supposedly as a result of the intercept, that left some onboard injured.
By Joseph Trevithick
July 23, 2020

• The War Zone

Two U.S. Air Force F-15 combat jets reportedly flew in the vicinity of an Airbus Airbus A310 airliner belonging to Iran's Mahan Airlines over Syria today, but a U.S. official has said that the warplanes were conducting "legal, routine flights." This follows still murky reports that the F-15s harassed the Mahan Airlines flight, causing it to make an evasive maneuver and leading to a number of injuries among its passengers.



Russia Sent Three Types Of Fighters To Intercept B-52s Flying Rare Mission Into Sea Of Okhotsk (Updated)By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone
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Let's Talk About How Iran Could Have Shot Down A 737 Full Of Innocent PeopleBy Tyler Rogoway Posted in The War Zone
F-15E Shot Down "Predator-Sized" Drone That Attacked Coalition Forces In SyriaBy Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone
U.S. Airpower Makes Show Of Force To Protect Troops In Syria As Security Situation UnravelsBy Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone

VOA was first to report that American military aircraft were flying in the same general airspace as Mahan Air Flight 1152 on July 23, 2020, as the A310 passed over a strategic forward garrison that American forces and their local Syrian partners operate near the city of At Tanf in Syria. This site is situated in the southeastern portion of the country near the Iraqi and Jordanian borders.

#Breaking US official confirms to VOA that two US military aircraft were conducting “legal, routine flights” in vicinity of al-Tanf military base today as #Iran commercial aircraft was nearby.
— Carla Babb (@CarlaBabbVOA) July 23, 2020​

At the time of writing, the U.S. military has not offered a detailed explanation of exactly what happened in the skies over At Tanf. The state-run Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) news agency had been the first to report the alleged dangerous maneuvering by the F-15s based on information from one of its journalists on Mahan Air Flight 1152, which was heading from Iran's capital Tehran to Beirut, Lebanon at the time of the incident.

Watch: Video relarased by #Iran StateTV purportedly shows the moment 2 #Israeli warplanes threaten #Iranian passenger plane in the #Syrian airspace. pic.twitter.com/982gEyQb2h
— Habib Abdolhossein (@HAbdolhossein) July 23, 2020​

Video footage reportedly from onboard the aircraft after the incident shows debris in the aisles and at least one passenger with blood running from their forehead. Others are seen wearing uninflated life jackets. Some emergency oxygen masks are seen deployed in the cabin, but no passengers appear to be wearing them.

The theory that Israeli warplanes intercepted an Iranian civilian aircraft, IRM1152 is not possible, for the following reasons: [Thread] pic.twitter.com/Ihv005iA3z
— INTELSky (@Intel_Sky) July 23, 2020​

The video posted on #Iran’s IRIB telegram channel says an #Israel|i fighter plane got close to a Mahan Air civilian plane and an attempt to avoid collision injured several passengers. The channel claims the video was taken by an IRIB reporter while traveling to #Beirut. pic.twitter.com/uNtMr0hRgW
— Hossein Ghazanfari (@TehranDC) July 23, 2020​

More footage pic.twitter.com/FnkDfkXJfB
— Hossein Ghazanfari (@TehranDC) July 23, 2020​

Another clip taken from behind one airliner's windows shows an F-15 flying alongside the airliner at a considerable distance away and then peeling off.

#Iran’s state TV reporter who recorded the video says 2 #American jets approached MahanAir flight 1152 over Damascus which was traveling from Tehran>Beirut in #Lebanon and maneuvers by the pilot to avoid collision resulted in injuries among passengers.

pic.twitter.com/nHYSdPlH1A
— Hossein Ghazanfari (@TehranDC) July 23, 2020​

Iranian quasi-state media, Syrian state media, and pro-Iranian Lebanese outlets quickly picked up the story, with many initially identifying the two F-15s as Israeli. There has been no official statement from the Israel Defense Forces, but Israeli media reports had said that the IDF had denied any involvement even before the confirmation that the U.S. aircraft were in the area at the time.

And: IRIB reporter now says two American jets came close to Mahan Air, not an Israeli plane
— Amichai Stein (@AmichaiStein1) July 23, 2020​

Online flight tracking software does show that Mahan Air Flight 1152 did make a relatively rapid descent of about 250 feet as it flew over western Iraq toward the airspace over At Tanf. However, Another Mahan Air airliner flying the same route from Tehran to Beirut made a nearly identical maneuver in the same general location on July 20 without there being any apparent incident.

There is a dip at 16:13:49, however.
— Aurora Intel - #StayHome (@AuroraIntel) July 23, 2020​

A close-up of altitude changes.
2020-07-23T...
...16:13:43Z 33.467613,38.939472 34000
...16:13:49Z 33.470856,38.925770 33875
...16:13:58Z 33.477036,38.904457 34275
...16:14:04Z 33.480835,38.890888 34350
...16:15:08Z 33.529083,38.746693 34150
...16:16:12Z 33.582779,38.601135 34025 pic.twitter.com/81yofGcmlL
— Gerjon | חריון (@Gerjon_) July 23, 2020​

The A310 landed safely Lebanon, though there were unconfirmed reports that at least four individuals had to be taken to the hospital after the plane touched down. A photograph reportedly of the plane on the tarmac Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport shows individuals being transferred to an ambulance.

Mahan Air landed in Beirut after the incident over Syria. pic.twitter.com/J0WR0gE21o
— Aldin (@aldin_ww) July 23, 2020​

After a normal amount of time on the ground in Beirut, the aircraft took back off and headed back toward Tehran along the same route. It passed back over At Tanf, without any further reported harassment.

It's already heading back Iran. Have a safe flight!Live Flight Tracker - Real-Time Flight Tracker Map | Flightradar24 pic.twitter.com/xEwdZxDp97
— avi scharf (@avischarf) July 23, 2020​

Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles are forward deployed to Jordan and do routinely patrol the airspace around At Tanf, which has been the target of a number of attacks by forces aligned with the regime of Syrian dictator Bashar Al Assad, including Iranian-backed militias and drones, in recent years. It's not necessarily unfounded that these combat jets would fly up to check out an Iranian airliner flying over the garrison.

The U.S. government has also sanctioned Mahan Airlines, which it says is a key instrument in Iran's support of proxy forces in Syria, as well as Lebanon and elsewhere. It has also been tied to Iranian efforts evade other sanctions. Other countries, including Israel and France, have also alleged that Mahan Air is actively involved in illicit and otherwise hostile activity on behalf of the Iranian government.

This incident also comes as the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump continues to pursue a policy of maximum pressure against Iran, which includes extensive sanctions and reported covert activities aimed at destabilizing the Iranian regime. In recent weeks there have been a series of mysterious incidents, including an explosion at a centrifuge production center within Iran's Natanz nuclear facility, as well as numerous fires, that have put Iranian forces on high alert. Reports have suggested that at least some of these separate incidents could be the work of foreign actors, namely Israel and possibly with the help of the United States.

Whatever may or may not have happened between the U.S. Air Force's F-15s and Mahan Airlines Flight 1152 over Syria, it seems almost certain it will further contribute to the already heated tensions between the two longtime foes.

We will continue to update this story as more information becomes available.

UPDATE:
U.S. Central Command has made it clear that U.S. Air Force F-15s did indeed intercept the airliner in question near At Tanf, but that the fighters stayed thousands of feet away from the Airbus during the intercept:

The below statement is attributable to Capt. Bill Urban, spokesman for U.S.
Central Command:

A U.S. F-15 on a routine air mission in the vicinity of the CJTF-OIR At
Tanf garrison in Syria conducted a standard visual inspection of a Mahan Air
passenger airliner at a safe distance of approximately 1,000 meters from the
airliner this evening. The visual inspection occurred to ensure the safety
of coalition personnel at At Tanf garrison. Once the F-15 pilot identified
the aircraft as a Mahan Air passenger plane, the F-15 safely opened distance
from the aircraft. The professional intercept was conducted in accordance
with international standards.

Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com

 

[Housecarl]

Of course direct reference to Turkey's relationship with Daesh is not mentioned.......

Posted for fair use.....

ISIS exploiting coronavirus security gaps to relaunch insurgency, UN report warns

By Paul Cruickshank, CNN Terrorism Analyst There has been a significant rise in ISIS attacks in Iraq and Syria, with the group exploiting security gaps in Iraq caused by the coronavirus...

www.weny.com

ISIS exploiting coronavirus security gaps to relaunch insurgency, UN report warns
Thursday, July 23rd 2020, 7:11 PM EDT
Updated:
Thursday, July 23rd 2020, 7:11 PM EDT

By Paul Cruickshank, CNN Terrorism Analyst

There has been a significant rise in ISIS attacks in Iraq and Syria, with the group exploiting security gaps in Iraq caused by the coronavirus pandemic to relaunch and invigorate its rural insurgency in the country, according to a report submitted to the UN Security Council that was made public on Thursday.

The wide-ranging report, put together by the UN monitoring team that tracks the global jihadi terror threat, states that the group is consolidating in Iraq and Syria and "showing confidence in its ability to increasingly operate in a brazen manner in its former core area."
It states that the number of ISIS attacks in Iraq and Syria "increased significantly in early 2020 as compared with the same period in 2019."

Referring to the situation in Iraq, the UN monitoring team stated that ISIS has "exploited security gaps caused by the pandemic and by political turbulence in Iraq to relaunch a sustained rural insurgency, as well as sporadic operations in Baghdad and other large cities."

In recent weeks in particular, Iraq has seen a huge surge in Covid-19 cases, with the number of cumulative cases surpassing 100,000 on Thursday compared with fewer than 7,000 confirmed on June 1.

Syria has far fewer confirmed cases, but leaders of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces say ISIS has exploited the fact that the pandemic has limited the SDF's mobility in the region.

Gen. Mazloum Abdi, the top commander of the SDF, told CTC Sentinel, the monthly publication of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, in June that a major Covid-19 outbreak would limit his forces' ability to counter the Islamic State "because we will be busy managing the situation in detention facilities" where the group currently houses thousands of former ISIS members.

The newly released UN report, which is based on information from member states, estimates that there are currently more than 10,000 ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria.

One reason for ISIS's resilience in those countries is money. According to the new UN report, member states assess ISIS still has approximately $100 million in reserves. It states the group's assets are "believed to take the form of cash, buried or stored in caches across the conflict zone or kept with financial facilitators in neighbouring countries. Some of the funds have been invested in legitimate businesses in Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic and neighbouring countries."


Report challenges Trump's narrative

The new United Nations findings challenge the narrative of President Donald Trump, who earlier this year claimed to have destroyed "100% of ISIS and its territorial caliphate."

The UN monitors also presented a more pessimistic assessment than that recently presented by the Trump administration. In June, Ambassador James Jeffrey, the special envoy to the global coalition to defeat ISIS, stated that although ISIS remained "a resilient and significant threat" in Iraq and Syria, there had been a small reduction in the overall number of ISIS attacks and a lessening in their complexity, "so we think the situation is not getting worse, it's getting better."

The UN report does not paint a uniformly negative picture of the evolving ISIS threat in Iraq and Syria. It noted that several significant ISIS leaders had been removed since Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed last October and that "as some financial facilitators are captured or killed in counter-terrorism operations, knowledge of the whereabouts of hidden funds may also be lost."

The new UN report also notes that ISIS's new leader Amir Muhammad Sa'id Abdal-Rahman al-Mawla "has not visibly asserted himself in communications, which may prove to be a limiting factor in his influence and appeal, and perhaps that of the group."

In June the US government doubled the reward for information about al-Mawla to $10 million.

When it came to the big picture the new UN report noted that although ISIS "maintains the ambition to control territory and populations ... for the moment, [it] represents an entrenched rural insurgency without the reach to threaten urban areas on a sustained basis."

Covid-19 and the global terror threat

The UN report finds that outside of Syria, Iraq and other conflict zones, the short-term terror threat has fallen as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, noting that "restrictions on international travel significantly constrain terrorist mobility, networking and finance-related activity" and that targets have become more elusive because of the discouragement of public gatherings

However, it warns that ISIS has "had a captive audience during the lockdown and, if it has successfully used this for planning and recruitment purposes, it is possible that the easing of restrictions in non-conflict zones will see a spike in attacks once targets become available again. Another motivation is fear of irrelevance: COVID-19 largely eclipsed terrorism from the news."

The report warns that should the pandemic lead to a severe global recession that could create conditions where terrorist and extremist narratives gain increased currency.
The report also noted that there have been no indications that ISIS "is systematically attempting to weaponize the virus."


Concern over al Qaeda

The report warns that the security situation in West Africa and the Sahel is a particular cause for concern, stating that ISIS and al Qaeda franchises there "continued to enjoy operational success in early 2020," which led to heightened concerns about stability in the region.
It also states that al Qaeda remains active in Afghanistan nearly 19 years after 9/11 and notes that its leadership continues to maintain a close relationship with the Haqqani network, a powerful subgroup within the Afghan Taliban.

A Pentagon report published earlier this month reached a similar conclusion.

The persisting close relations between al Qaeda and the Taliban are widely seen as one of the main stumbling blocks to future progress in the peace process in Afghanistan in the wake of the agreement signed between the US and the Taliban earlier this year.

Though there has been speculation that al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri may, like Osama bin Laden, have hidden in Pakistan, the UN report states that according to member states, al-Zawahiri is currently based in Afghanistan. The report finds that should al-Zawahiri's "poor health ... force a leadership succession, it will be challenging for Al-Qaida in the context of a peace process" in Afghanistan.

The report also found that al Qaeda has "ingrained itself in local communities and conflicts" around the world, with its recent "favored" affiliate in Syria, Hurras al-Din, "committed to preparing for external attacks despite its current focus on targeting Syrian forces" and its Yemeni affiliate, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, still "determined to mount external operations."

According to the US government, AQAP had "significant ties" to Saudi air force officer Mohammed Alshamrani, who carried out a terrorist attack that killed three at Naval Air Station Pensacola in Florida in December 2019.

The report states that "during his time at Pensacola and up to the day of the attack, Alshamrani was in direct contact with Abdullah al-Maliki, an AQAP media and Internet recruitment operative who was killed in Yemen on May 13. The Pensacola attack is believed to have been planned prior to Alshamrani's arrival in the United States." In a May news conference, Attorney General William Barr and FBI Director Christopher Wray revealed that al-Maliki had been targeted in a counterterrorism operation but did not spell out whether he had been killed.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

French soldier killed in combat in Mali

A French soldier from the army’s First Parachute Hussar Regiment was killed in combat in Mali, President Emmanuel Macron's office said Thursday.

www.france24.com

French soldier killed in combat in Mali

Issued on: 23/07/2020 - 19:57

A French soldier from the army’s First Parachute Hussar Regiment was killed in combat in Mali, President Emmanuel Macron's office said Thursday.

"This soldier ... was killed in fighting against armed terrorist groups, when an improvised explosive device was triggered next to his armoured vehicle," the presidency said in a statement.

France has more than 5,000 troops in the West African Sahel region as part of international efforts to fight Islamist militants in the area.

The news of the French soldier's death came as leaders of five West African countries were holding a one-day summit in the Malian capital, Bamako, in a bid to resolve the country's escalating political and security crises.

The presidents of Senegal, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria and Niger were meeting with Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and leaders of a protest movement clamouring for his resignation.

The unrest deeply worries Mali's neighbours and allies, who fear a country bloodied by a jihadist insurgency could slide into chaos.

The impoverished nation of around 20 million people has been struggling to contain an insurgency that first emerged in the north in 2012 before spreading to its centre, as well as neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger.

Thousands of soldiers and civilians have died in the conflict, and hundreds of thousands of people have been driven from their homes.

France started its military operations in Mali in 2013, after northern Mali was seized by Islamist extremists who had hijacked a Tuareg rebellion in the country’s northern desert regions the previous year.

The French military successfully drove extremists from several key towns, but the jihadist insurgency has since spread throughout Mali and across the border to Niger and Burkina Faso.

(FRANCE 24 with AFP and REUTERS)

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Afghanistan’s Three Trillion Dollar Question – OpEd

By Pierrepont Johnson III For three days in May, the streets of Kabul were peaceful. No bullets exchanged between the Taliban and government forces. No bombs dropped. The ceasefire, which coincided with the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Fitr, was significant not only for its lack of casualties, but...

www.eurasiareview.com

Afghanistan’s Three Trillion Dollar Question – OpEd

July 24, 2020 Geopolitical Monitor 0 Comments

By Geopolitical Monitor
By Pierrepont Johnson III

For three days in May, the streets of Kabul were peaceful. No bullets exchanged between the Taliban and government forces. No bombs dropped. The ceasefire, which coincided with the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Fitr, was significant not only for its lack of casualties, but also in that it laid the groundwork for a prisoner exchange between the two warring sides. This was the first major diplomatic showing between the parties since the Taliban rose to power in the mid-90s. While diplomacy is critical to peace, long-term economic development must be prioritized if the country is to install democratic institutions and reduce terrorism. Afghanistan has a unique opportunity, though one that comes with its own risks – the country’s $3 trillion worth of mining deposits.

To date, efforts to harvest Afghanistan’s mineral wealth, which exceeds the GDP of Great Britain, Italy, or India, have largely failed. The threat of the Taliban and extortion from militias, infrastructure deficits, and high mining fees have made investments in Afghanistan’s 1,400 mining fields an unprofitable venture. Prior to the Soviet invasion in 1977, Afghanistan was a relatively prosperous country, with a rich history and culture. The country has since suffered largely due to de facto foreign rule, from the end of the Cold War to the US-led War in Afghanistan. Today, it is one of the poorest countries in the world.

However, a developed, safe, and corruption-free mining sector can become a driver of economic growth, as well as perhaps the best weapon the country has in its fight against terrorism. The UN identifies poverty among the leading causes of terrorism, as 40% of lone wolf terror incidents are orchestrated by those who are unemployed. For mining to reach its potential in aiding economic growth and reducing terrorism, diplomatic resolutions between the Taliban and Afghan government, specifically in regard to the mining sector, must be reached. In addition to diplomacy, the U.S. must shift its policy to focus on foreign investment, instead of military aid, for the mining sector to have a chance.

The primary reason Afghanistan has not been able to profit from its natural resources is political instability. In addition to 25 years of off-and-on Taliban rule, Afghanistan has shouldered additional burdens from Al-Qaeda and ISIS. However, developments in recent months have signaled hope. In February 2020, President Trump signed a historic preliminary peace agreement with the Taliban. Scheduled to happen in July in Qatar, these talks could provide the first step to a more stable Afghanistan.

If the two sides come to the table in July, the groundwork for an action plan regarding the future of the mining sector in Afghanistan must be proposed. Currently, the Taliban, Afghan government, and local militias profit from the mines. Minerals are believed to be the Taliban’s second-largest source of revenue. The Afghan government barely sees revenue from its mineral sector, as the economy is largely driven by agriculture. Even if concessions need to be made on the government’s side during negotiations, any guaranteed revenue that can be extracted from the mines would have a huge benefit. For a country with 55% of its population below the poverty line, and an unemployment rate of 24%, this could have a big impact.

The U.S. should also have a vested interest in the economic development in Afghanistan. The primary goal of US foreign policy in the country is to reduce terrorism, and economic development is a crucial step toward this objective. Ideally, a concession regarding the mines would have been included in the US-Taliban pact. If the US can bring to the table a discussion on implementing rule of law for mineral extraction going forward, it could be a crucial step in getting the resources to benefit the Afghan government. Second, the U.S. should invest in Afghanistan’s mineral resources. Foreign aid has shown to have little success in the country, but a long-term strategy focusing on economic growth and development helps the U.S. achieve its primary objective in achieving peace, while also providing economic benefits from the use of mineral wealth.

Harvesting Afghanistan’s vast natural resources will take time. In addition to diplomatic and economic challenges, safety and human rights in the mines must be a priority. Afghanistan ranks 173 in the world in corruption, while being recently accused of misappropriating coronavirus aid funds. However, government revenue can help reduce corruption, as the IMF discusses two types of corruption: corruption due to greed and corruption due to need, with the latter being applicable. $3 trillion of limestone, gemstones, copper, iron, gold, and salt can’t be ignored. Increased government revenue should be used not only for government salaries, but also to further develop infrastructure such as roads, hospitals, and schools, as well as create jobs. More economic opportunity would also reduce the temptation for young Afghans to consider joining terrorist organizations. Additionally, terrorist organizations, such as ISIS, that do not originate in Afghanistan would be less likely to establish strongholds as higher levels of development and stability act as a deterrent.

The mining sector won’t save Afghanistan. However, it can act as an important tool to accelerate development that has been halted due to conflict. The race to the mines seems inevitable – China has already invested billions of dollars in mineral extraction. India and the US have shown interest in mining projects as well. Progress in diplomacy can help increase foreign investment, which will create infrastructure that reduces poverty and ultimately fights terrorism. $3 trillion in natural resources will be an asset to a more peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com or any institutions with which the authors are associated.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Pak ID cards seized from terrorists in Afghanistan

Pakistani ID cards were recovered from the bodies of terrorists killed in Afghanistan Kandahar Khaama news agency reported

www.bignewsnetwork.com

Pak ID cards seized from terrorists in Afghanistan

Kabul [Afghanistan], July 23 (ANI): Pakistani ID cards were recovered from the bodies of terrorists killed in Afghanistan's Kandahar, Khaama news agency reported.
The development highlights Pakistan's complicity in aiding Taliban to create unrest in Afghanistan.

Security forces killed five terrorists in Maroof and nine others in Arghistan districts of the province, said Kandahar's police chief Gen Tadin Khan Achakzai, according to Khaama news agency.

Some ID cards read names in Urdu, identifying the dead terrorists as Abdul Ghani, Abdul Ghaffar, Sanaullah, Naqibullah, Obaidullah, Abdul Malik among others.

In another attack, 25 Taliban terrorists, including 12 Pakistanis, were killed in an airstrike by NATO Rescue Support in the Takht-e-Pol town of Afghanistan's Kandahar province.

The arrest of Abdullah Orakzai alias Aslam Farooqi, a key leader of the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) earlier this year brought the terror group's Pakistani connections into sharp focus, according to European Foundation For South Asian Studies (EFSAS), a think-tank based in Amsterdam.

The UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team to the 1988 Sanctions Committee, which oversees sanctions on the Taliban, in its 2019 report had acknowledged that nearly 5,000 terrorists belonging to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, which is based in Pakistan, were active in Kunar and Nangarhar provinces of Afghanistan alone.

The Pakistan government and its intelligence service, ISI, have long claimed that it is not aiding terrorists in Afghanistan by sending Pakistani youth to create unrest in the war-torn nation. However, the recent operation has again exposed Islamabad's false claims. (ANI)

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm......

Posted for fair use.....

If the Arms Ban Ends: Implications for Iran’s Military Capabilities

Discussions about lifting the ban tend to focus on major weapons systems Tehran might acquire abroad, yet the most important long-term impact may be on its ability to upgrade existing capabilities and strengthen domestic arms production.

www.washingtoninstitute.org

PolicyWatch 3351

If the Arms Ban Ends: Implications for Iran’s Military Capabilities

Michael Eisenstadt
July 23, 2020

Discussions about lifting the ban tend to focus on major weapons systems Tehran might acquire abroad, yet the most important long-term impact may be on its ability to upgrade existing capabilities and strengthen domestic arms production.

The ban on arms transfers to and from Iran is scheduled to “sunset” on October 18, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2231, the document that gave international legal force to the Iran nuclear deal. If the ban is not extended, what are the likely implications for the Islamic Republic’s military capabilities?

CONVENTIONAL ARMS PROCUREMENT OPPORTUNITIES
Tehran’s relatively modest defense investments in recent decades have yielded some impressive niche capabilities, enabling long-range precision strike, naval guerrilla warfare, and proxy operations. The regime has used these to gain leverage and project influence while avoiding a major regional war. Thus, drones and missiles in the hands of proxies and partners threaten America’s foremost regional allies (Israel and Saudi Arabia), while Iran’s own long-range precision strike forces can hit U.S. military bases and other targets throughout the region. Iran can also disrupt traffic through two major maritime chokepoints: the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab Strait (the latter via its Houthi partners in Yemen).

In Tehran’s view, the successes that its proxies and partners have registered in the Middle East—expelling Israeli forces from Lebanon in 2000, ousting U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011, and defeating the “U.S.-Saudi-Zionist conspiracy” to unseat Bashar al-Assad in Syria since 2011—have vindicated its approach of using force to shape the regional security environment. Iran also regards its armed forces as an effective deterrent against a large conventional attack—a mindset no doubt reinforced by Washington’s reluctance to employ military levers as an integral part of its maximum pressure policy.

Iran is therefore likely to maintain this basic approach if the ban on arms transfers ends later this year, while filling capability gaps and selectively modernizing its conventional forces to reflect lessons learned in Syria. To this end, it would try to purchase at least some of the systems it has been unable to produce domestically, such as advanced surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), fighter aircraft, infantry fighting vehicles, and tanks. Indeed, media reports indicate it has already approached Russia about buying Su-30 fighters, S-400 SAMs, T-90 tanks, modern artillery systems, and Yakhont antiship cruise missiles. Likewise, it would probably continue strengthening its guerrilla navy by acquiring advanced mines, torpedoes, and antiship ballistic missiles. It is also likely to enhance the expeditionary capability of its Shia foreign legion by acquiring fixed- and rotary-wing close support aircraft, transport helicopters, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technology, potentially enabling proxies to conduct sustained operations abroad independent of Russian air and fire support.

Given Iran’s dire economic circumstances, however, the regime would likely be unable to buy large numbers of major weapons systems. For instance, initial outlays for a single squadron of 18-24 fighter aircraft could approach $2 billion, and the process of recapitalizing the air force as a whole could approach $100 billion, since it requires buying modern aircraft, stockpiling large quantities of munitions and spare parts, modernizing and hardening air bases and maintenance facilities, and expanding command, control, communications, and intelligence networks. Recapitalizing the army and navy would require investments of a similar scale. Perhaps most important, Russia and China are unlikely to extend Tehran the line of credit needed to facilitate large-scale purchases.

Yet across-the-board military modernization is unnecessary to achieving Iran’s core national security goals, which depend on only a handful of robust, niche capabilities. And while the lack of hard cash and other factors may prevent Tehran from negotiating co-production and technology transfer deals, the regime would likely acquire at least modest amounts of more advanced arms, thereby enabling its industries to reverse-engineer and eventually produce some of these weapons on their own.

BOOSTING SELF-RELIANCE AND DOMESTIC PRODUCTION
Indeed, lifting the ban could make a bigger difference for Iran’s domestic arms industry. The ethos of self-reliance is fundamental to the Islamic Republic, which has aspired to boost domestic arms production since the early 1980s in order to reduce dependence on outside suppliers, evade sanctions, and develop capabilities tailored to its specific operational needs. It has made major strides in the production of small arms, light and heavy weapons, munitions of all types, drones, rockets/missiles (including antiship, surface-to-surface, and SAM systems), light armored vehicles, and small warships (e.g., midget submarines and frigates).

Without the ban, Tehran may have more opportunities to acquire parts, components, machine tools, computer-aided production technologies, and special materials needed to produce more-advanced systems. Yet even under the current restrictions, Tehran has been able to procure commercial, off-the-shelf, dual-use items using convoluted and expensive clandestine procurement schemes. Many of these are small-ticket items that are available from numerous sources, difficult to track, and affordable even for fiscally constrained Iran. Over time, the regime has used these acquisitions to produce an impressive range of simple but highly capable weapons systems that are good enough for its needs and allow it to punch far above its weight.

For instance, the September 2019 strike on Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure was carried out with an estimated 18 delta-wing drones and 7 Qods-1 cruise missiles, but this relatively small arsenal was sufficient to cut the kingdom’s oil production in half for several weeks (equal to about 5 percent of global output). According to the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen, the motors of the drones used in the attack were unlicensed copies of a British engine that may have been produced in China and/or Iran, while their avionics, flight control, and fuel systems contained components from Britain, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Poland, South Korea, Sweden, and the United States. Likewise, the cruise missiles were powered by Iranian copies of a Czech turbojet engine and contained flight control and fuel components from Germany, Italy, and Switzerland.

Iran was able to obtain these commercial dual-use items despite international sanctions, and lifting the arms ban would make it easier. Even if unilateral U.S. sanctions remain in place or are strengthened, Iran could evade them by acquiring components from Chinese firms or other vendors that do not have business interests in the United States. Likewise, countries with weak export controls would likely be less vigilant about such transfers if the ban is lifted. And Washington would almost certainly have trouble convincing some countries to interdict arms and dual-use components en route to Iran if there are no Security Council resolutions proscribing them.

At the same time, several emerging high-tech trends will likely benefit Iran’s procurement and production efforts. Cutting-edge dual-use technologies are increasingly being developed by private firms around the world, not just by top-secret government labs in the United States and Russia. For this reason, it will be increasingly difficult to control the diffusion of “radical leveling technologies” (e.g., artificial intelligence, additive manufacturing, advanced robotics) that could enable Iran to gradually narrow certain military gaps with its adversaries. And because most modern weapons rely on embedded miniature computers, leaps in capability (e.g., harnessing AI to create complex drone swarms) may be just a software download away, as U.S. Navy commander Jeremy Vaughan pointed out in a 2017 IISS study. Even if some of these upgrades require the help of foreign software designers, such assistance would be difficult to detect and stop.

This Iranian strategy of marginal gains could pose substantial proliferation challenges to the United States and its allies. For instance, without an arms ban, Tehran may acquire technology to convert its long-range rockets to missiles, improve the accuracy of its short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, and manufacture countermeasures and penetration aids (chaff, jammers, decoys, maneuvering warheads) to defeat missile defenses. This could increase the striking power of its missile force by an order of magnitude, making it a potential game-changer in a future conflict. To illustrate: a point target that might once have required 100 inaccurate missiles to ensure destruction could be taken out by 2-3 highly accurate missiles in the future. Increased accuracy would also dramatically expand the number of targets Tehran can strike. Similar increases in capability would likely be realized for other types of Iranian weapons as well. And the regime would proliferate many of them to its various foreign proxies—as it has already been doing for years in violation of Security Council Resolutions 2231 (2015), 2216 (2015), and 1701 (2006). Once that happens, these proxies would inevitably become proliferators in their own right down the road, transferring Iranian arms to their own partners.

CONCLUSION
Most discussions about lifting the ban focus on how major arms transfers might affect Iran’s military capabilities. Yet while such transfers are a major source of concern, other factors may have a more significant long-term military impact. In particular, Iran would likely focus even greater resources on acquiring dual-use components, production technology, and special materials needed to upgrade its existing systems and advance its domestic arms industry. This approach makes more sense for the regime financially, politically, and militarily, as these kinds of acquisitions are relatively inexpensive, difficult to detect, and conducive to achieving technological surprise during a crisis or conflict. It is also more consistent with Tehran’s effort to realize a “revolution in military affairs” by seeking marginal gains that enable leaps in capability. As experience has shown, further Iranian progress of this type would disadvantage the United States and its allies, with potentially unsettling consequences for regional stability and global oil markets.

Michael Eisenstadt is the Kahn Fellow and director of the Military and Security Studies Program at The Washington Institute. This PolicyWatch updates the author’s 2017 article “Iran after Sanctions: Military Procurement and Force-Structure Decisions.”

 

[jward]

US and UK accuse Russia of launching new space weapon
By Ryan Browne, CNN

Updated 5:35 PM EDT, Thu July 23, 2020

(CNN) The US and UK militaries on Thursday accused Russia of conducting a space-based anti-satellite weapons test earlier this month, saying that a Russian satellite released an object capable of targeting a satellite.

It's the first time the US has accused Moscow of testing such a weapon.

"U.S. Space Command has evidence that Russia conducted a non-destructive test of a space-based anti-satellite weapon," the command said in a statement, saying that on July 15, Russia "injected a new object into orbit from Cosmos 2543," a Russian satellite that has been in orbit since 2019.

The statement added that the new "object" was released in proximity to another Russian satellite, activity that the command said was "inconsistent with the system's stated mission as an inspector satellite."




US works to bolster Ukraine's Navy to confront Russian threat

"Actions of this kind threaten the peaceful use of space and risk causing debris that could pose a threat to satellites and the space systems on which the world depends. We call on Russia to avoid any further such testing," Air Vice Marshal Harvey Smyth, head of the UK's Space Directorate said in a statement.

The accusation comes amid heightened tensions between Washington and Moscow over a range of issues. In recent days the US has accused Russia of a wide range of activities, including cyber-attacks on organizations involved in coronavirus vaccine development, human rights abuses, and using Russian mercenaries to destabilize Libya. Reports that Russian operatives offered cash incentives to Taliban-linked militants to target US troops in Afghanistan have further highlighted the tense relationship.

While the US has previously accused Moscow of testing anti-satellite weapons this is the first time the US has publicly accused Russia of testing an "on orbit" weapon, that is a weapon that is based in space.



"The Russian satellite system used to conduct this on-orbit weapons test is the same satellite system that we raised concerns about earlier this year, when Russia maneuvered near a U.S. government satellite," Gen. John W. "Jay" Raymond, Commander of US Space Command and US Space Force Chief of Space Operations said in a statement.

"This is further evidence of Russia's continuing efforts to develop and test space-based systems, and consistent with the Kremlin's published military doctrine to employ weapons that hold US and allied space assets at risk," he added.

The US also accused Russia of conducting an anti-satellite missile test in April.

Russian and Chinese anti-satellite weapons were cited as one of the reasons why the US needed a military branch focused on space, prompting the creation of the Space Force which Raymond now leads.

US satellites play a critical role in everything from navigation, weapons targeting and intelligence gathering, including keeping tabs on North Korea's nuclear weapons program and monitoring Russian and Chinese military activity, and there is concern about Beijing and Moscow's growing ability to target satellites.

Days prior to the new Russian space-based weapons test the State Department said that it was planning on holding a "Space Security Exchange" meeting with Russian representatives at the end of this month, saying that Christopher Ford, the US Assistant Secretary of State currently performing the duties of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, had finalized the details of the meeting with the Russian ambassador.

Ford slammed the weapons test in a statement Thursday, saying "This event highlights Russia's hypocritical advocacy of outer space arms control, with which Moscow aims to restrict the capabilities of the United States while clearly having no intention of halting its own counterspace program - both ground-based anti-satellite capabilities and what would appear to be actual in-orbit anti-satellite weaponry."

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US and UK accuse Russia of launching new space weapon