WAR 07-09-2016-to-07-15-2016_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Possible Impact

TB Fanatic
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/12/world/asia/japan-election-shinzo-abe.html?_r=0

Asia Pacific

Japan Election, a Landslide for Abe, Could Allow a Bolder Military

By MOTOKO RICH
JULY 11, 2016

TOKYO — The Liberal Democratic Party of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has governed Japan in one way or another for all but four of the past 61 years, a winning record that reflects the political inertia of a society that values stability and tradition.

But even by the standards of Japanese politics, Mr. Abe’s landslide victory in national elections on Sunday was stunning. For the first time, voters gave the Liberal Democrats and their allies more than two-thirds of the seats in Parliament — a supermajority that could allow Mr. Abe to realize his long-held ambition of revising the clause in the Constitution that renounces war and make Japan a military power capable of global leadership.

Opinion polls show only lackluster support for Mr. Abe’s security agenda or even his program to revitalize the Japanese economy, but the public appeared unwilling to take another chance on the opposition Democratic Party, which stumbled badly in its last, rare stint in power, most notably in its response to the 2011 earthquake and Fukushima nuclear disaster.

The vote for stability at home, though, is likely to provoke unease across Asia, where memories of Japanese militarism in World War II endure and the prospect of a more assertive Japan will add to worries over China’s territorial ambitions and North Korea’s nuclear program.

In China, Xinhua, the state news agency, warned in a commentary on Monday that the election results “could pose a danger to Japan and regional stability.”

Experts say that Mr. Abe’s governing coalition will not be able to push through constitutional revisions immediately, given that some of the partners have differing opinions on what needs to be amended and how. For example, the Liberal Democrats’ main ally, a small Buddhist party, has said that it opposes changes to the clause that renounces war. At a news conference on Monday, Mr. Abe said that he intended to press for debate on constitutional revision, though he acknowledged that “it’s not so easy” and added, “I expect the discussion will be deepened.”

Mr. Abe’s party, in a draft proposal of a revised Constitution, has also recommended amendments to the clause on freedom of speech and the press that could limit these rights in cases deemed dangerous to the public interest. Another proposal would expand emergency powers for the prime minister. Any revision would need to be approved by a majority in a public referendum.
Continue reading the main story

But the party’s victory on Sunday appears to have less to do with its proposals and more to do with the disarray in the opposition Democratic Party.

“The people’s distrust towards the Democratic Party is very high,” said Lully Miura, a lecturer on international politics at Tokyo University. “In 2009, the Democratic Party won the government, but they failed and failed and failed, and even once-supporters of the Democratic Party now distrust them.”

Some analysts said the opposition may have overestimated the public’s worries about Mr. Abe’s constitutional agenda at a time when so many remain concerned about Japan’s weak economy. Mr. Abe, for his part, spent most of his time on the campaign trail exhorting voters to allow his economic plan — called Abenomics — to continue, and he barely mentioned the Constitution.

“Probably the opposition parties pushed too much on the constitutional issue as a political agenda,” said Koji Murata, a professor of international relations at Doshisha University in Kyoto who supports constitutional changes. “But people didn’t care about the constitutional agenda in this upper-house election.”

Toshio Ogawa, an opposition candidate from Tokyo who narrowly won a seat, said voters might have had a hard time understanding how his party’s economic plans differed from those of the Liberal Democrats. But, he said, “I knew that Abe’s real goals were security and the Constitution. So I thought I had to point it out clearly.”

Critics said Mr. Abe’s party deliberately played down its agenda on constitutional change. Some also accused the Japanese news media, particularly the public broadcaster, NHK, of conspiring to help the governing party and failing to air enough information about the issues at stake in the election.

Voters seemed more interested in staying the course and giving Mr. Abe’s economic policies more time to yield results than in the debate over rewriting Japan’s pacifist policies.

“I want them to accelerate their economic policy to increase more jobs and improve social welfare,” said Akemi Machida, 29, who voted for Liberal Democratic candidates at a polling station in Sagamihara, a suburban town southwest of Tokyo. As for the opposition, she said, “There were no particular alternatives besides the L.D.P., whose policies sounded more convincing.”

Opinion polls show a majority of respondents in Japan oppose Mr. Abe’s security policies. But when the news media conducts these surveys, the questions are often vague.

“The opinion polls ask whether there is a need to revise the Constitution at all,” said Yasuo Hasebe, a constitutional scholar at Waseda University. “This is quite a strange question. People can’t answer that question before knowing which clause and in what way this change will be made.”

The very language used to describe constitutional revision may also confuse voters.

“In Japanese, the word for revise, ‘kaisei,’ gives an impression that something is improved or made better,” said Minako Saigo, 28, a mother of three children in Kyoto who founded Mothers Against War last July to protest legislation that gave the military some powers to fight in foreign conflicts for the first time since World War II.

“People stop thinking,” Ms. Saigo added. “They don’t question what will happen next.”

Outside Japan, Mr. Abe’s new supermajority is likely to further unsettle an increasingly tense region. South Korea defied China last week by announcing that it would deploy an advanced American missile defense system to protect itself against North Korea. And many in Asia are waiting to see how China and the United States respond to a ruling expected on Tuesday in a complaint brought by the Philippines challenging Beijing’s territorial claims in the South China Sea.

“The Chinese will fear that Abe will find a way to work the system to his advantage,” said Bonnie S. Glaser, a senior adviser for Asia and a China expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. At a regular news briefing on Monday, a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, Lu Kang, said that China and other Asian countries were “concerned about political moves in Japan” because of its past military action in the region.

In South Korea, an editorial in Munhwa Ilbo, a right-leaning newspaper, said the election results “opened the door for a Japan that can go to war,” though it added that a rearmed country “will also help deter North Korea’s nuclear threat and check the rising military power of China.”

The White House had no immediate comment on the election, but Jonas Stewart, a spokesman for the United States Embassy in Tokyo, said the Japanese government remained “a steadfast ally across our broad agenda of regional and global issues.” The United States supported Mr. Abe last year in the passing of the security bills that enable the military to participate more fully in foreign actions.

While constitutional change may be a long way off, some analysts said they worried the consequences of Sunday’s election were more fundamental.

“Democracy needs a system of checks and balances,” Gerald L. Curtis, a professor of political science at Columbia University, wrote in an email. “But if the opposition parties are impotent and the L.D.P. is firmly under Abe’s control, that system will be weakened to an unprecedented degree.”


Jane Perlez contributed reporting from Beijing, Makiko Inoue and Hisako Ueno from Tokyo, and Choe Sang-Hun from Seoul, South Korea.


Related Coverage

Japan Vote Strengthens Shinzo Abe’s Goal to Change Constitution JULY 10, 2016

Teenagers in Japan Can Finally Vote. But Will They? JULY 9, 2016


zerohedge ‏@zerohedge 3h
JAPAN'S EMPEROR EXPRESSES WISH TO ABDICATE AT SOME POINT:

NHK: Akihittingit




WR6k1Kqi_bigger.jpg


Japan's emperor expresses wish to abdicate,
report says



By James Mayger and Keiko Ujikane
Bloomberg
Published: July 13, 2016
http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/japan-s-emperor-expresses-wish-to-abdicate-report-says-1.418826


Emperor Akihito of Japan expressed his desire to abdicate at some
point, and the Crown Prince and other members of the imperial family
have accepted his wishes, NHK reported.

The emperor, 82, has reigned for 28 years, after succeeding his
father, Hirohito, in 1989. He would be succeeded by his eldest son,
Crown Prince Naruhito. NHK cited unidentified people at the Imperial
Household Agency.

As the first emperor to serve from the outset in the strictly symbolic
role prescribed by the U.S.-imposed constitution, and the first to marry a
commoner, Akihito was credited with helping modernize Japan's
monarchy. His reign began as the nation was at the zenith of its
economic power and just a year before its "bubble economy" burst,
ushering in decades of economic stagnation.

In visits across Asia and beyond, Akihito repeatedly addressed the
issue of the past aggression Japan's military carried out in his father's
name.

In 1990, he apologized for Japan's colonization of Korea from 1910 to
1945. Two years later, during the first visit by a Japanese monarch to
China, he acknowledged that Japan had "inflicted great suffering" on its
neighbor in the first half of the century.

"It's not an economic issue but the emperor is very widely respected,"
Robert Feldman, chief economist at Morgan Stanley MUFG Securities Co.
in Tokyo, said on Bloomberg TV. "In Japan the notion of the Emperor as a
symbol of the state is very important. From an economic point of view,
it's very important for social cohesion."

Emperor Kokaku, who gave up the throne in 1817, was the last
emperor to abdicate, NHK said. There is no provision in the Imperial
Household Law for such a move, and a legal change is likely to be
required, according to the public broadcaster.

 

Lilbitsnana

On TB every waking moment
Conflict News ‏@Conflicts 4m4 minutes ago

BREAKING: #US State Department says it is implementing an "ordered departure" of its staff from South Sudan - @AlArabiya_Eng

Conflict News ‏@Conflicts 1h1 hour ago

BREAKING: White House says 47 military personnel arrived in South Sudan yesterday to protect U.S. citizens, property - @ReutersWorld
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Sorry folks for being a bit absent, I've got "meat world" stuff coming out of my ears at the moment.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-idUSKCN0ZT2UV

World | Wed Jul 13, 2016 7:10pm EDT
Related: World

India vows more tough action, and aid, to tackle Kashmir conundrum

SRINAGAR | By Fayaz Bukhari


India will go on hunting militants in Kashmir despite widespread protests over the killing of a young separatist commander, officials said, as the government bets that force coupled with development will quell rebellion in the restive state.

The strategy for the Muslim-majority region contested by nuclear-armed neighbors India and Pakistan has worked in part.

The number of militants crossing into Jammu and Kashmir state from Pakistan to launch attacks against India has dropped in the last few years, and home-grown fighters are estimated to number only around 100, according to one security official.

Last year, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, whose ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is closely aligned to the Hindu nationalist right, also pledged 800 billion rupees ($11.9 billion) in investment there.

That has not prevented violent protests and rioting from breaking out when security forces killed Burhan Wani, a separatist militant commander and a Kashmiri, last Friday.

At least 34 people were killed - almost all shot by Indian security forces - and more than 1,500 people wounded in the worst violence in Kashmir since 2010, underlining how the crackdown on militants is not enough to solve a conundrum that has frustrated India since independence in 1947.

The government must also find a way to persuade local people that it is on their side, observers said, something it has failed to do since winning a landslide election in 2014.

"There is no denial in Delhi ... that a problem exists," said retired Lieutenant General Syed Ata Hasnain, an Indian army corps commander in the area from 2010 to 2012 who was deployed there seven times during his career.

"But no one seems to be clear on how to get into engagement with the people on the ground."

Under Modi, whose BJP is also in a coalition government in Kashmir, the federal government has taken a harder stance on engaging in political dialogue with the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, a separatist alliance.

While Hurriyat leaders traveling to Delhi and meeting Pakistani officials had been accepted before, Modi's government has objected to such interactions, saying Pakistan should not interfere in Indian affairs.


"WHY THIS HATRED?"

Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, the head of the alliance, said separatist political leaders felt isolated.

"The government of India cannot continue to deal with Kashmir with a clampdown," he said.

The state's deputy chief minister, Nirmal Singh of the BJP, said the government was ready to engage with the Hurriyat under a legal framework.

"They are not ready, but they try to exploit every situation," Singh said.

A senior BJP mandarin in New Delhi also said the government was open to talking to the Hurriyat, but did not appreciate it when they spoke with Pakistan.

He added that the government will continue to go after militants, but with time it hoped the people in Kashmir would "realize that their anger is misdirected."

"Be it jobs, education, health or any other amenities, the Kashmiri population gets all the same opportunities and benefits as any other Indian," said the BJP official.

"Why this hatred against the Indian government?"

A senior government official in New Delhi said Wani was a criminal facing 14 separate cases, including the murder of elected politicians and security forces, and that popular support for him was beside the point.



CYCLE OF VIOLENCE

In Wani's case, the security crackdown appears to explain his path towards militancy, and raises the possibility that other Kashmiri youths may follow.

His father, school headmaster Mohammad Muzaffar Wani, told Reuters in an interview last year that Wani's decision to take up arms was linked to an incident in which he and his brother were beaten by Indian police.

The brother, not known to be a militant, was killed by Indian security forces last year in circumstances that remain unclear.

Wani, who was 22 when he died, grew in popularity through videos posted on social media platforms like Facebook and WhatsApp in which he would appear without a mask.

Authorities have been accused by some of using excessive force to control the protests that followed his death.

The Doctors' Association of Kashmir said in a statement that security forces launched tear gas shells into a hospital where victims were being treated, and officers beat hospital staff and damaged ambulances.

Asked whether police and paramilitary forces used excessive force to control crowds after Wani's killing, BJP's Singh replied: "It is a matter of concern: this should not have happened. It is a worry as the anti-national forces will try to exploit the situation."

The inspector general for operations at the Central Reserve Police Force, a paramilitary organization with some 60,000 troops in Kashmir, said his men had been told: "Don't get into confrontation with locals, defuse the anger."

The official, Zulfiqar Hasan, said 300 of his men were injured in four days.


(Writing by Tom Lasseter; Editing by Mike Collett-White)
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-saudi-idUSKCN0ZT2CL

World | Wed Jul 13, 2016 10:20pm EDT
Related: World, Saudi Arabia

Attacks in Saudi Arabia bear hallmarks of Islamic State: CIA head


CIA director John Brennan said on Wednesday recent attacks in Saudi Arabia bore the hallmarks of Islamic State, and that the militant group was a very serious threat to the kingdom.

Suicide bombers struck three cities across Saudi Arabia earlier this month, killing at least four security officers in an apparently coordinated campaign of attacks on the penultimate day of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

"Those attacks bear the hallmarks of ISIL," Brennan said at an event hosted by the Brookings Institution think tank, using an acronym for Islamic State.

The explosions struck in Jeddah, Qatif and a security headquarters in the holy city of Medina, an attack Brennan described as "unprecedented".

The attacks were not claimed by any group although the Saudi government believes Islamic State is responsible after detaining 19 suspects linked to the five attackers.

Brennan said that while al Qaeda still posed a threat to Saudi Arabia, which had launched a fierce crackdown on the militant group in the early 2000s, Islamic State posed a greater danger to the kingdom.

Islamic State militants have carried out similar bombings in the U.S.-allied, Sunni Muslim-ruled kingdom in the past year, targeting minority Shi'ites and Saudi security forces.


(Reporting by Jonathan Landay; Writing by Yara Bayoumy and Ism'ail Kushkush; Editing by Chris Reese and Alistair Bell)
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/12/turkeys-deep-state-has-a-secret-backchannel-to-assad/

Dispatch

Turkey’s ‘Deep State’ Has a Secret Back Channel to Assad

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has recently patched up ties with Russia and Israel. Are a couple of nationalist politicians laying the groundwork for a deal with Syria’s strongman?

By Ceren Kenar
July 12, 2016

ISTANBUL — In the past month, Turkey has worked to turn two old rivals into new friends. On June 27, Turkish officials announced a deal normalizing relations with Israel after a six-year rift in the wake of the deadly Mavi Marmara incident. That day, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also expressed regret to Russia over the downing of a Russian warplane in November 2015, which paved the way for the two countries to patch up their relationship.

The fate of Syria looms large over Turkey’s foreign-policy “reset.”
Could Ankara alsoextend an olive branch to its greatest enemy: Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime?..........
 

Lilbitsnana

On TB every waking moment
interesting ship movement, could be "something" or "nothing"

connected to earlier posted info?



Nathan J Hunt Retweeted
DWS Intel ‏@DWSAviation 8m8 minutes ago

@ISNJH The data says this happened 21 hours ago. All vessels were at stationkeeping (1kt)so whatever was being transferred is likely over.


Nathan J Hunt Retweeted
DWS Intel ‏@DWSAviation 29m29 minutes ago

DPRK vessel (20.9247°/ 112.7941°) east of the Port of Zhanjiang. vessel in contact with smaller vessel/ nearby ship





Nathan J Hunt Retweeted
38 North ‏@38NorthNK 9m9 minutes ago

High level of activity detected at #NorthKorea’s nuclear test site, but purpose is unclear http://bit.ly/29wg8lK


posted for fair use and discussion


North Korea: High-Level of Activity at Nuclear Test Site Portal but Purpose is Unclear



By 38 North
11 July 2016

A 38 North exclusive with analysis by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.

Summary

Recent commercial satellite imagery indicates a high-level of activity at North Korea’s Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site, specifically at the North Portal area where the DPRK conducted its 2013 and 2016 nuclear tests. Based on imagery alone, it is not possible to determine whether this activity is for maintenance, excavation or preparation for a fifth nuclear test. Nevertheless, it is clear that North Korea is ensuring that the facility is in a state of readiness that would allow the conduct of future nuclear tests should the order come from Pyongyang.

High Level of Activity at North Portal

Commercial satellite imagery from July 7 indicates a high level of activity at the North Portal. What appears to be supplies and/or equipment are stacked on the ground south and southeast of the portal. Additionally, a small vehicle is present at the support building immediately to the south of the portal. Several mine ore carts may also be present southeast of the portal, suggesting the tunnel is being actively worked. However, the resolution of the image is insufficient to provide further insight into the nature of this activity.

Figure 1. Supplies/equipment, vehicle and several mine ore carts identified at the North Portal.
Image © 2016 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Image © 2016 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Limited Activity at West Portal

Imagery shows little activity at the West Portal although what appear to be two mine ore carts are present on the tailings pile to the east. Their presence suggests that work is taking place at the tunnel. The winter melt and runoff, combined with recent rains, produced a small landside just uphill of the portal. It is unclear if this has affected operations at the site.

Figure 2. Two mine ore carts present at the West Portal.
Image © 2016 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Image © 2016 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

No Activity at South Portal or Main Support Area

There is no activity identified at the South Portal, though runoff (caused by winter melt and recent rain) is visible in the area. This is also true at the Main Support Area, although greenhouse activity and light ground scarring indicate the area is active.

Figure 3. No activity at South Portal.
Image © 2016 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Image © 2016 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Figure 4. No activity at the Main Support Area.
Image © 2016 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Image © 2016 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Activity on Facility Access Road

Several groups of people and small vehicles are visible on the road south of the test facility. The nature or purpose of their presence is unclear, although it is likely that they are either engaged in spring maintenance or travelling to and from the test facility.

Figure 5. Vehicles identified on facility access road.
Image © 2016 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Image © 2016 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Figure 6. Group of people visible on road.
Image © 2016 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Image © 2016 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Little Activity in the Command Center Area

Imagery shows no vehicles or activity in the secured Command Center area. Camouflage is visible on the southernmost building, but it is unclear why this building has a camouflaged roof since the light blue/dark blue pattern stands out dramatically against the green forests around it.

Imagery indicates the construction of a building east of the Command Center and on the main road to the test facility. The purpose of this new building is unclear, but its position—east of the Command Center and between the north and south guard positions—suggests that it may support the security forces in this area.

Figure 7. New building constructed at the Command Center area.
Image © 2016 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Image © 2016 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realcleardefense.com/art...ds_a_heavy_defensive_ground_force_109561.html

July 14, 2016

Why NATO Needs a Heavy Defensive Ground Force

By Octavian Manea

A senior defence analyst at the RAND Corporation explains why the overall message that NATO needs to send coming out of Warsaw should be one that reinforces the gold standard of deterrence.

At the Warsaw Summit, the Alliance revised its forward deterrence posture. Over the past year the RAND Corporation conducted a series of simulations and war-games that exposed the major vulnerabilities that the Alliance has in the Baltic. Defence Matters discussed ways to mitigate them with David Ochmanek, a senior defence analyst at the RAND Corporation and a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Force Development (from 2009 until 2014).

The overall message that NATO needs to send coming out of Warsaw should be one that reinforces the gold standard of deterrence that of “confronting your adversaries with the prospect of failure at the operational level if they choose aggression.”

The access-denial problem is becoming very sensitive in Europe - in Kaliningrad, but also in the Black Sea. How do you see the impact of developing these A2/AD bubbles for the traditional power projection posture?

The issue of A2/AD cuts across all dimensions of power projection. Every domain of military operations – air, space, maritime, cyber-space, land – is affected by the A2/AD capabilities. The extent to which one’s power projection capabilities are affected depends on the adversary, the type and number of systems that are deployed, the proficiency of adversary and friendly forces, geography, and other factors. If you look at our most capable adversaries the threat is such that it is not simply going to be enough for us to continue to modernise our forces. We are also going to have to revise our entire concept for power projection operations. The approach that we’ve taken and worked so well against Iraq, Serbia, Libya is not going to be highly successful in face of our most capable adversaries. So there is a conceptual dimension to this as well as a modernisation problem.

How do you see the NATO Wales summit in perspective? Was it enough for reassuring the most exposed allies especially in an increasingly A2/AD environment?

The Wales summit took some useful steps. But it is only the beginning. As we do assessments of potential future scenarios that will involve Russian forces we are identifying other measures that would be appropriate to give us a robust deterrent. Some of them are pretty straight-forward and involve adjusting our posture. Others are about getting new capabilities to offset some of these Russian A2/AD capabilities.

I like to remind people that between the US and Europe there is an ocean, and this has important implications for how we prepare. We have to have the heavy component of NATO’s defensive ground force in the theatre before a crisis occurs. Specifically, the Alliance should deploy heavy brigade-sets to the Eastern flank of the Alliance in order to be prepared for the kinds of challenges that Russia could pose. The other things are more in the realm of countering specific Russian capabilities. We need improved capabilities and concepts for suppressing their integrated air-defence. We are going to need systems that will give us battle space awareness even in contested environments where we don’t have complete confidence in being able to operate in space or in the air space over the enemy’s territory. In Europe we need larger stocks of advanced expendable weapons: air-to-air missiles, air-to-surface weapons, anti-armoUr weapons, artillery. It is a mix between some old and new systems. The challenges posed by Russian forces are not insurmountable, but sustained investments will be needed to meet them.

The Warsaw summit of the Alliance is very close. How could NATO instil credibility into the defence of the Baltic states and (re)secure its Eastern Flank?

Looking back, there were three things that happened when the Cold War ended. Firstly we became focused on out of area operations and we changed our forces to do expeditionary operations in irregular environments. Secondly, the defence spending by most NATO members was reduced, their forces were thinned out and cut back. Lastly, we didn’t fundamentally adjust the Alliance’s posture because the idea that Russia would use military force to forcibly change borders in Europe, didn’t seem to be valid anymore. We had the expectation that we could partner with Russia and that we would broadly share objectives. Putin’s actions in 2014 have changed all of that. We have to focus again on traditional territorial defence, even though out of area challenges are not going away. We need to invest more--the 2% goal is a reasonable target. And we need to revise our posture. This last point means moving more capability toward the Eastern Flank, particularly the Baltic States that actually touch Russia and where there is very little operational depth.

A credible defence of the Baltic states would imply a combination of posture and modernisation. Our analysis points to the importance of prepositioning heavy equipment for several armoured brigades in the Baltic states, having a rotational presence of a company or battalion for every one of those sets so that they are not vulnerable to preemption. The Alliance will also need to have the proper munitions stocks in theatre, ensure that transportation networks are adequate to resupply and reinforce, and raise the readiness levels of some multinational armoured units in the rear areas of NATO so that those forward units can be reinforced within a few days by a second armoured force.


So a necessary component should be the forward presence. There is no way to avoid that in the current environment.

I don’t think so. I don’t see any substitute for that and the forward presence has to have an armoured component. The forces of the Russian Federation are overwhelmingly armoured and motorised infantry. In a crisis we could get light forces there, whether it is from the NATO Response Force or the 173rd from Vicenza or 82nd Airborne from US. But those forces find it difficult to engage armoured forces on the move because they don’t have the tactical mobility or the survivability to be effective. So we need a heavy armoured component there.

Is NATO’s deterrence capital on the Eastern Flank weakened?

I am not comfortable with our posture now, living in a world where Russia has demonstrated the capability and will, to use military power to change borders. We enlarged the Alliance under a set of fairly optimistic assumptions about Russian objectives. Those are no longer valid so it is extremely important to adjust our posture and capabilities. We need to get right the underlying military balance between NATO and Russia. The gold standard of deterrence is confronting your adversaries with the prospect of failure at the operational level if they choose aggression. We should not be comfortable until we have a posture that can deny a quick, low-cost invasion of NATO territory.

Are we going to have a new capability gap at the horizon? Should the Alliance be able to neutralise an access-denial bubble? I don’t see many countries ready to invest in the equipment that can break and put the access-denial network of the other side in danger.

We face capabilities gaps now. NATO members collectively have a GDP many times greater than Russia’s. If we want a stable geopolitical order in Europe and we wish to avoid war, we should invest prudently in the capabilities needed to confront Russia with the prospect of defeat should it choose war.

The Pentagon and Bob Work have been talking for some time now about a third offset strategy. What is its purpose and what are the consequences for the Alliance?

Our response to this challenge is going to be in two dimensions: The firs one is about posture and the second is focused on modernisation. The offset strategy is about focused modernisation. The things that emerged from the RAND war-games made us realise that we need better capabilities to suppress the integrated air defences--the network of double digits SAMs and their command and control; we need effective area anti-armour munitions and they are going to need to be delivered in an environment where the control of the air is still contested; we need to gain battle space awareness in contested space-air environment. The third offset strategy should be focused on addressing a finite number of operational challenges relevant to operations in the anti-access/area denial environment. Capabilities emerging from this work will apply not just to the Russia, but also to China because there are a lot of commonalities between the two.

As in the Western Pacific our challenge is to modernise the force and come up with new conceptual approaches in order to conduct power projection. We need to do both in parallel. We should expand field experimentation, doctrine development, and combined training.

There is an emphasis on forward stationing around 4 battalions in the Baltic states and Poland, together with the necessary pre-positioned equipment. Having in mind the results of the most recent RAND war-games and simulations, is this move along with the ERI funding enough to provide a credible deterrence? Will the deterrence be robust enough? What gives robustness to deterrence?

The four battalions and other steps being taken under ERI and the Warsaw Summit are certainly steps in the right direction. There is no substitute for having heavy ground combat power deployed forward. But given the size and firepower of the forces that Russia is capable of positioning on NATO’s eastern borders, a forward force of about three heavy brigades, supported by light forces, artillery, and improved air force capabilities is called for. Reinforcements for this forward force will be needed as well.


This article originally appeared at Defence Matters.
http://defencematters.org/news/deterrence-nato-needs-heavy-defensive-ground-force/969/
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.voanews.com/content/us-forces-afghanistan-battle-taliban-almost-daily/3416083.html

News / Asia

Taliban Pose 'Almost Daily' Challenge for US Troops in Afghanistan

Carla Babb
Last updated on: July 12, 2016 11:02 PM

BAGRAM AIR FIELD, AFGHANISTAN — The top U.S. general in Afghanistan says his forces are using their new authorities—which include airstrikes against the Taliban--"almost daily” in support of the Afghan government's efforts to rid the country of insurgents and terrorists.

Speaking at Bagram Air Field on Tuesday, General John "Mick" Nicholson, the commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, said his troops are now better equipped to help Afghan forces take the offensive against the Taliban, and they have begun to carry out their mission in several areas.

Nicholson spoke to reporters accompanying U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter, who made an unannounced visit to Afghanistan. In Kabul earlier Tuesday, Carter said the expanded authority that President Barack Obama granted to U.S. forces last month allows "much more efficient use and effective use" of both American and Afghan forces.

U.S. troops in Afghanistan can now attack Taliban fighters directly to gain a strategic advantage. Previously, American forces were only authorized to strike Taliban units if they were under attack or if their Afghan allies were facing imminent defeat.

Explaining the new rules of engagement for his troops, Nicholson used the example of last year's lengthy battle for control of Kunduz, in northern Afghanistan. The Taliban launched a complex attack against Kunduz city in late April 2015, and over the course of several months the insurgents made major gains against Afghan forces, while U.S. forces were limited in their ability to join the fight.

Nicholson said U.S. troops were on "a defensive, reactive" footing during the prolonged Taliban offensive.

Kunduz fighting

Only when Taliban forces attacking from three directions gained complete control of Kunduz, five months after their initial attack, were U.S. Army Special Forces able to take an active role in the battle. They made rapid progress in pushing back Taliban fighters and their allies, but that phase of the fighting also was marred by an erroneous American airstrike in early October. A U.S. warplane hunting for a Taliban command center mistakenly bombed a hospital run by Doctors Without Borders, killing dozens of patients and hospital staff.

Now that American forces have more clear-cut guidelines allowing them greater freedom to attack Taliban units, Nicholson said, U.S. assistance has helped Afghan forces expand their control outward from Kunduz city to a large area of that northern province.

Similarly, in southern Afghanistan, the U.S. is attacking Taliban fighters alongside Afghan troops in areas such as Kandahar Province's Maiwand district, the U.S. commander said.

Carter's trip to Afghanistan followed by less than a week Obama's announcement that U.S. troop reductions will be slower than planned in the coming months. Total American forces in Afghanistan as of next January will be 8,400 troops, up from the force of 5,500 men and women originally scheduled to be on duty at the start of 2017.

Troops 'over the horizon'

A senior defense official told VOA several troops will support the NATO mission from regional bases outside Afghanistan.

Nicholson specified that 400 U.S. troops with Resolute Support would be outside Afghanistan.

"Some capabilities we put over the horizon," Nicholson said, "but I'm very comfortable with them being where they are, and we can call them forward [to duty in Afghanistan] if necessary."

The decision to place "some hundreds" of troops outside Afghanistan complicates the question of how many American forces actually are being withdrawn, since any of the units shifted to regional bases could be redeployed into the country on short notice.

Nicholson said about 3,000 troops will be advising Afghan forces as part of NATO’s Resolute Support Mission. Roughly 2,150 of the 8,400 U.S. troops in Afghanistan will support the U.S. counterterrorism mission, dubbed Freedom’s Sentinel, which targets remnants of al-Qaida, pockets of Islamic State fighters and six other terror groups. About 3,300 will serve as enablers for both missions.

WATCH: US forces remain committed in Afghanistan

Carla Babb

Carla is VOA's Pentagon correspondent covering defense and international security issues. Her datelines include Ukraine, Turkey, Pakistan, Korea, Japan and Egypt.




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http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/ar...rces-for-population-centric-counterinsurgency

Training Host Nation Forces for Population-centric Counterinsurgency

by Barnett S. Koven
Journal Article | July 11, 2016 - 4:18am

The initial, 2006, publication of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency (COIN) Field Manual, FM 3-24, received extensive attention. It inspired ample discussion among both practitioners and academics, was the topic of myriad symposia, and was even republished by a major university press in 2007. Interest in the manual was not limited to the U.S. Numerous developed countries, including France, Spain, and the UK produced their own versions of FM 3-24 in short order. Developing country forces similarly became aware of and often adopted the manual’s dictates. During extensive field research in Peru for example, I observed that both senior military officers responsible for developing Peruvian COIN strategy as well as more junior officers and NCOs tasked with carrying out COIN at the operational and tactical levels were familiar with the core tenants of population-centric COIN as elucidated by FM 3-24. Peru, in particular is an interesting case as Peruvian forces adopted a U.S.-inspired doctrine w/minimal input from U.S. forces. As such, examining this case helps to illustrate where developing country forces are readily able to adapt to the demands of population-centric COIN on their own and what persistent barriers remain. This enhanced understanding of developing country forces’ abilities to adjust to the requirements of population-centric COIN will enable U.S. train and equip mission to better target their scares resources to areas where host nation forces need the most assistance and where they are most likely to have a positive impact.

Getting COIN training for host nation forces right is especially important given that even as the number of conventional wars decline, instances of intrastate dynamics such as insurgency and civil war are on the rise. Unfortunately, recent U.S. training efforts have come up short. This is not surprising, when one considers the complexities involved in COIN and the difficulties that even advanced forces such as the U.S. experienced. Specifically, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24.2, which seeks to translate the doctrinal lessons of FM 3-24 into tactics that can be implemented at the brigade, battalion, and company levels notes that commanders must be equipped to handle “diverse issues such as land reform, unemployment, oppressive leadership, or ethnic tensions.” It further notes that, COIN “places a premium on tactical leaders who can not only close with the enemy but, also negotiate agreements, operate with nonmilitary agencies, and other nations, restore basic services…orchestrate political deals, and get ‘the word’ on the street.”

Given the complexity of COIN operations and the requirement that military forces engage in activities that they have not traditionally been involved in or trained for such as land reform, substantial adaptation must occur in six broad areas in order to facilitate population-centric COIN. First and foremost, senior political and military leaders must be committed to making substantial changes in order to enable the adaptation necessary to implement this type of COIN doctrine. Absent this commitment, changes in the other five areas are unlikely. In addition to high-level commitment to the strategy, reforms must be made to enhance unity of effort, improve intelligence capacities, expand military presence and basing in contested areas, ensure that officers and NCOs are flexible in their approaches and able to take tactical initiative, and curtail military corruption.

As indicated, buy-in from senior political and military officials is crucial. If high-level commitment to a population-centric approach to COIN and the adjustments necessary to implement it are absent, success is highly unlikely. Unfortunately, research suggests that even in cases where host nations were highly dependent on foreign support for COIN efforts and where a substantial threat that the government would fall to the insurgents existed, U.S. and British efforts to encourage the host nation to embrace certain tenants of population-centric COIN failed miserably absent organic political will. In short, if domestic political elites and senior military officers are not invested in the strategy, there is little U.S. train and equip missions can do to change that and scarce training resources ought to be directed to other countries where they are more likely to have a positive impact.

Assuming there is organic domestic interest in and support for the changes necessary for the adoption of population-centric COIN doctrine, efforts to increase unity of effort among security forces, intelligence services, and civilian governmental entities are required. The complexities of this type of COIN strategy necessitates a whole of government approach. Integrating the disparate military services, police forces, and intelligence capacities is relatively easily accomplished. This is the case since all share a similar, security-focused, purpose and usually have a pre-existing history of close collaboration. In Peru, a joint command was created to incorporate army, navy, marine, air force, special forces, and intelligence personal engaged in COIN under a unified commander and joint staff. The Peruvian National Police were subsequently added. Similar successes have occurred in other cases. In Colombia, the National Police are considered part of the ‘Public Force’ comprised of both police and military forces. The police are under the control of the Ministry of National Defense and not the Ministry of the Interior. In Afghanistan efforts have also been made to ensure collaborative planning among the army, police and intelligence service. While Peru was successful in greatly enhancing unity of effort among its security forces without extensive foreign assistance, in all three examples, collaboration between the security services and civilian government entities that are essential to tasks such as governance reform and development assistance has been extremely limited. In short host nation forces do not need extensive assistance to enhance unity of effort. Though what assistance that is offered in this regard should be directed to encouraging collaboration between security services and civilian government ministries and agencies.

In addition to unity of effort, intelligence is critical to overcoming the fundamental problem of COIN, the ‘identification problem.’ Unlike traditional set-piece battles, insurgents do not wear uniforms and blend into civilian populations. As such, superior intelligence capacities are required to enable the counterinsurgent to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants and apply military force only against insurgents. Following the same model used for integrating their security forces, Peru developed the Special Joint Intelligence Brigade to incorporate each military services’ and the national police’s intelligence apparatus under a single command. Importantly, the brigade includes improved reporting structures that ensure that military planners receive actionable intelligence reports that are produced by fusing the products of the various intelligence services. To increase their intelligence capacities, Peruvian forces looked to Colombia’s experience with intelligence reform. While extensive U.S. collaboration undergirded Colombian reform efforts, Peruvian forces were able to adopt a similar approach absent extensive collaboration with U.S. forces. Although, some cooperation with Colombia did occur. Again, while major intelligence reforms do require political will, they can be accomplished without the need for extensive U.S. assistance. To the extent that foreign assistance is required in this regard, triangulated security cooperation is likely to be more efficient than direct U.S. support.

Another critical area where host nation forces can, if desired, affect substantial changes on their own relates to military presence and basing. A sustained military presence and engagement with the local population in contested areas is crucial to the success of COIN efforts. This will often require the deployment of additional forces and the construction of forward operating bases. Peruvian forces embarked upon an impressive base-building campaign wherein dozens of new bases were constructed and existing bases renovated during a four year periods between 2012 and 2015. Building new bases and deploying additional forces is a task that even militaries that are not used to population-centric COIN have pre-existing experience in. Construction efforts can also be contracted to local builders. As such, it is unlikely that these efforts will require extensive U.S. support. However, in cases where U.S. forces are attempting to standup host nation forces to take over counterinsurgency operations begun by the U.S., local forces may benefit from bases previously constructed by U.S. forces.

Whereas host nation forces can make substantial progress on their own in the aforementioned three focus areas, foreign assistance is especially necessary in two interrelated areas tactical initiative and flexibility, and corruption. Relative to the U.S., recruits for developing country forces tend to have lower levels of education. This problem is compounded by relatively less investment in professional military education and training. Given that FM 3-24.2 requires tactical commanders to engage in a wide range of complex activities, this is especially concerning. U.S. train and equip missions have often focused on increasing unit-level tactical proficiency. Indeed, in Afghanistan NATO ran a combined arms training course. While the aforementioned example targeted field grade officers, efforts to train NCOs and junior officers for the complex tasks required by this type of COIN doctrine could prove especially fruitful in improving the tactical skills and the level of flexibility required for COIN missions. Foreign training, exchange programs, and especially joint operations also help to improve the professionalization and morale of host nation security forces. And of course, morale is a critical component of combat power.

By improving the professionalization of host nation forces, this type of training will also help curtail military corruption. Insurgencies are often fueled by narcotics and lootable natural resources. These dynamics can also breed military corruption. In the Peruvian case, General Wilson Barrantes, compared deploying the Peruvian military to confront a narcotics-fueled insurgency to utilizing “four street dogs to guard a plate of beefsteak.” Certainly, increased professionalization is not a panacea solution to corruption, but it does help. U.S. assistance efforts could also be directed towards enforcement and the administration of military justice as a means to further curtail corruption.

Assuming buy-in from senior political and military officials, host nation forces are often capable of adapting to improve unity of effort, intelligence collection, and military presence and basing largely on their own. Scarce assistance resources are likely to be most useful in assisting local forces to improve tactical skills and flexibility, and to moderate corruption among the armed forces. If senior leaders are not committed to the necessary reforms, U.S. assistance is not likely to have a major effect and it may make sense to redirect resources elsewhere.

SWJ Editor’s Note: During 10 months of field research in Peru, Barnett S. Koven researched and wrote an article entitled “Emulating US Counterinsurgency Doctrine: Barriers for Developing Country Forces, Evidence from Peru,” which was published in the Journal of Strategic Studies. The genesis for this subsequent article is a recent SMA SOUTHCOM Lecture Series briefing in which he began to translate the specifics of the Peruvian case to more generalized lessons for U.S. efforts to stand-up host nation forces for population-centric counterinsurgency.

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About the Author »

Barnett S. Koven

Barnett S. Koven is a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the George Washington University and an Affiliated Scholar at the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy at Florida International University. His dissertation examines under what conditions development assistance reduces or exacerbates insurgent violence both where it is implemented and in geographically proximate areas. This research, which has involved extensive archival investigation, practitioner interviews, fieldwork, and the construction of original quantitative datasets covering Iraq, Afghanistan, Peru, and Colombia, was funded by two grants from the Horowitz Foundation for Social Policy and a third from the George Washington University. More information about Koven’s research and a complete list of publications are available on his website.
 

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