WAR 07-08-2017-to-07-14-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

Sorry for another delay in getting the weekly thread started, as you're all aware from my "chat" thread things are a bit chaotic here right now, such that this sort of subject matter is "relaxing".... HC


(276) 06-17-2017-to-06-23-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...23-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(277) 06-24-2017-to-06-30-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...30-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(278) 07-01-2017-to-07-07-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...07-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.defenseone.com/feature/mosul-largest-battle-decade-future-of-war/

What the Largest Battle of the Decade Says about the Future of War

By Ben Watson

The bloody battle to wrest Mosul from ISIS was the world’s largest military operation*in nearly 15 years.*

Here’s how Western-backed*Iraqi soldiers*helped break the Islamic State’s grip on a city of more than 1 million people —*and what we can learn from it.

Video

Day One

The Mosul offensive began on October 17, 2016,*when a variegated body of more than 100,000 troops—local volunteers, regular soldiers, elite Iraqi*and Western special forces—collapsed on the country's second-largest city. The force, believed to overmatch*ISIS 10-to-1,*moved under the cover of*airpower provided by*a half-dozen nations.

Advancing*from the south, east and the north, Baghdad*and its allies*needed*just 14 days*to make it to Mosul’s doorstep. Iraqi special forces raced*about 15 miles in those two weeks, and became*the first to knock*on that door.*But such large-scale, coordinated assaults would prove much more difficult in the*months to come.**


Listen:*Voices from the Battle for Mosul,*featuring*interviews with Brig. Gen. Rick Uribe, deputy commanding general for*U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq; and*retired U.S. Army*Special Forces Col. David Witty, who spent years training Iraqi special forces. Via*SoundCloud,*below.*

The assault on Mosul proper revealed an enemy well-prepared to grind down an attacking force. ISIS fighters used tunnels and street-spanning*canvas overhangs*to hide*their movements. They set up artillery — both conventional and improvised. They armed a*small fleet of boats for riverine combat. Most forbiddingly,*ISIS laced the city with car bombs and the means to replace them.

“A lot of VBIEDs,” said the coalition's Deputy Commander, Brig. Gen. Rick Uribe, referring to vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices—what some in the military have termed bluntly "very big improvised explosive devices." “Particularly in November and December, which is when we finally got into the urban side of the city.”

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Those car bombs*soon were exploding at the punishing rate of five per day.*“Then you had indirect fire that ISIS was using against our Iraqi Security Forces,” Uribe said.

Stuff like mortars*and rockets—some stolen from Iraqi Army stocks, some manufactured from scratch.*“It really was inaccurate. But they just were putting a bunch downrange,” said Uribe.

ISIS also continued to use*suicide bombers, including many more children, terrorism scholar Charlie Winter noted in an exhaustive analysis of ISIS suicide operations through February. The trend would continue through the month of June.

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In early November, Iraqi special forces broke through to East Mosul, where the Islamic State’s resistance stiffened markedly. The use of suicide car bombs rose steadily, as did coalition airstrikes on more than 100 ISIS factories producing*them.*

But the advance also yielded troves of intelligence. Iraqi troops*seized the TV station and began digesting new information on car-bomb factories, artillery caches*and a new weapon: armed*off-the-shelf commercial drones.*

By 2016, many militant*groups had already put consumer drones to use for*surveillance and reconnaissance, but the battle for Mosul marked the first use of*armed drones*by a nonstate actor. And even as ISIS was pushed from East Mosul in January, their drones grew deadlier.*

It was also an easy tactic to copy.*

Within weeks, Iraqi federal police had armed drones of their own. Like the ISIS versions, these were rigged to*drop*40mm grenades fixed to badminton-like birdies that steadied the munitions as they fell.*

http://cdn.defenseone.com/media/featured/chart-mosul-uavs-jul-1-bp.png

Halfway There

The January 24 liberation of the city's eastern side marked the battle’s halfway point, and the coalition took a few weeks to regroup. The next phase would*push*across the Tigris River, whose bridges had been largely disabled. (See a detailed map of damage to Mosul's five bridges by December 5, via Stratfor, here.)

Coalition leaders used the time to review*some of the more glaring tactical successes and shortcomings, said David Witty, a retired Green Beret colonel who now teaches at Norwich University. Witty, who advised*Iraq’s Counter-Terrorism Service, or CTS, has published a report on Iraq’s Golden Division (also called the "Golden Knights")*special forces for the Brookings Institution.

“There were a lot of mistakes made there in the first phase of the battle,” said Witty. “One of the big mistakes that was made early was that the counterterrorism service was really the only force to enter into East Mosul.”

For Baghdad, that was both a blessing—that the CTS advanced so far so quickly—and a curse, because the coalition began*to rely on*the special-purpose force to lead the charge. And oftentimes, alone.

“The counterterrorism service was set up to be an elite special operations unit,” Witty said. “You don't tell a Ranger battalion or a U.S. special forces battalion to go out and clear a city. That’s what you have a regular army for. The counterterrorism service, like the name implies, was an elite counterterrorism unit which is going to conduct precision range hostage rescues ambushes. It was never designed to be used the way it's been used now.”

The Golden Knights “fought in East Mosul by themselves for a good month while the other units were still outside of the city—the Iraqi army, the Iraqi federal police. It wasn't really until December when the other axes opened up and you had the Federal Police moving in, and the Iraqi army in, and they made some good progress.”

The pause appears to have given Iraqi officials time to absorb at least one important lesson.

“When they attack ISIS on multiple axes and have multiple advance routes, they’re successful. But when they only have one, it turns into a meat grinder,” Witty said. “It usually doesn’t work out, because ISIS is able to concentrate their best fighters and all their combat power on just that one axis. And that's a mistake that was made during the first half of the battle.”

Final Push

In March, coalition forces*began their attack on Mosul’s Old City,*where ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had first announced the caliphate*in mid-2014. It’s a dense and difficult area to assault. General Uribe said this was well-understood by Iraqi and coalition planners.
*
“This would be a challenging fight for any force,” he said. “We knew that that was gonna be the case. Old Mosul, it’s just a different landscape. It’s very tight. Vehicles can’t fit in there. It’s a dismounted fight.”

Eight months of airstrikes largely leveled Mosul's Old City:

Gallery

“West Mosul is much more difficult is because it's such a compact battle space and there's so many people, the streets are narrow, and of course there's been civilian casualties, no doubt about that,” Witty said.

Coupled with ISIS' use of human shields (see, for example, here and here), these factors turned the advance into a bloody weeks-long stalemate, with thousands of civilians caught in the middle.

The coalition's deadliest strike of the ISIS war to date took place*on March 17 in al-Jadida district, West Mosul. Iraqi forces called in an airstrike on two snipers atop a building, which once hit, triggered an enormous explosion that killed more than 100 Iraqis.

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The*airstrike on al-Jadida*marked a deadly turning point. The coalition*reduced the frequency*of airstrikes on suspected VBIED factories, though officials continue to stand by the overall conduct of the air war*in the Mosul offensive.*

"I don't think you've seen another*camapaign in a long time with the level of precision that we've been able to accomplish here in striking the right target with the right weapon at the right time," Uribe said.

But the bulk of the fighting has taken place on the ground, and under historically dangerous conditions, Uribe said. “When is the last time that any major army has fought in an environment like this? I would offer it’s probably been in World War II.” Others have suggested the 1990s battles for Grozny, Chechnya,*and 1968's assault on*Vietnam's Hue City—but with caveats.

Witty suggested the 1942 battle for Stalingrad*as a possible parallel. But, he added, “The thing that really makes this different is that the Iraqis are really taking a lot of care to try to protect as many civilians as they can and as much infrastructure as they can. And, of course, those those weren’t concerns to the Germans and Russians in the battles that they fought. So that's what kind of makes this unique and I think that was really kind of a hallmark in the battle of the east Mosul.”

By the end of May, the Iraqi Security Forces had been bogged down just*900 meters from the Nuri mosque for more*than 40 days. On*June 21, perhaps as a kind of last hurrah, the Islamic State group apparently detonated explosives inside and around the 12th-century Nuri mosque. Coalition troops managed to push ISIS into the final, remaining blocks of the Old City by July 7, one week after retaking the territory around the symbolic Nuri mosque.*

http://cdn.defenseone.com/media/featured/mosul-intensity-map-july-1-bp.jpg

Since October, nearly one million*Iraqis have fled their homes in Mosul and its surroundings, according to the UN.

However, the situation in the wider country is improving. “In Iraq, 1.7 million Iraqis are now back in their homes; no longer displaced, no longer refugees or migrants seeking to flee,” Brett McGurk, the U.S. envoy for the counter-ISIS campaign, said May 19. “That record is historically unprecedented in a conflict of this nature, and we give tremendous credit to the government of Iraq and local leaders who have worked cooperatively to stabilize local areas and return local populations.”

By March,*the effort to free Mosul had killed*more than*7,000 Iraqi civilians and wounded another 22,000,*estimated*Middle East observer Joel Wing, who has been tracking developments in Iraq since 2008.*“The vast majority—6,340 of those killed and 17,124 of the injured—were civilians," Wing wrote.

How many of these deaths were caused by errant coalition munitions? By early July, Iraqis had accused the coalition of killing*more than 7,000 civilians. The monitoring group*Airwars*said*the number was more likely between 900 and 1,200. For their part,*coalition officials said that its entire anti-ISIS bombing campaign since 2014 had killed just 603 civilians, including the 105*who died*in the March 17 strike on Al-Jadida.

The offensive took a heavy toll on Iraqi security forces as well. Through mid-May, nearly 1,000 had died and 6,000 wounded, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Joe Dunford said. And that’s an important, if often overlooked point about all of this, Witty said. “There's a lot of coalition air support a lot of advisers and ground trainers, but Iraqis are ones that are bleeding and dying every day. And I think that's what a lot of Americans don't understand.”

And ISIS itself? No one knows. Iraqi official estimates of the group's troop strength were all over the map;*one officer claimed that*more than 16,000 militants died in the battle for Mosul. But official*U.S. estimates*generally held that ISIS had begun its defense of the city with no more*6,000 ISIS fighters.

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What Comes Next

What comes next? As Iraq looks to rebuild, and tens of thousands of*Moslawis return to their homes—or what’s left of them—ISIS is still holding onto territory south and west of Mosul.

“Other pockets of ISIS exist elsewhere in Ninawa, Hawija, and the western Euphrates River Valley of Anbar Province,” U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis told reporters during his first ISIS war briefing on May 19. “We will continue to fully support the Iraqi Security Forces and Prime Minister Abadi's government in isolating and destroying ISIS throughout Iraq.”

And the future of Iran-Iraq relations? “That's really the million-dollar question,” said Witty. “The Popular Mobilization Forces—the Shi’a militias—they’ve become so important in this. Some of the popular mobilization forces are really independent, and work directly for Baghdad; others have Iranian advisors.”

Consider*as well, he said,*the Kurdish regional government and its willingness to cooperate with Baghdad. "Some will be opposed to it, of course. And then, so when that happens, where does that leave Iraq? Does Anbar Province want to break off, and set up its own its own country, since its majority Sunni? And does the rest of Iraq—Baghdad, really—become an Iranian rump state heavily influenced Iranian politicians and leaders? I think this is the beginning of a long, difficult process. Iraqi politicians have all been saying that the the phase that comes after Mosul is going to be harder than the actual Mosul because there's going to be a lot of hard decisions that have to be made.”

http://cdn.defenseone.com/media/featured/just_isis-turf-map-jul-1-bp.jpg

If the U.S. military has learned anything about Iraqi insurgencies over the past 15 years, it’s that violence will likely return to Mosul, as it has on occasion in Baghdad—which the group never seized.

And there are still other regions that Baghdad must wrest from ISIS.

On top of that is the ISIS presence in Syria, where an entirely separate large-scale operation has been progressing for months. The target: the group’s de facto headquarters in Raqqa. Beyond that, ISIS also maintains strongholds south of Raqqa*in*the Euphrates River city of*Deir Ez-Zour,*and some 200 kilometers west, around the ancient city of Palmyra.

Which is all to say: the battle for Mosul may soon be over,*but the war against ISIS — already a generational conflict —*is far from finished.*

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/07/08/weekly_recon_8_july_2017_111752.html

Weekly Recon 8 July 2017

By Blake Baiers
July 08, 2017

Good Saturday morning and welcome to Weekly Recon. On this day in 1853, Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, representing the U.S. government, sails into Tokyo Bay, Japan, with a squadron of four vessels.*For a time, Japanese officials refused to speak with Perry, but under threat of attack by the superior American ships, they accepted letters from President Millard Fillmore, making the United States the first Western nation to establish relations with Japan since it had been declared closed to foreigners two centuries before.

Somalia: America’s “Forever War” – *The U.S. launched fresh airstrikes against al-Shabaab, Somalia’s al Qaeda affiliated group, this week, marking an uptick in ongoing hostilities in an often forgotten theater of the so-called “forever war.” These strikes follow a similar airstrike launched in June. Earlier this year the Trump administration declared Somalia an area of active hostilities. That decision was designed to give ground commanders more latitude regarding offensive airstrikes. Stars and Stripes reports that AFRICOM has not changed the guidelines for the decision to launch strikes, but the easing of restrictions has allowed AFRICOM to respond more quickly.

Al-Shabaab has been able to operate effectively in Somalia due to the country’s weak and often corrupt central government. The country has found new hope in its new president, Mohamed Abdullahi "Farmajo" Mohamed, who enjoyed popular support at the time of his election in February. Since then, the initial sense of promise has waned, and the political situation now verges on crisis. Thus far, “Farmajo” has not proven to be a source of political stability, which has always been elusive in post-colonial Somalia. Furthermore, the Somali military, greatly affected by the political instability, is not yet capable of keeping al Shabaab in check on its own.

Writing in the Washington Post, Tricia Bacon of American University offers her recent experiences in the region to show that al Shabaab won’t be going anywhere anytime soon. Barring a drastic change in the situation, the U.S. military is likely to remain in Somalia for the foreseeable future, especially following the expected withdrawal of African Union (AMISOM) troops in 2020. Although largely ineffectual, AMISOM has been responsible for the brunt of counterinsurgency operations in Somalia since 2007.

Does the U.S. Army Have What It Takes to Fight?*– *The U.S. Army faces a daunting problem – its potential enemies are getting much better at challenging its ground-to-ground weapons systems. The Army once comfortably overmatched any potential adversary, but Sandra Erwin reported this week on the diminishing qualitative technological edge that the U.S. Army holds over its near-peer adversaries in ground combat. The Abrams tank is increasingly vulnerable to advanced anti-armor missiles. Russian anti-tank missiles outrange U.S. “armor by two kilometers.” Furthermore, Russia currently deploys land attack missiles that, in defiance of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, can travel over 500km. In comparison, the current U.S. long-range land attack rocket has a range that is less than 320km.*

The gaps have been identified, and the Army is taking steps to close them. As the Army receives more funds for modernization it tasking industry with developing better protection for its armor, as well as developing next-generation “long-range ground fires” capabilities. But the Army has a poor record of accomplishment when it comes to fielding new ground platforms. Furthermore, it is yet to be seen if the Army will prioritize growing the size of the force over modernizing weapons systems.

As adversaries close technological gaps in the area of ground-to-ground combat at ever increasing speeds, time is a luxury the Army can no longer afford. As Erwin astutely points out, “This is not just a budget issue, but also one of military strategy.”

SEND RCD YOUR INPUT:*Please send your tips, suggestions, and feedback to editors@realcleardefense.com. Make sure to follow us on Twitter at*@RCDefenseand follow Blake Baiers*@BlakeBaiers

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.washingtonpost.com/worl...5875b7d1876_story.html?utm_term=.b27da8107a07

National Security

The watchers: Airmen who surveil the Islamic State never get to look away

By Greg Jaffe July 6

JOINT BASE LANGLEY-EUSTIS, Va. — Her day begins following a man on a red motorcycle as he bumps down a rutted road past palm trees and cement block houses. An assault rifle is slung across his back.

While her partner stares at the video feed from an armed Air Force drone, Courtney, 29, a staff sergeant and intelligence analyst, fires off questions and compiles a running narrative.

“What’s the driver wearing?” she asks, keeping one eye on the action as she types.
“Black Western wear,” says Aaron, 20, the airman assisting her.

The motorcycle driver is speeding through Qaim, an Islamic State-controlled city in western Iraq, where the midday sun has driven temperatures over 100 degrees.

Courtney is sitting in a chilly cubicle, where purplish-pink overhead lights, designed to make the video stand out, give the room a feeling of perpetual dusk. It’s the start of another shift at this base outside Hampton, Va., on a recent morning in mid-June.

For more than three years, this has been Courtney’s war — 10 hours a day, four days a week, thousands upon thousands of hours of live video footage from Iraq and Syria.

It is an existence characterized by long stretches of boredom and grim flashes of action as she helps guide pilots’ decisions on when to shoot and watches the last seconds of another person’s life. The Air Force allowed a Washington Post reporter to spend a day with a team of its analysts — the first time a journalist was allowed to spend a full shift watching their secret work — on the condition that their last names were withheld for security reasons.

With President Trump likely to send thousands more troops to Afghanistan and maintain a military presence in Iraq indefinitely, some airmen will spend most of their careers immersed in the war zone, watching an ever-expanding flood of live video. Trump’s proposed defense budget would continue the rapid growth in worldwide drone missions. The Air Force is on pace to fly as many as 70 missions a day next year, up from fewer than 15 missions a day a decade ago

“Our airmen never get to unplug,” said Lt. Col. Alison Kamataris, the deputy commander of the 497th Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Group here.

Infantrymen typically serve nine- to 12-month combat tours; pilots deploy for four months. Even U.S.-based drone pilots rotate off war duty every three or four years.
“We don’t have the same ability to give breaks to train or innovate,” Kamataris said of her analysts.

[How a woman in England tracks civilian deaths in Syria, one bomb at a time]
Air Force officials are just beginning to grapple with the long-term effects of this life. For now, they mostly have questions: How long before the intensity of the troops’ war zone experience begins to overwhelm the relative quiet of their lives off-base? Can repeated exposure to remote killing over a long career lead to moral exhaustion? What should Air Force officials do to rebuild boundaries between the war zone and home — “combat and the cul-de-sac,” in the lingo of the modern Air Force — that technology has obliterated?

Courtney, meanwhile, has more immediate concerns. On this morning, she is both watching life in a distant city and waiting to see whether her name is on a list, due to be released in about an hour, of airmen selected to go to officer training school. The promotion would free her from the daily grind of the video feed and give her broader responsibilities overseeing airmen and positioning Air Force intelligence assets on the battlefield.

A few cubicles away, her fellow airmen, anticipating good news, have bought a celebratory cake. “It’s going to be a sad cake or a happy cake,” she says. “Either way, we’re having cake.”

‘A lesson in patience’

Courtney was working as a paralegal at a law firm near her home town in Louisiana and weighing law school when she first applied to be an Air Force officer. The Air Force had seemed like a chance to serve and see the world.

When she wasn’t selected for officer training in 2013, she decided to enlist as an intelligence analyst, a job that would put her quickly into the fight. Unlike most enlistees, she has a college degree.

Courtney is the first link in a chain that runs from her base in Virginia to the air operations center in Qatar to the drone pilots scattered across the United States. The targets are chosen by commanders who rely on voice intercepts, satellites, human intelligence, high-altitude surveillance planes and the analysis of people such as Courtney.

Only a few months into her work here, she was looking for a gathering of Islamic State fighters in northern Iraq. She found their trucks parked in the desert and, as the drone’s camera panned, spotted the fighters who were firing their weapons into a mass of about 50 unarmed men, packed shoulder to shoulder in a ditch.

The fighters rumbled past two more mass graves before coming to a stop on the side of the highway. Courtney scanned the area for women and children. There were none, so the Air Force planes let loose.

Courtney’s next job was to tally the dead. “I hadn’t witnessed anything that gruesome before,” she says. “It was shocking.” She stayed after work to talk with Air Force mental- health counselors. The next day she was back behind the screen.

The toughest part of the job, she says, has been forgetting about it when she goes home and not second-guessing decisions. “We’re at war,” she says. “We don’t experience bullets flying, but our decisions have direct impacts on people’s lives.”

Analysts such as Courtney typically take part in strikes or witness acts of killing every two to three weeks. In between, they spend hours upon hours watching scenes of everyday life unfold on their screens: children playing, women shopping, men gathering for evening prayers.

[Air Force is trying to improve drone pilot morale — with memes]

Now Courtney and her partner are orbiting a crossing over the Euphrates River, moving from Iraq into Syria.

“On the south side of the river there’s a ferry carrying a white truck and two adult males,” Aaron says. “It looks like there’s also a motorcycle on board.”

“Yeah, it’s a motorcycle,” Courtney says, leaning in for a better look.

Neither she nor Aaron can make out any weapons, which suggests it’s just another scene of everyday life in Islamic State territory.

She checks her watch and notices it’s a few minutes before 10 a.m., when the list of airmen selected for officer training is due to be released online.

Another airman takes her place behind the video screen. Courtney slides her chair a few feet to her left and logs onto the Air Force personnel website. A banner at the top of the screen reads: “Active FY17 Officer Selection Board Updates!” But the names have yet to post.

“A lesson in patience,” she says, drumming her fingers on the desk.

She refreshes the page a few more times. Nothing.

Courtney’s colleague watches as the drone moves from the river crossing to a suspected Islamic State “operations center,” which on the screen looks like almost every other blocky, cement house in eastern Syria. A woman in a black abaya glides past, trailed by a child.

Courtney, still waiting, pops her knuckles and refreshes the screen. “Oh, goodness gracious,” she whispers under her breath.

Eventually, another airman who has also applied for an officer slot tells her to type PSDM, short for “personnel services delivery memorandum,” into the website’s search bar.

It takes only a few seconds for Courtney to scan the list and realize she’s not among the airmen who were selected. She looks to see whether any other intelligence analysts were picked and texts her disappointing news to a friend: “No cigar. Only 63 selected.”

A deep breath, and then she’s back to the drone feed.

“There’s a child in the alley to the south of the building,” Aaron is saying.

“What?” Courtney asks, an edge of sadness and frustration in her voice.

‘A single word’

For the next few hours, the pace is unrelenting. They orbit a warehouse complex, another Islamic State “operations center,” an enemy checkpoint. They follow a truck, a motorcycle and then another truck.

Courtney’s immediate supervisor, a tech sergeant, approaches her cubicle and asks gingerly about the officer list.

“Sorry,” he says.

“Don’t be,” she replies, her eyes fixed on the screen. “That makes nobody feel better.”

“You’ll make it next time,” he offers.

Courtney’s job is to watch the video feed and make judgments: Are the people on the screen civilians or enemies? Do they pose a threat to U.S. troops or allies? Does it make more sense to shoot now, or wait and see where they go or what they do?
To mitigate civilian casualties she keeps a tally of men, women and children in the area. She makes note of anyone who crosses her screen.

“One previously unobserved adult male pushed a wheelbarrow on the south side of the target building,” Courtney writes while observing a suspected Islamic State drone factory. “He took a box — already present in the wheelbarrow — into the building.”

She types her observations in a chat room that is monitored by dozens of U.S. military and intelligence officials around the world, where even the smallest details can have life-or-death consequences. After U.S. and coalition airstrikes last September mistakenly killed 62 Syrian troops, a military investigation honed in on communications among the pilots, commanders and the analysts, who had doubts about the target.

“A single word made the difference between shooting and not shooting,” said an Air Force intelligence officer who oversees operations at the base here.

To sharpen the analysts’ vigilance, the Air Force is experimenting with different lighting schemes. And to help with stress, particularly after strikes that result in civilian casualties, a psychiatrist and mental-health counselor have been assigned full-time to the operations floor.

“Our suicide and suicidal ideation rates were way higher than the Air Force average; they were even higher than for those people who had deployed,” said Col. Jason Brown, commander of the 480th Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Wing. “Something had to be done.”

The suicide rates in the small community have fallen with the introduction of the mental- health teams, Brown said. The stressors, though, haven’t diminished. In the past three years, Air Force officials said there has been a tenfold increase in weapons expended on the battlefield. The heavier fighting has meant more scenes of carnage on the feed.

In some instances, the demands of urban combat and a more aggressive approach to the war have meant taking shots even when analysts determine civilians are present. The number of allowable civilian casualties can vary with the importance of the target.

“For us, it can be kind of demoralizing,” says Christopher, a tech sergeant and Courtney’s immediate supervisor on this day. “We’re aware of civilians,” he says, but the analysts don’t set the limits for pilots. “We can’t tell them, ‘This is your cutoff,’ ” Christopher says.

Somewhere over Syria

“We’re shifting,” Courtney says as her drone heads for what she is told is a suspected Islamic State war “spoils camp.”

“That’s an interesting name,” says Aaron, who assumes it’s a place where the Islamic State stashes captured loot.

Night has fallen in the desert, and the men at the camp are stretched out on mats under the stars.

“Was that a cigarette he just tossed?” Aaron asks, pointing to one of the men on the screen.

“Yeah,” Courtney says. “This doesn’t really seem nefarious.”

In fact, it looks like a typical Bedouin campsite. Camels lope across the screen. No one appears to be armed.

Courtney’s squadron commander pulls her aside to offer her some words of encouragement on becoming an officer.

“The service didn’t see fit this time,” he says. “But it doesn’t mean no. It just means not right now.”

She walks back to her cubicle, passing people eating her celebration cake. A few minutes later she’s back at the screen, transiting to the next location in her target deck: an Islamic State safe house. She studies the cluster of buildings, the curve of the road and the placement of the satellite dishes on the roofs.

“Hey, I’ve been here before,” she says. “I just recognized it.”

“It’s like driving through your home town,” Aaron replies. “You get familiar.”

Courtney watches a man shoo a dog and children at play. Her relief arrives and boots up his computer a few minutes before 4 p.m.

“Your eyes are free,” he tells her.

She stands up and stretches.

Her first call when she leaves the building is to her parents to let them know she wasn’t selected for officer training. Early the next morning, she’s back in her chair, back in the war, floating somewhere over Syria.

147 Comments

Greg Jaffe is a reporter on the national staff of The Washington Post, where he has been since March 2009. Previously, he covered the White House and the military for The Post. Follow @GregJaffe

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/why-another-philippines-terrorist-attack-is-coming/

Why Another Philippines Terrorist Attack Is Coming

Another Marawi-like siege is likely to occur.

By Zachary Abuza
July 06, 2017
*****
As fighting in the southern Philippine City of Marawi recedes, there is much to take stock of. The six week siege of the city by the Islamic State pledged Maute Group and a faction of the Abu Sayyaf tested the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and it has led to a regional concern that Mindanao is, once again, a black hole in regional security. The toll was high: 70 members of the military and police, 27 civilians, and 290 militants were killed according to recent estimates, and more bodies are being recovered as security forces comb through the rubble. Over 246,000 civilians were displaced. The city is in ruins.

There is much to write about Marawi: the intelligence failure;*the fact that the Maute Group had conducted a similar siege in Butig in November 2016; President Rodrigo Duterte’s single-minded attention on the war on drugs rather than the growing threat by terrorist groups. We can question Duterte’s decision and justification for declaring martial law. We can debate whether the decision to drawdown the U.S. Special Forces contingent in 2014 was the right one, or whether, if they had stayed, the AFP would have conducted itself better or more professionally. And we can analyze the rift between the AFP and Duterte over U.S. assistance and provision of intelligence.

But here I want to ask just one question: is another Marawi-style siege likely? And, relatedly, what this mean for the United States?


The answer to the first question is a definitive yes, and for five interrelated reasons:
1. The Militant Leadership is Largely in Tact

On June 22 the AFP acknowledged that the Isnilon Hapilon, the Maute brothers, and Mahmud Ahmad, the leading Malaysian militant had all fled the city. This is despite the fact that there are only three roads in and out of Marawi. So while the AFP claims that the militants suffered nearly 300 casualties, the charismatic leadership is able to regroup and plot anew. Leadership matters. Their success, in tying down the AFP for some six weeks, will attract followers and new recruits. They have every reason to be confident. They sieged cities on two occasions. *They have proven themselves as committed jihadists, willing to take the fight to the Philippine government. And as will be discussed below, the pool of recruits is large and growing.

2. The Draw for Foreign Militants

While there is still a debate over the number of foreign militants who were involved in the fighting, there is no doubt they were there. *The Philippine military claims that two Malaysians, two Indonesians, two Saudis, and a Yemeni and Chechen have been confirmed killed. The pipeline for militants is there. The Philippine military, without offering evidence, has suggested that as many as 89 combatants were foreign fighters. Indonesia estimates some 40 pro-Islamic State militants are currently engaged in fighting in the southern Philippines. Malaysia has estimated the number of its nationals in the 20s.

As the fortunes and territory of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) dwindle, more militants from Southeast Asia and Bangladesh will make their way to Mindanao. In a 2015 video, Southeast Asian militants based in Syria, implored their brethren to do just that, if they were unable to get to Iraq or Syria. And I think that it is very clear that the jihadist pendulum between focusing on the near and far enemy, is clearly swinging back to the former. I anticipate that militants across Southeast Asia will renew their focus on issues close to home, such as Mindanao and the plight of the Rohingya.

Moreover, Mindanao will continue to attract foreign fighters for one other critical reason: they control territory. Since the demise of the Mujahideen Indonesia Timur (MIT) in Mindanao, not a single al-Qaeda or ISIS-affiliated group in Southeast Asia outside of the southern Philippines controls physical space. At an operational level, a secure space is essential, to regroup, train, and plan attacks. Ungoverned space is key for the growth of militant groups. But it is more important at the strategic level: these groups aspire to be recognized as a province of the caliphate; and one cannot achieve that without physically controlling space. Only in the Philippines is this seemingly achievable in the near term.

Though trilateral maritime patrols have commenced in the Sulu Sea, the capabilities and resources of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines remain weak, and the borders remain very porous. It is a good start, but no panacea.

3. The MILF Peace Process

The leaders likely got away across Lake Lanao. And what lies there? The Moro Islamic Liberation Front’s (MILF) 102nd Base Command, led by Abdullah Macapagar, aka Commander Bravo.

Bravo is bellweather figure, whose comments and actions are worth studying. In 2007 and 2008, when the cabinet of President Arroyo rejected the draft peace agreement (MOA-AD) and the Supreme Court found it to be unconstitutional, a number of MILF base commanders began attacking Christian communities. Macapagar was one of them. Several others broke from the MILF leadership, and established the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), which continues to fight the government to this day. Macapagar is the most influential of the Maranao constituents, and his base command is one of the most secure. He was critical of the peace process, but still supported the MILF’s 2014 peace accord. There were no signs that he was planning to defect or join forces with the BIFF.

In January 2015, the Philippine police conducted a botched counter-terrorism operation, that led to the death of 44 of their men. The backlash from that put the entire peace process on hold, at a time when the Philippine Congress was deliberating the implementing legislation, the Bangsamoro Basic Law. Since then, the peace process has been on hold.

In February 2016, Macapagar gave an unprecedented interview to a French TV crew. The imagery was very important. He was filmed in front of an MILF flag, with MILF insignia on his uniform. He acknowledged the spread of IS militants throughout his base command, and yet called them “brothers.” He was making it very clear the problem was bad, was going to get worse, and that he could police his territory were he to have sufficient reason to do so. The Maute’s November 2016 siege of Butig town and their filmed ISIS-style execution of two Christian “spies” were all done in the MILF’s heartland.

Whether the MILF’s provision of sanctuary to the Maute group is active or passive, remains up to dispute. The AFP, acknowledged during the Butig crisis, that the Maute group, at the very least was “taking advantage of the peace process,” aware that the government would not enter MILF territory. Duterte at the time, saw a complicit relationship and demanded that Macapagar be eliminated.

In the midst of the Marawi siege, Macapagar released a pre-recorded 17 minute video statement, calling the Maute group “misguided” — but not wrong — for engaging in jihad (legitimate) but endangering civilians (not legitimate). In it he called the Maute and Abu Sayyaf, “our younger brethren” and asked them to leave the city. His communications, somewhat full of bluster, somewhat garbled, are nonetheless very deliberate.

The MILF remains key to any solution. It was Macapagar’s men who opened up the relief corridor into the city, to help trapped civilians flee. But the MILF made clear they don’t want to be in position of “negotiating” with the Maute and Abu Sayyaf on behalf of the government, for it could reopen an avenue of attack that they have sway over or coddle terrorists. The MILF is in an untenable position.

Without a peace process, the MILF have no reasonable or logical incentive to act as a responsible stakeholder and police their territory. The MILF leadership has publicly stated their commitment to the peace process, and even decommissioned heavier crew-serviced weaponry. But it is very clear that they have been able to recruit from the ranks of the MILF, who have grown disenchanted with the stalled peace process, and who have seen no peace dividend. There is a direct correlation between the spread of pro-IS groups and cells in the Philippines with the collapse of the MILF peace process, following the Mamasapano incident in January 2015. How much longer can the MILF leadership maintain effective command and control?

A draft Bangsamoro Basic Law has been renegotiated by an enlarged Bangsamoro Transition Commission. It will soon be submitted to Duterte’s office. It’s transmission to Malacanang was immediately delayed. Even if you assume that Malacanang isn’t going to water it down, there is no guarantee that Duterte will make it a legislative priority, will spend the political capital to get the bill passed in Congress. Even if Duterte has promised a Bangsamoro homeland in three years, why should we expect Congress, in the aftermath of Marawi, to be willing to pass the law, when it wouldn’t pass it in 2015?

And then we need to consider the fact that Duterte is pursuing a separate agreement with the former MNLF chairman Nur Misuari, as well as trying to push through his signature campaign issue, amending the constitution to turn the Philippines into a federal system, with significant political and economic autonomy. These three goals are contradictory. You cannot have all three. And the MILF is very ambivalent towards federalism.

Militancy is about exclusion and until Moro youth feel that they have a reason to stop fighting, they will take up arms. If you were a Moro youth, and you saw the patent Islamaphobia in the congressional investigations over the Mamasapano clash in 2015, or viewed the government’s unwillingness to make the stalled peace talks a priority, or saw the AFP use artillery and gravity bombs on a civilian population, or hear President Duterte “joke” that it was alright for his soldiers rape women in Marawi or to engage in combat even if there were civilians, you might not feel that there was much space for you in the Philippine nation.

4. Duterte Himself

The next reason that Marawi is likely to happen again lies with Duterte himself. In trademark bluster, he recently warned: “The objective of ISIS is to kill and destroy. I will also kill and destroy!” But this was not the enemy he wanted or was ready for.
Let us be clear, Duterte is not going to defeat the militants through force, but that is exactly what he is opting for. His campaign of 8,000 extrajudicial killings did not end the sale of drugs on the streets, but he shows no sign of reversing course. Indeed, one of his cabinet officials dismissed the Maute’s ideological goals, and linked the siege to the desire to control the drug trade. His campaign against the Abu Sayyaf have not ended the group’s spate of kidnappings.

This is just his temperament.

Insurgencies flourish because of weak governance. Duterte’s contempt for the rule of law and democratic norms, his authoritarian tendencies, his campaign of extrajudicial killings, jailing of political opponents, routine threats to extend martial law beyond Mindanao, will collectively weaken the hardwood rule of law, governance and system of checks and balances that the Philippines has achieved in the past 30 years.

The Maute and Abu Sayyaf Group militants are likely to retreat and regroup to the mountainous hinterland that straddles Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao provinces, long the MILF heartland. If the AFP is tasked with going in hot pursuit of the militants, they almost definitely encounter MILF forces. And there is every reason to fear another Mamasapano-style “tragic encounter” that caused the peace process to collapse in 2015.

5. The Philippine Military’s Limited Capabilities

Even if Duterte thinks he can shoot his way out of this, the AFP is all too aware that it has neither the manpower nor resources to cope with the host of threats that it faces. The AFP was sorely tested and resources and manpower were stretched very thin in Marawi. Yes, urban combat is very hard and it is new for them.

In the midst of the Marawi siege, the BIFF staged a siege of a school in neighboring Maguindanao province. Were other fronts to open, the BIFF, the Ansuar al-Khalifa Philippines (AKP), a spate of ASG kidnappings, or should talks with the NPA break down, the AFP would be overwhelmed. There is too much space, and the AFP has such limited capabilities that similar attacks are inevitable.

Implications for U.S. Policy

There is no military solution to this conflict. It requires a holistic strategy. Sadly, there is none evidenced from Duterte. The next siege or spectacular attack is not a matter of if, but when. And that has grave implications, not just for Philippine, but regional security.

Some have argued that the Marawi conflict is drawing the United States and the Philippines back together, after Duterte’s lurch to China, and public distancing of ties to it treaty ally.

The United States provided significant amount of weapons during the siege, not to mention intelligence, including the deployment of P3s and drones. Could the United States continue to supply more weaponry? Perhaps. Duterte’s war on drugs have already led to one Senator putting a hold on the export of small arms to the Philippines. At what point does the deflation of martial law invoke Leahy Amendment sanctions?

The United States could offer training and assistance, but it should do so only with some very open eyes. After 14 years of a relatively successful mission, the security situation is worse than it ever was. And isn’t that the yardstick we need to measure such assistance by? Moreover, it’s very clear that Duterte himself does not welcome such assistance and training, preferring Chinese assistance, even though it pales in comparison with US aid.

And there are many reforms that the AFP is in dire need of, that, no matter how much U.S. assistance Washington provides, will need to be addressed: the nine to ten month tenure in armed forces chiefs, endemic corruption, and chronic under-investment in their military.

Until Duterte comes up with a holistic strategy, the United States should hold back on assistance. Washington is really good at “mowing the lawn” when it comes to jihadist groups around the world. But 16 years into the Global War on Terror, the field is growing, and mowing has proved to be an insufficient strategy, for both the United States and the Philippines.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/07/07/nato_enhances_its_eastern_front_111748.html

Atlantic Council
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NATO Enhances its Eastern Front
What in the World is Vladimir Putin Up To?

NATO Enhances Its Eastern Front

By Teri Schultz
July 07, 2017

The Baltic States and Poland have long wanted an enduring NATO presence on their territories. Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea in 2014 convinced their allies they need it.* With plans approved at the Warsaw Summit in 2016, now the four countries each have a battle group of approximately 1,000 troops stationed on their territory. “We don’t see any imminent threat against any NATO ally,” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said, “but we have to be vigilant.”

Stoltenberg traveled to Latvia and Lithuania in June during the Saber Strike 2017 military exercises, which involved some 11,000 troops from twenty countries, to mark the battle groups becoming fully operational and to remind everyone why they exist. *

“What we saw in Crimea and Ukraine was that there was a lack of a strong military presence that made it possible for Russia to act in the way they did, with hybrid warfare, with little green men in Crimea,” Stoltenberg told me.*“[Lithuania] is a very different country, but we need an increased NATO presence with multinational forces, improving our situational awareness to be able to send a very clear message that any attack, any threat against any NATO ally will trigger a response from the whole Alliance.”

Stoltenberg noted that the battle groups aren’t the only new element NATO has added to its beefed-up border protection, having tripled the size of the joint response force to 40,000 troops and*including an upgraded spearhead force that can be deployed within days.

Audio

Closing the experience gap

Part of Saber Strike’s goal this year was to practice defending the “Suwalki Gap,” the roughly sixty-five-mile border between Lithuania and Poland which also separates Russia’s Kaliningrad enclave from Belarus.* If that strip of land were blocked during a military conflict, it would sever the continuity of NATO territory and dramatically hinder allies’ movements.

No one’s saying the Kremlin has definite designs on the “Suwalki Gap,” or any other NATO territory, but Russia and Belarus are gearing up for their own joint exercises in September, Zapad, which are expected to simulate conflict with NATO. Details of Zapad 2017 have not been made public. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu has said Zapad will*be smaller than Saber Strike’s roughly 11,000 troops, but some Western analysts believe Russia will actually call up as many as 100,000 military personnel. An exercise that large would require Moscow to officially notify the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and OSCE members must be allowed to observe parts of the program, as Russia would have been welcomed at Saber Strike, had it wanted to attend.

Zapad still a mystery

Stoltenberg called on Moscow to follow those rules with Zapad 2017. “We expect Russia...,” he said before correcting himself, “we call on Russia to fully adhere to their international obligations.*The increased presence of military personnel and forces across our borders just underlines the importance of more predictability, transparency, and mechanisms for risk reduction to avoid any incidents and accidents from happening.”

Regardless of what the Kremlin is considering, practice or otherwise, NATO’s not taking any chances, explained US Maj. Gen. Neal Loidolt, the Minnesota National Guardsman who directed Saber Strike. “As planners, we try to be prepared for any way that the next war is going to be waged,” he said, in response to my question about whether he really expects Russian tanks to come rolling across the Lithuanian border rather than some more sophisticated type of intrusion.

From traditional training to hybrid hoaxes

“You might say why are we still practicing mounted maneuvers with tanks and Bradleys [fighting vehicles]? Well, because the enemy still has its own versions of tanks and Bradleys. And they might very well still choose to use them against us,” he said. He also referred back to Crimea. “Perhaps it could be [like] both phases of the Ukraine operation,” he went on. “Perhaps it could be ‘little green men’ but perhaps it could be [like] the invasion into the Donbas region that could very well happen here.” Loidolt said Estonian colleagues told him they believe that is a realistic possibility in the Baltic region.

Loidolt mentioned that disinformation attacks have already been attempted against the German forces leading the Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battle group. Those efforts, widely attributed to Russia, have thus far failed.* Still, Loidolt acknowledged, that’s more likely to be the way a potential conflict would emerge.* “But what we don’t know,” he reminded, “is what happens if there’s a real tactical miscalculation and somebody does run a bomber into somebody else’s bomber or somebody crosses the border that they’re not supposed to? And you wouldn’t want to be an unprepared force practicing and training only for little green men and then being made to deal with a maneuver threat.”

Loidolt is confident NATO can handle anything that comes across the border, hoping that means nothing will.

Teri Schultz is a Brussels-based freelance journalist. You can follow her on Twitter @terischultz.

This article originally appeared at The Atlantic Council.

 

[OldArcher]

Thanks for all you do, Housecarl... Great articles, especially the view inside the drone intel operation.

GBY&Y's

Maranatha

OldARcher

 

[Housecarl]

Thanks for all you do, Housecarl... Great articles, especially the view inside the drone intel operation.

GBY&Y's

Maranatha

OldARcher

You're most welcome OldARcher.......

Well no surprises here.....

For links see article source.....
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http://www.weeklystandard.com/iran-...ons-technology-across-germany/article/2008747

Iran Still on the Hunt for Nuclear Weapons Technology Across Germany

3:07 PM, Jul 07, 2017 | By Benjamin Weinthal

Startling new evidence from German intelligence reports shows the Tehran regime is working to illegally obtain technology and know-how to advance its nuclear weapons and missile programs, despite the 2015 agreement to curb its nuclear program.

A report from the state of Hamburg holds that “there is no evidence of an complete about-face in Iran’s atomic polices in 2016” [after the Islamic Republic signed the JCPOA deal with Western powers in 2015, aimed at restricting Tehran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief]. Iran sought missile carrier technology necessary for its rocket program.”

The report noted that the federal prosecutor filed criminal charges against three German citizens for violations of the export economic law due to the deliveries of 51 special valves to Iranian company that can be used for the Islamic Republic’s sanctioned Arak heavy water reactor. The installation, the intelligence officials wrote, “can be used to develop plutonium for nuclear weapons.” Iran pledged, under the JCPOA deal, to “dismantle the [Arak] facility,” the intelligence report states.

On the proliferation of atomic, biological and chemical weapons, a second report from Baden-Württemberg’s state intelligence agency report states: “Regardless of the number of national and international sanctions and embargoes, countries like Iran, Pakistan and North Korea are making efforts to optimize corresponding technology.”

The 181-page document outlines the technology Iran is seeking: “Products and scientific know-how for the field of developing weapons of mass destruction as well [as] missile technology.”

Iran’s illegal procurement and terrorist activities are cited 49 times in the report and range from cyberwarfare to espionage to support of the EU- and U.S.-classified terrorist organization Hezbollah.

The Baden-Württemberg report provides detail on Iran’s development of ballistic missiles with the aid of a Chinese front company. A Chinese import-export business approached a company in the southern German state that manufactures “complex metal producing machines” to buy equipment.

Berlin’s Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control requested an end-use receipt for the Iranian purchase. The intelligence agency informed the engineering company that the merchandise was set to be unlawfully diverted to Iran. “This case shows that so-called indirect-deliveries across third countries is still Iran’s procurement strategy,” wrote the intelligence officials.

A third intelligence report from last month, from another German state, says that in 2016, “German companies located in Rhineland-Palatinate were contacted for illegal procurement attempts by [Pakistan, North Korea and Iran]. The procurement attempts involved goods that were subject to authorization and approval on account of legal export restrictions and UN embargoes. These goods, for example, could be used for a state’s nuclear and missile programs.”

Germany’s federal intelligence agency (the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution or BfV)—the rough equivalent of the FBI—published its intelligence report on Tuesday. The federal data did not cite Iran’s activity in Baden-Württemberg—a state that is home to highly advanced engineering and technological companies.

Nonetheless, the 339-page federal document reports that Iran has not curtailed its missile program: “The amount of evidence found for attempts to acquire proliferation-sensitive material for missile technology/the missile program, which is not covered by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, remained about the same.”

The report did find “significantly less evidence of Iranian attempts to acquire proliferation-sensitive material for its nuclear program. As far as the BfV was able to verify such evidence, it did not reveal any violation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.”

The second anniversary of the JCPOA will fall on July 14. Days after the agreement was signed in 2015, German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel rushed to Tehran with a delegation of business leaders. The U.S. State Department has designated Iran as a top state-sponsor of terrorism.

The Social Democrat Gabriel, who is widely considered to be one of the European leaders most sympathetic toward the Islamic Republic, hosted Iranian leaders in May and June, including Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif in Berlin last month. In May, Gabriel welcomed Hamidreza Torabi, a radical anti-Western Iranien cleric who called for Israel’s destruction at the annual pro-Hezbollah al-Quds rally Berlin in 2016.

Germany’s foreign ministry invited Torabi to its event titled “The Conference on the Responsibility of Religions for Peace.”

Meanwhile, Iran’s aggressive cyberwarfare activities were stressed in the reports. According to the federal document, “The Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Iran are the major players behind espionage activities that are directed against Germany. Cyberattacks can now also be attributed to presumed government agencies in Iran.”

It is clear from all this that the Islamic Republic of Iran remains determined to be able to hit its foes with weapons of mass destruction, either before or after the restrictions supposedly placed on it by the 2015 nuclear agreement expire.

Benjamin Weinthal is a fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/ar...ns-and-the-demise-of-the-afghan-national-secu

The End of Afghanistan’s Spring Fighting Seasons and the Demise of the Afghan National Security Forces?

by Barnett S. Koven
Journal Article | July 9, 2017 - 6:24am

The End of Afghanistan’s Spring Fighting Seasons and the Demise of the Afghan National Security Forces?
Barnett S. Koven

While many rejoice the arrival of spring, Afghans know that this season ushers in a considerable increase in fighting. Or at least it used to. A confluence of three factors – the conclusion of poppy cultivation, improved weather conditions and recesses in madrassas in neighboring Pakistan – have made spring Afghanistan’s ‘fighting season.’ However, 2016 marked the first year, since insurgent violence first surged in 2006, where the arrival of spring did not correlate with an increase in insurgent attacks. Indeed, attacks trended downward as the season progressed. Moreover, insurgent violence fell precipitously compared to 2015 (1,338 attacks in 2016 versus 1,716 incidents in 2015; a decrease of 22 percent). Figure 1, below, depicts this trend, as well as casualty rates, using data from 2012 through 2016. Paradoxically, this is cause for serious concern. While one might think that the end to Afghanistan’s fighting season and a considerable decline in attacks is a positive development, ‘the logic of violence in civil war’ is far more nuanced. Specifically, violence decreases as a belligerent cements control over territory. In this case, decreasing violence appears to be the result of increasing Taliban control and the rapid deterioration of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

http://smallwarsjournal.com/sites/default/files/kovan1.jpg

This article proceeds in four sections. The first explains the aforementioned factors that contributed to the seasonality of fighting in Afghanistan. The subsequent section summarizes the extant literature, which explains trends in insurgent violence. The penultimate section analyzes the latest data from the Global Terrorism Data (GTD) and other sources, with specific reference to the theories explained in the previous section. The final section concludes.

Seasonality and Conflict in Afghanistan

As previously noted, Afghanistan’s spring surge in violence corresponds to agricultural cycles, improved weather and breaks in instruction at Pakistani madrassas. This section explores the relationship between each of these three factors and springtime fighting.

Arguably, agricultural cycles have the greatest impact on defining the Afghan fighting season. This is the case for two reasons. First, the Taliban rely on the cultivation and trafficking of opium poppy to finance their insurgency. As such, fighting occurs around opium poppy cultivation cycles. Specifically, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reports that opium cultivation has surged from a low of just 8,000 hectares under cultivation in 2001 to a high of 224,000 hectares in 2014, before tapering off slightly in 2015. The farm-gate value of the crop peaked earlier, in 2011, at over $1.4 billion. While the farm-gate value decreased to $572 million in 2015, significant value is added through subsequent refinement and trafficking. The Taliban are heavily involved in these activities as well.

Beyond the Taliban’s financial interest in opium poppy production, the harvest season robs the Afghan Taliban of much of their fighting force. One Afghan expert noted that three distinct classes of Taliban fighters exist. Specifically, he indicated that the ‘ideological Taliban,’ which as the name implies are those insurgents who are deeply ideologically committed, represent only a very small percentage of the groups fighting force. A second group that he termed the ‘mercenary Taliban’ constitute a relatively larger fraction of the Taliban’s overall force strength. This group is heavily involved in the opium economy and other illicit actives. It sides with the Taliban due to the opportunity to profit handsomely from opium cultivation and related activities and not because of ideology. By far the largest group of fighters, are the ‘paycheck Taliban,’ who are comprised of seasonal or otherwise under-employed or unemployed young men who take-up arms to earn a paycheck when they are not engaged in productive economic activity.[ii] In Afghanistan, where as much as 40 percent of the economy is agrarian, the bulk of these fighters are agricultural workers. In short, during harvest times, the number of available insurgent fighters is substantially lower.

Second, harsh weather makes winter fighting extremely challenging. Specifically, the confluence of extremely difficult terrain, limited improved road networks and substantial snowfall make overland travel next to impossible in parts of the country. For example, a particularly strong winter storm dumped more than five feet of snow in parts of the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan during just a 24 hours period earlier this year. This particular storm left more than 100 Afghans dead. These types of weather dynamics are common place and some remote parts of Afghanistan remain completely cutoff from the rest of the country by inclement weather for as many as six months a year.

Finally, existing research on civil wars and insurgencies show that the presence of cross-border sanctuaries greatly exacerbates the duration of conflicts and the odds of an opposition victory. Not surprisingly, ample evidence from the conflict in Afghanistan highlights the criticality of secure basing in Pakistan to the success of the Afghan Taliban.[iii] Importantly, madrassas on the Pakistani side of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, which provide a combination of religious education and military training, go on recess in the spring. Though this may be as much a consequence as a cause of the spring fighting season.

‘The Logic of Violence in Civil War’

As already noted, decreasing violence during insurgent conflicts can be cause for celebration or serious concern. This is the case as it may signal that the counterinsurgent is cementing control or that insurgent forces are gaining ground. In explicating this phenomena, Stathis Kalyvas classified areas within insurgent conflicts on a one to five scale based on territorial control. Areas under total incumbent control are coded a 1, areas under dominant incumbent control are denoted by a 2, contested areas are a 3, areas under dominant insurgent control are classified as a 4 and areas under complete insurgent control are marked as 5. As government forces gain (movement from zone 3 to 2) or consolidate (movement from zone 2 to 1) control, we would expect to see an increase in fighting. Similarly, as insurgent forces gain (a movement from zone 3 to 4) or consolidate (movement from zone 4 to 5) control, violent attacks are also likely to increase. In the former scenario an increase in violence is positive. The opposite is the case in the latter. However, Kalyvas not only shows that there is a correlation between changing zones of control and levels of violence, he also demonstrates that the type of violence depends on the zone of control. Specifically, in zone 3, civilian populations are unlikely to provide intelligence to either side because neither belligerent is dominant and doing so risks repercussions from the other side. Absent extensive human intelligence sources, both sides will be forced to rely more heavily on indiscriminant violence. As one side gains control (a move from zone 3 to either zone 2 or 4), risks decrease for civilians providing intelligence to the dominant side. As such, the belligerent that has gained control will be able to perpetrate violence more selectively. Doing so is also desirable as it is less likely to alienate the population and more efficient.

Violent Attacks, Territorial Control and the End of the Afghan Spring Fighting Season
After just over 13 years in-country, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) pulled out of Afghanistan on December 28, 2014. With the departure of ISAF, which at its heighted totaled more than 130,000 NATO and allied soldiers, the ANSF were left to continue fighting the Taliban largely on their own. (Even though 9,804 U.S. troops and a much smaller contingent from other NATO members remained behind, experts agree that not only is this an inadequate force-strength to prop up the ANSF, but the fact that the vast majority of these forces are relegated to train and equip missions and cannot be deployed in combat operations, further limits their impact.) Unfortunately, the ANSF forces are hampered by rampant corruption, inconsistent training across military units, difficulty retaining qualified personnel, as well as limited abilities to undertake complex operations involving combined arms integration. Corruption, in particular, deserves special attention. A January 2016 report noted that as much as 40 percent of the ANSF are ‘ghost’ soldiers and police officers. Specifically, these personnel – if they ever existed in the first place – have either been killed or deserted. Nevertheless, their commanders keep them on the books and pocket their pay and rations.

Under these conditions, and absent ISAF support, it is unsurprising that the Taliban surged in 2015. Specifically, the GTD notes that insurgent attacks increased from 1,594 in 2014 to 1,716 in 2015 (a nearly 8 percent increase). Moreover, the number of resulting fatalities climbed from 4,507 to 5,307 (an increase of almost 18 percent). One report notes that ANSF casualties in 2015 alone were double the number of insurgent casualties inflicted by U.S. forces in the preceding 13 years. Nevertheless, violence decreased markedly in 2016. Specifically, 2016 experienced only 1,338 attacks (a decrease of more than 22 percent from 2015 and over 16 percent from 2014).[iv] Figure 2, below, depicts these trends graphically.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/sites/default/files/kovan2.jpg

Furthermore, an examination of Figure 1, above, shows that there is no evidence of the characteristic spring fighting season in 2016. Figures 3 and 4, below, display similar trends. Specifically, Figure 3 presents a snapshot of the results of emerging hot spot analysis conducted utilizing the GTD data[v] from 2012 to 2015, while Figure 4, examines the time period from 2012 to 2016. Each cube represents a five square mile grid. The analysis shows that sporadic hotspots, which entail a repeated pattern of fighting during certain three month time periods and not others, were relatively prevalent in the analysis ending in 2015 (Figure 3). However, once the analysis is extended through 2016, sporadic hot spots, and thus seasonality in fighting remain in just two areas, the capital, Kabul, and in Afghanistan’s second largest city and commercial hub, Jalalabad. These results are robust across analyses for the entire country. What explains this apparent reversal?

Figure 3: Emerging Hot Spot Analysis, 2012-2015

http://smallwarsjournal.com/sites/default/files/kovan3.jpg

Figure 4: Emerging Hot Spot Analysis, 2012-2016

http://smallwarsjournal.com/sites/default/files/kovan4.jpg

Unfortunately, it is likely the case that violence declined in 2016 because the Taliban had succeeded in retaking territory in 2015, which also explains the marked increase in violence during 2015. Indeed, within a year of ISAF’s withdrawal, the Taliban controlled more territory in Afghanistan than at any time since 2001.[vi] Following the logic of violence in civil wars, if enhanced territorial control explains the decrease in violence and the end of the spring fighting season, we would also expect to see a change in the nature of violence. Indeed, we do. Specifically, attacks became better targeted and more selective. As regards targeting, even though 2016 experienced 22 percent fewer attacks than 2015, the number of fatalities per attack increased by over nine percent (from an average of 3.09 fatalities per attack in 2015, to an average of 3.38 in 2016; see Figure 2, above, for a graphical representation of these data). Increasing lethality is likely a result of improved intelligence – due to the Taliban’s enhanced territorial control – enabling better targeting. In a similar vein, attacks became more selective. Specifically, ANSF casualties continued to rise in 2016. While civilian casualties also increased in 2016, they did so at a far lower rate. Moreover, the number of Taliban inflicted civilian casualties actually fell. The overall rise in civilian casualties is due to the emerging presence of the Islamic State (IS) in Afghanistan. While the IS had previously been a minor player in the country, in 2016 it caused more than an order of magnitude more civilian casualties than it had during the previous year.

Even though the Taliban do not control all of Afghanistan, the ANSF have often proven unable to sustain fighting with the Taliban when they threaten new areas. As such, further territorial expansion by the Taliban may not require as many attacks as it had previously. For example, in March 2017, the Taliban retook the strategic town of Sangin in Helmand province after the ANSF withdrew, ostensibly to avoid civilian casualties. However, the Taliban’s claim to have captured 39 armored personnel carriers, one tank and 34 other vehicles that the ANSF left behind, suggests a hasty retreat. Sangin is a critical location for Taliban opium smuggling operations. Again, the emerging hot spot analysis is consistent with this explanation. Despite the fact that the Taliban continued to capture territory in 2016, there are virtually no new hot spots evident in Figure 4, above. This indicates that fighting is not breaking out, even when the Taliban moves into new territories and ANSF withdraws. This is in stark contrast to the Taliban’s 2015 territorial expansion efforts, which resulted in extensive fighting, as illustrated in Figure 3, also above. (There are virtually no more consecutive hot spots evident in Figure 4, which indicates that sustained fighting is also no longer occurring. Again, this finding sharply contrasts with patterns evident prior to 2016, depicted in Figure 3.)

Conclusion

In short, the apparent decline in violence and the end of seasonality in fighting in 2016 appear to indicate that the Taliban has made substantial inroads against the ANSF. Furthermore, even though the number of attacks has declined, casualties are up as each attack is now more effective. Moreover, the ANSF are increasingly being targeted by attacks. This is likely the case as increased territorial control affords the Taliban better intelligence. Nevertheless, it is unclear what 2017 has in store for Afghanistan. On the one hand, it is possible that violence will continue to decline as the ANSF forces are further weakened and the Taliban continue to expand their territorial control. Indeed, as of late 2016, the Taliban had already encircled six provincial capitals. On the other hand, it is possible that violence will rise and seasonality will again define the fighting as the IS begins to present a greater challenge to the Taliban. The deployment of additional Western troops, which is now being considered following a massive explosion in the, supposedly highly secure, diplomatic area of Kabul that killed 80 during rush hour on May 31, 2017, could also have similar effects. (Importantly, the Taliban, who are often quick to take credit for their exploits, have already denied responsibility for the bombing.) However, this will depend on the number of additional troops, restrictions on their employment and the length of time additional troops will remain in-theater.

End Notes
I wish to thank Erin Miller for providing access to the 2016 Global Terrorism Database (GTD) data ahead of its public release, as well as for her constructive comments. In addition, special thanks is due to Marcus A. Boyd, for conducting the emerging hotspot analysis presented herein. Nevertheless, all errors are my own.
[ii] Ahmad, Javid, in discussion with Barnett S. Koven, April 8, 2014.
[iii] See also: Rashid, Ahmed, “Letter from Afghanistan: Are the Taliban Winning?,” Current History 106, no. 696 (January 2007): 17-20.; Tellis, Ashley J., “Pakistan's Record on Terrorism: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance,” The Washington Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2008): 7-32.
[iv] See also: Burns, Robert, “Decrease in Taliban violence leaves US officials cautiously hopeful.” The Christian Science Monitor (July 18, 2016). http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2016/0718/Decrease-in-Taliban-viol....
[v] Observations that were only georeferenced at the national or regional level were excluded from the emerging hot spot analysis to improve specificity.
[vi] See also: Roggio, Bill, “Afghan Taliban lists ‘Percent of Country under the control of Mujahideen,’” Long War Journal (March 28, 2017).

About the Author

Barnett S. Koven
Barnett S. Koven is a Senior Researcher at the University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), a U.S. Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence. He is also an Affiliated Scholar at the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy at Florida International University. Koven received his Ph.D., M.Phil. and M.A. in Political Science at the George Washington University, as well as a B.A. in International Affairs and Latin American and Hemispheric Studies. He also holds a Certificate in Conflict Analysis from the United States Institute of Peace and a Certificate in Advanced Security in the Field from the United Nations System Staff College. More information about Koven’s research and a complete list of publications are available on his website.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world...in-iraq/ar-BBE3Yo9?li=BBmkt5R&ocid=spartanntp

Mosul Liberated as Islamic State Faces Total Defeat in Iraq

Bloomberg
Caroline Alexander and Donna Abu-Nasr
36 mins ago

Cease-fire in southern Syria goes into effect

(Bloomberg) -- Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi traveled to Mosul to declare it liberated from Islamic State, three years after the city’s abrupt fall to the jihadists alerted the world to the group’s growing strength, territorial ambitions and barbarity.

Abadi congratulated the Iraqi people and fighters on a “great victory” as the last pockets under Islamic State control were being retaken, according to a*tweet from his media office.

The campaign to free Mosul from Islamic State entered its final phase in the narrow streets of the Old City in mid-June, eight months after thousands of Iraqi troops and Kurdish fighters backed by U.S.-led airstrikes began their offensive. Lieutenant General Stephen Townsend, commander of the coalition, has described it as the toughest urban warfare he has seen in 34 years of service.

Retaking Mosul marks a major blow against Islamic State, whose*leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi made his first speech as self-proclaimed caliph from one of the city’s mosques in 2014. The group is now diminished, having lost much of its territory spanning northeastern Syria and northwestern Iraq. Its ability to attract foreign fighters is also dented, although it continues to inspire militants abroad who have staged terrorist attacks from London to Tehran. For Abadi, whose government has struggled to overcome political and sectarian challenges and rebuild an economy stripped of oil revenue, it’s a major success.

There have been scenes of jubilation as Iraqi forces have slowly taken back control of Mosul, removing the black banners of the jihadist group. The United Nations says as many as 150,000 residents were trapped in the Old City when the battle there began, with illness and disease spreading as clean drinking water, food and medicine ran low. Islamic State used those who stayed as human shields, according to the UN. Over the last few months, it has massacred hundreds who attempted to flee the city in an attempt to deter others from doing the same.

Brutal Punishment

In one of its final acts of defiance, Islamic State blew up the Great Mosque of al-Nuri on June 22. The monument, whose iconic leaning minaret is pictured on Iraq’s 10,000-dinar note, once towered above the historic city center. It was there that Baghdadi made his first sermon as self-proclaimed caliph and called on the world’s Muslims to obey him, dressed in a black robe and turban to signify his claim of descent from the Prophet Muhammad.

As the group sought to entrench its strict interpretation of Islam, it meted out brutal punishments to those who opposed it. Children were trained to be fighters. It also destroyed ancient sites it said were heresy to its ideology -- apart from the Great Mosque, Mosul also lost the Tomb of Jonah. Its museum was ransacked.

Lightning Assault

Mosul was Islamic State’s most important bastion along with Raqqa in Syria, its self-styled capital. It featured in its propaganda videos, many filmed in the style of television news reports. British hostage John Cantlie appeared in at least five that sought to portray the city as an example of utopian governance with a bustling economy. In reality, residents described shortages and struggles to cope with rising prices for basic foods and fuel.

An estimated 2.4 million people lived in Mosul before the war, making it northern Iraq’s largest city. Hundreds of thousands fled after it was captured and as operations began to retake it in October 2016, with many seeking refuge in the semi-autonomous Kurdish region and camps nearby.

Islamic State evolved from al-Qaeda in Iraq, which U.S. troops and Sunni militias defeated after its powers peaked in 2006 to 2007 in a campaign that was known as the Awakening. It was able to expand in 2013 in Syria, where a civil war has raged for more than six years, attracting fighters from Chechnya, Afghanistan, North Africa and Europe.

The extremists took advantage of the poor military performance of Iraqi troops -- portraying themselves as a champion of Sunni Arabs who felt alienated by a Shiite-led government -- in a lightening assault across northern Iraq in the summer of 2014. The group then headed south toward Baghdad, triggering fears of the country’s breakup as ethnic and sectarian tensions surged.

Last Stronghold

Iraqi forces and militias supported by Iran had pushed Islamic State into reverse with months-long battles in key cities such as Fallujah and Ramadi, before moving on to Mosul. The air power, artillery, and intelligence provided by a U.S.-led coalition helped secure the city’s eastern neighborhoods in January. Residents returned to their homes, children went back to school, and shopkeepers reopened stores, free to sell whatever they choose.

Battlefield progress then slowed as fighting moved deeper into the Old City, as Iraqi forces entered dense neighborhoods and faced persistent counterattacks. With the offensive from the south stalling, Iraqi troops repositioned to begin a new offensive from the north in May.

While Mosul was Islamic State’s last main urban center in Iraq, it still controls several areas in the west and northeast part of the country, including Hawija near Kirkuk.

Noureddin Qablan, vice chairman of the council in Nineveh province, whose capital is Mosul, said by phone on July 3 from the city that Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish leaders have met to prevent the eruption of sectarian or nationalist conflicts. “There are possibilities, but they are weak,” he said, citing the absence of violence in parts of the city freed months ago.

Territory Losses

Keeping the peace won’t be easy, said Kamran Bokhari, a fellow with George Washington University’s Program on Extremism. Local leaders need to prevent the spiraling of tensions over sectarian differences and the region’s political and economic plight, which Islamic State would look to exploit, he said. “But will they be able to?"

As Islamic State’s territory has shrunk, the group has shifted its emphasis from state building and governance to survival, and analysts say battlefield losses don’t spell the end of its ideology. A cappella hymn, or nasheed, released this month insists the jihadist group won’t vanish despite the setbacks: “Oh people of error, it (the state) is remaining, not vanishing, Anchored like the mountains.”

The message is “clearly addressing the current losses faced by the Islamic State amid the coalition campaign against it,” said Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, an analyst at the International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, who translated the nasheed.

“Military defeat and the loss of territory in Syria and Iraq will be insufficient to sway the views of Islamic State supporters,”*IHS Markit, a London-based information and analytics group, said in a June 29 report. “The group’s video productions have declined in frequency, suggesting that it is less capable of disseminating its messages. However, it has already prepared its followers for the loss of territory.”
(Updates with comment from local official in 15th paragraph.)

To contact the reporters on this story: Caroline Alexander in London at calexander1@bloomberg.net, Donna Abu-Nasr in Beirut at dabunasr@bloomberg.net.

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Alaa Shahine at asalha@bloomberg.net, Mark Williams, Ros Krasny
©2017 Bloomberg L.P.

 

[Be Well]

http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/why-a...ack-is-coming/

Why Another Philippines Terrorist Attack Is Coming

Another Marawi-like siege is likely to occur.

Two comments about The Diplomat from a quick search, a Quora site answering the question "How unbiased/biased is The Diplomat? Is it inclined towards any particular country?" One answer said it was totally unbiased and excellent and the commenter said he writes for it...

It's a Japan-based company with an Australian as the Editor. It's mostly an opinion-based publication because they don't really have the ground staff to do news reporting, which gives the publication a flavor of "trial balloons" from various opinion pundits - throwing out an opinion and see how it flies.

From the latest article by Shawn in “the diplomat” - it seems more like a news media that does not like to admit the advanced capabilities [assymetric surveillance/strike capabilities] that have been indigenously developed in India and used in the surgical strike against terrorist organisations [ nurtured and state-supported by pakistan goverment] at 5 different locations simultaneously inside PoK [Pakistan occupied Kashmir].

Definitely looks like “the diplomat” editorial board likes to live in denial - and like to live in a mindset that looks upon the state-supported terrorism by pakistan as a natural extension of the policies by western countries to fight Russian attempts at acquiring a warm water port - still living in the past[distant past].

I was wondering because a good friend (Filipina) who lives in Manila, DH and BIL ex career mil, FIL was career mil, and she has two sons in mil, one Special Forces and one a doctor. SHe's visiting in the US right now and is going to call me soon. I'll ask for her take on this assessment. Both her sons were or are in Mindanao.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/10/politics/secret-documents-qatar-crisis-gulf-saudi/index.html

Exclusive: The secret documents that help explain the Qatar crisis

By Jim Sciutto and Jeremy Herb, CNN
Updated 3:05 PM ET, Mon July 10, 2017

Video

Story highlights
- The Gulf countries have accused Qatar of not complying with the two agreements
- A Qatari spokesman said in a statement that it was Saudi Arabia and the UAE who "have broken the spirit of the agreement"

(CNN)Qatar made a series of secret agreements with its Gulf neighbors in 2013 and 2014 barring support for opposition and hostile groups in those nations, as well as in Egypt and Yemen.

The existence of the agreements has been known, but both the content and the documents themselves were kept secret due to the sensitivity of the issues involved and the fact that they were agreed in private by heads of state. The agreements were exclusively obtained by CNN from a source from the region with access to the documents.

The Gulf countries have accused Qatar of not complying with the two agreements, which helps explain what sparked the worst diplomatic crisis in the Middle East in decades.

The first agreement -- handwritten and dated November 23, 2013 -- is signed by the King of Saudi Arabia, the Emir of Qatar and the Emir of Kuwait. It lays out commitments to avoid any interference in the internal affairs of other Gulf nations, including barring financial or political support to "deviant" groups, which is used to describe anti-government activist groups.

The agreement, referred to as the Riyadh agreement, specifically mentions not supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, which the Gulf allies have repeatedly alleged Qatar supports, as well as not backing opposition groups in Yemen that could threaten neighboring countries.

In justifying their boycott launched last month, Qatar's Gulf counterparts accuse Doha of financially supporting Hezbollah and other terror groups, in addition to backing the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

In the first agreement, the countries also vowed not to support "antagonistic media," an apparent reference to Al Jazeera -- the satellite news station based in Qatar and funded by its government -- which other Gulf states accuse of trumpeting opposition groups in the region including Egypt and Bahrain.

A second agreement headlined "top secret" and dated November 16, 2014, adds the King of Bahrain, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and the Prime Minister of the UAE. It specifically mentions the signatories' commitment to support Egypt's stability, including preventing Al Jazeera from being used as a platform for groups or figures challenging the Egyptian government.

The second agreement specifically mentions Al Jazeera, and not other media outlets like the Saudi-owned Al Arabiya. After the agreement was signed, Al Jazeera had shut down a channel dedicated to Egypt coverage: Al-Jazeera Mubashir Misr.

Abiding by the agreements was among six principles the Gulf nations set as requirements to mend relations with Qatar in a statement released last week.

In a statement to CNN, Qatar accused Saudi Arabia and UAE of breaking the spirit of the agreement and indulging in an "unprovoked attack on Qatar's sovereignty."

A supplemental document to the 2013 agreement signed by the countries' foreign ministers discusses implementation of the agreement.

It includes provisions barring support of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as outside groups in Yemen and Saudi Arabia that pose a threat to security and stability of Gulf Cooperation Council countries, a six-nation group that includes Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar.

The agreements do not single out Qatar, as the provisions included apply to all countries who signed it.

In response to CNN questions, a Qatari spokesman said in a statement that it was Saudi Arabia and the UAE who "have broken the spirit of the agreement."

"A full reading of that text will show that the intent of the 2013/14 agreements was to ensure that sovereign GCC nations be able cooperate within a clear framework," said Sheikh Saif Bin Ahmed Al-Thani, director of Qatar's government communication office.

"Their demands -- that Qatar close down Al Jazeera, force the breakup of families, and pay 'compensation' -- are demands that bear no relation to the Riyadh agreements," he added. "Further, at no point did Saudi Arabia or the UAE use the mechanisms in the Riyadh agreement to communicate their concerns to Qatar."

Al Thani said that the current list of demands put to Qatar "represent an unwarranted and unprecedented attack on Qatar's sovereignty, and it is for that reason that they have been rejected by Qatar and condemned by the international community."

"This crisis was triggered by a hacking, fabricated statements, and a coordinated media campaign against Qatar," he said. "From the beginning, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have attempted to conceal facts from the general public, including their own citizens, going so far as to block Al Jazeera and other media outlets within their borders."

The documents hint at longstanding tensions between the countries in the GCC.

In March 2014, for instance, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar because they alleged Qatar was not implementing the first agreement's pledge not to interfere in other countries' internal affairs.

But the agreements also appear to be an attempt to improve relations. Citing "extensive deliberations in which they conducted a full revision of what taints the relations between the [Gulf Cooperation] Council states," the first agreement states that the parties agreed to "abolish whatever muddies the relations."

But the agreements also provide new insight to help explain why nine Middle Eastern countries, led by Saudi Arabia, cut ties with Qatar in June over its alleged support of terrorism.

Qatar has called the allegations leveled last month "unjustified" and "baseless."

Four of the Arab States that boycotted Qatar submitted a list of 13 demands to end the diplomatic crisis, including shuttering Al Jazeera.

The list also included demands to cut ties to extremist organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah and ISIS, to halt the development of a Turkish military base in the country and to stop the practice of giving Qatari nationality to their citizens.

Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry said last week that Qatar's had responded negatively to the demands, saying Qatar's response was "overall negative and lacked any substance."

Qatari's foreign minister argued some of the demands violated international law.

"If you are looking at the demands -- there are accusations that Qatar is supporting terrorism -- they are shutting free speech, shutting the media outlets, expelling people. ... So there are a lot of demands which are against the international law," Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani told CNN's Christiane Amanpour last week.

Trump administration officials are hoping they can help broker a resolution to the diplomatic crisis. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson is making stops in Qatar and then Saudi Arabia this week as part of his trip through the region, where he was already meeting Monday with officials in Turkey -- allied with Qatar in the dispute -- and Kuwait, which is playing a mediator role.

R.C. Hammond, a State Department spokesman, said the purpose of Tillerson's trip was "to explore the art of the possible of where a resolution can be found," and the US was "looking for areas of common ground where a resolution can stand."

"We've had one round of exchanges and dialogue and didn't advance the ball," Hammond told reporters. "We will work with Kuwait and see if we can hash out a different strategy. ... This is a two-way street. There are no clean hands."

President Donald Trump also spoke last week to the leaders of Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

When the Gulf countries first cut ties with Qatar, however, Trump appeared to support the Gulf countries cutting ties with Qatar, saying that Doha had to stop funding terrorism. Trump's comments came following his visit to Saudi Arabia on his first foreign trip as president, and contradicted his secretary of state.

UPDATE: This story has been edited for clarity and to add the text of the supplemental agreement signed by countries' foreign ministers.

CNN's Sarah El Sirgany, Becky Anderson and Nicole Gaouette contributed to this report.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://news.sky.com/story/children-forced-to-fight-alongside-islamic-state-in-philippines-10943438

Children forced to fight alongside Islamic State in Philippines

Teenagers are among the extremists and the army says they may have been recruited and trained to use guns when they were children.

19:13, UK,
Monday 10 July 2017

The Philippine military has said children and hostages are being forced to fight with pro-IS gunmen trying to take control of Marawi.

Large parts of the mostly Muslim city in the southern Philippines was seized by militants on 23 May in pursuit of creating an IS province.

More than 100 militants are hiding in the city despite intense military efforts to oust them.

Teenagers are thought to be among them and many may have been recruited and trained to use guns when they were just children, a military spokesman said.

:: Cholera breaks out in Philippines war

Brigadier-General Restituto Padilla told reporters in Manila: "We continuously get disturbing narratives from (escaped residents) that children as well as hostages are being employed in the firefight.

"As disturbing as it is, our troops are doing their best to avoid any casualty among these children that are being employed," he said.

:: IS takes slaves as Philippines battle intensifies

"But in the event... they bear arms and are involved in the fighting, there is nothing much that we can do. Similar to the hostages who are being forced."

The military says civilians trapped in the city have been forced to help the gunmen by carrying supplies and ammunition.

The Philippine government says more than 500 people have been killed in the fighting, including 89 soldiers and police, 39 civilians and 379 militants.

A further 400,000 civilians have fled their homes.

Marawi's business district has been consumed by daily airstrikes against militant snipers causing work and trade to all but cease.

The fighting has prompted president Rodrigo Duterte to declare martial law over the entire southern Philippines.

Mr Duterte last month vowed to "crush" the militants, but a number of government-set deadlines to end the conflict have been missed.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-depetris-afghanistan-commentary-idUSKBN19S335

Edition: United States

Commentary | Mon Jul 10, 2017 | 2:52am EDT

Commentary: Steve Bannon is right on Afghanistan

By Dan DePetris

The trio known in foreign policy circles as the adults of the Trump administration wants the president to send more American soldiers into Afghanistan. Defense Secretary James Mattis, National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster, and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson are advocating for yet another troop increase less than three years after the U.S. officially transferred all security responsibility to the Afghans. But it’s Steve Bannon, the White House’s controversial chief political strategist, whom President Trump should listen to before dispatching his advisers to brief Congress on the strategy in mid-July.

As commander-in-chief Trump has granted the U.S. military tremendous latitude to*resource operations as it sees fit. So Trump may not be inclined to overrule the Pentagon's*recommendation for*3,000 to*5,000*more American trainers and advisers to support the 8,500 troops.*It seems clear, though, that the administration is divided over the decision - and Steve Bannon is the most influential adviser in the White House urging Trump to think twice before deploying those forces. In fact, Bannon may be the only aide among the non-interventionist camp in the White House, which also includes senior policy adviser Stephen Miller, who has sufficient access to the president to persuade him to carefully review the military’s request before approving it.

In*this case, Bannon, who was removed from the National Security Council in April, is right. One doesn't have to agree with Bannon's world view or nationalist ideology to recognize his logical and pragmatic perception of the war in Afghanistan.*

After*more than 15 years of combat, the spending of hundreds of billions of dollars of taxpayer money, and the ultimate sacrifice*of nearly 2,400 U.S. troops, it's tragic that more officials in Washington can't see the war as it is: a chaotic environment full of false hopes, unrealistic promises, and an American inability to come to grips with the impossibility of creating a safe, democratic, and prosperous nation in a country where corruption, violence and patronage determine who wins and who loses.*

America's military intervention in Afghanistan was the quintessential example of a war launched on solid moral and strategic grounds. The Taliban regime, after all, harbored al Qaeda, the group behind the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington. Rooting out al Qaeda from Afghanistan, killing its top leadership, cutting off its financing and ousting the Taliban were all objectives that U.S. liberals and conservatives alike could agree on.*

But after the invasion, the U.S. objective switched from destroying al Qaeda in Afghanistan to developing a new government in Kabul from the ground. Because Afghanistan had not possessed a national army or police force since the Soviet-backed government collapsed in the early 1990’s, the U.S. was also put into the position of starting one from scratch. Uprooting al Qaeda’s terrorist infrastructure and supply lines in Afghanistan was diluted from the principal U.S. goal in the country to one of many. Perhaps it was hubris to think that the West could construct a democratic state in the middle of Central Asia, unshackled by corruption and strong enough to keep the militants and warlords at bay.*Or perhaps Washington truly believed it could pacify a country that knew nothing but war since the late 1970s. Whatever the reason, Afghanistan translated virtually overnight into a laboratory where the establishment of a presidential system could be tested.
*
This context is important because the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces have been fighting and dying in*Afghanistan to this very day - with little*sustainable, strategic success*to show for it. It's a policy failure, not a military failure.*And as the U.S. should have learned already through two troop surges - the first of which took place in 2007 and the second in 2010-2011 - a policy failure cannot be solved with a few more troops. *

The latest quarterly report*from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction shows*the war is nowhere close to being over.*According to United Nations statistics, 2016 was the bloodiest on record for Afghan security forces and civilians alike.*Over a third of the country's districts are either under the control or influence of the Taliban. It's difficult to say U.S. policy is going smoothly when General John Nicholson, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, calls the war a stalemate in public testimony to the U.S. Senate.*It's even harder when so many “ghost” troops - non-existent soldiers listed by corrupt Afghan officials to obtain additional U.S. taxpayer funding - are on the Afghan army's payroll that Washington can't be certain where its money is going or whether the Afghan security forces are equipped to respond to a crisis.

Also In Commentary
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None of this*lies at the feet of the corporal or*sergeant*on the ground risking their lives. Rather, the blame lies squarely on the policymakers in the national security bureaucracy who still think that the Afghanistan mess can be sorted out if just a few thousand additional soldiers are deployed, or a bigger check is written, or a few more years are dedicated to the mission.*The blame should be directed at the generals and officials who fail to ask why 5,000 more trainers, advisers, and special operators will be capable of doing what 140,000 soldiers in the field during the troop surge couldn't.*Congress shares the blame for deferring to the generals without asking questions and for failing to understand that military power alone can’t quash an insurgency, especially when those insurgents can cross the border to find safe havens in neighboring Pakistan.*

We don’t know yet if Trump will follow the advice of the Mattis trio or his political adviser. But the fact that the president didn’t announce his intentions at the May NATO summit in Belgium suggests that something may have made him think twice on troop deployment. Thanks perhaps to Steve Bannon, the president may be slower to repeat the mistakes of his predecessors - at least when it comes to Afghanistan. *

(Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities. The opinions expressed here are his own. @DanDePetris.)
*
The views expressed in this article are not those of Reuters News.


Next In Commentary

Commentary: Seeking the truth, not the tragedy, in journalism
London’s Grenfell Tower fire victims aren’t furious just with local authorities for ignoring safety concerns raised before this month’s blaze killed at least 79 residents. They’re angry with journalists too.

Commentary: Mosul’s fall won’t stop Islamic State spreading fear
Iraqi officials have declared that Islamic State’s caliphate is finished. On June 29, after months of urban warfare and U.S. air strikes, Iraqi forces say they are on the verge of expelling the militants from their last holdouts in Mosul. “Their fictitious state has fallen,” an Iraqi general told state TV after troops captured a symbolically important mosque in Mosul’s old city. In Syria, U.S.-backed rebels are moving quickly through the eastern city of Raqqa, another capital of the self-proclai

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.thedailybeast.com/satellites-reveal-us-military-bases-emerging-in-the-desert

Secret Expansion

Satellites Reveal Secret U.S. Bases Emerging in the Desert

Imagery from June appears to show a small airstrip in southern Syria near the border with Jordan and Iraq—that’s in addition to a drone base in northeastern Jordan and scores more.

David Axe
07.11.17 1:00 AM ET

In 2013, when the United States first considered intervening in the Syria war, teams of U.S. Air Force commandos scouted out, across the Middle East, no fewer than 300 potential sites for new bases to support a possible intervention force.

Since then, the Pentagon has established or expanded scores of bases in Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, among many other countries.

Now we’ve located what appear to be another two new bases—one in Jordan near the border with Syria, and another a short distance across the same border in southern Syria. The two airstrips could support drones, helicopters, and special operations airplanes.

On July 8, 2017, the Already Happened Twitter account, which bills itself as “independent media,” pointed out satellite imagery from June 2017 that appears to show a small airstrip in southern Syria a few miles from the trinational border where Jordan, Iraq, and Syria meet.

Wikimapia satellite imagery dated 2017 doesn’t show the airstrip, implying that the facility was built in recent months. Wikimapia gets its imagery from DigitalGlobe, Airbus, and a French government imaging agency.

About a year before the new airstrip was being carved in the Syrian desert, the U.S. was hard at work expanding a separate drone base in northeastern Jordan, not far from the trinational border.

This base, known as “H4,” was originally built in 2014 or earlier and was significantly expanded in early 2016, as indicated by sensitive imagery that an intelligence source described to The Daily Beast.

In May 2017, DigitalGlobe released the first public images of H4. The site appears to support Air Force or CIA Reaper drones plus Jordanian military helicopters.

Among other facilities, Jordan is known to host a second U.S. drone base at Muwaffaq Salti, 33 miles south of the border with Syria. In November 2016, three U.S. Special Forces soldiers died when a Jordanian guard opened fire on their convoy at King Faisal Air Base in central Jordan.

The expansion of American base infrastructure makes possible the Pentagon’s escalating support for Iraqi military forces and pro-U.S. Syrian rebel groups battling the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. America’s anti-ISIS war plan builds upon initial planning that U.S. Special Operations Command, or SOCOM, completed more than three years ago.

In 2013, so-called Assault Zone Reconnaissance Teams from the Air Force branch of SOCOM scouted out around 300 landing zones, drop zones, and other sites “throughout the Middle East,” according to an official Air Force history that War Is Boring reporter Joseph Trevithick obtained via the Freedom of Information Act.

“There’s a lot of work going on at SOC FWD locations,” a member of the Air Force’s 720th Special Tactics Group wrote in a 2014 email cited in the official history, using the abbreviation for “Special Operations Command, Forward.”

The airmen said SOCOM was building bases in Yemen, Lebanon, Oman, and all the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, whose members include Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Oman.

The exact scale of U.S. base infrastructure remains secret. U.S. Central Command, which oversees the wars in Iraq and Syria, declined to confirm the existence of the two new airstrips. “We generally do not discuss the movement and position of our aircraft for safety and operational security reasons,” the Florida-based command told The Daily Beast via email.

But U.S. military fuel contracts hint at a sprawling—and likely expanding—complex of bases. A May 16, 2017, solicitation from the U.S. Defense Logistics Agency, which Trevithick also obtained via the Freedom of Information Act, asks contractors to provide about 5 million gallons of fuel to U.S. bases in Jordan from late 2017 to late 2020.

The solicitation lists several bases, including Muwaffaq Salti, H4, and several unspecified “northern integration sites” that can be accessed from H4 with an official escort. “Location is an austere site,” the document explains of one integration site. “Delivery vehicle will need to be capable of traveling off-road to this location.”

One of the austere sites—which could be the new airstrip—requires a staggering 1,080,000 gallons of aviation fuel by late 2020. That’s enough to fuel up two Reaper drones every day for nearly three years.

 

[Housecarl]

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https://www.voanews.com/a/once-us-ally-pakistan-now-looks-to-china-russia/3934030.html

Once a US Ally, Pakistan Now Looks to China, Russia

Last Updated: July 11, 2017 9:42 AM
Paul Alexander
Noor Zahid

Comments 15

WASHINGTON —*Once a key ally in the U.S. war on terrorism, Pakistan finds itself increasingly isolated from Washington amid allegations that it harbors more than a dozen terrorist groups. Instead, it has been steadily cozying up to China and Russia.

Both of America’s primary rivals have been taking advantage of Pakistan’s paranoia about India, and gaps in Washington’s global influence as President Donald Trump continues to form his foreign policy in the strategic region.

Pakistan’s relations with three of its four neighbors — Afghanistan, India and Iran — are at a low point. And instead of trying to rein in extremism, the government appears to be feeding the growing conservative movement with no sign of backing off a controversial blasphemy law that has led to repeated mob violence.

Experts say 13 of the approximately 60 U.S.-designated global terrorist organizations are based in Pakistan, mostly in the tribal region that borders Afghanistan.

Major militant groups include the Pakistani Taliban and the Haqqani Network, along with Laskar-e-Jhangvi, Jaish-e-Muhammad and Jundullah. And despite denials that Islamic State has a presence in the country, the terror group has claimed responsibility for recent attacks there.

Two U.S. lawmakers introduced legislation last September to designate Pakistan a terror state over its inability to curb homegrown militancy and the threat it poses to its neighbors. Republicans Ted Poe and Dana Rohrabacher accused Pakistan of harboring global terrorist leaders and supporting terror groups, including the Haqqani Network, which targets Afghan and U.S.-led NATO forces in Afghanistan.

State sponsor of terrorism?
Former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, said Pakistan should be designated as a state that is sponsoring terrorism.

"The Haqqani Network, which is an ally of al-Qaida and Taliban extremists, has operated as Pakistan's proxy," Khalilzad told VOA recently. "If Pakistan refuses to move against the Haqqani Network sanctuaries, the U.S. should consider actions against the sanctuaries, including striking them."

Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States in 2008-11 and now director for South and Central Asia at the Hudson Institute in Washington, has advice for Trump.

"... for Pakistan, the alliance has been more about securing weapons, economic aid and diplomatic support in its confrontation with India,” Haqqani wrote recently in an op-ed column in The New York Times.

“The Bush administration gave Pakistan $12.4 billion in aid, and the Obama administration forked over $21 billion. These incentives did not make Pakistan more amenable to cutting off support for the Afghan Taliban. … Mr. Trump must now consider alternatives,” Haqqani wrote.

Pakistan also has done little about the thousands of unregistered Islamic schools known as madrassas, which are linked to an increase in militancy in the Afghan-Pakistan region. The schools nurture militant ideology and are known to provide foot soldiers for the Taliban.

Sense of victimhood

Instead, Pakistan has portrayed itself as a victim of terrorism and a staunch ally in the U.S. campaign.

A statement issued after a National Security Committee meeting on Friday in Islamabad said, "No other country in the world has done as much for global safety and security as Pakistan at a huge cost of both men and material."

Pakistan's Foreign Office spokesperson Nafees Zakariya said the allegations about the Haqqani network’s presence in tribal areas are mere rhetoric.

"This is only aimed at putting the blame of their own failures on Pakistan,” he said.

The reality on the ground is different. Just three weeks ago, the most recent drone attack in Hangu, a Pakistani district in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, eliminated a Haqqani Network commander. Officials confirmed his identity to local media.

Pakistan has repeatedly accused Afghanistan and India of allowing terrorists to use their territory to plot and carry out cross-border attacks. Both countries make nearly identical claims against Pakistan.

India blames the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba group for attacks in 2008 in Mumbai that killed more than 150 people, including six Americans. Afghanistan blames the Haqqani Network for a bombing in Kabul's diplomatic area that killed at least 150 and injured more than 450.

Paranoia about India

At the center of Pakistan’s actions and policies are its fears about India. The two countries have fought three wars, and another is always a threat. Both sides have nuclear arsenals capable of destroying the subcontinent several times over.

Last month, the U.S. State Department imposed sanctions on Syed Salahuddin, the Pakistan-based chief of Hizbul Mujahideen, one of the major anti-Indian militant groups fighting in Kashmir, saying he poses "a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States."

Islamabad criticized the move and said militants fighting New Delhi’s rule in Kashmir are involved in a “legitimate" struggle for freedom.

Relations with Kabul have taken a downturn this year after terror attacks in Pakistan that it claims were at least planned by extremist groups in Afghanistan.

Pakistan has closed border crossings for lengthy periods and has begun construction of a border fence with Afghanistan.

In May, Tehran warned Islamabad that it would hit bases inside Pakistan if the government does not confront Sunni militants who carry out cross-border attacks. Ten Iranian border guards were killed and one abducted by militants last month.

While President Trump has yet to come up with a policy to deal with Pakistan’s worsening quagmire, China has stepped in as part of what appears to be a concerted effort to expand its sphere of influence. It currently is involved in a major mutually beneficial project to build a network of roads and other infrastructure from its territory to Pakistan’s Gwadar port in order to provide a shorter route to the Persian Gulf.

Russia, too, has been making diplomatic overtures and recently participated in joint naval exercises off Pakistan.

VOA’s Afghan, Urdu and Deewa Services contributed to this article.

 

[Housecarl]

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https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/china-builds-maritime-muscle

Jul 11, 2017 | 09:00 GMT

China Builds Maritime Muscle


China recently reached a new milestone on its path toward military modernization. On June 28, the country launched the first Type 055 warship from the Jiangnan Shipyard on Shanghai's Changxing Island. The vessel is China's first heavy destroyer, and it is the largest surface combatant warship built by an Asian power since the end of World War II. With the Type 055, China shows how far it has come in its efforts to expand its maritime capabilities.

The Type 055 warship is a large and heavy vessel, with a full displacement — or weight — of more than 12,000 tons, a length of about 180 meters (590 feet) and a beam of roughly 20 meters. In fact, the U.S. military classifies the Type 055 as a cruiser, a class of warship larger than a destroyer. And despite its size, the new ship is sleek and modern in its design. For instance, it incorporates numerous features that reduce its visibility on radar, such as a fully enclosed foredeck and an integrated mast.

Compared with the previous Chinese destroyer class, the Type 052D, the Type 055 does not vastly improve on actual weaponry. The new warship largely carries the same type of missiles as the Type 052D and is equipped with a similar suite of close-in weapons systems. But the Type 055's larger size allows it to carry between 112 and 128 Vertical Launch System cells, compared with the 64 cells carried by the Type 052D. This expanded capability gives the new destroyer many more offensive and defensive options, as well as greater flexibility and staying power.

The Type 055 is also equipped with a bigger and more capable sensor set than the Type 052D. It has a dual-band radar system, an extensive electronic support and countermeasures suite, and advanced communication data links. Moreover, since it serves as a command ship and air defense escort for China's aircraft carriers and fleet squadrons, the Type 055 boasts extensive command and control and battle management systems.

Marking China's ascent to the upper echelons of naval technology, the Type 055 is an important accomplishment for the country. When it comes to destroyer-class vessels, only two countries' warships arguably supersede the Type 055 in technological advancement or combat capability: the United States' Zumwalt-class destroyers, and South Korea's Sejong the Great-class destroyers.

The new vessel is made all the more significant by the fact that it is being mass-produced. There are currently four Type 055 warships under construction in two Chinese shipyards, and many more are expected to follow. That capacity, combined with the ongoing production of the Type 052D, makes it clear that the Chinese navy is witnessing a major increase in both the quality and number of its surface combatants.

Of course, no amount of advancement can be fully leveraged if a navy's forces are not highly trained. The only way for China to sculpt its new maritime muscles will be to give them a workout; to that end, observers can expect the Chinese navy to more frequently foray into waters far from home. After all, Beijing is as keen as ever to catch up to the experience level of some of its greatest maritime adversaries, including the United States and Japan.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.longwarjournal.org/archi...ment-backed-locals-in-tora-bora-mountains.php

Islamic State fights the Taliban, Afghan government-backed locals in Tora Bora Mountains

By Thomas Joscelyn | July 10, 2017 | tjoscelyn@gmail.com | @thomasjoscelyn

The Islamic State’s Wilayah Khorasan (or Khorasan province) has released a new set of photos documenting its battles against the Taliban in the Tora Bora Mountains and the nearby area. The region garnered worldwide attention in late 2001, after Osama bin Laden and many of his men retreated to an al Qaeda base in the mountains. It could have been bin Laden’s last stand, but the al Qaeda founder escaped and continued to manage an international network of subordinates until early May 2011, when he was finally killed in Abbottabad, Pakistan.

In June, press reports indicated that Wilayah Khorasan had captured bin Laden’s cave complex in Tora Bora from the Taliban. It was a supposedly high-profile win for Baghdadi’s men at a time when they are losing ground in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. CBS News cited a broadcast in Pashto on the so-called caliphate’s local radio station, which trumpeted the territorial gain.

In mid-June, the Islamic State’s Naba magazine also carried an article on the campaign. Naba claimed that Wilayah Khorasan’s members sought to dispel any misgivings about their intentions after the Taliban had previously warned people in the area about the self-declared caliphate.

The Taliban denied that Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s loyalists held the ground in Tora Bora, according to press reports. However, Wilayah Khorasan’s offensive in early June forced the Afghan government to respond after locals forged an alliance with the Taliban to fight the caliphate’s representatives.

The Taliban is battling the Afghan government and its Western allies on multiple fronts throughout Afghanistan. This allowed the Islamic State’s arm, which has far fewer fighters, to take advantage of a neglected front, as its enemies were preoccupied elsewhere.

At first, villagers sided with the Taliban to push Wilayah Khorasan’s forces back in Tora Bora. The Taliban reportedly controls much of the area, but didn’t have enough men on hand to respond to the assault on its own.

Lacking a significant deployment in the area, the Afghan government eventually decided to provide more arms to eager villagers and tribesmen. Voice of America (VOA) reported on July 7 that the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) “is arming dozens of local men in the Pachiragam district of Nangarhar province, which shares a border with Pakistan.”

“We have enlisted 300 local uprising members in the Pachiragam district who have been equipped and will soon start their activities,” Attaullah Khogyani, the Nangarhar governor’s spokesperson, told VOA earlier this month. “The National Directorate of Security will finance them and provide them weapons.” (A previous Afghan government-led effort had reportedly recruited several hundred locals to man checkpoints in Pachiragam.)

“We ask the government to support us, provide us with arms and equipment. We will fight IS [Wilayah Khorasan] more effectively,” VOA quoted a “tribal elder” named Malek Sherzai as saying.

Meanwhile, the Islamic State continues to advertise its battles with the Taliban in Tora Bora and elsewhere. It makes for good propaganda, as the organization rejects the legitimacy of all jihadists who refuse to bend their knee to Baghdadi.
Yesterday, Wilayah Khorasan released a set of photos purportedly documenting an “assault” on “apostate Taliban positions…on the outskirts of Tora Bora.” Some of the images can be seen below.

Wilayah Khorasan has repeatedly highlighted its fighting against the Taliban, even as it has lost ground in Nangarhar to US soldiers and their Afghan allies. As of early 2016, the group’s safe haven in the province consisted of approximately nine districts. But this was reduced to just three districts by the end of the year, according to the US military.

Wilayah Khorasan has a much smaller footprint than the Taliban, but it is still capable of launching large-scale attacks in Afghanistan’s cities. And as the fighting in Tora Bora shows, it has also been able to take advantage of gaps in the complex, multi-sided Afghan war to suit its own purposes.

The Islamic State’s Wilayah Khorasan released the photos below purportedly documenting its battles with the Taliban near the Tora Bora Mountains. Some of the images show spoils recovered during its raids. Two photos of beheaded men are not reproduced, but were part of the original photo set.

----

Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for FDD's Long War Journal.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.longwarjournal.org/archi...iraqi-militias-for-helping-liberate-mosul.php

US military credits Iraqi militias for helping liberate Mosul

By Bill Roggio | July 11, 2017 | admin@longwarjournal.org | @billroggio

The US military commended*“Iraqi Militia Forces” for their role in helping liberate the city of Mosul from the Islamic State, but*warned that the jihadist group remains a threat and still controls areas in Iraq. Many of those same militias operating near Mosul, though, are responsible for killing US soldiers during the occupation and remain hostile to America with the backing of Iran.

Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), the US-led coalition organized to battle the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, said Iraqi forces achieved a “victory”*over the Islamic State. Reports from Mosul indicate that the Islamic State has been cornered into a football field-size area in Mosul’s old city neighborhood, with only scores of fighters and their families remaining. Many areas of the city lay in ruin as a result of the*nine month-long battle to to regain control from the Islamic State.

A mix of forces from Iraq’s Counter Terrorism Service, regular troops, Kurdish Peshmerga, and Iranian-backed Shia militias were involved in the ground fighting. The US and other countries provided air support and other combat enablers, as well as advisers during the battle for Mosul. CJTF-OIR said all of these forces should be commended for their role.

“Iraqi Militia Forces, Kurdish Peshmerga fighters and the global Coalition also deserve a share of the credit for their sacrifices to achieve this hard-won victory,” the press release noted.

The “Iraqi Militia Forces” are organized under the aegis of the Popular Mobilization Forces, or PMF, and includes many Iranian supported militias that are responsible for killing hundreds of American soliders in Iraq, such as Hezbollah Brigades, which is a US-designated terrorist group, Asaib al Haq, and the Seyyed al Shuhada Brigades. The last two militias have been operating on the outskirts of Mosul.

The PMF is led by Abu Mahdi al Muhandis, a designated terrorist who was described by the US State Department as “an advisor to Qassem Soleimani,” the commander of the Qods Force, the external operations wing of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Additionally, Soleimani serves as an official adviser to Iraq’s prime minister. Muhandis and Soleimani were instrumental in forming the PMF, which was made an official security branch that reports directly to Iraq’s prime minister. The PMF has been modeled after Iran’s IRGC. [See FDD’s Long War Journal reports, Iraq’s prime minister establishes Popular Mobilization Forces as a permanent ‘independent military formation’ and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces in Iran’s game plan.]

The US military’s praise of Iraq’s militias and the PMF should come as no surprise. US officials and generals have ignored, downplayed and even praised the role that the Iranian-supported militias have played in liberating other cities and towns across Iraq. For instance, in March 2015, General Martin Dempsey, then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, characterized the the Shiite militias’ and Iran’s efforts to retake Tikrit from the Islamic State as “a positive thing.”

“Frankly,” General Dempsey said, “it will only be a problem if it results in sectarianism.”

However, US commanders have turned a blind eye as the Shiite militias have been involved in numerous instances of sectarianism throughout Iraq.

“Still a tough fight ahead”

Lieutenant General Stephen Townsend, commander of CJTF-OIR, warned that the Islamic State remains a threat in Iraq despite the loss of “one of its twin capitals and a jewel of their so-called caliphate.” US-backed Kurdish militias are currently fighting the Islamic State for control of Raqqa in Syria.

“Make no mistake, this victory alone does not eliminate ‘ISIS’ and there is still a tough fight ahead,” Townsend said.

“Although ISIS has lost Mosul, the threat remains in other areas of Iraq,” the CJTF-OIR press release stated.

Those areas include pockets around the cities of Tal Afar and Hawija, and along the Euphrates River Valley from Anah to Al Qaim on the border with Syria. Even if the Islamic State is driven from these areas, the group will likely follow the same strategy that it did after it was defeated during the US-led surge that ended in 2010. Then, al Qaeda in Iraq, the predecessor of the Islamic State, went underground and waged a guerrilla insurgency. The group was also buoyed by the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011.

Townsend warned that the victory in Mosul does not mean that the Islamic State is finished, and urged Iraqis to “unite” to prevent the group from re-emerging.

“However, this victory does not mark the end of this evil ideology and the global threat of ISIS. Now it is time for all Iraqis to unite to ensure ISIS is defeated across the rest of Iraq and that the conditions that led to the rise of ISIS in Iraq are not allowed to return again,” he said.

The involvement of the PMF in military operations and the occupation of Sunni cities, towns, and villages and their sectarian reprisals may serve to radicalize Sunnis and push them into the arms of the Islamic State. Additionally, the Iraqi military’s increasing reliance on the militias strengthens Iran’s influence in Iraq, which is also feared by Iraq’s Sunnis.

---

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD's Long War Journal.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://dailycaller.com/2017/07/11/m...ange-in-iran-infuriates-its-defense-minister/

Mattis’ Call For Regime Change In Iran Infuriates Its Defense Minister

Russ Read
Pentagon/Foreign Policy Reporter
6:31 PM 7/11/2017

Secretary of Defense James Mattis seriously angered Iran’s radical regime after he called for a change in government in a recent interview.

Iranian Minister of Defense Gen. Hossein Dehqan responded to Mattis claiming he “talks like a patient who has hallucinations due to high fever.”

“Instead of deciding for other nations, the U.S. defense secretary and the country’s ruling body had better care about the resolution of their own internal problems and examine the underlying causes that, most probably and in the not too distant future, will both wipe out the current U.S. government, and bring more serious challenges for the country’s political system,” said Dehqan on Tuesday, according to Tasnim News, a state-affiliated outlet.

Dehqan’s response comes after Mattis gave a recent rare interview to the Mercer Island High School Islander. When asked about the future of U.S.-Iranian relations, Mattis gave a dim view of the future, noting that better relations would be difficult to achieve under the current regime.

“Until the Iranian*people can get rid of this theocracy, these guys who think they can tell the people even which candidates they get a choice of. It’s going to be very, very difficult,” Mattis told The Islander.

The former Marine Corps general added that Iran was his “biggest problem” while serving as commander of U.S. Central Command. Mattis has long seen Iran as a negative actor in the Middle East, having once pursued the possibility of engaging in a retaliatory strike on Iran after they supplied rockets to Iraqi insurgents who killed U.S. forces.

Follow Russ Read on Twitter
Send tips to russ@dailycallernewsfoundation.org.

 

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https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-djibouti-idUSKBN19X049

#World News
July 11, 2017 / 6:03 PM / 3 hours ago

China sends troops to open first overseas military base in Djibouti

Ben Blanchard
4 Min Read

Video

BEIJING (Reuters) - Ships carrying personnel for China's first overseas military base, in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, have set sail to begin setting up the facility, as China's rapidly modernizing military extends its global reach.

Djibouti's position on the northwestern edge of the Indian Ocean has fuelled worry in India that it would become another of China's "string of pearls" of military alliances and assets ringing India, including Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka.

China began construction of a logistics base in Djibouti last year. It will be used to resupply navy ships taking part in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions off the coasts of Yemen and Somalia, in particular.

It will be China's first overseas naval base, though Beijing officially describes it as a logistics facility.

State news agency Xinhua said late on Tuesday the ships had departed from Zhanjiang in southern China "to set up a support base in Djibouti".

Navy commander Shen Jinlong "read an order on constructing the base in Djibouti", but the news agency did not say when the base would begin operations.

Xinhua said the establishment of the base was a decision made by the two countries after "friendly negotiations, and accords with the common interest of the people from both sides".

"The base will ensure China's performance of missions, such as escorting, peace-keeping and humanitarian aid in Africa and west Asia," it said.

"The base will also be conducive to overseas tasks including military cooperation, joint exercises, evacuating and protecting overseas Chinese and emergency rescue, as well as jointly maintaining security of international strategic seaways," Xinhua said.

Foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang told a daily news briefing the base would enable China to make "new and greater contributions" to peace in Africa and the world and would benefit Djibouti's economic development.

Djibouti, which is about the size of Wales, is at the southern entrance to the Red Sea on the route to the Suez Canal. The tiny, barren nation sandwiched between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia also hosts U.S., Japanese and French bases.

'Not Military Expansionism'

The People's Liberation Army Daily said in a front-page commentary the facility was a landmark that would increase China's ability to ensure global peace, especially because it had so many U.N. peacekeepers in Africa and was so involved in anti-piracy patrols.

China would not seek military expansionism or get into arms races no matter what happened, the newspaper said.

"These promises will not change because of the construction of the overseas logistics base," it said.

The state-run Global Times said in an editorial there could be no mistake that this was in fact a military base.

"Certainly this is the People's Liberation Army's first overseas base and we will base troops there. It's not a commercial resupply point. It makes sense there is attention on this from foreign public opinion," said the paper, which is published by the official People's Daily.

China's military development was about protecting its own security, it said.

China would not seek military expansionism or get into arms races no matter what happened, the newspaper said.

"These promises will not change because of the construction of the overseas logistics base," it said.

The state-run Global Times said in an editorial there could be no mistake that this was in fact a military base.

"Certainly this is the People's Liberation Army's first overseas base and we will base troops there. It's not a commercial resupply point. It makes sense there is attention on this from foreign public opinion," said the paper, which is published by the official People's Daily.

China's military development was about protecting its own security, it said.

 

[northern watch]

The Intel Crab‏ @IntelCrab · 16h16 hours ago

The #Liaoning, a Chinese aircraft carrier, has entered #Taiwan's air identification zone.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/article160763494.html

VENEZUELA
JULY 11, 2017 4:04 PM

Slingshots vs. shotguns: Venezuela’s ‘youth resistance’ takes on the government

BY CODY WEDDLE AND JIM WYSS
jwyss@miamiherald.com

CARACAS, VENEZUELA
Venezuela’s ongoing street protests are increasingly looking like outright warfare. As security forces shoot rubber bullets, tear-gas canisters and sometimes live rounds at the churning crowds, increasingly restive mobs are responding with lethal slingshots, homemade mortars and Molotov cocktails.

This week, seven National Guard members were injured in Caracas when a roadside bomb exploded as they drove by on motorcycles.

Leading the opposition shock-troops are loose-knit groups of young men and women that have names like The Templars, The Warriors and The Arcadias. Collectively, they’re known as the Chamos de la Resistencia or, roughly, the Youth Resistance.

Since the demonstrations began in early April, more than 90 people have died, almost half of them between the ages of 17 and 32, who might have been part of these front-line groups.

To the opposition, these bands that march into battle carrying wooden shields and sticks are the symbols of resistance. The government, however, accuses them of being right-wing, drug-crazed “terrorists,” financed by shadowy forces intent on toppling the government.

Read More: Leopoldo López is moved to house arrest. Now what?

On a recent weekday, a group of the chamos agreed to talk about their experience on the front lines, as long as their identities weren’t revealed.

Nelson, a 22-year-old aspiring musical producer, said most of the dozen people in his group are from humble backgrounds who once supported the socialist administration. But now they’ve become committed to stopping what they see as President Nicolás Maduro’s power grab.

“We’re the resistance but we’re a poor resistance,” Nelson said. “We don’t come from the Country Club-set and nobody pays us.... And we don’t need any drugs to go on the streets. The only drug that we have is hunger.”

Speaking in the enclosed garden of a supporter, the young men and women said the rapidly deteriorating conditions in the country — including sweeping food shortages — were fueling their commitment.

While many of them are professionals or university students, they come from all walks of life.

Read More: Venezuela’s Catholic church calls administration “dictatorship”

Mario, 22, said he’d been part of Maduro’s security detail before he abandoned the armed forces, disenchanted by an administration that coddles the military but abuses civilians.

“At the battalion I was in we were throwing food away, giving it away, and this was while my family was going hungry,” he said. “I just couldn’t be in a place where they were wasting food while other people are in need.”

Mario claims he was part of the 311 Bolívar Battalion and said he’s met at least four other former soldiers who are now part of the “resistance.”

He said he’d helped bring some discipline to the rag-tag group and taught them about National Guard riot formations.

Read More: Is this man starving the country or saving the nation?

“One time, with five other people, we made an entire platoon retreat,” he boasted. “The difference between us and the [security forces] is that they’re being paid to be there. I’m there because I’m a Venezuelan who wants to defend my country.”

For the opposition, groups like these are a double-edged sword. While they provide energy and a degree of protection to the almost-daily marches, they also undermine the opposition’s claims to be an entirely non-violent movement.

Fabio, 21, one of the leaders of The Templars, described his group in almost military terms. His team plans their operations through phone calls and text messages and each person is assigned to his or her own “squad.”

The escuderos carry shields and provide protection, while those who own gas masks are used as devolvederos, or “returners,” who throw tear-gas canisters back at the police.

“Then we have the people with Molotov cocktails who neutralize the [armored personnel carriers],” he said. “In the back, we have people with radios who tell us where [the security forces] are coming from and where our escape routes are.”

But he insists their work is defensive: that they’re protecting themselves, and protesters, from government attacks. Asked if his group had participated in torching government buildings, he said those actions were being carried out by government “infiltrators” who were trying to discredit the movement.

“There are also street people who have no purpose in their lives and, psychologically, they get carried away and commit those acts,” he said.

Read More: Pro-government gangs storm congress

The chamos know they’re risking their lives. Nelson said he knows at least two colleagues who have died on the front lines, one hit by a tear-gas canister and another one shot.

“You feel so impotent and so much pain because they’re such cowards,” he said of the security forces. “They have to know they’re killing their own people and that’s going to weigh on their conscience.”

Anita, a 24-year-old dancer, said she had been hit several times with rubber bullets and was once shot in the stomach with a tear-gas canister. While the government has cautioned troops against shooting the metal projectiles directly into the crowds, it’s a common form of injury, and in some cases, death.

“It hurt so much,” Anita said of the impact. “It hit me directly in the stomach and there was so much blood, I was vomiting blood, and I spent the entire next day at the hospital with an inflamed stomach and I couldn’t eat anything.”

Amnesty International this week said the lethal attacks on protesters were not one-off events, as the government has suggested, but part of a “premeditated policy.”

“What seemed to be isolated reactions by the Venezuelan authorities in the face of protests in fact indicate a planned strategy by the government of President Maduro to use violence and illegitimate force against the Venezuelan population to neutralize any criticism,” Erika Guevara-Rosas, Americas Director at Amnesty International, said in a statement.

Demonstrators nationwide are asking for general elections, humanitarian aid and the release of political prisoners. While the administration did transfer a prominent critic, Leopoldo López, to house arrest last weekend, it has shown few signs that it’s willing to budge. Maduro has said he’ll serve out his term through 2019 and is pushing a controversial and unpopular plan to rewrite the constitution.

Some of the Templars said they were supporters of Maduro’s predecessor and mentor, the late Hugo Chávez, who died in 2013 from an undisclosed form of cancer.

Nelson said he supported Chávez because of his focus on the country’s neediest. But he said he lost faith as corruption gutted the socialist administration and the once oil-rich nation fell on hard times.

“It sucks when your mother... tells you that all she has to eat is fried mangoes, or that she’s only eating plantains and yuca, when we’re a country that exports things and is rich,” he said. “Before, you could go to a grocery store and buy anything you wanted to.”

He said he feared that Maduro’s plans to amend the 1999 constitution will “constitutionalize life-long hunger.”

With few obvious ways out of the crisis, it’s likely the death-toll will continue to mount in coming weeks. And Nelson said he and his group of chamos has no choice but to continue fighting on the streets.

“Nobody knows how this is going to end,” he said. “The only one who knows is God, and whatever he throws at us, we’ll keep fighting — for better or for worse.”

Jim Wyss: +57-312-465-1776, @jimwyss

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/arti...-security-crumbling-and-how-matters-here-1091

EXPERT COMMENTARY

Why Mexican Security is Crumbling – and How That Matters Here

JULY 12, 2017 | ERIC OLSON

Mexico was ranked the most-worsened country this year on the Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index (FSI), tying with Ethiopia for the bottom spot. Although Mexico has long faced violence, corruption, and organized crime, these problems all worsened during the past year, countering a decade-long trend of increasing stability there. The Cipher Brief’s Kaitlin Lavinder asked Eric Olson, the deputy director of the Wilson Center’s Latin American program and senior advisor to its Mexico Institute, what explains this drop in stability, and whether uncertainty over Trump Administration policy has anything to do with it.

The Cipher Brief: Why did Mexico worsen so drastically this year on the Fragile States Index?

Eric Olson: It’s a combination of things. It’s a serious uptick in violence tied to renewed conflicts between criminal organizations in the country. Separate, but related, Mexico had several major corruption scandals at the state level involving governors and former governors. That also showed the serious institutional weakness at the state and local levels. It’s not like that was unknown before, but really the extent of it was pretty shocking.

TCB: Could that be a positive sign – that these corruption scandals came to light?

Olson: That’s one way of thinking about it if one thought they were going to lead to major improvements, but what it revealed was the extensive nature of corruption at that level and that it was happening under everybody’s noses, and people were either aware and looked away or simply put their heads in the sand. The message could be spun in a positive way, but overall what people see is a confirmation of the weakness that exists particularly at the state and local levels. There are other instances of corruption that include federal forces as well, including in the presidency over the last two or three years. All those things together make people wary.

The third thing is the uncertainty in the U.S.-Mexico relationship that crept in during and after the 2016 U.S. election. Candidate, and now President, [Donald] Trump’s statements about Mexico were very unsettling. In some ways, what has contributed to making Mexico an economically stable and successful country has been its close ties to the U.S. – and that relationship has strengthened, deepened, and broadened in recent years. Then suddenly, that’s thrown into question with Trump’s demands to renegotiate the free trade relationship, and promises to build a wall that Mexico would be forced to pay for. So uncertainty about the future of the relationship was reintroduced and Mexico’s currency and economy took a significant hit as a result – the peso fell over 20 percent [after Trump was elected]. That actually is beginning to turn around now. People are feeling a little more confident. But no doubt that throughout most of 2016 it was an issue.

TCB: You mentioned a serious uptick in violence in Mexico over the past year – why?

Olson: It shouldn’t be that surprising – Mexico has had ups and downs in its homicide rate. But the height of homicides in 2011 had come down in a significant way, and so for homicides to spike again is deeply troubling and unsettling. You’d have to look at each individual case and place where homicides have spiked to understand the various explanations. Most have to do with renewed conflicts between criminal organizations, especially centering around the Sinaloa Cartel and its future.

One of the dramatic things that happened last year was the arrest, then escape, re-arrest and extradition of [Joaquín] “El Chapo” Guzmán to the United States. It’s quite interesting that homicides didn’t actually go up when he was arrested; it was after he escaped and then was re-arrested that homicides went up dramatically. The thinking there is that he maintained control of his criminal network during his initial arrest, but was losing control after his re-arrest and extradition, leading to renewed internal competition between factions of the Sinaloa Cartel, one of which is led by his own son, and another by the son of another leader of a criminal organization. The second factor is that in the midst of the instability within the Sinaloa Cartel, another major criminal organization – the Cartel de Jalisco Nuevo Generación – has started to challenge the Sinaloa organization for control of different areas, creating more violence.

The third element is that we see some shifts in the drug market in the United States. We see more and more demand for heroin. Roughly 80 percent of heroine supplied to the U.S. now comes from Mexico. We’ve seen a real uptick in methamphetamine trafficking with laboratories in the Sinaloa and Colima area. Colima is the smallest state by population in Mexico and yet last year had the highest homicide rate. What is that about? Part of it is that it includes the port city of Mazatlán, which is the largest commercial port. There’s a huge amount of precursor chemicals coming through Mazatlán and the port of Lázaro Cárdenas, and roads from these major port cities join up in Colima on the way to Guadalajara and north to the U.S. border converting Colima into a battleground. So the simple answer is that the increase in homicides is due, in part, to the shifting criminal landscape.

And then you have a place like Veracruz that’s experiencing an extreme uptick in violence right now, and that’s partly because there’s a vacuum of any kind of leadership there – criminal or political – because that’s one of the states where an apparently very corrupt governor [former Veracruz Governor Javier Duarte] cut deals with criminal organizations while also allegedly pillaging the state coffers. He fled but was eventually found in Guatemala, and Mexico is seeking his extradition.

TCB: You said part of Mexico’s stability comes from close ties with the United States but part of its instability also comes from those close ties – the drug demand going north and weapons sales going south – so how much responsibility does the U.S. have in helping stabilize Mexico by curbing its own internal drug demand?

Olson: The United States shares a lot of responsibility. Drug demand is one issue; but controlling or disrupting the illegal trafficking of firearms to Mexico is another huge issue. All of this revolves to some extent around illicit financing. The main market is in the United States. The U.S. generates all kinds of illicit money, and that’s being laundered through the U.S. financial and other systems, and the U.S. has a responsibility for that as well. There’s multiple ways in which the U.S. could do more at home that would definitely help Mexico.

But the focus tends to be the other way around. We tend to want to address the problem of illicit drugs in the region and are less convincing when it comes to the home front.

TCB: Do you think that’s the tendency of the Trump Administration, to view the issue as mostly emanating from Mexico?

Olson: It’s a little bit too early to say for sure. We can evaluate that better in about six months. But Secretary [of Homeland Security John] Kelly, former general and commander of SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command], is well aware of the problems related to illicit drugs and drug trafficking. He often speaks about the U.S. needing to do more to reduce demand. They say the right things. I have yet to see an investment in those things in the United States. Secretary Kelly doesn’t have the authority to deal with problems related to drug consumption. His policy brief is really more at the border and with relation to migration and internal enforcement, not so much with illicit drugs.

TCB: How effective is U.S.-Mexico security cooperation, mainly through the Merida Initiative, the partnership between the U.S. and Mexico to fight organized crime and associated violence?

Olson: It’s a pretty small program compared to the amount of money the U.S. has been giving to Central America and Colombia. And it’s a pittance compared to other regions of the world. Its value is not so tied to the amount, the dollars and cents of it. The value is the level of collaboration and cooperation at the operational level and at the intelligence-sharing level, which is not really measured in dollars and cents as part of the Merida Initiative. That is why there was so much concern initially when President Trump said what he did about Mexicans, some negative things about the Mexican military, etc. because there was the worry that the aspect of trust and collaboration was going to be put at risk. It seems that it has not ultimately been put at risk – the U.S. and Mexican militaries continue to work in a collaborative way, and there’s still intelligence-sharing going on.

But he [Trump] said again today [July 7] that he still wants Mexico to pay for the wall, and for Mexicans, that’s kind of a nonstarter. They’ve learned to live with that rhetoric, let it roll off their backs. But if the U.S. and President Trump and the U.S. Congress insist that Mexico pays for this through some kind of taxation program, for example, it could put at risk the kind of security collaboration that is valued by both sides.

TCB: Were there any other signals from Trump’s meeting with Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto today [July 7] to show how this relationship is going to be moving forward?

Olson: It was a friendly meeting. The focus was really on NAFTA [the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement] and the feeling that the questions around NAFTA, the renegotiation of NAFTA, were progressing in a good way. So in a sense, that was all positive.

TCB: Do you have any final thoughts on Mexico’s current state of stability and how that impacts U.S. security?

Olson: The U.S. has always recognized that U.S. safety and security and stability rests in no small measure on the security and stability of Mexico. While I’m not sure I agree with the assessments of the Fragile States Index, what it does point to is Mexico has some very serious problems, in terms of capacity and issues around corruption, and that it’s urgent that the Mexicans deal with it, but also that the U.S. be positively engaged with Mexico on these issues.

Mexico has a presidential election a year from now, and if things continue the way they are, where people are frustrated, disappointed, unhappy, there could be election results that are not to the liking of the United States. It could result in a very anti-American election. That could further exacerbate the issues between the two countries.

MEXICO

INSTABILITY

DRUGS

BORDER SECURITY
THE AUTHOR IS ERIC OLSON
Eric Olson is Deputy Director of the Latin American Program and Senior Advisor to the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. His research and writing has focused on security issues and the impacts of crime, organized crime, and violence on democratic governance. He has also written extensively about U.S. security assistance in Mexico and Central America. Prior to joining the Wilson Center, he was a Senior Specialist in the Department for... Read More

 

[Shacknasty Shagrat]

Hc, I don't usually intrude on your excellent thread, but I thought this article is important.
There is such optimism in preparing for a 'short intense war'.
SS

'Govt authorises Indian Army to make emergency purchases for a short and intense war amid border tensions with China
BT Online New Delhi Last Updated: July 13, 2017 | 13:28 IST






Amid the ongoing face-off between India and China on the border of north-eastern state Sikkim, the government has passed an executive order authorizing Indian Army to make emergency purchases of arms and ammunition to be able to fight if required 'short intense war'.

The decision has come at a time when two neighbouring countries -India and China- are locked-in a bitter border stand-off which also involves Bhutan as a third country.

India Today reported that an internal audit of the Indian Army had revealed critical shortfall of artillery ammunition, tanks shells, fuses and spares for weapons platforms. The audit was conducted after Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad terrorists attacked Uri brigade headquarters, killing 19 soldiers.

In the audit report, the army identified 46 kinds of ammunition, spares for 10 weapons platforms like infantry combat vehicles and half-a-dozen mines of various kinds as critical for war fighting.

After this order, the Army can spend as much as it feels required on weapons that are needed to be added in military arsenal. "Unlike previous process, there is no per-determined cap on the amount that can be spent. Rather, the limit to spending has been tied to the minimum stores, ammunition that must be in the reserve of the army at given time. This is big shift," a senior Ministry of Defence officer told India Today.

Internal audit report is not the only basis, it appears, for making this decision. Earlier in 2015, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India made somewhat similar observation about the shortage of arms and ammunition.

The CAG's findings, in a report, were damning which said: "While availability of authorised stock against War Wastage Reserve to meet the expected duration of operation formed the basic criteria for ensuring the operational readiness of the Army, we found during the review that against the WWR of 40 (I) days, the availability of ammunition was only in 10 per cent of the total types of ammunition held (March 2013)."

The current conflict started when People's Liberation Army construction party entered the Doklam area and attempted to construct a road. India opposed the attempted construction as it would have allowed Chinese Army to get closer to Indian defence interests and also move forward the India-China-Bhutan tri-junction

http://www.businesstoday.in/current...for-a-short-and-intense-war/story/256382.html