WAR 06-24-2017-to-06-30-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Shacknasty Shagrat]

Fox News reporting that US Intel reported by White House to have found indicators that Assad regime is preparing another chemical weapons attack and is warning Assad that there will be repercussions if they go through with such an attack.

HC, thanks for all your work.
You might consider, respectfully, starting a new WAR thread every 6-8 hours, reflecting the rapid pace of events.
SS

 

[almost ready]

Petya cyberattack being compared by NYT on twitter to big attack in May.

Took down many companies of one of world's biggest corporation, WPP

http://www.independent.co.uk/life-s...-attack-wannacry-petya-security-a7810756.html

There's no keeping up. 16 new tweets as I typed this. Rosneft, too.

"Across Europe".


Here we go again.

My internet was down briefly a half hour ago. Thought "Oh no, it got us". Not yet.

https://twitter.com/search?q=cyber attack&src=tyah

now 64 new tweets. Gotta go.

Good luck.

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Steve Herman‏Verified account @W7VOA 3m3 minutes ago

#Petya #cyberattack has now spread to US. @Merck says its "computer network was compromised."

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Steve Herman‏Verified account @W7VOA 3m3 minutes ago

Steve Herman Retweeted AFP news agency

#Petya #cyberattack #Chernobyl

Steve Herman added,

AFP news agencyVerified account @AFP
Replying to @AFP
#BREAKING Chernobyl's radiation monitoring system affected by cyber attack: spokeswoman

 

[Lilbitsnana]

just because today has been "interesting"


Larry Van Horn‏ @MilcomMP 6m6 minutes ago

Another DoD variable character EAM broadcast 68c QCAB6I at 1552 by Pull Over. Also standing by for traffic calls. Interesting EAM day.


Larry Van Horn‏ @MilcomMP 1h1 hour ago

DoD HFGCS 36c QCEKXX EAM by station Pull Over on all HF primary freqs. Interesting start of CONUS a.m. EAMs was variable instead of 30c.EAM.

 

[Possible Impact]

Raytheon‏ Verified account @Raytheon Jun 26
Test success: For the first time, an airborne Apache helicopter
hit a ground-based target with a high-energy laser.
http://rtn.co/HEL

 

[Possible Impact]

Liveuamap MiddleEast‏ @lummideast 2h2 hours ago

Kremlin slams US 'threats' against Syria's Assad https://syria.liveuamap.com/en/2017/27-june-kremlin-slams-us-threats-against-syrias-assad-- … via @AFP

Ali Özkök‏ @A_Ozkok 2h
With the visit to the Russian military base
Bashar al-Assad sends a message to Pentagon:
If they challenge him, they challenge also Russia

[FONT=Verdana,Arial]
Within Syria‏ @WithinSyriaBlog 3h
President Assad inside Hemiem Air Base operation room

Military Advisor‏ @miladvisor 3h
The Chief of the General Staff, Gen. V. Gerasimov
and president Assad inside command centre
of Group of Russian Forces in Syria, Hmeymim AB

[/FONT] Within Syria‏ @WithinSyriaBlog 3h
A new US strike on SAA might be closer than some expect

^^^ Preemptive strike!


Within Syria‏ @WithinSyriaBlog 3h
as I said before US moved from making up excuses to attack SAA,
to attack it without any excuse
MSM swallow any US lie now without a clue

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/arti...il&utm_term=0_b02a5f1344-59e48d71a0-122460921

As ISIS Falls, Border Battles Loom

June 27, 2017 | Fritz Lodge

The U.S.-led military campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria appears to be nearing its end. In Mosul, Iraqi military forces are now pushing into ISIS’s last pocket of resistance in the Old City as allied militias cut off ISIS forces near Tal Afar. In Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have encircled the ISIS “capital” in Raqqa and pushed into the city proper with U.S.-led coalition support.

However, as ISIS’ territorial footprint shrinks, a new battle for control over liberated areas is brewing. Forces aligned with the U.S.-led coalition are not the only players fighting ISIS. Russia, Turkey, the Syrian government, the Iraqi central government, Iran-backed militias, and a mix of Kurdish militias are just some of groups angling to stake their claim to the lands ISIS leaves behind.

Two strategic areas along the Iraqi-Syrian border – Sinjar in northwestern Iraq and the regions of Raqqa and Deir al Zour in eastern Syria – are set to play a vital role in this burgeoning power struggle. As these disparate forces operate in ever closer proximity, who stands to gain after ISIS’ fall, and how far is the U.S. willing to go to assert its interests in eastern Syria and northwestern Iraq?

Russian cruise missile strikes launched from warships in the Mediterranean against ISIS targets near Palmyra on Friday are only the latest in a series of escalating tensions between U.S.-backed and Syrian government-aligned forces in eastern Syria. U.S.-led coalition troops stationed on the southeastern Syrian border with Iraq in al Tanf have shot down two approaching Iranian and Syrian regime drones this month, and on June 18, a U.S. Navy F/A 18-E Super Hornet shot down a Syrian SU-22 bomber, which was attacking SDF and other coalition-allied units to the west of Raqqa. *

This spike in incidents is a reflection of eastern Syria’s strategic importance to both the Syrian regime of President Bashar al Assad and Iran. First, in the city of Deir al Zour, Assad’s forces have held out against ISIS fighters since 2014. Those troops only control two small enclaves, which must be resupplied by air, but their presence has been a useful thorn in ISIS’ side. Now, says Aron Lund, Syria expert and Fellow at the Century Foundation, Syrian regime forces must relieve this bastion in Deir al Zour, unless they want to “continue to waste the enormous amount of resources that they’ve sunk into the city.” Deir al Zour is also the administrative capital of the surrounding region so taking it from ISIS would give Assad a valuable base of operations from which to project authority in the province.

For Iran, it is the border regions south and east of Deir al Zour which hold the most value. If Tehran can establish control over one or more major border crossings on the Syria-Iraq border, the Islamic Republic will finally have a secure land route from Iran to Lebanon and the Mediterranean through friendly territory in Iraq and Syria. According to Michael Knights, a Lafer Fellow at the Washington Institute, this route “would be very useful in the event that Iran’s allies cannot use airports in Lebanon and Syria during a future war.” It would also have symbolic value as a public victory in Tehran’s regional competition against Sunni Arab states led by Saudi Arabia, as well as the United States.

This is why Iran-backed militias have continually pushed so close to U.S. troops – and the local Arab allies they have been training to fight ISIS – garrisoned in al Tanf. It is also why regime forces are pushing towards Abu Kamal to the north of al Tanf, which is the last unclaimed major border crossing in eastern Syria.

In a press conference on Friday, the spokesman for the U.S.-led anti-ISIS Operation Inherent Resolve appeared to accept Syrian regime and Iranian-backed efforts to take Abu Kamal, saying, “if they want to fight ISIS in Abu Kamal and have the capacity to do so…that would be welcome.” This statement could be a sign that the U.S. is willing to accept further regime advances towards Deir al Zour from Palmyra in central Syria and the city of al Dumayr in eastern rural Damascus. However, the downing of the Syrian warplane in western Raqqa and Iranian and Syrian drones near al Tanf suggests that Washington will continue to draw the line on Syrian and Iranian encroachment in the coalition’s areas of operations around Raqqa and al Tanf, or attacks on local allies like the SDF.

Similar dynamics are raising the risk of new conflict along the Syrian border in northwestern Iraq, particularly near the Iraqi region of Sinjar. There, as ISIS forces face defeat in Mosul and encirclement in Tal Afar to the west of Mosul, a dizzying array of local and regional actors are positioned to vie for influence. The local population of Sinjar is primarily Yazidi – an ancient religious group in northern Iraq – and has suffered grievously at the hands of ISIS fighters. Before ISIS’ conquest of the area in 2014, Sinjar was controlled by the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and secured by the Kurdish Peshmerga.

However, after ISIS routed Peshmerga troops in 2014, fighters from the Turkish Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) helped defend the Yazidi population. Now, the PKK has established a presence in Sinjar and along the northeast Syrian border where their sister organization, the U.S.-backed Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) hold power. At the same time, Iraqi paramilitary Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) militias – many of them backed by Iran – have looped around Tal Afar to enter the Sinjar region and establish a presence along the Syrian border, positioning themselves well to establish a border linkage with either the Assad regime or YPG-controlled Syria, which has deep economic ties to Damascus.

With all these groups operating in the same area – and training their own local militias – the potential for new conflict is high. The potential for a conflict that drags in regional powers is also increasing. Turkey, for instance, is closely linked with the KRG and adamantly opposed to the PKK and YPG establishing a presence in Sinjar and on the Turkish border with Iraq; Iraq would like to reestablish control over the previously KRG-controlled region; and Iran is intent on expanding the presence of its proxy militias in the area.

One common denominator in both of these critical flashpoints is the United States. U.S. coalition and allied forces are at the vanguard of anti-ISIS operations in both border regions, giving Washington the military leverage to shape the political map post-ISIS. So far, however, policymakers have given little indication as to what America’s strategy in the region will be after the battle against ISIS is complete.
--
View our expert commentary on this topic:

The Complex State of Play in Eastern Syria, by*Aron Lund, a Fellow at The Century Foundation

The Fight for the Northern Iraq-Syria Border, by*Michael Knights, the Lafer Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Fritz Lodge is a Middle East and international economics analyst at The Cipher Brief. Follow him on Twitter @FritzLodge.

--

Recent Briefs:

Conflict Minerals: The Dark Side of the Digital Age Electronics Boom
Levi Maxey

U.S. Running Out of Options in Afghanistan
Bennett Seftel

Close Calls or Worse Between U.S. and Russia in Syria
Fritz Lodge and Will Edwards

Allying Public and Private Forces on the Front Lines of Cybersecurity
Levi Maxey

Can China Actually Restrain Kim Jong-Un?
Will Edwards

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://warontherocks.com/2017/06/dont-believe-the-hype-about-european-defense/

Don’t Believe the Hype About European Defense

Luis Simon
June 27, 2017

If you’re a Europe-based think tanker, policy wonk, or commentator, Donald Trump and Brexit are great for business. Just about every Brussels pundit is leading off his musings about Europe’s future with some sort of Trump or Brexit hook. If you haven’t heard by now that either Trump, Brexit, or — ideally — both offer historical windows of opportunity for European defense cooperation, you’re way outside of the Brussels bubble.

Those invested in the notion that the European Union can become strategically autonomous interpret pretty much whatever happens out there as a catalyst for greater European defense cooperation. Every time there is some sort of global crisis or “external shock,” catalyst-related narratives pop up — there are just too many politicians, officials, and pundits in Europe who lust after such narratives.

We have been here before. Many times. Think about the Balkan Wars triggering all that talk about the hour of Europe; of the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 being widely viewed as wake up calls for Europe; or how Obama’s 2010 announcement of a pivot to Asia or reluctance to lead on Libya supposedly left Europeans no choice but to take security matters into their own hands. And let us not forget the 2003 Iraq War, when millions of Europeans took to the streets to protest against George W. Bush and Tony Blair’s mischiefs. That irresponsible, trigger-happy, and condescending American cowboy — not to speak of his British “poodle” — was supposed to be the mother of all catalysts for greater European defense cooperation.

And yet, no serious push for European strategic autonomy ever came about. E.U. defense die-hards have been left at the altar again and again. What they typically acknowledge, by way of consolation, is that these things take time and patience — Rome was not built in a day. They also argue important steps are being taken, and these things (i.e. the articulation of a serious E.U. defense policy) tend to move forward one step at a time. Yet, it is not easy to keep count on how many allegedly “important steps” have been taken along the long and winding road to European strategic autonomy. But perhaps the next catalyst will be the real thing that many seem to be waiting for. Enter Trump and Brexit.

Some say Trump is just too unstable and untrustworthy to look after European interests or be entrusted with the defense of the international liberal order. Others argue his emphasis on greater allied burden-sharing means Europeans need to step up their defense efforts. No matter which of these arguments you prefer, the conclusion is similar: Europeans have no option but to get their act together.

Yet, the notion that an irresponsible or disengaged America forces Europeans to take care of their own security could re-open old divisions on fundamental questions. One such question is nuclear deterrence. This is a question many could pretend to ignore during the two decades that followed the end of the Cold War, as the so-called peace dividend gave way to repeated European attempts to integrate Russia into the West. However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea has put deterrence and defense back in Europe’s security agenda. And Moscow resorting to nuclear saber-rattling as a means of intimidation, and its ongoing efforts to modernize its nuclear arsenal, underscore the renewed importance of nuclear weapons for European security. Any serious discussion on European strategic autonomy must square the nuclear circle.

This leads to a critical and highly uncomfortable question: Given widespread reluctance around the idea of a German nuclear deterrent, are Paris and Berlin ready to reach some sort of sharing agreement over the French nuclear deterrent? Most unlikely. The idea of national strategic autonomy is embedded in France’s political DNA, and an independent nuclear deterrent is the jewel of France’s autonomy crown. Germany, for its part, might have come to terms with its de facto strategic subordination to the United States through NATO. But it is unlikely to sign off on a serious European defense scheme if its role is to be relegated to playing second fiddle to France, let alone Britain. This red line was already set by former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt during the Cold War. For Brandt, any European defense scheme independent from NATO would require a serious discussion about the modalities for including West Germany in the process of decision-making concerning the French nuclear deterrent: Germany’s role could not be “restricted to infantry tasks.” This continues to reflect German thinking.

As long as a shared nuclear deterrent is off limits, Berlin is unlikely to reject any sort of French (or British) nuclear umbrella, both for strategic and political reasons. Therefore, and for all the rhetoric about Trump having done more for European defense cooperation than anyone else, once the electoral fog clears in Germany, we should expect key European leaders to re-emphasize the centrality of the United States to Europe’s security and geopolitical architecture, and put their energies on co-opting the United States (mainly through NATO) and re-stating its commitment to European security.

Now let’s turn to Brexit and the myth that “British recalcitrance” has been responsible for the misfortunes of “European defense” over the last few decades. With the British out of the E.U. — or so the argument goes — the path is finally clear for European strategic autonomy. Never mind the sorry state of European military capabilities, or that Britain has actually been one of the leading advocates of greater military spending in Europe, and of investing in modern capabilities, having partnered with France to that effect. Never mind that, when it comes to defense, the French are just as likely to hold Germany’s hand and release Britain’s as Trump is to get a standing ovation in the European Parliament. And never mind the gulf between France and Germany, the supposed engine of an alleged European security enterprise.

France looks at military force not just through the lens of defense and deterrence, but also as a means of advancing its foreign policy and economic interests. And it makes a proactive use of it. Germany rejects that vision. It sees the military as a last resort defensive instrument. These are deeply ingrained differences of strategic culture. And any serious effort on the part of Germany to overcome its cautious and defensive attitude towards military power is likely to cause discomfort amongst some of its European partners, France included. In many ways, when it comes to defense spending and its attitude towards the use of force, Germany is damned if it does and damned if it doesn’t.

At any rate, the differences in French and German attitudes toward military force are not just philosophical. They project into virtually any debate on European security cooperation, whether it relates to capability development, new institutional structures, or launching E.U. military missions.

The never-ending debate over the establishment of an operational headquarters for the planning and conduct of E.U. military operations give us an example that is both critical to any debate about European strategic autonomy and highly illustrative of the extent to which Franco-German differences can cripple the idea of a serious E.U. defense policy. The French have traditionally pushed for a fully staffed European Union military headquarters geared for planning and conducting expeditionary missions. The Germans have advocated for a more modest civilian-military planning facility focusing on low-intensity, peacekeeping, and stabilization missions. Despite numerous institutional reshuffles in the European Union’s planning and conduct structures, French and German red lines have barely moved since the CSDP was launched in 1999.

As a result, it has taken nearly 20 years of allegedly significant steps for the European Union to establish a “Military Planning and Conduct Capability” composed of up to 25 staffers, devoted to assisting with the planning and conduct of so-called non-executive (i.e. training and assistance) missions. By way of comparison, it took NATO barely a few years to set up a permanent, integrated military command structure with a strategic level command and several joint force and specific component commands capable of planning and conducting all types of operations.

All in all, ongoing differences amongst the European Union’s key member states suggest that neither Brexit nor Trump are likely to prove to be real game changers for E.U. defense cooperation, let alone lead to European strategic autonomy.
*
Luis Simón is Research Professor at the Institute for European Studies (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) and Director of the Brussels office of the Royal Elcano Institute. He has a PhD in International Relations from the University of London (Royal Holloway College).

-

Commentary
Trump, NATO, and Establishment Hysteria

Commentary
Don’t Count on Germany to Save the West

Commentary
What to Expect at Today’s NATO Leaders Meeting

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Strat 2 Intel Retweeted
The Intel Crab‏ @IntelCrab 14m14 minutes ago

The Intel Crab Retweeted أسَـكٌـنّـدِرٌ

RUMINT: #Turkey has officially launched her invasion into #Syria near #Afrin.

The Intel Crab added,
أ

سَـكٌـنّـدِرٌ @Altmimy_1
#عاااااااجل #سوريا
كما وصلني #الآن أنباء عن بدء الجيش التركي عملية عسكرية ضد ميليشيات YPG الكردية في مدينة #عفرين

translation of above:

I have also received news that the Turkish army has launched a military operation against Kurdish YPG militias in the town of Afrin

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Strat 2 Intel Retweeted
The Intel Crab‏ @IntelCrab 14m14 minutes ago

The Intel Crab Retweeted أسَـكٌـنّـدِرٌ

RUMINT: #Turkey has officially launched her invasion into #Syria near #Afrin.

The Intel Crab added,
أ


translation of above:

The Intel Crab Retweeted
Nidal‏ @Nidalgazaui 30m30 minutes ago
Replying to @Nidalgazaui

#BREAKING: Heavy clashes between the #Turkish army/ #FSA and the #PKK near #Azaz right now..

The Intel Crab Retweeted
Simon Cousins‏ @sicodaddy 1h1 hour ago

BREAKING: Hearing from Pentagon sources that USS George H.W. Bush Battle Group has been issued "Extraordinary Orders" relating to #Afrin.

 

[Lilbitsnana]

The Intel Crab‏ @IntelCrab 8m8 minutes ago

Turkish Army tanks pour into northern #Aleppo for humongous offensive.


posted for fair use
video at link
https://www.almasdarnews.com/articl...nks-pour-northern-aleppo-humongous-offensive/



VIDEO: Turkish Army tanks pour into northern Aleppo for humongous offensive
By
Chris Tomson -
28/06/2017 1

DAMASCUS, SYRIA (2:00 A.M.) – Kurdish forward units in the Efrin region are on high alert after massive deployments of Turkish armored vehicles were spotted arriving in northern Aleppo on Tuesday.

Ahead of the suspected offensive, the Turkish Army lit up the skies over northern Aleppo on Tuesday evening, targeting a string of Kurdish-held villages with artillery fire while reconnaissance planes hovered above the battlefield throughout the day.

Meanwhile, an amateur video emerged reportedly showing dozens of Turkish Army tanks arriving in region, likely to spearhead a brand new offensive aimed at connecting the northern Aleppo pocket with the rebel heartland in Idlib.
video at link: https://www.almasdarnews.com/articl...nks-pour-northern-aleppo-humongous-offensive/
almasdarnews.com

For Ankara to connect these two large rebel-held regions, it requires the Turkish Armed Forces and vetted Islamist rebels to push through roughly 30 kilometers of territory under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a staunch US ally which is regularly supplied with weapons by Washington.

If a rebel supply line were to be established, the armed Syrian Opposition would be strengthened significantly while Turkey could reinforce its influence over Idlib province where the hostile Al-Qaeda linked Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) group remains the most powerful group.

To complicate matters even further, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and Russian Army also have soldiers stationed in the SDF-held region to mend ties between the parties.

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Strat 2 Intel Retweeted
Strategic Sentinel‏ @StratSentinel 49m49 minutes ago

Turkey fires on Kurdish YPG in Syria's Afrin. Possible buildup of Turkish ground forces.

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Nidal‏ @Nidalgazaui 33m33 minutes ago
Replying to @Nidalgazaui

#BREAKING: Several Explosions heard inside #Afrin city..

 

[Possible Impact]

ilhan tanir ‏Verified account @WashingtonPoint 2h
Erdoğan's mouthpiece says
"Turkey continues bombing YPG positions in Afrin"

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Tomas Portillo‏ @blogm633 2m2 minutes ago

Venezuela's supreme court attacked with grenade from police helicopter



kristoferkawas‏ @kristoferkawas 3m3 minutes ago

CARACAS (Reuters) - Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro said on Tuesday that a police helicopter had attacked the…



The Intel Crab‏ @IntelCrab 8m8 minutes ago

The Intel Crab Retweeted Christopher Abreu

Major military presence in #Caracas tonight. Tanks can be seen along major arteries.

The Intel Crab added,

Christopher Abreu @AbreuReport
#ULTIMAHORA: Caracas totalmente militarizada, sacan tanques de guerra, confirman alzamiento de grupo militar, Movimiento en Fuerte Tiuna.

posted for fair use
http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ve...k-idUKKBN19J034?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews

Wed Jun 28, 2017 | 1:44am BST
Venezuela says Supreme Court attacked from helicopter

Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro said on Tuesday that a police helicopter had attacked the Supreme Court in Caracas but a grenade tossed at the building did not explode.

Speaking on state TV, the 54-year-old president, who has been facing three months of opposition protests and some dissent from within government ranks, said that Venezuelan special forces were after the "terrorists" behind the attack.

(Reporting by Silene Ramirez; Writing by Andrew Cawthorne; Editing by Sandra Maler)

 

[Lilbitsnana]

so now they say the copter was stolen? I think maybe, but maybe not


Israel News Feed‏ @IsraelHatzolah 13m13 minutes ago
Replying to @IsraelHatzolah

RIGHT NOW: Soldiers with armored vehicles have been deployed near Venezuela's presidential palace in Caracas.


Israel News Feed‏ @IsraelHatzolah 36m36 minutes ago

BREAKING - VENEZUELA: President Maduro confirms "terrorist attack" after stolen helicopter attempts to bomb Supreme Court firing grenades.

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Peter Scheffer‏ @pscheff3r 11m11 minutes ago
Replying to @pscheff3r

A lot still unclear about the situation in #Caracas #Venezuela also reports of opposition lawmakers and journalists held by security forces.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...hina-sanctions-over-north-korea-say-officials

Donald Trump considering China sanctions over North Korea, say officials

Inaction over Pyongyang and trade war thought to have prompted the US president to look at options including tariffs on steel imports

Reuters
Tuesday 27 June 2017 23.03 EDT

US president Donald Trump is growing increasingly frustrated with China over its inaction on North Korea and bilateral trade issues and is now considering possible trade actions against Beijing, three senior administration officials told Reuters.

The officials said Trump was impatient with China and was looking at options including tariffs on steel imports, which commerce secretary Wilbur Ross has already said he is considering as part of a national security study of the domestic steel industry.

Whether Trump would actually take any steps against China remains unclear. In April, he backed off from a threat to withdraw from the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) after he said Canadian and Mexican leaders asked him to halt a planned executive order in favour of opening discussions.

The officials said there was no consensus yet on the way forward with China and they did not say what other options were being studied. No decision was expected this week, a senior official said.

Chinese steel is already subject to dozens of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy orders. As a result it has only a small share of the US market.

“What’s guiding this is he ran to protect American industry and American workers,” one of the US officials said, referring to Trump’s 2016 election promise to take a hard line on trade with China.

On North Korea, Trump “feels like he gave China a chance to make a difference” but has not seen enough results, the official said.

The US has pressed China to exert more economic and diplomatic pressure on North Korea to help rein in its nuclear and missile programs. Beijing has repeatedly said its influence on North Korea is limited and that it is doing all it can.

“They did a little, not a lot,” the official said. “And if he’s not going to get what he needs on that, he needs to move ahead on his broader agenda on trade and on North Korea.”

The death of American university student Otto Warmbier last week, after his release from 17 months of imprisonment in Pyongyang, has further complicated Trump’s approach to North Korea, his top national security challenge.

Trump signalled his disappointment with China’s efforts in a tweet a week ago: “While I greatly appreciate the efforts of President Xi & China to help with North Korea, it has not worked out. At least I know China tried!”

Trump had made a grand gesture of his desire for warm ties with China’s president, Xi Jinping, when he played host to Xi in April at his Mar-a-Lago retreat in Palm Beach, Florida. “I think China will be stepping up,” Trump said at the time.

Since then, however, North Korea’s tests of long-range missiles have continued unabated and there have been reports Pyongyang is preparing for another underground nuclear test.

Trump dropped by last Thursday when White House national security adviser HR McMaster and Trump senior adviser Jared Kushner were meeting Chinese state councillor Yang Jiechi, an official said. China’s inability to make headway on North Korea was one of the topics that was discussed, according to two people familiar with the meeting.

Officials in Beijing did not respond to a request for comment on the meeting.

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Fox Reporting‏ @Fox61A 24m24 minutes ago

#BREAKING: Military tanks of #Turkey are reportedly at the border with #Hatay now.


Fox Reporting‏ @Fox61A 22m22 minutes ago
Replying to @Fox61A

Unconfirmed reports claim they are heading to Bab al Hawa bordercrossing and to the village of #Atmah

 

[Lilbitsnana]

The Intel Crab Retweeted
Already Happened‏ @M3t4_tr0n 3m3 minutes ago

Armoured vehicles, incl. Air Def systems, spotted in NE India today as China beefs up positions on Sikkim border �� https://already-happened.com/2017/06/28/arm

 

[Lilbitsnana]

I wonder how many terror attacks or attempts there will be while he is there?


Steve Herman‏Verified account @W7VOA 3m3 minutes ago

July 14 visit by @POTUS to #France confirmed by office of President. @EmmanuelMacron.

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Newsweek‏Verified account @Newsweek 4m4 minutes ago

Russian warships have been firing rockets in the Baltic Sea, practicing a "duel" http://bit.ly/2tYcqwL



The Intel Crab Retweeted
Pamela Falk‏Verified account @PamelaFalk 27m27 minutes ago

#Now @nikkihaley on warning to Syria on ChemicalWeapons: "Due to the President's action, we did not see an incident"

^^^^I say BS

 

[Housecarl]

HC, thanks for all your work.
You might consider, respectfully, starting a new WAR thread every 6-8 hours, reflecting the rapid pace of events.
SS

Not with what I've got going on in my meat world...

 

[Shacknasty Shagrat]

Not with what I've got going on in my meat world...

You do important and reputable work here.
Prayers for your safety, success and protection.
SS

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Michael Horowitz Retweeted
Turkish Minute‏ @TurkishMinuteTM 11m11 minutes ago

Erdoğan says Turkey ready for new operation in Syria http://buff.ly/2uilzzp


posted for fair use and discussion
https://www.turkishminute.com/2017/...al&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer


Erdoğan says Turkey ready for new operation in Syria
By
TM -
June 28, 2017
ISTANBUL, TURKEY - JUNE 25 : President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan gestures as he speaks within "Istanbul Exchanges Greetings" event organised by AK Party's Istanbul Province Branch during Eid al-Fitr in Istanbul, Turkey on June 25, 2017. Eid-al-Fitr is a holiday celebrated by Muslims worldwide that marks the end of Muslims' holy month of fasting "Ramadan". AFP

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said on Wednesday that Ankara is ready to undertake a new military operation in northern Syria similar to Operation Euphrates Shield, which was launched in August of last year.

Speaking to the Russian Izvestia newspaper, Erdoğan said Turkey’s borders are under threat by Syrian Kurdish militia and that Turkey would not allow the establishment of any Kurdish state in Syria, Sputnik reported.

“Presently, negative processes are under way in Syria. In the event they lead to a threat to our borders, we will respond in the same way as during Euphrates Shield. Turkey will not allow the establishment of a Kurdish state in Syria and is ready to carry out another large-scale military campaign if needed,” he said.

In late March Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım announced that Turkey had successfully completed its Operation Euphrates Shield in Syria.

During the operation, Turkey and Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) forces were involved in clashes that caused tension with the US, which considers the YPG a close ally in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), while Turkey considers it a terrorist group due to its links with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

Turkish military: Turkey returns fire on YPG in northern Syria

Meanwhile, Turkish armed forces retaliated with artillery fire overnight and destroyed YPG targets after Kurdish militia opened fire on Turkish-backed forces in northern Syria, the Turkish military said on Wednesday.

According to a Hürriyet Daily News story, the army said YPG machine-gun fire targeted Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) elements in the Maranaz area south of the town of Azaz in northern Syria on Tuesday night.
“Fire support vehicles in the region were used to retaliate in kind against the harassing fire and the identified targets were destroyed/neutralized,” the military statement said.




Michael Horowitz Retweeted
Charles Lister‏Verified account @Charles_Lister 3h3 hours ago
Replying to @Charles_Lister @faysalitani and

.@FredericHof with a necessary & strong warning:

- In #Syria, #Trump is Letting #Iran & #Assad Win

http://www.newsweek.com/syria-trump-letting-iran-and-assad-win-629380 …



Michael Horowitz Retweeted
Matthew Schweitzer‏ @PostWarWatch 24m24 minutes ago

ICYMI: @AlexMello02 explains why #UAE is expanding in E #Africa, part of its #Yemen war. A fascinating conversation:


posted for fair use and discussion
https://postwarwatch.com/2017/06/26/beyond-the-peninsula/

Beyond the Peninsula

ALEX MELLO — The United Arab Emirates’ rapid expansion into East Africa will permanently reshape the region.

Over the past decade, the UAE has become increasingly assertive in its foreign policy, breaking from a tradition of regional neutrality. Since the Arab Spring, Abu Dhabi has, most notably, joined the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, participated in the fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and deepened engagement in Libya. Why has the UAE sought to practice a more activist foreign policy – are Abu Dhabi’s policies today truly a departure from its historical foreign policymaking?

The war in Yemen since 2015 has been the main driver of the UAE’s activist foreign policy and power projection in the Horn of Africa and East African coast. In the summer of 2015 Emirati planners needed to deploy fairly large conventional forces – around two brigade-sized task forces – into Yemen and sustain these forces logistically once they were in-country. The UAE government was aware that it would be unable to rely entirely on the US for these services – a realization that prompted a crash program of Emirati base building in places like Eritrea and across the Horn of Africa. Underlying these developments was a perception in Abu Dhabi that Washington was in the process of disengaging from the Middle East region between 2009-2013, beginning with the Obama Administration’s push to complete the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement with Iran. This perception of US disengagement and inaction drove, in part, the Arab Gulf countries’ combined intervention in Yemen, ultimately sparking the energetic UAE power projection drive that’s now being exhibited.

As Abu Dhabi assumed a leading role in the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, Emirati planners faced some huge logistical challenges. However, Abu Dhabi’s demonstrated capabilities have been impressive. The UAE first deployed large ground forces into the southern Yemeni port city of Aden in August 2015. This operation – the amphibious insertion of a brigade-sized battlegroup into a Special Forces-developed pocket in Aden and the subsequent armored breakout north from Aden city – was quite impressive in terms of its scale and professionalism. Such a complex operation is logistically very challenging for any military – especially for the UAE, which had to transport these forces to a battlefield approximately 1,000 miles from the Emirati homeland. By comparison, most NATO countries aside from potentially France and the UK would be hard-pressed to pull off a similar intervention without any US support.

It’s key to remember that the UAE was able to successfully complete this operation without any significant American air or naval support. Emirati commanders have subsequently said that their US Central Command (CENTCOM) counterparts had very little idea about what the UAE was doing in Aden; American military planners were quite surprised at Abu Dhabi’s ability to complete the Aden operation. The UAE military’s successful conduct of the Aden operation and subsequent operations in Ma’rib, likely demonstrated to planners in Abu Dhabi that they could independently conduct large, complex expeditionary operations in Yemen, and potentially other places in the region, thus giving rise to the more ambitious power-projection mindset in Abu Dhabi today.

In 2015, Saudi Arabia led a coalition of nine Arab states to war in Yemen to support the government of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. Abu Dhabi was a critical and seemingly enthusiastic member to this expedition. What factors influenced the UAE’s decision to join this coalition – did it enter the conflict with the same goals as outlined by Saudi leadership?

When the Saudi-led coalition’s intervention in Yemen began in March 2015, the aims of its member countries were more closely aligned than they are now. The operation was initially simple and urgent: stop the Houthi rebel forces – which had swept into the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, in September 2014 and sought to depose the internationally-recognized government under President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi – from overrunning all of southern Yemen and seizing critical cities like Aden and Taiz. Initially, the coalition attempted to achieve these goals using airpower, but eventually were forced to insert ground forces. Until this escalation point, the UAE and Saudi Arabia aims were very closely aligned.

(See here for more details about the causes of and actors in Yemen’s war.)

As the UAE started putting boots on the ground, however, Abu Dhabi’s goals began to diverge slightly from those pursued by Riyadh. At this point, too, there was a growing delineation of spheres of influence across Yemen: The UAE took a leading role in southern coastal areas in Aden and Abyan, while the Saudis operated further north in places like Ma’arib. These divisions ultimately precipitated a wider divergence of Emirati and Saudi goals over the following year of fighting. Today, the UAE is not terribly keen on putting the Hadi government back into power, which is a core Saudi objective – though I think there is a sense that the Saudis themselves are getting impatient with Hadi. Abu Dhabi views Hadi’s government as ineffectual, and is not convinced that it could ever return to Sana’a.

Instead, the UAE has focused its efforts on building a what amounts to a sphere of influence in southern Yemen through infrastructure projects, humanitarian aid, and small, limited deployments of ground forces. By having actual boots on ground, the Emirati have been able to work with a range of local militias under the umbrella of the Yemeni Southern Resistance movement, which advocates for autonomy and a secular republic in southern Yemen. Meanwhile, the Saudis are still more focused on maintaining a united Yemen under President Hadi’s government. The Saudi leadership have also been far more willing to tolerate Islamist factions in central Yemen, whereas the UAE is deeply suspicious of these groups.

The state of cooperation between Saudi and Emirati-backed forces has deteriorated over the past six months as a result of these divergent goals. The first significant clash between the Hadi government and Southern Resistance forces occurred in February 2017, regarding the status of Aden’s international airport. The Hadi government’s Presidential Protection Force – commanded by Hadi’s son – attempted to seize the airport from the Aden Security Belt forces, an Emirati-developed security force for Aden. Fighting continued for several days, with the UAE providing air support for their allies against the Hadi-aligned units. After the fighting President Hadi and his son flew to Abu Dhabi for joint talks with the Emirati and Saudi leaders, which were ultimately inconclusive. Between April-June, tensions in Aden have remained high, with three outbreaks of fighting for control over Aden’s airport. In May, President Hadi hit back by dismissing Aden’s provincial governor, a very popular UAE-backed Southern Resistance figure.

Today, the situation in Aden is very dangerous. It is unclear how – or if – these tensions can be resolved. Leaving this situation unresolved will likely in the long-run end up leading to greater autonomy for the Southern Resistance movement. The UAE has a footprint on the ground in Aden and across southern Yemen, supporting its local partners and building influence there. The Hadi government, on the other hand, does not receive the same sort of backing from the Saudis, and thus has far fewer resources with which to assert his control.

Within the context of the Saudi-led war in Yemen, the UAE has spearheaded operations in southern and eastern Yemen against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). How has the UAE shaped its counter-insurgency campaign against AQAP, particularly in terms of building local coalitions and financing train-and-equip programs?

Quite a bit of long-term planning went into this counterinsurgency effort. For example, nine months before UAE-backed forces moved into AQAP territory around the city of Mukalla in coastal Hadramawt Governorate, the UAE began recruiting local tribal fighters and shipping them to the Emirati base at Assab, Eritrea. There, the UAE military could conduct large-scale training – maneuvering of company and battalion-sized mobile infantry units – without any interference. When these forces were re-inserted into Yemen, they fought alongside embedded UAE Special Forces and a small Emirati conventional ground force. Though not perfect they performed fairly well – the aim was to develop local forces that were “good enough” to complete their immediate missions without trying to build them into clones of the UAE military.

Concurrent to military-based counterinsurgency operations, the UAE has engaged in a range of reconstruction and development projects, providing electricity generators, re-opening schools and supplying humanitarian aid. One of the UAE’s telecommunications providers rapidly established cellphone coverage in southern Yemen. Ultimately, these counter-insurgency efforts have not been completely successful. Emirati forces are small in number and spread very thinly on the ground; the effort of training and supporting local forces to hold large swathes of territory from AQAP appears to be overstretching the UAE’s resources.

Initially, the UAE achieved success in its counterinsurgency operations largely due to its focus on clearing AQAP from major urban areas in the region. Before the UAE intervention, AQAP held huge areas in southeastern Yemen, including Mukalla and a number of other cities in Abyan Governorate, just east of Aden. The UAE task force was inserted to rapidly clear these cities and towns and then moved out again with aim of not getting bogged down in prolonged ground operations, and sustaining heavy casualties – that the Emirati armed forces, which are quiet a small, compact professional force can’t really afford. While Emirati forces and their local allies cleared insurgents from the urban areas very rapidly, they’ve had more difficulty transitioning to static security operations in rural, low-population operations.

Emirati and local forces have struggled in this new environment of open-ended counterinsurgency, largely due to insufficient resourcing. Training, equipping, and sustaining the forces necessary to maintain security these areas has proven much more challenging than the first phase of the UAE’s battle against AQAP. For example, the UAE has trained a number of small, local “security belt” forces to hold towns across southern Yemen, but these units have been handicapped by insufficient weapons, emerging tribal splits, and lack of continuous funding.

Since operations against AQAP kicked off in early 2015, the UAE has attempted to avoid precisely the kind of open-ended rural counterinsurgency in which it is now engaged. Since 2015, US support has been focused mostly on the kinetic end of the spectrum: counterterrorism raids, conducting drone strikes against AQAP targets, and providing intelligence assets. It is far less clear whether Washington will provide any support to local UAE and Yemeni forces in terms of development or counterterrorism. For example, the Governor of Hadramawt commented in a Foreign Policy article that AQAP could only be defeated with more local-level counter-terrorism, intelligence, and development aid. In the future, it will be important to see whether the UAE and their local partners receive any more support from the US to support these types of operations.

In recent years, the UAE has sought to build up its military presence in East Africa, most notably through its 2015 acquisition of the deep-sea port and airbase at Assab in Eritrea following a breakdown in relations with neighboring Djibouti. How does the Assab base development fit into the context of the UAE’s growing footprint in East Africa, Horn of Africa, and Indian Ocean – has its development shifted the UAE’s strategic footprint in the region?

The speed with which the UAE managed to acquire its Assab base after losing access to another location in Djibouti is extremely impressive. It took Abu Dhabi only three weeks to secure Assab, and the scale of the base’s subsequent development in 2015 surprised many analysts. The UAE was already flying Mirage fighter jets out of Assab in early May, some six weeks after the start of the Gulf coalition air campaign in Yemen. The Assab base has been vital to the UAE’s entire operation in Yemen, serving as the key transshipment hub for troops and materiel destined for southern Yemen.

Since that period of rapid development, Abu Dhabi has used the Assab base to sustain its entire military operation in Yemen. As a result of conducting as a result of independently conducting these long-range expeditionary operations for the first time, Emirati policymakers have come to appreciate the critical importance of the Bab al-Mandeb and Indian Ocean sea-lanes for the UAE, not only in terms of sustaining its operations in Yemen but also for the federation as a whole. For example, these sea-lanes are critical for maintaining the port in Jebel Ali, near Dubai, as they key Middle East logistics and trade hub. From this understanding emerged a new phase of Emirati expansion and power projection. The UAE is constructing a new airfield and naval facility on Yemen’s Perim Island, directly on the Bab al-Mandeb between Eritrea and Djibouti. It is also developing a number of bases or forward operating locations along the southern Yemeni coast and Socotra Island. Across the Bab al-Mandeb Straits in the Horn of Africa, the UAE’s Dubai Ports World also operates a major port in Berbera, just across the Gulf of Aden from Yemen in Somaliland, and has begun to develop an airfield and naval base there. P&O, another Emirati port operator, also won a contract to develop a port in in northeastern Somalia’s Puntland region.

map at link halfway down: https://postwarwatch.com/2017/06/26/beyond-the-peninsula/


Taking a wider look along the East African coast, Abu Dhabi has sought to expand its footprint in many of the Indian Ocean island-states – most notably in the Maldives and Seychelles. Until a few years ago, this process was largely defined by trade, private investments and development aid. Yet, the Yemen War has emphasized the security benefits gained through such power-projection. For example, the UAE provides funding, training and support for the Seychelles Coast Guard – in 2011 they built a new coast guard base on an artificial island development funded by Abu Dhabi in Mahé and donated a number of patrol boats. The Emirati navy also regularly calls there. The UAE also provides training and support for the Puntland region of Somalia’s Maritime Police Force, which assist in interdicting smuggled Iranian weapons destined for Yemen through the Horn of Africa. Ultimately, these bases represent the initial stages of larger, deliberate UAE policy of power-projection across the East Africa region that will continue into the future.

As Abu Dhabi expands its footprint in East Africa, it has become embroiled in regional conflicts. Who are the UAE’s main competitors in its push to expand its footprint in East Africa – how have Emirati actions impacted relations between regional actors like Djibouti, Eritrea, or Ethiopia?

The UAE’s economic interests in the region predate the outbreak of conflict in Yemen. For example, the UAE owns large tracts of land in East Africa as part of its food security policy. Yet, it has only been in the past two years as a result of the war in Yemen that Abu Dhabi deepened its engagement across East Africa and the Horn of Africa. The base at Assab base was set up rapidly in 2015 to meet an immediate military necessity. Today, policymakers in the UAE are moving more deliberately, with an eye on balancing their relationships in the region and the potential repercussions of high-visibility UAE expansion.

For example, when the regional Somaliland parliament voted to approve the UAE base at Berbera, there was significant protest from the Somali federal government that the base deal had been conducted without its approval. This case is interesting because Somalia also receives a great deal of security assistance from the UAE, including train and equip program run from a base in Mogadishu. In addition, as part of the Berbera base agreement, the UAE plans to build a highway corridor between Somaliland and landlocked Ethiopia. Currently, almost everything that goes into or out of Ethiopia – the region’s largest and fastest growing economy – has to go through the port terminal at Djibouti; if the highway is finished, the Djibouti port – which is also run by DP World – may end up having problems competing economically.

The UAE’s East Africa policies today represent a new phase of Emirati “hard power” projection compared to the “soft power”, development aid and investments-centric approach of the last decade. Balancing competing regional interests is going to be increasingly challenging for policymakers in Abu Dhabi as they pursue this expansion. They are trying to be friends with every actor – and they have achieved some successes, most notably the quick turnaround with Assab in 2015. Yet, moving forward, the UAE will face many challenges achieving its “zero problems with neighbors” goal in East Africa and the Horn, despite its financial muscle and newfound influence as provider of regional security assistance.

 

[Lilbitsnana]

The Intel Crab‏ @IntelCrab 31m31 minutes ago

The Intel Crab Retweeted Michael Isikoff

Two Russian agents have been charged in a plot to overthrow #Montenegro's government; including the possible assassination of their PM.

The Intel Crab added,

Michael IsikoffVerified account @Isikoff
Former Montenegro amb tells Senate intel 2 Russian agents have been charged in plot to overthrow his country's govt & assassinate PM

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Gregor Peter‏ @L0gg0l 7m7 minutes ago EXPLOSION HEARD FROM AREA OF SYRIAN MILITARY BASE

internet is fxxxed up, so posting several things here that don't necessarily belong because it took me an hour to get to this point....


Gregor Peter‏ @L0gg0l 7m7 minutes ago




EXPLOSION HEARD FROM AREA OF SYRIAN MILITARY BASE NEAR HOMS -- WITNESSES



The Intel Crab‏ @IntelCrab 3m3 minutes ago





The #US is deploying units for possible military operation in #Syria.



The Intel Crab‏ @IntelCrab 60m60 minutes ago





#NATO warns cyber attacks 'could trigger Article 5' as world reels from #Ukraine hack.

 

[mzkitty]

Syria News‏ @Syrianews_daily 3m3 minutes ago

#BREAKING No American strike on Shaairat airbase nor T4 Airport
All are false news

https://twitter.com/Syrianews_daily

 

[Lilbitsnana]

ok, 2 hrs later...hopefully, Spectrum has their act together and my connection stays up.



The Intel Crab Retweeted
Gregor Peter‏ @L0gg0l 2h2 hours ago
Replying to @L0gg0l

Syrian sources say Homs airbases/airports were not targeted. More likely it was a RU strike on an allegeed rebel meeting.

yeah, not sure which group was hit, but 2 different ISIS teams got bombed to pieces today, so this was probably one of the strikes.





WarMonitor‏ @TheWarMonitor 32m32 minutes ago

'Russia to respond to any US strike on Syria'


WarMonitor‏ @TheWarMonitor 29m29 minutes ago

US strike on Syria likely a rumor based on a recent buildup of forces in the region suggesting that it could happen. Stay tuned.


Reuters Top News‏Verified account @Reuters 25m25 minutes ago

Russia says will respond 'with dignity' if U.S. mounts Syria strike http://reut.rs/2s3JDW1


The Voice of America‏Verified account @VOANews 44m44 minutes ago

Gunmen Fire at UN Convoy in Libya, Seize Workers http://dlvr.it/PQqW8r




Air Force Times‏Verified account @AirForceTimes 36m36 minutes ago

Lawmakers reject new plan to make women register for military drafts http://trib.al/RlOMJnV


IWCsync‏ @IWCsync 5m5 minutes ago

U.S. Military Sending Warship to Israel, Spy Planes to Syria After Chemical Weapons Report

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Strat 2 Intel Retweeted
CivMilAir
✈ ��‏ @CivMilAir 2h2 hours ago
Replying to @CivMilAir

Constant Phoenix nuke sniffer passing Sicily at 34,000ft after a mission over the eastern Med...

���� USAF WC135C 62-3582 DUNE42

 

[Lilbitsnana]

The Intel Crab‏ @IntelCrab 23m23 minutes ago

The Intel Crab Retweeted Massoud Mohammed

#Russia has deployed soldiers & equipment to #Efrin as #Turkey prepares for a major incursion into #Syria.

The Intel Crab added,

Massoud Mohammed @M1Massoud
160 Russian soldiers and 10 vehicles arrived to Kafar Jana base in #Efrin this evening.

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Conflict News‏ @Conflicts 3h3 hours ago

BREAKING: US approves 1st arms sale to Taiwan under Trump in deal worth $1.3 billion, official says - @AP

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Conflict News‏ @Conflicts 3h3 hours ago

BREAKING: US approves 1st arms sale to Taiwan under Trump in deal worth $1.3 billion, official says - @AP

The Intel Crab‏ @IntelCrab 5m5 minutes ago

Breaking: #China's ambassador to #US says arms sales to #Taiwan, sanctions on Chinese firms, run counter to spirit of Trump-Xi summit.


^^^ does this mean we're not friend anymore?

 

[Lilbitsnana]

The Intel Crab Retweeted
SURA‏ @AlSuraEnglish 47m47 minutes ago

#BREAKING - #Saudi government sources state there are internal demands to invade #Qatar to "liberate it from the al-Thani family rule"

 

[Warm Wisconsin]

The Intel Crab‏ @IntelCrab 23m23 minutes ago

The Intel Crab Retweeted Massoud Mohammed

#Russia has deployed soldiers & equipment to #Efrin as #Turkey prepares for a major incursion into #Syria.

The Intel Crab added,

Are the troops there to assist Turkey against the Kurds or stop Turkey from coming in to far?

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Are the troops there to assist Turkey against the Kurds or stop Turkey from coming in to far?

I am not sure.

Turkey has been playing nice, nice with Russia on some things, but they (Turkey) want that part of Syria, so not sure.

Considering it said only 160 men (Russia), I am not quite sure what to think. My gut says it's all a trap of some sorts.

Either they side with Turkey and change course to fight against YPG (and US by default) therefore dragging us into an all out war with both.

Or, they are there to fight Turkey, in which case, wouldn't we be drawn into war via article 5?

Or, we end up at war with Turkey if they attack the kurds.

No matter which way, I think it might suck.

Oh, and that area is the area that the infamous Dabiq of muslim lore/prophecy is in. (less than 25 miles from Dabiq)

Which kicks off another whole big can of worms and set of events.


WorldOnAlert‏ @worldonalert 1h1 hour ago

#Aleppo: Turkish journalists reporting that the Turkish offensive against #YPG in #Afrin Canton will start in July or August.



Shaun Brown‏ @staffsgtshawnb2 2h2 hours ago

#Efrin. If turkey crosses into Efrin Afrin American forces have and order to protect the ypg there and defend them with force


EHSANI2‏ @EHSANI22 Jun 19

Recall how in early days in #Afrin ,it was #Russian #Syrian Air Force that helped & coordinated with Kurds against FSA & other armed groups

 

[Lilbitsnana]

which time zone? (time in Turkey is currently 6:31 AM)


Mohamed Farghaly‏ @farghaly1969 8m8 minutes ago

A telephone call has been planned at 16.30 between #trump and #Erdogan. Most probably, a warning concerning #afrin

 

[Lilbitsnana]

The Intel Crab‏ @IntelCrab 23m23 minutes ago

The Intel Crab Retweeted Massoud Mohammed

#Russia has deployed soldiers & equipment to #Efrin as #Turkey prepares for a major incursion into #Syria.

The Intel Crab added,

Massoud Mohammed @M1Massoud
160 Russian soldiers and 10 vehicles arrived to Kafar Jana base in #Efrin this evening.

I am not sure.

Turkey has been playing nice, nice with Russia on some things, but they (Turkey) want that part of Syria, so not sure.

Considering it said only 160 men (Russia), I am not quite sure what to think. My gut says it's all a trap of some sorts.

Either they side with Turkey and change course to fight against YPG (and US by default) therefore dragging us into an all out war with both.

Or, they are there to fight Turkey, in which case, wouldn't we be drawn into war via article 5?

Or, we end up at war with Turkey if they attack the kurds.

No matter which way, I think it might suck.

Oh, and that area is the area that the infamous Dabiq of muslim lore/prophecy is in. (less than 25 miles from Dabiq)

Which kicks off another whole big can of worms and set of events.


WorldOnAlert‏ @worldonalert 1h1 hour ago

#Aleppo: Turkish journalists reporting that the Turkish offensive against #YPG in #Afrin Canton will start in July or August.



Shaun Brown‏ @staffsgtshawnb2 2h2 hours ago

#Efrin. If turkey crosses into Efrin Afrin American forces have and order to protect the ypg there and defend them with force


EHSANI2‏ @EHSANI22 Jun 19

Recall how in early days in #Afrin ,it was #Russian #Syrian Air Force that helped & coordinated with Kurds against FSA & other armed groups

which time zone? (time in Turkey is currently 6:31 AM)


Mohamed Farghaly‏ @farghaly1969 8m8 minutes ago

A telephone call has been planned at 16.30 between #trump and #Erdogan. Most probably, a warning concerning #afrin

Are the troops there to assist Turkey against the Kurds or stop Turkey from coming in to far?

see why I am concerned?

If Russia is there to protect YPG and US is there to protect YPG then that increases the odds that Turkey is going full-out rogue.

I think Turkey is trying to fulfill the rest of the Hadith. He wants to be top Kaliph.

He might even fulfill or cause to be fulfilled via reaction to his moves several prophesies (Biblical and muzzie) and take out Damascus in the process. Who knows who will take out Damascus or when, but I think time is short a major war for multiple reasons.



ScienceOfDiscontent‏ @SciOfDiscontent 1h1 hour ago

ScienceOfDiscontent Retweeted Syrian Civil War Map

Meeting between #YPG from #Afrin and #Russia supposedly about further military cooperation - #Syria

ScienceOfDiscontent added,

Syrian Civil War Map @CivilWarMap
Meeting between YPG and Russia in the military base in Kafr Jana. The goal is an increase of military cooperation.

http://syriancivilwarmap.com

 

[Lilbitsnana]

here is another translation:


Agidoagit @ Agidoagit1 3m3s ago

Agidoagit Retweeted Malik Dragon

Yesterday we sent the old paintings and we went to the #

Agidoagit added,
Malik Ejder @ Malikejder47

Replying to @ Malikejder47
The Russian troops evacuated the base for monitoring the conflict at Afrin.
The TSK seems to be stepping into Afrin's operation.