WAR 06-10-2017-to-06-16-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://jamestown.org/program/lost-soft-power-post-soviet-space-moscow-increasingly-using-hard/

Having Lost ‘Soft’ Power in Post-Soviet Space, Moscow Increasingly Using ‘Hard’

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 14 Issue: 78
By: Paul Goble
June 13, 2017 10:08 PM Age: 9 hours

The aggressiveness Moscow has shown in its relations with countries in the former Soviet space reflects Russia’s loss of influence via “soft” power channels. At the same time, the Kremlin’s demonstrated bellicosity simply exacerbates that loss. Consequently, if President Vladimir Putin is going to rebuild Russia’s sway over the region, as he hopes, he will increasingly have to rely on “hard” power, including military and economic pressure. That—more than any of his personal preferences—explains Putin’s actions up to now, and it sets the stage for the further decomposition of the former Soviet space and for more violence as this process continues. And this trend will necessarily involve outside powers, ranging from China to the Middle Eastern states to the West.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow has been losing what it expected to be its primary means of holding onto the extended geographic space previously under its control: the number of ethnic Russians in neighboring post-Soviet countries has declined sharply, as has the number of Russian speakers. Moreover, ever more former Eastern Bloc or post-Soviet countries have or are reorienting themselves away from Moscow by seeking membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the European Union; many are even dispensing with the Cyrillic alphabet, which Moscow earlier imposed, or are at least talking openly about doing so (Dsnews.ua, June 10; see EDM, April 25). Meanwhile, Russian aggression—first in the so-called “frozen conflicts” like Transnistria, then in Georgia and now in Ukraine—has backfired, alienating ever more non-Russian countries from Russia and helping to solidify their independent existence. And although the economy of Russia is still better off than some in the region, as the massive influx of guest workers from Central Asia and the Caucasus shows (see EDM, February 18, 2014; September 15, 2015; May 22, 2017), it is much weaker than it was over a decade ago and cannot compete with the economies of China or Western countries.

Moscow might have compensated for this weakening regional posture by developing contacts with the rising generations of leaders in these neighboring post-Soviet countries. For instance, it could have done more to encourage them to study in Russia, or by other means. But it has failed to do that. And now, a quarter of a century after the Soviet Union fell apart, Moscow has lost the ability to affect outcomes in most if not all of the post-Soviet states, according to Russian analyst Vladislav Inozemtsev. Instead, he writes, the Russian government has to use force or the threat of force to get its way. That may work in the short term but is counterproductive over the long haul (Gazeta.ru, June 6).

In short, Moscow has lost two of the three elements in the trinity of resources that define a hegemonic power: It no longer provides an attractive model for others to emulate, and it does not have the economic strength to leave them with no choice but to become part of its orbit. What it retains, at least for now, is the third element of that triad: disproportionate military strength. And consequently, it is not surprising that across the former Soviet space, Moscow is building up its military presence in the hopes of resisting the impact of the centrifugal forces its lack of other resources have unleashed.

Over the last six months, Moscow has beefed up its bases in Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, giving it the kind of military muscle that the governments of those three countries cannot ignore (Centrasia.ru, June 9). It has staged military exercises near the borders of other countries, from the Baltic States to Kazakhstan. And it has even organized exercises in countries of the Moscow-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

But perhaps most indicative of Moscow’s growing reliance on force as its only remaining tool of influence has been its actions in Belarus. Russia has long pressed Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s government for the rights to set up a base there, but the Belarusian leader has resisted. Lukashenka recognizes that the creation of such a base would severely limit his ability to navigate between Moscow and the West, something he is now compelled to do because Moscow no longer has the ability to provide the economic assistance his country requires. Moreover, Belarusians are increasingly viewing themselves as separate and apart from Russians, all of Moscow’s propaganda notwithstanding (RT, June 4; see EDM, June 8).

Many analysts in Moscow, Minsk and the West have been focusing on the possibility that Russia may use the Zapad 2017 military exercise in Belarus to force Lukashenka to change course or even to depose him and seek the incorporation of Belarus into the Russian Federation, much as Moscow did with its annexation of Crimea. The more hyperbolic predictions are almost certainly wrong (see EDM, March 8), but there is no question that Russia will seek to use its massive military presence during and perhaps after the exercise to put new pressure on Lukashenka and his regime (see EDM, January 20).

That conclusion is suggested by another military exercise now taking place in Belarus that may be a bellwether of what will happen this summer. Specifically, the “Slavic Brotherhood” counter-terrorism operation includes soldiers and—what is especially important—political figures from Russia, Serbia and Belarus. Notably, it appears designed to coerce Minsk more than to test anti-terrorism cooperation (Camarade.biz, June 5; Rossiyskaya Gazeta, June 9; Newsland.com, U-f.ru, June 8; Naviny.by, June 6).

All too often, analysts in the West have focused on each specific Russian action in isolation or seen them as manifestations of some Putinist grand design. But the collapse of Russian “soft” power provides an explanation for all such activities as well as for Putin’s neo-imperialism: Russia simply does not have any other way to try to hold this region. And consequently, it can be expected to use force more, not less often in the future.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://jamestown.org/program/ukraine-hopes-become-arms-exporter-nato-countries/

Ukraine Hopes to Become Arms Exporter to NATO Countries

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 14 Issue: 77
By: Oleg Varfolomeyev
June 12, 2017 05:48 PM Age: 2 days

Ukraine’s state defense-industry concern Ukroboronprom announced, on May 30, that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) offered to add Ukrainian defense-industry firms to its list of approved defense-related producers. Ukroboronprom said it may be allowed to participate in tenders to supply goods and services to NATO members and partners. Ukroboronprom CEO Roman Romanov said Ukraine was the first Eastern European partner country to be offered the opportunity to supply arms and equipment to NATO armies. This, said Romanov, was proof of the Ukrainian defense industry’s capacity and credibility (Ukroboronprom.com.ua, May 30).

Ukroboronprom’s subsidiaries boosted arms sales by 25 percent to $756 million last year, Romanov’s deputy Denys Hurak said. Moreover, they concluded contracts worth a total of $1.5 billion last year, and the volume of arms export contracts concluded in 2014–2016 is estimated at $3.8 billion (Zn.ua, January 30). Ukraine, outperforming Israel, was the world’s ninth largest arms exporter in 2012–2016, when its sales jumped by half compared to 2007–2011, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Among the world’s top ten arms exporters, only China’s sales grew faster. At the same time, China was also Ukraine’s main client, with 28 percent of total exports, followed by Russia with 17 percent and Thailand with 8.5 percent (Sipri.org fact sheet, February 2017).

Because of Crimea’s annexation and the hybrid war launched by Russia against Ukraine in 2014, Kyiv has severed ties with the Russian military-industrial complex (see EDM, December 1, 2014). Consequently, Russia will cease to be a key buyer of Ukrainian arms. Given the European vector of Ukraine’s current foreign policy and the large size of NATO’s arms market, it is natural for Ukraine’s defense industry to look for customers in the West; hence, NSPA’s offer comes in handy.

Kyiv announced plans to join the North Atlantic Alliance’s procurement system in 2015, and by 2020 it plans to fully switch military production to NATO standards. This would facilitate exports to NATO countries, but it will not be easy to achieve for a country whose defense industry for more than two decades depended on component suppliers and buyers in Russia. Over the course of the past 25 years, Ukraine had not developed much of its own military hardware and technologies, continuing instead to exploit the international reputation of the defunct Soviet military-industrial complex.

Until the war with Russia, Kyiv had also neglected its army, which could not afford to modernize its rusting arsenals even with the relatively cheap weapons made in Ukraine. This proved to be a blessing in disguise for local arms manufacturers, which have had to export almost 100 percent of their products, rubbing elbows with international competitors. As a result, Ukraine’s defense industry developed a competitive edge. Ukraine has unique facilities in shipbuilding and missile production. It also makes armored vehicles, tanks, radar systems, engines, transport aircraft and military trucks. Domestic military producers have numerous design bureaus inherited from the Soviet Union. The world’s largest transport plane, the An-225 Mriya, is a product of the Kyiv-based Antonov Design Bureau. Local firms have also been successfully competing for international orders to repair weaponry.

The biggest potential deal for Ukroboronprom to date, worth $600 million, is for upgrading tanks for Pakistan (Mil.gov.ua, November 23, 2016). Most recently, Ukrainian First Deputy Prime Minister Stepan Kubiv announced that the private Ukrainian manufacturer of helicopter engines, Motor Sich, would make and service Ukrainian-designed engines jointly with China’s Skyrizon (Interfax, May 16). Last May, Antonov and Turkey’s Aselsan signed a memo to jointly develop components for transport aircraft and to subsequently market them internationally, while Ukroboronprom’s subsidiaries Artem and Ukrspetstechnoeksport reached an agreement with the Turkish company MKEK to make ammunition for firearms (Ukroboronprom.com.ua, May 10, 11). Since Turkey is a key NATO member state, these deals may prove to be important steps in Ukraine’s strategy to enter Alliance markets.

On the downside, Ukrainian arms manufacturers and exporters face image problems after a botched contract from 2009 to supply BTR-4 armored vehicles to Iraq (see EDM, September 7, 2012). Ukraine delivered only 88 vehicles out of the 420 ordered, and only 34 of them could move; 42 had cracks in their armor, and there were also numerous other defects. Iraq had to send those vehicles that could not be fixed back to Ukraine (Zn.ua, May 19).

NATO membership is not on the immediate agenda for Ukraine at the moment, but Kyiv does not make a secret of its plans to join the North Atlantic Alliance in the future. Last week (June 8), Ukraine’s parliament approved a bill according to which the main goal of Ukraine in its cooperation with NATO is eventual membership (Pravda.com.ua, June 8). In the long run, Kyiv seeks protection from NATO. The current lull in the war with Moscow’s proxies in eastern Ukraine may end, and Kyiv fears a massive renewed Russian push. Locally produced weaponry may not be sufficient to repel such aggression since a significant share of Ukrainian arms and equipment is obsolete compared to what Russia has. Thus far, the West has not provided lethal weapons to Ukraine in any significant amounts. It would be a boon to the Ukrainian defense industry if it could supply arms to NATO armies through NSPA. But to upgrade the Ukrainian army to modern standards, this relationship may need to become much more reciprocal.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realcleardefense.com/art...productive_anachronism_for_europe_111568.html

The TLAM-N: A Counterproductive Anachronism for Europe

By Luke O’Brien
June 12, 2017

With Russia’s deployment of the new SSC-8 ground-launched cruise missile, the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty appears to be in its last death-throes. But what should the U.S. do in response to the treaty's demise? One suggestion is to bring back the nuclear version of the Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile, the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile - Nuclear, or TLAM-N. The last TLAM-N was dismantled in 2013, though U.S. submarines hadn’t patrolled with them since President George H.W. Bush’s 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives.

Much of this thinking has its roots in NATO’s Double Track Decision, which President Reagan’s opted to deploy Gryphon, a ground-launched version of the Tomahawk missile, and Pershing II, an intermediate-range ballistic missile, to Europe. These systems both aimed to enhance NATO’s nuclear warfighting capability while also allowing the United States to induce the Soviet Union to return to the bargaining table and negotiate from a position of relative strength.

Despite the Cold War deja vu, however, the 2010s are not the 1980s. As we attempt to apply any historical case study to a modern problem we would do well to examine what differences exist between the two. And in reviewing the decision to deploy Gryphon and Pershing II we can see that many of the factors behind that decision are simply not applicable in the same ways today and that the costs associated with re-fielding the TLAM-N to Europe exceed any potential benefit.

20th Century and 21st Century Coupling Have Different Requirements

Throughout the Cold War, the United States and its NATO allies offset Soviet conventional military superiority through the deployment of a vast array of tactical nuclear weapons. These included nuclear warheads in the form of landmines, artillery shells, artillery rockets, and bombs which could be dropped from fighter aircraft. These tactical systems were to ensure that any conventional attack against NATO by the Soviet Union would quickly escalate to a nuclear level, and as such risk the U.S. heavy bomber and missile force launching attacks directly against the Soviet Union itself. This, in turn, was designed to make the potential cost of a conventional attack against NATO unpalatable.

Throughout this period, however, NATO leadership was deeply concerned about ensuring that the United States (and its strategic nuclear forces) remained sufficiently “coupled” to Europe. If the U.S. should become “uncoupled” from Europe, the Soviet Union would be able to engage in a conventional attack safe in the idea that the United States would not risk using nuclear weapons out of fear of a reciprocal attack against the U.S. mainland. To compensate against this, the U.S. maintained longer-range theater nuclear systems to prevent this decoupling, starting with the Thor and Jupiter missiles.

In the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States withdrew its Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) from Europe in exchange for a Soviet withdrawal of its IRBMs from Cuba. The Soviet Union, however, maintained a large force of IRBMs inside of Soviet territory, which could target the majority of Europe. These IRBMs could be used to target key NATO targets, including NATO nuclear forces, stationed in Europe, leaving NATO unable to retaliate in kind without having to make use of strategic nuclear forces.

In response, the United States deployed both F-111 bombers and additional submarines armed with Polaris ballistic missiles to Europe and placed them directly under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. These systems were intended to counter Soviet IRBMs, essentially restoring the strategic balance in Europe. However, at the end of the 1970s, the Soviet Union began to field the SS-20 road-mobile ICBM. In addition to being a vast improvement in accuracy compared to the older IRBM systems, they were road-mobile and thus less vulnerable to NATO attack.

Today, however, there is a different dynamic between NATO and Russia. During the Cold War the entire point of coupling was to ensure that the Soviet Union wouldn’t be tempted to destroy NATO’s nuclear weapons stocks in an early attack out of the belief that the United States wouldn’t make use of its strategic nuclear systems. If this happened, NATO would have lost its tactical nuclear weapons, and thus the only tools it had available to stop the Warsaw Pact’s vast conventional force.

But tactical nuclear weapons aren’t the only thing standing between NATO and conventional defeat. Today, NATO, and especially the United States, has a large conventional edge on the Russian military and would be able to inflict significant amounts of damage against the Russian state in the event of conflict. Conventional attack is no less capable of inflicting sufficient damage to deter attack. Nuclear weapons aren’t magic. As political scientist Robert Mueller observes, “It is probably quite a bit more terrifying to think about a jump from the 50th floor than about a jump from the 5th floor, but anyone who finds life even minimally satisfying is unlikely to do either.”

Practical: Nuclear Availability Often Limits Conventional Availability

One key reason the U.S. had to introduce nuclear GLCMs in the 1980s, besides a desire for nuclear strike assets that were more survivable than aircraft, was to compensate for the decision to dual-hat other assets. Now, decades later, advocates of the TLAM-N would have us repeat the same mistake.

Upon the withdrawal of Jupiter IRBMs from Europe in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, NATO leadership was concerned that Soviet theater-level targets were no longer sufficiently threatened. As such, the U.S. assigned F-111 dual-capable fighter-bombers and Polaris-equipped ballistic missile submarines to Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to perform theater-level nuclear strikes. That said, though the F-111 was dual-capable (able to transition from nuclear to non-nuclear missions relatively quickly), squadrons during wartime would still be required to maintain aircraft on alert ready to deliver nuclear weapons when needed. The reason for this was twofold.

First, dual-capable aircraft performing conventional bombing missions would be exposed to normal battlefield attrition. Consequently, if you don’t maintain a baseline force on the ground that doesn’t participate in those missions, you run the risk of having insufficient aircraft available to perform the nuclear strikes desired by decision makers. Deciding to execute a nuclear strike, then discovering that you had no aircraft left to carry it out, was understandably seen as unacceptable.

Second, the decision to release and target nuclear weapons is a lengthy one, especially inside NATO’s highly convoluted nuclear approval chain. When combined with the often fleeting nature of nuclear targets (like mobile launchers), the time it would take to retask an aircraft from conventional mission planning and reassign it to a nuclear one meant the difference between a nuclear mission being carried out on time, and a nuclear mission being carried out late. That had grave consequences for not only escalation (where striking at the right time with the right weapon was crucial) but for efficient targeting* (a delay might mean that you miss a fleeting target).

One of the rationales for the Gryphon, therefore, was the freeing up of dual-capable aircraft. With Gryphon launchers that were purely focused on the nuclear mission, then dual-capable aircraft could be taken off quick-reaction alert and assigned back to conventional bombing missions in support of ground forces.* NATO could both maintain a nuclear force that was ready should decision makers opt to use it, but also ensure that it was providing the maximum possible support to conventional air-to-ground bombing.

Today, returning the TLAM-N to Europe, however, would likely be subject to the same constraints as NATO faced with the F-111 in the 1980s. If the submarines equipped with the TLAM-N are allowed to perform conventional warfighting missions, then you risk them being exposed to normal battlefield attrition. It's hard to see combat in the Baltic Sea, Barents Sea, or elsewhere not subjecting the submarine force to combat losses. This is particularly the case if those submarines are launching conventional cruise missile strikes, thus potentially compromising their position. The alternative, then, is to dedicate one or more submarines to a reserve force, carrying the TLAM-N and remaining concealed until such a time as it is needed, depriving theater commanders of a combatant that could be performing any number of different missions.

Submarine-Basing and Alliance Maintenance: Deceptively Costly

The Double Track Decision, as history shows, was a controversial one. Sensitive to any perception that the United States may be pushing NATO to prepare to fight a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union, one that would take place largely on European soil, European publics exploded in opposition to the deployment, with thousands taking to the streets in protest across West Germany and elsewhere.* Indeed, to overcome much of these concerns, NATO had to agree to withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads immediately, with the warheads supporting the Pershing IIs and Gryphons being introduced on a one-for-one basis with the remaining warheads. Consider then that this was at a time when the perceived threat from Russian nuclear weapons was far higher than it is today, which sees over 85% of Germans opposed to the presence of any weapons on German soil.

TLAM-Ns, then, might seem like a more attractive alternative. Since submarines will spend the majority of their time patrolling at sea, they won’t be subject to the same levels of protests that rocked Gryphon and Pershing II bases across Europe. That's a distinction that peace activists inside Europe are not likely to find especially compelling. This means deploying TLAM-Ns on some or all of the submarine forces assigned to European Command complicates every potential port-call and exercise inside Europe, a problem to which U.S. Pacific Command can attest.

Even if the United States only loads TLAM-Ns to a handful of submarines, it is for obvious reasons unlikely to announce which submarines are nuclear-armed with it and which ones aren’t, which essentially means that every port call by an attack submarine is likely to become extremely complicated. Should NATO nations refuse docking rights due to public pressure, what would that do to U.S. alliance maintenance inside Europe? Most likely nothing good. And the diplomatic fallout of a U.S. submarine accident in European waters is bad enough before you start having them carry nuclear weapons. The Whiskey on the Rocks incident, where a Soviet Whiskey-Class attack submarine ran aground in Swedish waters is likely informative here. It wasn’t just the fact that the Whiskey had been violating Swedish waters, but also that it was carrying nuclear warheads that helped make the fallout that much more intense (no pun intended).

Assigning the TLAM-N to nuclear submarines also has signaling implications. Do we want the routine deployment of attack submarines, especially in the event of a crisis, to carry a nuclear signaling message? Though this might have utility in some situations, it could also deter the United States from flowing additional attack submarines into Europe during a crisis out of fear that such a move would be seen as having too high of an escalation cost. Of course, the United States could opt to introduce the TLAM-N only after a crisis and fly them in to be loaded onto attack submarines, but this too has signaling implications and undercuts the argument that bringing back the TLAM-N would avoid the basing problem.

The reasoning behind why intermediate-range nuclear forces were introduced into Europe the way that they were in the 1980s must also be considered. The idea of basing these new weapons at sea, or basing them on remote islands, was actually a course of action that NATO explored but ultimately rejected. Though basing at sea would avoid higher domestic political costs, avoiding such costs would signal to the Soviet Union that NATO wasn’t serious about its nuclear deterrent. If NATO allies were unwilling to take on the political costs of such a deployment, would those same allies be willing to approve a NATO nuclear release if the time came to do so? Given the deeply wary approach to nuclear weapons that NATO has shown since the end of the Cold War, this is likely an even bigger problem today than it was then, and if a deployment of TLAM-N isn’t seen as credible, then it defeats the entire purpose of deploying it in the first place.

TLAM-N Will Not Change Russia’s Mind

When the INF Treaty was signed in the 1980s, it served a very specific purpose in the minds of the Soviet leadership. Gryphon and Pershing II, when introduced to Europe, demonstrated an unacceptable decapitation risk to the Soviet leadership. Like their American counterparts, the Soviet Union had been endeavoring to create reliable command and control systems for their nuclear forces since the late 1950s. By the 1980s, however, Soviet leaders become acutely afraid that the United States could succeed. With the introduction of Gryphon and Pershing I, Soviet leadership had become convinced that the United States had introduced a new generation of weapons into Europe which would allow such a strike to succeed, killing Soviet leaders before they could order their nuclear forces to retaliate. As such, the INF Treaty was a win-win for both sides. The United States would eliminate a weapon that potentially decoupled it from its allies, and the Soviet Union would no longer face a weapon that could, in their view, allow for a successful decapitation strike.*

It goes without saying, however, that times have changed. As Sergei Ivanov, the former Russian foreign minister, would tell Robert Gates in 2007, when the United States and the Soviet Union signed the INF Treaty, from their perspective the United States was the only country that had intermediate-range systems capable of reaching the Soviet Union. Now, however, Russia is ranged by intermediate-ranged systems from North Korea, the People’s Republic of China, Iran, and Pakistan. Further, with the Baltic States and Poland jutting closer to Russia’s western border, dual-capable aircraft like the F-35 (once fielded and certified to carry out the nuclear mission) could accomplish much the same thing.

Further, Russia increasingly sees longer-range precision strike weapons as being particularly useful operational capabilities. It should be no surprise that long-range cruise missile strikes against targets in Syria have been launched from Russia’s Caspian Sea flotilla. Sea-based systems are still allowed under the INF Treaty, and Russia is showing that it sees real utility in their use. Further, Russian ground-launched intermediate-range systems would enable them to strike NATO targets as far away as Germany while still sitting more deeply inside of Russia’s integrated air defense system, and would allow them to replace shorter-ranged Iskander systems deployed in Kaliningrad, which would be far more vulnerable to NATO airpower.

Conclusion

If NATO wishes to deter Russia, it needs to focus on building capabilities that allow it to prevail in an armed conflict. That doesn’t mean new nuclear capabilities, but rather the continued enhancement of NATO’s conventional capabilities, backed by a more robust U.S. conventional warfighting capability in Europe and elsewhere. The Turgidsonian impulse to field capabilities purely because an adversary maintains something similar is counterproductive. Defense resources are finite, and every dollar spent fielding capabilities that aren’t core to meeting your strategic requirements is a dollar that could have gone elsewhere.

There is much to be said about fielding conventionally-armed intermediate-range missile systems. Besides their utility in the Pacific, where ranges are much more extreme, such systems potentially offer commanders the capability to overwhelm Russian air defense systems and critical logistics nodes. But the diplomatic costs of doing so are too high until such a time as Russia withdraws instead, or so blatantly violates it as to leave no doubt as to their noncompliance. But bringing back a nuclear variant is not likely to accomplish much more than complicating both alliance maintenance as well as harming NATO’s edge in conventional warfighting.

Luke O’Brien is a U.S. Army officer assigned to Aberdeen Proving Ground and was most recently a Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Graduate Fellow at National Defense University. He is also a member of the Military Writers Guild.* His views are his own, and do not represent those of the Department of Defense, National Defense University, or the U.S. Army.* He can be found on Twitter as @luke_j_obrien.

Comments

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.nipp.org/2017/06/12/colin-s-gray-nuclear-security-and-strategic-force-modernization/

Issue No. 420
June 12, 2017

Nuclear Security and Strategic Force Modernization

Colin S. Gray
Colin S. Gray is the European Director and co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, and Professor Emeritus of Strategic Studies, University of Reading.
*
There is nothing extraordinary about current Russian-American dislike, distrust, and antagonism. What is happening today is not a return to the much unbeloved Cold War of quite recent memory (only 26 years), but rather to the enduring reality of international politics as usual. This persisting condition has always been characterized by competition – political, economic, and inevitably military also. If we read history as we should, we learn that distrust or more active dislike among great powers, including actual warfare, is both normal and to a degree inevitable. The most persisting reason is not hard to fathom. When security/threat analysts of national security scan the current and anticipatable international horizon, quite properly they look out first and primarily for the larger, indeed existential, threats to the wellbeing of their home country. Americans today are almost spoiled for choice among somewhat villainous regional and even sub-regional local states, as well as a more serious malevolent one. The latter category only has one member, Vladimir Putin’s recovering Russia.
*
The Problem of Russia
When considered in historical context it is unlikely that Putin would warrant nomination even for the ‘B’ list of ‘bad guys’. Yes, he lies, cheats, bullies and threatens neighbors, and flexes his growing military muscles to change borders, which makes him seriously unsuited for partnership in a top state duopoly of cooperative powers alongside Uncle Sam. Lest we forget, the sundry crimes and misdemeanors his particular Russian regime has committed have been entirely standard practice by Moscow for decades. It is necessary to remember always that Russia lives, and has always lived, in a very rough geopolitical neighborhood, one bereft of geographical help for defense, save for sheer space with the distances it provides and its weather. From the time of Tamerlane’s rampaging Mongols in the late 14th Century to Hitler’s storming Teutons in the 20th, Russians have learnt that national history has been one characterized by loss of life on a very large scale. They know, really know, that history periodically produces horrific tragedies. Even if or when victory eventually is achieved, not infrequently it has been earned at an extremely high price.

Russia can never be an enduring friend and well trusted ally because international politics almost literally mandates antagonism, if not outright hostility in the relations between near-equals with competing interests. There is no inevitability of war between the two states, but the danger and risk of such an eventuality cannot be totally expunged. There is an apparent permanence in the mutuality of nuclear deterrence that holds in Russo-American relations. Nonetheless, given the danger that lurks in the situation it is desirable that some anxieties should be present in both countries. This is truly serious business and it is necessary that neither party should forget that fact.* Given its history, it is perhaps no surprise that Russian leaders have not forgotten this point over the past two decades, unlike many in Washington.

The future is not foreordained and therefore reliably predictable, not, at least, so far as we know or can ascertain. Nonetheless, there are grounds for considerable optimism. While Russia will never be our friend, with prudent Western steps there is ample reason to believe that Russia will never be convinced she can take advantage of the United States over a matter about which the American public cares profoundly. Of course, even confident expectations of expert analysts, occasionally are proven wrong by the actual unfolding of history—demonstrating once again the inherent uncertainty of political decision-making. The demise of the deeply unlovable USSR in late 1991, for example, generally was neither anticipated nor expected.

Alas, the end of that great socialist experiment did not herald the emergence of a new and benign dawn, one shedding light on old problems and illuminating a path forward for the human race. There was no tomorrow garlanded with evidence of good intentions for international peace and security. Not only did that fail to happen, its occurrence was not possible. The reasons were both all too human and also rather abstract. On the human front, when the United States emerged from a condition of Cold War warrior as the victor (and survivor) its leaders were more than somewhat surprised by the precipitate and non-violent collapse of its rival of the preceding 46 years. A few people were not surprised, Dr. Andrew Marshall and his Office of Net Assessment in the Pentagon, for honorable example. Understandably, it took some little time for Americans to absorb fully the definitive fact of Soviet disintegration and collapse; but what did it mean for the near term and beyond?* Politics, internal, international, and a mix of the two, were as unpleasant as ever, if not worse, from the ‘Horn’ of Africa to Cambodia, and especially in the Balkans, where the death of Marshal Tito was taken as a ‘start’ signal seemingly for every ambitious politician in states or nascent ‘statelets’ in the region. The new, currently much disordered and seriously demographically and geographically diminished, Russia unsurprisingly meddled. However, it did not do so in a way or with a weight that much troubled the White House of Bill Clinton in the 1990s, nor did more significant and violent meddling appear to much trouble subsequent American administrations.
*
Russia’s Revival
By the end of the Millennium and for a very few years thereafter it was not understood with much clarity in the United States that great states may be shaken, but that is unlikely to be the end of the story. As a consequence of a fall from greatness they can be stirred into revival in a form that works well enough for a while. In 1917 Russia was stirred by defeats and poor military performances both at home and abroad, but following four terrible years of civil war and foreign intervention the country was obliged to try something new, whether or not it so desired. The choice of the time was less than glittering—leading to the rise of Josef Stalin without any resemblance of free and fair elections.

What we need to appreciate is that Russia’s history bequeathed a political culture that has expression in a strategic culture utterly unlike the American. To back up briefly: it is entirely usual for powerful states to be suspicious of each other. What has been, historically unusual, though not unprecedented, has been for there to be only two states in a topmost class of superpowers. Russia slipped in the competitive ratings seriously in the decade that followed immediately after the official dissolution of the USSR. Rather superficially this wounded condition was partially repaired in the 2000s, in the ‘guided democracy’ of neo-czarist Vladimir Putin. His Russia is a state back both with a vengeance, and very evidently seeking some vengeance upon those who disrespected the interest and wishes of a distinctly unholy recreation of Holy Russia.

It is important for us to recognize that our current troubles with Russia reflect not only the disagreements of here and now, but also are faithfully reflective of the entire historical narrative. When two powers rise far above the rest of the world they are almost condemned by what is common to their natures to be rivals. Blame for the antagonism always can be located if one looks hard enough, but that exercise is futile, often misleading at least. The hostility is an inevitable and unavoidable consequence of the geometry of power. Each of two superpowers, even only great powers, have no prudent choice in their statecraft other than to regard the other through a lens colored by suspicion. It is only prudent for them to stress the taking of measures for the practical goal of prevention of possible subsequent regret. This is the demonstrated way of international relations and the rather unhappy context within which the United States and the West more broadly finds itself today.
*
Nuclear Weapons
We have lived with nuclear weapons for so long now (72 years) that it can prove quite a challenge to try to think through just how great their influence has been for both national and global security. Whether or not they are widely understood, two facts govern the reality of nuclear arsenals. The first pertains to the permanence of these weapons: they are here to stay. I need to cite this certainty since some people hold deeply moral and possibly religious objections to nuclear weapons. I do not doubt their sincerity or even the sense in some of their arguments. However, I am no less sincerely convinced that nuclear weapons have entered human weapons’ arsenals on a permanent basis. Indeed, it may be unfortunate but still probable that it would prove extraordinarily dangerous to attempt to implement very large scale denuclearization, unilaterally, bilaterally, or on a global basis. It is all too easy to forget that although these weapons are indeed fearsome tools of state they did not appear, as it were magically from nowhere. Rather they were and remain the products of political competition between politically organized communities. The weapons exist because of the needs driven by human insecurities. History provides ample evidence of the bad results that tend to flow as a consequence of undeserved optimism about the amity possible in international relations. Nuclear weapons and their various means of delivery are not and cannot be the problem. The problem, rather, is the enduring search for security manifested in the struggle to attain influence. Given that this character of our behavior often is judged in moral terms, we can appreciate that such fundamental debate over nuclear weapons is not likely to be helpful for policy and strategy. Nuclear weapons are what they are, and they are what they are because international relations are a reflection of us as we are, and by all appearances have always been.

The second often under-recognized fact about nuclear weapons is that they do not lend themselves at all easily to a strategic framework for employment in and by statecraft. The idea of nuclear strategy trips readily enough off a lecturer’s tongue but familiarity should not be permitted to promote foolish disrespect. It may be helpful to recall the bare basic structure of strategy which is expressed in the standard formula comprising these elements: Ends, Ways, Means – and Assumptions. I will admit that the tail-end concept here is a personal insistence of mine. The United States has a nuclear strategy as it must, as does Russia. However, there is little doubt that an actual war would rapidly find nuclear expression that must strain toward and beyond breaking point the resilience of any state’s society. It is relatively easy to conceive of a very small number of these weapons being employed to make a political point, but it is difficult to conceive how the hundreds and more weapons in both superpowers’ arsenals could be employed for any politically meaningful, sensible purpose. Obviously, one would think, this has to mean that the superpowers could not risk causing catastrophe that easily would be far worse than any in humanity’s bloody history—exceeding by far even the excesses in slaughter effected by Tamerlane’s Mongols.

What is almost all too obvious is the strong likelihood that the slide from small (even just token) nuclear use on or for the battlefield in Europe, to a ‘central’ (homeland to homeland) war, could be unstoppable. Virtually any size of nuclear war would be catastrophic, and possibly nationally terminal for the relatively small states that comprise NATO in Europe. It is not self-evident that even the super-size superpower states—the United States, Russia, and China—could wage nuclear war for prudent political ends. In short, major nuclear war would not only be grossly imprudent, it would be literally beyond the bounds of strategy. Nonetheless, it is not a physical impossibility.* All too plainly, nuclear employment needs to be deterred, and, in the case of some lesser nuclear-armed states, even physically disabled where feasible.

With considerable reluctance this essay is obliged to recognize the inevitability of an enduring nuclear policing role for the United States. This is not a matter for choice; it is driven by the realities of international politics. In practice, the only prudent question to pose is that of the nuclear capable armament required for American weapons today and tomorrow given that our choice is distinctly limited by the facts we know about our principal state competitor. The Russia we know well enough by now is a ruthless competitor for influence in the search for ever greater security. This is not an immoral goal, although it may be carried out in immoral ways.* Rather it is usual for great states to press their influence outwards until it runs into a barrier that can only be overcome by the threat or use of countervailing force. All great powers, not excluding the United States, behave similarly. However, this time in the lengthy historical narrative, the great power that is striving to expand its domain both of actual ownership and influence at least, runs up against an opposing Alliance system in the character of a NATO that remains nuclear armed, despite some internal pressures to disarm. In order to stand some reasonable chance of deterring or frustrating any Russian invasion, the Alliance will need to have some resort to nuclear weapons. If such resort would be a NATO initiative sought in military desperation, we might assume that the number of weapons used would be few. However, that cannot be a prudent assumption because the Russian military incentive to launch a preemptive nuclear attack might well be compelling.

*
Prudent Modernization of the Triad
The sad state of world affairs sketched briefly above leaves us with little prudent choice for national and international security. What we can do, however, is ensure is that such prospects as there might be for careful control and limitation of nuclear weapon employment, are fully prepared. A survivable and flexible nuclear force has long been recognized as key to this deterrence goal.

It is in that context that we need to address the urgent issue of modernization and, where necessary, replacement of elements in America’s Triad of strategic forces (ICBMs, SLBMs, and Manned Bombers). Not all audiences appreciate just why this Triad needs attention. First and foremost is the fact that these strategic forces are akin to being the crown jewels of our country in strategic terms. They comprise complementary capabilities that could ruin any foe far beyond any possibility of recovery, and as part of a proper deterrence strategy, can effectively communicate this result to a spectrum of bad actors and thereby help deter their provocations.* As much to the point, the performance of America’s non-nuclear conventional forces to support our interests and allies abroad is given needed deterrence cover by the dreadful menace posed by our strategic forces. As Herman Khan explained more than fifty years ago, a process of escalation connects the different kinds, levels, and amounts of force employed.[1]

The entire American Triad now begs for modernization to remain operational in coming years, and deserves the attention and support of the U.S. leadership.* In particular, the Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile will be a weapon with a performance character that must be highly desirable, even essential, to meet the kind of challenges of most concern here. Replacing the old ALCMs (Air-Launch Cruise Missiles) of 1980s vintage, the LRSO will be “stealthy” and have the extensive range to ensure that our manned bomber force is not compelled of necessity to attempt to penetrate the advanced air defenses of the late 2020s and beyond.

Uniquely among strategic forces, manned bombers are relatively slow to complete their missions and are recallable on command, which may be of great utility during a crisis. Yet, our bombers could have difficulty penetrating opponents’ active defenses in future years—hence the clear need for the “stand off” capability inherent in the LRSO.* The weapons carried primarily could be conventional and precisely targetable for counterforce effect or they could be nuclear. Analysis shows that the LRSO option all but makes itself as being vital for the long-term health of the U.S. Triad of strategic forces. While the ICBM force is needed in order to hold heavily protected and probably defended targets at prompt risk, and the SLBM force to provide enduring deterrent effect, the airborne leg of the Triad can offer purposeful delay, even recall response in real-time to orders, and high flexibility as to use, timing, and signaling. The B-21/LRSO marriage offers an excellent investment prospect for a notably insecure world and wider flexibility for deterrence and assurance missions in the future; much more so than the B-21 and nuclear gravity bombs alone could credibly accomplish.

An issue for LRSO critics is an overwrought concern that an adversary, presumably Russia, could mistake a conventionally armed U.S. cruise missile for a nuclear-armed LRSO during a crisis, and that this misunderstanding could escalate a crisis dramatically.[2]* Many things are possible, of course, but recent history demonstrates that this concern is overstated.* The United States has employed dual-capable cruise missiles in conflicts around Russia’s periphery on multiple occasions in recent decades, for example: in Iraq in 1991, in Bosnia in 1995, in Kosovo in 1999, in Afghanistan in 2001, in Iraq in 2003, and against Syria in 2017, without any such problems.* Indeed, Russia itself seems to have no qualms about launching dual-capable cruise missiles over and near stationed U.S. forces in the Middle East. In addition, if dual-capable cruise missiles are deemed so “destabilizing,” then U.S. bombers and dual-capable aircraft must similarly be labelled since they too can carry both conventional and nuclear weapons. But any such designation can only be considered far-fetched, and indeed LRSO critics have not made this charge against our bombers or other dual-capable aircraft.* Finally, the concern about LRSO and dual-use technology, beyond being unpersuasive, is vastly outweighed in a net assessment because LRSO will be uniquely valuable for the priority goals of deterrence, assurance, and damage limitation.
*
Conclusion
The international security environment breeds competition and suspicion among great states, and contemporary U.S.-Russia relations reflect this harsh reality. Russian national goals are inimical to U.S. and NATO goals and openly hostile to the status quo; and Russia has made the strategic choice of using its nuclear arsenal as a coercive tool to advance its hegemonic ends. This decision by Moscow has shocked Western audiences that almost universally had very different expectations about the future.* The United States can and should act to extinguish the apparent Russian notion of profitable nuclear first use threats. Prudence now dictates the United States modernize its nuclear Triad to support its priority national goals of deterrence, assurance, and damage limitation. The LRSO is very likely to be a critical tool in these missions and deserves the full support of U.S. leadership.
*
Recommended further reading:* Williamson Murray, America and the Future of War: the Past as Prologue (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institutions Press, 2017); and, Keith B. Payne and John S.* Foster, Jr., et al., A New Nuclear Review for a New Age (Fairfax, VA:* National Institute Press), 2017.
[1].***** Herman Khan, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Praeger, 1965).
*
[2].***** For example see, Dianne Feinstein and Ellen O. Tauscher, “A Nuclear Weapon That America Doesn’t Need,” The New York Times, June 17, 2016, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/opinion/a-nuclear-weapon-that-america-doesnt-need.html?_r=0.; Kingston Reif, “Cruise Control: Why The U.S. Should Not Buy A New Nuclear Air-Launched Cruise Missile,” War on the Rocks, March 21, 2016, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/opinion/a-nuclear-weapon-that-america-doesnt-need.html?_r=0.
*
*
*
The views in this Information Series are those of the authors and should not be construed as official U.S. Government policy, the official policy of the National Institute for Public Policy or any of its sponsors.* For additional information about this publication or other publications by the National Institute Press, contact:* Editor, National Institute Press, 9302 Lee Highway, Suite 750 |Fairfax, VA 22031 | (703) 293-9181 |www.nipp.org.* For access to previous issues of the National Institute Press Information Series, please visit http://www.nipp.org/national-institute-press/information-series/.
*

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-education-protests-idUSKBN1951IH

World News | Wed Jun 14, 2017 | 7:41am EDT

Beijing protesters in rare clash with police over school dispute

By Yawen Chen and Thomas Peter | BEIJING

About a hundred protesters clashed on Wednesday with police in downtown Beijing after authorities abruptly reassigned their children to a school in a rough neighborhood, a rare display of public anger in the Chinese capital.

Although still infrequent in China, protests increasingly break out over issues such as the construction of rubbish incinerators, air pollution and property ownership rights.

The school reassignment plan comes at a time when educational resources have become increasingly stretched in the crowded Chinese capital, while home prices have soared.

During their hours-long standoff, protesting residents of the city's northwestern district of Changping skirmished several times with more than 20 unarmed police officers outside the office of the Beijing municipality.

"Our kids need to go to school! We demand a response!" shouted some of the gathered protesters.

The protesters, who included white-collar professionals in their 30s, said they were outraged after district authorities suddenly reassigned their children to a school in a decrepit neighborhood.

Photographs they showed Reuters depicted a single-storey brick building on a street littered with rubbish and advertising flyers offering forgery services.

"How can we send our kids to this kind of school?" asked one upset mother. "We fought and worked so hard, and put down millions to buy a house to earn a decent life in Beijing. And now our kids will have to go to this kind of school?"

"We are really powerless and don't know what to do," the woman, who declined to be identified because of the sensitivity of the matter, told Reuters.

Police briefly detained at least three protesters beside a police van nearby.


Also In World News
Fire engulfs London apartment block, at least six dead, more than 50 injured
'Staggering' civilian deaths from U.S.-led air strikes in Raqqa: U.N.


"If you make this even bigger, it won't be just one person (being dragged away)," the leader of the police team told protesters who refused to disperse, after authorities had detained one of the three.

An official from the Beijing municipality office addressed the protesters in the early afternoon, urging them to resolve the issue with the Changping district government on Thursday.

Reuters could not immediately reach municipal and district government authorities for comment outside of business hours.

(Reporting by Yawen Chen and Thomas Peter; Editing by Clarence Fernandez)

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-mosul-idUSKBN1951HE

World News | Wed Jun 14, 2017 | 7:36am EDT

Iraqi forces repel Islamic State counter-attack in west Mosul: police

Iraqi forces repelled a major counter-attack by Islamic State fighters, many of them wearing suicide vests, in a district south of the Old City of Mosul, their remaining enclave in the city, at dawn on Wednesday, a police commander said.

Dozens of IS fighters were killed in the operations to push back the militants, the commander told Reuters.

Residents said the militants seized a number of blocks in the Danadan district before being driven out in fierce clashes.

In an online statement, Islamic State said it killed 40 from the Federal police forces deployed in west Mosul and destroyed eight military vehicles.

(Reporting by Maher Chmaytelli; Editing by Andrew Heavens)

 

[Lilbitsnana]

Conflict News‏ @Conflicts 1h1 hour ago

EGYPT: Parliament set to vote on controversial measure to transfer two uninhabited Red Sea islands to Saudi Arabia


posted for fair use
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-saudi-islands-idUSKBN1951G4


Wed Jun 14, 2017 | 8:28am EDT
Egypt's parliament to vote on Red Sea islands transfer


An aerial view of the coast of the Red Sea and the two islands of Tiran and Sanafir is pictured through the window of an airplane near Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt November 1, 2016. Picture taken November 1, 2016. REUTERS/Amr Abdallah Dalsh

By Nashaat Hamdy | CAIRO

Egypt's plan to hand over two uninhabited Red Sea islands to Saudi Arabia under an agreement that has attracted widespread criticism moved closer to fruition with parliament set to vote on the measure on Wednesday.

A key parliamentary committee unanimously backed the plan and referred it to parliament for a final vote before it can be ratified by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, its chairman told journalists.

Sisi's government last year announced a maritime demarcation agreement with Saudi Arabia, which has given billions of dollars of aid to Egypt, ceding control of the islands of Tiran and Sanafir to the Gulf kingdom.

"We have unanimously approved the maritime demarcation accord with Saudi Arabia and it will be voted on in the general session today," said House of Representatives Committee on Defense and National Security Chairman Kamal Amer.

Some members of the committee who did not attend the meeting on Wednesday criticized the decision to approve the accord.

The transfer plan triggered rare street protests last year from many Egyptians, who say their country's sovereignty over the islands dates back to a treaty from 1906, before Saudi Arabia was founded.

Dozens of protesters gathered in downtown Cairo on Tuesday evening and organizers said a handful were briefly detained.

The Egyptian and Saudi governments say the islands are Saudi but have been subject to Egyptian protection since 1950 at the request of Saudi Arabia's King Abdulaziz Al Saud.
Also In World News

Fire engulfs London apartment block, at least six dead, more than 70 injured
Turkey's top diplomat to push for an end to rift in Gulf tour

The treaty has also been referred to the courts, irritating Riyadh and raising tensions between two major Arab states and traditional allies.

Egypt's highest administrative court blocked the deal but parliament insists the matter is constitutionally within its domain, putting the legislature and the judiciary at odds.

A government report advising parliament on the terms of the agreement said Egypt would keep administrative control over the islands and Egyptians would not need visas to visit them if they were transferred to Saudi Arabia.

(Reporting by Nashaat Hamdy; Writing by Ahmed Aboulenein and Asma Alsharif; Editing by Giles Elgood and Andrew Heavens)

 

[Lilbitsnana]

NuclearKalashnikitty‏ @NuclearKitteh Jun 13

China declares success of hypervelocity missile program


posted for fair use
https://m.northernstar.com.au/news/china-declares-success-hypervelocity-missile-progr/3189239/


China declares success of hypervelocity missile program
13th June 2017 5:22 PM
Firestorm ... ultra-fast, ultra-long range hypervelocity missiles have the capacity to reach far beyond the front line to target support ships and aircraft. Firestorm ... ultra-fast, ultra-long range hypervelocity missiles have the capacity to reach far beyond the front line to target support ships and aircraft. Chinese state media

by Jamie Seidel News Corp Australia Network

BEIJING says it has perfected a new engine technology which will propel its weapons further and at incredibly fast speeds.

The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) has announced the successful development of a hypersonic ramjet engine after a series of eight test flights.

A report in the Global Times outlet of the state-owned People's Daily states the revolutionary engine is now ready to be mated to a new generation of air-to-air missiles.

To qualify as 'hypersonic', the engine would have to move at more than 6200km/h.

And any missile moving at such speeds is likely to be impervious to existing defensive systems.

TURN AND BURN

China has reportedly chosen to focus on solid fuels as they are more stable and don't require complicated and time consuming fuelling processes. This means such weapons would be 'on call' for rapid deployment.

Ramjet engines have the ability to produce more energy from any given payload of fuel through sucking oxygen out of the atmosphere to burn, instead of carrying its own oxidisers. The rate of this oxygen supply can be controlled through the ramjet's air intakes.
This picture from China’s state-run social media site Weibo last year is believed to show a J-16 fighter carrying a prototype hypervelocity missile.
This picture from China’s state-run social media site Weibo last year is believed to show a J-16 fighter carrying a prototype hypervelocity missile. Supplied

A similar ramjet research project by the United States Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) appears to have stalled after a series of test flights ended in 2015.

Efforts have now focused on a new, Small Advanced Capabilities Missile which is not likely to appear before the 2030s.

China has reportedly been working on developing its reliable solid-fuel ramjets since 2000.

LONG REACH

Such hypervelocity engines, when mated to existing missiles, could potentially triple their range. Existing 100km weapons could have their range extended to 320km. Up to six of these can be carried in the weapons bay of China's new J-20 and J-31 stealth fighters.

Combined with long-range sensor networks, this would give Chinese fighters the ability to reach far behind the front lines to destroy vital support aircraft such as air-to-air tankers and early-warning radar platforms.

Such an ability could severely stunt the reach of any opposing force.

But the ultra-high speed and agility of ramjet powered missiles also increases the risk to more nimble fighter jets.

It extends the range of a theoretical 'no escape zone', where targeted fighters simply don't have the reaction time, speed nor manouvrabilty to 'dodge' incoming fire.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The Global Times report says the Chinese military is now looking at building up a 'super range detection' network of sensors to support such long-range air-to-air ability, as well as mating the new engine to air-to-surface and surface-to-surface missiles.
China’s J-20 stealth fighter entered operational service earlier this year. Here it displays its large internal weapons bay in an overhead fly-past.
China’s J-20 stealth fighter entered operational service earlier this year. Here it displays its large internal weapons bay in an overhead fly-past. Supplied

Song Zhongping, a military expert who used to serve in the PLA Rocket Force, told the news service that the hypervelocity engines as yet did not produce enough thrust to be used to propel manned aircraft.

But cruise missiles and experimental drones could be adapted to use such high-speed engines, the report states.

POWER PIVOT

The addition of hypervelocity missiles to China's arsenal would exacerbate fears already being expressed about its new generations of stealthy, supersonic anti-ship missiles.

Beijing's ongoing development of such weapons has raised questions about the ability of the United States' iconic nuclear-powered super carriers and forward bases such as on the island of Guam to withstand an attack.
Long-range weapons such as the Chinese DF21 mobile 'carrier killer' missiles have the potential to push opposing naval and air forces out of the South China Sea.
Long-range weapons such as the Chinese DF21 mobile 'carrier killer' missiles have the potential to push opposing naval and air forces out of the South China Sea. PLA

One such missile was displayed during China's Victory Day Parade in 2015 - the DF-21D 'Carrier Killer', and its nuclear-capable variant, the DF-26.

Negating the strategic influence of US ships and facilities would dramatically shift the future balance of power in Asia away from Washington.

Meanwhile Russia reportedly tested its new hypervelocity missile system, Zircon, last month - a full year ahead of its previously announced schedule. The missile, believed capable of travelling about 7400km/h, is intended to be fitted to the battlecruiser PyotrVeliky which currently undergoing a major rebuild.

 

[Lilbitsnana]

WarMonitor Retweeted
JuVi‏ @SciteCito 58m58 minutes ago

Russia may deploy Arctic radar station due to proximity of US nuclear subs


posted for fair use
https://www.rt.com/news/392497-arctic-radar-nuclear-submarines/#.WUNwWmhMGns.twitter

Russia may deploy Arctic radar station due to proximity of US nuclear subs
Published time: 15 Jun, 2017 20:36

Russia may deploy Arctic radar station due to proximity of US nuclear subs
© Ministry of defence of the Russian Federation / Sputnik
Moscow is considering the deployment of additional elements of the early warning system, including a radar station in its Arctic territory, said Viktor Ozerov, the head of the Russian Federal Assembly’s Defense Committee.

“The early warning system has already been built, but I think that its additional elements should be deployed there [in the Arctic],” Ozerov told RIA Novosti.

The senator said he was talking about a radar station as well as ground, air and space surveillance systems.
Read more
© Ministry of defence of the Russian Federation ‘There is no potential for any conflict in the Arctic’ – Lavrov

Ozerov addressed the issue after Russian President Vladimir Putin said during his Q&A session earlier Thursday that Russia must have a warning system in the Arctic due to the presence of US nuclear submarines in the area.

The Arctic “is an extremely important region in terms of ensuring the country’s defense capability,” Putin said.

“Experts are aware of the fact that American nuclear submarines are stationed in northern Norway. The fly-in time of missiles to Moscow is 15 minutes. We have to understand what happens there [in the Arctic], to see what happens there. We have to properly protect this shoreline, provide border security.”

“We have to remember that the route of the surface-launched missiles, based on the territory of the US, goes over the North Pole,” the president added.

Putin also said that the region “will provide for the future” of the Russian state, saying that “around 30 percent of hydrocarbons will be extracted in the Arctic by 2050.”

It’s economic and strategic potential explains the fact that “even non-region states are showing interest” in the Arctic, he said.

REAd MORE: Russia lays down icebreaker patrol boat to bolster Navy’s Arctic presence (VIDEO)

“It’s good. We’re ready to cooperate with them, but we must ensure the priority position for ourselves,” the President explained.

Exploration of the Arctic and protection of the northern frontiers have become one of the priorities for the Russian government and military in recent years.

Putin ordered constant naval military presence in the Arctic back in 2013, with Defense Ministry presenting a major plan to cover Russia’s northern borders with a network of military bases and radar stations a year later.

READ MORE: Arctic Shamrock: Russian MoD offers interactive 360° tour of unique military base (PHOTOS)

Russia also held major exercises to test its readiness to counter challenges in the country’s north and particularly in the Arctic, involving about thousands of troops as we as dozens of warships, submarines and aircraft.