WAR 05-28-2016-to-06-03-2016_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realcleardefense.com/art...ac_to_include_a_record_27_nations_109411.html

June 1, 2016

Exercise RIMPAC to Include a Record 27 Nations

By AP

HONOLULU (AP) — The U.S. Navy says 27 nations will participate in the world's largest maritime exercises in coming weeks.

This is an all-time high for the Rim of the Pacific exercises, which date to 1971. The drills are held every two years.

The Navy's 3rd Fleet will host the exercises in and around Hawaii and Southern California for five weeks beginning June 30. The exercises will feature 45 ships, five submarines and more than 200 aircraft. More than 25,000 personnel will participate.

Brazil, Denmark, Germany and Italy are joining for the first time. China is sending ships to participate for the second time this year.

A Canadian admiral will serve as deputy commander and a Japanese admiral will be vice commander.

 

[Housecarl]

http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...onalism-Is-Rising-Not-Fascism-George-Friedman

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/nationalism-is-rising-not-fascism/

Nationalism Is Rising, Not Fascism

May 31, 2016 The claims of an increase in fascism in Europe and the U.S. derive from a misunderstanding of the term.

reality check-headerbar
By George Friedman

Recently, there have been a number of articles and statements asserting that fascism is rising in Europe, and that Donald Trump is an American example of fascism. This is a misrepresentation of a very real phenomenon. The nation-state is reasserting itself as the primary vehicle of political life. Multinational institutions like the European Union and multilateral trade treaties are being challenged because they are seen by some as not being in the national interest. The charge of a rise in fascism derives from a profound misunderstanding of what fascism is. It is also an attempt to discredit the resurgence of nationalism and to defend the multinational systems that have dominated the West since World War II.

Nationalism is the core of the Enlightenment’s notion of liberal democracy. It asserts that the multinational dynasties that ruled autocratically denied basic human rights. Among these was the right to national self-determination and the right of citizens to decide what was in the national interest. The Enlightenment feared tyranny and saw the multinational empires dominating Europe as the essence of tyranny. Destroying them meant replacing them with nation-states. The American and French revolutions were both nationalist risings, as were the nationalist risings that swept Europe in 1848. Liberal revolutions were by definitions nationalist because they were risings against multinational empires.

Fascism differs from nationalism in two profound ways. First, self-determination was not considered a universal right by fascists. Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini and Francisco Franco, to mention three obvious fascists, only endorsed nationalism for Germany, Italy and Spain. The rights of other nations to a nation-state of their own was at best unclear to the fascists. In a very real sense, Hitler and Mussolini believed in multinationalism, albeit with other nations submitting to their will. Fascism in its historical form was an assault on the right of nations to pursue their self-interest, and an elevation of the fascists’ right to pursue it based on an assertion of their nations’ inherent superiority and right to rule.

But the more profound difference was the conception of internal governance. Liberal nationalism accepted that the right to hold power was subject to explicit and periodic selection of the leaders by the people. How this was done varied. The American system is very different from the British, but the core principles remain the same. It also requires that opponents of the elected have the right to speak out against them, and to organize parties to challenge them in the future. Most important, it affirms that the people have the right to govern themselves through these mechanisms and that those elected to lead must govern in the people’s name. Leaders must also be permitted to govern and extra-legal means cannot be used to paralyze the government, any more than the government has the right to suppress dissent.

Fascism asserts that a Hitler or Mussolini represent the people but are not answerable to them. The core of fascism is the idea of the dictator, who emerges through his own will. He cannot be challenged without betraying the people. Therefore, free speech and opposition parties are banned and those who attempt to oppose the regime are treated as criminals. Fascism without the dictator, without the elimination of elections, without suppression of free speech and the right to assemble, isn’t fascism.

Arguing that being part of the European Union is not in the British interest, that NATO has outlived its usefulness, that protectionist policies or anti-immigration policies are desirable is not fascist. These ideas have no connection to fascism whatsoever. They are far more closely linked to traditional liberal democracy. They represent the reassertion of the foundation of liberal democracy, which is the self-governing nation-state. It is the foundation of the United Nations, whose members are nation-states, and where the right to national self-determination is fundamental.

Liberal democracy does not dictate whether a nation should be a member in a multinational organization, adopt free trade policies or protectionism, or welcome or exclude immigrants. These are decisions to be made by the people – or more precisely, by the representatives they select. The choices may be wise, unwise or even unjust. However, the power to make these choices rests, in a liberal democracy, in the hands of the citizens.

What we are seeing is the rise of the nation-state against the will of multinational organizations and agreements. There are serious questions about membership in the EU, NATO and trade agreements, and equally about the right to control borders. Reasonable people can disagree, and it is the political process of each nation that retains the power to determine shifts in policy. There is no guarantee that the citizenry will be wise, but that cuts both ways and in every direction.

The current rise of nationalism in Europe is the result of European institutions’ failure to function effectively. Eight years after 2008, Europe still has not solved its economic problems. A year after the massive influx of refugees in Europe, there is still no coherent and effective policy to address the issue. Given this, it would be irresponsible for citizens and leaders not to raise questions as to whether they should remain in the EU or follow its dictates. Similarly, there is no reason for Donald Trump not to challenge the idea that free trade is always advantageous, or to question NATO. However obnoxious his style and however confusing his presentation, he is asking questions that must be asked.

In the 1950s, the McCarthyites charged anyone they didn’t like with being communists. Today, those who disapprove of the challengers of the current system call them fascists. Now, some of the opponents of the EU or immigration may really be fascists. But the hurdle for being a fascist is quite high. Fascism is far more than racism, tinkering with the judiciary, or staging a violent demonstration. Real fascism is Nazi Germany’s “leader principle” – which dictated absolute obedience to the Führer, whose authority was understood to be above the law.

We are seeing a return to nationalism in Europe and the United States because it is not clear to many that internationalism, as followed since World War II, benefits them any longer. They may be right or wrong, but to claim that fascism is sweeping Europe and the United States raises the question of whether those who say this understand the principles of fascism or the intimate connection between nationalism and liberal democracy.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://warontherocks.com/2016/05/in-search-of-the-xi-doctrine/

In Search of the Xi Doctrine

Michael Auslin
May 30, 2016
Comments 1


As President Obama sought to make his final mark in Asia, visiting Vietnam and Japan last week, he confronted the increasingly clear strategic goals of Chinese President Xi Jinping. Though Xi continues to focus on domestic issues, including a weakening economy, and cracks down on foreign non-governmental organizations with a new repressive law, he is also making clear that China intends to shape East Asia’s security environment. Although not formally articulated as such, put together, his statements form what could be called the Xi doctrine. This “doctrine” appears to reserve to China the right to use force to intervene in conflicts or crisis situations outside its borders, in order to preserve or create a balance of power favorable to its interests. As such, it poses a challenge to U.S. policymakers, who must uphold the regional rules-based order that has provided stability for over a half-century while at the same time ensuring that Beijing and Washington avoid conflict.

Xi has made dozens of foreign policy speeches since taking power in late-2012, most of them touting peaceful coexistence. In recent months, though, both Chinese actions and his statements have gelled into a more operationally coherent policy, one that directly influences China’s security actions abroad. Xi’s vision and aspiration encompass the whole of East Asia. As such these speeches give greater clarity to what he considers China’s core security interests. The Xi doctrine shapes the geopolitical environment surrounding these core interests, primarily preventing the Korean peninsula from tilting toward the United States, ensuring Chinese dominance in the region’s seas, and forestalling any moves by Taiwan toward independence.

In a little-noted speech to Asian foreign ministers in Beijing in late April, Xi announced that China would “absolutely not permit war or chaos on the [Korean] peninsula.” This policy declaration may be China’s equivalent of America’s hoary “strategic ambiguity” towards Sino-Taiwan relations, keeping all interested parties unsure exactly of what China intends to do. It also appears to be in response to the continued deepening and evolution of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, and the modernization of Korea’s military with new capabilities, including stealth fighters and increased anti-ballistic missile focus.

Xi’s Korea declaration raises more questions than it answers. It can be interpreted equally as a signal to the obstreperous Kim Jong-un not to trigger a conflict with South Korea, to Seoul not to put too much pressure on the North, or to the United States to limit its role in case of war.

Nor did Xi make clear just how it would prevent war. Is this the pre-conflict equivalent of the old Soviet Brezhnev doctrine, pledging Chinese intervention to prevent the toppling of a quasi-client state? Or is Beijing signaling that it would act to restrain Pyongyang, by force if necessary, to prevent a wider conflict? Alternately, proponents of a bigger Chinese role in regional diplomacy might interpret Xi’s words as a plan for acting as broker to mediate during a crisis. Specifics aside, Xi has made clear that China will not sit passively by and let other powers determine the future of the Korean peninsula, thus signaling to Washington and its allies that Beijing will play an active role in shaping Northeast Asian security trends.

In the same speech, Xi reiterated that Beijing would ensure peace and stability in the South China Sea while also defending its sovereignty and interests. The Xi doctrine thus raises the specter of even more direct Chinese intervention in the highly contested South China Sea, which Beijing already claims through its controversial “9-dash line” dating back to the 1930s. Giving teeth to Xi’s statement, China is militarizing its possessions in the Spratly and Paracel Islands, including its new manmade islands dredged from the seafloor. Reports that the Chinese may begin dredging the Scarborough Shoal, contested by the Philippines, further underscores Xi’s position while at the same time promising to enflame an already combustible situation.

The Philippines several years ago took China to international court over the Spratlys. In response, Beijing repeatedly announced its intention to ignore any international court decision. With the U.N. tribunal at The Hague soon to rule on China and the Philippines’ competing claims, Xi’s latest statement further hardens Beijing’s position. Here, too, the Xi doctrine is clarifying China’s position on strategically-important maritime possessions, indicating little hope for compromise on territorial disputes. Beijing seems willing to risk a clash with its neighbors, or possibly even America, in order to maintain a redline over its claimed possessions. Similarly, China issued warnings to Taiwan after its recent presidential election that returned the nominally pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party to power, to abandon the “hallucination” of independence. These moves raise fears that Beijing remains willing to risk regional conflict to keep firm control over what it considers a renegade province.

All nations act in their self-interest, and no one should be surprised that Beijing has altered its policies to take advantage of its years of economic growth and new military strength. Yet few nations are able to assert their national interest in ways that have the potential to reshape their regions. China’s selective adherence to international law is not unique, but its power and influence makes its actions far more disruptive than smaller states when it chooses a unilateral path based on might.

Xi Jinping has pushed China toward a more confrontational posture throughout East Asia. Japan is scrambling its jet interceptors hundreds of times per year in response to Chinese fighters encroaching on Japanese territory, including the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. New Chinese Coast Guard cutters, larger than any operated by other Asian nations, patrol contested waters, intimidating smaller vessels from other nations. Philippine and Vietnamese fishing boats regularly face pressure from Chinese maritime patrol vessels. Cyberattacks emanating from the mainland relentlessly test the computer defenses of Japan and other countries.

The Xi doctrine presents the nations of Asia and the United States with a version of former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s “known unknowns.” While it is clear that Beijing intends to shape the East Asian security environment to its preferences, the exact means it will use, or how far it will test its strength remains uncertain. That alone may be part of China’s plan, to maintain strategic flexibility by sowing uncertainty among those enmeshed in disputes with Beijing. Such uncertainty could possibly lead China’s counterparts to become more cautious and risk averse in the light of Xi’s forceful statements.

Yet with The Hague ruling looming, and continued bad economic news, the belief that China is an unstoppable force may be waning. With countries like the Philippines willing to use international means to challenge China, and Japan increasing its defense budget, Chinese foreign policy may run into stiff headwinds in coming years. Xi’s statements can be interpreted therefore as a way of forestalling greater challenges to China’s regional interests.

The problem is that Xi will have to respond, if for some reason he were directly and materially challenged on any of his pronouncements. A new air defense identification zone in the South China Sea, for example, might result in a response even from a nation that is far weaker than China, such as the Philippines. Or, the sinking of a Vietnamese fishing vessel could unleash nationalist demonstrations in both countries. That could be an incident which could easily spin out of control, further poisoning relations in Asia, and possibly bringing the United States into the conflict, were its allies involved. It would be better for all if the Xi doctrine were never put to the test.



Michael Auslin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, is the author of The End of the Asian Century (forthcoming, Yale). Follow him on Twitter @michaelauslin

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/india-and-iran-changing-the-great-game/

The Pulse

India and Iran: Changing the Great Game

The Chabahar port deal has the potential to alter the “great game” in Afghanistan for good.

By Siddhartha Srivastava
May 27, 2016

The historic pact between India and Iran recently to build Chabahar port in Iran has the potential to alter the dynamics of “The Great Game” for good. The pact, which will kick off a transport-and-trade corridor linking India to Afghanistan via Iran, dramatically adds new players to the game, constructs a compelling economic dimension, and has the potential for a new security paradigm to bring about a geopolitical shift in the region. If implemented successfully, “The Great Game” in Afghanistan may be bright for future generations.

For all the participants, the economic rewards of this pact are huge. The development of Chabahar port and the connecting transport-and-trade corridor has the potential to unlock the untapped energy and mineral riches of Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asia for export toward India, one of the largest and fastest growing economies in the world.

For India, a fast growing economy presents an insatiable need for energy and raw materials. The Chabahar pact ends the country’s economic isolation from Central Asia, opening access that has been choked by an unfriendly Pakistan since 1947. In the long run, India’s connectivity could expand to Russia and Europe, adding further economic vibrancy to the India-Iran-Afghanistan arc.

Iran needs no introduction as an energy supplier. What is momentous is that Iran is also emerging as the gateway between Central Asia and India and furthermore an Indian manufacturing hub by creating a junction of cheap energy and Afghan raw materials for Indian markets.

Impoverished Afghanistan is a mineral rich country. The U.S. Geological Survey has verified previous Soviet finds. Afghanistan may hold 60 million tons of copper, 2.2 billion tons of iron ore, and 1.4 million tons of rare earth elements such as lanthanum, cerium and neodymium, in addition to aluminum, gold, silver, zinc, mercury, and lithium. Rare earth deposits in Helmand province alone are valued at $89 billion. Total Afghan mineral wealth is estimated between $1 to 3 trillion, according to the U.S. Geological Survey. Such mineral deposits have remained untapped due to the lack of connectivity to a major economy, among other factors. No more, with new connectivity to India. Afghanistan might be able to jump-start the engine of modern economic growth and move beyond poppy cultivation. Also, a successful corridor further enforces Afghanistan as a transit route for oil and natural gas exports from Central Asia to the Arabian Sea. The resources generated from mining, the export of raw materials and later finished commodities like iron and aluminum could have a transformational impact on Afghanistan’s economy, society, and politics.

This potential will not be realized without ensuring peace and security, particularly in Afghanistan. This is the graveyard of empires. The British and the Soviets have tasted bitter defeats; Americans are the latest to fail. Why should India and Iran succeed? The intertwined answers lie in economics, connectivity, and resulting security.

The British, Soviet, and American campaigns were military interventions of occupation, with little in direct economic benefit for Afghanistan. The Chabahar corridor is not an intervention. This corridor unleashes economic opportunities that did not exist in the past and it offers Afghanistan the most tangible prospect to build a modern economy. The past governments in Kabul were weakened due to lack of an internal tax base and the resulting dependence on foreign aid reduced them to puppets. The tax generated from mining and mineral exports could facilitate a resourceful and strong government in Kabul that can assert authority across the country. The job creation from modern economic activity would create a society with vested interests in economics and peace. This potentially offers a sustainable model that had been absent in the past superpower-led ventures in Afghanistan.

In the worst case, should Afghanistan still descend into unfortunate factionalism and warfare, similar to that witnessed following the Soviet withdrawal, there nevertheless will be greater opportunities than in the past. In the past, the Northern Alliance held on to a sliver of territory with Indian help against the Taliban onslaught, becoming the basis for the ground defeat of the Taliban during the American offensive. In the future, India and Iran, with land connectivity, will be able to play a far bigger role by supporting democratic or modern factions. Mineral wealth will reduce the cost of such support. The model can be similar to the one West has employed in keeping the oil-rich Middle East peaceful and prosperous.

The Indian road to Afghanistan leads through Iran; in event of internal chaos in Afghanistan, India and Iran will be required to collaborate closely in bringing about peace. This makes the two countries with civilizational links the newest strategic partners in The Great Game, with a direct stake in long-term peace and prosperity.

The undeclared but principal paradigm-breaking impact of this deal is on Pakistan. India, Iran, and Afghanistan constitute over 95 percent of Pakistan’s territorial borders. A pact of such magnitude among Pakistan’s bordering states, aimed at excluding Pakistan, is an enormous indictment of Pakistan’s policies with its neighbors and a sharp reminder of its isolation in the region. But Pakistani losses extend beyond the symbolic to the tangible. The advantage Pakistan enjoyed due to its geography has been minimized and will perhaps be eliminated over time.

First, with the envisioned trade corridor, Iran usurps the all the economic fruits that fittingly belong to Pakistan as the natural transit route between India, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. As Indian supply chains mature via Iran, Pakistan — lacking in energy, raw materials or other major economic incentives — will find it hard to claw its way back to the center stage.

Second, Pakistan loses its stranglehold over the land-locked Afghanistan. After the Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan managed near absolute control over Afghanistan through Taliban proxies. As the U.S. Afghan campaign unfolded, Pakistani leverage continued due to supply lines passing through Karachi port. This resulted in billions in American aid to Pakistan, despite duplicity and subterfuge. This leverage over Afghanistan, built due to Pakistan’s monopoly on land routes to Afghanistan, will be a thing of the past. Connectivity introduces new players to the game: India and Iran. Afghans secure a second lifeline, this one also laced with economic booty. Pakistan will lose hegemony in Afghanistan. In the long run this could be an enduring blow to the Pakistani idea of seeking strategic depth in Afghanistan.

Finally, compared to Chabahar, the alternative China–Pakistan Economic Corridor looks lop-sided. This corridor links the backward and restive Chinese west, the autonomous Xinjiang region and autonomous Tibet region, to the Pakistani port of Gwadar in the equally restive Balochistan province. The question this corridor faces is who will benefit? The convincing logic of connecting energy sources and raw materials to big and hungry markets is obviously absent. Why build across thousands of kilometers of inhospitable Himalayas, through restive and disputed territories, when Xinjiang and Tibet can be connected to much closer ports through Southeast Asia or Kolkata?

The answer conceivably is that the corridor is about connecting the Pakistani market to the emerging manufacturing base in Tibet and Xinjiang. Gwadar port, on the other hand, would serve as a resting base for the Chinese navy, guarding the Chinese energy lanes running from the Middle East. There can be no doubt that Pakistan has shunned regional connectivity at a price.

India, Iran, and Afghanistan need to be commended on the farsightedness of this pact. However the challenges remain; without security in Afghanistan this deal becomes hollow. The Afghan government’s future is not yet secured. As the United States disengages, the clock of Afghanistan’s descent will start ticking. Direct economic benefits to Afghanistan can delay and reverse the slide down this chaotic incline. Speed will be of the essence; this is a race against time. The corridor’s development, and tickling of economic benefits, will take time. On top of that, India and Iran as old civilizations can boast of byzantine bureaucracies. The alacrity displayed toward finalizing this pact soon after the dismantling of UN sanctions on Iran will be needed again and again. Continued political determination will be vital to seize the opportunity and open a novel and refreshing chapter in the Great Game.

Siddhartha Srivastava is a Strategy Consultant based in Cleveland, USA. He has two decades of experience in senior positions in mutilation corporations and an MBA from INSEAD, France.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-northkorea-idUSKCN0YN3TU

World | Wed Jun 1, 2016 7:13am EDT
Related: World, China, North Korea

After failed missile test, China calls for Korean calm

BEIJING | By Ben Blanchard


China hopes all parties on the Korean peninsula will remain calm and exercise restraint, President Xi Jinping told a senior visiting North Korean envoy on Wednesday, after the isolated state rattled nerves with a failed missile test.

The rare meeting in Beijing between Xi and one of North Korea's highest-profile officials, career diplomat Ri Su Yong, follows a flurry of weapons tests in the run-up to the first congress in 36 years of North Korea's ruling Workers' Party in May, when young leader Kim Jong Un consolidated his control.

China is reclusive North Korea's only major ally but has been angered by its nuclear and missile programs.

China signed up to harsh new U.N. sanctions against North Korea in March in response to its fourth nuclear test in January and a satellite launch in February.

Xi told Ri that China attached great store to the friendly relationship between the two countries, and was willing to work with North Korea to consolidate that friendship, China's Foreign Ministry said.

"China's position on the peninsula issue is clear and consistent. We hope all sides remain calm and exercise restraint, increase communication and dialogue and maintain regional peace and stability," the ministry cited Xi as saying.

There was no direct mention of Tuesday's failed missile test, the latest in a string of unsuccessful ballistic missile tests by North Korea.

Ri passed on a verbal message to Xi from Kim, the ministry said, in which Kim expressed a desire to work hard with China to maintain peace and stability on the peninsula and across northeast Asia.

Xi welcomed Ri's visit to report on the North Korean party congress, which Xi said showed the importance Kim attached to ties with China, the ministry added.

Xi said he hoped North Korea could achieve even greater achievements in improving its economy and people's livelihoods, the ministry said.

Kim has yet to visit China since assuming office after his father died in 2011.

Chinese state television showed pictures of the two men meeting in Beijing's Great Hall of the People.

The United States plans to use high-level Sino-U.S. talks in Beijing next week to discuss ways to bring greater pressure to bear on North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions, a senior U.S. official said on Tuesday.

But China has been reluctant to take tougher action, such as completely shutting its border with North Korea, for fear that North Korea could collapse in chaos.


(Reporting by Ben Blanchard; Editing by Clarence Fernandez, Robert Birsel)

 

[China Connection]

Below I can believe Housecarl!


/////////////////////

N. Korea, China agree to boost ties amid int'l sanctions

À½¼ºµè±â
By Yi Whan-woo, Jun Ji-hye

Senior party officials from North Korea and China agreed to boost cooperation, according to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Tuesday.

The agreement was made during talks Ri Su-yong, vice chairman of North's ruling Workers' Party had with his Chinese counterpart, Song Tao, minister of the International Department of the party, late Tuesday.

The agreement was seen as a fresh sign that the traditional allies are trying to mend soured ties after the international community imposed its harshest sanctions yet on the North in early March for its fourth nuclear weapons test.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/05/iran-marriage-convenience-taliban-isis.html

Iran's 'marriage of convenience' with Taliban

Iranian authorities deny that Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour had just returned from a trip to Iran when he was killed May 21 by a US drone strike not far from the Iran-Pakistan border.

Author: Barbara Slavin
Posted: May 31, 2016
Comments 39

But experts on Afghanistan tell Al-Monitor that Iran has played a complicated game with the Afghan militant group for over a decade and has stepped up contacts in recent years in part to keep an even more dangerous organization — the group that calls itself the Islamic State — from expanding its territory to Iran’s east.

Although IS has only 1,000-3,000 adherents in Afghanistan, according to the Pentagon, far fewer than in Iraq or Syria, the Iranian government has a much more alarming assessment.

“My own personal observation from exchanges with Iranians in various settings is that their estimate of the threat of [IS] in Afghanistan is higher than that of the United States,” said Barnett Rubin, a former senior adviser to the Barack Obama administration on Afghanistan and Pakistan. He told Al-Monitor that the Russians also share this view.

Iran and the United States tacitly cooperated in overthrowing the Taliban regime in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks. Iran had staunchly opposed the Taliban in the 1990s and had almost gone to war with it after Taliban forces massacred Iranian diplomats and local Shiite Muslims in the Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif in 1998.

US and Iranian attitudes toward Afghanistan began to diverge after President George W. Bush announced a strategic partnership with the government of then-Afghan President Hamid Karzai in 2005. According to Rubin, the Iranians, already worried about the heavy US military presence to their west in Iraq, considered this declaration “a step toward our having permanent bases in Afghanistan.”

A decade later, there are still 10,000 US troops in Afghanistan and thousands are likely to remain, given the fragility of the current government of President Ashraf Ghani and the continuing threat to Afghan and US forces primarily from the Taliban.

James Cunningham, a former US ambassador to Afghanistan, told Al-Monitor in an email that while Iran doesn’t want the United States to remain, it “doesn’t want Afghanistan to collapse," explaining, "Iran wants to have contacts but doesn’t want the Taliban in power. And it is afraid of [IS].”

IS first appeared in Afghanistan in 2014. It proclaimed its presence on Jan. 26, 2015, naming a former Pakistani Taliban chief, Hafiz Saeed Khan, head of what IS called Khorasan province, the name for the region that centuries ago included Afghanistan, Pakistan and several Central Asian countries.

According to Afghan expert Fatemeh Aman, the group has attracted mostly non-Afghan fighters from Central Asia, including members of the Hizb ut-Tahrir (Islamic Party of Liberation) from Uzbekistan, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan, Chechens from Russia and Uighurs from China. It also has adherents from the Pakistani Taliban, known as Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, and other extremist Pakistani groups.

US forces have targeted IS in Afghanistan heavily this year, striking its camps in eastern Nangarhar province. Analysts say the group missed an opportunity to recruit more disaffected Afghan Taliban after it was revealed that the Taliban leadership had kept the 2013 death of the group’s founder, Mullah Omar, secret for two years. Earlier this year, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper described IS as a “low level threat to Afghan stability.”

Given this assessment and the fact that IS is concentrated in eastern Afghanistan, both Rubin and Cunningham said that a recent report claiming Iran had enlisted the Taliban to build a buffer zone against IS on the Iran-Afghan border was overstated.

Rubin said, “There is more alignment between the Taliban and Pakistan,” which has harbored Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders for many years. “With Iran, it’s a marriage of convenience.”

However, the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan has become caught up in the proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia that is churning in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Iran has recruited thousands of Afghan and Pakistani Shiites to fight alongside the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and members of Lebanon’s Hezbollah in support of the government in Syria against Saudi-backed Sunni militants. Hundreds of members of the so-called Zaynabiyun Brigade have died in the Syrian war.

In providing some minimal support to the Taliban, Iran is likely trying to compete with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan for the group’s affections as well as hedging about the durability and reach of the Kabul government.

Iran is also worried about IS recruitment among its own disgruntled Sunni minority, especially members of non-Persian ethnic groups such as the Kurds and Baluch, who live in peripheral areas of the Islamic Republic.

Asked whether Mansour had just visited Iran before he was killed, Hamid Babaei, the press counselor at the Iranian mission to the United Nations, relayed a comment by Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Jaberi Ansari. “The concerned authorities in Iran reject that such a person had entered Pakistan via Iran’s border at the stated date,” Ansari said, according to Babaei.

The US State Department also declined to confirm Mansour’s travel, which was indicated by visa stamps on a passport carrying a false name, Wali Mohammad, and Mansour’s picture that the Pakistanis said was found near his body.

“We just don’t have any clarity on that," spokesman Mark Toner told reporters May 24.

Rubin was more definitive. “I’m sure he was in Iran,” he told Al-Monitor. “He had stamps on his visa and he was killed near a border post.”

Rubin added that there are several million Afghans in Iran, most of whom have relatives back home and who travel frequently back and forth across the border. “I expect that if the leader of the Taliban goes to Iran, [the Iranians] know about it,” he said.

According to one account, Mansour, using the false passport, also traveled frequently from the international airport in Karachi, Pakistan, visiting Dubai 18 times and Bahrain once over the past nine years.

US officials say they targeted Mansour because he threatened US forces and had shown no interest in peace talks with the Afghan government. Mansour’s successor, a hard-line jurist named Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada, also looks disinclined to pursue peace. Just days after he was elevated, the Taliban carried out new attacks against Afghan police in southern Helmand province.

“Pick your conspiracy theory,” Cunningham said when asked about Mansour’s demise. “How did his passport survive? Did [IS] shop him to the US? Did the Iranians tip us off? We likely will never know. But the Taliban must be wondering, too.

“What needs to be debunked is the Pakistani line that Afghanistan is the fault of the United States and the international community, and that the killing [of Mansour] blocks the [Afghan-Taliban] peace process,” Cunningham continued. “There is no peace process; Mansour made clear there was no intent to negotiate.”

 

[Housecarl]

Below I can believe Housecarl!


/////////////////////

N. Korea, China agree to boost ties amid int'l sanctions

À½¼ºµè±â
By Yi Whan-woo, Jun Ji-hye

Senior party officials from North Korea and China agreed to boost cooperation, according to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Tuesday.

The agreement was made during talks Ri Su-yong, vice chairman of North's ruling Workers' Party had with his Chinese counterpart, Song Tao, minister of the International Department of the party, late Tuesday.

The agreement was seen as a fresh sign that the traditional allies are trying to mend soured ties after the international community imposed its harshest sanctions yet on the North in early March for its fourth nuclear weapons test.

Yeah. Goes to show that Great Game 2.0 is in full swing.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm......Problem is the Waahabists/Islamists/Jihadists aren't going to sit down and agree to any of this and they've got enough of an affinity for using violence to get what they want on the ground that until they're completely out of the picture you aren't going to get where the author wants to go.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://gulfnews.com/opinion/thinkers/arab-world-does-not-need-a-new-westphalia-1.1838968

Arab world does not need a new Westphalia

The key to renewed stability in the region is inclusion and tolerance within stable nation states

By Francis Matthew, Editor at Large
Published: 17:36 June 1, 2016

There is an assumption that the similarity between the Thirty Years’ War in Europe and the current chaos in the Middle East requires the Arab world to find something like the 1648 Peace of Westphalia for itself. The idea is that the rambling chaos of the Protestant and Catholic fighting in the German states mirrors the multiplicity of wars in the Arab world with their increasingly sectarian divisions.

The danger with this parallel is that any comparison across almost 400 years and different continents is bound to be a bit stretched. But it also misses the point that the treaties of Westphalia were largely about how independent states behaved with each other, while the issue in many Arab countries today is how a varied population can find an inclusive relationship with a central national government.

Most of the fighting in the Arab world today is between different ethnic groups or sectarian factions within a nation-state that has failed. Apart from Daesh (the self-proclaimed Islamic Sate of Iraq and the Levant), no militia is seeking to build a new nation-state or merge its territory across national boundaries, although one can see some of the Kurds edging that way sometimes. So the challenge in today’s Middle East is not a crisis between nation-states, but about the need to rebuild national governments that offer inclusive governance to all citizens.

The Thirty Years’ War raged between Catholics and Protestants from 1618 to 1648 and caused the death of half the population of Germany. It ended with the Peace of Westphalia that provided the building blocks of the modern state system, with the recognition of the sovereignty of each state and its right to political self-determination, the equality of all states, regardless of their size, and the principle of nonintervention. As John McHugo points out in A Concise History of the Arabs, this led to constitutional forms of government where writers like John Locke and Montesquieu formulated theories of the separation of the three powers of the state: Executive, legislative and judicial. These led in time to new constitutions that enshrined the principles of democracy and secularism, based on the principle that an individual’s rights are the most important definer of society, rather than religious duties or affiliation.

External guarantors

In Brendan Simms, Michael Axworthy and Patrick Milton’s impressive article in the January issue of the New Statesman, it has been pointed out that Westphalia also included a requirement on the princes to respect their subjects’ basic rights, such as religious freedom (even for Calvinists), enjoyment of property and access to judicial recourse. But the authors add that the treaties gave France and Sweden the right to act as external guarantors of the system, to intervene against either the emperor or the princes to uphold the system. It is hard to imagine which modern state can take on the role of a guarantor of any settlement in the Arab world. Regional powers like Iran or Turkey are hopelessly tainted and global powers like Russia or the United States will not be accepted even if they have the will to take on such a miserable task.

A further difficulty is that much of the political thinking in the Arab world is expressed in the context of the Islamic society. There is no Arab state that is overtly atheist and even to argue in favour of secular (religiously neutral) government requires pages of definition to make clear that secularism is not atheism. And in what is still a socially conservative region, there is no widespread support for the European and American idea that libertarian individualism is more important than religion. While it is obvious that the vast majority of Arabs value their personal liberties they are nonetheless happy to remain within an overtly-Islamic structure.

It is true that Tunisia’s Islamist Al Nahda party chief Rached Gannouchi announced last week in Le Monde that Al Nahda is a political, democratic and civil party. “We will exit political Islam and enter Muslim democracy. We want religious activity to be completely independent from political activity,” he said. But Abdul Rahman Al Rashid of Al Sharq Al Awsat quoted him, as telling a party rally on the same day that “We’re surprised by some parties’ insistence to eliminate religion from national life”. How constitutional Islamic parties work out their future is still a work-in-progress, but the immediate need is to build inclusive stability.

Therefore the key is for the political thinkers to find a new way forward that makes inclusion and tolerance the key to future stability. This is why it is important that all Iraqis refer to themselves as Iraqis and that no Syrian militia calls for the break-up of the Syrian nation. There is still some room for the various sides to recognise that mutual recognition has to be at the core of any end to the fighting because extermination or expulsion is not an option. This is why it is important that the Yemen peace talks recognise that Al Houthis will be part of the solution, even if it is not yet clear how that will happen. Stability in the Arab world will come from a willingness to work across sect or ethnic divide within a national consensus.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://gulfnews.com/news/europe/fra...ng-to-more-international-attacks-un-1.1839110

Daesh seen shifting to more international attacks: UN

In the last six months, Daesh has been linked to attacks in 11 countries that have killed over 500 people

Published: 20:38 June 1, 2016 Gulf News
AFP

United Nations: Daesh is moving into a new phase of warfare that is likely to lead to more attacks on international civilian targets, according to a new report by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.

In the last six months, Daesh has been linked to attacks in 11 countries that have killed over 500 people, in Bangladesh, Belgium, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Lebanon, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey and the United States.

“Recent international attacks perpetrated by members of Daesh demonstrate that the terrorist group is now moving into a new phase, with the increased risk that well-prepared and centrally directed attacks on international civilian targets may become a more frequent occurrence,” said the report obtained by AFP on Wednesday.

UN member-states are reporting a marked increase in the number of foreign fighters returning from Syria and Iraq where Daesh has suffered military setbacks, Ban said in the report to the Security Council.

The Paris and Brussels assaults demonstrate the terrorist group’s “ability to mount complex, multi-wave attacks” that were coordinated by foreign fighters returning from Syria, with some direction from Daesh leaders.

These leaders are seeking to “elevate the role” of Daesh affiliates, suggesting a broader theater for its military campaign.

Several hundred foreign fighters have “relocated back to Libya” while other returnees are seeking to establish new affiliates as part of the Daesh strategy to expand its global footprint, said the report.

The presence of Malaysian and Indonesian fighters in Syria and Iraq has raised concerns that Southeast Asia is at risk of attacks, the report said.

Ban sent the report to the council on Tuesday in line with a UN resolution adopted in December that takes aim at the financing networks of Daesh and Al Qaida.

For the first time since it proclaimed its caliphate in June 2014, Daesh has come under financial pressure following a sharp drop in oil production in territory it controls among other measures, the report said.

A recent 50-percent-cut in salaries paid to Daesh fighters in Raqqa was seen as a sign that finances were becoming tighter.

“The global threat emanating from Daesh remains high and continues to diversity,” said Ban in the report, prepared with input from the UN’s counter-terrorism committee.

The document quoted an unidentified member-state as saying that the number of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria had reached 38,000, but most governments estimate that figure at 30,000.

The council is set to discuss the report during a meeting on June 8.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.npr.org/sections/paralle...ics-near-violence-grips-rios-pacified-favelas

As Olympics Near, Violence Grips Rio's 'Pacified' Favelas

May 31, 2016·5:24 PM ET
Lulu Garcia-Navarro

In the misty rain, surrounded by Rio de Janeiro's green hills, police officer Eduardo Dias was buried last week. He was shot, purportedly by gang members, as he was leaving his post inside the favela, or shantytown, where he worked as a community cop.

The killing took place a few hundred feet from the Maracana Stadium, where the opening ceremony of the Summer Olympics will be held on Aug. 5. As family members wept by the graveside, the pastor raised his hands.

"This rain is like our tears," he said. "Not just ours, but coming also from the heavens for everything that we are going through. I have been asking God, until when, my Lord? Until when are we going to have to bury our good policemen? Until when will we have to keep burying our children?"

Brazil has been rattled by a terrible recession, multiple corruption scandals, a political meltdown and the Zika virus. And now Rio is suffering a security crisis.

Murders are up 15 percent from last year. Robbery is up 30 percent. Amid the economic and political turmoil, the state security budget has been cut by a third. The gangs are fighting for territory in advance of the Olympics, according to authorities.

While everyone is feeling the effects, the impact is greatest on Rio's poorest communities, the favelas.

'Disneyland' Favela


Related Stories

Robert Laurindo recently opened Casa da Tapioca in favela Vidigal, in Rio de Janeiro. He purchased a two-level, one-bedroom building, which includes the cafe on the ground floor. Here, he serves his grandmother's tapioca recipes to Elizangela Ferreiro, right, and her daughter, Jessica da Silva, originally from Sao Paulo, who recently moved to Vidigal.

Parallels

Once Unsafe, Rio's Shantytowns See Rapid Gentrification

To get a sense of how far things have slipped, I went back to Babilonia, a community I visited when I first arrived to Rio three years ago.

Babilonia, like many of Rio's favelas, is located on a hillside with an amazing view of the water and the famed Copacabana beach. Babilonia became known as one of the so-called Disneyland favelas because they were shown to visiting dignitaries and the media as an example of how conditions had improved.

In the new and improved Babilonia, police walked around with their guns holstered. Residents were opening up businesses catering to tourists. They included restaurants, and hostels that were advertised on Airbnb. The drug gangs kept a low profile.

All this was part of a bold policing program called pacification, which placed permanent bases of community police, known as UPPs, in neighborhoods that had little or no state presence previously. Residents considered them long overdue and the state considered them necessary as Brazil prepared to host the World Cup in 2014 and this summer's Olympics.

But unlike three years ago, the pacification police are now patrolling with their guns drawn. Police commander Paulo Berbat walks to the crest of the hill, where muddy paths disappear into the jungle.

He says six weeks ago, a rival gang from the neighboring favela tried to push in and take control from the group that controls the drugs and guns in Babilonia. Three drug dealers were killed in a firefight that sent fear through the community.

Too Scared To Speak

Rodrigo da Silva agreed to meet with me on the beach where he works. He owns a hostel in the favela that he advertises on Airbnb, but he also sells food on Copacabana to make ends meet.

He hoped the Summer Olympics would get him out of the hot sun. But so far, there have been few guests at his hostel. "Our business has decreased," he says. "We had much higher expectations in terms of hosting people throughout the Olympics. If the situation had improved, maybe I wouldn't still have to work here on the beach."

Other members of the community had similar stories about a sharp drop in business due to the violence.

Aside from da Silva, favela residents refused to be interviewed, in marked contrast to three years ago. Several told me they had been directly threatened by the gangs, who said we were asking too many questions.

"If you talk too much, it ends badly," da Silva says. "Here's the deal: You do not mess with their business, don't mess with their stuff — and they don't mess with you."

Olympic officials are promising the games will be safe for visitors and athletes. Brazil will be bringing in double the amount of security that the London Games had four years ago.

"What we need to push, and we will do so, is to have more security before the games, and more security after the games. We don't want the games to be an island of success and perfection. We want the games to transform Rio, and to make Rio a safer city in the years to come," says Mario Andrada, the communications director for Rio 2016.


But even if the Olympics go according to plan, the future of the pacification program is in doubt. Da Silva tells me he fears the worst.

"There will be more violence, more violence in all the communities because of the fights between the drug gangs, fights against the police," he says. "In the end the ones who will pay for this will be the residents, as always."

NPR has been collaborating with the the PBS NewsHour, which will also feature reporting by Lulu Garcia-Navarro on its program Tuesday evening.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://38north.org/2016/06/jschilling060115/

Three (or Four) Strikes for the Musudan?

By John Schilling
01 June 2016

North Korea has reportedly tried and failed to launch a Musudan missile for a third time in two months. It is not surprising that a new missile would fail on its first test, but previous North Korean practice has been to stand down for several months to a year before another attempt. Repeating a failed test again and again with no more than a month for analysis and troubleshooting will almost guarantee repeated failure. One of the tests apparently involved two simultaneous launches, and launching two copies of an unproven design just meant a double failure while learning nothing new. Whether this unrealistic tempo is driven by impatience or desperation, it may mark the end of the Musudan program—whose military utility is in any case increasingly questionable as North Korea’s other programs advance.

http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/KCNA_Musudan-WPK-65th.jpg
(Photo: KCNA)

The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reported on May 30 that North Korea had attempted and failed to launch a Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) from a mobile launcher. This follows similar reported failures on April 15 and April 28, with the latter possibly involving two missiles. We have no confirmation that these were Musudan missiles. Still, that is the only possibility that really makes sense here—the only other missiles the North Koreans could launch from a mobile platform are the proven Scud, Nodong and Toksa designs. Those usually work, and there would be little value in a test or demonstration. The Musudan desperately needs a successful test and such a success would have made for good propaganda.

A little background: The Musudan ballistic missile was seen in North Korea in 2003, but until this year had probably never been flown. The missile appears to be based on an early Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) called the R-27 “Zyb” or the SS-N-6 “Serb” in the West that was first produced in the mid-1960s and retired by the late 1980s. Some of the missile’s designers are known to have made their way to North Korea in the immediate post-Cold War era and incomplete records suggest that some of the surplus hardware may have wound up there as well. But the subsequent development of the Musudan has been extremely slow, to the point that some people had suggested it might be little more than a hoax or a bluff.

The last thing a poker player will do in a bluff is reveal his cards when he doesn’t have to. The North Koreans didn’t have to do any of these tests so they’re clearly not bluffing. At least up until yesterday, they thought they had a working missile. Maybe they still do.

We know the North has a working engine. North Korean television released images of an engine test in early April that we assessed as a pair of Isayev 4D10 engines from the R-27 missile coupled to form an ICBM-class power plant. As these were only still images, we couldn’t be sure the test had been fully successful. But satellite images show no indication that the test stand had been damaged by an explosion, and if this ground test had failed in some other respect then presumably the North Koreans would not have been so eager to launch a missile using the same engine.

It would seem that a missile with a proven design and a proven engine simply ought to work. And maybe the reason the North Koreans hadn’t tested the system before now is that they were so confident it would work that they didn’t need to test it. So much for that theory. Engines that work on the ground don’t always work in flight, as the missile’s acceleration can produce instabilities in the propellant feed. The structure could collapse under flight loads. There are always surprises the first time a new system is flown no matter how much ground testing is done.

And working from old Soviet designs, even using old Soviet hardware, is no guarantee of success. The design has been visibly modified, at a minimum stretching the propellant tanks by 2-3 meters for additional range. That might not have been done right. Even the parts of the design that haven’t changed will have been based on the implicit assumption of Russian parts, Russian raw materials and Russian technicians reading blueprints to Russian conventions. This author has seen rocket engines fail simply because the manufacturing site was moved from England to Ireland[1]—how many more opportunities for failure must there be between Russia and North Korea? As for any tested, proven Russian hardware the North Koreans might have obtained, such hardware will by now be at least 40 years old and perhaps not properly cared for given all that time. In short, there is no substitute for flight-testing to see if an engine still works.

Or more accurately, to find out why it doesn’t work and fix it. North Korea’s rockets almost never work on the first try. The first Nodong apparently blew up on the pad just like the most recent Musudan. The Taepodong 1 and 2 rockets, the Unha, and now the KN-11 SLBM, all failed on their first flight. To be fair, this is literally rocket science. It isn’t supposed to be easy, and even NASA failed on its first satellite launch attempt. Like NASA, North Korea has shown the ability to persevere, fix the problems, and eventually succeed.

The North Koreans have also, in the past, shown patience. This is critical. When a rocket fails, it takes at a minimum several months to figure out why it failed and fix it. Trying to repeat a failed test without taking that time almost guarantees additional failures. NASA understands this, but when the first Vanguard satellite launch attempt failed at a time of intense political pressure, it attempted a second launch a little more than a month later, which also failed. Ultimately, six launches were conducted at roughly one-month intervals, with only a single success. Modern space programs, facing less pressure, will usually stand down for a year or more after a failed test. Just a few weeks before the North Korean failures, an American Atlas rocket suffered a minor anomaly that forced an early engine shutdown. The mission was successfully completed but further Atlas launches have been postponed to give the engineers at least three months for troubleshooting.

The North Koreans have traditionally followed this approach. Yet after the April 15 failure they conducted a second test less than two weeks later, possibly involving two simultaneous launches. With embarrassing failure the almost certain outcome, why was the attempt made? At the time, we had speculated that the upcoming Party Congress was putting extreme pressure on the schedule, but the Congress is over and done with, and now we have yet another test that was probably doomed from the start. There has been speculation that the test was intended to send a message to China, as a senior North Korean official visited Beijing and met with the Chinese leader. But what kind of message was intended?

Another possibility is that this is driven by pressure from the top. While the test failures were not highly publicized, they were probably an embarrassment to a Kim Jong Un who was expecting success. He may still be impatiently demanding that success. If true, this does not bode well for the engineers on the project. If they can’t convince the Party leadership, even now that the Party Congress is done, to back off and give them the time they need to find and solve the Musudan’s problems, they will keep failing. How many failures will Kim tolerate, and what happens when he runs out of patience?

The other possibility is that the Musudan, and the people behind it, may be struggling for relevance. The Musudan is a missile with a single mission—to deliver nuclear or perhaps chemical weapons to the island of Guam. It could also reach targets in Japan or South Korea, but the DPRK’s more reliable Nodong and Scud missiles can do that as well. Guam is certainly an important target for North Korea—the only sovereign US territory it can reach without developing a true ICBM, and a critical logistical base for any US operations against North Korea. But with limited economic resources and with several ambitious new rocket and missile programs, is it worth the cost to develop a troublesome system devoted to a single target? Maybe the senior leadership has decided to leave Guam to the more capable and versatile KN-08 and KN-14 missiles now under development, or the GORAE-class ballistic missile submarine, and the Musudan engineers are desperately trying to prove their own worth.

In any case, these failures may mark the end of the Musudan program. If there are continued test attempts at the current rate, whether driven by impatience from above or desperation at the bottom, there will likely be continued failures. Eventually, patience and resources will run out, and a team of North Korean rocket engineers will find themselves unemployed. If, instead, there is a real commitment to make the Musudan work, we would expect to see anywhere from three months to a year or more of ground testing before any further launch attempts. Only time will tell.



_______________

[1] To be fair, the Irish engineers got the system working properly – largely because they took the time to do it right.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.msn.com/en-us/money/mark...hing-parts-of-opec/ar-BBtKjMr?ocid=spartanntp

Saudi Arabia tried to crush US shale; instead, it's crushing parts of OPEC

CNBC
Tom DiChristopher
6 hrs ago

Video

Saudi Arabia engineered OPEC's policy to kill off U.S. shale oil production. The plan was straightforward: Keep pumping oil, maintain market share, and outlast the Americans.

But the plan is also producing casualties within the cartel itself: Angola, Nigeria and a Venezuela that's on the verge of implosion.

Six months after OPEC left its high-production policy in place, some of the cartel members who called loudest for output cuts are feeling the most pain. Inflation is soaring and currencies have plummeted in lesser petro states, as top exporter Saudi Arabia continues to dictate policy.

While Riyadh tries to embark on a new path toward economic diversification under its influential deputy crown prince, those other OPEC states are seeing fragile gains slip away and threats to stability creep in.

For the moment, relief is elusive.

The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries is not expected to cut production at its meeting on Thursday. Nor is it likely that members will agree to freeze production, an idea that failed at an April meeting after the Saudis balked at capping output without participation from Iran.

"The other member nations of the OPEC cartel have had their hands out since November of 2014, saying, 'Let's have a meeting. Let's stop this stuff,'" Dr. Loren Scott, president and founder of economic consulting firm Loren C. Scott & Associates, told CNBC's "Power Lunch" on Tuesday.

"The problem here is these other countries do not have a big stash of cash over here like the Saudis," he said.

Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have ridden out the downturn in no small part due to the cushions afforded by their huge sovereign wealth funds and foreign reserves.

Meanwhile, Iran says its crude exports will soon reach 2.2 million barrels per day, as the country competes with rival Saudi Arabia for market share following an end of sanctions against Tehran. Iraq and Kuwait are also ramping up production this summer to capture a bigger piece of the pie.

OPEC members like Venezuela, Libya, Nigeria, and Angola have called for production cuts essentially since the start of the oil price downturn in mid-2014. Now some of those countries have reached their tipping points.

To be sure, those countries already had problems of their own making. A wealth of research has shown that nations with abundant natural resources often fail to achieve economic growth because there is little incentive to develop non-energy industries. Commodity-dependent economies also tend to lack the institutions necessary to turn resource windfalls into equitable development, and corruption is often entrenched in these places.

In Venezuela, inflation has exploded by triple digits, making imports so expensive that people have resorted to looting. Electricity rationing has ironically cut energy producers' access to power, compounding the oil problem with output declines.

Street protesters are calling for President Nicolas Maduro to step down, leading to confrontations with police. Maduro's party does not hold a majority in the Venezuelan legislature, and friction between the two branches of government has led to a constitutional crisis.

A poll shows nearly 70 percent of people believe President Maduro must go.

James Lockhart Smith, head of financial sector risk at Verisk Maplecroft, said there is risk of severe political upheaval.

"You're in a situation with a political regime that has never had to play by the rules of democracy when it's been on the losing side," he told CNBC's "Closing Bell" last week. "It's been very happy to be committed to elections and so forth when it's enjoyed a majority, but it's now in a very, very difficult situation and will not voluntarily hand over power."

In Nigeria, where oil accounts for 90 percent of exports and 70 percent of government revenues, President Muhammadu Buhari's administration kept the country's currency pegged to the dollar. That checked the currency plunge that other oil producers have experienced, but it has also put the country's trade in jeopardy as the central bank's supply of greenbacks runs perilously low.

United Airlines (UAL) announced last week it would cut air service to the capitol of Lagos because currency controls had made it difficult to collect money from Nigerian customers.

The budget was also delayed for months, leaving Nigeria's 36 states without money to pay salaries. Now, Central Bank Governor Godwin Emefiele says recession is imminent.

That forecast came amid renewed attacks by militants on the country's energy infrastructure following seven years of relative peace. Sabotage by a group calling itself the Niger Delta Avengers has reduced the country's oil output by a third.

The group is determined to bring the government to economic paralysis, said Manji Cheto, senior vice president at Teneo Intelligence.

"It wants to dominate the sort of security environment, make the government really get to the point where they have to get to a negotiating table," she told CNBC Europe's "Street Signs."

Things aren't much better in Angola.

Amid turmoil in the Middle East and Africa in 2011, the Center for Strategic and International Studies identified three major risks for Angola: a downturn in crude prices, difficulty in delivering services to the nation's urban poor, and a botched succession should President Jose Eduardo dos Santos step down after 37 years in office.

Today, the first scenario has come to pass, and the second is underway.

Infrastructure, housing, and access to water and electricity improved significantly for Angola's city dwellers after the country emerged from a quarter century of civil war in 2002. But runaway inflation is inflaming lingering problems in this oil-dependent nation.

"Meeting daily needs has become much more difficult. Food has risen a lot. Transport costs have risen a lot. You see less cars on the road, and people are struggling to take semi-public transport because the prices are also increasing," said Rebecca Engebretsen, a PhD candidate at the University of Oxford who studies oil governance and petroleum revenue.

With the Angolan currency in free fall, Angolans are having a tougher time compensating for the country's under-investment in education and health care, Engebretsen said. It has become more expensive for Angolans to continue seeking medical care in South Africa and Brazil, and to send children to schools in Portugal and English-speaking countries, she added.

Even as oil prices rebound to around $50 a barrel, countries like Angola may continue to find themselves in turmoil. Some OPEC watchers believe the cartel is at a turning point that will see Saudi Arabia embrace a more hands-off approach to oil prices.

Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman appears to believe that OPEC should less directly manage oil markets, according to Gary Ross, founder and executive chairman of PIRA Energy, who spoke to CNBC last month after Saudi Arabia replaced its oil minister of 20 years.

That approach will have ramifications for all OPEC states.

"What it means is you'll have much more market volatility," he said.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/06/01/big-win-over-isis-could-mean-a-new-war.html

PUZZLE
06.01.16 2:19 PM ET

Big Win Over ISIS Could Mean a New War

The fight against ISIS is succeeding, but ironically the wins scored by US-backed forces raise tough questions about who exactly will rule when ISIS is gone.

written by Nancy A. Youssef, Michael Weiss


Troops fighting ISIS appeared to on the verge of another victory over the self-proclaimed Islamic State Wednesday, as they moved into a city that has served as the main thoroughfare for ISIS foreign fighters and weapons. But the potential seizure of the Syrian city of Manbij by U.S.-backed forces is only likely to set off a new battle for control—this time pitting Arabs against Kurds.

The battle Wednesday reflected a growing problem for the U.S. and its push to train local fighters, even as those forces take territory from ISIS. Who exactly will govern those towns now? Will it be the Kurds who have led the fight against ISIS? Or will it be what some in the Pentagon have privately called the “token Arabs” trained by the U.S. to accompany them?

Two defense officials told The Daily Beast Wednesday they don’t know. They believe the Arabs would be in charge. But even these officials admit that asking the 5,000-or-so newly-trained Arab fighters to control three or more formerly ISIS-controlled areas—and at the same time move into the ISIS capital of Raqqa—would be difficult.

On the other hand, some worry that a Kurdish controlled Manbij could be ethnically cleansed, creating the kind of Sunni disenfranchisement that led to the rise of ISIS. The fall of Manbij into Kurdish hands, however, would give the Kurds a contiguous region in northern Syria. Moreover, a Kurdish controlled Manbij could draw the ire of U.S.-allied Turkey, which rejects a Kurdish controlled region on its border.

The question “what happens after ISIS?” looms increasingly over the U.S.-led effort. Indeed, defense officials said how the governance question is answered in Manbij could foreshadow the strategy for Raqqa, ISIS’s capital. Local U.S.-backed forces, accompanied by U.S. forces, have moved within 18 miles of the city in the last week. Over the Memorial Day weekend, one U.S. service member was injured while supporting the local fighters.

“ISIS is losing. The U.S needs to make sure what emerges next is not an utter wreck that will allow this brutal organization or something like it to move back in,” Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, a senior fellow at the Washington, D.C.-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies, explained to The Daily Beast.

U.S. officials could once defer answering about what happens after ISIS, saying their focus was to end the terror group’s brutality. But the militants’ steady stream of defeats is making such questions unavoidable. The U.S.-led airstrike campaign has increasingly assaulted ISIS logistical operations, forcing the terror group to retreat from territory it once controlled. Such losses have made it harder for ISIS to move weapons, food, and fighters around the self-proclaimed caliphate and appear to have weakened the group’s ability to expand its state across the Middle East and Africa.

In recent months, ISIS has lost control of Ash Shaddadi, a key logistical city east of Raqqa, several town north of the ISIS capital. And now it appears that the Iraqi city of Fallujah, the last bastion of ISIS control near Baghdad, is in danger of falling out of ISIS hands.

At the organization’s peak nearly two years ago, thousands of ISIS fighters entered through Manbij each month and moved throughout Syria and Iraq. U.S. military estimates now put that number at closer to 500 a month, as it appears ISIS has instead spread its foreign fighters across the region to places like Libya and Egypt. The terror group has even asked recruits to stay in Europe and attack from there.

The Kurds have set the tone for the war against ISIS, saying for months they wanted to take places like Manbij before approaching Raqqa, the ISIS capital.

On Wednesday, more than 2,000 fighters entered Manbij, which has served as a key thoroughfare between Turkey and Syria. According to one report, the fighters have taken 20 villages and are fewer than 10 miles from the city center.

The forces have received American help, which signaled that the coalition was willing to risk aggravating Kurdish/Arab tensions and the Turks in exchange for a liberated Manbij. Since May 27, the U.S.-led coalition has conducted 36 airstrikes around Manbij, including 18 in the last day, according to Defense Department (DoD) statistics. And according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the latest strikes have killed at least 15 civilians.

The fighters charging toward Manbij are members of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-dominated, U.S.-backed force recently bolstered by 5,000 U.S.-trained Arab fighters. In all, there are roughly 25,000 SDF, according to DoD figures.

When asked who would control Manbij if ISIS fell, one defense official demurred, saying instead, “Right now, the SDF are closing the flanks.”

The military plan for Manbij is for Arab fighters to lead the charge, backed by Kurds, and then hold the city. But just how that would play out remains unclear, defense officials conceded. What happens if the Arab fighters need help from the Kurds? Will they receive it? And if so, will the Kurds demand more in concessions for the city?

The potential fall of Manbij with the help of the Kurds, along with the fall of areas around Raqqa, suggest that the U.S. is willing to risk creating potential new tensions to rid the northern city of ISIS.

“All signs point to the de facto establishment of a contiguous Kurdish-controlled territory in northern Syria, which the United States will have had a hand in creating,” Aaron Stein, the senior resident fellow for Turkey with the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, concluded in a February assessment.

The retaking of the Manbij pocket—and particularly the town of al-Bab, where ISIS’s foreign intelligence apparatus is headquartered — would represent a hammer blow to ISIS’s operations in northern Syria. For that reason, the terror group has continued to demonstrate a willingness to hang onto its holdings there. In recent days, its own progress on the battlefield has come as a result of exactly the sort of sectarian conflict between Arab and Kurd that CENTCOM is seeking to avoid.

The Aleppo town of Marea, for instance, is now completely surrounded by both ISIS and the U.S.-backed Kurdish militias—even though the 400 Syrian rebels of Mu’tasim Brigade are also assets of the U.S. military, as the Pentagon has confirmed to The Daily Beast.

According to Mustafa Sejry, the head of the political office of the Mu’tasim Brigade, ISIS has dispatched 1,000 jihadists to try and invade Marea, roughly the same force contingent ISIS currently has deployed against 20,000 pro-Iraqi ground troops in the city of Fallujah.

“ISIS cut off the road between Azaz and Marea six days ago,” Sejry said, referring to a crucial Syrian-Turkish border town that ISIS has also made a major play to recapture. “After that, Marea became completely besieged by ISIS. We’re engaged in operations to break the siege. We were making progress on the second day, but we were surprised that the coalition struck one of our groups, killing 10 of our fighters and injuring 12.”

Sejry shared with The Daily Beast photographs purporting to show the damaged caused by these alleged U.S. airstrikes. These images could not be independently confirmed, however.

“Since then, we’ve been asking the Americans to airdrop support for us,” Sejry said.

Fifty fighters from the Mu’tasim Brigade are graduates of the Pentagon’s “train and equip” program for recruiting Sunni Arab and Turkmen counterterrorists from the ranks of the Free Syrian Army to take on ISIS. These men were trained at a U.S.-administered military base in Turkey.

From its inception, the train-and-equip program has been plagued by setbacks and failures, with the first class of graduates having been kidnapped by Jabhat al-Nusra, the Syrian al-Qaeda franchise, and members of the second class having sold American supplies to that same franchise, as The Daily Beast was the first to report.

But Sejry insists that the Mu’tasim Brigade has been an exception to that ignoble trend. “There is no incident of our weaponry being given or sold to any other group, not even other FSA groups,” he said. “The U.S. government has always been very happy and enthusiastic to work with us.”

For months, the Mu’tasim Brigade had received “regular shipments" from the United States of mortar shells, M16 and M2 rifle ammunition, vehicles, clothes and belts, he added. “But since the last shipment we have not received any supplies. We’ve given the U.S. coordinates where they can safely drop support for us.”

So why did the shipments stop? The reason given to the Mu’tasim sounded implausible. “The Americans told us that they feared that if they dropped supplies to us, these might fall into the hands of the PYD,” Sejry said, using the acronym of the Kurdish political party that controls the Syrian Democratic Forces. “And they said they don't want that to happen. That’s unconvincing to us because we’re fully aware of U.S. support to the PYD.”

Navy Commander Kyle Raines, a CENTCOM spokesman, told The Daily Beast on Tuesday, that, so far as he is aware, U.S. supply runs to anti-ISIS forces have not stopped.

“We’ve been resupplying the vetted Syrian coalition and other folks all along,” Raines said. “I’m not in a position to contradict what [Sejry] is saying but we have continued to resupply people.” Possibly delays, Raines offered, could owe to battlefield conditions that make cargo runs or airdrops impossible.

But how does the U.S. reconcile two of its own ground proxies fighting each other while ISIS simultaneously targets one of them? Raines declined to comment.

On Wednesday evening, after inquiries made by The Daily Beast to CENTCOM, the Mu’tasim Brigade received confirmation from the Pentagon that it would be resupplied imminently.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news...he-army-to-replace-soldiers-with-contractors/

Checkpoint

How Obama’s Afghanistan plan is forcing the Army to replace soldiers with contractors

By Thomas Gibbons-Neff June 1 at 2:47 PM
Comments 13

Current restrictions on U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan and a heavy reliance on civilian contractors are eroding the skills and cohesion of units deployed to the country, according to information from the Army given to the House Armed Services Committee and provided to The Washington Post.

According to an Army document, the use of civilian labor in one of the Army’s combat aviation brigades, or CABs, in Afghanistan has had negative side effects because the contractors are being used in lieu of the brigade’s maintenance soldiers. Those soldiers should be deploying with their units, but are not because of the “constrained troop level environment” in Afghanistan, the document says.

[Obama faces what is likely his last major decision on the Pentagon’s role in Afghanistan]

“Aviation maintainers not deploying with their [brigades] results in an erosion of skill and experience essential to soldier and leader development,” Army officials said in the document. “The atrophy of these critical skills erodes the brigade’s ability to deploy in the future and sustain itself in an expeditionary manner to locations that may not permit the deployment of contractors.”

According to the Army document, three CABs have deployed to Afghanistan since 2013 with reduced maintenance staffs. A typical CAB usually deploys with 1,500 soldiers but can swell above 2,500 depending on the mission. In 2013, a brigade deployed with 1,900 troops, but as U.S. forces were reduced in Afghanistan, only 800 deployed in 2015. Despite the reduction in troop levels, the brigade was still expected to maintain and fly its roughly 100 aircraft.

Currently, the 4th Infantry Division’s CAB is deployed to Afghanistan and provides “country-wide aviation support,” according to a breakdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan that was compiled by the Institute of the Study of War. It primarily provides rotor-wing support in the form of helicopter gunships and transports.

According to the Army document, only 6 percent of the 4th’s CAB is dedicated to maintaining aircraft. That small number is specifically for recovering aircraft that land or crash in a hostile environment. Instead, 427 civilian personnel — at a cost of $101 million annually — are maintaining the CAB’s fleet of helicopters. Through 2014 and 2015, 390 contractors maintained both the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions’ aircraft for $86 million when their CABs were deployed to Afghanistan.

While U.S.-led combat operations in Afghanistan officially ended in 2014, last fall, as the Taliban gained momentum throughout the country, President Obama agreed to keep about 9,800 U.S. troops in Afghanistan through 2016, and 5,500 into 2017.

Although the troop levels are low compared to the 45,000 deployed at the start of 2014, the number of uniformed service members in Afghanistan is only part of the U.S. war effort there. As of April, 26,000 Pentagon contractors are in Afghanistan, about half of whom are assigned to logistics and maintenance duties, according to publicly available reports.

[In Afghanistan, a series of attacks on Americans during ‘non-combat’ operations]

Although the number of contractors has almost always exceeded the number of uniformed troops in Afghanistan, the ratio of civilian employees compared to U.S. military personnel has more than doubled in the past two years, from 1.34 to 2.92.

“I am not at all convinced that the only units affected are the combat aviation brigades,” Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-Tex.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said in a recent interview. “Aside from financially … is there a potential that it increases the risk that our folks face just because of these political limits? Those questions are certainly worthy of a significant deep dive on the part of the committee.”

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/06/nato-russia-arms-buildup-diplomacy/128743/?oref=d-topstory

What’s Missing as NATO Rearms Its Eastern Flank? Diplomacy

June 1, 2016 By Ulrich Kühn

An arms buildup alone won’t keep the Baltics safe, but a parallel Cold War-style diplomatic track just might.

From a military standpoint, Western planners’ biggest headache is the defense of the Baltic states, located at the edge of NATO territory and hopelessly outnumbered by Russian troops. Indeed, the need to deter Russia will top the agenda when alliance leaders meet next month in Warsaw. But as they contemplate what military means might stop a swift, Crimea-type land grab, they should also review what they know about Moscow’s beliefs and motivations — and choose a path that might defuse, rather than elevate, regional tensions.

NATO’s fears are not unfounded. In Ukraine, Moscow achieved surprising success with unorthodox tactics that included the use of “voluntary battalions” and unidentified troops. President Putin has made it clear that Russia sees itself as the protective power for all Russians. Theoretically, this also includes the large Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia.

Thus, the alliance is currently doing what can be expected from a collective defensive organization: it is ramping up defenses. In addition to the decisions at the last summit in Wales, Washington is sending a continually rotating brigade (about 5,000 men) to Eastern Europe. Furthermore, NATO is planning to station a multinational battalion in each of the Baltic States and Poland (altogether about 4,000 men). Romania recently reported the completion of a part of the European ballistic missile defense system. NATO is thus on track to better defend its easternmost allies.

But alliance leaders need a better approach, for even the planned measures are inadequate to mount a military defense. A recent RAND study found that available troops could hold off a Russian attack for a maximum of three days. For serious resistance, about 35,000 soldiers would be needed — and this imbalance is about to get worse. Rushing ahead of the anticipated Warsaw decisions, Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoygu recently announced the stationing of three new divisions (up to 30,000 men) on Russia’s western and southern borders.

Shoygu’s reaction points to the central problem with NATO’s current approach. Although alliance leaders believe they are shifting their forces in purely defensive efforts — and in particular, to minimize vulnerability to a second use of Putin’s “Crimea tactic” — that is not how Moscow sees the situation.

In fact, Russia has accepted the expansion of NATO, however reluctantly. Moscow is also clear-eyed about the ultimate consequences of an attack on an alliance member: war, and possibly with nuclear weapons. What Russia does not accept is further expansion into the post-Soviet space. To Moscow, therefore, NATO’s activism looks like hysteria and a pretext for an offensive rearmament.

The combination of fundamental, contradictory views and the imbalance in military capabilities does not augur well. It seems as if both sides are steering towards a regional security dilemma. Because one side feels uncertain, it arms itself. The other side misunderstands the intention and follows suit. A regional arms race threatens. It’s Cold War déjà vu all over.

To prevent such a scenario and, in the absence of a fundamentally new approach, the Warsaw meeting should lead NATO back to a Cold War strategy that mixes deterrence and cooperation. What became known in the 1960s as the Harmel Doctrine – that is, the combination of stronger defense and the offer of dialogue with the Soviets – was ultimately implemented in NATO’s dual-track decision of 1979. Today, NATO needs a new dual-track strategy adapted to 21st-century needs.

The formula could be as follows: Dialogue comes before any additional military build-up (on top of the Warsaw decisions). A concrete dialogue offer to Russia should aim at clearly defined consultations with a concrete deadline and a realistically approachable goal. The aim would be a reciprocal and verifiable conventional arms control regime for the region, limiting conventional forces and military equipment on both sides of the NATO-Russian border and providing for much-needed transparency about military maneuvers.

The advantages are obvious. Rather than letting itself be pulled unchecked into a renewed arms race, the Alliance would – at least temporarily – give priority to diplomacy. Thereby, the quite divergent positions between the classic proponents of deterring Russia (above all Poland, the Baltics, Romania and, to some extent, the United States) and the proponents of a more cooperative approach (particularly Germany) could be better reconciled.

Furthermore, this would offer the opportunity of an urgently needed military dialogue with Moscow. Should Russia reject or undermine the discussions, NATO could always still deploy additional forces – it wouldn’t even have to take the international blame for its allegedly “aggressive” policy. More likely Moscow would be viewed as the main spoiler in the game. Even if consultations do not yield an immediate outcome, allies could still continue the dialogue with Moscow in the hope that more favorable conditions might emerge in Russia.

The proponents of deterrence are right: The Kremlin must be shown the limits. But deterrence alone is simply not enough. In order to better gauge Russia’s intentions and prevent a costly decade of mutual rearmament, the alliance must re-discover diplomacy — starting in Warsaw.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-security-idUSKCN0YO28O

World | Thu Jun 2, 2016 12:54pm EDT
Related: World, Germany, Syria

Three Syrians arrested in Germany suspected of planning attack

BERLIN | By Noah Barkin and Michelle Martin


Three Syrian men with suspected links to Islamic State have been arrested in Germany on suspicion of planning a large-scale attack in the western city of Duesseldorf, the federal prosecutor said on Thursday.

The plot was uncovered because a fourth Syrian man, identified as Saleh A., voluntarily turned himself in to authorities in Paris on Feb. 1 and confessed to the plot.

After the confession, it took German investigators four months to accumulate enough evidence against the three men to arrest them. Saleh A. remains in custody in France and Germany is seeking his extradition, the prosecutor said.

The arrests, made about two months after suicide bombers killed 32 people in Brussels, are likely to deepen concerns that Germany has become a priority target for Islamic militants operating in Europe.

Germany has not been the victim of a major attack like those seen in Belgium, France, Spain and Britain. But it is seen as particularly vulnerable because hundreds of thousands of migrants streamed into the country over the past year, overwhelming authorities who could not vet many of them.

German intelligence officials have said they believe IS militants took advantage of the chaotic influx to sneak fighters into Germany.

Prosecutors said in their statement that they believe Saleh A., 25, and one of the three men arrested in Germany, a 27-year-old named Hamza C., joined Islamic State in Syria in the spring of 2014 and received orders to carry out an attack in the old town of Duesseldorf.

IS leaders sent them to Turkey in May 2014, prosecutors said. The two men are believed to have then traveled separately through Greece to Germany in March and July of last year.

By January 2016, they had convinced a third man, Mahood B., 25, to participate in the attack, prosecutors said. Around the same time they contacted a fourth man, Abd Arahman A., 31, whose task was to make suicide vests.

Prosecutors believe Abd Arahman A. had worked previously for the militant group Nusra Front in Syria making suicide vests and bombs before he was sent by IS leaders to Germany in Oct. 2014 to participate in the planned attack.


SUICIDE BOMBINGS

According to the prosecutors' statement, two of the men were planning to blow themselves up on the Heinrich-Heine-Allee, a busy road in the Duesseldorf city center, while other attackers would mow down pedestrians with guns and explosive devices.

There is no evidence the suspects had begun implementing their attack plans. The three men were arrested in the states of North Rhine-Westphalia, Brandenburg and Baden-Wuerttemberg. Their homes were also being searched.

"Germany, just like other European countries, finds itself in the crosshairs of international terrorism," a spokeswoman for German Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere said.

"We will do everything in our power to prevent terrorist attacks and protect people in Germany as best we can," German Justice Minister Heiko Maas added.

The accusations are interesting because they suggest that Islamic State was deploying its members to launch attacks in Germany as early as 2014.

Authorities said earlier this month they were investigating 40 cases in which Islamic militants are suspected of having entered the country with the recent flood of refugees from the Middle East, which began last summer.

The number of migrants entering Germany reached peaks of more than 10,000 a day last autumn, but has fallen dramatically in recent months due to the closing of the Greek border with Macedonia and a deal between the European Union and Turkey that has discouraged refugees from crossing the Aegean Sea.

The reduction in the numbers has eased pressure on German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who came under fierce criticism last year for welcoming hundreds of thousands of migrants with the optimistic slogan "We can do this".


(Reporting by Michelle Martin and Madeline Chambers; Editing by Tom Heneghan)

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-idUSKCN0YO0P2

World | Thu Jun 2, 2016 1:09pm EDT
Related: World, United Nations, Syria, Iraq

U.S.-backed fighters advance to cut off Islamic State, win tacit Turkish support

NEAR THE EUPHRATES RIVER, northern Syria | By Rodi Said


U.S.-backed Syrian fighters in a major new offensive against Islamic State vowed on Thursday to cut off the last remaining access route to the outside world for the self-proclaimed caliphate, and won vital, if tacit, backing from Turkey.

The assault around the Syrian city of Manbij, backed by U.S.-led coalition air strikes and a contingent of American special forces, aims to cut off Islamic State's last 80 km stretch of the Syrian-Turkish frontier by seizing territory in northern Syria west of the Euphrates River.

If successful, that would achieve a long-standing aim of Washington and amount to one of the biggest strategic defeats inflicted on Islamic State since it proclaimed its rule over all Muslims from territory in Iraq and Syria two years ago.

"We confirm that this campaign will continue until the liberation of the last inch of the land of Manbij and its rural areas," said a statement read out on the banks of the Euphrates by Adnan Abu Amjad, a commander of a group called the Manbij Military Council, allied to the U.S.-backed Syria Democratic Forces.

"Oh brave people of Manbij, our forces are coming to liberate you from the shackles of the Daesh terrorist torturers," said the statement, using an acronym for Islamic State also known as ISIS or ISIL.

Washington has been leading an international campaign of air strikes against Islamic State for two years in both Syria and Iraq. It has long been in search of reliable allies on the ground in Syria, where it also opposes the government of President Bashar al-Assad in a multi-sided civil war that has ground on for five years.

The SDF, set up last year, includes a powerful Syrian Kurdish militia and what Washington says are growing numbers of Arab forces that have been persuaded to join it. It has swept into villages west of the Euphrates since launching its offensive on Tuesday.

That advance comes as Iraqi army forces have separately begun an assault on the Iraqi city of Falluja, 750 km down the Euphrates at the opposite end of Islamic State's sprawling caliphate.

The Iraqi troops held their positions without advancing for a third straight day on Thursday, after pouring into the besieged city's southern outskirts on Monday. A Reuters reporting team in Saqlawiya, a village near Falluja, saw Iraqi Shi'ite militia fighters in control of a complex of well-fortified trenches and tunnels captured from Islamic State.

In other separate campaigns, Iraqi Kurds have also been advancing in villages near the northern Iraqi city of Mosul, and Russian-backed forces of the Syrian government have fought Islamic State in other parts of Syria. The fighting amounts to some of the biggest pushes against the militants by their disparate enemies across a variety of fronts.


Related Coverage
› Turkey's Erdogan says U.S.-backed Syrian force largely Arab, in tacit approval
› Damascus working to ensure aid delivery to all Syrians: top Assad adviser
› U.N. plans for air drops, food aid in Syria suffer setbacks


TURKISH SUPPORT

Washington hopes the assault near Manbij will be a turning point in the two-year conflict by choking off Islamic State's last major link to the outside world. The militants have used the frontier for years to receive supplies and manpower, and more recently to send back fighters for attacks in Europe.

"We know that there is external plotting from Manbij city... against the homelands of Europe, Turkey, all good friends and allies of ours, and the United States as well," U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter said.

Of the SDF fighters, he said: "This is a capable force. They are doing all the things we can always do with able and motivated local forces to fight ISIL."

Washington's ultimate goals are to drive Islamic State from its main bases: Raqqa in eastern Syria and Mosul in northern Iraq, to bring about the collapse of its control.

Kurdish fighters allied to Washington have already captured much of northeast Syria near the Turkish border, but their advance west of the Euphrates to close off the frontier once and for all was limited by strong opposition from U.S. ally Turkey, which considers the Kurdish YPG its enemies.

However, Turkey's President Tayyip Erdogan signaled his apparent tacit support for the latest advance on Thursday, saying he had been informed that most of the fighters involved would be Arabs rather than Kurds.

Turkish military sources said Turkey had shelled Islamic State positions across the border at Azaz, west of where the advance was taking place, killing five militants. Medical charity Medicins sans Frontieres says 100,000 people are trapped near Azaz and in peril as the battle lines draw near.

A Kurdish source, speaking on condition of anonymity to Reuters in Beirut, predicted the Syrian militias would reach Islamic State-held Manbij within days, after advancing to within 10 km (6 miles) of the town.

It was too early to say how the battle for Manbij would go, the source said, but added that IS defenses on the west bank of the Euphrates River had collapsed at the start of the campaign.

However, Naser Haj Mansour, an adviser to the SDF general command, told Reuters Islamic State was still putting up a fight: "In general, the progress is at a good pace and performance, keeping in mind that Daesh still has the capability to fight."


Related Coverage
› MSF urges Turkey to open border to Syrians fleeing fighting
› Carter says Islamic State used Manbij to plot against U.S., Europe, Turkey
› Turkey shells Islamic State in Syria west of U.S.-backed assault


FALLUJA ASSAULT PAUSED

In Iraq, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announced the assault on Falluja 11 days ago, veering from the strategy sought by Washington which wants its Iraqi allies to concentrate on Islamic State's de facto Iraqi capital Mosul.

Falluja, where U.S. forces fought the biggest battles of their 2003-2011 occupation of Iraq, has long been a bastion for Sunni Muslim insurgents and was the first Iraqi city where Islamic State raised its flag in 2014 before storming through the north and west of the country.

It is just an hour's drive from Baghdad, and seizing it would give the government control of the main population centers of the fertile Euphrates valley west of the capital for the first time in more than two years. But the mission in potentially hostile Sunni territory is also fraught with risk.

Abadi repeated calls on Thursday for Iraq's fractious politicians to unite behind the army in its advance on Falluja. On Wednesday he announced a pause in the advance to reduce the threat to civilians still trapped in the city.

Although most of Falluja's population has fled, the United Nations has expressed deep concern over the fate of tens of thousands of civilians still there, including hundreds of families held by Islamic State fighters as human shields in the city center.

U.N. refugee agency UNHCR said 4,380 people had fled Falluja so far during the offensive and it was searching for places for them in camps. It estimates 10,000 families could be displaced during the assault.

Abadi, a member of Iraq's Shi'ite majority, is trying to hold together a coalition government in the midst of popular protests against an entrenched political class. An operation in Falluja that harms Sunni Muslim civilians could further alienate Sunnis, but he has decided he must act there to protect Baghdad from suicide bombers who have escalated attacks in the capital.


(Additional reporting by Tom Perry and John Davison in Beirut, Maher Chmaytelli and Ahmed Rasheed in Baghdad, David Brunnstrom in Singapore, Seyhmus Cakan, Humeyra Pamuk and Ece Toksabay in Turkey, Tom Miles in Geneva and Phil Stewart in Washington; Writing by Peter Graff, editing by Peter Millership)

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-summit-usa-idUSKCN0YO25B

World | Thu Jun 2, 2016 12:45pm EDT
Related: World, United Nations, Israel

U.S. not bringing specific proposals to Middle East peace talks in Paris


The United States will not bring any specific proposals at a Paris conference meant to set out a framework for fresh negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians nor has it decided what, if any role, it may play in the French effort, a senior State Department official said on Thursday.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry is attending the French conference on Friday, which is set to include the Middle East Quartet – the United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations – the Arab League, the U.N. Security Council and about 20 countries, without Israeli or Palestinian participation.

U.S. efforts to broker a two-state deal collapsed in April 2014, and Kerry has said any peace effort would require compromise from both sides.

Diplomats say the meeting will package all the economic incentives and other guarantees that various countries have offered in previous years to create an agenda for an autumn peace conference.

The United States will be in Paris "to listen to the ideas that the French and others may have, and talk through with them what might make sense going forward," a senior State Department official said.

"We haven't made any decisions about what, if any, our role would be in that initiative going forward," said the official, speaking on condition of anonymity. "We're not bringing any specific proposals to this meeting."

Previous attempts to engage the adversaries have come to nought. The Palestinians say Israeli settlement expansion denies them a viable state they seek in the occupied West Bank, the Gaza Strip and a capital in Arab East Jerusalem.

Israel has demanded tighter security measures from the Palestinians and a crackdown on militants who have attacked or threaten the safety of Israeli citizens.

France is hoping to re-launch talks between Israelis and Palestinians by the end of the year.


(Editing by Bernadette Baum)

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2016-shangrila/

The Great Asian Arms Buildup

China’s Military Expansion, South China Sea to Dominate Shangri-La Dialogue

By David Tweed and Mira Rojanasakul
May 31, 2016


The 15th Shangri-La Dialogue kicks off in Singapore on June 3, with a keynote speech by Thailand’s Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-Ocha. The region's most prestigious defense meeting gathers military leaders from around the globe to discuss security and defense policy.

This year talks are likely to be dominated again by discussions of the South China Sea disputes ahead of an arbitration ruling on China’s claims to the waters expected mid-year. Combating terrorism and cyber-warfare will also be on the agenda.

U.S. and China Muscle Up

U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter will lead the U.S. delegation for the second year running. Two years ago his predecessor Chuck Hagel traded barbs with a Chinese general over China’s territorial claims.

http://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2016-shangrila/img/mil-spending-Artboard_1.png

China Spooks Asia


China's growing military might is a cause of concern for countries in the region, particularly its navy, now the biggest in the region. The East China Sea and South China Sea fleets are responsible for naval security around Taiwan and the South China Sea. The North Sea fleet protects Beijing and the northern coast.

China is on a modernization drive and has programs to produce everything from submarine-launched missiles to nuclear and conventionally powered attack submarines, destroyers, corvettes, and other naval assets. It is also building a second aircraft carrier.

The new carrier is based on the Soviet era Liaoning aircraft carrier currently in service. Military analysts speculate that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) will build and operate at least three aircraft carriers.

The U.S. is also beefing up its presence in Asia, and is sending littoral combat ships, jet fighters, surveillance planes and another aircraft carrier to the region.

Beast Patrols

Another area of Asian competition is the region’s coast guards. China has Asia’s biggest one — a civil fleet whose presence limits the need for navy-on-navy encounters that risk escalation. However, China has been using its coast guard to assert territorial claims, seeking to avert international condemnation that might result if it employed warships.

http://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2016-shangrila/img/coastguard-Artboard_1.png



China is finishing its second giant coast guard cutter, dubbed “The Beast” by the Global Times newspaper. China Coast Guard vessel 3901, with a 12,000-ton displacement, will carry 76-millimeter rapid fire guns, two auxiliary guns and two anti-aircraft machine guns, the paper says. Along with its sister ship, the 2901, they will be the world’s biggest coast guard vessels.

They are bigger than many U.S. warships. The USS Lassen, which patrols the South China Sea for the U.S. Navy, is an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, which typically displaces about 9,700 tons.

Military Wish List

The expansion of China’s military and coast guard, its territorial disputes, and tension on the Korean peninsula over North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, have prompted countries around the region to upgrade and expand their militaries and civil maritime law-enforcement agencies. Here is a snapshot of some of the biggest recent and upcoming deals.

http://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2016-shangrila/img/deals-Artboard_1.png

Asian defense spending is expected to keep growing as countries move to secure their land and sea borders and acknowledge the need for awareness across their national territory, according to defense analysts.

Force modernization is another driving factor, according to Dan Enstedt, Chief Executive Officer of Saab Asia Pacific. “This is particularly true in the realm of air and naval forces where whole-scale modernization is essential for many nations to be able to operate effectively and affordably into the future.”

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-iran-commentary-idUSKCN0YN2XW

Blogs | Thu Jun 2, 2016 9:55am EDT
Related: Commentary

Commentary: With Washington looking the other way, Iran fills a void in Iraq

By Mohamad Bazzi

On May 30, Iraqi special forces stormed the southern edge of Falluja under U.S. air cover, launching a new assault to recapture one of the last major Iraqi cities under the control of Islamic State militants.

Iraq’s elite forces who are leading the fight have been trained by U.S. advisers, but many others on the battlefield were trained or supplied by Iran. It’s the latest example of how Washington has looked the other way as Iran deepened its military involvement in Iraq over the past two years.

In recent weeks, thousands of Iraqi soldiers and Shi’ite militia members supported by Iran assembled on the outskirts of Falluja for the expected attack on the Sunni city. In the lead-up to the assault, General Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force, the special operations branch of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, met with leaders of the Iraqi coalition of Shi’ite militias known as the Popular Mobilization Forces.

Sunni politicians in Iraq condemned the involvement of Soleimani and other Iranian advisers in the battlefield preparations, saying it could fuel sectarian tension and unleash a new round of Sunni-Shi’ite bloodletting. They also cast doubt on the Iraqi government’s assurances that the offensive is purely an Iraqi-led effort to defeat Islamic State. “Soleimani’s presence is cause for concern,” said an Iraqi member of parliament from Falluja. “He is absolutely not welcome in the area.”

Leaders of the Shi’ite militias have pledged that they will not take part in the main offensive on the city, and will instead help secure nearby towns and lay siege to Islamic State fighters. But the battle over Falluja highlights Iran’s growing military and political influence over Iraq, a country wracked by a complex civil war that leaves it open to outside manipulation.

If there is one regional player that gained the most from America’s gamble in Iraq, it is Iran. With its invasion in 2003, the United States ousted Tehran’s sworn enemy, Saddam Hussein, from power. Then Washington helped install a Shi’ite government for the first time in Iraq’s modern history. As U.S. troops became mired in fighting an insurgency and containing a civil war, Iran extended its influence over all of Iraq’s major Shi’ite factions.

Today, the Iranian regime is comfortable taking a lead role in shaping the military operations of its Iraqi allies. There is no one to restrain Tehran, and the rise of Islamic State, which views Shi’ites as apostates, threatens the interests of Iran and all Iraqi Shi’ite factions.

The Iranian regime has several interests in its neighbor: Iraq provides strategic depth and a buffer against Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab states that are competing with Iran for dominance over the Persian Gulf. More broadly, Tehran wants to ensure that Iraq never again poses an existential threat to Iranian interests, as Hussein did when he invaded Iran in 1980, instigating the eight-year Iran-Iraq war that devastated both countries.

Hussein was supported by the Sunni Arab states and most Western powers. (The Shi’ites are the majority in Iraq, but since its independence from Britain in 1932, the country was ruled by the Sunni minority until the U.S. invasion in 2003.) Iran will do whatever is necessary to keep a friendly, Shi’ite-led government in power in Baghdad.

Iran has excelled at playing the long game, especially in Iraq. Tehran’s willingness to spread money to various proxies and factions gave it great agility in maneuvering through Iraqi politics. One diplomatic cable sent by the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Christopher Hill, to officials at the State Department in November 2009 estimated that Tehran’s financial assistance to its Iraqi surrogates ranged from $100 to $200 million a year.

The Islamic Republic was also willing to invest across sectarian lines: Iran “recognizes that influence in Iraq requires operational (and at times ideological) flexibility,” Hill wrote in his cable. “As a result, it is not uncommon for the IRIG [Islamic Republic of Iran Government] to finance and support competing Shia, Kurdish, and to some extent, Sunni entities, with the aim of developing the Iraqi body politic’s dependency on Tehran’s largesse.”

Like some of Iraq’s other neighbors, Iran used its largesse to help fuel and prolong the Iraqi insurgency and civil war. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps financed, armed and trained numerous Shi’ite militias that targeted U.S. troops and Iraq’s Sunni community. The Iranians provided explosives, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and other small arms. They also brought Iraqi militiamen to Iran to be trained in the use of explosives and as snipers.

After Islamic State militants swept through northern Iraq in June 2014, Tehran once again mobilized to protect the Shi’ite-led government from the Sunni militant threat. Soleimani traveled to Baghdad at the start of the crisis to coordinate the defense of the capital with Iraqi military officials. He also directed Iranian-trained Shi’ite militias -- including the Badr Brigade and the League of the Righteous, two notorious militias responsible for widespread atrocities against Sunnis -- in the fight against Islamic State. With a weakened and corrupt Iraqi military, the militias proved crucial in stopping the jihadists’ advance.

Since mid-2014, Tehran has provided tons of military equipment to the Iraqi security forces and has been secretly directing surveillance drones from an airbase in Baghdad. Iran has also sent hundreds of its Quds Force fighters to train Iraqi forces and coordinate their actions.

And Iran has paid a price for its deepening military involvement. In December 2014, a Revolutionary Guards commander, Brigadier General Hamid Taqavi, was killed by a sniper in the Iraqi city of Samarra while he was training Iraqi troops and Shi’ite militia fighters. Taqavi was the highest-ranking Iranian official to be killed in Iraq since the Iran-Iraq war. Thousands of Revolutionary Guards gathered for his funeral in Tehran, where Ali Shamkhani, head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, told mourners: “If people like Taqavi do not shed their blood in Samarra, then we would shed our blood” within Iran.

For their part, Iraqi leaders argued that as long as the United States did not provide military assistance, they had no choice but to ask Iran for more help. “When Baghdad was threatened, the Iranians did not hesitate to help us,” Haider al-Abadi, the Iraqi prime minister, told a television interviewer in late 2014.

Although Abadi has signaled that he wants to be closer to the West, he needs the support of Iran and its Iraqi allies to keep his government in power. Without the Iranian-backed militias taking the lead in fighting over the past two years, the Iraqi government would not have recovered as much territory from the jihadists. Through a combination of funding, training for militias and political support, Iran will continue to extend its influence over the major Shi’ite groups in Iraq.

The United States and Iran now share common interests in defeating Islamic State and maintaining a stable regime in Baghdad that can transcend sectarian conflicts. While the Obama administration and Tehran are not coordinating directly in Iraq, they essentially have an undeclared alliance.

Without committing far more U.S. troops and resources, there is little that Washington can do to counter Iranian power in Iraq. And Tehran will not hesitate to use its many levers of influence over Saddam Hussein’s former domain.


(Mohamad Bazzi is a journalism professor at New York University and former Middle East bureau chief at Newsday. He is writing a book on the proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran. He tweets @BazziNYU)

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.......

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-...why-is-military-coup-in-saudi-arabia-possible

Why is a military coup in Saudi Arabia possible?
Hesham Shafick 2 June 2016

Saudi Arabia is the most significant player in determining the future of the Arab revolutions. There are two ways to break this stalemate: replace Saudi regional hegemony, or change the regime controlling it.

Students of Arab history might assert that the fall of the Egyptian monarchy in 1952 was necessary to kick off further liberation projects in the Arab world – such as in Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Libya and Yemen.

Some read the “Tunisian effect” during the Arab Spring as a reincarnation of this political diffusion (Such as Reem Abou-El-Fadl in her book Revolutionary Egypt: Connecting Domestic and International Struggles). However, I disagree on two main points. Empirically, it seems obvious that Tunisia is neither willing nor able to internationalise its revolutionary agenda. Conceptually, military coups are more capable of policy diffusion than mass movements; if only because they have the necessary capacity (of both hard and soft power) to act cohesively as regional players.

Viewing it from this perspective suggests seeing 1952 Egypt in terms of its ‘power’ not ‘ideology’. That is to say, the regional significance of the Egyptian coup/revolution of 1952 lies not in its revolutionary agenda, but in its ‘ability’ to force its agenda on other states – regardless of what that agenda was. Reflecting this onto contemporary regional politics, it is not Tunisia but Saudi Arabia that seems to be the most significant player (in terms of power/ability) in determining the future of the Arab revolutions. As with Nasser in the 1950s, King Salman appears to be on top of events, funding regimes he favours and cracking down on those he dislikes – in both cases under the guise of defending pan-Arabism.

In such a pax-Saudi regional arrangement, political change can hardly be achieved without the kingdoms’ blessing. Who would wish for the hypothetical toppling of Sisi to be followed by brutal Saudi airstrikes to bring him back to power (as with Yemen’s Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi), or, at best, for the nonviolent Saudi sponsorship of another aid-dependent military president (like Libya’s Khalifa Haftar)?

To break this stalemate, KSA's regional power must be transferred to a progressive actor. This could happen in two ways: either by replacing the Saudi Arabian regional hegemony – which is not possible at the moment given the lack of a serious alternative approved by world superpowers (particularly the US) – or substituting the ruling regime in control of this hegemony. The second is well within the realm of possibility, for the following reasons.

A brief history

First and formost, the kingdom has lost most of the historical roots of its legitimacy. Since the foundation of the modern kingdom, its legitimacy has been grounded on three main pillars: Sunnism, nationalism and kinship. To understand those three pillars, a quick review of the kingdom’s history is necessary.

Today’s kingdom is the third reign of Al Saud. The first was in 1788, when King Muhamed bin Saud signed an agreement with Sheikh Mohammed Abdul Wahhab – the father of Salafism (also known as Wahhabism) – to fight what Abdul Wahhab saw as “the new jahiliyya” and restore the orthodox teachings of Islam. In that spirit, Bin Saud established the first Saudi state, which ruled over the central plateau of today’s Saudi Arabia (now known as Najd and Riyadh) and was put under the spiritual guidance of Sheikh Abdul Wahhab (also assisted by members of his family).

The Saud-Sheikh families' alliance pursued war against neighbouring tribes under the pretext of Islamic liberation – ghazw. The alliance was mutually complementary: Al Saud, being among the biggest families in the peninsula, supported the alliance with wealth and manpower, while Al Sheikh legitimised the war through their status as religious priest-warriors. Projected as a semi-caliphate, the Kingdom posed a serious threat to the Ottoman Empire, which effectively put the nascent kingdom down.

In 1824, King Turki Al Saud restored the Saudi dynasty based on the same dual family contract – Al Saud being the political rulers and Al Sheikh controlling the social-religious agenda. Again, the Ottoman empire, the Islamic caliphate of the time, could not stand the Saudi-Wahhabi proposition of a counter-caliphate representing the Muslim population. It supported a tribal coup that replaced Al Saud with Ottoman patrons – establishing the Al Rashed dynasty.

Around forty years later, King Abdul Aziz Al Saud, the youngest son of the former Saudi king, regained the family’s patrimony. This was timely, for the Ottomans were no longer a challenge after the failure of their empire and the fall of Istanbul in 1922. Moreover, the rise of Ataturkian secularism in place of the Ottoman caliphate invited the Saudis to stage themselves as the new and only Islamic caliphs.

On another note, the history of Al Saud’s struggle against Ottoman imperialism added a national aspect to their theocratic legitimacy. Those two factors combined made the Saudi family the most legitimate inheritor of Najd after the failure of the Ottomans and their patrons. What remained was to expand their rule beyond Najd and Riyadh, to include tribes in Hijaz which were previously ruled by the Ottoman empire.

With the failure of the former rulers’ patronage in Istanbul, such an acquisition was not the toughest of tasks. The main challenge was to do it peacefully, as a war would invite regional empires to support a proxy war against the rising caliphate, putting Saudi reign once again in jeopardy.

The solution was to take over those tribes by the peaceful means of power sharing with the country’s former rulers and big families. King Abdul Aziz’ resolution was out-of-the-box and exceptionally effective: marriage. The king married a woman from each major family, making her father, brothers and sons participate in both governance and war against revolting tribes. With plenty of princes and princesses, and a contract to pass the throne to all sons of King Abdul Aziz, the power was shared between all involved families and the third Saudi dynasty was here to stay.

This short history demonstrates three main reasons that make a Saudi king accepted as ruler: his theocratic status as the protector of orthodox (Wahhabi) Islam, his nationalistic status as a participant in the unification war, and his promised turn in governance as a representative of his mother’s family which shared power with Al Saud.

None of these three factors apply to today’s crown princes – neither Prince Muhamed Bin Nayef nor Prince Muhamed Bin Salman. Neither of the princes participated in, or were even alive during, the national unification war. Accordingly, neither of them was promised a turn in governance or was proposed as a representative of a warrior-family in a kinship alliance with Al Saud.

Modern day rule of the kingdom

As for the third pillar, theocratic legitimacy, it is about to fall, particularly after the kingdom’s decision to terminate the powers of the official Wahhabist agency that reinforces Islamic order – the 'Organisation for the Prevention of Vice and the Promotion of Virtue'. The kingdom was forced to make this decision so as to move beyond its contemporary image as a despised semi-medieval state that does not respect human rights.

Although this necessary decision contributed positively to the kingdom's international status (allowing its admission as a member of the prestigious UN human rights council and its chairing of a key UN human rights council panel twice), it puts the theocratic status of KSA’s ruling class in jeopardy. This has been reinforced by the fact that the concept of a caliphate empire (and ‘empire’ in general), which formed the contours of Al Saud’s dynasty, is no longer globally accepted.

Worse, caliphate has become associated with ISIS, Qaeda, and internationally despised terrorist movements. If the kingdom wants to distance itself from the Islamist organisations that are targets of the ‘war on terror’, it would have to give up its theocratic status, losing a main pillar of its legitimacy. This leaves the coming king without any legitimacy whatsoever.

The loss of political legitimacy, as Hannah Arendt articulated, "is an open invitation to violence". Three forms of violence are invited: regime coercion to keep control and order, violent opposition from paramilitary groups that find opportunity in lost legitimacy, and external powers which seek to cease the same opportunity. The three apply to the case of contemporary KSA.

Proxy wars are waged by Iranian clients in Yemen – the Houthis – not only against the Saudi puppet regime of Hadi, but even against KSA itself, striking their borders – for the first time in Saudi history – twice. Internally, several terrorist attacks were reported in the last few months, signaling a rise of anti-regime clandestine activism. The rise of those two actors, external and internal, feed further into the already expansive regime coercion against its challengers.

The third violent actor, the regime, is the trickiest. For if we look beyond the conventional conceptualisation of a regime as a black box, to view it from a Gramscian perspective that gives attention to each regime 'component', we see the distinction and probable separation between the state's coercive institutions – the police and military – on the one hand, and the state's political apparatus – in this case the ruling family – on the other.

Whereas conventional political scientists tend to view these coercive institutions as 'tools' in service of the political leadership, Gramsci's work informs us that it also goes the other way. In the same way that they are being used as 'tools of coercion' by political actors, these institutions also use political actors as 'tools of persuasion'. Those two components are what maintains the regime's hegemony. If one component falls, it puts more pressure on the other – but also gives it more power.

Nobody wants to do extra work for free! With the coercive apparatus growing simultaneously powerful and frustrated, it becomes more likely to use the opportunity of a legitimacy gap to its benefit. A coup would relax their tensions (extra work) by redistributing the responsibility again with an efficient political (i.e. persuasive) elite which enjoys popular support, while also expanding their access to political power.

This, however, is easier said than done. Several structural factors need to be present to allow such a coup to gain internal and external legitimacy. Luckily for KSA's military-elite, they are all present.

Anti-regime grievances?

To begin with, the military leadership needs to be interested in seizing such an opportunity. This interest, as Berdal and Malone’s extensive research reveals, is either motivated by the presence of an anti-regime grievance within the military, or the presence of an easy opportunity that incites the greed of military officers.

In economic terms, they explain, it is either motivated from the demand side – grievance – or the supply side – greed. In the real world, they assert, it is usually a mix of both. In the Saudi case, it may appear at first that Saudi military officials should not have grievances. They are well-paid, well-trained, and socially respected and celebrated. This applies as long as we think in absolute terms. Yet in relative terms, comparing their status with that of their political counterparts, grievances become vivid.

Think of Galbraith’s concept of relative poverty which sees the poor as those whose income “falls markedly behind that of their community.” Of course, it cannot be argued that Saudi generals are poor. But what can be argued is that in the same way Galbraith demonstrated how poverty becomes socially redefined in affluent societies, in a way that makes “adequate survival” not enough of an indication of non-poverty, it can be argued that the concepts of ‘wealth’, and also ‘power’, can become redefined as well. In this case, the income and power-share of military leaders in KSA become relatively ‘grieving’.

Looking at the coup possibility from the greed/supply side is far less tricky. The recent rise of anti-Al Saud discourse among international super powers, particularly the United States, signals a carte blanche for the military to make its move.

The analogy between the 2016 US Senate's unanimous vote to allow the families of 9/11 victims to sue Al Saud, and the 1952 British condemnation of Egypt’s last monarch King Farouk's cabinet reshuffle is striking. The latter signalled to the Egyptian military that the king would not be protected from a military coup against him. The Egyptian Free Officers understood the signal and acted accordingly.

The former might be read in the same terms. The US senate’s declaration that it would not protect Saudi from prosecution in the US also signifies that it would not likely protect them if prosecuted in their own homeland. The US' position regarding several others of their favoured Arab rulers (think of Mubarak!) is another, equally serious, signal.

Moreover, internally there is the silent rise of an opportunity to mobilise against Al Saud. If the popular protests in the oil rich eastern province were not enough of an indicator, the ones following the execution of Shi'a cleric Nimr Al Nimr – which bluntly called for the demise of the Al Saud family – should suffice. The stubbornly consistent feminist movement calling for women’s right to drive also tells us something about the changing character of Saudi society.

Those socio-political indicators, combined with socio-economic indicators which demonstrate the rise of an educated middle class in KSA, as well as the rise of poverty (absolute and relative), reveal a discrepancy between the society upon which the social contract of Al Saud’s dynasty was drafted, and the contemporary one. This discrepancy does not necessitate the overthrow of the powerful family, but suggests the possible acceptance of a more progressive alternative.

If this alternative can follow the footsteps of Egypt’s 1952 coup, grounding its legitimacy on wealth and opportunity redistribution, their task would be even easier. If only because the resources of the Saudi oil-centred economy are more concentrated than those of 1950s feudal Egypt. In fact, the majority of Saudi resources are centred in the state-owned oil company Aramco. If this company alone is confiscated, the new state would have enough resources to appease the masses.

The recent talks about the Kingdom’s preparation to partially privatise the company (in what could be the world’s largest public offering) puts such a potential confiscation opportunity in jeopardy, as the company’s worth would be internationally distributed. However, it will take quite a while until this privatisation process takes place. And even when it happens, the (non-Aramco) wealth will still remain in very few hands and institutions, again far fewer than in the case of 1952 Egypt.

The final structural facilitator of a Saudi coup is the anti-Al Saud agony of regional powers. Saudi hostility with Iran has reached its peak after the beheading of Nimr Al Nimr. The Iranian government stood silently by while the angry Iranian masses attacked the Saudi embassy in Tehran. The Saudis retaliated by expelling the Iranian ambassador and completely severing the remaining diplomatic ties. Already openly accused of supporting anti-Al Saud movements in the eastern province, the Iranians are very likely to support any action that rids them of their unwelcome neighbours.

As for the two other major Middle Eastern powers, Turkey and Israel, several attempts at reconciliation recently took place, but are far from reaching alliance in the case of Turkey, or even diplomatic recognition in the case of Israel. Although the trend indicates that these three powers are gradually aligning to balance against Iran, several years if not decades are required for such an alliance to take shape. In all cases, a more progressive regime in Saudi Arabia would hasten rather than impede the alignment process.

The question is: with all these factors present, why isn’t a coup happening?

In politics, reasons ‘facilitate’ not ‘cause’ certain outcomes. Thus, one should not be puzzled if the reasons remain without producing their expected effects. All political research can do is highlight the reasons that create probability; then wait, hope and see. The reasons that facilitate the endurance of the Saudi reign also need to be analysed.


About the author

Hesham Shafick is PhD candidate and graduate teaching assistant at Queen Mary University of London.


Related Articles

The Arab World: towards bi-polarity?
Maged Mandour

The Egyptian counter revolution: the Gulf connection
Maged Mandour

A fascist history of the Egyptian revolution III: phase two, from the numinous to the real
Mohamed Hasan
Hesham Shafick

A fascist history of the Egyptian revolution II: laughter and the future
Abe Abolkheir
Hesham Shafick

The fascist history of Egypt’s revolution
Hesham Shafick

Normalising bloodshed: education and the dreams of the Marshall
Hesham Shafick

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.eurasiareview.com/030620...ain-killing-of-afghan-taliban-chief-analysis/

Pakistan’s Double-Game Stands Exposed Again: Killing Of Afghan Taliban Chief – Analysis

By South Asia Monitor
June 3, 2016
By Jai Kumar Verma*

Mullah Akhtar Mansour, the Afghan Taliban chief who was killed in a drone attack on May 21 in the restive Pakistani province of Balochistan was a hardliner and averse to the idea of any negotiations. He refused to participate in the Quadrilateral Cooperation Group (QCG) constituted to initiate peaceful negotiations. In fact, instead of taking part in peace talks, under his leadership, the Afghan Taliban enhanced attacks on US and Afghan forces.

According to reports, when he was killed, he had a Pakistani passport in the name of Mohammad Wali on him and had valid Iranian visa, along with a CNIC which is issued to ‘bonafide’ citizens of Pakistan. He was entering Pakistan from the Taftan check post on the Iran-Pakistan border from where he was ostensibly headed to the Afghan Taliban headquarters in Quetta. It has been reported that he had travelled out of Pakistan several times, especially to United Arab Emirates and Iran on Pakistani passport. All of this comes to indicate his close relationship with the Pakistani deep state.

Taliban spokesperson announced the appointment of Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada, who was the deputy leader of slain leader Mansour as the chief of Taliban on May 25. Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob son of Mullah Omar and Sirajuddin Haqqani were declared as the deputy supreme leaders of Taliban.

Haqqani is the leader of Haqqani Network which has carried out the most daring and fierce attacks on the US-led NATO forces as well as on Afghan forces. As Presidential election in the US is due in November 2016, Barack Obama himself announced about the killing of the Afghan Taliban chief as it is expected to help the Democrats’ Party candidate in the forthcoming Presidential elections. Obama stated that killing of Mansour would help in bringing peace in Afghanistan.

Overtly, the Pakistani leaders including, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif condemned the drone attack as it violated the sovereignty of their country. However, they realized that previously Al-Qaeda Chief Osama bin Laden, Adnan el Shukrijumah an important al Qaeda leader who planned to plant bombs on trains in London and New York and now the Afghan Taliban Chief, all were exterminated inside Pakistan. The presence of these as well as many other top ranking terrorist leaders in Pakistan reaffirm that the deep state is not only sheltering these terrorists but also assisting them in their terrorist actions.

Killing of the Afghan Taliban chief in the drone attack in Balochistan is also significant as, so far, the US drones were targeting terrorists in the troubled Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) especially North and South Waziristan areas. However, the killing of Taliban chief in Balochistan confirms Pakistani connection with the terrorists and also substantiates that US administration is losing patience as Pakistan is playing a dual game.

On the other hand, Taliban leaders allege that they augmented attacks on US forces in Afghanistan therefore Pakistan government under US pressure supplied intelligence and it resulted in the killing of Mansour. The Afghan Taliban leaders had also mentioned that Mullah Mansour refused to yield under Pakistani pressure to participate in negotiations, and hence, the Pakistani deep state passed on the information about Mansour to US government which resulted in the extermination of Afghan Taliban chief. The Afghan Taliban has however, threatened to take revenge from Pakistan government for this ‘treachery’.

Analysts claim that Akhundzada who is from Noorzai tribe, hails from Kandhar and was a non-controversial religious leader who has the support of majority of Taliban Shura (Supreme council) members barring a few elements who are anyway not a part of the Afghan Taliban anymore. He passed most of his life inside Afghanistan and Pakistan and has little exposure to the outside world. The 55 or 46 year old (his age is disputed) newly appointed chief was the deputy of slain chief, and hence, there may not be much change in the policies.

The pessimists visualize that the chances of Afghan Taliban joining peace talks are remote as the statement announcing Akhundzada as chief was harsh and without any special consideration. They claim that the change in leadership will not bring any visible change in the policies of Taliban and Sirajuddin Haqqani who was made operational head is hawk and Taliban would make more daring and devastating attacks in the near future.

Meanwhile Mullah Mohammad Rasool, leader of a breakaway faction of Taliban, rejected these appointments and stated that the appointments were done on behest of foreigners and these leaders do not represent people of Afghanistan.

The spokesperson of Afghanistan government invited Akhundzada for political settlement through peace talks, threatening that if Taliban leaders do not agree for peace, they will also be eliminated.

Few Afghanistan watchers point out that the family of Akhundzada migrated in Pakistan during Soviet rule in Afghanistan and was residing in Pakistan from several years. He runs Madarassa in Pakistan from where he recruits the terrorists and he has close relations with ISI.

Akhundzada is an educated, religious scholar hence it is visualized that after sometime he may leave the path of confrontation and may agree for peaceful negotiations. As a respectable religious figure first he may try to reunite various splinter groups, consolidate his position in the outfit and afterwards may agree for the negotiations after having discussions in the Shura.

Not only this Sirajuddin Haqqani, is the son of Jalaluddin Haqqani a notorious Mujahedeen. Haqqani group has influence in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan. He heads a big dreaded terrorist network in North Waziristan area of Pakistan and US State Department has announced a reward of USD 10 million on his head. The faction has close contact with ISI and he was the choice of ISI.

It is also mentioned that Mullah Mansour was deeply involved in production and smuggling of narcotics hence he never wanted peace in the area as cultivation and smuggling of narcotics is easier during insurgency. Therefore under the garb of religious fervor he refused to participate in peace talks.

US senate has stopped supply of F-16 planes to Pakistan however the later needs it urgently as India is purchasing 36 Rafael jets. It appears that now US will compel Pakistan to pressurize Mawlawi Haibatullah as well as Sirajuddin Haqqani to join peace talks as both of them have close links with ISI.

Indian security agencies should also chalk out a plan to safeguard Indian interests in Afghanistan as ISI has close links with two top leaders of Taliban and it will try to harm Indian interests in Afghanistan.

*Jai Kumar Verma is a Delhi-based strategic analyst. He can be contacted at editor@spsindia.in

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.eurasiareview.com/030620...of-damocles-policy-in-baltic-region-analysis/

Blunting Moscow’s Sword Of Damocles Policy In Baltic Region – Analysis

By Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute
June 3, 2016
By Douglas Mastriano and Jeffrey Setser*

(FPRI) — The Roman philosopher Cicero recounted how King Dionysius answered a courtier, Damocles, who thought that ruling a realm was merely pleasure and leisure. In response, King Dionysius offered Damocles to switch places. However, King Dionysius ordered that a large sword be hung precariously above Damocles’ head, suspended by a single hair from a horse’s tail. Realizing the danger that came with ruling a kingdom, Damocles gave up his envy of the king.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are under looming danger from a Russian “Sword of Damocles” today. Evidence of this growing peril includes the Kremlin’s increasingly harsh rhetoric towards NATO, the aggressive and often reckless behavior of Russian military aircraft in the Baltic Sea region, and the increase of massive Russian military exercises in the region. This Russian “Sword of Damocles” was demonstrated in the cyber-attack against Estonia in 2007, the war against Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the ongoing war against Ukraine. Additionally, there is Moscow’s information operations campaign directed at Russian speakers living in NATO nations.

Russian president Vladimir Putin is responsible for this unpleasant turn in Moscow’s relationship with NATO. His grand strategy is to reassert Russian influence in the region and to make Russia a dominant player in international affairs. To achieve this, Putin needs to diminish the credibility of NATO, especially in the Baltic nations. There are two military approaches that Putin can pursue to push NATO out of the Baltics. The first is a direct attack, and the second is via hybrid warfare tactics.

This “unthinkable option” of a direct attack on Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania would be a high-risk move that could only come if American leadership is weak, and NATO’s commitment to its Baltic allies is diminished. In such a gamble, Russian forces would seek to seal off land, air and sea access to the Baltic Region within 36 to 48 hours. The narrow Suwalki Gap, just 60 miles wide, is where Russian troops would sever land access to the Baltic nations from Poland and the rest of NATO. Once the land route is cut, Russian anti-aircraft and anti-shipping assets would make it too risky for US and other NATO forces to arrive.

331px-baltic_states_flag_map.svg_The more likely Russian strategy, however, would rely on ambiguity. This would take the form of fomenting a “local” (exported from Moscow) ethnic Russian separatist movement similar to what was witnessed in Ukraine. This would occur in an area with a high Russian-speaking population in either Estonia or Latvia. These would not be the little green men of Crimea, which were quickly identified as Russian forces. In the Baltics, Russian special forces could appear as locals seeking independence for the “discrimination” that they suffer from Estonians or Latvians. Moscow’s goal would be to destabilize the region while denying responsibility. The purpose of this ambiguity is to cause NATO to delay as it determines whether the crisis was foreign or domestic.

In the time that NATO deliberated, Russia would have space for a low risk move to destroy the alliance. Moscow would send a large force to the borders of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to intimidate the alliance and to provide covert support to their separatist movement. As security deteriorates and the local population suffers, Putin would announce a humanitarian mission to end the distress. Of course, Moscow would pledge that the army would be withdrawn from the disputed area once security is restored. Without firing a shot, NATO could be undermined, with a simple act of occupying a modest piece of Baltic land without war. The brilliance of this strategy of ambiguity is that should NATO respond rapidly, Putin could deny involvement.

How should NATO respond to such a risk? There are concerted steps that NATO and the United States can take. Frontline, vulnerable allies such as the Baltic states should be armed with offensive capabilities that give them a modest ability to strike Russian bases, transportation hubs, and airfields. Acquiring mid to long-range weapons could make threatening these nations less appetizing to Moscow. If attacked, these offensive weapon systems could wreak havoc on Russian command and control nodes, transportation hubs and disrupt the movement of Russian forces. This would provide the Baltic nations a credible military capability and strengthen deterrence capabilities.

The US can help. It should station more military assets in the region, to complement the US Army’s campaign of making “30,000 American Soldiers look like 300,000” in Europe. The genius of such a concept is to blend the Active Army with the Army National Guard and Army Reserve to support the European Theater. Exercises conducted in the region must be expanded in size and scope. Part of this expansion should be called “Deploy Forces to the Baltics.” Using the Return Forces to Germany concept (an annual exercise to deploy American forces from the United States to Europe) during the Cold War, the goal is to allow units to fly soldiers into the region and use the American equipment already staged there. This reduces the arrival time of “over the horizon” forces considerably.

Finally, the key to forward defense of NATO is to permanently station American and other NATO forces in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This force should be a three-brigade element, one in each nation. Estonia should have a mechanized American Brigade Combat Team, Latvia a regional Baltic Brigade that should include forces from Sweden and Finland (if they are willing to participate as non-NATO partners). The brigade in Lithuania should be a multi-national NATO force permanently stationed in the Suwalki Gap. Keeping this gap open is imperative lest the Baltic states are cut off from the rest of NATO. The purpose of these three brigades is to provide both an equitable level of deterrence/assurance, while also providing sufficient forces to secure key infrastructure (i.e. airports, sea ports) to facilitate the arrival of additional NATO forces.

This three-brigade model for the Baltic nations borrows from the Berlin Brigade concept from the Cold War. Although the American, British and French Brigades stationed in West Berlin could not stop a Soviet invasion, they guaranteed that three powerful nations would defend Germany if attacked. The same logic would work in the Baltic states. Deploying more NATO forces there would mean that the cost of meddling in the Baltics would be too high for Moscow to contemplate.

The emerging Russian “strategy of ambiguity” is a direct threat to the NATO Alliance. Yet, it can be defeated now with resolve, and a modest forward deployment of American at NATO forces in the region. A rotational brigade is a start, but not the final answer. NATO leaders have the opportunity during next month’s Warsaw Summit to take concerted action to deter Russian aggression against the Baltic nations. The first step is to station NATO forces “permanently” in the region. There is a Russian “Sword of Damocles” hanging over the Baltic Region, yet the risk can be blunted by the physical commitment of NATO land power to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. NATO has the opportunity this summer to show strength and solidarity against a rising threat to the peace and prosperity of the European Continent and the world.

*About the authors:
Colonel (COL) Douglas Mastriano, a veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan, began his career in the 1980s, serving along the Iron Curtain with the Second Armored Cavalry Regiment. Since then, he has served at tactical, operation and strategic levels of command ranging from the 3rd Infantry Division (Rock of the Marne), to the Pentagon and in NATO. COL Mastriano has a Ph.D. in History from the University of New Brunswick. His book, Alvin York: A New Biography of the Hero of the Argonne, is an award-winning biography.

Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Jeffrey Setser, a veteran of Iraq, began his career in 1990 serving in a North Carolina Army National Guard Infantry Battalion. Since then, he has served at the tactical and operational levels of command with the West Virginia Army National Guard (WVARNG) with the 1-201st Field Artillery Battalion. LTC Setser has a Master’s in Business Administration. Currently, LTC Setser is a student at the U.S. Army War College and upon completion will receive a Master’s in Strategic Studies. LTC Setser’s next assignment is the Deputy G3 with the West Virginia Army National Guard. LTC Setser has over 21 years of Law Enforcement experience with the Charleston Police Department, Charleston, West Virginia.

Source:
This article was originally published here by FPRI

 

[mzkitty]

So what else is new? Skanks.



12m
Iran's supreme leader Khamenei rules out cooperation with US in Middle East and says US and 'evil' Britain remain Iran's enemies - State TV

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realcleardefense.com/art...rging_potential_for_war_in_europe_109414.html

June 3, 2016

Responding to the Emerging Potential for War in Europe

By Keith B. Payne

The prospect for a regional war between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is growing. This reality is in stark contrast to the long-standing, sanguine belief that the West’s post-Cold War relationship with Russia is benign, even cooperative. Indeed, Western powers appear to have based their security planning largely on the assumption that hostility with Russia is, as asserted by the late former Defense Secretary, Robert McNamara, “hardly more likely to be revived than the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.”

Until recently, such a claim was widely regarded as a self-evident truth. Now, it is demonstrably false. Understanding the fundamental reasons for this emerging prospect for another European war requires an understanding of recent history.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to its breakup into fifteen separate countries and to the disbandment of the Soviet Union’s Cold War alliance system, the Warsaw Pact. Several of these new countries formed from the old Soviet Union, including the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and some of its former Warsaw Pact allies, such as Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Czech Republic, chose to move away from Russia politically, militarily and economically. They have instead joined the Western alliance system, NATO, and the European Union (EU).

As a result of this transformation of Europe, NATO membership has grown from 16 countries to 28, with new NATO members expanding the alliance to the very borders of Russia. Gone are Warsaw Pact allies that previously provided “buffer space” between the Soviet Union and NATO. In all of this, Moscow sees the West, led by the United States, as guilty of deceitfully undermining Russia, causing the revolutions that brought down allied governments, and now being intent on bringing down Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime in Moscow.[ii]

The leadership in Moscow deems this fracturing of the old “Soviet space” and its Cold War alliance system to be intolerable—leaving millions of ethnic Russians outside Russia’s borders and denying Russia its deserved special sphere of dominion in Europe.[iii] Indeed, President Putin has decried the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest catastrophe of the 20th century.[iv] The newly independent peoples of Europe formerly under the Soviet thumb clearly do not agree, as is demonstrated by their decisions and sacrifices to escape first Soviet and now Russian domination. They rightly view moving to join Western institutions such as NATO and the EU as their sovereign choice and prerogative, and as helpful protection against Russian power and revanchism. Aspiring to this Westward-leaning independence was the great “crime” committed by Georgia and Ukraine that led to Russian military attack and territorial occupation in 2008 and 2014, respectively.

The fundamental reasons for the emerging threat of war in Europe are familiar. As was the case with Imperial Germany prior to World War I, Russia under Putin seeks its supposedly rightful “place in the sun” at the expense of its neighbors. Moscow now is willing to use force to overturn the post-Cold War East-West settlement, including numerous explicit threats of nuclear first use.

Russian leaders, for example, have said that Romania could be turned into “smoking ruins,”[v] and that Poland will be in its “cross hairs.”[vi] Russia has expressed nuclear threats to smaller NATO countries, such as Denmark,[vii] and even to NATO partners such as Sweden.[viii] Correspondingly, President Putin has said publicly that he was ready to put Russian nuclear forces on alert when Russian forces occupied Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in 2014; Russian nuclear forces reportedly were put on alert during Russia’s 2008 military operations against Georgia.[ix]

Western leaders, including some senior US military officers, have considered such developments to be implausible. As, Gen. James Cartwright, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said in the 2012 co-authored, Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission Report, “large-scale conflict” with Russia is “implausible,” and, “The risk of nuclear confrontation” with Russia “belongs to the past, not the future.” In addition, the “nuclear balance” is said not to be a “salient factor” in US-Russian relations. Evidence for such critical conclusions is that “several hundred experts” surveyed by the Council on Foreign Relations foresaw no Russian threat.[x]

Yet, Russian nuclear strategy indeed appears to focus on using the threat of limited nuclear first use to compel the West to stand down and accept Moscow’s forceful expansionism without a strong military response. For example, the Russian military occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea Peninsula was followed by Russian nuclear threats to deter any serious military efforts to restore Ukrainian territory.[xi] By all appearances, this strategy has worked for Moscow.

Indeed, Russian leaders, civilian and military, have for years called for precision, “super low-yield” nuclear weapons that could be employed in regional conflict.[xii] The apparent purpose of these weapons, in part, is to deter or prevent Western recovery of territories lost to Russian military coercion and aggression. This Russian strategy is based on the notion that Moscow’s very limited use of small, “clean” nuclear weapons would deter or defeat a united Western military response, with such a limited level of destruction that NATO would not be willing to escalate the war further.[xiii] This appears to be Moscow’s strategy of nuclear coercion that corresponds to its expansionist goals.[xiv]

The inconvenient truth about contemporary Russian goals and strategy remain unwanted and beyond belief for many Western leaders. Indeed, the United States was still in the process of further reducing conventional forces in Europe in 2014.

Yet, by 2014, Moscow had twice forcibly changed borders in Europe for the first time since World War II. Russian leaders now use multiple coercive tools, including the threat of nuclear first use, to prevent neighbors from taking unwanted Westward steps, such as participating in the US-led ballistic missile defense program in Europe, or joining NATO or the EU. Moscow has had some success in this coercive campaign, including vis-à-vis Georgia and Ukraine, while Sweden has recently decided to stand back from its earlier expressed interest in NATO membership, citing the danger of the current nuclear threat environment as its reason for backing off.[xv] This Swedish decision may well lead Finland to stand back from NATO membership.[xvi]

This situation in the heart of Europe is a recipe for further confrontation and war. Russia sees itself as recovering its rightful place of primacy in Europe, now denied by a US-led coalition that supposedly wants to bring Russia to its knees. NATO, in turn, sees itself as compelled, reluctantly, to defend against a revanchist, reckless neighbor with a recent history of nuclear threats, military aggression and occupation. Article V of the NATO Treaty calls for members to treat an attack on one as an attack on all, but recent Russian successes and apparent relative NATO passivity may easily inspire Russian overconfidence and miscalculation.

Russia, of course, claims the justness of its cause, and some Western commentary certainly downplays Moscow’s threats.[xvii] But, the great danger posed by Russia’s goals and strategy must be recognized: in its bid to overturn the existing order in Europe, Russia seeks to deny its neighbors and erstwhile allies the sovereign right to choose their own futures. And, Moscow employs coercive tools, military operations and nuclear first-use threats to help reestablish its dominion in Europe. Herein lies the basic cause of conflict.

In contrast, NATO strategy seeks to protect the territory and sovereignty of NATO states and manifestly has no designs on Russian territory. In short, Russia has placed its military, including its nuclear arsenal, in the service of Russian expansionism; NATO strategy is reluctantly defensive against this threat and the alliance has long sought to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. These are profound differences.

What to do? As an alliance, NATO is much more powerful than Russia. Separately, however, NATO members bordering Russia are much weaker. The reasonable promise that a united NATO could eventually dislodge Russian forces after they have occupied allied territory is necessary but insufficient. Attempting to liberate a NATO ally after a Russian military fait accompli would likely see that ally and its neighbors suffer horrific destruction, and could lead to the dangerous escalation of war, including Russian nuclear first use.

NATO must instead prevent a Russian attack from taking place altogether by deterring any Russian expansion into NATO territory. President Putin appears to understand power, and thus may be deterrable.

To help deter Moscow, NATO must–on an alliance-wide basis–impress upon Russian leaders that any violation of NATO territory is intolerable and will be met swiftly by a powerful, united NATO military response capable of defending NATO territory. To wit, Russia must be denied its apparent preferred strategy: first taking Western territory rapidly and presenting the West with a military defeat, and then deterring a powerful, united NATO response by threatening the West with nuclear first use

Denying Russia its preferred strategy will be a challenge: at this point, according to serious analyses, Russian troops could militarily overrun Baltic capitals in 36 to 60 hours.[xviii] If so, under the Russian threat of nuclear first use, NATO would have to launch a grinding counterattack to liberate NATO territory. Unless NATO is in a position to prevent such a Russian military fait accompli, it will be vulnerable to this extremely dangerous Russian strategy.

To counter this strategy, Moscow must also be denied any confidence that it has license to use nuclear escalation to deter NATO from defending NATO territory. NATO must fill this gap in its deterrent that Russian leaders apparently believe they can exploit. It is critical to impress Moscow with the deterring message that any Russian first use of nuclear weapons will carry the gravest risk of escalating to incalculable destruction for Russia and its leadership. Credible, limited nuclear response options may be essential for this purpose of deterring Russia’s limited nuclear first use.

This is not a call for NATO nuclear “war-fighting” capabilities or a desire simply to mimic Russian strategy, as some have mistakenly charged.[xix] It is a call for those nuclear deterrence capabilities likely needed to fill a gap apparently perceived by Russian leaders, to include credible NATO limited nuclear response options.

Fortunately, the Obama Administration’s modernization programs for US nuclear capabilities now underway should help fill this need, particularly including the B-61 bomb, Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA), and a new cruise missile (Long Range Stand Off—LRSO). These programs should go forward without further delay. Why? Because we should want to deter nuclear confrontation and war as the highest priority of our nuclear policy. Such a prioritization of US goals may seem painfully obvious, but would require a change in the priority established in the Obama Administration’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, which instead places non-proliferation as the highest priority goal.[xx]


Critics will say that this is a return to Cold War thinking,[xxi] and some recommend that the West should instead “do very little” in response.[xxii] No, after decades of relative slumber, restoring the capabilities needed to deter Russia is the most prudent Western strategy in response to Moscow’s expansionist goals, Westward military assaults and nuclear threats. These are the new post-Cold War realities and all of NATO now must step up to the task.

Keith B. Payne is the president of National Institute for Public Policy, head, Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Washington area campus) and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense.


Notes

. Carl Kaysen, Robert S. McNamara, and George W. Rathjens, “Nuclear Weapons After the Cold War,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 4 (Fall 1991), p. 96.

[ii]. Pavel Felgenhauer, “Russia Prepares for War with the US and NATO, While Lacking Resources,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 10, No. 48 (March 14, 2013), available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40592&no_cache=1#.V023_vkgvcs.

[iii]. Keith B. Payne and John S. Foster, et. al., Russian Strategy: Expansion, Crisis and Conflict (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2016) pp. 2-3, available at http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/FINAL-FOR-WEB-1.12.16.pdf.

[iv]. Andrew Osborn, “Putin: Collapse of the Soviet Union was ‘catastrophe of the century,’” The Independent, April 26, 2005, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/w...n-was-catastrophe-of-the-century-6147493.html.

[v]. Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Calls New U.S. Missile Defense System a ‘Direct Threat,’” The New York Times, May 12, 2016, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/world/europe/russia-nato-us-romania-missile-defense.html.

[vi]. Fox News and Associated Press, “Putin Warns Romania, Poland over Implementing US Missile Shield, Fox News, May 28, 2016, available at http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/0...lementing-us-missile-shield.html?intcmp=hpbt1.

[vii]. Reuters, “Russia Threatens to Aim Nuclear Missiles at Denmark Ships if it Joins NATO Shield,” Reuters, March 22, 2015, available athttp://www.reuters.com/article/denmark-russia-idUSL6N0WO0KX20150322.

[viii]. Damien Sharkov, “Russia Practiced Nuclear Strike on Sweden: NATO Report,” Newsweek, February 4, 2016, available at http://www.newsweek.com/russia-practiced-nuclear-strike-sweden-nato-report-422914.

[ix]. Frank Miller, “Keynote, 2015 USSTRATCOM Deterrence Symposium” US Strategic Command, July 29, 2015, available at https://www.stratcom.mil/speeches/2015/137/Keynote_2015_USSTRATCOM_Deterrence_Symposium/.

[x]. James Cartwright, et al., Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and Posture (Washington, D.C.: Global Zero, 2012), pp. 1-11, 19, available at http://www.globalzero.org/files/gz_us_nuclear_policy_commission_report.pdf.

[xi]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Effect of Finland’s Possible NATO Membership: An Assessment (Helsinki, Finland: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 29, 2016), p. 14, available at http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=157408&GUID={71D08E6C-3168-439F-9C31-0326D1014C26}.

[xii]. Central Intelligence Agency, “Evidence of Russian Development of New Sukiloton Nuclear Warheads [Redacted],” Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Transnational Issues, Intelligence Memorandum, August 30, 2000, available at http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0001260463.pdf.

[xiii]. Central Intelligence Agency, “Senior Executive Intelligence Brief,” June 4, 1999, Approved for release October 2005, available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB200/19990604.pdf.; Pavel Felgengauer, “Limited Nuclear War? Why Not!” Segodnya, May 6, 1999, as translated by BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, available at http://dialog.proquest.com/professional/login.; Central Intelligence Agency, “Russian Postures and Policies on Nuclear Deterrence, First Use, and the Nuclear Threshold: Balancing on a Tightrope [Redacted],” February 7, 2000, Approved for release August 25, 2010, available at http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0005460644.pdf.; Central Intelligence Agency, “Evidence of Russian Development of New Subkiloton Nuclear Warheads [Redacted],” August 30, 2000, Approved for release October 2005, available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB200/20000830.pdf.; Central Intelligence Agency, “Evidence of Russian Development of New Subkiloton Nuclear Warheads [Redacted],” August 30, 2000, Approved for release October 2005, available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB200/20000830.pdf.

[xiv] . Keith B. Payne and John S. Foster, et. al., Russian Strategy: Expansion, Crisis and Conflict (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2016) pp. 61-73, available at http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/FINAL-FOR-WEB-1.12.16.pdf.

[xv]. Gareth Jennings, “Sweden rules out NATO membership,” IHS Jane’s 360, May 17, 2016, available at http://www.janes.com/article/60389/sweden-rules-out-nato-membership.

[xvi]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Effects of Finland’s Possible NATO Membership, op. cit., pp. 55-57.

[xvii]. Mark Galeotti, “Russia is not the Threat the West Thinks it is,” The Moscow Times, July 14, 2015, available athttp://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russia-is-not-the-threat-the-west-thinks-it-is/525641.html.

[xviii]. David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank (Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation, 2016) p. 4, available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1253/RAND_RR1253.pdf.

[xix]. Senator Dianne Feinstein, as quoted in, Hans M. Kristensen, “Questions About The Nuclear Cruise Missile Mission,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, March 25, 2016, available at https://fas.org/blogs/security/2016/03/lrso-mission-questions/.

[xx]. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, p. vi. See also Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ cover letter to the 2010 NPR, dated April 6, 2010.

[xxi]. Keith Rogers, “Cold War Mentality Over Nuclear Weapons Returning, Panelists Say,” Las Vegas Review Journal, May 28, 2016, available at http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/m...-over-nuclear-weapons-returning-panelists-say.

[xxii]. Joshua Rovner, “Dealing with Putin’s Strategic Incompetence,” War On The Rocks, August 12, 2015, available at http://warontherocks.com/2015/08/dealing-with-putins-strategic-incompetence/.

The views in this Information Series are those of the authors and should not be construed as official U.S. Government policy, the official policy of the National Institute for Public Policy or any of its sponsors. For additional information about this publication or other publications by the National Institute Press, contact: Editor, National Institute Press, 9302 Lee Highway, Suite 750 |Fairfax, VA 22031 | (703) 293-9181 |www.nipp.org.


This article originally appeared at the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP).

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realcleardefense.com/art...key_us_ally_for_african_security__109416.html

June 3, 2016

Uganda on the Brink: Key U.S. Ally for African Security

By Ian Platz

Over the past decade, the United States government has viewed Uganda as one of the best guarantors of stability and thus American interests in East and Central Africa. In its most basic form, the U.S. government has been able to count on the Ugandan military as a proxy for missions and operations that are important to U.S. interests and provide access to volatile areas in times of crisis. In exchange Uganda has quickly become the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. security assistance funding in Sub-Saharan Africa. With US support, Uganda has been more than willing to export its capable military into complex stability operations, with just over six thousand military personnel deployed to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and provides the majority of forces in the Counter-Lord’s Resistance Army (C-LRA) mission. It has also provided the U.S. with tremendous depth into the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa regions through a Cooperative Security Location (CSL) in Entebbe, just outside of the capital city of Kampala.

Both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations have continued to support this relationship even as there are serious allegations that the Ugandan government has supported the theft of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo, compromised the settlement of the conflict in South Sudan by militarily supporting Salva Kiir, and greatly limited the free expression of its citizens. While it has been a capable partner in complex stability operations, the Ugandan government has a recent history of making choices that have led to further destabilization in East and Central African countries. The recent Presidential election in Uganda appears to be an indicator of a coming crisis and the U.S. government needs to evaluate how this fracturing will affect U.S. security interests in the region and whether the U.S.-Uganda security partnership can survive.

The recent aggressive actions taken by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni during the Presidential election in February demonstrate his commitment to staying in power. Deploying military forces, arresting key opposition figures, shutting down information outlets, and his suspiciously successful reelection were disturbing signals to all Ugandan citizens and the world, that he will hold onto power no matter the cost. Unlike previous elections that were also less than free and fair, there has been very little public support in the streets for the five-year extension of Museveni’s rule. Instead Uganda’s public mood seems to be changing as protests against Museveni’s win are still occurring months after he claimed victory. This growing discontent is concerning for the Museveni regime and could also lead to major changes at the top of the Ugandan government.

There are several shifts that could occur as Museveni attempts to keep power within his family and each could easily lead to the kind of instability that Washington has worked hard to avoid. The first is the removal of the age limit from Uganda’s constitution, which currently bars any person older than age 75 from holding the office of the President. There have been rumors and movements by Museveni supporters in the last several years to remove this limitation and keep Museveni in power well into his eighties. Even with seemingly growing support from Museveni’s supporters on this matter, it is not a certainty and could cause citizens to voice their frustration in ways that even internal security forces could not stop.

If Museveni is unable to legally extend his rule because of legal or health obstacles, then it is likely that his wife Janet Museveni or son Muhoozi Kainerugaba would take his place. Janet at age 67 is a seasoned politician, having held a ministry position and been an elected member of parliament. More than just the First Lady of Uganda, she has had a strong role in her husband’s most recent presidential campaign and is an active participant in domestic political matters. Muhoozi is 42 years old, a Brigadier in charge of Uganda’s Special Forces, and is a well-known figure to western governments. As commander of the Special Forces, Muhoozi is in charge of the protection of his father and the estimated six billion barrels of oil sitting in the Lake Albert Basin. Being in charge of Uganda’s largest revenue resource has made him one of the most important figures in not just Uganda, but all of East Africa.

Muhoozi’s rapid ascension and control of the country’s oil assets have led many in Uganda to refer to his progress as the “Muhoozi Project.” Several former senior military leaders have expressed great displeasure at Muhoozi’s sudden rise in Ugandan national security matters, and at least one appears to have been targeted by the Ugandan government because of his open contempt for Muhoozi. Currently there are no immediate and legal paths for Janet or Muhoozi to transition from their current positions to the Presidency. Museveni may spend the next few years working to remove any barriers that could keep his Wife or Son from the Presidency. If this occurs there will be some kind of power struggle. Janet could face competitors within Uganda’s political elite that join the opposition parties the Museveni regime has worked to degrade. Muhoozi may not have the full support of Uganda’s armed forces and the military could fracture under his transition. Either of these power struggles could shift to bloodshed and force the U.S. government to evaluate whether the security relationship is worth continuing when the government and its military are caught up in an internal conflict.

A fracturing of the Ugandan political elite and military could also lead to Uganda disengaging from East and Central Africa as it works on internal matters. This would likely entail the Ugandan military withdrawing from AMISOM, which would leave an enormous gap in the fragile security situation facing Somalia and threatening the security of all the nations that make up the Horn of Africa. The Somalia National Army is far from being a capable military force and it could be years before it is ready to truly augment the AMISOM mission, let alone fulfill the responsibilities of the Ugandan military. The same issue would occur in the C-LRA mission, with Ugandan military forces returning home and giving the terror group tremendous freedom of movement in some of the most fragile areas of Africa. The U.S. could quickly be forced to choose between strengthening other partners in the region, like Kenya and Tanzania, taking a more hands-on approach similar to operations in Iraq and Syria with American military forces deployed on the ground, or accepting the limitations of not having a strong military partner and little depth in several fragile regions of East and Central Africa.

Questioning the possible outcomes of what a fracturing Uganda looks like is vitally important, quite simply because Yoweri Museveni, at age 71, may have a shorter lifespan than his presidency and his decisions on who will replace him could quickly and easily lead Uganda to crisis. While the US government could weather this fractious period, it could also find itself with no other reliable security partner in East Africa and being forced to choose between deploying American military forces or risk losing presence in East Africa. While Washington may not wish to consider an unstable Uganda and the political-military turmoil that could come with the end of one of the longest serving heads of state in Africa, the elections in February demonstrated the U.S. doesn’t have a choice.


Ian Platz is a defense analyst in Washington, D.C.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/chinas-perspective-on-north-korea/

China's Perspective on North Korea

June 2, 2016 Managing Pyongyang’s outbursts is a valuable tool for Beijing in its relationship with Washington.

By George Friedman


The director of North Korea’s International Department, Ri Su Yong, is in China and met with Chinese President Xi Jinping yesterday. It is said that Ri is close to North Korea’s ruling family, meaning that at the meeting he represented the views of Kim Jong Un and those around him. According to media reports, the North Koreans refused to reduce their emphasis on nuclear weapon development, as the Chinese asked of them.

Nevertheless, it was agreed that good relations between the two countries are essential. In effect, the Chinese accepted that North Korea could violate China’s wishes on nuclear weapons without harming bilateral relations.

China clearly sees real value in North Korea. It likely has nothing to do with ideology. Even with the increasing autocracy of Xi’s regime, China and North Korea have very different ideological perspectives.

North Korea is utterly centralized and has sacrificed economic development in order to maintain rigid control of all aspects of society. China takes a much less centralized approach, even under Xi. They are both considered communists, but they are very different regimes.

Amicable bilateral relations with North Korea are essential for China. One reason comes simply from geography. China is a difficult place to invade. To the south are hills and jungles, from Myanmar to Vietnam; to the southwest run the Himalayas. In the northwest, vast expanses of grasslands and desert separate China’s population from Central Asia, and to the north is Siberia. Attacking China poses fantastic problems of distance, terrain and logistics – not to mention population.

But one of the few places where China might be vulnerable is along the Yalu River, which creates the border between North Korea and China. During the Korean War, when U.S. forces moved close to the Yalu, the Chinese intervened, risking a nuclear counterstrike from the United States at a time when the communist world didn’t have a credible counter. Still, China could not risk American forces moving across the Yalu.

For China, the Korean Peninsula poses a substantial threat, particularly with U.S. troops deployed there. Therefore, North Korea is a critical buffer state for China. Its survival as an independent state – with a substantial military and hostile to the United States and South Korea – is important to protect China’s periphery.

From this perspective, China wants to preserve North Korea exactly as it is. So regardless of how strange and unpredictable North Korea is, the Chinese will do what they can to prevent Korean unification and maintain the current character of the regime.

The possibility of a U.S.-South Korean invasion northward is remote, to say the least. But from the Chinese point of view, the consequences of miscalculation are high. Maintaining the status quo makes sense.

There is, however, a more immediate value in maintaining relations with the North Koreans. North Korea deflects the United States’ attention and increases U.S. dependence on China. The U.S. has a fixation with nuclear programs, especially programs developed by unpredictable countries like North Korea.

The North Koreans periodically explode a test device, sink a South Korean ship or engage in some other apparently irrational behavior. This triggers a crisis with the United States.

Having no diplomatic leverage in North Korea, the Americans approach the Chinese to intercede with the North Koreans. North Korea desists. The United States must be grateful to China. Therefore, the U.S. must put aside some bilateral issues with the Chinese for the time being, given China’s willingness to use its influence in North Korea to avoid a crisis.

North Korea is perceived as an uncontrollable threat. China is perceived as the only agent that can control North Korea. The United States wants to avoid exacerbating a crisis. China solves the problem.

In this way, North Korea is an important tool for China in managing its relations with the United States. Managing Pyongyang is the one thing the Chinese can do for the Americans that they really care about, and it costs China very little. From China’s point of view, North Korea’s escapades give China leverage with the United States.

To proceed along these lines into the land of pure speculation, it would make sense for China to order up an outrageous action at particular moments. Whether they do or whether they just take advantage of North Korean moments – or whether the entire process is less conscious – is an interesting subject. But it is clear that the dynamic is there. From China’s perspective, North Korea is not an unpredictable danger. It is a diplomatic asset.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://quwa.org/2016/06/02/pakistans-nuclear-weapons-program-18-years-later/

Bilal Khan - Jun 2, 2016

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program 18 years later

On 28 May 1998, Pakistan conducted five simultaneous underground nuclear tests in Baluchistan. This test, designated Chagai-I, was followed up with another two days later, Chagai-II. From that day, Pakistan became the world’s seventh nuclear weapons program, and since then, it has had an interesting journey developing and defending its program.

This is not a topic that we can properly cover in one article. There are many different aspects to consider; from the nuclear technology itself to the delivery mechanisms employed (and being sought), to the geo-political concerns and realities surrounding that program. This piece will try to offer a general overview, a primer or simple backgrounder on what to think about Pakistan’s nuclear program in terms of how it has developed and where it could go in the coming years. We will take on an intensive research approach in later articles, but for the sake of instigating thought and discussion, we will keep things general today.

Immediately following the detonations, Pakistan incurred another round of severe sanctions. There were sanctions in place before, particularly in the form of an arms-embargo from the U.S. (which initiated the infamous case of Pakistan’s F-16 program), but these tests threatened political and economic isolation as well. It would not be long before that isolation would begin to be unravelled, following 2001 the U.S. – under the leadership of George W. Bush – sought to not only lift many of the restrictions on Pakistan, but integrate it into long-term U.S. security interests (the results of which could be felt to this day).

It would seem that political isolation, particularly of Pakistani leaders, is not a policy the U.S. is going to return to in regards to any of its problems with Pakistan. Whether it be the question of the Taliban and other militant entities in the region, America’s approach is less of categorical separation (e.g. embargoes), and more of targeted attempts to tie-up issues that concern or could concern U.S. interests. This will be explored a bit towards the end of the article, especially in the context of Pakistan’s delivery methods.

In terms of delivery methods, Pakistan’s acquisitions – especially from 2000 to 2010 – were extensive. First came the introduction of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) such as the Ghauri-I and Shaheen-I. Although short-range (relative to other – including future – ballistic missiles), the reality that Pakistan had paired nuclear warheads to ballistic missiles was a significant step, and a sign that it was serious about its nuclear program. From the mid-2000s, medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) such as the Shaheen-II were inducted; Pakistan’s aim was to envelop all of India. This was completed with the Shaheen-III.

Pakistan did not push ahead or attempt (at least openly) intermediate – much less intercontinental – ballistic programs (though rumours of such are abundant in common discourse). There is no verifiable proof of such programs considering the reality that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program was driven by India’s introduction of such weapons, not to deter or threaten distant powers. With its SRBM and MRBM units being inducted, Pakistan then focused on advancing the qualitative aspects of its program.

The steady production of weapons-grade plutonium (via the Khushab Complex) and the miniaturization of warheads was coupled with the testing of tactical cruise missiles – the 750km range Babur and the 350km range Ra’ad. These comparatively smaller missiles enabled Pakistan to class a wide range of tactical systems – such as fighter aircraft and submarines – as potential nuclear delivery platforms. Moreover, one would assume that smaller and relatively high-yield (via tritium boosting) plutonium warheads would be produced in greater numbers, easier to distribute – and that too in a much wider delivery network encompassing conventional assets – and more difficult to track (for those with an incentive to neutralize the program). This implication pulled Pakistan back within the scope of Washington’s concerns.

As a result, Washington has in recent months been actively trying to neutralize the issue through some kind of integration requiring Pakistan to cap and/or scale-back its program. Sanctions are not on the table, but measures in the form of enticement and targeted isolation (of specific economic sectors) may be pursued. At this stage, U.S. policy thinkers are simply offering ideas, it is unclear if there is a substantive offer (or ultimatum) on the table. But nonetheless, this issue will likely generate more momentum in the next several years, especially as Pakistan begins to construct the naval leg of its deterrence umbrella.

The political aspect is in part tied to Pakistan’s success in securing new – and more flexible – delivery platforms. For example, had the nuclear weapons program remained static, i.e. dependent on the use of a relatively few large warheads with SRBM and MRBM that are not as easy to move around, then perhaps the U.S. may not have had too much of a concern (at least in the short-term). But the rise of a continuously developing system, one involving a high number of smaller warheads alongside nuclear-tipped rockets (i.e. Nasr) and cruise missiles that could be launched from a variety of platforms, means for a more difficult challenge. It is for this reason that Pressler-era political pressure will likely return.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-falluja-idUSKCN0YP0MI

World | Fri Jun 3, 2016 5:29am EDT
Related: World, Iraq, Campaign Finance

Falluja is a 'tough nut to crack': Iraqi finance minister

BAGHDAD | By Maher Chmaytelli and Ahmed Rasheed


Islamic State is putting up a tough fight in Falluja and its recapture by the Iraqi army could take time, said Iraqi Finance Minister Hoshiyar Zebari.

Falluja, located 50 kilometers (32 miles) west of Baghdad, has been a bastion of the Sunni insurgency that fought both the U.S. occupation of Iraq and the Shi'ite-led Baghdad government.

Islamic State fighters raised their flag there in January 2014 before sweeping through much of Iraq's north and west, declaring a caliphate several months later, from Mosul.

"Falluja is a tough nut to crack," he told Reuters in an interview on Thursday evening. "Daesh are holding the population as hostages, not allowing them to escape, and they are putting up a tough fight there," he added, referring to the militant group by one of its Arabic acronyms.

"Nobody can give you a definitive time when Falluja will be cleared of Daesh. Mainly because of the resistance, because of the IEDs (improvised explosive devices), because of the tunnels" the militants have dug to move without being detected, he added.

The army started the offensive on May 23, with the backing of Shi'ite militias known as Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and air support from the U.S.-led coalition.

Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi said on Wednesday the army had slowed the pace of its offensive because of fears for the safety of tens of thousands of civilians trapped in the city with limited access to water, food and healthcare.

"The security forces, the PMF have made significant progress but really to storm the center of Falluja I think will take time," Zebari said. "We should not declare victory prematurely."


SHI'ITE APPEAL

A spokesman for one of the main Shi'ite paramilitary groups taking part in the offensive on Falluja said the operations have come to a near standstill in the past three days and asked Abadi to order the attacks to continue.

"We demand that Prime Minister Abadi continues the operation to free Falluja and not to submit to American and Western pressure to halt the operation," said Jawad al-Talabawi, a spokesman of the Iran-backed Asaib Ahl al-Haq.

"We say ... freeing Falluja is needed to protect Baghdad."

Abadi ordered the offensive on Falluja after a series of bombings claimed by Islamic State hit Shi'ite districts of Baghdad, causing the worst death toll this year.

Falluja would be the third major city in Iraq recaptured by the government after former dictator Saddam Hussein's home town Tikrit and Ramadi, the capital of Iraq's vast western Anbar province. Abadi has expressed hope that 2016 will be the year of "final victory" over Islamic State, with the capture of Mosul, their de facto capital in northern Iraq.

Baghdad-based political analysts said the battle for Falluja would be harder than Tikrit and Ramadi because of the symbolism of the city for the militants and because they cannot retreat to other places, as the whole area is under siege by the army and Shi'ite militias.

"In Falluja, Daesh has die-hard fighters defending a city they consider as a symbol for Jihad," said analyst and former army general Jasim al-Bahadili.

Political analyst Ali Hashim said that even if the government managed to retake Falluja, it would continue to face the problem of winning over the Sunni population, some of whom feel marginalized by the Shi’ite-led government.


(Editing by Toby Chopra and Gareth Jones)

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-kurds-idUSKCN0YP1W3

World | Fri Jun 3, 2016 11:08am EDT
Related: World

Security campaign against Kurdish militants in Turkish border town completed: sources


Turkish security forces called an end to operations in the town of Nusaybin near the Syrian border on Friday, security sources said, after nearly three months of often heavy clashes that left nearly 600 people dead.

Turkey's predominantly Kurdish southeast has been engulfed by the worst violence in two decades after the collapse of a ceasefire between the state and the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in July.

While security forces completed Nusaybin operations, a round-the-clock curfew was still in place, the sources said. A total of 495 PKK militants and 70 Turkish soldiers have been killed since the operations in the town began on March 14, the local governor's office said in a statement.

Nusaybin, in Mardin province, is just across the border from Syria.

The PKK, which has taken up arms to seek autonomy for Turkey's Kurdish minority, is designated as a terrorist group by Turkey and its Western allies. It launched its insurgency in 1984 and more than 40,000 people have been killed in the conflict.


(Reporting by Seyhmus Cakan; Writing by Humeyra Pamuk; Editing by David Dolan)

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/russian-ground-operation-syria-160602094724997.html

War & Conflict
13 hours ago

Russian ground operation in Syria 'under discussion'

Kremlin insider tells Al Jazeera that Moscow is considering sending special forces to fight against Syrian rebel groups.

By Zeina Khodr

Moscow - Russian President Vladimir Putin may deploy special operations forces on the ground in Syria, a former official has told Al Jazeera, a move that might be made to ensure "a decisive victory".

It has been more than eight months since Russia intervened in the Syrian conflict, and at the time Putin said there were no plans to participate in ground operations - but he also said "for now".

Putin is reportedly discussing with military commanders the possibility of deploying combat troops on the battlefield.

"This is under discussion, there are plans for this," Andrei Fyodorov, a former deputy minister for foreign affairs, told Al Jazeera.

The reinforcements could be special forces or volunteer soldiers who are willing to fight alongside the Syrian army and its allies.

"This is a delicate issue for our military. There are serious doubts that any participation by Russia on the ground would be favourable. [Rather it could] complicate the negotiation process and lead to further disagreements with the US," Fyodorov explained.

But there are those in political and military circles who believe this deployment is needed.

Syria civil war: Russia denies conducting Idlib raids

Russian firepower prevented the collapse of the Syrian government last year. Damascus was struggling to repel rebel advances on several fronts.

The Kremlin wanted to tip the balance in favour of its ally enough to allow it to benefit at the negotiating table.

But the battle lines did not change and peace talks led nowhere. Neither side was willing to compromise nor strong enough to impose a settlement.

"From the Russian point of view, [Syrian President Bashar] al-Assad should control 70 percent of Syria, and that way you can hold elections and they would be favourable for Assad. That is why the issue of ground operations is becoming more actual," said Fyodorov.

Over recent weeks, Russia's role on the Syrian battlefield was noticeably reduced as Moscow wanted to give a chance to political talks.

That message was clear when Russia did not provide close air power to the Syrian government and its allies in their military campaign in Aleppo in early May.

But on May 22, the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported the first Russian air strikes in Aleppo province since the US-Russian brokered a cessation of hostilities deal in February.

The Russian defence ministry has said it recently intensified strikes against al-Nusra Front in Aleppo and Idlib provinces, and said that the conflict would only escalate after blaming Washington's refusal to join efforts in the fight against what it called "terrorism".

Russia's draft constitution: End of Syria's Baath era?

"Russia has little choice. It can't allow itself to lose Aleppo. This would deprive it of a trump card. This would enable the other side to regain the initiative and [force Russia] to accept conditions not favourable for Assad," Sergey Strokan, a political analyst, told Al Jazeera.

There are Russian voices within the government and military pushing for the ground operation.

Russia's intervention in Syria has been costly - billions of dollars have already been spent, and the country is suffering from an economic crisis.

The Kremlin never wanted a permanent war, and it can't just pull out of a conflict that has brought it back into the international arena.

That is why some analysts suggest a "Stalingrad" in Syria is what the Syrian government and its allies need - a final battle to decisively end the war. And that would require ground troops.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://warisboring.com/b-52s-train-for-possible-strikes-in-north-africa-f47e70126afe#.cc2k89yax

War Is Boring
11 hrs ago·6 min read

B-52s Train For Possible Strikes in North Africa

Bombers could pound terrorists in Libya in a future intervention

by JOSEPH TREVITHICK

The U.S. Air Force’s iconic B-52 Stratofortresses have become a regular sight at war games across Europe. But as terrorist groups wreak havoc across North Africa, the lumbering bombers are headed farther south.

On June 2, three of the massive, eight-engine planes touched down at RAF Fairford in the United Kingdom. From there, the aircraft will fly practice missions during three different exercises, including one off the coast of North Africa.

“Our bombers have not recently conducted training flights” near the African continent, U.S. Army Lt. Col. Martin O’Donnell, the U.S. Strategic Command chief of public affairs for current operations, told War Is Boring by email. “The B-52 will remain over international waters and will not cross into national airspace.”

Since the top Pentagon headquarters for Africa lacks experience in commanding the big planes, the B-52s — or any of the Air Force’s other heavy bombers — do not make regular appearances in the region. However, that could all change very soon.

Ostensibly, the military exercise off North Africa — nicknamed Just Hammer — is all about communication. In the upcoming exercise, a single Stratofortress will fly from Britain to an unspecified location off the African coast.

During the flight, a command center handling U.S. military operations in Europe will hand control of the aircraft over to another center handling operations in Africa, according to O’Donnell. The bomber’s crew will also check in with other American forces throughout the mission.

The Pentagon’s top headquarters for operations in Europe and Africa are situated within minutes of each other in Stuttgart, Germany. From Ramstein Air Base, less than a 100 miles northwest, the same Air Force general is in charge of aerial missions in both regions.

While this procedure might sound utterly banal, the process mirrors how U.S. commanders would control any future bomber missions from bases in Europe against targets in countries in North Africa. And one country in the region where the United States is already carrying out air strikes is Libya.

Both O’Donnell and a public affairs officer at U.S. Africa Command were quick to highlight that B-2 stealth bombers — in that case flying all the way from Missouri and back — dropped bombs on hardened aircraft shelters in Libya during the country’s civil war in 2011.

Those strikes were part of an international mission that unseated long-time Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi. Four years after Gaddafi’s death, the country has descended into near chaos. Various political factions compete for legitimacy while militias and terrorists enforce their own brands of authority with impunity.

Formed in December 2015, the country’s internationally recognized “government of national accord” hardly reflects its title. Even more serious, after the stunning rise of the Islamic State terror group in Iraq and Syria two years ago, the group was quick to send its emissaries to create a safe haven inside Libya.

By December 2014, the Pentagon had started sending drones and other spy planes to keep an eye on the situation and hunt for specific terrorists. Since June 2015, the Air Force has launched at least four air strikes aimed at militants in Libya — including an Islamic State training camp.

But in those cases, F-15E fighter bombers, likely flying from Britain or Djibouti, carried out the attacks. Able to take advantage of intelligence on short notice, the fast flying jets are ideal for targeted strikes.

B-52s are very, very different. A single Stratofortress can carry up to 70,000 pounds of bombs and missiles, making them better suited for attacking larger terrorist camps and command centers. Sure enough, after the bombers arrived in the Middle East in April for missions over Iraq, their first target was a building full of Islamic State weapons.

Of course, none of this means that the B-52s are gearing up to join a new American intervention in Libya — or anywhere else in North Africa. Officially, Just Hammer isn’t related to any current events. Similarly, a June 1 press release about the U.K. deployment stressed that the Air Force “routinely” sends bombers to Europe and the Pacific.

Over the past two years, the Pentagon has repeatedly denied that its bombers’ presence in Europe are a response to Russia’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy in any way.

But senior military officials are inconsistent on whether to consider the B-52 deployments in Europe to be unusual … or just standard practice. A recent arrival of the bombers for March exercises in Norway was “not normal,” U.S. Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove said, who also denied it had anything to do with Russia.

Flying B-52s toward the North African coast is, suffice to say, even more unusual.

“Ensuring we can operate from strategic forward locations like RAF Fairford is integral to … a more timely and coordinated response during crises,” U.S. Navy Adm. Cecil D. Haney, the head of the Pentagon’s top strategic headquarters, said in a statement on June 1. “Integrating strategic bombers … in a variety of scenarios enhances the readiness and capability of U.S. and NATO military forces.”

With the prospect of the Islamic State strengthening its position in Libya, the White House and U.S. legislators continue to debate whether the Pentagon should take a more active role. In late 2015, the Pentagon sent commandos to seek out allies inside Libya who could help during a potential intervention, according to a report by the Washington Post.

In May, the State Department formally branded the Islamic State branch in Libya — along with the ones in Saudi Arabia and Yemen — as a separate terrorist group. This move gave Washington additional authority to sanction the organization’s members, seize their assets and punish anyone who might try and support their cause.

Wary of becoming embroiled in another conflict with no foreseeable end, the White House and the Pentagon have deflected suggestions that greater American involvement is inevitable. There are also lingering questions whether there are any willing partners on the ground to work with.

“[Libyans] like everybody, you know, want to do it themselves and to protect their sovereign people, and just like everybody else would be a little bit embarrassed that they need help,” U.S. Army Gen. David Rodriguez, the Pentagon’s chief of operations in Africa, told reporters on April 7.

“There are a lot of plans out there and everything.”

So whatever decision Washington makes in the end, it’s entirely possible that some of those war plans will soon include B-52 bomber strikes — if they don’t already.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2016/06/03/is_frances_fifth_republic_doomed_111890.html

Is France's Fifth Republic Doomed?

By Robert Zaretsky
June 03, 2016
Comments 17

Is France’s Fifth Republic, successor to a paralyzed and powerless Fourth Republic in 1958, slated for a similar fate? Since early March, workers and students have aimed a series of massive strikes at the Socialist government of President Francois Hollande. The footage of masked protesters colliding with riot police, piles of blazing tires outside oil refineries, shuttered gas stations, and police cars set ablaze suggests a flailing and perhaps failing government. At the very least, the defection of their traditional rank-and-file reflects the grave crisis now confronting the Socialist Party. More important, these events betray a deeper institutional and political crisis. The question French newspapers are asking as the government confronts this spring of deepening discontent -- “Où est la sortie?” (Where’s the exit?) -- should now also be asked about the republic over which Hollande was meant to reign.

The crisis has been long simmering. On the international stage -- the president’s preserve under the Fifth Republic -- Hollande has been mostly a walk-on. Apart from the military operations he launched in Mali and the Central African Republic against radical Islamic movements, he has been repeatedly checkmated. Eager to oust Syrian President Bashar al Assad, Hollande was embarrassed by U.S. President Barack Obama’s last-minute decision to pull back. Sympathetic to the predicament of a bankrupt Greece, Hollande failed to budge Germany’s austerity demands. Dignified in the wake of last year’s terrorist attacks, he then instructed his Prime Minister, Manuel Valls, to pursue a misbegotten law allowing the government to strip convicted French terrorists of their citizenship.

Ultimately, Valls failed to pass the bill and succeeded in alienating dozens of Socialist deputies who had opposed it. These “rebels” were further galvanized when Valls announced a series of changes to France’s labor code. Modest by the standards of most European countries -- employers would be given greater freedom to change the 35-hour work week, and greater say in hiring and firing workers -- the legislation provoked a rebellion within the party, forcing Valls to invoke a rarely used constitutional wrinkle to pass the law without a general vote. An attempt by the rebels to bring down their own government fell short by just two votes.

But the government has not been able to staunch the rebellion on the streets. The protests have taken two different, but equally menacing, directions. The first, Nuit Debout (Rise Up at Night), is unprecedented. Convening every evening at Place de la République, thousands of students, workers, and activists practice direct democracy. Holding general assemblies -- one part group therapy session, one part constituent assembly -- participants speak briefly on issues ranging from unfair housing practices to the ongoing state of emergency.

The movement’s slogan -- “Our Dreams Don’t Fit Your Ballot Boxes” -- is a worthy ideal, but hard to translate into policy. As for the other form of protest, its anti-government slogan might as well be “Your Dreams Are Our Nightmares.” These traditional labor union strikes are rooted in the long history of what, 40 years ago, sociologist Michel Crozier called “la société bloquée,” or “the stalled society.” The French, Crozier argued, distrust negotiation and compromise, and do not identify with political parties. Given their “horror of face-to-face contact,” their resistance to cooperation, and their fear of innovation, the French are most comfortable with confrontation. The take-no-prisoners policy of both the government and the General Federation of Workers, the militant union leading the strikes, suggests that Crozier’s analysis is still pertinent. With the start next week of the Euro Cup football championship, hosted by France, one or the other side will have to blink.

In 1958, when France was fissuring over the question of Algeria, the unencumbered exercise of executive power had its attractions. Allergic to a parliamentary system incapable of responding to such crises, Charles de Gaulle endowed the new republic with a powerful, nearly monarchic presidency. Directly elected to a seven-year term, the president was answerable neither to parliament nor his own government. With day-to-day affairs left to the prime minister, the president’s task was to yoke the French to “great undertakings” that would keep France in the first rank of nations. And, until the student rebellion of 1968, the French mostly went along.

Since de Gaulle left the political scene, however, a bipolar world has splintered into many poles, a Europe of nation-states has softened into a supranational sludge of laws and regulations, and national economies have been shackled to a single currency. Whereas Bourbon kings answered only to God, and de Gaulle answered only to France, his successors answer only to Brussels. The internet and social media, moreover, have “desacralized” a presidency that required majesty and mystery. Whereas de Gaulle’s private life was taboo, tabloids have feasted on the private lives of recent presidents. Following the bling-bling years of Nicolas Sarkozy, Hollande had promised a return to “normalcy.” What he really meant, it seems, was “mediocrity” -- a distinction captured when paparazzi ambushed Hollande as he stole away from the Elysée Palace for an affair with an actress. He did so on a moped, his head hidden under a large black helmet -- a measure of the distance France had traveled from a president who wore a helmet atop a tank.

In 2000, the office’s seven-year term was trimmed back to five years. But this and similar tweaks, resulting in a kind of Gaullism Lite, simply underscore the system’s fundamental dissonance. The Republic’s stability and integrity flow from an era and office that, in effect, only its founder could properly embody. Novelist André Malraux may well have been right to think de Gaulle was equal to his myth. But even the General would be hard-pressed to resist the global forces and transnational powers that now bear upon the Elysée.

De Gaulle perhaps foresaw this changed world. Shortly before his death, he confided to Malraux: “I had no predecessor and will have no successor.” This need not be as grim a forecast as the boast of an earlier ruler: “After me, the deluge.” A growing number of political theorists as well as notable political figures, including Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Arnaud Montebourg, have argued for a new republic endowed with more powerful legislative and more modest executive branches. Such a republic would correspond to the aspirations of movements like Nuit Debout that demand a more responsive and representative government.

Also at play, however, is the deeply rooted national reflex for a “providential man,” a powerful and charismatic figure, from Napoleon through Clemenceau to de Gaulle, capable of unblocking France. Two years ago, in a much-discussed Le Monde poll, nearly nine out of ten respondents wished for a “true leader capable of re-establishing order.” The most likely candidate for this providential man is, in fact, a woman: Marine Le Pen, leader of the extreme right-wing National Front. Le Pen’s approval ratings continue to climb, and last month, in a poll taken for the newspaper Le Parisien, she outdistanced Hollande in the second round of next year’s presidential election, 55 percent to 45 percent.

While she fares less well against some of the other contenders, Le Pen’s growing strength nevertheless underscores the republic’s predicament: its survival perhaps depends on someone whose politics resembles that of another providential figure: Philippe Pétain, the head of the xenophobic, reactionary, and authoritarian Vichy regime. Over the next few weeks, it is not just the Euro Cup, but perhaps also the Fifth Republic that will be at stake.


Robert Zaretsky is a professor of history at the University of Houston's Honors College. His most recent book is "Boswell's Enlightenment." The views expressed are the author's own.