WAR 05-20-2017-to-05-26-2017_____THEWINDSofWAR

Housecarl · May 20, 2017

(268) 04-29-2017-to-05-05-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...05-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(269) 05-06-2017-to-05-12-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...12-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(271) 05-13-2017-to-05-19-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...19-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world...te-isis/ar-BBBjr0Y?li=BBmkt5R&ocid=spartanntp

Mattis says Trump's orders will annihilate ISIS

USA TODAY
Tom Vanden Brook
3 hrs ago

WASHINGTON —*New approaches approved by President Trump to defeat Islamic State militants have begun to bear fruit, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis told reporters Friday.*

Commanders in the field have been given greater authority to press the fight without approval from Washington, and a tactical shift to "annihilation" from a war of attrition has thrown*fighters from the Islamic State, or ISIS, on "their back foot," Mattis said.

"We're there to drive ISIS to its knees," Mattis said.

A military analyst, however, cautioned that the threat from extremists won't end even if ISIS is destroyed, and that good governments are key to stability in the region.

Mattis, along with Marine Gen. Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Brett McGurk, the presidential envoy to the coalition fighting ISIS, gave a generally*upbeat assessment of the fight that began in 2014. That's when a U.S.-led coalition, mostly using warplanes, began pounding ISIS fighters who had gobbled up large chunks of Iraq and Syria in a largely uncontested fight. There are now thousands of U.S. troops on the ground in Iraq and Syria, mostly as advisers.

Trump's order, Mattis said, has shifted the focus from surrounding ISIS fighters in their strongholds and waiting them out to attacking them and choking off their lines of retreat. Mattis described foreign fighters who have descended on the region, and threaten to return to their homes in places like Detroit and Paris, as a strategic threat.*He noted that ISIS terrorists have been fought by dozens of countries from Southeast Asia to Africa.

Mattis declined to put a timeline on defeat for the terror organization, calling it a "transnational, long-term threat." Trump, during his campaign, vowed to develop a plan once in office to "soundly and quickly" defeat ISIS.

U.S. troops have been advising local forces in what Mattis called an "annihilation campaign" against foreign fighters.*

At its peak, the flow of militants from other countries into Iraq and Syria was 1,500 fighters per month. Dunford now estimates that fewer than 100 terrorists trickle in each month.*

The other approach has given commanders authority, for example, to put U.S. combat advisers closer to the fight. Those troops can now partner with local troops, including Iraqi forces seeking to liberate Mosul, at the battalion level, or about 700 soldiers. Previously, U.S. troops had been advising brigades, which can have thousands of soldiers.

Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, cautioned that focusing too narrowly on destroying ISIS can mean ignoring other extremist groups like al-Qaeda offshoots entrenched in other parts of *Syria.*

"Absent a more comprehensive plan for how to stabilize Syria, that threat isn’t on the verge of annihilation and in fact may not even be diminishing," O'Hanlon said. "And in Iraq, while the overall situation is better, the absence of any clear plan for how to stabilize, govern and rebuild Mosul after its liberation makes me worry about the possibility of renewed sectarian strife down the road."

Mattis also briefly addressed the war in Afghanistan and North Korea's continued defiance of sanctions in testing missiles. Mattis*has yet to recommend to Trump*increasing U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan from the current level of 8,400. The commander there, Army Gen. John Nicholson, is seeking a few thousand more to help local forces beat back Taliban insurgents.

North Korea recently tested another missile, raising concerns that it is learning the lessons it needs to develop a nuclear weapon capable of reaching the United States. For now, the best approach to deter*North Korea is to rely on diplomatic pressure with the Chinese government; attacking North Korea militarily would result in casualties that would be "tragic on an unbelievable scale," Mattis said.

Also late Friday, the Pentagon announced that Dunford had been nominated by Trump for another two-year term as chairman. His nomination is subject to Senate confirmation. Dunford's first nomination was made by then-President Obama. By custom, the chairman serves two terms.

China Connection · May 20, 2017

"That's when a U.S.-led coalition, mostly using warplanes, began pounding ISIS fighters who had gobbled up large chunks of Iraq" From above.

Since the U.S. has taken charge in Iraq, ISIS has come into power. Real success huh?

Housecarl · May 20, 2017

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https://news.vice.com/story/the-u-s...adow-war-in-africa-exclusive-documents-reveal

The war you’ve never heard of

The U.S. is waging a massive shadow war in Africa, exclusive documents reveal

By Nick Turse on May 18, 2017

Six years ago, a deputy commanding general*for U.S. Army Special Operations Command gave*a conservative estimate*of 116 missions being carried out at any one time by*Navy SEALs, Army Green Berets, and other special operations forces across the globe.

Today, according to U.S. military documents obtained by VICE News, special operators are carrying out nearly 100 missions at any given*time — in Africa alone.*It’s the latest sign*of the military’s quiet but ever-expanding presence on the continent, one that*represents the most dramatic growth in the deployment of America’s elite troops to any region of the globe.

In 2006, just 1 percent of all U.S. commandos deployed overseas were*in Africa. In 2010, it was 3 percent. By 2016, that number had jumped to more than 17 percent. In fact, according to data supplied by U.S. Special Operations Command, there are now more special operations*personnel devoted to Africa than anywhere except*the Middle East —*1,700 people spread out across*20 countries dedicated to assisting the U.S. military’s African partners in their fight against terrorism and extremism.

“At any given time, you will find SOCAFRICA conducting approximately 96 activities in 20 countries,” Donald Bolduc, the U.S. Army general who runs the special operations command in Africa (SOCAFRICA), wrote*in an October 2016 strategic planning guidance report. (The report was obtained by VICE News in response to a Freedom of Information Act request and is published in its entirety below.)*VICE*News reached out to SOCAFRICA and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) for clarification on these numbers; email return receipts show an AFRICOM spokesperson “read” three such requests, but the command did not offer a reply.

The October 2016*report offers insight into what the U.S. military’s most elite forces are currently doing in Africa and what they hope to achieve. In so doing, it paints a picture of*reality on the ground in Africa*today and what it could be 30 years from now.

That*picture is bleak.

“Africa’s challenges could create a threat that surpasses the threat that the United States currently faces from conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria,” Bolduc warned. He went*on to cite a laundry list of challenges with which he and his personnel must contend: ever-expanding illicit*networks, terrorist safe havens, attempts to subvert government authority, a steady stream*of new recruits and resources.

Bolduc indicated his solution was*the “acceleration of SOF [special operations forces] missions [filling] a strategic gap as the military adjusts force structure now and in the future.” Translation: U.S. commandos “in more places, doing more” in Africa going forward.

At the same time, Bolduc says the U.S. is not at war in Africa. But this assertion is challenged by the ongoing operations aimed at the militant group al-Shabaab in Somalia, which operates often in all-but-ungoverned and extraordinarily complex areas Bolduc*calls “gray zones.”

In January, for example, U.S. advisers conducting a counterterrorism operation alongside local Somali forces and troops from the African Union Mission in Somalia*“observed al-Shabaab fighters threatening their safety and security” and “conducted a self-defense strike to neutralize the threat,” according to a press release from AFRICOM.

Earlier this month, in what AFRICOM*described as “an advise-and-assist operation alongside Somali National Army forces,” Navy SEAL Kyle Milliken was killed and two other U.S. personnel were injured during a firefight with al-Shabaab militants about 40 miles west of Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu. The battle occurred shortly after President Donald Trump loosened Obama-era restrictions on offensive operations in Somalia, thereby allowing U.S. forces more discretion and leeway in conducting missions and opening up the possibility of more frequent airstrikes and commando raids.

“It allows us to prosecute targets in a more rapid fashion,” Gen. Thomas Waldhauser, the AFRICOM commander, said of the change. In April, the U.S. military reportedly requested the locations of aid groups working in the country, an indication that yet a greater escalation in the war against al-Shabaab may be imminent.

“Looking at counterterrorism operations in Somalia, it’s clear the U.S. has been relying heavily on the remote-control form of warfare so favored by President Obama,” said Jack Serle, who covers the subject for the London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism.

Recently, the U.S. has augmented this strategy, working alongside local Somali forces and African Union troops under the banner of “train, advise, and assist” missions and other types of “support” operations, according to Serle. “Now they partner with local security forces but don’t engage in actual combat, the Pentagon says. The truth of that is hard to divine.”

U.S. operations in Somalia are part of a larger continent-spanning counterterrorism campaign that saw special operations forces deploy to at least 32 African nations in 2016, according to open source data and information supplied by U.S. Special Operations Command. The cornerstone of this strategy involves training local proxies and allies — “building partner capacity” in the military lexicon.

“Providing training and equipment to our partners helps us improve their ability to organize, sustain, and employ a counter violent extremist force against mutual threats,” the SOCAFRICA report says.

As part of its increasing involvement in the war against Boko Haram militants in the Lake Chad Basin — it spans*parts of Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad — for example, the U.S. provided $156 million to support regional proxies last year.

In addition to training, U.S. special operators, including members of SEAL Team 6, reportedly*assist African allies in carrying out a half dozen or more raids every month. In April, a U.S. special operator reportedly*killed a fighter from Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army during an operation in the Central African Republic. U.S. forces*also remain intimately involved in conflict in Libya after the U.S. ended an air campaign there against the Islamic State group in December. “We’re going to keep a presence on the ground… and we’re going to develop intelligence and take out targets when they arise,” Waldhauser said in March.

Though Bolduc said special operators*are carrying out about 96 missions on any given day, he didn’t specify how many total missions are being carried out per year. SOCAFRICA officials did not respond to several requests for that number.

The marked increase in U.S. activity tracks with the rising number of major terror groups in Africa. A 2012 version of SOCAFRICA’s strategic planning documents also obtained by VICE News lists five major terror groups. The October 2016 files list seven by name — al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Magreb, ISIS, Ansar al-Sharia, al-Murabitun, Boko Haram, the Lord’s Resistance Army, and al-Shabaab — in addition to “other violent extremist organizations,” also known as VEOs. In 2015, Bolduc said that there are nearly 50 terrorist organizations and “illicit groups” operating on the African continent.

Terror attacks in sub-Saharan Africa have skyrocketed in the past decade. Between 2006 and 2015, the last year covered by data from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland, attacks*jumped from about 100 per year to close to 2,000. “From 2010 to the present,” Bolduc says*in the report, “VEOs in Africa have been some of the most lethal on the planet.”

“Many of Africa’s indicators are trending downward,” he writes. “We believe the situation in Africa will get worse without our assistance.”

Colby Goodman, the director of the Washington, D.C.–based Security Assistance Monitor, pointed to some recent tactical gains against terror groups, but warned that progress might be short-lived and unsustainable. “My continuing concerns about U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Africa,” he said, “is an over-focus on tactical military support to partner countries at the expense of a more whole-government approach and a lack of quality assessments and evaluations of U.S. security aid to these countries.”

Read the entire document below: Pages 1 of 14

Nick Turse is an award-winning investigative journalist who has written for the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and the Nation, and is a contributing writer for the Intercept. His latest book is “Next Time They’ll Come to Count the Dead: War and Survival in South Sudan.”

Cover: An U.S. Special Forces trainer supervises a military assault drill for a unit within the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) conducted in Nzara on the outskirts of Yambio November 29, 2013. REUTERS/Andreea Campeanu

Housecarl · May 20, 2017

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http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-afghanistan-taliban-idUSKCN18G0BI

World News | Sat May 20, 2017 | 5:47am EDT

Afghan Taliban launch three-pronged assault on Ghazni city

Taliban fighters launched a three-pronged attack on parts of the central-eastern Afghan city of Ghazni overnight, driving a Humvee packed with explosives into the entrance of a district governor's compound during the assault, police said on Saturday.

The assault on Ghazni, on the highway linking the capital Kabul with the southern city of Kandahar, ramps up the Taliban's spring offensive and comes as U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis prepares to present recommendations to President Donald Trump on future troop levels in Afghanistan.

In the north of the country, the Taliban has stepped up its operations and targeted Kunduz, a city that they have twice managed to seize for brief periods in the past.

The Taliban have had a strong presence in the province of Ghazni for years, but provincial police chief Aminullah Amerkhil said the overnight attack from three directions was the fiercest launched by the insurgents. However, he said his men had held out.

Hashim Zwak, the police chief of Waghaz district, was wounded in the hand during the fighting. He described how the militants drove a Humvee packed with explosives into the entrance of the district governor's compound and blew it up before other fighters tried to overrun the police defenders.

"They put all their effort into it but they could not defeat us," Zwak told Reuters from a hospital in Ghazni city.

Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said, however, that the fighters had gained control of Waghaz district, straddling the highway to the south of the city and fighting was continuing in other areas.

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He said several members of the security forces had been killed and many vehicles destroyed along with weapons and ammunition.

The provincial police chief said the Taliban had suffered far heavier casualties, with 25 fighters killed, while only two members of the security forces died.

"The Taliban put all their pressure on Afghan security forces to take control of at least one district but we fought well and pushed them back," Amerkhil said.

(Reporting by Mustafa Andalib, writing by James Mackenzie; Editing by Simon Cameron-Moore)

Housecarl · May 20, 2017

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https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/d...colonial-boundaries-middle-east-north-africa/

Divided tribes: the impact of colonial boundaries in the Middle East and North Africa

19 May 2017|Jacob Rosen-Koenigsbuch

In their grab for influence and resources, colonial powers drew artificial borders across the Middle East and North Africa, often arbitrarily splitting traditional tribal territories into new states. Clans and families found themselves living in different countries. It was bearable at the beginning since no real physical barriers were erected, meaning that the nomad and semi-nomad tribes continued their routine movements and family contacts weren’t interrupted. Most states established patterns of dependence and inclusion with these tribal populations which included representation in state institutions, financial subsidies and assurances of non-interference in their jurisdiction and practices.

It wasn’t a perfect formula but it created a modus vivendi that served both the tribes and the regimes so long as the states could provide the means to keep the tribes loyal mainly through financial subsidies. The model worked for more than half a century from Algeria, through Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq and the Horn of Africa. Little was invested in education, so tribal leaders were kept busy maintaining their tribal authority and prestige—prerequisites for survival in the unforgiving sands of Arabia and the Sahara desert.

This comfortable equilibrium started fraying at the edges towards the end of the 20th century when literacy improvements coincided with the rapid spread of cellular communications. Tribes in Egypt, Syria and Yemen began to feel disenfranchised by privatisation policies brought about by globalisation. The trend was accelerated by the 2011 upheavals naively dubbed ‘The Arab Spring’. Central authority was severely weakened in most places across the Middle East and North Africa, preventing authorities providing the tribes with the essentials, which were mainly economic, needed to maintain their loyalty.

These tectonic changes want hand in hand with the spread of social media. The practical disappearance of international borders in some places contributed to the meltdown. Remote tribal clans, spread across three or four countries in Northern Africa like the Tuareg in Algeria, Tunisia and Libya or the big Annazah, Rawallah, Shammar tribes in Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan in Western Asia which had managed to stay in contact over decades, began communicating intensively through new media and taking advantage of the breakdown of the borders. Doing so helped them to spread ideas and to coordinate moves and policies. This happened also with the Bedouin tribes in the Sinai Peninsula, Southern Israel, the Gaza Strip, Jordan and Northern Saudi Arabia.

To complicate the situation, dangerous new elements in the shape of al-Qaeda and ISIS took advantage of the governance vacuum. These Jihadi-Salafi groups influenced some tribes through a combination of financial benefits and a show of cruel power which sometimes disrupted their organic and traditional structures. In other places (such as Syria), the tribes split between opposing the regime or supporting it. That new factor turns the traditional equation into a triangle: state, tribes and Jihadi-Salafism.

Here we come to the contemporary challenge: who’s going to find out what happens among those dispersed tribes and how are they going to do that? This isn’t an academic or social question but an intensely practical one. European, North American and Australian diplomats, armed forces and NGOs operate in those areas but most of their quarters are either closed or fortified by barbed wire and concrete protective walls, hindering efforts to discharge their classical duties. Baghdad’s ‘Green Zone’, home to most of the embassies, is an example of such disconnect, as is the phenomenon of trying to monitor the situation in Syria through the staff who have been withdrawn from Damascus and rehomed in Beirut.

Operational and political decisions have to be made and policies adopted now to help resolve situations created over a century ago. How much support, in equipment and finance, should be extended to tribes in return of fighting against ISIS or turning their back on their current “allies”? That’s a current and valid issue in Syria, Libya, Yemen and Iraq. Such complex decisions must be based on the best information available. How can one sense the mood of the tribes in Deir Al-Zour Province in Eastern Syria and Al-Anbar Province in Western Iraq who reside along the Euphrates River on whether joint regional self-rule will work in the future? How much support may the Ruwallah, Shammar and Annazah factions in different countries provide to their brethren in other countries? And how are Kurdish tribal groups in Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey planning for their common future at the same time as their nations of residence are using them as a proxy against their rivals?

The complicated picture on the ground gives rise to the question of who should monitor and research these cross-border issues. At the moment there exists no cohesive architecture or mechanism to carry out such activities. Such an oversight obscures our vision of what is happening in the Middle East and North Africa, where the sands keep shifting.

AUTHOR
Jacob Rosen-Koenigsbuch served as Israel’s ambassador in Jordan (2006-2009). He is currently an independent consultant on demographic mapping and collects books about Lawrence of Arabia. Image courtesy of Flickr user Pablo Porsia.

Housecarl · May 20, 2017

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https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-plan-breaking-blue-waters/

China’s PLAN—breaking out to blue waters

18 May 2017|Eli Huang

On 25 December 2016, the PLAN deployed its Liaoning carrier group beyond the First Island Chain for the first time, in what many considered to be a warning to Taipei after President Tsai Ing-wen’s phone call with US President-elect Donald Trump. The PLA’s activities in the Western Pacific continued after President Trump told President Xi that the US would honor the ‘One China’ policy.

On March 2, PLAAF fighters, bombers, and early warning aircraft transited the Miyako Strait and entered the western Pacific for joint exercises with the PLAN’s far-sea training taskforce including the destroyers Changsha and Haikou and supply ship Luomahu. A PLAN task force left Sanya on 10 February for a joint exercise with an aviation force in the South China Sea and the eastern Indian Ocean, and then returned by the south-eastern waters of Taiwan to the Western Pacific.

The PLAN’s naval drills are not only political exercises and a warning to the US, but also a basis for routine PLAN activities in the future. China’s maritime strategy is clearly moving beyond the traditional ‘island chain’ boundary that has limited the PLAN’s operations and development in the past

The island chain is originally an American strategic concept that was adopted by then PLAN commander Admiral Liu Huaqing who set ‘command of the sea out to the First Island Chain’ as the initial goal for modernizing the navy in the 1980s. But while Western media and analysis focus on Liaoning’s deployment through the First Island Chain, Chinese military media chose to de-emphasise the island chain concept. On 5 January 2017, the PLA Daily published an op-ed suggesting the island chain barrier was just a psychological threshold for PLAN itself.

The Chinese media’s reaction is highly significant in the signals it sends about China’s future naval intentions. It makes clear that the most significant barrier to China’s development of sea power is not the geopolitical environment or lack of capability but a psychological fixation over the island chains which has become an obstacle to PLAN’s formulation of a comprehensive maritime strategy. This intangible mental boundary needlessly prevented development of true sea power. Internal debate within the PLAN over the significance of the First Island Chain has recently intensified. In January 2013, political commissar of the Liaoning, Mei Wen, stated that ‘the so-called first island chain and second island chain should not be chains to bind up development of the Chinese Navy, but navigation marks for the Chinese Navy to sail into the vast oceans.’

This encouraged the PLA to shift its view of the island chain. On 7 February 2014, PLA Naval Military Studies Research Institute member, Zhang Junshe, wrote in the PLA Daily that the PLAN should change its strategic mindset and not be restricted by the existence of the island chains. This will alter the debate among Chinese thinkers and transform China’s focus from the limitations of the island chain to development of a blue water navy.

If China is breaking self-imposed barriers, expect expeditionary deployments to become a routine PLAN activity in the near future. That would also require greater operational support from other PLA arms. In this context, the PLA and PLAAF’s Far Sea joint exercise on 2 March suggests that China’s Eastern Theater Command aims to increase its ability to project power and gain air superiority beyond the mainland to support naval operations.

From Taiwan’s perspective, all of this increases risks. Sea-air joint operations, along with operations by the Rocket Force and Strategic Support Force against Taiwan’s C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) system, reinforce the perception of a deteriorating security outlook across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense has confirmed that Chinese DF-16 precision ballistic missiles now target the island.

With a lot of focus on Chinese activities in the South China Sea, it’s important not to forget Taiwan’s security interests are at stake as well. Chinese naval activities, such as the Liaoning deployment, and regular probes by PLAAF airpower, are reinforcing the prospect of a more contested security outlook for Taiwan.

AUTHOR
Eli Huang is special assistant of Dr. Chong-Pin Lin, former deputy minister of National Defense in Taiwan. She is also a columnist for Defense International, a commercial monthly military magazine published in Taiwan.

Housecarl · May 20, 2017

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https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/20/world/asia/china-cia-spies-espionage.html?_r=0

ASIA PACIFIC

Killing C.I.A. Informants, China Crippled U.S. Spying Operations

By MARK MAZZETTI, ADAM GOLDMAN, MICHAEL S. SCHMIDT and MATT APUZZO
MAY 20, 2017

WASHINGTON — The Chinese government systematically dismantled C.I.A. spying operations in the country starting in 2010, killing or imprisoning more than a dozen sources over two years and crippling intelligence gathering there for years afterward.

Current and former American officials described the intelligence breach as one of the worst in decades. It set off a scramble in Washington’s intelligence and law enforcement agencies to contain the fallout, but investigators were bitterly divided over the cause. Some were convinced that a mole within the C.I.A. had betrayed the United States. Others believed that the Chinese had hacked the covert system the C.I.A. used to communicate with its foreign sources. Years later, that debate remains unresolved.

But there was no disagreement about the damage. From the final weeks of 2010 through the end of 2012, according to former American officials, the Chinese killed at least a dozen of the C.I.A.’s sources. According to three of the officials, one was shot in front of his colleagues in the courtyard of a government building — a message to others who might have been working for the C.I.A.

Still others were put in jail. All told, the Chinese killed or imprisoned 18 to 20 of the C.I.A.’s sources in China, according to two former senior American officials, effectively unraveling a network that had taken years to build.

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Assessing the fallout from an exposed spy operation can be difficult, but the episode was considered particularly damaging. The number of American assets lost in China, officials said, rivaled those lost in the Soviet Union and Russia during the betrayals of both Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen, formerly of the C.I.A. and the F.B.I., who divulged intelligence operations to Moscow for years.

The previously unreported episode shows how successful the Chinese were in disrupting American spying efforts and stealing secrets years before a well-publicized breach in 2015 gave Beijing access to thousands of government personnel records, including intelligence contractors. The C.I.A. considers spying in China one of its top priorities, but the country’s extensive security apparatus makes it exceptionally hard for Western spy services to develop sources there.

At a time when the C.I.A. is trying to figure out how some of its most sensitive documents were leaked onto the internet two months ago by WikiLeaks, and the F.B.I. investigates possible ties between President Trump’s campaign and Russia, the unsettled nature of the China investigation demonstrates the difficulty of conducting counterespionage investigations into sophisticated spy services like those in Russia and China.

The C.I.A. and the F.B.I. both declined to comment.

Details about the investigation have been tightly held. Ten current and former American officials described the investigation on the condition of anonymity because they did not want to be identified discussing the information.

Photo

Investigators still disagree how it happened, but the unsettled nature of the China investigation demonstrates the difficulty of conducting counterespionage investigations into sophisticated spy services. Credit Carolyn Kaster/Associated Press..

The first signs of trouble emerged in 2010. At the time, the quality of the C.I.A.’s information about the inner workings of the Chinese government was the best it had been for years, the result of recruiting sources deep inside the bureaucracy in Beijing, four former officials said. Some were Chinese nationals who the C.I.A. believed had become disillusioned with the Chinese government’s corruption.

But by the end of the year, the flow of information began to dry up. By early 2011, senior agency officers realized they had a problem: Assets in China, one of their most precious resources, were disappearing.

The F.B.I. and the C.I.A. opened a joint investigation run by top counterintelligence officials at both agencies. Working out of a secret office in Northern Virginia, they began analyzing every operation being run in Beijing. One former senior American official said the investigation had been code-named Honey Badger.

As more and more sources vanished, the operation took on increased urgency. Nearly every employee at the American Embassy was scrutinized, no matter how high ranking. Some investigators believed the Chinese had cracked the encrypted method that the C.I.A. used to communicate with its assets. Others suspected a traitor in the C.I.A., a theory that agency officials were at first reluctant to embrace — and that some in both agencies still do not believe.

Their debates were punctuated with macabre phone calls — “We lost another one” — and urgent questions from the Obama administration wondering why intelligence about the Chinese had slowed.

The mole hunt eventually zeroed in on a former agency operative who had worked in the C.I.A.’s division overseeing China, believing he was most likely responsible for the crippling disclosures. But efforts to gather enough evidence to arrest him failed, and he is now living in another Asian country, current and former officials said.

There was good reason to suspect an insider, some former officials say. Around that time, Chinese spies compromised National Security Agency surveillance in Taiwan — an island Beijing claims is part of China — by infiltrating Taiwanese intelligence, an American partner, according to two former officials. And the C.I.A. had discovered Chinese operatives in the agency’s hiring pipeline, according to officials and court documents.

But the C.I.A.’s top spy hunter, Mark Kelton, resisted the mole theory, at least initially, former officials say. Mr. Kelton had been close friends with Brian J. Kelley, a C.I.A. officer who in the 1990s was wrongly suspected by the F.B.I. of being a Russian spy. The real traitor, it turned out, was Mr. Hanssen. Mr. Kelton often mentioned Mr. Kelley’s mistreatment in meetings during the China episode, former colleagues say, and said he would not accuse someone without ironclad evidence.

Those who rejected the mole theory attributed the losses to sloppy American tradecraft at a time when the Chinese were becoming better at monitoring American espionage activities in the country. Some F.B.I. agents became convinced that C.I.A. handlers in Beijing too often traveled the same routes to the same meeting points, which would have helped China’s vast surveillance network identify the spies in its midst.

Some officers met their sources at a restaurant where Chinese agents had planted listening devices, former officials said, and even the waiters worked for Chinese intelligence.

This carelessness, coupled with the possibility that the Chinese had hacked the covert communications channel, would explain many, if not all, of the disappearances and deaths, some former officials said. Some in the agency, particularly those who had helped build the spy network, resisted this theory and believed they had been caught in the middle of a turf war within the C.I.A.

Still, the Chinese picked off more and more of the agency’s spies, continuing through 2011 and into 2012. As investigators narrowed the list of suspects with access to the information, they started focusing on a Chinese-American who had left the C.I.A. shortly before the intelligence losses began. Some investigators believed he had become disgruntled and had begun spying for China. One official said the man had access to the identities of C.I.A. informants and fit all the indicators on a matrix used to identify espionage threats.

After leaving the C.I.A., the man decided to remain in Asia with his family and pursue a business opportunity, which some officials suspect that Chinese intelligence agents had arranged.

Officials said the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. lured the man back to the United States around 2012 with a ruse about a possible contract with the agency, an arrangement common among former officers. Agents questioned the man, asking why he had decided to stay in Asia, concerned that he possessed a number of secrets that would be valuable to the Chinese. It’s not clear whether agents confronted the man about whether he had spied for China.

The man defended his reasons for living in Asia and did not admit any wrongdoing, an official said. He then returned to Asia.

By 2013, the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. concluded that China’s success in identifying C.I.A. agents had been blunted — it is not clear how — but the damage had been done.

The C.I.A. has tried to rebuild its network of spies in China, officials said, an expensive and time-consuming effort led at one time by the former chief of the East Asia Division. A former intelligence official said the former chief was particularly bitter because he had worked with the suspected mole and recruited some of the spies in China who were ultimately executed.

China has been particularly aggressive in its espionage in recent years, beyond the breach of the Office of Personnel Management records in 2015, American officials said. Last year, an F.B.I. employee pleaded guilty to acting as a Chinese agent for years, passing sensitive technology information to Beijing in exchange for cash, lavish hotel rooms during foreign travel and prostitutes.

In March, prosecutors announced the arrest of a longtime State Department employee, Candace Marie Claiborne, accused of lying to investigators about her contacts with Chinese officials. According to the criminal complaint against Ms. Claiborne, who pleaded not guilty, Chinese agents wired cash into her bank account and showered her with gifts that included an iPhone, a laptop and tuition at a Chinese fashion school. In addition, according to the complaint, she received a fully furnished apartment and a stipend.

RELATED COVERAGE
China Is Reluctant to Blame North Korea, Its Ally, for Cyberattack MAY 17, 2017

A Breezy Resort, and a Thorny Agenda, for Trump’s Meeting With Xi Jinping of China MARCH 14, 2017

Housecarl · May 20, 2017

http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...ain-Thread-All-things-Korea-May-20th-May-26th

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://38north.org/2017/05/hwasong051917/

A Quick Technical Analysis of the Hwasong-12

By Ralph Savelsberg
19 May 2017

Summary

On May 14, North Korea flight-tested a new ballistic missile, the Hwasong-12. This missile was first revealed during the April 15 military parade commemorating Kim Il Sung’s 105th birthday, and has since been the subject of much scrutiny as North Korea watchers try to assess its dimensions and capabilities, as well as what it contributes to the North’s overall ballistic missile program.

At a first glance, the successful flight-test of the Hwasong-12 appeared to have implications for North Korea’s efforts to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), but to what extent is still unclear given the limited information available. In this article, I have run computer simulations to help assess the missile’s range and performance. The missile’s parameters were estimated based on close examination of the available photographs and missile trajectory, with a large focus on engine performance. Based on the results of the simulations, it would seem that the Hwasong-12 is simply a larger variant of the existing Hwasong-10 or Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with a similar engine and a lighter construction, offering only slight gains in range but with limitations on mobility. While the new missile may serve as a testbed for some of the technology intended for an ICBM, the flight-test did not provide evidence of a major step forward in North Korea’s ICBM program.

Introduction

North Korea has displayed supposedly road-mobile ICBMs, known as the KN-08 and KN-14, during past military parades, and while Kim Jong Un announced in his 2017 New Year’s Address that the country was close to being ready to flight-test an ICBM, no test has taken place to date.

The most powerful rocket that North Korea has flight-tested is its Unha-3, which was used to successfully launch small satellites into orbit in 2012 and 2016. In 2006, an attempted launch of an ICBM based on this rocket, known as the Taepodong-2, ended in failure; the Taepodong-2 is also too large for mobile use.

The Unha-3 uses four Nodong engines for its first stage; a smaller missile with an intercontinental range will require more advanced rocket engines. So far, the most powerful liquid-fuelled engine that North Korea is known to have flight-tested is the engine used in the Hwasong-10 or Musudan IRBM. This engine is closely related to the one used in the Soviet R-27 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). By itself, it does not have sufficient thrust to lift the mass of an ICBM, so using this type of engine for an ICBM would require combining at least two of them. However, because the R-27 engine was uniquely tailored for use in a very compact SLBM, building a rocket stage that incorporates two is an immensely complicated task. Photographs of ground tests of what appear to be two R-27 engines mounted very close together were published in 2016, but this combination does not appear to have been test-flown. Some experts speculate that the engine used in this test was the new engine North Korea tested in March, but it is difficult to confirm this based on the photographs alone.

Additionally, North Korea has yet to demonstrate a working re-entry vehicle (RV) with a heat shield suitable for an ICBM. An ICBM’s RV enters the atmosphere at a much higher velocity than North-Korea’s known IRBMs and is therefore subject to much higher temperatures and stresses that cannot be fully replicated in ground tests. Flight-testing an RV design on the trajectory flown by the Hwasong-12 could provide more realistic conditions, but a truly convincing demonstration would have to involve even higher velocities.

Hwasong-12 Test Parameters

During the test-launch of the Hwasong-12, the missile reportedly flew on a lofted trajectory, covering a range of in roughly 30 minutes and reaching apogee at an altitude of 2,000 km.[1] This performance has led to speculation that the missile is closely related to North Korea’s efforts to build a road-mobile ICBM, and it may have indeed used the engines intended for this.[2]

Based on photographs of the test released by North Korean state media, the Hwasong-12 appears to be a single-stage missile powered by a single large engine coupled to four vernier engines (see Figure 1).[3] A single uninterrupted cable raceway is clearly visible on the outside of the missile, running from just below the re-entry vehicle towards the engine compartment at the bottom. This routes wires connecting the guidance system to the vernier engines along the outside of the propellant tanks. If the missile had multiple stages, one would expect the raceway to be interrupted near the location where the stages separate.

Other photographs show that the missile was transported on a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) similar to the vehicle used to launch the Musudan. Video footage of the launch shows that the missile was not launched from the vehicle, but from a detachable launch table. (See Figure 2 for a series of frames.)

Figure 1. The May 14 flight-test of the Hwasong-12.

http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Fig1_Hwasong-Test_17-0519-300x225.jpg
Photo: KCNA/Reuters
Missile Trajectory Simulations

To assess the Hwasong-12’s performance, I have run computer simulations of its trajectory. Parameters were estimated based on available photographs and baseline parameters of the Musudan. The diameter of the missile is similar to that of the Musudan at roughly 1.5 m, but it is longer and slightly flared at the base. Including the warhead, its approximate length is 15.7 m. The booster length is approximately 12.4 m. I assume that the single main engine is essentially an R-27 engine, as flown in the Musudan, but with the addition of two more verniers. This leads to a small increase in the mass flow and thrust.

For the propellant, I assume dinitrogen tetroxide (N2O4) as the oxidizer and unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine (UDMH) as the fuel, with corresponding values for the specific impulse—a measure of the fuel’s effectiveness. This is the same propellant combination as used in the R-27. The length of the missile allows estimating the propellant volume and propellant mass, leading to the parameters in Table 1.

Simulations of the lofted flight of the Musudan, in June 2016, showed that this was most likely flown with an empty re-entry vehicle, with a mass of 150 kg for just the empty heat shield.[4] I assume that this was the case for the Hwasong-12 as well. The model for calculating the trajectory is the same as that used for the earlier analysis of the Musudan.

Figure 2. Frame by frame photos of the Hwasong-12 flight test.

http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Fig2_Hwasong-Test_17-0519-300x196.jpg
Photo: KCNA/ Reuters
Table 1: Parameters of the Hwasong-12 used in the simulation.

http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/HS-12-Simulation-Parameters-298x300.jpg
HS-12 Simulation Parameters

With these parameters, a lofted trajectory over a distance of 700 km was simulated, with a launch originating from Kusong. The initial heading was 70 degrees. The simulation includes the effects of Earth rotation. The maximum altitude reached during the flight is 2,000 km and the total flight time is close to 30 minutes, both similar to the reported values. The simulated trajectory is shown in Figure 3, and a visualization using Google Earth is shown in Figure 4.

Figure 3. Computer simulated lofted trajectory.

http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Fig3_Hwasong-Test_17-05191-300x212.png
Fig3_Hwasong Test_17 0519
(Image: R. Savelberg)
In order to obtain this performance, the structural mass of the booster had to be reduced to 7 percent of the total booster mass. The lengthening of propellant tanks tends to decrease this number, but its low value means that the construction of the propellant tanks is unusually light. The equivalent number for the R-27, for instance, is closer to 10 percent.

The use of a TEL to transport the Hwasong-12 suggests that it is meant to be a mobile weapon, but given these parameters, one can expect the missile airframe to be quite fragile and unsuitable for transport and erection with propellant inside. This means that the missile would have to be fuelled after being positioned vertically on its launch table, which dramatically increases launch preparation time.

The presumed N2O4 oxidizer also has a very limited temperature range in which it can be safely stored and used, further limiting the missile’s usefulness as a mobile system. Inhibited fuming red nitric acid (IFRNA) could serve as an alternative oxidizer since it is easier to handle safely, but this would result in a lower specific impulse. Therefore, if the Hwasong-12 had used IFRNA, it would not have had sufficient thrust for the trajectory it flew during the flight test.

Figure 4. Visualization of the lofted trajectory reportedly flown by the Hwasong-12 in Google Earth.

http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Fig4_Hwasong-Test_17-0519-300x164.jpg
Fig4_Hwasong Test_17 0519
(Image: R. Savelberg)
The lofted trajectory of the test flight is atypical for a ballistic missile. However, the Musudan, during its single successful flight in 2016, flew a similarly lofted trajectory over a distance of 400 km, reaching an altitude of more than 1,000 km.[5] The Hwasong-12 flew both farther and higher. Consequently, if it were to be flown on a minimum-energy trajectory, which maximises the range, it can cover a longer distance than the Musudan.

With a payload of 650 kg (equivalent to the payload of the R-27, including the heat shield, but likely lighter than a North Korean nuclear warhead), its simulated maximum range is more than 3,700 km (on a 70 degreeheading, including Earth rotation) (see Figure 5). Provided that North Korea has a sufficiently accurate guidance technology, this would theoretically allow the Hwasong-12 to reach Guam, at a distance of roughly 3,400 km—a target that cannot be reached by the Musudan.

In the simulation of the lofted trajectory, the velocity during the re-entry peaks at 5.4 km/s. This is only marginally higher than the maximum of 5.2 km/s reached in the simulation of the minimum-energy trajectory. Therefore, testing a new heat shield for the re-entry vehicle is not a likely explanation for the choice of a lofted trajectory. The more likely reason for this choice is that the missile cannot be flown on minimum-energy trajectories without violating the airspace of other countries in the region, such as Japan. The velocity is a lot higher than the peak velocity reached by the Musudan, however, and is closer to ICBM velocities.

Figure 5. Simulated minimum energy trajectory with a payload of 650 kg.

http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Picture5-300x212.jpg
(Image: R. Savelberg)
Implications

Based on photographs and computer simulations, the Hwasong-12 appears to be a longer, lighter version of the Musudan. However, the main engine is not significantly more powerful than engines North Korea has already test-flown.

The missile does have a higher performance than the Musudan, being able to deliver a payload as far as Guam, but its light construction and fuel/oxidizer mix mean that it is ill-suited for mobile use. Additionally, despite its light construction, it is still heavy compared to the thrust of this engine, which means that there is little room for further growth.

While the new missile may serve as a testbed for some of the technology intended for an ICBM—for instance the heat shield—the May 14 flight test of the Hwasong-12 did not provide evidence of a major step forward in North-Korea’s ICBM program.

[1] David Wright, “North Korea’s Missile in New Test Would Have 4,500 km range”, 38 North, May 13, 2017, http://allthingsnuclear.org/dwright/north-koreas-missile-in-new-test-would-have-4500-km-range.

[2] John Schilling, “North Korea’s Latest Missile Test: Advancing towards an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) While Avoiding US Military Action,” 38 North, May 14, 2017, http://38north.org/2017/05/jschilling051417/.

[3] It is possible that the missile is a two-stage missile, where the system is largely internal and invisible, but we cannot confirm this with the limited information available.

[4] Ralph Savelsberg and James Kiessling, “North Korea’s Musudan Missile; A Performance Assessment”, 38 North, December 20, 2016, http://38north.org/2016/12/musudan122016/.

[5] John Schilling, “A partial success for the Musudan,” 38 North, June 23, 2016, http://38north.org/2016/06/jschilling062316/.

Found in section: WMD
Tags: ballistic missile, hwasong-12, missile test, ralph savelsberg, transporter-erector-launcher, WMD

Previous Topic: North Korea’s Sohae Satellite Launching Station: Facility Upgrades Continue

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For links see article source.....
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http://armscontrolwonk.libsyn.com/the-hwasong-12-finally

Mon, 15 May 2017

The Hwasong-12, finally

North Korea has finally tested (successfully) a new missile -- and boy it is a doozy. After the April 15 parade, we called this missile the KN-08 Mod Odd and the KN-08 +/-. But North Korea calls it the Hwasong-12 and it contains a surprise: the brand-new "indigenous" engine that North Korea debuted in March.

Jeffrey and Scott discuss this new IRBM, its odd firing table and launch configuration, the propaganda of missile testing, and whether or not an ICBM is next.

https://assets.libsyn.com/secure/show/59527/MM00255799.jpg
Direct download: 39.mp3
Category:general -- posted at: 3:31pm EDT

Housecarl · May 20, 2017

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http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-N...-attack-on-Libya-airbase/8801495204788/?nll=1

Dozens killed in army attack on Libya airbase

By Ed Adamczyk Contact the Author | May 19, 2017 at 11:15 AM

May 19 (UPI) -- At least 60 people were killed at a rebel airbase in Libya this week by government forces, the country's defense ministry said.

The Third Force of the Government of National Accord, the internationally recognized government of Libya, said it attacked and captured the Brak Shati airbase in southern Libya. The facility, near the government-held city of Sabha, was seized after heavy fighting Thursday with forces of Operation Dignity, a faction of the rebel Libyan National army led by military strongman Khalifa Haftar.

The groups are part of a web of rival militias and shifting alliances in Libya, a country without a strong central government since the ouster of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. An informal truce was reached in southern Libya earlier this month after Haftar met with recognized Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj.

Government army spokesman Mohammad Agliwan said the attackers "liberated the base and destroyed all the forces inside."

An area hospital treated dozens of fighters and civilian workers, the BBC reported Friday, adding that the majority of the fatalities were allied with the Libyan National Army.

Follow us on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram for more news from UPI.com

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Housecarl · May 20, 2017

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https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-05/nato-isn’t-“obsolete”-—-it’s-not-ready

NATO Isn’t “Obsolete” — But It’s Not Ready

Proceedings Magazine - May 2017 Vol. 143/5/1,371
Comments 2

Then-President-elect Donald Trump startled U.S. alliance partners in Europe when he described NATO as “obsolete.” He really unnerved them by suggesting future U.S. commitments to defend members of that alliance might be conditional, depending on whether they had met their obligations to adequately fund their own defenses. Nonetheless, several senior U.S. policymakers traveled to Europe this February to reassure NATO allies that the United States would stand by its commitments. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis was reassuring. At the annual Munich Security Conference, he noted, “President Trump came into office and has thrown now his full support to NATO .” But he also repeated a concern about the shared obligations of NATO members, observing bluntly, “It is a fair demand that all who benefit from the best alliance in the world carry their proportionate share of the necessary costs to defend our freedoms.”

European contributions to NATO’s overall readiness have been a concern for the past few years. NATO’s anemic military budgets after 1991 were understandable given the reduced threat to European security. Then the recession of 2008 came, and NATO defense spending declined sharply, although this has been masked by the addition of new members, including Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Baltic States. Still, impelled by the financial crisis, security spending in Europe dropped 14 percent , 2007-2014.

Thanks to Russia’s assertive behavior, Europe’s disarmament has stopped and a modest funding increase has begun, consistent with the agreements announced at the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014. That announcement articulated a general commitment to move toward a common goal of investing 2 percent of GDP by 2024. Despite its flaws as a crude input, the 2 percent GDP metric is a transparent goal and a reflection of commitment. As such it is likely to remain the standard in the debate over shared obligations in NATO.

Progress toward that aim is slow. NATO claims a 3.8 percent increase in NATO European defense expenditures, which equates to a significant $10 billion (U.S.) boost in spending. This is the first aggregate increase since 2008’s financial crisis; with notable increases from both Germany and Italy. The major point is that the defense decline has been turned around but more progress is needed, just as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg inveighed at the February Munich Security Conference. Yet some German politicians believe Russia is a temporary problem and that significant increases in security spending are not warranted. Domestic politics has allowed Germany’s defense spending to flatten at 1.2 percent of GDP. Given that nation’s large economy that level should still produce substantial real combat capability. However, the German military is considered overstretched and underfunded . This is what pushed Secretary Mattis to tell his European audience at the conference: “Americans cannot care more for your children's future security than you do.”

In a speech at Brussels, Secretary Mattis warned: “If your nations do not want to see America moderate its commitment to this alliance, each of your capitals needs to show support for our common defense.” A formal partnership like NATO should have agreement about pooled resources and risk. No one should be trying to shortchange other partners.

The Next Summit

The first steps toward the fair and proper funding of NATO were taken at Wales and need to be pursued with resolute political leadership and a common understanding of the dangers the United States seeks to prevent. The President recently hosted the Secretary General in Washington and again expressed his support for NATO . He should do so again this spring at the upcoming mini-summit.

NATO remains the world’s great alliance, and it should remain capable in the face of old threats that have reemerged in the 21 st century. Maintaining the territorial integrity of Europe’s borders is the greatest challenge the alliance has faced since the Cold War. That should be NATO’s focus for now and remain the primary agenda item for the upcoming summit scheduled for later this month.

The Trump administration should continue to make the U.S. Article V commitment to allies unambiguous, but it also should make additive commitments of funding more conditional on NATO sustaining its progress. The United States should be patient with its allies but equally persistent about measuring real warfighting capability. This would put begin to put teeth into NATO as a deterrent force and ensure it contributes to what Dr. Stan Sloan rightfully calls the “ Defense of the West ” (Oxford University Press, 2016). At the end of the day, NATO underwrites a free and prosperous Europe able to secure its borders against aggression. This is not just a priority for European friends, but a vital interest of the United States.

Dr. Hoffman is a Distinguished Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense University.

Lilbitsnana · May 23, 2017

Steve Herman‏Verified account @W7VOA 3h3 hours ago

Steve Herman Retweeted Reuters Top News

-@Raytheon allied with @MitsubishiHVAC while @LockheedMartin working with @Fujitsu_Global.

Steve Herman added,

Reuters Top NewsVerified account @Reuters
Exclusive: U.S., Japanese firms collaborating on new missile defense radars - sources http://reut.rs/2rvkp5Z

posted for fair use and discussion
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-j...=topNews&utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=Social

Exclusive: U.S., Japanese firms collaborating on new missile defense radars - sources

Raytheon Co and Lockheed Martin Corp are working with Japanese partners on rival projects to develop new radars that will enhance Japan's shield against any North Korean missile strike, government and defense industry sources in Tokyo told Reuters.

As nuclear-armed Pyongyang builds ever more advanced missiles with the ability to strike anywhere in Japan, Tokyo is likely to fund a ground version of the ship-based Aegis defense system deployed on warships in the Sea of Japan, other sources had said earlier.

Raytheon is allied with Mitsubishi Electric Corp on the project while Lockheed is working with Fujitsu Ltd. The intent is to extend the range of Japan's detection and targeting radars multiple times beyond range of models currently deployed at sea, the five government and industry sources said.

"Japan's government is very interested in acquiring this capability," said one of the sources with knowledge of the radar plans. The sources asked not to be identified because they were not authorized to speak to the media.

"Japan wants to have Aegis Ashore operational by 2023 at the latest," said another of the sources.

Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and Mitsubishi Electric declined comment, while Fujitsu did not respond to requests for comment.

A spokesman for Japan's Ministry of Defense said Tokyo did not currently have any concrete plans to collaborate with the United States on Aegis radars. "It is not our place to discuss the activities of corporations," the spokesman added.

The proposed Aegis Ashore radars would be variants of models already developed by Raytheon and Lockheed, the sources said. They would include components using gallium nitride, an advanced material fabricated separately by Mitsubishi Electric and Fujitsu that can amplify power far more efficiently than conventional silicon-based semiconductors.

Nuclear-capable North Korea has a fast accelerating missile development program and Japanese officials have been worried that its ballistic missile defenses (BMD) could be overwhelmed by swarm attacks or be circumvented by warheads launched on lofted trajectories.

In the latest snub to demands it end its weapons program, North Korea on Sunday fired what it described as a intermediate-range ballistic missile that flew about 500 km (311 miles), falling into waters off its east coast.

It had tested another missile the previous Sunday. North Korea said that launch tested the capability to carry a "large-size heavy nuclear warhead" and put the U.S. mainland within "sighting range."

Japan would likely need three Aegis Ashore batteries to cover the whole country, each of which would cost around $700 million without missiles, one of the sources said.

EXPORT

The idea is that such systems could eventually be sold to the U.S. or other militaries, representing a second chance for Japan to break into global arms markets after a failed bid last year to sell Australia a fleet of submarines in what Tokyo had hoped would spur military exports.
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Prime Minister Shinzo Abe ended a decades-old ban on arms exports in 2014 to help beef up the nation's military and lower the unit cost of home-built military equipment but Japan's long-isolated defense companies have so far had scant success winning business overseas.

"Rather than a fully engineered submarine or other platform, the best way Japan can win export deals is to get Japanese components and technology integrated into U.S. equipment," another of the sources said.

Japan is expected to make a final decision to acquire a ground-based Aegis system this year. It has also looked at buying THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense), which would add a third layer of defense between Aegis and Japan's last line of defense PAC-3 Patriot missiles, to counter the North Korean threat.

Each THAAD battery, which come with missiles already loaded, costs around $1 billion.

Using either THAAD or beefed up Aegis radars could, however, anger China, which is already upset that THAAD batteries recently deployed in South Korea can peer deep beyond its border.

(Editing by Raju Gopalakrishnan)

Housecarl · May 23, 2017

UK, reported explosion, gunfire at Ariana Grande show at Manchester Arena
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Philippine President Declares Martial Law
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9:15 ETD This Morning-POTUS Trump's Historic Arab Islamic Speech TUNE IN NOW!
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Trump to Abbas: There Can Be No Peace When Violence is Rewarded
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North Korea attack drones carrying biological, chemical weapons can strike Seoul within 1
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ANTIFA CALLS FOR DIRECT ISLAMIC GROUND SUPPORT
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http://www.realcleardefense.com/art...l_qaeda_compound_in_central_yemen_111443.html

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archi...s-raid-al-qaeda-compound-in-central-yemen.php

US special forces raid al Qaeda compound in central Yemen

BY BILL ROGGIO | May 23, 2017 | admin@longwarjournal.org | @billroggio
US special operations forces raided an al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) compound in Marib province in central Yemen earlier today and killed seven operatives. The operation took place just days after the US Treasury Department listed two tribal leaders from Marib as global terrorists for supporting al Qaeda.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) said seven AQAP members were killed “through a combination of small arms fire and precision airstrikes.” No senior al Qaeda leaders or operatives were reportedly killed.

“Raids such as this provide insight into AQAP’s disposition, capabilities and intentions, which will allow us to continue to pursue, disrupt, and degrade AQAP,” CENTCOM stated.

As in previous statements, CENTCOM also noted that al Qaeda branch in Yemen and Saudi Arabia “has taken advantage of ungoverned spaces in Yemen to plot, direct, and inspire terror attacks against America, its citizens, and allies around the world.”

The US military has conducted at least one other raid against AQAP since President Trump took office. On Jan. 29, special operations forces targeted the home of senior AQAP leader Abdulrauf al Dhahab in the province of Al Baydah. Heavy fighting broke out as US forces entered the village. US forces killed Dhahab and one other senior AQAP leader. However, the raid was controversial, as a US Navy Seal and more than a dozen civilians – including the daughter of radical al Qaeda preacher Anwar al Awlaki – were killed in the fighting.

Marib is an al Qaeda stronghold

Marib province is a known haven for al Qaeda. The first recorded armed drone strike took place in Marib in 2002. The US killed Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, al Qaeda’s operation chief in Yemen who was involved in the bombing of the USS Cole.

Since the US began its air campaign against AQAP in 2009, FDD’s Long War Journal has recorded 26 drone and conventional airstrikes against the group in Marib. Several mid-level AQAP leaders have been killed in Marib during the air campaign, which is ongoing. The US military has launched more than 80 airstrikes throughout Yemen so far this year.

One airstrike in Marib, in May 2010, was highly controversial. US drones killed Jabir al Shabwani, the deputy governor of Marib province, five of his bodyguards, and two al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula operatives, including a local leader. The strike took place as Shabwani was meeting with al Qaeda leader Mohammed Saeed bin Jameel in order to negotiate a peace agreement. Shabwani was the brother of Ayed al Shabwani, the leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Marib province, who was targeted by US drones on at least two other occasions.

Designations highlight AQAP’s tribal ties

Today’s raid in Marib took place just four days after the US Treasury Department listed two tribal leaders from the province as global terorirsts for supporting al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

On May 19, Treasury added Hashim Muhsin Aydarus al-Hamid and Khalid Ali Mabkhut al-Aradah to its list of specially designated global terrorists. In the designation, Hamid was identified as “a tribal leader in Yemen” who “regularly acted as an AQAP facilitator by assisting in the provision of weapons and money for AQAP.”

Aradah was described as “a tribal sheikh and senior AQAP official in Yemen who facilitates financial support to AQAP, to include support to AQAP leadership.” Aradah also runs “an AQAP camp.”

AQAP has been able to maintain a significant presence in southern and central Yemen due to it s strong tribal ties as well as an ongoing civil war that pits Shiite Houthis, the weak central government, and AQAP all against each other. AQAP has taken control of large areas of southern Yemen twice since 2010.

AQAP leverages Ansar al Sharia in an effort to gain local support. In a 2012, the US State Department amended its terrorist designations of AQAP “to include the new alias, Ansar al Sharia.”

According to State, Ansar al Sharia (AAS) “was established to attract potential followers to sharia rule in areas under the control of AQAP. However, AAS is simply AQAP’s effort to rebrand itself, with the aim of manipulating people to join AQAP’s terrorist cause.”

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD's Long War Journal.

Tags: Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen

Housecarl · May 23, 2017

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https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/5/22/reviewing-the-age-of-total-war

#Reviewing The Age of Total War

John Q. Bolton
May 22, 2017

The Age of Total War: 1860-1945. Jeremy Black. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010.

Clausewitz tells us war is inherently unknowable, and once released it becomes an entity unto itself, transforming and growing without regard to the circumstances particular to its creation. But analysis requires categories, and most military professionals accept that war occurs on a continuum, a spectrum of conflict ranging from small-scale guerrilla warfare, to limited war, to conventional combat (force on force) by states leveraging all the elements of national power in a bid to defeat each other. And the period roughly ranging from the American Civil War to the end of World War II is clearly delineated in the scale, scope, duration, and government control of conflict.

It is useful for experts to challenge the consensus in their field and in The Age of Total War Jeremy Black does not disappoint. He not only questions convention, but offers a useful for doing so. Dr. Black’s work is not so much a history as a paean to the historiography and military dogma regarding what we commonly call Total War. After listing the criterion and schema others have used to describe total war, Black acknowledges that any analytical term is inherently an abstraction and that we should not concern ourselves too much with the details of what is or isn't total war. What is important is that the period of history from 1860 to 1945 showed a remarkable break from previous and subsequent periods in terms of the character of fighting, economic and social mobilizations employed, and scale of conflict. Black’s thesis is that this period “bulks large in the study of military history” due to its consequences.[1]

While the military tools employed from 1860-1945 were not necessarily new—blockade for instance—the scale, scope, and consequences of conflict were different. What occurred from 1860-1945 was a confluence of worldwide trends that created fertile ground for the types of major conflicts commonly known as total war: mass industrialization, the collapse of centrifugal trends (especially in Europe) that led to the rise of centralized nation states, and direct interstate competition (imperialism). The result was warfare on an unprecedented scale, a kind of war that fundamentally changed both the nature of the citizen-state relationship and the purpose and capability of armed force, and the creation of industrialized slaughter on a worldwide scale. During this period, warfare also moved from something governments did (a lot) to something societies did relatively infrequently.

Prior to Blacks age of total war, precedent emerging from the post-Napoleonic Councils of Vienna caused the public to generally view major conflicts during this period as a break from a norm, a national emergency. Though common, war was viewed as a distinct type of event, with particular laws, rules, norms, and expectations of citizens. Of course, this model leaves out the huge number of small-scale conflicts waged by imperial powers across the globe, from the Philippines to Egypt to India. The analysis holds true, however, because during this period, major war (not brush fire conflict) was a state-sponsored endeavor. When war occurred, states generally adopted specific wartime measures such as rationing, conscription, and a curtailment of civil liberties designed to enhance production and efficiency. In other words, during this period, war evolved from something armies and governments did to something societies did. In doing so, war became more total.

Black acknowledges the trend of mass war mobilization and societal warfare did not begin in this age, but rather two generations prior during the wars of the French Revolution. This type of warfare became the commonplace after 1865, however. Black acknowledges this historiography may ignore examples of total war from Ancient Rome or China, but it was only during 1865-1945 that total war as Black defines it (mass mobilization, state control of resources, etc.) became both common and fundamental as opposed to an asymmetric advantage. Indeed, he acknowledges his analysis focuses almost entirely on Western Warfare, ignoring major conflicts outside of Europe aside from World War II.

https://static1.squarespace.com/sta...echanized_P-38_conveyor_lines.jpg?format=750w
Overall view of Lockheed's mechanized P-38 assembly line; 10,037 aircraft would be built between 1941 and 1945. (Wikimedia)

Black makes a clear distinction between our common conception of total war as methods—mass mobilization and large campaigns—and the aims of war—total victory. While war has often been total in its means and methods (genocide in Rwanda for example), it’s political purpose is often limited. Even the brutal wars of religion in 15th and 16th century Europe often had limited political goals despite the frequently horrific means employed. On the other hand, many conflicts, even the most brutal ones, do not seek the completion annihilation of adversaries, particularly civilian populations.[2] According to Black, that distinction makes 1860-1945 more unique; during this era both the means of warfare and the political end state sought were often total. The period from 1860-1945 can be thought of as a combination of totality in both areas, ends and ways.

Aside from the Civil War, the United States is the exception to most of the Black’s examples. Unlike Germany, China, Japan, France, or Russia, America emerged from World War I and World War II relatively unscathed, with little or no change in domestic structure or public institutions. Even America’s massive mobilization during the Second World War did not alter the shape or character of its domestic institutions. The war also did not change America’s aversion to foreign entanglements and a large peacetime army; postwar demobilization was rapid and severe. It would take the mass mobilization and drastically different global arrangement of power following the Second World War for Americans to fundamentally change their views on permanent military readiness.

Despite its hold on our imagination as the culmination of interstate conflict, total war as a phenomenon may not repeat itself, at least in the West. There may be another large-scale conflict that requires commensurate mobilization of state resources, but the legalistic and moral frameworks developed during the 20th century, to say nothing of the impact of mass media, may make the battlefield methods of total war (e.g., indiscriminate bombing and brutality) less acceptable. Indeed, such methods may reduce the civilian commitment total war requires. For Europe, the United States, and the most Westernized Asian powers, demographic and social change have increasingly constrained state conduct in war. What Black calls hyper-informed and conscientious populations are critical of the traditional tools used by states during large-scale conflict. Conscription, for example, is nearly extinct in the West, and declined in particular after the Cold War ended.[3] Increasingly diverse populations and shifting demographics weaken concepts of nationalism, further eroding bonds between populations and the state that are particularly important during wartime. Ethnic nationalism remains a strong force, but one that is increasingly localized and tribal; one need only look at domestic politics in the United States today to see that a broader view of “Americanism” is lacking. As a result, it may be difficult to mobilize for even a true national emergency. However, in light of the destruction that total war can bring, even to the victor, this may not necessarily be a bad thing, especially among nuclear-armed states.

What a term or concept is lies in the eye of the beholder; total war can describe nearly any conflict when couched in the proper terms. Moreover, a conflict can be total for one participant while something less for another. Black uses the colonial conquests of the Western powers in the second half of the 19th century and the American Indian Wars to illustrate this point. Black’s use of revolutionary wars—the Chinese Civil War in particular—helps demonstrate that total can also mean the literal reordering of society, leading to a conclusion that one of the most commonly seen types of warfare is in fact total.

The Age of Total War has utility as a text for framing the importance of questioning terms and widely-held beliefs in graduate-level history courses, though its brevity limits usefulness for bachelor’s programs. As a brief summary of major conflicts from 1860-1945 this work succeeds. For the wider audience, however, even history buffs will find the book’s material either redundant or narrowly focused on terminology. By parsing the term total war into various meanings and offering numerous examples of total conflicts outside of 1860-1945, Black proves his own point that total war means different things to different people; consequently, such terms have limits. In doing so, Black renders his postscript so abstract that it will turn off casual readers not focused on the teleology of historical terms.

Black’s work is strongest when he questions conventional wisdom regarding how we see war. His approach is an excellent counter to a linear view of warfare—one that sees the evolution of warfare through various stages, culminating at some point. This is also the view of technologists, those that advocate that technology will fundamentally change warfare, a view that has failed time and time again when it meets the reality of conflict. In undermining the technologists, Black augments previous criticisms of Williamson Murray and others.

By focusing on the unique circumstances (societal, technological, industrial) of the period ranging from 1860-1945, Black helps us understand how and why this period’s conflicts were fought in a particular way and why their consequences were important to the world we live in today.

John Q. Bolton is an U.S. Army officer and a frequent contributor to military journals. The views contained in this article are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Housecarl · May 23, 2017

Uh oh....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-40014165

India 'bombs Pakistan army posts' in Kashmir

23 May 2017
From the section India

India's army says it bombed Pakistani army posts along the de facto border dividing the two countries in Kashmir.

Army spokesman Ashok Narula said the action had been taken to stop Pakistan's army from helping militants cross into Indian-administered Kashmir.

He told reporters that bringing down the number of militants in Kashmir would discourage local youths from taking up arms.

Pakistan denied any of its posts had been destroyed.

The Indian army spokesman did not specify when the Pakistani posts were targeted but said it was "recent, very recent".

Army footage purported to show the destruction of a Pakistani army post in the Nowshera sector, near the Line of Control (LoC) dividing the disputed territory.

Pakistan's army spokesman responded swiftly, rejecting India's account.

"The Indian claims of destroying Pakistani post along LoC in Nowshera Sec and firing by Pak Army on civilians across LoC are false," Maj Gen Asif Ghafoor said.

India's 'surgical strikes': Truth or illusion?
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Award for Kashmir 'human shield' officer

The Indian claims come amid deteriorating relations between the two countries over Kashmir and other issues.

Indian-administered Kashmir has seen an upsurge of violence over the last few months. India blames Pakistan for inciting the unrest, a claim Islamabad denies.
Disputed Kashmir is claimed by both countries in its entirety.

https://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/624/cpsprodpb/146DC/production/_91767638_kashmir_map624.png

India's Hindu nationalist BJP government has adopted a more assertive stance towards Pakistan since taking power three years ago. Both sides accuse each other of provocations.

On Monday, an Indian army officer who tied a local man to a jeep to stop protesters throwing stones at his convoy was given a commendation.

The army said the award was not linked to the incident, but the move is likely to anger many Kashmiris and Pakistanis.

Earlier, India's army chief said that civilians who had "helped" militants during gun battles or thrown stones at armed forces would be treated as terrorists.

This is not the first time that India has announced military action against Pakistan.

It said it had carried out "surgical strikes" along Kashmir's de facto border last September, a claim dismissed by Pakistan.

Housecarl · May 25, 2017

Sorry folks, the Meatworld strikes again.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realcleardefense.com/art...tan_a_conflict_with_no_time_limit_111452.html

In Afghanistan, a Conflict With No Time Limit
By Stratfor
May 24, 2017

Forecast Highlights

The Pentagon's move to deploy more troops to Afghanistan, should U.S. President Donald Trump approve it, would be aimed at empowering the Afghan National Security Forces to eventually inflict enough casualties on the Taliban to encourage them to negotiate.

Until the factors that contribute to the conflict — including the Afghan forces' weakness and Pakistan's support for the Taliban — have been addressed, the prospects for ending the war will be dim.

Lax border enforcement between Afghanistan and Pakistan will ensure that militants continue launching attacks into both countries from the border regions, further complicating efforts to end the war.

The invasion routes into Afghanistan are well worn at this point in history. The pathways leading out of the country, on the other hand, are far less clear. This is the predicament U.S. President Donald Trump faces as he weighs the Pentagon's proposal to send up to 5,000 troops to Afghanistan to support the struggling Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in their 15-year war against the Taliban. If Trump approves the measure, Washington will escalate its involvement in a conflict that has so far lasted through two presidencies. The move would entail granting U.S. troops greater authority on the battlefield, and may well invite a commensurate personnel contribution from Washington's allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

But as much as the Afghan military could benefit from reinforcements — the Taliban are intensifying their attacks as part of the group's annual spring offensive — Washington understands that more troops will only accomplish so much. The reasons for the war's endurance are much deeper and more complicated than the number of boots on the ground. And until these underlying factors are addressed, peace will continue to elude Afghanistan.

Enfeebled Forces
One of the biggest issues preventing a resolution to the conflict is the Afghan military's weakness. The ANSF lost a key source of support in 2014 when President Barack Obama ordered NATO troops to draw down from Afghanistan. In the years since, the country's forces have struggled to contain the Taliban insurgency on their own while simultaneously grappling with organizational problems such as corruption, defections and a lack of leadership. The Taliban wasted no time in capitalizing on the security vacuums that resulted, and today the group claims some 40 percent of Afghan territory.

In light of the Taliban's gains, Gen. John Nicholson, the top NATO commander in Afghanistan, requested a few thousand more troops in February. The Trump administration, which has so far been willing to delegate greater authority to the Pentagon to prosecute the war, looks likely to approve the request. Yet the president must also consider the political consequences of re-engaging the United States in a distant war when much of the U.S. electorate would rather focus on domestic affairs. Consequently, the troop increase, if approved, will be a modest one.

The measure aims to turn the stalemate in the ANSF's favor to keep it from losing the war altogether, even if it can't win. At the same time, the Pentagon hopes that more U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan will help the ANSF inflict a high enough cost on the Taliban that negotiations become a more appealing option for insurgent leaders than continued fighting. But as history has demonstrated, troops alone will not guarantee progress toward peace. After all, the presence of more than 100,000 U.S. military personnel on the ground in Afghanistan in 2010 couldn't persuade the Taliban to come to the negotiating table.

Internal Struggles
In some ways, additional U.S. forces in the country could further undermine the ANSF. The Taliban use the presence of foreign troops on Afghan soil to advance the narrative that their country is under occupation and to recruit new fighters to their cause. The group has also made the withdrawal of foreign forces a precondition for participating in peace talks. Despite the dangers of staying in the country, however, NATO forces understand that withdrawing troops from Afghanistan would be riskier still. The Taliban would likely take more territory — perhaps eventually claiming enough land to effectively reconquer the country. Though the United States is open to a power-sharing agreement that includes the Taliban in the interest of ending the war, it won't tolerate a government led by the group. After all, the last Taliban administration abetted transnational extremist organizations such as al Qaeda by hosting them on Afghan territory.

Afghanistan's mountainous terrain, meanwhile, defies unified governance and economic development alike, posing additional challenges to the peacemaking effort. The dearth of tax revenues makes it even harder for the central government in Kabul to project power in the country's hinterlands or, for that matter, to adequately fund its military. The country's complex milieu of ethnic groups, meanwhile, adds to the difficulties of governing. The current National Unity Government, for example, rests on a shaky compromise between President Ashraf Ghani, a member of Afghanistan's largest ethnic group, the Pashtun, and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, an ethnic Tajik. The Taliban have skillfully exploited Kabul's limited reach by installing shadow governors in provinces across the country and establishing courts to mete out justice in accordance with Islamic law. Until the central government has addressed its shortcomings, the Taliban will continue to win hearts and minds in Afghanistan as they wage their insurgency.

Friends in High Places
The Taliban, moreover, has a powerful ally on their side — and just across the border. Pakistan has admitted to hosting elements of the Taliban's leadership on its territory and even nurtured the organization during its infancy, helping the group sweep across southern Afghanistan on its way to conquer Kabul in September 1996. Islamabad's long-standing support for the Taliban reflects its own national security interests: Installing a government in Afghanistan that shares some of its priorities would enable Pakistan to guard against potential encirclement by its archrival, India.

Islamabad's strategy derives in part from its experience with the Bengali independence movement of 1971. India intervened in the conflict that ensued to help East Pakistan achieve its independence as Bangladesh. In the process, Pakistan lost a chunk of its territory and half its population. Islamabad is determined to keep the episode from repeating in its restive western territories along the Afghan border, including Balochistan in southwest Pakistan. The province is home to a secessionist movement whose exiled leaders have sought India's assistance in their campaign against Pakistan's government. Cultivating a relationship with the Taliban offers Islamabad a way to keep neighboring Afghanistan from falling into India's orbit by ensuring that it will have a say in the country's post-war future.

Crossing the Line
The Durand Line, the 2,430-kilometer (1,510-mile) border that separates Pakistan and Afghanistan, has historically facilitated this effort. The border, which cuts through the inhospitable terrain of the Hindu Kush mountains, is porous, enabling Islamabad to project influence into Afghanistan through its support for the Taliban. But after 15 years of war on the other side, the boundary's permeability has become more of a liability than a selling point for Pakistan. Militant inflows into the country have aggravated Pakistan's own internal security problems, prompting Islamabad to try to secure the border. As Islamabad clears the way for a merger between its Federally Administered Tribal Areas and neighboring Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province, it is even putting up fencing along the Durand Line so that it can devote greater military attention to India.

But effective border management will require Afghanistan's cooperation — something that Pakistan is unlikely to secure. For one thing, the ANSF is already stretched thin in its nationwide fight against the Taliban. For another, by guarding the border, Afghanistan would be recognizing the Durand Line's legitimacy, which it has long contested. Enforcement along the boundary will remain lax, giving militants the continued leeway to launch attacks from the border regions into both countries — and further complicating efforts to end the war.

Beyond the number of soldiers deployed in Afghanistan, a complex set of factors underpins the conflict there. Even if a troop increase alters the stalemate in the Afghan government's favor, the ANSF and the Taliban will keep hammering away at each other until one of them relents. As the Taliban reportedly once put it, the United States has "the watches and we have the time." Trump will have to consider these factors as he decides whether to recommit his country to its longest-running war.

This article originally appeared at Stratfor's Worldview.
Related Topics: Afghanistan War, Afghanistan, U.S. Military, U.S. Military Strategy

Housecarl · May 25, 2017

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http://www.independent.co.uk/news/w...2017-obselote-comments-campaign-a7754236.html

Donald Trump prepares to meet with 'apprehensive' Nato with terrorism on the agenda

The Nato meeting comes days after an explosion in Manchester killed nearly two dozen people

Clark Mindock
New York
3 hours ago
10 comments

Once Donald Trump steps into Nato's headquarters in Brussels he will hope that he can navigate a tricky gathering with nervous European allies in a similar way to his meeting with Pope Francis in the Vatican.

Mr Trump's penchant for outlandish and dismissive statements meant that before his arrival in Europe, both the meeting in Brussels and the audience with the Pontiff, were being dissected for their potential for awkwardness. But while there were moments of obvious disagreement between Pope Francis and Mr Trump – namely a pointed gift from the Pontiff of a papal letter on climate change for the US President to read, given his previous statements declaring it a "hoax" – both appeared visibly more jovial after their 30 minute private meeting.

For Mr Trump's Nato allies the issue has been the uncertainty the commitment of the US to the group, particularly after Mr Trump labelled it "obsolete" and ill-equipped to fight terrorism, but that stance has softened and in the wake of the attack in Manchester, both sides appear keen to try and find common ground.

READ MORE
Nato denies its head said Trump has a '12-second attention span

As with the meeting for the Pope, which centred on a call for Mr Trump to pursue peace, something the President said he was "determined to do", the Nato mini-summit will focus on fighting terrorism, one of Mr Trump's main pledges.

There will also be a number of mutual assurances given following months of uncertainty over Mr Trump's commitment to Nato since his inauguration. The President has repeatedly pushed for Nato allies to commit to a greater role in combating terrorism, including joining the coalition fighting against Isis in Syria. He has urged Nato allies to assume a greater share of defence spending.

Mr Trump repeatedly complained about the financial burden that the US takes on in ensuring the security of the alliance during his presidential campaign. Those comments created concern among European allies fretting about escalating Russian aggression and the repeated terror attacks faced by member states. Mr Trump’s silence on whether or not he would endorse Nato’s mutual defence pledge, known as Article 5, has further added to that trepidation.

Mr Trump pulled back from his “obsolete” comments last month, and he is expected to publicly break his silence on Article 5 in Brussels this week.

“Of course we support Article 5,” Secretary of State Rex Tillerson told reporters after landing in Brussels with Mr Trump. “The only time Article 5 has been invoked was in 9/11.”

Article 5 was invoked for the first and only time soon after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US, and saw Nato allies deploying several counter-terrorism operations including the deployment of a larger naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean to monitor shipping and trafficking. Nato allies also assisted US defence by flying radar aircraft missions in American airspace.

That US commitment to mutual defence has been of particular concern for Baltic member states who have experienced increased aggression from Russia, which annexed Crimea from Ukraine in March 2014, claiming it was protecting citizens from a conflict that is still raging in eastern Ukraine. A swirling scandal back in the US surrounding Mr Trump’s campaign’s potential ties to Russia have only added to the concerns.

Mr Tillerson, however, said in Brussels that the US remained convinced that Russia should move forward with the 2014 Minsk cease fire agreement in Ukraine and move toward restoring Ukrainian sovereignty.

“They are going to have to address the situation in Ukraine and we have been pretty clear with them what that means,” Mr Tillerson said when asked if it is still appropriate for Russia to be sidelined at G7 summits, one of which Mr Trump will attend later in the week in Sicily. “It means moving forward with the Minsk accord and restoring Ukraine sovereignty."

To show Mr Trump that Nato is responding to his calls to take on a greater role in combating terrorism, France and Germany are expected to agree to a US plan for Nato to take on a bigger role in fighting Isis and join the coalition fighting the terror group in Syria. French and German leaders have, however, indicated that the commitment is purely symbolic.

An anti-terror coordinator may also be named, but most changes will be cosmetic, as Nato allies have no intention of going to war against Isis. “It's totally out of the question for Nato to engage in any combat operations,” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said Wednesday, on the eve of the meeting.

“Nato as an institution will join the coalition,” a senior diplomat involved in those discussions told Reuters. “The question is whether this is just a symbolic to the United States. France and Germany believe it is.”

Mr Tillerson said that the President also plans on pushing Nato allies to fulfil their financial commitments to the alliance. Just five of 28 allies have met a 2014 agreement to spend at least 2 per cent of their gross domestic product on defence. The US is one of those countries.

“As the president has said, he really wants participating Nato members to step up and fully meet their obligations of the burden sharing,“ Mr Tillerson said. ”Two per cent of GDP was a target they all agreed to. I think you can expect the president to be very tough on them, saying: ‘Look, the US is spending 4 per cent. We're doing a lot. The American people are doing a lot for your security for our joint security. You need to make sure you're doing your share for your own security as well.’”

However, this will not be easy - with Germany already making clear that it cannot afford to spend double

READ MORE
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Corbyn signals he would refuse to send more troops to Afghanistan

Aside from security and financing concerns, American officials may hear from Nato allies who have written a series of reports in recent weeks highlighting the risks poised by climate change. Those countries have urged the Trump administration to respect the Paris Climate Agreement and to ensure that the US meets its commitments to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. It will certainly be a topic for the G7 summit on Friday.

Pope Francis made clear he sees climate as a priority for Mr Trump in gifting him a signed copy of his 2017 peace message whose title is “Nonviolence - A Style of Politics for Peace”, and a copy of his 2015 encyclical letter on the need to protect the environment from the effects of climate change. “Well, I'll be reading them,” Mr Trump said.

After Mr Trump flew from Rome to Belgium, the countries Prime Minister Charles Michel said he also insisted that Mr Trump should unequivocally back the Paris Agreement on climate change.

It is clear that there are a number of delicate issues facing Mr Trump on the latest leg of his first foreign trip - but having told Pope Francis "we can use peace" and come away from their meeting declaring that it went "great" and the Pontiff "is something... he is really good" - Mr Trump will hope he can emerge of the Nato mini-summit similarly unscathed.

More about: President Donald TrumpNatoRex TillersonSyriaUkraineEuropeMinsk

Housecarl · May 25, 2017

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http://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-blast-idUSKBN18K25E

WORLD NEWS | Thu May 25, 2017 | 3:37am EDT

Indonesian president urges calm after Islamic State-linked Jakarta attacks

By Agustinus Beo Da Costa and Gayatri Suroyo | JAKARTA
Indonesia's president urged people to remain calm on Thursday, a day after suspected suicide bombers killed three police officers at a Jakarta bus terminal in an attack that authorities believe is highly likely to be linked to the Islamic State group.

Six police officers and six civilians were also wounded in the twin blasts that were detonated five minutes apart by the two suspected attackers in the Indonesian capital late on Wednesday evening, police said.

The attack was the deadliest in Indonesia since January 2016, when eight people were killed, four of them attackers, after suicide bombers and gunmen attacked the capital.

"We must continue to keep calm (and) keep cool. Because ... we Muslims are preparing to enter the month of Ramadan for fasting," President Joko Widodo said in a statement.

Authorities in the world's biggest Muslim-majority nation are increasingly worried about a surge in radicalism, driven in part by a new generation of militants inspired by Islamic State.

It was "highly likely" an Islamic State-linked group was behind Wednesday's attack, National Police spokesman Awi Setyono said. "There's a link, but we're still studying whether it's an international network," Setyono said.

Setyono told reporters earlier that police were investigating whether the attackers had direct orders from Syria or elsewhere.

Police have not yet named the two dead suspects but a law enforcement source, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said they may have been linked to Jemaah Ansharut Daulah, an umbrella organization on a U.S. State Department "terrorist" list that is estimated to have drawn hundreds of Islamic State sympathizers in Indonesia.

Indonesia has suffered a series of mostly low-level attacks by Islamic State sympathizers in the past 17 months.

BLOOD, BROKEN GLASS

Residents helped clean up debris at the bus terminal in East Jakarta on Thursday, where splattered blood stains and broken glass remained after the attacks.

"After what happened in Manchester, in Marawi in the Philippines, maybe the cells here were triggered by the bombs and that lifted their passion to start bombing again," Setyono told television station TVOne.

RELATED COVERAGE

Indonesia police link Islamic State to Jakarta bombings: spokesman

He was referring to the suicide bombing that killed 22 people in a crowded concert hall in the British city of Manchester this week.

In the southern Philippines, thousands of civilians in Marawi City fled their homes this week after Islamist militants took over large parts of the city, leading to a declaration of martial law.

While most recent attacks in Indonesia have been poorly organized, authorities believe about 400 Indonesians have joined Islamic State in Syria and could pose a more lethal threat if they come home.

Police said Wednesday's attackers had used pressure cookers packed with explosives.

A similar type of bomb was used by a lone attacker in the Indonesian city of Bandung in February. Authorities suspect the attacker, killed by police, had links to a radical network sympathetic to Islamic State.

(Additional reporting by Jakarta bureau; Writing by Fergus Jensen; Editing by Ed Davies and Paul Tait)

Housecarl · May 25, 2017

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-southchinasea-navy-idUSKBN18K353

WORLD NEWS | Thu May 25, 2017 | 3:38am EDT

In first under Trump, U.S. warship challenges Beijing's claims in South China Sea

By Idrees Ali and Phil Stewart | WASHINGTON
A U.S. Navy warship sailed within 12 nautical miles of an artificial island built up by China in the South China Sea, U.S. officials said on Wednesday, the first such challenge to Beijing in the strategic waterway since U.S. President Donald Trump took office.

The officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the USS Dewey traveled close to the Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands, among a string of islets, reefs and shoals over which China has territorial disputes with its neighbors.

The so-called freedom of navigation operation, which is sure to anger China, comes as Trump is seeking Beijing's cooperation to rein in ally North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.

Territorial waters are generally defined by U.N. convention as extending at most 12 nautical miles from a state's coastline.

One U.S. official said it was the first operation near a land feature which was included in a ruling last year against China by an international arbitration court in The Hague. The court invalidated China's claim to sovereignty over large swathes of the South China Sea.

The U.S. patrol, the first of its kind since October, marked the latest attempt to counter what Washington sees as Beijing's efforts to limit freedom of navigation in the strategic waters.

The United States has criticized China's construction of the man-made islands and build-up of military facilities in the sea, and expressed concern they could be used to restrict free movement.

U.S. allies and partners in the region had grown anxious as the new administration held off on carrying out South China Sea operations during its first few months in office.

Last month, top U.S. commander in the Asia-Pacific region, Admiral Harry Harris, said the United States would likely carry out freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea soon, without offering any details.

Still, the U.S. military has a long-standing position that these operations are carried out throughout the world, including in areas claimed by allies, and they are separate from political considerations.

The Pentagon said in a statement it was continuing regular freedom of navigation operations and would do more in the future but gave no details of the latest mission.

"We operate in the Asia-Pacific region on a daily basis, including in the South China Sea. We operate in accordance with international law," Pentagon spokesman Captain Jeff Davis said in the statement.

U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS

Under the previous administration, the U.S. Navy conducted several such voyages through the South China Sea. The last operation was approved by then-President Barack Obama.

China's claims to the South China Sea, which sees about $5 trillion in ship-borne trade pass every year, are challenged by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, as well as Taiwan.

The latest U.S. patrol is likely to exacerbate U.S.-China tensions that had eased since Trump hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping for a summit at the U.S. leader's Florida resort last month.

Trump lambasted China during the 2016 presidential campaign, accusing Beijing of stealing U.S. jobs with unfair trade policies, manipulating its currency in its favor and militarizing parts of the South China Sea.

RELATED COVERAGE

China says U.S patrol severely disrupts South China Sea negotiations
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In December, after winning office, he upended protocol by taking a call from the president of self-ruled Taiwan, which China regards as its own sacred territory.

But since meeting Xi at his Mar-a-Lago resort, Trump has praised Xi for efforts to restrain North Korea, though Pyongyang has persisted with ballistic missile tests despite international condemnation.

U.S.-based South China Sea expert Greg Poling of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the operation was also the first conducted by the United States close to an artificial feature built by China not entitled to a territorial sea under international law.

Previous freedom of navigation operations have gone within 12 nautical miles of Subi and Fiery Cross reefs, two other features in the Spratlys built up by China, but both of those features are entitled to a territorial sea.

Mischief Reef was not entitled to a territorial sea as it was underwater at high tide before it was built up by China and was not close enough to another feature entitled to such a territorial sea, said Poling.

He said the key question was whether the U.S. warship had engaged in a real challenge to the Chinese claims by turning on radar or launching a helicopter or boat -- actions not permitted in a territorial sea under international law.

Otherwise, critics say, the operation would have resembled what is known as "innocent passage" and could have reinforced rather than challenged China's claim to a territorial limit around the reef.

(Reporting by Idrees Ali and Phil Stewart; Additional reporting and writing by Matt Spetalnick and David Brunnstrom; Editing by Cynthia Osterman and Sandra Maler)

Housecarl · May 25, 2017

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http://www.defenseone.com/technolog...-over-it/138100/?oref=defense_one_breaking_nl

Trump’s First Defense Budget Has North Korea Written All Over It

This image made from video of a news bulletin aired by North Korea's KRT on Monday, May 22, 2017, shows what was said to be the Pukguksong-2 missile at an undisclosed location in North Korea.

BY PATRICK TUCKER
READ BIO
MAY 23, 2017

TOPICS
NORTH KOREA
DEFENSE BUDGET
KRT

There’s lots of money in the Pentagon’s 2018 spending proposal to stop missiles of the sort that Pyongyang keeps launching.

Donald Trump’s first defense-budget request contains large increases for weapons intended to shoot down North Korean missiles or even attack them on their launchers. The budget bumps aren’t unexpected — many appeared in the outgoing Obama administration’s final spending plans as well. Still, they reveal the Pentagon’s intensifying focus on Pyongyang’s missile threat.

Here are a few of the most important adds:

Missile Defense from Alaska

The president requests $821 million for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense program. Midcourse defenses hit an incoming missile after its engine has shut down and before it gets too close to its target. The Missile Defense Agency, or MDA, is adding four Ground Based Interceptor, or GBI, missiles at Fort Greely, Alaska, bringing the total to 44 by year’s end. (There are also four GBIs in California.) This year’s $821 million request, follows a plan announced by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel in 2013. (That’s one reason why this year’s number is down from last year’s for the same program. Last year’s ask was about $1 billion.) But the program takes on new relevance because of North Korea’s quickening progress toward an operational ICBM. MDA says that the extra missiles will “improve protection against North Korean and potential Iranian ICBM threats.”

The budget request also features $465 million for components and testing for the Redesigned Kill Vehicle, or RKV, the most important part of the interceptor missile. It’s kind of a big, smart bullet. The RKV, which carries no explosives, destroys an incoming warhead by ramming it at 15,000 miles per hour. The requested $465 million would fund targeting upgrades to the kill vehicle’s software. It would also help replace old ground control systems.

Missile Defense from Destroyers

The new budget request also bumps spending for the AEGIS missile defense system, primarily deployed on U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers but also on land as AEGIS Ashore. The proposal would boost AEGIS spending to $1.6 billion from last year’s $1.5 billion, funding 34 Standard Missile-3 Block IB interceptor missiles.

The budget increase follows a historic and successful February test in which sailors aboard the John Paul Jones intercepted a mock ballistic missile with an SM-3 Block IIA. The ability to intercept mid- and intermediate-range North Korean missiles from ships will allow the U.S. military to much better protect Japan, Guam, and other potentially vulnerable targets. That’s a big improvement over the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, missile battery, which is land-based and limited in what it can cover.

Find The Orange Plume

Before you can shoot at North Korean missiles, you have to know that they’ve launched and where from. Intelligence collection in North Korea is notoriously difficult — the U.S. almost never has advance warning of a launch — so the U.S. military relies on infrared satellites in Geosynchronous Earth Orbit and in Highly Elliptical Earth Orbit to detect the thermal signature (basically big orange clouds of pure heat) that rockets emit during liftoff.

The new budget allocates $1.4 billion, up from $500 million, to acquire new satellites for the Space-Based Infrared System, or SBIRS, which provide initial warning of a strategic missile attack on the United States.

The budget also requests $1.861 billion, about $61 million more than last year’s request, for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle — basically, a big rocket that can lift SBIRS’ large satellites into GEO orbit.

Kill It With Nuclear Cruise Missiles

Just in case things with North Korea get really rocky, the budget also requests $451 million, up from $95 million last year, for the Long-Range Stand-Off missile, or LRSO. It’s a nuclear cruise missile that the Air Force can fire from a jet, which has attracted considerable controversy. But it’s more important function is as an intimidation weapon; it transforms any aircraft that can carry cruise missiles into a de facto bomber.

Manufacturing contracts are expected no earlier than 2022.

“LRSO provides a reliable cost-effective force multiplier for the B-52, B-2 and the B-21 bomber” according to Pentagon budget documents.

Think about that in the context of how the military today uses B-52s as menacing props, such as in January 2016, when the U.S. flew a B-52 over the nearby South Korea following nuclear tests.

Given the North Korean goal of accelerating missile testing, it appears the skies over the China Sea will be considerably more crowded in the years ahead.

Patrick Tucker is technology editor for Defense One. He’s also the author of The Naked Future: What Happens in a World That Anticipates Your Every Move? (Current, 2014). Previously, Tucker was deputy editor for The Futurist for nine years. Tucker has written about emerging technology in Slate, ... FULL BIO

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Housecarl · May 26, 2017

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https://www.thecipherbrief.com/arti...il&utm_term=0_b02a5f1344-90b98a8ec8-122460921

Japan, South Korea Shaken by Pyongyang, Beijing – And Now, Washington

MAY 25, 2017 | WILL EDWARDS

South Korea and Japan are attempting to maintain business as usual in their alliances with the U.S., but the Trump Administration has not made this easy. A gap between President Donald Trump’s unpredictable comments and the more measured statements of his top Cabinet members has made building relations difficult.

As one of his first acts as South Korea’s president, Moon Jae-in dispatched special envoy Hong Seok-hyun to the United States to meet with Trump and many of his senior officials. After months without a president, South Korea wishes to set the vital U.S. alliance on the right course at a time of increased tensions over North Korea.

Months after Trump’s February meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Tokyo is still parsing the difference between candidate Trump and President Trump as it seeks to develop new economic ties with the U.S. in light of the end of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and its own concerns over North Korea.

America’s two most important East Asian allies want a return to the stability they have come to expect from U.S. East Asia policy.

South Korea’s new Administration has attempted to make up for lost time and forge ties with the Trump Administration on security and economic issues, but Trump’s comments on two key issues for Seoul during the South Korean election have added a hurdle.

Trump said in April that South Korea should pay the $1 billion cost of the THAAD missile defense system. This would have violated the terms of the original deal between the U.S. and South Korea, and it caused outrage among many citizens, prompting the South Korean newspaper the Chosun Ilbo to run the headline “Trump’s mouth rattling Korea-US alliance.”

Trump’s comment during the South Korean election on a contested issue prompted speculation that he could have shifted some votes in Moon’s favor, as Moon had called for revisiting the terms of the deal and capitalized on anti-THAAD sentiment.

While Trump’s words caused a backlash among the South Korean public, his National Security Advisor, H. R. McMaster, told his South Korean counterpart that the U.S. would honor the terms of the THAAD agreement. Neither the episode, nor any mention of THAAD, came up during Hong’s visit, although Moon still intends to revisit the agreement.

A similar episode occurred over the U.S.- South Korean free-trade agreement. Trump railed against the pact as a candidate, stated, “We may seek to terminate [the agreement]” in April, and in early May called it a “horrible deal” in an interview with The Economist. By contrast, during his visit to Seoul in April, Vice President Mike Pence said the U.S. would only seek to “reform” the FTA.

While less provocative than the THAAD statement, Trump’s comments over the FTA still prompted an outpouring of support for the deal from Korean and American businesses alike. Like THAAD, the FTA did not come up between Hong and Trump Administration officials, leaving continued uncertainty for Seoul on how the U.S. will proceed.

This uncertainty could stifle the Moon Administration’s efforts to maintain and improve alliance relations and even bleed into his domestic support. Before sending Hong – and other diplomatic envoys to China, Russia, and Japan – Moon stressed that each envoy “emphasize [to each country] that political legitimacy and transparency have become extremely important.” In the wake of the Park Geun-hye impeachment, Moon seeks policy clarity on these important security and economic issues so he can, in turn, display transparency to South Korean citizens. With mixed messages coming from the Trump Administration, this will likely be difficult.

Trump Administration mixed messaging has also confused policymakers in Tokyo. Kuni Miyake, the president of the Tokyo-based think tank, the Foreign Policy Institute, told The Cipher Brief that some in Japan “wonder whether the Trump Administration has truly sensible, consistent and reliable foreign policy vis-a-vis East Asia in general and China/North Korea.”

Japan is still reeling from the loss of TPP – a vital part of its economic growth plan – and is seeking economic partnerships with the U.S. to replace it. Some fear that Abe’s victory in establishing a rapport with Trump could be overshadowed by the successful summit between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Trump reversed his stance on many China issues – he will no longer seek to label Beijing a currency manipulator, for example – and opened the door for greater economic cooperation. With no TPP and China as a competitor for U.S. favor on economic issues, Tokyo may have to seek other options while watching for further changes in Trump Administration policy.

The issue of watching and waiting for changes in Trump policy is complicated by what Miyake sees as an Administration that still seems to switch between “campaigning mode” and “governing mode.” Miyake said “He seems to be … somewhere in between, and he could also be flip-flopping every few days. This is what I am most concerned about.”

For years, unpredictability in East Asia was driven primarily by North Korea’s provocations and China’s rise, and through that, the U.S. presence was a source of stability for South Korea and Japan. Today the scenario is more complicated. Seoul’s new Administration is motivated by a desire to improve government transparency and reset the North Korea relationship while Tokyo wants stable policy for economic growth. A U.S. presence without predictable policy further complicates these goals.

Will Edwards is an Asia-Pacific and defense analyst at The Cipher Brief. Follow him on Twitter @_wedwards.

Housecarl · May 26, 2017

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https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-imperial-overreach/

China’s imperial overreach

25 May 2017|Brahma Chellaney

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s tenure has been marked by high ambition. His vision—the ‘Chinese dream‘—is to make China the world’s leading power by 2049, the centenary of communist rule. But Xi may be biting off more than he can chew.

A critical element of Xi’s strategy to realize the Chinese dream is the ‘one belt, one road’ (OBOR) initiative, whereby China will invest in infrastructure projects abroad, with the goal of bringing countries from Central Asia to Europe firmly into China’s orbit. When Xi calls it ‘the project of the century,’ he may not be exaggerating.

In terms of scale or scope, OBOR has no parallel in modern history. It is more than 12 times the size of the Marshall Plan, America’s post-World War II initiative to aid the reconstruction of Western Europe’s devastated economies. Even if China cannot implement its entire plan, OBOR will have a significant and lasting impact.

Of course, OBOR is not the only challenge Xi has mounted against an aging Western-dominated international order. He has also spearheaded the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and turned to China’s advantage the two institutions associated with the BRICS grouping of emerging economies (the Shanghai-based New Development Bank and the $100 billion Contingent Reserve Arrangement). At the same time, he has asserted Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea more aggressively, while seeking to project Chinese power in the western Pacific.

But OBOR takes China’s ambitions a large step further. With it, Xi is attempting to remake globalization on China’s terms, by creating new markets for Chinese firms, which face a growth slowdown and overcapacity at home.

With the recently concluded OBOR summit in Beijing having drawn 29 of the more than 100 invited heads of state or government, Xi is now in a strong position to pursue his vision. But before he does, he will seek to emerge from the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party later this year as the country’s most powerful leader since Mao Zedong.

Since taking power in 2012, Xi has increasingly centralized power, while tightening censorship and using anti-corruption probes to take down political enemies. Last October, the CCP bestowed on him the title of ‘core’ leader.

Yet Xi has set his sights much higher: he aspires to become modern China’s most transformative leader. Just as Mao helped to create a reunified and independent China, and Deng Xiaoping launched China’s ‘reform and opening up,’ Xi wants to make China the central player in the global economy and the international order.

So, repeating a mantra of connectivity, China dangles low-interest loans in front of countries in urgent need of infrastructure, thereby pulling those countries into its economic and security sphere. China stunned the world by buying the Greek port of Piraeus for $420 million. From there to the Seychelles, Djibouti, and Pakistan, port projects that China insisted were purely commercial have acquired military dimensions.

But Xi’s ambition may be blinding him to the dangers of his approach. Given China’s insistence on government-to-government deals on projects and loans, the risks to lenders and borrowers have continued to grow. Concessionary financing may help China’s state-owned companies bag huge overseas contracts; but, by spawning new asset-quality risks, it also exacerbates the challenges faced by the Chinese banking system.

The risk of non-performing loans at state-owned banks is already clouding China’s future economic prospects. Since reaching a peak of $4 trillion in 2014, the country’s foreign-exchange reserves have fallen by about a quarter. The ratings agency Fitch has warned that many OBOR projects—most of which are being pursued in vulnerable countries with speculative-grade credit ratings—face high execution risks, and could prove unprofitable.

Xi’s approach is not helping China’s international reputation, either. OBOR projects lack transparency and entail no commitment to social or environmental sustainability. They are increasingly viewed as advancing China’s interests—including access to key commodities or strategic maritime and overland passages—at the expense of others.

In a sense, OBOR seems to represent the dawn of a new colonial era—the twenty-first-century equivalent of the East India Company, which paved the way for British imperialism in the East. But, if China is building an empire, it seems already to have succumbed to what the historian Paul Kennedy famously called ‘imperial overstretch.’

And, indeed, countries are already pushing back. Sri Lanka, despite having slipped into debt servitude to China, recently turned away a Chinese submarine attempting to dock at the Chinese-owned Colombo container terminal. And popular opposition to a 15,000-acre industrial zone in the country has held up China’s move to purchase an 80% stake in the loss-making Hambantota port that it built nearby.

Shi Yinhong, an academic who serves as a counselor to China’s government, the State Council, has warned of the growing risk of Chinese strategic overreach. And he is already being proved right. Xi has gotten so caught up in his aggressive foreign policy that he has undermined his own diplomatic aspirations, failing to recognize that brute force is no substitute for leadership. In the process, he has stretched China’s resources at a time when the economy is already struggling and a shrinking working-age population presages long-term stagnation.

According to a Chinese proverb, ‘To feed the ambition in your heart is like carrying a tiger under your arm.’ The further Xi carries OBOR, the more likely it is to bite him.

AUTHOR
Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including Asian Juggernaut, Water: Asia’s New Battleground, and Water, Peace, and War: Confronting the Global Water Crisis. This article is presented in partnership with Project Syndicate © 2017. Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

Housecarl · May 26, 2017

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Lessons Learned After 25 Years of Failed Negotiations

MAY 26, 2017 | JOSEPH DETRANI

Twenty-five years of failed negotiations with North Korea. Since 1993, our efforts to halt North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons have failed. What have we learned from this experience?

The 1994 Agreed Framework froze North Korea’s plutonium program, but it did not halt North Korea’s desire for nuclear weapons. Thus, while the U.S., working with Japan and South Korea, was building two civilian light-water reactors in North Korea, and providing heavy crude oil in the interim, until the reactors were operational, North Korea was pursuing a clandestine highly enriched uranium (HEU) program for nuclear weapons.

We became complacent once we had the 1994 Agreed Framework. We assumed that with the new leadership in North Korea, with Kim Jong-il replacing the deceased Kim Il-sung, and with food scarcity and significant starvation, and reports of dissension in the ranks of the military, that there would be regime change from within. We were wrong.

The Agreed Framework came to an abrupt halt in 2002, due to the HEU program, and the U.S. decision to halt heavy crude oil shipments to North Korea and suspend construction of the two light-water reactors, which motivated North Korea to pull out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In August 2003, with the assistance of China, the Six-Party process commenced, with China serving as the Chair, and the U.S., South Korea, Japan and Russia participating. After many plenary sessions and task force meetings, in September 2005 the six countries signed a Joint Statement, committing North Korea to complete and verifiable denuclearization, in return for security assurances, economic development assistance and the provision of light-water reactors when North Korea returned to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.

The Joint Statement initially wasn’t implemented, however, because of the freezing of $24 million of North Korean money in a Macao bank, Banco Delta Asia. After a number of months, during which international financial institutions refused to deal with North Korean banks, the U.S. informed the Macao bank that it could release the $24 million to North Korea. The North Koreans insisted the money be returned to them through a U.S. financial institution to demonstrate to international financial institutions that it was fine to deal with North Korean banks. Understandably, no U.S. bank wanted to deal with North Korea, so the money was returned to North Korea via the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. This pleased Pyongyang and North Korea then started to implement the Joint Statement.

The implementation of the Joint Statement ended in late 2008, when North Korea refused to sign a monitoring and verification protocol that would permit monitors to inspect suspect nuclear sites. Since then, there have been no formal talks with North Korea.

During the five years since Kim Jong-un replaced his father in December 2011, North Korea has had over 70 missile launches, the most recent on May 14 of an intermediate-range ballistic missile. It has had two nuclear tests and is preparing for its sixth. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has progressed exponentially, with bigger nuclear tests and the likelihood that North Korea is capable of miniaturizing its arsenal of nuclear weapons. Eventually, North Korea will test-launch an intercontinental ballistic missile (capable of reaching the U.S., potentially with a nuclear warhead.

In addition to its nuclear and missile programs, North Korea has upgraded its asymmetrical warfare capabilities, as shown by their cyber penetration of Sony Pictures in 2014 and the use of VX nerve agent to assassinate Kim Jong-nam, the brother of Kim Jong-un in February.

North Korea has made it abundantly clear that it wants to be recognized and accepted as a nuclear weapons state. It has been told this would never happen. North Korea with nuclear weapons will contribute to a nuclear arms race in East Asia, with countries like South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and others demanding that they, too, have nuclear weapons, regardless of any extended nuclear deterrence commitment from the United States. It could also result in nuclear weapons or devices or fissile material getting into the hands of rogue states and other parties, such as terrorists. There’s also the possibility of a nuclear weapon being used accidentally. Meanwhile, we should never forget North Korea’s contribution to constructing a nuclear reactor in Al Kibar, Syria, that, fortunately, the Israelis destroyed in 2007.

So, what does this all mean? What have we learned and will it help us draft a meaningful strategy for dealing with North Korea? These are some of my takeaways:

Stay engaged. Don’t assume the domestic situation in North Korea will lead to regime change. Accept the fact that Kim Jong-un has consolidated power and we will have to deal with him.
It’s easy to walk away from negotiations, as we did in October-November 2002, due to North Korea’s HEU program. However, to re-engage is difficult, so stay at the table and work those difficult and seemingly intractable issues.
Being too eager for an agreement could reinforce North Korea’s belief that it will prevail and eventually the U.S. will accept it as a nuclear weapons state. Using the New York Federal Reserve Bank to facilitate the return of the $24 million at BDA to North Korea could have been interpreted by Pyongyang as proof that the U.S. wanted an agreement badly.
Trust but verify. We were correct in demanding that North Korea permit, in writing, verification monitors to visit suspect sites in North Korea.
We should not be patient with a North Korea building greater nuclear and missile capabilities. Work hard and, with our allies and partners, implement a strategy for resolving the nuclear issue with North Korea.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s strategy of “all options are on the table” is timely and necessary. It’s now possible that working closely with our allies, in South Korea and Japan, and with China more aggressively pursuing North Korea, we will get North Korea to halt its nuclear and missile programs and return to denuclearization talks.

The author was the former Special Envoy for negotiations with North Korea. The views are the author’s and not any government agency or department.

NORTH KOREA

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

DIPLOMACY
THE AUTHOR IS JOSEPH DETRANI
Ambassador DeTrani was the Senior Advisor to the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the National Counterproliferation Center and the Intelligence Community Mission Manager for North Korea. Prior to joining the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in 2006, he served at the Department of State as the Special Envoy for Six-Party Talks with North Korea, with the rank of Ambassador, and as the U.S. Representative to the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO). ... Read More

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