WAR 05-14-2016-to-05-20-2016_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

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http://nypost.com/2016/05/15/the-next-us-victory-in-iraq-may-just-mean-another-crisis/

Opinion

The next US victory in Iraq may just mean another crisis

By Judith Miller and Charles Duelfer
May 15, 2016 | 10:10pm


President Obama could end his presidency with a crisis in Iraq of his own making.

In April, the president said the conditions for liberating Mosul from the Islamic State should be in place by year’s end. But Sunni Iraqi tribal leaders and Kurds are quietly warning that “doing Mosul” is likely to result not in military victory but a humanitarian and political disaster.

First, Iraq’s second-largest city is home to 1 million to 2 million people. ISIS, which hasn’t hesitated to slaughter fellow Arabs and flatten cities, has had ample time to prepare to take hostages and booby-trap buildings.

Consider the Iraqi government’s recent “victory” in Ramadi, with a population far smaller than Mosul. ISIS virtually flattened it before being ousted in January. ISIS is even more deeply embedded in Mosul, which it has occupied since June 2014. Its fanatics haven’t hesitated to use chemical weapons in Syria and against Kurdish peshmerga forces.

An offensive would spread panic among the city’s beleaguered residents, who would be trapped inside Mosul along with their occupiers. Baghdad’s plans to liberate the city include strangling ISIS by laying siege to Mosul in preparation for a full assault. If Ramadi is any example, liberation could turn Mosul into an uninhabitable ghost town.

Second, Mosul’s Sunnis still distrust Baghdad. Many fear Iraq’s semi-independent Shiite militias, some backed by Iran and encouraged by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, pose a greater long-term threat to them than ISIS. Horrific images of Shiite militia-inflicted atrocities vie on Sunni smartphone screens with ISIS’s beheadings and corporal punishments. Every family has a relative whom the militias have brutalized and killed.

Third, even if the US-backed Iraqi forces succeed in expelling ISIS from Mosul, then what? Who will occupy and administer the city? After the US occupation of Baghdad in April 2003, American officials gave Sunnis little stake in the planning for and future of a post-Saddam Hussein era. Why should Mosul’s Sunnis believe that the chaotic central government in Baghdad has their interests at heart? Many Sunnis continue to view the 2007 “surge” as a “bait and switch” by Washington, at their expense.

Fourth, Iran seems determined to continue fomenting conflict within Iraq as long as possible. Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Iranian Quds Force who fought against Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war in 1980-1988, has greater control over some militias than the nominal political leadership in Baghdad. Few Sunnis in Mosul believe that Baghdad can protect them.

Fifth, chaos in Mosul could trigger even greater chaos in Baghdad. Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi seems to be trying to limit corruption and run a more inclusive regime. But trying to reclaim Mosul before Sunnis derive benefit from his efforts is risky, and American officials have signaled deep concern about the Abadi government’s stability.

No strong Sunni voices in Mosul have expressed support for the invasion/liberation of their city by Iraqi forces. They know all too well America won’t be there to protect them. Many continue to see the growing influence of Iran and its surrogate militias as a longer-term threat to their survival than ISIS, particularly given the nuclear deal with Iran, yet another signal of

America’s realignment in the Middle East.

Obama faces a tough choice, perhaps more consequential than his decision to launch the raid that killed Osama bin Laden. Should he try to encourage Iraqi forces to retake Mosul before leaving office to claim another victory over the radical jihadis he has vowed to “degrade and destroy,” or encourage Baghdad to wait until a more cohesive government is in place?

While reclaiming Mosul would enable Obama to claim yet another “legacy” achievement, liberation of the city under current conditions is likely to result in more bloodshed, higher casualties, greater destruction and the creation of thousands more refugees in Iraq — a tragic, but utterly predictable coda to the Obama presidency.


Charles Duelfer is the former special adviser to the CIA for Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction who led the Iraq Survey Group’s hunt for WMDs. Judith Miller is a fellow at the Manhattan Institute and author of “The Story, A Reporter’s Journey.”

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.usnews.com/news/politics...a-push-armenia-azerbaijan-on-nagorno-karabakh

U.S., Russia Push Armenia, Azerbaijan on Nagorno-Karabakh

Territory dispute between the two recently sparked the worst violence in 26 years.

May 16, 2016, at 10:57 a.m.
By MATTHEW LEE, AP Diplomatic Writer

VIENNA (AP) — The United States, Russia and France are pressing the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to begin immediate negotiations on a settlement to their dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh following last month's outbreak of violence, the worst in 26 years.

Senior U.S. officials say Secretary of State John Kerry, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault planned to bring the two presidents together in Vienna on Monday to urge them to recommit to a 1994 cease-fire, take steps to build confidence and resume stalled peace talks that have dragged on for two decades without visible result.

Among the measures they will recommend are an increase in monitors along the cease-fire line and the possible placement of cameras there to observe and document violations, the officials said. They spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to publicly preview the Vienna meeting, which is being convened by the U.S., Russia and France, co-chairs of the so-called "Minsk Group." That group, operating under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, is seeking to mediate an end to the conflict.

Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan and Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliev both say they support a negotiated settlement to the dispute and last met together in December, but hostilities broke out in April. About 75 soldiers from both sides were killed, along with several civilians, before a Russian-brokered cease-fire stopped the worst of the fighting.

Yet fears loom of a possible escalation, with Turkey strongly backing Azerbaijan and Russia obliged to protect Armenia by a mutual security pact. Earlier this month, Armenia's government gave the go-ahead to legislation that calls for recognizing the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. The government has blocked earlier similar proposals from the opposition but this time agreed to send it to parliament in what is seen as a warning to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has condemned the initiative, saying it is aimed at scuttling peace talks.

U.S. officials say they are concerned the recent violence may be the result of each side testing the other's defenses, something made more troubling by the introduction of heavy weapons in recent years. In previous skirmishes, casualties were mainly caused by sniper fire, but in the past year, both sides have introduced mortars, rocket launchers and artillery to the region, the officials said.

Nagorno-Karabakh, a mountainous region in Azerbaijan with about 150,000 residents in an area of 12,000 square kilometers (4,400 square miles), has been under the control of local ethnic Armenian forces and the Armenian military since 1994. The conflict is fueled by long-simmering tensions between Christian Armenians and mostly Muslim Azeris and has been an economic blow to Armenia because Turkey has closed its border with Armenia, leaving the country with open borders only with Georgia and Iran.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-brief...reatment-of-us-sailors-will-be-huge-cause-for

May 16, 2016, 02:00 pm

GOP rep: Details of Iran's treatment of US sailors disturbing

By Rebecca Savransky
Comments 100

A Republican congressman said the classified details surrounding Iran's treatment of U.S. sailors captured earlier this year are disturbing.

“I think that when the details actually come out, most Americans are going to be kind of taken aback by the entire incident, both how Iran handled it and how we handled it,” Rep. Randy Forbes(R-Va.), a member of the House Armed Services Committee, told The Washington Free Beacon.

“I think that’s going to be huge cause for concern for most Americans. That’s why I’ve encouraged members of Congress to get that briefing so they do know exactly what did take place.”

Forbes said the Obama administration is withholding information about how the 10 U.S. sailors were treated when they were captured earlier this year after drifting into Iranian territorial waters in the Persian Gulf. The sailors were detained by Iran for 15 hours.

Forbes said it could be as long as a year before that information is released, noting he had a "full classified briefing" from military officials.

“I think clearly there were violations of international and maritime law that took place here,” Forbes said, according to the news outlet.

“We did almost nothing in response, in fact, to have Secretary [of State John] Kerry actually thank them for releasing our sailors after they way they captured them, I think was a slap in the sailors’ face."

Following the incident, Kerry thanked Iran for what he called a "quick and appropriate response" to return the American sailors.

Forbes told the Free Beacon he is advocating for increased sanctions on Tehran for its treatment of the U.S. sailors and other aggressions against U.S. forces.

“The administration will not stand up and say this is just wrong,” Forbes said. “Instead of thanking them the administration should be standing up and saying its wrong.”

The U.S. response "undermines stability in the Gulf," he said.

“And they raise the danger of inadvertent escalation," he added.

“I think it goes without saying that if that’s the case and they won’t stop that activity, all of that should at least be considered and debated as part of any Iran sanctions bill that may come up in the future.”

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/16/w...africa-terrorism-land-war.html?ref=world&_r=0

Africa

Long Emphasis on Terror May Hurt U.S. in Conventional War, Army Chief Says

By HELENE COOPER
MAY 15, 2016

ARUSHA, Tanzania — When Gen. Mark A. Milley, the Army chief of staff, stepped off his jet into the sunshine here on Sunday, it was the first time the Obama administration had sent its top Army officer to Africa for a high-level meeting to get the continent’s fledgling militaries in shape to deal with growing terrorist threats.

As General Milley plunged into three days of talks with senior military officials from 38 African countries, the biggest question facing him was not how the United States would work with those militaries to contain the threats. Among them are four militant groups that American officials say are capable of carrying out attacks in Europe as well as across Africa: the Islamic State affiliate in Libya, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al Qaeda in northwestern Africa and the Shabab in Somalia.

Instead, the question was whether the new focus on the ever-widening terrorist threat in Africa — not to mention the focus on the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, and the continuing war in Afghanistan — is taking away from the Army’s ability to fight a land war against a more traditional military adversary.

After 15 years of conflict, the Army knows how to fight terrorist groups and how to train its partners to do so, as well. But that is both a blessing and a curse.

“Today, a major in the Army knows nothing but fighting terrorists and guerrillas, because he came into the Army after 9/11,” General Milley said in an interview during his flight to Arusha. “But as we get into the higher-end threats, our skills have atrophied over 15 years.”

A result, General Milley said, has been a loss of what he calls muscle memory: how to fight a large land war, including one where an established adversary is able to bring sophisticated air defenses, tanks, infantry, naval power and even cyberweapons into battle.

With the declared end of major combat operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army was supposed to return to barracks after more than a decade of war, resume training, and rebuild its readiness to fight more entrenched powers like Russia, China or Iran.

At the same time, because the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were supposed to be ending, the Army’s budget has shrunk as the Obama administration has sought to move away from a war footing.

The size of the active-duty Army, now 470,000 troops, is expected to drop to 450,000 next year. If automatic budget cuts are reinstated because Congress fails to reach a budget deal this year, the Army will have to cut down to 420,000.

“Is that sufficient capacity and capability to do the various national strategies?” General Milley said of current troop levels to a group of foreign policy experts at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on May 3. “We think it is. But the real hard question is what happens if one of these other contingencies were to go off that.” He was referring to potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula, or with a large power like China or Russia.

President Obama has begun to respond to the re-emergence of Russia as a strategic threat. The White House has quadrupled the budget for military spending in Europe in 2017, to $3.4 billion. As part of an effort to deter Russia, the United States will provide additional weapons and equipment to American and NATO forces in Europe, to ensure that the alliance can maintain a full armored combat brigade in the region at all times.

But other threats are not going away, forcing Army officials and Pentagon planners to figure out how to adapt America’s military strategy to the new global reality. Army officials are trying to balance the military’s responsibilities in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia while relearning how to fight higher-end, great-power conflicts, as well.

One possible solution, General Milley said, could be to increase training days for the National Guard. Its members now train 39 days a year, which allows them to be ready to deploy within four months if called up.

“I do not think we will have the luxury of four to five months lead time if a significant contingency comes up,” General Milley said.

This week, his focus is on Africa, which has increasingly become a battleground in the West’s war against militant Islam.

In Central Africa, American service members are working with militaries from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger to counter Boko Haram. American military officials say that Boko Haram has begun to collaborate with the Islamic State, which is also known as ISIS or ISIL, and that the terrorist groups — two of the world’s most feared — could be working together to plan attacks on American allies in North and Central Africa.

Pentagon officials have presented the White House with military options, including airstrikes, against the Islamic State affiliate in Libya. At the same time, Mr. Obama and his advisers, along with allies like Britain, France and Italy, are trying to nurture a fragile political process for a new unity government there.

In West Africa, Army and Special Operations forces are working with militaries from Burkina Faso, Mali, Senegal and other countries to try to stem a recent wave of attacks by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which has taken to hitting hotels and other tourist sites.

And in East Africa, American military advisers and trainers are working with regional counterparts to fight the Qaeda-affiliated Shabab. The group was responsible for one of the deadliest terrorist attacks on African soil, at a popular mall in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2013, and it is resurgent after losing much of its territory and many of its fighters in the last several years.

“With the onset of ISIL in the north, Al Shabab in the east and Boko Haram and A.Q.I.M. in the center and the west, what we’re doing in Africa is centered on trying to get to the left of that,” said Maj. Gen. Darryl A. Williams, the head of Army forces assigned to Africa Command. “We’re building these relationships so that if called in, we can respond.”

The United States is also working in Africa with former Russian satellite states like Angola; General Milley will meet one-on-one on Tuesday with his Angolan counterpart.

“This is a region of the world that is of growing importance to the Army,” said Carter F. Ham, a retired four-star Army general who was previously head of Africa Command. “A lot of good stuff is happening in Africa, but from a security standpoint, there’s also a lot of bad stuff happening as well that could undermine U.S. interests in the region.”

Related Coverage

After Years of Distrust, U.S. Military Reconciles With Nigeria to Fight Boko Haram MAY 15, 2016

Al Qaeda Turns to Syria, With a Plan to Challenge ISIS
MAY 15, 2016

For Obama, an Unexpected Legacy of Two Full Terms at War
MAY 14, 2016

U.S. Fortifying Europe’s East to Deter Putin
FEB. 1, 2016

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm....Considering the current internal situation with the PRC and how that's manifesting in its behavior towards its neighbors, unless there's regime change, IMHO with all of its warts and blemishes, the Europeans/NATO would still be the better choice with Russia....HC

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http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/a-new-big-three

A New Big Three?

by G. Murphy Donovan
SWJ Blog Post | May 16, 2016 - 1:27pm

If nothing else, Vladimir Putin is a leader who paints Russia’s image with broad strokes. He overcame a KGB and Communist past to create a kind of democratic autocracy in Russia. He literally, and figuratively, restored Christianity and orthodox churches across the land. In his spare time, Putin rides Harley Davidson bikes with the Night Wolves, Russia’s first post-Communist motorcycle club, an organization that might be the only state-sponsored political club for bikers on the planet.

The Russian president rehabilitated the Russian armed forces too in the wake of the Afghan/Chechen debacles. More recently, Putin has unchained the bear and changed the complexion of politics and dissent in the Caucuses, Georgia, Ukraine, and now Syria. Russian push back against NATO expansion, and regime change follies, is a predictable, if not understandable, response to a hapless Brussels. Why European politicians seek a fight with Russia in the middle of an Islamic migrant blitz is a mystery to tacticians, strategists, and veteran diplomats alike.

The Russian president recently exposed Turkey too, as NATO’s Achilles’ heel, a terrorist 5th column between East and West. NATO turned a blind eye to the Erdogan/Baghdadi oil cartel until the Russian Air Force began destroying north bound convoys. The CFO for the Turk/ISIS connection appears to be Billy Erdogan, son of the duplicitous Turkish president. Across the border, Syria was another small war stalemate until Putin stepped in.

Russians still carry American astronauts into space too, while Washington maintains spite sanctions against Moscow - a testimony to Russian character and Obama era vapidity. With Putin, diplomacy is often just a door left ajar. The Russian space taxi serves Americans at NSA and affirmative action astronauts worldwide. The cutting edge of extra-terrestrial travel now requires a Kazak base and a Russian rocket.

Unlike European and American leaders, Vladimir Putin has no illusions about existential threats like open borders, Islamic imperialism, or religious fascism.

The Muslim world has been providing fighters to a half century of global jihad that targets and kills Americans and West Europeans with near impunity. Ironically, no Muslim nations are burdened with economic sanctions like those imposed on Russia. Indeed, America and Europe are now suffering from atrocity fatigue. Muslims continue to kill and maim while Washington and Brussels continue to rationalize global terror as the new normal.

For apologists, calling Islam a “great” culture is the feckless rhetoric of enablers.

The boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement against Israel is similar to the Russian sanctions, movements motivated by bias and historical bigotry. Just as Israel won a series of wars against predatory Arabs, the West won the Cold War with inept Communism - and Europe still can’t take yes for an answer from a Russia that has reinvented itself.

Victory Day, celebrating Soviet success in World War II, has become the most significant holiday on the Russian calendar under Putin. Unlike America and Europe; victory, success, and the need to oppose fascism, including the religious variety, are mainstays of contemporary Russian vigilance. President Obama is about to visit Hiroshima in Japan, he has declined invitations to celebrate Victory Day in Russia. Of the WWII “Big Three” allies that defeated fascist Germany and imperial Japan, Russia sacrificed the most to defeat the Nazis and save Europe. Russia may have to rescue Europe from itself again in the 21st Century.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/sites/default/files/bigthree2.jpg

While the Russian president cultivates “a never forget” ethic, the American president seems to never remember. Indeed, Barack Obama, as with Muslim history, seems to be ignorant about the legacy of uncommon cultures - and the difference between friendly and lethal competition. If a liberal like Roosevelt could make common cause with Joseph Stalin and a conservative like Ronald Reagan could do business with Mikhail Gorbachev, how is it that a political footnote like Barack Hussein Obama can’t do business with Vladimir Putin?

The face of 21st century fascism is religious – and Islamic. There’s not much difference between secular and religious totalitarians. Coercion, terror, and atrocity is what they have in common. Alas Europe, with the possible exception of Brexit England, seems to be channeling early 20th Century behaviors that enabled National Socialism. Recall that Italy and Spain made common cause with fascism. France and Belgium rolled over like streetwalkers, and most of Scandinavia allowed Hitler’s vermin to take control uncontested. “Neutrality” in Europe before and during WWII was another word for appeasement. In the North, the flavor was Quisling; in the South, collaboration was called Vichy. The EU and NATO are not about defense today so much as they are about flirting with historical folly.

The parallels between mid- Century Europe and early the early 21st Century European Union are difficult to ignore anymore. Euocrats do not have a clue about common cultural or common kinetic defense. Terrorists live cheek to jowl with oblivious Belgians. The European Union seeks to solve the 5th Column problem now by making Turkey an open border too!

Some days it’s not difficult to conclude that clueless Europe and ruthless Mecca deserve each other. In the distant past, Islam was at the Gates of Vienna. Now the crescent and sword knocks on the doors of Westminster Abby. If common sense were currency, the European Union would be insolvent.

The loss of a feckless West Europe is sure to provide new opportunities for new alliances. Given the endemic chaos and aggression emanating from the Muslim world; Russia, China, and the United States might be the logical core for a new “big three,” alliance against 21st Century totalitarians. One of the most obvious advantages of a new global military coalition would be economy. Unlike NATO dependencies, the Chinese and Russians will surely pay their own way.

Ironically, China and Russia are already fiscal allies, in so much as both have emerged as a kind budget Viagra for the US Department of Defense. It’s difficult to justify “huge” defense budgets at the Pentagon if the real threat is 5th column migrants and terror driving a Toyota.

Only one candidate in the US presidential primaries suggests that small wars, strategy, and alliances should on the table in 2016. Hard as it is to forecast how such a discussion might go, any movement in new directions would be an improvement over the “new normal;” cooked threats, sanguinary inertia, and suicidal appeasement.

In small wars of a thousand cuts, time is not an American or European ally.

--

About the Author »

G. Murphy Donovan

The author is a former USAF Intelligence officer, Vietnam veteran, a graduate of Iona College (BA), the University of Southern California (MS), the Defense Intelligence College, and the Air War College. He the former Senior USAF Research Fellow at RAND Corporation, Santa Monica and the former Director of Research and Russian (nee Soviet) Studies, ACS Intelligence, HQ USAF, serving under General James Clapper. Colonel Donovan has served at the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the Central intelligence Agency.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.newsweek.com/expect-intense-russian-pushback-nato-459842

Opinion

Expect Intense Russian Pushback on NATO

By Steven Pifer On 5/17/16 at 1:20 AM

This article was first published on the Order From Chaos blog of the Brookings Institution site.

When NATO leaders gather in Warsaw, Poland, July 8–9, they will announce steps to beef up the alliance’s conventional force presence on its eastern flank. NATO also will shortly announce that the SM-3 missile defense site in Romania has achieved operational status.

These moves will spur the Kremlin, with some fanfare, to announce military “countermeasures.” But those will be steps that Moscow almost certainly intends to take in any case.

Russia’s military buildup, its illegal seizure and annexation of Crimea and support for armed separatism in eastern Ukraine have caused NATO to focus more intently on territorial defense over the past two years. The Warsaw summit will approve a number of actions in this regard.

One idea under discussion is the deployment of a battalion from NATO member states such as the United States, Britain and Germany in each of the Baltic states and Poland.

That will hardly suffice to defend the Baltics. A 2015 RAND study suggested the need for seven brigades—including three heavy armored brigades—to have a chance of stopping a major Russian offensive. That is beyond NATO’s capacity at present. Moreover, such a force would appear overly provocative to Moscow, posing a potent ground offensive capability less than 400 kilometers from Russia’s second city of St. Petersburg.

What the smaller battalions will instead provide is a credible trip wire. Attacking them would ensure that allies joined in the fight.

Russian Countermeasures

Moscow will like none of this. Nor will it like the announcement that the U.S. SM-3 missile interceptors in Romania to defend southeastern Europe against a ballistic missile attack have become operational.

The Russians will make their displeasure known. The West should anticipate irate declarations of military countermeasures.

We have seen this before. Last September, a German television report suggested that U.S. B61-12 nuclear bombs would soon be deployed at Buechel Air Base in Germany. The report was wrong. B61-12 bombs will not even go into serial production until 2020. The Russians surely knew that, as the Department of Energy has made public the program’s timeline.

Officials in Moscow nevertheless went into hyper–spin mode. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peshkov darkly warned: “This could alter the balance of power in Europe. And without doubt it would demand that Russia take necessary countermeasures to restore the strategic balance and parity.”

Former Chief of the General Staff Yuri Baluyevsky suggested Russia respond by deploying Iskander short-range ballistic missiles to the Kaliningrad exclave north of Poland. Federation Council member Viktor Ozerov said Russia might withdraw from the 1987 treaty banning intermediate-range missiles.

Iskanders in Kaliningrad as a countermeasure? Western analysts have expected that deployment for several years as part of the Russian army’s ongoing modernization.

In early 2015, a Russian Defense Ministry official stated that Iskanders would be stationed in Kaliningrad. Units armed with those missiles have already deployed to the exclave temporarily as part of Russian military exercises.

Another possible countermeasure, this one near Romania, would involve deployment of Iskander missiles and Backfire bombers to Crimea. Again, that would be nothing new. Those plans have been in the works for at least a year, according to the same Defense Ministry official.

Seizing on a NATO action to justify withdrawal from the treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces would constitute a more dramatic Russian move, but it would hardly qualify as a countermeasure.

Senior Russian officials—including President Vladimir Putin’s chief of staff, Sergey Ivanov, and Putin himself—questioned Moscow’s adherence to that treaty more than eight years ago. The Russian military, moreover, has tested a prohibited ground-launched cruise missile of intermediate range in violation of the treaty.

An Old Kremlin Tactic

Categorizing its military programs as countermeasures to Western military deployments has a long tradition with the Kremlin. Indeed, at the negotiation on intermediate-range nuclear forces in the early 1980s, the chief Soviet negotiator called the deployment of the Soviet SS-20 ballistic missile a response to the U.S. Pershing II. He did so with a straight face, which impressed his American counterparts, as the SS-20 was first deployed in 1976—seven years before the Pershing II.

Moscow may even be getting a head start with its countermeasures. On May 4, Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu said that Russia would create three new army divisions opposite NATO countries.

In light of Moscow’s recent belligerence, NATO has little choice but to take sensible steps to bolster its defenses, both to assure allies made more nervous by Russian actions and to deter the Kremlin from any foolhardy moves.

NATO members should be ready for howls of protest and the announcement of various Russian actions as countermeasures—and should understand that Moscow would have taken those actions in any event.

Steven Pifer is the director of the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative and a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Center on the United States and Europe and the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the Brookings Institution. A former ambassador to Ukraine, Pifer served as a foreign service officer centered on Europe, the former Soviet Union and arms control. Pifer also had postings in London, Moscow, Geneva and Warsaw, as well as on the National Security Council.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_...urope_is_making_russia_nervous_should_it.html

May 13 2016 4:29 PM

Cold War Theater

The U.S. and Russia are fighting about missile defense when they should be settling differences.

By Fred Kaplan
Comments 88

An American missile defense system was activated with great fanfare in Romania on Thursday, and Russian officials instantly denounced it as a provocation that might trigger a nuclear arms race and possibly war.

Is Moscow’s protest mere bluster and nonsense? Mainly yes, but a little bit no. The Russians are being paranoid in typically Russian fashion; but, as has often been the case, there’s some logic to their madness.

You may be surprised (I was) that we’re putting antimissile missiles on Eastern European soil. Wasn’t that President George W. Bush’s idea, and didn’t President Obama scotch the plan during his first year in office, deciding instead to put the interceptors out to sea, on the U.S. Navy’s Aegis cruisers? Obama did this for two reasons. First, ships are mobile, so the missiles would be less vulnerable to a pre-emptive attack. Second, Russians had expressed fears that the missiles were aimed at them, and this was the era of the “reset” in Russian-American relations. (Bush did design the program to intercept Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles; Obama reoriented it, with different interceptors, to go after short-range missiles launched at Europe by Iran or rogue powers.)

However (and, I admit, I’d forgotten this, too), Obama’s plan did call for eventually placing these interceptors—24 of them—on Romanian soil by 2015 (so we’re running a year late) and another 24 in Poland by 2020. This decision was the product of a compromise. Some officials in Eastern Europe, who had recently joined NATO, wanted above all a firm symbol of American commitment to their defense. A ship can sail away; a missile base, on land, with officers, infrastructure, launch sites, and all the rest—that was tangible.

But this tangible symbol is, in part, what irritates the Russians. Losing the Warsaw Pact was bad enough (Vladimir Putin famously called it the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century); seeing America carve out a military foothold in this lost territory would deepen the humiliation—and, within that mindset, would constitute a grave threat. That was the fear: A dozen or two antimissile missiles would be just the beginning of America solidifying its control of Eastern Europe, right up to Russia’s border.

U.S. and NATO officials have long insisted that this view is overblown. The Standard Missile 3, or SM-3 as it’s called, is purely defensive; it works not by blowing up a missile in midair but by slamming into it with great force; in other words, it couldn’t be turned into an offensive weapon, even if some future Western leader wanted it to be.

But from Russia’s point of view, that’s not the issue. As one military adage has it, the only purely defensive weapon is a foxhole, and a battery of antimissile missiles doesn’t change this fact. In the odd world of nuclear strategy, a nation deters an attack by posing a credible threat of “retaliation in kind.” Side A attacks Side B; Side B strikes back against Side A; therefore, Side A doesn’t attack in the first place. But imagine that Side A has an effective missile-defense system. Side A attacks Side B; Side B strikes back, but most of its missiles get shot down before reaching their targets; therefore, Side B is unable to “retaliate in kind.” Both sides do the calculation and understand the strategic imbalance, and therefore (so goes the theory), Side A dominates Side B—intimidates it into doing certain things in A’s favor—without having to go to war.

This is why Russian officials see missile defense systems as a threat. It’s a concept they learned from the Americans. In the 1950s and early ’60s, many American nuclear strategists, notably Herman Kahn, author of the best-seller On Thermonuclear War, advocated anti-ballistic-missile systems as an explicit adjunct to an offensive first-strike strategy: The U.S. launches a nuclear attack on the USSR; the USSR strikes back with the few nuclear missiles that survived the first strike; the U.S. shoots them down with its antimissile missiles. Or, more to the point, the U.S. has the capability to do these things—which puts the U.S. in a dominant position in international confrontations.

In the mid-1960s, when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara proposed a treaty banning anti-ballistic missiles in the United States and Soviet Union, some Russian officials were puzzled: Why ban defensive weapons, they asked? McNamara schooled them on nuclear strategy; he essentially wanted to avoid the destabilizing situation that Herman Kahn wanted to foster and exploit. The Russians learned the lesson. (Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed the ABM Treaty in 1972; George W. Bush abrogated it in 2001. At the time, the post–Cold War Russian Federation was too weak, economically and militarily, to do much in protest.)

Bush’s missile defense program was designed to protect the United States from an attack by (mainly Russian) ICBMs. The antimissile missiles, called Ground-Based Interceptors, or GBIs, were massive, almost as large as ICBMs, and they were to be encased in underground concrete silos: Some of them would be (and are) based in Alaska; some would be installed in Europe, to shoot down ICBMs shortly after they were launched. Seeing this as a threat to Russia’s deterrent, then-President Dmitry Medvedev announced he would deploy his own short-range nuclear missiles in Kaliningrad. Obama canceled the European part of Bush’s program, refocused it to deal with a possible Iranian attack against Europe, replaced the large GBIs with much smaller and slower SM-3s, and said he’d put them on ships, not on Eastern European soil—as a result of which Medvedev canceled his Kaliningrad plan.

Now that U.S. interceptors are being placed on Eastern European soil after all (as envisioned, but not loudly announced, in Obama’s plan), it’s no surprise—especially with Putin in power and the era of “reset” long evaporated—that Russian is responding with renewed threats to deploy missiles to Kaliningrad and more.

U.S. and NATO officials are once again offering reassurances. A couple dozen interceptors, they correctly say, aren’t nearly enough to undercut Russia’s deterrent force. In any case, the SM-3s are much too slow to cope with Russian ICBMs; and their location, about 100 miles southwest of Bucharest, Romania, is too far away to stop Russian short-range missiles. These officials have offered to share all technical data with the Russians; in fact, they’ve offered to give Russian officers access to the missile defense radar station—to let them use it to help protect their own country from a missile attack. But so far the Russians have ignored the offers.

The entire spectacle is theater, and little more. The fact is, it’s unclear whether the SM-3 interceptors would even work. They have a mixed record of shooting down ballistic missiles in carefully controlled tests; results would likely be spottier still in real life, where a missile strike’s timing and trajectory are unknown ahead of time, especially if the enemy (whoever that might be) fires more than one missile at a target (a scenario that has never been tested).

We put some missile defense rockets on Eastern European soil, as a tangible token of our commitment to the defense of NATO’s newest members. The Russians haul out their fiercest rhetorical assaults, in (quite possibly genuine) fear of American “encirclement” and the permanent loss of their own imperial holdings. It might be entertaining theater, like the apes waving their bones and beating their chests in the first part of 2001: A Space Odyssey. But the missiles are real, the tensions are growing, and despite dramatic reductions brought on by four decades of arms-control treaties, both sides still have thousands of nuclear weapons in their active stockpiles.

Cold War redux is a dangerous phenomenon. At least in the original version, the United States and the Soviet Union controlled vast chunks of their hemispheres. That’s no longer the case. Power centers have collapsed, alliances have frayed, national borders are weakening in the world’s most unstable regions, and millenarian militias are vying with states for the loyalty of disenfranchised sects. It’s a time for traditional powers to work through their real differences, build collective defenses in the pursuit of common interests, and put away Cold War fantasies.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realclearworld.com/artic...born_essential_middle_east_truths_111857.html

Six Stubborn, Essential Middle East Truths

By Aaron David Miller
May 17, 2016
Comments 1

This piece was created in collaboration with the Woodrow Wilson Center. Aaron David Miller, a Vice President at the Woodrow Wilson Center, served as a Middle East negotiator, analyst and adviser in Republican and Democratic Administrations. The views expressed here are the author's own.

Leaders change, and the Middle East can always surprise. But regardless of presidential preference and promises, there are a half-dozen verities that will haunt any leader, from Donald Trump to Hillary Clinton -- just as they have bedeviled President Barack Obama and his predecessors.

Want Hollywood endings, go to the movies. I challenge anyone to identify a single issue in this region today that is heading toward a meaningful or sustainable end state. From Syria’s civil war to the politics of Iraq, from the war against the Islamic State to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we are dealing with problems that are much more likely to have outcomes than solutions.

Even the Obama’s administration’s signal foreign policy achievement -- the P5+1 Iranian nuclear agreement -- is an accord limited in time and scope that in no way assures Iran’s nuclear aspirations have been laid to rest, let alone guarantees the Islamic republic’s behavior in the region.

We need to stop thinking about fixing problems in the Middle East on what I call Administration Time -- four-to-eight-year increments -- and start thinking about a more extended metric, say a decade. Even the highly imperfect Iran nuclear agreement recognizes this reality.

Blame America, but blame the locals more. The United States has made many mistakes in the Middle East. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was a galactic blunder. It was followed by additional mistakes, such as American support for the repressive and corrupt government of Nouri al-Maliki, and its hasty military withdrawal from the country. But the lion’s share of the responsibility for the state of the broken, angry, and dysfunctional Middle East lies with the locals themselves.

There’s a reason this region seems impervious to positive, progressive change. The elements required to catalyze that change do not presently exist. Sparking such change will require leaders who are ready and able to rise above their narrow sectarian, political, or corporatist affiliations for the sake of their countries; effective and authoritative institutions; freedom of expression; gender equality, and so on. What exist instead are sectarian, regional rivalries overlaying weak and failing states to guarantee instability, and in some cases, fragmentation and chaos.

Doctrines are disastrous. Consistency, Emerson opined, is the hobgoblin of little minds. It is certainly of limited value to a great power operating in the Middle East. It can at times make sense to be consistent in what you say and intend when dealing with friends and adversaries. It is foolhardy, however, to force U.S. values, interests, and policies to fit a doctrinal straitjacket. We supported an Arab Spring in Egypt and Tunisia. Why did we not do the same in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain? We invaded and occupied Iraq with disastrous results, presumably to remove a bad regime. Now we have been there for more than a decade. Should we not have been compelled, then, to repeat the exercise in Libya and Syria? They also had bad leaders, so why not invade and occupy?

Great powers behave in anomalous and contradictory ways, driven sometimes by sheer hypocrisy, sometimes by domestic politics, and more often by what they deem to be their selective interests. And when it comes to the Middle East, it’s hard to see how American interests and values will ever strictly align.

Want a perfect friend? Get a dog. Unless the United States plans to go it alone in a region where it has vital interests, enormous challenges, and a lot of enemies, it’s going to have to make do with the friends that it has. And those friends are far from perfect. In some cases -- think of Saudi Arabia and Egypt -- Washington shares few values, particularly when it comes to democratic principles. But some interests nevertheless overlap.

In other cases, such as Israel, there is affinity on values and many shared interests. Even so, serious differences remain on issues such as Israeli settlements, the terms for a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and recent American overtures to Iran -- particularly the merits of last year’s nuclear accord.

The odds of pushing these imperfect partners to see things the American way on issues that are dear to them are pretty slim. No matter how hard we insist, they have more at stake on these issues than we do. Good luck trying to impose a deal with the Palestinians on the Israelis, or telling the Egyptians or Saudis to democratize. We’re caught in an investment trap when it comes to these partners, especially as the Middle East melts down.

Don’t let rhetoric outstrip reality or capacity. Sadly, the United States has become adept at doing precisely that. Words are not actions, but they do count. And far too often Washington has not followed through on our words. America has said too much or not explained clearly enough what it’s trying to accomplish in the region.

Just look at Syria. Washington called repeatedly for the removal of Bashar al-Assad, and now seemingly accepts that he could be part of a prolonged transition. President Obama identified any regime use of chemical weapons as an unacceptable red line, not to be crossed; it was crossed. We called for ISIS’s destruction without any realistic hope of achieving that, and warned the Russians off supporting the Assad regime without the means to stop them. More recently, Secretary of State John Kerry talked about reaching the “critical hours” in a search for a cease-fire in Syria that appears interminable.

There are many things we cannot control. Our rhetoric, we can control.

Forget transforming the region. Transact and manage as best you can. Why the United States thinks it can impose its dreams and schemes on small tribes, where other great powers have failed, is not entirely clear. We cannot end Syria’s civil war or put Iraq back together. We cannot bring democracy to the Arab world, nor solve the Israeli-Palestinian problem. You need regional buy-in for all those things. And America lacks partners in this region who can undertake such transformative acts.

What Washington can do is focus on trying to keep America safe and prosperous: To the extent we can, hammer ISIS, al-Qaeda affiliates, and other jihadists who want to attack the United States and our allies; continue to wean America off Arab hydrocarbons and in the interim ensure no disruption in Middle East supply; and work to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

It’s not pretty, perfect, or heroic. But it’s eminently sensible and smart in a region America can neither fix nor leave.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/16/size-and-japanese-power/

Size and Japanese power

16 May 2016
Author: Editors, East Asia Forum

In 2008, the Japanese population peaked at 128 million. Already Japan has a million fewer people today than it did then. With the workforce shrinking even faster — almost 10 million lower than at its peak in 1997 — and the proportion of the population over 60 years old now at more than one-third of the total population, per capita income growth has stagnated. Japan’s economic size is on the way to maxing out. Relative to its faster growing neighbours, its share of regional GDP is declining, as too is its share of global income.

Japan remains one of the wealthiest countries in the world. It is also blessed by one of the highest levels of social security and community safety anywhere on earth. But it no longer projects economic size and 10 or 20 years hence that is not going to change.

These facts are the premise on which Japan must now make its way in the world. They are facts that creep up on you, if you’re living life out in the community. They’re reflected by the greying of crowds in the streets, the smaller cohorts entering schools and universities, and the expansion of the mortuary business. It’s no wonder that they take a while to imprint themselves on strategic outlooks formed in years of bustling youthful growth and a growing reach around the world.

But these facts must eventually change Japanese strategic outlook in every dimension.

For many years, Yoshihide Soeya has sought to reinvent his country as a middle power. What a strange idea it seemed to his countrymen and women a decade or two ago when he first proposed it — and to most commentators outside Japan hard-wired into Japan’s ambitions of the past! And still it remains a conception of Japan’s place in the world that has little traction among the current Japanese leadership nor impact on Japanese strategic thinking.

Soeya was surely prescient, although his starting point was from the postwar constraints on Japanese security policy: the Constitution (and its pacifist Article 9) and the US–Japan Security Treaty. ‘Both have fundamentally constrained Japan’s freedom of action in international security and limited Japan’s foreign policy options to those of a middle power’, Soeya suggests. ‘This diplomatic style allowed Japan to focus on postwar economic recovery, which eventually proved to be the key to the nation’s rise as an economic power.

But even as Japan achieved economic strength it maintained a restrained posture in dealing with political and security issues, and concentrated instead on cultivating economic and cultural relations with Asia and the world’. More recently he observed that ‘[w]hether one likes it or not, Japan’s status may also be evolving into that of a middle power, in which the creation of a culturally rich welfare society, living in an increasingly interdependent and globalised world, is the natural goal of an ageing nation’.

Now Japan’s economic power is shrinking, Shiro Armstrong suggests in this week’s lead essay, that this imposes a third constraint on national ambitions and how they might be achieved. In that context, he continues, ‘[t]he preoccupation with growing the aggregate economy and, for Abe, returning Japan to some form of pre-war glory, appears a strange distraction … The Abenomics policy package to revive the economy is palpably failing’. But even if it were to succeed, it would not reverse the big structural trend towards ‘peak Japan‘. This does not make Japan irrelevant, as Brad Glosserman says, but establishes a frame for reasonable national goals.

No future, including that of Japan, is set in stone — Japanese immigration policy could in principle be reversed and the productive power of women be called up — but both developments would seem at this point, as Armstrong notes, highly unlikely.

So what are the implications for Japan’s place in the world and the country’s national agenda?

Whatever Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s ambitions for Japan’s security policy may have been, recent changes in Japanese security policy are modest adaptations that permit Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defence and satisfy its alliance partner, but within constraints that protect the thrust and credibility of its peace constitution.

A security strategy consistent with this circumstance would be one that is more multi-faceted, that deals with long-standing issues that affect relations with its neighbours in the region. While the alliance with the United States remains the anchor of Japanese security policy, its diplomacy and foreign policy in years to come has to be welded into Asian coalitions. This requires a broader conception of security policy that is not purely military in its character, and a return to an updated version of the comprehensive security policy that has anchored security policy in the past.

In this conception of Japan’s capacities and its reach, there would be more active engagement in coalitions for cooperation not only in hard security affairs with partners like Australia but also with China and the rest of Asia in economic and energy cooperation through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and other big political initiatives. This multifaceted strategy of underpinning the US forward military presence in Asia, engaging politically and economically in China, and supporting regional multilateralism would signify a return to Japan’s critical role in managing China’s peaceful rise in the region, as Evelyn Goh has argued.

The breadth and depth of Australia’s relationship with Japan positions Australia’s place in Japanese regional diplomatic initiatives. Although its recent submarine deal with France might appear to take the shine off Australian engagement with Japan on all these fronts, it’s really a wake-up call for a new, proactive diplomacy between these partners that can endure beyond the Abe era and demonstrate common cause with Japan in pursuit of regional security, and economic and social development.

The EAF Editorial Group is comprised of Peter Drysdale, Shiro Armstrong, Ben Ascione, Ryan Manuel and Jillian Mowbray-Tsutsumi and is located in the Crawford School of Public Policy in the ANU College of Asia and the Pacific.

 

[Housecarl]

I just can't keep up with the day to day attacks behind the government lines.....


For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-blast-idUSKCN0Y8103

World | Tue May 17, 2016 10:19am EDT
Related: World, Iraq

Three bombings in Baghdad kill 63: police, medical sources

BAGHDAD | By Kareem Raheem


Three bombings killed at least 63 people and wounded more than 100 in Baghdad on Tuesday, police and medical sources said, extending the deadliest spate of attacks in the Iraqi capital so far this year.

A suicide bombing claimed by Islamic State in a marketplace in the northern, mainly Shi'ite Muslim district of al-Shaab killed 38 people and wounded over 70, while a car bomb in nearby Shi'ite Sadr City left at least 19 more dead and 17 wounded.

Another car bomb, in the mixed Shi'ite-Sunni southern neighbourhood of al-Rasheed, killed six and wounded 21, the sources said, in what a military spokesman described as a suicide attack.

Security has improved somewhat in Baghdad in recent years, even as the Sunni militant Islamic State (IS) seized swathes of the country almost up to the outskirts of the capital.

But attacks claimed by IS in and around the city last week killed more than 100 people, sparking anger in the streets over the government's failure to ensure security.

There are fears that Baghdad could relapse into the bloodletting of a decade ago when sectarian-motivated suicide bombings killed scores of people every week.

That has cranked up pressure on Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to resolve a political crisis or risk losing control of parts of Baghdad even as the military wages a counter-offensive against Islamic State in Iraq's north and west with the help of a U.S.-led coalition.

Abadi has said the crisis, sparked by his attempt to reshuffle the cabinet in an anti-corruption bid, is hampering the fight against Islamic State and creating space for more insurgent attacks on the civilian population.

A spokesman for the Baghdad Operations Command told state television the attacker in the al-Shaab neighbourhood had detonated an explosives-filled vest in coordination with a planted bomb. Initial investigations revealed that the bomber was a woman, he said.

Islamic State said in a statement distributed online by supporters that one of its fighters had targeted Shi'ite militiamen with hand grenades and a suicide vest. There were no immediate claims of responsibility for the other two bombings.


(Additional reporting by Saif Hameed and Mostafa Hashem in Cairo; Writing by Stephen Kalin; Editing by Mark Heinrich)

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.jns.org/latest-articles/...st-threat-landscape-experts-say#.VzszVRL5PIU=

North Korea an overlooked player in Mideast threat landscape, experts say

Posted on May 17, 2016 by JNS.org and filed under News, World.
By Maayan Jaffe-Hoffman/JNS.org

North Korea has provided the technology or weapons for Hamas’s cross-border attack tunnels from Gaza to Israel, Hezbollah’s Scud-D missile stockpile in Lebanon, and Iran’s Fordow nuclear facility. Yet the totalitarian state in East Asia doesn’t seem to frequently enter the Western public discourse on Middle East threats.

With the January 2016 North Korean nuclear test, which represented a significant advance in North Korea’s strike capability and the fourth time the nation has exploded a nuclear device, analysts such as Dr. Bruch E. Bechtol—the author of four books on North Korea and a political science professor at Angelo State University in Texas—say it is time for the United States to pay closer attention to the rogue state’s military proliferation in the Middle East.

Bechtol explained that North Korea has played a key role in the buildup of Iranian and Syrian forces, as well as the forces of the Iranian-funded Lebanese terror group Hezbollah. The five-year-long and ongoing Syrian civil war has meant a huge loss of military equipment for President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and North Korea has filled the void with T-55 tanks, trucks, rock-propelled grenades, and shoulder-fired missiles.

“The Assad regime has fired lots of Scuds…and chemical weapons. All of these came from North Korea,” Bechtol told JNS.org.

Regarding the terror tunnels that Gaza-ruling Hamas has dug in order to carry out attacks inside of Israel, Bechtol said the tunnels’ “concrete reinforcements” resemble the characteristics of North Korean structures.

The fear now is that North Korea will transfer its nuclear-enrichment technology to Iran, and will hand over its bomb designs to the Islamic Republic or tell Iran how to fit a bomb on the delivery mechanism of a ballistic missile, said Simon Henderson, the Baker fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and director of the institute’s Gulf and Energy Policy Program.

North Korea might even train Iranian nuclear scientists and engineers, and test an Iranian weapon design on the Islamic Republic’s behalf, Henderson told JNS.org.

According to Bechtol, Iran and North Korea have been closely collaborating since as early as the 1980s. North Korea supplied Iran with Scud B-missiles, artillery, tanks, and trucks during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War.

Since then, he said, North Korea has sold Iran Scud-B, Scud-C, and Scud-D missiles, as well as extended-range scuds. According to Bechtol’s research—a combination of media reports, U.S. intelligence, government sources, the work of other academics, and testimony from North Korean defectors—North Korea helped Iran build the Safir two-stage missile and the Sejil solid-fuel missile. He said that between 2014 and today, at least two North Koren shipments of long-range missile parts arrived in Iran.

In March, Iran test-fired multiple ballistic missiles, which Bechtol said are based on Pyongyang’s Nodong missile prototype.

Bechtol pointed to a 2015 testimony by Dr. Larry Niksch, a 43-year veteran with the Congressional Research Service, before a U.S. House of Representatives committee hearing on the Iranian-North Korean strategic alliance. Niksch told the committee that since 2011, he has seen a “reverse flow” from Iran into North Korea, expanding Iranian investment of both personnel and funds in North Korea’s domestic nuclear and missile programs.

“Iranian money appears to be the lubricant for North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs,” Niksch told the committee.

Additionally, North Korea expert Gordon Chang told The Daily Beast in January that several top Iranian officials went to witness North Korea’s nuclear test that month.

“One has to be able to connect the dots,” Bechtol told JNS.org.

With Iran standing to gain up to $150 billion in sanctions relief from the nuclear deal it signed with world powers last year, Bechtol said Iran could use the surplus funds to outsource its nuclear program to North Korea—a loophole that would help Iran advance its nuclear program without violating the nuclear deal.

“[U.S. Secretary of State John] Kerry and crew left a loophole a mile wide when they effectively allowed Iran to conduct all the illicit work it wants outside of Iran, in countries like North Korea or perhaps Sudan,” Michael Rubin, an analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, told The Washington Times in September 2015.

Bechtol said that the Iranians are also seeking to put a nuclear missile on the Shahab-3, a medium-range ballistic missile, with the goal of targeting Israel.

“Israel already knows, understands the threat that Iran presents. It knows the threat North Korea presents. The U.S. needs to take these threats more seriously,” he said.

Bechtol noted that because the governments of North Korea and Iran actually “don’t get along well,” their partnership is practical rather than ideological in nature. The combination of illegal weapons proliferation and other illicit sales of items such as cigarettes and drugs make up as much as 40 percent of North Korea’s economy. Therefore, Bechtol believes that targeting Pyongyang’s “dirty money” in several Asian banks—rather than going after North Korean weapons shipments—is the solution to the nuclear issue.

“If no U.S. banks will do business with these banks, North Korea will have to go elsewhere for the money and that will be a real crick,” said Bechtol, noting that similar American sanctions were effective in 2005.

“It snowballed all over Asia [in 2005], and the North Korean diplomats were carrying suitcases of cash to Mongolia to launder the money.…This is what will slow down nuclear proliferation in the Middle East,” he said.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-N...ainers-to-Congo-UN-report-says/6711463159099/

North Korea sent arms and military trainers to Congo, U.N. report says

North Korea-made firearms were used during peacekeeping operations, according to the report.

By Elizabeth Shim Contact the Author | May 13, 2016 at 1:27 PM

SEOUL, May 13 (UPI) -- North Korea sent firearms and 30 military instructors to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, according to a U.N. report.

The United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee Concerning Democratic Republic of Congo told the media those were some of the findings from a panel of experts, Kyodo News reported.

Experts said the Congolese troops were supplied with North Korean-made pistols and other weapons, and that the Congolese soldiers carried the firearms with them during U.N. peacekeeping operations.

Pyongyang also supplied the central African country's armed forces with personnel, the Sankei Shimbun reported Friday.

North Korean military instructors, 30 in total, were employed to train special forces in the Congo and instruct the Congolese president's bodyguards.

North Korea is prohibited from exporting weapons under Security Council sanctions resolutions.

Congo, in turn, is obligated to notify the U.N. if it imports weapons from Pyongyang. The African state is technically in violation of U.N. sanctions resolutions.

The report also contained details of how Congolese authorities were able to procure North Korea-made guns, beginning in the first half of 2014, at the chief seaport of Matadi.

North Korea first exported arms to the Congo in December 2009, U.N. records show. In January of that year, Congolese officers investigated a North Korea cargo ship at the port, where they stumbled upon weapons and ammunition.

 

[vestige]

North Korea an overlooked player in Mideast threat landscape, experts say

I believe this is the most overlooked element in the debates re: Iran's "efforts" to obtain nukes.

Iran's "efforts" don't require centrifuges etc.

Iran only needs to "write a check". (or the gook may take cash)

 

[Housecarl]

Now the "fun" starts.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-usa-congress-idUSKCN0Y8239

Politics | Tue May 17, 2016 2:04pm EDT
Related: World, Election 2016, Politics, Saudi Arabia

Senate passes bill allowing Sept. 11 victims to sue Saudi Arabia

WASHINGTON | By Patricia Zengerle

The U.S. Senate passed legislation on Tuesday that would allow victims of the Sept. 11 attacks to file lawsuits seeking damages from Saudi Arabia, setting up a potential showdown with the White House, which has threatened a veto.

The Saudis, who deny responsibility for the 2001 attacks, strongly object to the bill and have threatened to sell up to $750 billion in U.S. securities and other American assets in retaliation if it becomes law.

The "Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act," or JASTA, passed the Senate by unanimous voice vote. It must next be taken up by the U.S. House of Representatives, where no vote has yet been scheduled.

If it became law, JASTA would remove the sovereign immunity, preventing lawsuits against governments, for countries found to be involved in terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. It would allow survivors of the attacks, and relatives of those killed in the attacks, to seek damages from other countries.

In this case, it would allow lawsuits to proceed in federal court in New York as lawyers try to prove that the Saudis were involved in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.


Related Coverage
› White House voices concerns on Senate Sept. 11 lawsuit bill

Democratic Senator Charles Schumer of New York, a co-sponsor, said the bill is overdue and that, because it only applies to attacks on U.S. soil, does not risk lawsuits against the United States.

"Today the Senate has spoken loudly and unanimously that the families of victims of terrorist attacks should be able to hold the perpetrators, even if it's a country, a nation, accountable," Schumer told a news conference.

Republican Senator John Cornyn of Texas, also a sponsor of the bill, said JASTA does not target the Saudis, although he alluded to a still-classified section of a report on the Sept. 11 attacks that Saudi critics say might implicate Riyadh.

"We have yet to see the 28 pages that have not been yet released about the 9/11 report, and that may well be instructive," Cornyn said at the news conference.

Other lawmakers who have seen the 28 pages have said releasing them would quiet such rumors.

Cornyn said it was up to the court to decide whether the Saudis were liable. "I don't believe that this will be destructive of the relationship that we have with the kingdom of Saudi Arabia," he said.

The Obama administration has said it opposes JASTA and that President Barack Obama would veto it. Asked if Senate Democrats would back a veto, Schumer said he would vote against Obama.


(Reporting by Patricia Zengerle; Editing by Bill Rigby and Jonathan Oatis)

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/05/18/the_objective_value_of_clausewitz_109374.html

May 18, 2016

The Objective Value of Clausewitz

By Olivia Garard

It is a fact that today the form of war is different from that of the Napoleonic era. Just compare the conduct of the Battle of Fallujah to that of the Battle of Austerlitz. What is disputed, however, is whether this is a consequence of a changing nature of war. This debate often emerges from Carl von Clausewitz’s distinction between war’s nature and character. Unfortunately, this polarization leads to a semantic slugfest: defining and redefining words such as violence or politics in the vain hope that turning to Webster, rather than back to Clausewitz, will resolve the issue. What is actually at stake is something far more essential than merely the—or even a—definition of war.

Ultimately, the question—whether the nature of war is immutable—boils down to doubts about Clausewitz’s theoretical legitimacy. Thus, to address concerns about the ontological status of war, and thereby Clausewitz’s preeminence, we must instead ask: does Clausewitz provide a framework with which we should consider today’s wars, or for that matter any war?

To judge the value of Clausewitz’s framework, we must begin by examining his definition of war. The success of any definition of war is based on how well it discriminates between events of war from events of not war. Here, Clausewitz posits, “War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.”[1] His premise suggests that war fundamentally requires an interactive combination of violence and politics employed instrumentally. This is war’s nature, war’s constant. With it, we can identify the Battle of Fallujah as an event within the (Second) Iraq War, and the Battle of Austerlitz as an event within the Napoleonic Wars; and, moreover, connect the Iraq War and the Napoleonic Wars as manifestations of the greater concept of capital-W War. The variable of war is how war’s nature (violent, political, and interactive) presents in reality. Although a function of the nature of war, war’s character is chiefly dependent upon how the interplay of the Clausewitzian trinity—passion, reason, and chance—unfolds in the context of the era. This is why the conduct of the Battle of Austerlitz differs from that of the Battle of Fallujah. Yet, the question remains, ought we consider war this way?

Part of the debate stems from the continual development of novel technologies, such as drones, or the emergence of new spheres like cyber. Both the Battle of Austerlitz and the Battle of Fallujah seem rather obviously war when compared to events such as Stuxnet or the prolific global use of unmanned systems. Foreign Policy’s Rosa Brooks has highlighted how these fresh concepts and platforms challenge the primacy of Clausewitz and his articulation of what constitutes war, and whether war—as such—is possible in the future. While Brooks does concede that “we need some coherent way to distinguish war from non-war,” she remains skeptical.[2] Specifically, she worries that “if what we place into the categories we label ‘violence’ and ‘politics’ can change, then what do we gain by claiming that war’s nature never changes?”[3] Brooks points out that a Clausewitzian can superficially satisfy their assertion by surreptitiously increasing the flexibility of the supporting terms. It’s possible to agree to the above reduction of Clausewitz’s nature and character of war, but dispute the meaning of the building-block terms. Brooks continues:

My point right now is not that one way of understanding violence is right and another is wrong; rather, it’s that the term “violence” can itself be understood in multiple different ways, and different societies will conceive of violence in different ways at different times. The same is true of the idea of “the political.”[4]

But that’s the beauty of Clausewitz. While Brooks is correct to recognize that there are many ways to understand the terms violence, politics, and interactive, what matters is the rightness or wrongness of considering these terms in specific ways. And that’s just the point. We value conceiving of violence and politics in certain ways such that we are able to create meaning that translates throughout our society, and transcends (strategic) cultures.

Therefore, this leads us back to our other initial question about whether we should think of war as Clausewitz does. To understand this distinction, I turn to pluralism. Catherine Elgin’s “The Relativity of Fact and the Objectivity of Value” takes as its main point that “the demarcation of facts rests squarely on considerations of value; and evaluations are infused with considerations of fact. So factual judgments are not objective unless value judgments are; and value judgments are not relative unless factual judgments are.”[5] A ‘value’ is a framework with which to evaluate the world, while a ‘fact’ is a description of the world. Fusing this with Clausewitz, we find that his theory of war is a value since it presents us with a way to evaluate the world producing its own facts. It enables us to label instances of war as separate and distinct from events that are not war. When values are held constant, Elgin argues, like when Clausewitzians accept Clausewitz’s theory of war, the resulting description of the world, the facts, which the theory reveals, can be considered objective. Remember that Brooks glazed over the possibility that some definitions could be right while others could be wrong, but this is just Elgin’s point. What is right or wrong depends on the value system from which we judge; the answer derives itself directly from the values we want to uphold, which in our case is Clausewitz’s premise of war: war’s nature. In answer to our initial question of whether the nature of war can change, it follows that only we can change what we consider to be the nature of war.

Alas, this seems to reinforce Brooks’ point that Clausewitz’s theory is flexible to the point that, by altering various definitions, or, in this case, values, we can permit all manner of action as war. This is not so, because, even with the amount of systematic flexibility (pluralism) Elgin permits, she warns that “even though we construct the categories that fix the facts, we cannot construct whatever we want.”[6] Just because Clausewitz’s theory, held as an objective value, fixes various facts about what is or is not war, it does not mean, as Brooks intimates, that any other construction of what is war is permissible. While we might believe Clausewitz’s theory of war is right (or better), there is no authority that prevents others from conceiving of war in any other way. Elgin alleviates this worry, since “acceptability of any particular scheme depends on the truths it enables us to state, the methods it permits us to employ, the project it furthers, and the values it promotes. Together, these constitute a system of thought.”[7] We accept Clausewitz and employ his theory because it provides us with a value scheme that finds truths;’ helps us judge actions according to the trinity of passion, reason, and chance; and, moreover, enables us to locate conflict within a larger context: politics.

War, Clausewitz writes, “has certainly a grammar of its own, but its logic is not peculiar to itself.”[8] Although, it is possible to accept the logic, the context of politics, while denying the grammar, we cannot switch until we have found another better system of thought. Moreover, we should be questioning, not the facts Clausewitz’s theory generates, the semantics of violent means or political ends, but the acceptability of the system as a whole: choosing Clausewitz’s grammar as opposed to another’s. In order to deviate from one value system to another, there must be something to which we can change. Rarely can we just give up values without replacing them or their function within the system. If we are to destroy Clausewitz’s system of thought, we must not only have good reason to, but also there must be something better, that explains more, and more truthfully or righteously.[9] It is not tenable to deny Clausewitz’s theory, like Brooks, without presenting another more viable alternative. We must, however, be kind to Brooks, since she is right that current circumstances—like cyberspace or autonomous weapons—make holding Clausewitz’s theory even more difficult. Fortunately, Elgin has an answer.

The process of creating such a system of thought is neither immediate nor comprehensive. Elgin explains,“System-building is dialectical. We mold specific judgments to accepted generalizations, and generalizations to specific judgments. We weigh considerations of value against antecedent judgments of fact.”[10] Problems arise when the facts, which emerge from holding certain values, challenge the very values that produced them. This is not because the value itself is inconsistent, although possible, but because the context in which the value is applied is vastly different from the context in which the value developed. It is not that the value—Clausewitz’s theory of war—has changed, but instead, because of such an unfamiliar modern context, the possible inputs and, therefore, the possible outputs have altered. Often, these are situations and contexts that could never have been anticipated at the time when the value emerged. Could Clausewitz’s theory have anticipated nuclear weapons, the Internet, or satellite imagery and its implications for the conduct of war? Elgin explains that “unanticipated facts can thus put pressure on a system, by generating problems it cannot (but should) solve, yielding inconsistent evaluations, or producing counterintuitive verdicts.”[11] This is why people like Brooks attack Clausewitz’s theory and question its legitimacy, but just because the theory is under pressure does not mean it cannot or will not produce answers. Elgin reminds us:

The considered judgments that tether today’s theory are the fruits of yesterday’s theorizing. They are not held true come what may, but accorded a degree of initial credibility because previous inquiry sanctioned them. They are not irrevisable, but they are our current best guesses about the matter at hand. So they possess a certain inertia. We need a good reason to give them up.[12]

Do we have such reasons? Should we shove our trusty On War off the shelf?

Today, we face difficulties understanding the conduct of war because we are faced with major changes in the global landscape with emerging technologies, techniques, and procedures. Fortunately, Clausewitzian logic has not changed. Moreover, many still believe—we value—that Clausewitz provides the best system of thought with which to process various interactive violent and political actions. Clausewitz recognizes that such facts might come along and trouble what is considered to be within the realm of the conduct of war. He notes, “The necessity of fighting very soon led men to special inventions to turn the advantage in it in their own favor: in consequence of these the mode of fighting has undergone great alterations.”[13] Despite those changes, Clausewitz maintains, “in whatever way it is conducted its conception remains unaltered, and fighting is that which constitutes War.”[14] What matters, now, more than ever, is translating the underlying fighting to the modern political context; understanding the necessary deviations of character, while holding onto the (Clausewitzian) premise of war.

THE REALITY IS THAT WE VALUE CONSIDERING WAR IN A CERTAIN WAY: THE CLAUSEWITZIAN WAY.

Even though the cyber domain or autonomous weapons might shake up debate, the foundation of Clausewitz’s system remains intact. Changes in facts might change the character of war, but Clausewitz saw this as a consequence of its instrumental relationship to politics and accounted for such fluctuations. Such instances just make war more dissimilar to war of before: the difference between the Battle of Fallujah and the Battle of Austerlitz from whatever the future holds, perhaps a conflict like that depicted in Ghost Fleet. Additionally, using Elgin, we verified that arguments concluding that the nature of war is variable stem from semantic confusion rather than a real rejection of Clausewitz. The reality is that we value considering war in a certain way: the Clausewitzian way. Just like other values, people can disagree, but they should recognize that they are disagreeing based on value and not fact. Brooks is correct in stating,“Arguments about the definition of war are always, in some sense, efforts to shape, constrain, or channel violence and power,” but this makes it all the more important to consider whether we should think of the nature of war as Clausewitz does.[15]

To which I answer, most definitively, yes, because if not Clausewitz, then whom?

________________________

Olivia A. Garard is an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps. She has an MA in War Studies from King's College London. The opinions expressed are hers alone and do not reflect those of the Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

NOTES:

[1] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. By Colonel J. J. Graham (New York: Barnes and Noble Inc., 2004): 3. [Italics original]. As to whether this is a ‘truth’ akin to the metaphysical existence of numbers, I demure.

[2] Brooks, Rosa. ‘Fighting Words: Has the nature of ‘war’ changed since the days of Clausewitz?’ Foreign Policy, 4 February 2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/02/04/fighting_words_future_war_clausewitz.

[3] She forgets ‘interactive’, which, for the cyber debate that incited her post, is crucial. See Thomas Rid’s Cyber War Will Not Take Place. Ibid.

[4] Brooks.

[5] Catherine Elgin, "The Relativity of Fact and the Objectivity of Value," The Harvard Review of Philosophy, Spring 1996, 4.

[6] Elgin, 7.

[7] Ibid., 5.

[8] Clausewitz, 699.

[9] See Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions for how old paradigms are replaced by new ones, particularly how change can occur just through the death of the old theorists.

[10] Elgin, 8.

[11] Ibid., 11.

[12] Ibid., 8.

[13] Clausewitz, 69.

[14] Clausewitz, 69.

[15] Brooks.


This article originally appeared at Strategy Bridge.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-hekmatyar-idUSKCN0Y91FR

Breaking News:

Girl rescued from Boko Haram says other kidnap victims under heavy guard in Nigeria's Sambisa Forest: activist group


World | Wed May 18, 2016 9:19am EDT
Related: World, Afghanistan

Afghanistan signs draft pact with Taliban-allied militants

KABUL | By Mirwais Harooni

Afghanistan signed a draft agreement on Wednesday with the Hezb-e-Islami militant group in a move the government hopes could lead to a full peace accord with one of the most notorious warlords in the insurgency.

Hezb-e-Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is a veteran of decades of Afghan war and rights groups have accused his group of widespread abuses, particularly during civil war in the early 1990s, when he briefly served as prime minister.

The United States has also linked the group to al Qaeda and the Taliban and put Hekmatyar on its designated terrorist list.

The group has played only a minor role in the Taliban-led insurgency in recent years and the deal is unlikely to have any immediate practical impact on security.

But with little sign that the Taliban are ready to join peace talks, the deal offers President Ashraf Ghani's government a concrete sign that it is making headway in drawing insurgent groups away from the battlefield and into the political process.

Mohammad Khan, deputy to government Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, said the draft accord was a positive step but more work would be needed for a final deal.

"We are optimistic about this agreement and we strongly support it," he told reporters in Kabul before the accord was signed by a delegation from Hekmatyar's party and officials from Afghanistan's High Peace Council. But he added: "This doesn't mean it's finalised."

The announcement came as officials from Pakistan, the United States, China and Afghanistan held another round of meetings, in Pakistan, aimed at laying the ground for peace talks with the Taliban, who have refused to join the talks.

Human rights groups have criticized the move toward a deal with Hekmatyar's group but the pressure on the government for some sign of progress in bringing peace appears to have outweighed the concerns.

Under the terms of the draft, members of Hezb-e-Islami would be offered an amnesty, similar to that offered in 2007 to warlords accused of war crimes as well as a release of prisoners held by Afghan authorities.

The government would also work to have the group removed from a U.N. black list.

The group, which for years had close ties with Pakistan, would not join the government but would be recognized as a political party and be involved in major political decisions.

In 2003, the U.S. State Department included Hekmatyar on its terrorist list, accusing him of participating in and supporting attacks by al Qaeda and the Taliban.

His group was most recently blamed for a 2013 attack in Kabul, in which two U.S. soldiers and four U.S. civilian contractors as well as eight Afghans were killed.


(Writing by James Mackenzie; Editing by Robert Birsel)

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/18/middleeast/libya-isis-sirte/index.html

ISIS has executed almost 50 in Libya, Human Rights Watch says

By Joshua Berlinger, CNN
Updated 4:12 AM ET, Wed May 18, 2016

(CNN) ¡X Public beheadings. Corpses hanging from scaffolding. Floggings for violating the law.

This is life in the ISIS-held city of Sirte, Libya -- a Mediterranean coastal city that's about 350 miles away from Malta -- according to a new report from Human Rights Watch.

Many of the 45 former and current residents of Sirte Human Rights Watch spoke to say they live in a continued state of fear.

"As if beheading and shooting perceived enemies isn't enough, ISIS is causing terrible suffering in Sirte even for Muslims who follow its rules," said Letta Tayler, a senior terrorism and counterterrorism researcher at Human Rights Watch.

"While the world's attention is focused on atrocities in Syria and Iraq, ISIS is also getting away with murder in Libya."


Seven reasons you should care about Libya


Public killings

Since February 2015, the Sunni terror group has "executed" 49 people, the report says.

That number includes the 21 Coptic Christians that ISIS beheaded last year.

Two elderly men who were accused of "sorcery" were publicly beheaded in October, the report said.

"They encouraged people to watch," one resident told Human Rights Watch. "When the big man [the executioner] finished the job he raised the head for the crowd to see."

ISIS released a video of the purported incident online.

Many of those executed publicly were shot in the head, and those that were accused of being "spies" were killed and then dangled from scaffolding for a couple of days.

The group even has a "kill list" of 130 names of its supposed enemies that sits in the Sirte courthouse, according to the report. Many on the list have been killed in drive-by shootings.

Symbolism in Sirte

Much of the chaos that's engulfed Libya can be traced back to recent events in Sirte.

The city was the home of the country's former leader, Moammar Gadhafi.

That's also where he was killed in 2011, the year his regime collapsed.

ISIS has gained a foothold in the country due to a power vacuum that hasn't been filled since collapse of Moammar Gadhafi's regime collapsed in 2011.

Libya Fast Facts

At first there were hopes that the country would follow a more democratic path like its western neighbor, Tunisia.

But warring factions soon split over how to run the country, and civil war ensued. Two rival governments claimed to be the rightful leaders of the country before signing a U.N.-backed peace deal in December.

As those sides and local militias jostled for power, ISIS saw an opportunity to claim territory for itself.

U.S. officials estimate there are about 4,000 to 6,000 ISIS militants in the country.

The Pentagon is providing additional resources to counter ISIS in Libya, according to a U.S. defense official familiar with the operation.

The effort, which has been underway since late last year, involves sending in small teams of troops to try to establish relationships with groups that may be able to form a new nationwide government.

'Spies on every street'

The Human Rights Watch report describes life in Sirte as similarly brutal as accounts coming out of other ISIS strongholds like Raqqa in Syria or Mosul in Iraq.

The terror group has diverted food, medicine, fuel and cash to its members and seized homes from residents who fled, Human Rights Watch says.

"There are no vegetables or meat. Most shops are closed," one resident told Human Rights Watch in an interview. "Meanwhile the Daesh [ISIS] is living in our houses and having barbeques."

All banks have been shut but one, and only ISIS members can use it. Communication with outside world can only be achieved through ISIS-run call centers.

And the group has been accused of looting and destroying homes of those it thinks are enemies.

"There are spies on every street," another resident told the humanitarian group.

More than two thirds of Sirte's 80,000 residents have fled, according to Human Rights Watch.

"We need help -- we have no more food or housing to host the people fleeing the fighting," the mayor of nearby Misrata, Mohamed Eshtewi, said.


CNN's Barbara Starr contributed to this report.


„Ý

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[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/18/middleeast/libya-isis-us-special-forces/index.html

U.S. Special Forces take the fight to ISIS in Libya

By Nick Paton Walsh, CNN
Updated 9:20 AM ET, Wed May 18, 2016

Misrata, Libya (CNN) ¡X It is a tiny, remote aircraft hangar, carved in the Sicilian rock decades ago, but now home to a new and vital front for the United States against ISIS.

U.S. Special Forces and surveillance flights are operating on the ground and over Libya as the West moves to boost security operations in the country to bolster Libya's increasingly desperate fight against ISIS.

Surveillance flights over the country's 2,000-kilometer (1,240-mile) coast have been in operation from the remote Sicilian island of Pantelleria for over a year, and Special Forces have recently increased their presence on the ground. Witnesses and Libyan officials told CNN they are in evidence near the city of Misrata, with an estimated dozen soldiers operating out of a base near the city.

The U.S. presence in Libya was acknowledged by Pentagon officials in the past few days, who admitted groups of Special Forces were "meeting a variety of Libyans." The teams are said to be in action around the capital Tripoli, as well as Misrata and the east of the country.

ISIS executes almost 50 people in Libya

The U.S. publicly only supports the latest of the three groups who claim the right to govern the country -- the Government of National Accord, led by Fayez al-Sarraj and recently installed by the United Nations. But the presence of these Special Forces teams in the strongholds of the other two groups claiming to be the country's legitimate government shows that America retains wider private contacts.

It is unclear what precisely the U.S. Special Forces' scope of operations is in Libya, as airstrikes and other attacks have been limited. But they join an increasingly fraught Libyan battle against ISIS, who are now estimated to control about a tenth of the coastline.

CNN joined the Misrata militia along the isolated and dusty road between their stronghold port city and the ISIS bastion of Sirte on a day in which two ISIS suicide attacks, launched using armored cars, pushed the Misratans back at least 29 kilometers (18 miles).

The attacks caused significant damage in the town of Abu Grein, killing about a dozen people and injuring 110, according to lists of casualties posted outside an over-burdened hospital the next morning. The attacks -- the worst ISIS have launched in months -- caused Misrata to declare a state of emergency.

ISIS is thought to be focusing some of its efforts on Libya as it increasingly comes under pressure in Iraq and Syria. While the oil-rich coastal country does not have a ready Sunni-Shia ethnic divide for ISIS to exploit, its chaos and ready supply of jihadists from Africa and neighbouring Tunisia has made it very appealing to the group.

They have an estimated 4,000 to 6,000 fighters in the country, according to U.S. officials, and there have been repeated reports of senior ISIS commanders being dispatched from the Middle East to supervise their growth there.

The Western response to this threat -- so close to Europe's southern Mediterranean shores -- has been slowed by the chaos in Libya's crippled institutions.

Seven reasons you should care about Libya

One government that has long operated in Tripoli has recently been challenged by the arrival in the capital of the Western-backed Government of National Accord. The east of the country, however, has a separate claim on the administration, and is backed by the powerful military figure of General Khalifa Haftar. This week Western powers offered to help arm the GNA, but the road ahead to delivery of weapons is complex.

„Ý

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-security-idUSKCN0Y91Y4

World | Wed May 18, 2016 10:21am EDT
Related: World

Iraq's Sadr pulls out forces from Baghdad districts hit by bombs

Powerful Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has ordered his armed followers to withdraw from the streets of Baghdad districts that have been hit by deadly bombings claimed by Islamic State, an aide said on Wednesday.

Sadr's Saraya al-Salam, or Peace Brigades, had deployed hundreds of militiamen in Sadr City and five other mainly Shi'ite areas of the capital after he accused the government of failing to prevent the attacks by the hardline Sunni group.

At least 77 people were killed and more than 140 wounded by three bombings in Baghdad on Tuesday, extending the deadliest spate of attacks in the Iraqi capital so far this year.

The cleric "ordered that no arm be displayed in public, avoid friction with the security forces and avoid being dragged into violence," one aide said.

Witnesses said Saraya al-Salam pulled out of the streets of Sadr City overnight on Tuesday.

The bombings cranked up pressure on Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to solve a political crisis brought on by his attempt to reshuffle the cabinet in a drive to tackle corruption.

The crisis has crippled parliament and hampered government action, creating space for more insurgent attacks on civilians.


(Reporting by Ahmed Rasheed and Kareem Raheem; Editing by Angus MacSwan)

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-egypt-kerry-idUSKCN0Y91SS

World | Wed May 18, 2016 1:44pm EDT
Related: World, Egypt, Israel

Kerry, Egypt's Sisi discuss Mideast peace, Libya conflict


U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry held brief talks with Egypt's President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Cairo on Wednesday, a day after the Egyptian leader proposed new efforts to try to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Kerry had already been scheduled to meet with Sisi to discuss a series of meetings on the Libya and Syria conflicts which took place earlier this week in Vienna.

A U.S. official said Kerry would explore in more detail Sisi's proposal, made on Tuesday during a speech, to mediate a reconciliation between rival Palestinian factions to pave the way toward a lasting peace accord with the Israelis.

In a statement after the meeting, State Department spokesman Mark Toner said they had discussed a "range of bilateral and regional issues, including recent developments on Libya and Syria."

During the meeting Kerry "stressed the importance of Egypt's role as a regional partner", Toner said.

Egypt was the first of a handful of Arab countries to recognize Israel with a U.S.-sponsored peace accord in 1979, but Egyptian attitudes toward their neighbor remain chilly.

Sisi's proposal, made during an impromptu speech at an economic conference, came as France pushes for an international conference to launch peace talks between the Palestinians and Israelis.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told France's foreign minister on Sunday that his country remained opposed to Paris's initiative, which was born of French frustration over the absence of movement toward a two-state solution since U.S.-brokered talks collapsed in 2014.

Kerry spoke by phone with Netanyahu on Tuesday and with Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas earlier in the week, the U.S. official said, without elaborating.

During the meetings in Vienna on Monday and Tuesday, world powers said they were ready to consider demands from Libya's new unity government for exemptions from a U.N. arms embargo to help take control of the lawless country.

The West is counting on the U.N.-backed unity government to tackle Islamic State in Libya and to stop new flows of migrants heading across the Mediterranean, though the newly instated leaders are still not in control of the capital city Tripoli.


(Reporting by Lesley Wroughton)

 

[Housecarl]

US to Activate European Missile Shield Today
Started by imaginative‎, 05-12-2016 04:34 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?491216-US-to-Activate-European-Missile-Shield-Today

Russia to test-fire massive nuclear missile: Report
Started by China Connection‎, 05-14-2016 04:19 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...a-to-test-fire-massive-nuclear-missile-Report

In NATO tank competition, U.S. comes up short against Germany (and other NATO countries)
Started by wait-n-see‎, 05-16-2016 07:47 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...ort-against-Germany-(and-other-NATO-countries)

Main Russia/Ukraine invasion thread - NATO: Russian Tanks and Artillery Enter Ukraine
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...ian-Tanks-and-Artillery-Enter-Ukraine/page441

Russian missile obliterates Turkish helicopter killing two in shock attack video
Started by Shacknasty Shagrat‎, 05-14-2016 09:50 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...-helicopter-killing-two-in-shock-attack-video

US To Send Troops, Weapons To Libya To "Fight ISIS"
Started by Plain Jane‎, 05-16-2016 02:52 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...oops-Weapons-To-Libya-To-quot-Fight-ISIS-quot

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/0...us-on-security-challenges-outside-europe.html

Europe

NATO meeting to focus on security challenges outside Europe

Published May 18, 2016 · Associated Press

BRUSSELS – NATO foreign ministers this week will discuss how the alliance can deal more effectively with security threats outside Europe, including by training the Iraqi military and cooperating with the European Union to choke off people-smuggling operations in the central Mediterranean.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said Wednesday a major focus of the ministers' meeting will be on "projecting stability beyond our borders," namely in the Middle East and North Africa.

The two-day session, to be attended by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and his counterparts from NATO'S 27 other member countries, begins Thursday at alliance headquarters in Brussels.

The wide-ranging agenda includes welcoming the Balkan nation of Montenegro as NATO's newest member-designate, and a dinner discussion on what policy to adopt toward a resurgent and increasingly bellicose Russia. But the centerpiece is likely to be discussions on how NATO should interact with what U.S. Ambassador Douglas Lute called "a whole set of weak, failing and failed states" to Europe's south and southeast.

Stoltenberg told a news conference the ministers will discuss a request from Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to expand or transfer a NATO military training program for Iraqi officers already underway in Jordan to Iraq itself. He said NATO is also considering stepping up aid to the U.S.-led coalition combating the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria by supplying AWACS command and control aircraft.

"We're looking for niche capabilities that the alliance can add to reinforce or support the coalition," Lute told reporters later.

He said he also expected ministers to discuss what NATO can do to beef up the defenses of Libya's newly formed government, which faces a brutal insurgency mounted by an Islamic State affiliate. On Monday, the United States and other Western countries threw their support behind the U.N.-brokered government, saying they would supply it with weapons.

Lute said NATO has the ability to train, advise, and help build the military capabilities not only of Iraq, but of Jordan and Tunisia, countries he said are also under stress or located in "a dangerous neighborhood."

"By helping our partners strengthen their own forces, and secure their own countries" NATO members will enhance their own security, Stoltenberg said.

A Friday meeting of the NATO foreign ministers with European Union foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini and the foreign ministers of neutral EU members Sweden and Finland will consider how the two international organizations can pool efforts to address "unprecedented security challenges," Stoltenberg said.

Those challenges include hybrid warfare threats like disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks or maritime security risks and possible NATO cooperation with the EU's Frontex agency to detect and stop human trafficking and terrorist infiltration in the Mediterranean.

Ivo Daalder, former U.S. ambassador to NATO, said the alliance has been quick to react to the "threat from Russia" but "the bigger immediate challenge is to get the alliance engaged in actions focused on the threat from the south."

"NATO can do much more — from intelligence and surveillance of migrants and refugees to helping coordinate efforts to stabilize Libya to joining the coalition against ISIS (Islamic State)," Daalder said.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/artic...o-step-up-eastern-deployments-to-deter-russia

‘Outgunned’ NATO to Step Up Eastern Deployments to Deter Russia

by James G Neuger
May 18, 2016 — 8:11 AM PDT

- Allied generals seek new battalions in Baltics, nearby states

- NATO to stay below ‘substantial’ force level in Russia pact

NATO will move more defensive forces toward Russia’s border after eastern European governments complained that reinforcements deployed since 2014 don’t provide enough deterrence.

Allied military planners have called for a “battalion-size multinational force” in each of several eastern countries including the Baltic republics, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said.

“A multinational presence sends a very clear signal that an attack on one ally will be an attack on the whole alliance,” Stoltenberg told reporters in Brussels on Wednesday. He said details will be worked out by a summit in Warsaw in July.

Russia’s takeover of Crimea and proxy war in eastern Ukraine near NATO territory in 2014 led the U.S. to rotate troops into eastern Europe and prompted the alliance to set up a 5,000-man rapid-response force.

Substantial Forces

Still, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains “outnumbered, outranged, and outgunned,” with a Russian lightning strike able to reach Estonia’s or Latvia’s capital in 36 to 60 hours, RAND Corp. analysts David Shlapak and Michael Johnson wrote on The War on the Rocks website last month.

NATO’s dilemma is to field firepower that is strong enough to reassure Poland and its neighbors but not so strong as to spur a new arms race or violate a 1997 pledge not to permanently station “substantial combat forces” near the Russian frontier.

Stoltenberg treaded that line when he said the latest reinforcements will be “far below any reasonable definition of substantial combat forces.” Germany in particular has been worried about breaking the treaty commitment to Russia.

Effective Deterrence

While the allied troop movements will be below the hazily defined “substantial” threshold, U.S. Ambassador to NATO Douglas Lute said they will be “sufficiently coherent and sufficiently combat-capable to contribute to deterrence.”

Deterrence doesn’t come down to “bean counting” the troops on the ground but includes the ability to speedily send in backup land, sea and air forces in a crisis, Lute told reporters. “There’s more than one ingredient to effective deterrence,” he said.

The U.S. will also start rotating armored brigade combat teams into eastern Europe in 2017, going beyond reinforcements provided by the 28-nation alliance as a whole, the Obama administration said in March.

Deterring Russia and stabilizing the Middle East and Libya are among the topics at a meeting Thursday and Friday of NATO foreign ministers.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.......

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-war-commentary-idUSKCN0Y82DT

News | Wed May 18, 2016 8:22am EDT
Related: Russia

Commentary: Current U.S.-Russia tensions are dangerous -- but not ‘Cold War Two’

By Josh Cohen

Since Russian-American relations spiraled downwards after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, analysts and politicians have begun to raise the once unthinkable: the advent of Cold War Two. Both American and Russian commentators have declared “Welcome to Cold War Two,” while NATO’s retiring supreme allied commander, Europe stated that “trying to prevent a Cold War” was now his successor’s responsibility. Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev went one step further, arguing “one could go so far as to say we have slid back to a new Cold War.”

So is a new Cold War underway? On the surface some similarities exist. Russian jets buzz U.S. planes and ships in the Baltic Sea, while American armored brigades deployed to Europe and NATO start military drills near the Russian border. Tensions are clearly rising. Nevertheless, the current situation misses several elements of the Cold War -- and provided both sides act wisely, Cold War Two need never arise.

First, current American-Russian competition does not possess the same ideological component that existed during the Cold War. While Soviet communism ultimately proved to be a bankrupt ideology, for nearly 45 years following World War Two a genuine battle of ideas raged between Moscow and the West. While the United States and Europe emphasized the primacy of democracy, free markets and individual rights, Soviet ideology promoted economic equality and prioritized the collective and the state over the individual. From the Soviet perspective, communism offered a genuine alternative for structuring a society – beliefs Communist leaders did not hesitate to enforce by the most murderous means.

Today’s competition between Washington and Moscow lacks this clash of ideologies. Contemporary Russia possesses its own version of capitalism – albeit one skewed by corruption and oligarchic control of key assets – and Moscow offers the world no overarching message for how to organize a society. Russia sometimes struggles to assert unique messages based on so-called “Eurasianism” or opposition to European and Western “decadence,” but ultimately neither of these represents coherent alternatives to the West’s message in the same way communism did.

Current Russian-American tensions also lack the global component which existed during the Cold War. From Angola to Nicaragua and Vietnam to Afghanistan, Washington and Moscow faced off in a series of proxy wars and competitions. Although contemporary Russia did return to the Middle East with its deployment of military forces to Syria, the most serious current tension between Washington and Moscow largely centers on Europe – and even then lacks the millions of troops on hair trigger alert each side possessed during the Cold War.

Additionally, the economic imbalance between Russia and the United States is far greater than that which existed during the Cold War. In 1961, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev boasted that within 20 years the Soviet standard of living would exceed that of any capitalist country. Despite the inefficiencies of the command economy, Khrushchev’s boast was not an implausible one. From the early 1960s through 1975 the Soviet economy grew faster than the U.S. economy, reaching a high of 58 percent of the size of the U.S. economy by that year.

Currently, however, the $18 trillion American economy is approximately ten times the size of Russia's. Moreover, the Russian economy remains in deep recession, with predictions of ongoing decline or stagnation lasting several years. The heavily natural resources-based Russian economy remains hobbled by corruption, while the U.S. economy – despite the challenges it faces – remains one of the most innovative and dynamic in the world. Put simply, global power in the twenty-first century is increasingly tied to nations’ economic vitality, and Russia simply lacks the economic base to engage in a Cold War-style global competition with the United States.

Finally, the difference in power between the Soviet military and today’s Russian military is dramatic. During the Cold War, the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies could muster 173 divisions in Europe to fight NATO forces. The Soviets possessed three times the number of tanks, anti-tank weapons and artillery pieces, plus more than double the number of armored personnel carriers. To support these ground forces, the Soviets could bring more than 7,200 combat aircraft to bear against barely 3,000 for NATO.

A NATO-Russia comparison today tells a very different story. With a 2015 military budget of $600 billion, Washington spends approximately ten times the amount on defense as does Moscow, and while Russian combat forces are modernizing, American military technology largely outclasses the Kremlin’s. While the Russians could certainly sustain some initial successes in places like the Baltics, the Russian military of today is nothing like the fearsome machine the West confronted during the Cold War.

Clearly, the conditions that made the Cold War what it was do not exist today, largely because Russia possesses a fraction of the power the former Soviet Union did. Nevertheless, the risk of Western-Russian tensions spiraling into an outright military clash is very real - in many ways just as real as during the Cold War. Much of the blame for this rightly lies with Moscow, as the Kremlin’s bellicose rhetoric combined with the Russian military’s risky and irresponsible aerial games of chicken against NATO aircraft in the Baltic and Black Seas leave little room for error.

To prevent the current tensions from leading to war, the United States should take the following steps. First, Washington and Moscow must establish specific protocols for the military interaction of each side’s forces, to better establish the “rules of the game” so to speak. Washington bit the bullet and worked with Moscow to “deconflict” the risk of accidental clashes in Syria, and it’s worth making the same effort here.

Second, the United States should avoid the temptation to bypass its European allies and engage directly with Russia. This ensures the United States does not allow Russia to split the alliance by allowing the West to speak with one voice.

Finally, the United States should pick and choose its battles with Russia, confronting where necessary but cooperating where possible. The United States must make crystal clear via both words and actions that it intends to honor its Article 5 commitment to defend the Baltics, however militarily challenging that may be.

The West must oppose Russia’s “hybrid warfare,” which in Ukraine included fomenting local pro-Russian demonstrations in the eastern Ukraine, flooding the media with false claims Maidan was a “neo-Nazi” coup, supporting local military proxies, and infiltrating Ukraine's intelligence agency. The West should respond to Russian propaganda – such as the Russian media’s false claim that a thirteen year-old Russian-speaking girl was raped by migrants in Berlin. It should counter Russian spying operations in the West with beefed up counter-intelligence, and control the flow of dirty money to Western financial institutions.

The West must also maintain sanctions on Moscow until it fully honors the Minsk agreement - which provides a structure for ending the Russian-sponsored war in eastern Ukraine - and completely withdraws its troops from Ukraine and returns full control of the border to Kiev. The message should be clear – no normal relationship is possible until Moscow ends its hybrid war against Ukraine.

By the same token, the West can also seek opportunities to cooperate with Russia – provided these promote Western interests. Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism represents one possible space where each side’s interests overlap, while stabilizing Afghanistan, environmental cooperation and sharing intelligence on Islamic State are others.

Current tensions lack numerous elements of the Cold War, and with a combination of luck and level-headed policies we can still ensure the “dogs of war” are not unleashed.



(Josh Cohen is a former USAID project officer involved in managing economic reform projects in the former Soviet Union. He tweets @jkc_in_dc The opinions expressed are his own.)

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.npr.org/sections/paralle...-footprint-in-eastern-europe-to-mixed-reviews

Politics & Policy

U.S. Enlarges Its Military Footprint In Eastern Europe, To Mixed Reviews

May 18, 2016·12:06 PM ET
Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson

The most tangible sign of a growing American military presence in Eastern Europe, behind the former Iron curtain, is tucked inside a former military base in rural Romania.

Hidden from view is a U.S. naval facility, where sailors use high-tech radar day and night to watch for incoming ballistic missiles fired at NATO countries. If any are spotted, the Americans would fire back with SM-3 Block IIA missiles.

A second such American site will also be built in Eastern Europe over the next two years, this one near Poland's Baltic coast. It's inside a base that once belonged to the Nazis and later the Soviets.

Once this site is finished, the entire $800 million ballistic missile defense shield for NATO countries in Europe, more than a decade in the making, will be complete.

Top U.S. and NATO officials last week declared the Romanian facility up and running, and a day later broke ground on the Polish site. They say the state-of-the-art Aegis defense system, which will ultimately be under NATO control, is about protecting the alliance against rogue states like Iran and has nothing to do with Russia.

But Moscow considers the American bases on NATO's eastern flank to be a provocation, a position Russia has maintained ever since the alliance began moving into Eastern Europe in the 1990s, following the Soviet breakup.

"After the deployment of those missile defense elements, we will have to think about how we can fend off the threats to the Russian Federation's security," Russian President Vladimir Putin said last Friday. He has rejected repeated assurances by the Americans and NATO that Aegis is designed to only take out short-and-medium range ballistic missiles fired from outside Europe.

"It is fully compliant with existing arms control regimes," U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work said at the groundbreaking in Poland.

"It's not about Russia," added Frank Rose, the assistant secretary of state for arms control verification and compliance, who attended the Romanian ceremony. Rose says the alliance has "been clear for over 20 years that U.S. and NATO missile defense are not directed against Russia, nor do they have the technical capability to undermine Russia's strategic deterrence."

That comes as a surprise to many Romanians, who have a different view of the U.S. Navy's "Aegis Ashore Facility," located on the outskirts of Deveselu, a farming community that is a two-hour drive southwest of the capital Bucharest.

Romania, like Poland and the Baltic states, has been clamoring for more U.S. and NATO troops and equipment since Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea and its backing for separatists in eastern Ukraine.

The Obama administration responded by quadrupling its spending on initiatives intended to reassure its European allies, and has been increasing the scope of military exercises in Northern and Eastern Europe. The plan also includes adding a third Army combat brigade in Europe, as well as a continuous rotation of 4,000 NATO troops in the Baltic States and elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

The Kremlin, meanwhile, is reported to have sent more troops and weapons — including missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads — into Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave bordered by Poland and Lithuania.

The buildup on both sides has been accompanied by an escalation in rhetoric. At a change-of-command ceremony earlier this month, U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter lashed out at Moscow over its actions in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. He criticized Russia for intimidating its Baltic neighbors.

"And most disturbing, Moscow's nuclear saber-rattling raises troubling questions about Russia's leaders' commitment to strategic stability," Carter said.

It's making Romanians nervous, too, and helps explain why they are comforted by the American Navy setting up a base in their country, even if the Americans say it's not about Russia.

Marius-Lucian Obreja, who heads the Romanian Senate's Defense, National Security and Public Order Committee, says Russian actions are destabilizing Ukraine. And Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, some 300 miles off Romanian shores, "caught us off guard and leaves us in huge need of help from a military power."

He said the Romanian government is working to modernize its military and join the handful of NATO countries that are spending 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense, which alliance members agreed to do in 2014. But he added it will be at least a decade before the improvements are complete.

The senator said he believes that even if it isn't directly targeting Russian missiles, the U.S. facility will make Moscow think twice about causing trouble in Eastern Europe.

There's also a palpable economic benefit to the American base for the 3,500 residents of Deveselu, where the whole village is getting a facelift. Mayor Ion Aliman says about $8 million in local and European Union funds have gone to upgrade the power grid, sewage systems, roads, and municipal buildings to accommodate their new American neighbors who officially moved in 18 months ago.

In addition, the U.S. Embassy has spent hundreds of thousands of dollars to refurbish the local school and build a new kindergarten.

"Like many Romanians, my grandfather had been waiting for the Americans since 1944, and they have arrived" says Aliman, who has several American and NATO flags hanging in his office.

Workers were also busy improving roads across from the Navy base last week in a housing complex known as the "Airmen Neighborhood." Lined up to look like a Russian MiG jet when viewed from above, the apartments and homes were built for pilots who worked at the former Warsaw Pact base.

A handful of the Deveselu base veterans still live here, including retired navigator Marian Georgescu, 54. He boasted that he'd given some of his American neighbors rides in his horse-drawn wagon, a common form of transport in Romanian farming communities.

Anca Nelson, 34, of Highland, N.Y., who was visiting her mom and dad, a retired paratrooper transport pilot, says "it's great to have a different culture so close to us.

"This opens our minds a little bit," she added. "This is a very traditional community and we haven't had contact with foreigners very often."

Nelson said she hopes the base will attract investors and provide jobs for residents in this impoverished region.

Hundreds of miles to the northwest, in Poland, Slupsk Mayor Robert Biedron had the same hope for his picturesque city and its 100,000 residents.


Europe
To Defend NATO, U.S. Sets Up Missile Defense Systems In Eastern Europe


But he's since soured on the American base that was first proposed nine years ago and where ground was finally broken last Friday at the Redzikowo Air Base, two miles from his city hall.


Europe
U.S., NATO Reveal Plan To Confront Russian Aggression


Biedron said the Polish government had promised to bring in investors and improve the highways, port and railway in Slupsk in exchange for the base, which he said would have otherwise been turned into a regional airport for area residents.

But none of it ever happened, and the new government which took over last fall refuses to even talk about it, Biedron said, adding that he is incredibly frustrated.

"There are so many limitations today," because of the base, he explained. "If I want to built anything in my city, I have to ask the American government for permission ... like if I want to build a factory, if I want to build a higher block of flats, I have to ask — not in Warsaw, but in Washington," the mayor said. "This is so crazy!"

He added that analysts estimate the region will suffer big economic losses because of the new base.

Other Slupsk residents who I spoke to also worried that the base will make them ground zero for any Russian retaliation, fears that were exacerbated by a Russian military jet conducting a "barrel" roll last month over a U.S. Air Force plane that was flying a reconnaissance mission above the Baltic Sea.

One 72-year-old retiree who said she was too afraid to give her name, whispered that she has always been against building an American base in her community. "It's a provocation to the Russians" she said, "and that makes a lot of us afraid."

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-idUSKCN0Y82DV

World | Wed May 18, 2016 2:56pm EDT
Related: World

Venezuela security forces block anti-Maduro protesters

CARACAS | By Alexandra Ulmer


Venezuelan security forces fired tear gas at protesters in Caracas on Wednesday amid nationwide rallies demanding a recall referendum to end President Nicolas Maduro's socialist rule.

In the third day of opposition rallies in the past week, several thousand protesters descended on downtown Caracas, witnesses said, for a march to the national election board.

But National Guard soldiers and police cordoned off the square where they planned to meet, so protesters instead milled in nearby streets waving flags, chanting "the government will fall" and pressing up against lines.

Authorities shot tear gas to dissipate them several times, sending hundreds of panicked people running down streets. A handful of demonstrators was arrested and one young man was carried off unconscious, according to Reuters witnesses.

Opposition leaders have warned Venezuela is a "time bomb" and have said blocking democratic avenues for Maduro's removal means people will increasingly take to the streets. Spontaneous demonstrations and looting are becoming more common amid worsening food shortages, frequent power and water cuts, and inflation that is the highest in the world.

"They're scared," Alfredo Gonzalez, 76, from the 23 de Enero slum, said at the Caracas demonstration as he wore a scarf over his mouth.

"Venezuelans are tired, hungry," said Gonzalez, who added that he had been sprayed with pepper gas.

Both protesters and security forces appeared more numerous than in other rallies this year, although the demonstration was still smaller than anti-government protests that turned violent and shook the OPEC country for three months in 2014.

While Venezuelans are now much angrier at their deepening economic crisis, many are too busy queuing up for scarce food, fearful of violence or pessimistic about the chances of a recall referendum, to join marches.

In Tachira state, which saw the most violent scenes during the 2014 protests that resulted in 43 deaths, troops also blocked scores of marchers from reaching the local election board office on Wednesday. At a demonstration in the Caribbean coastal town of Coro, protesters formed a chain in the streets.

An anti-Maduro demonstration last Wednesday in Caracas also turned violent, with troops using tear gas to quell stone-throwing protesters and an officer pepper-spraying opposition leader Henrique Capriles.


"DEAL WITH IT"

Maduro, a 53-year-old former bus driver who narrowly won election to replace the late Hugo Chavez in 2013, accuses Capriles and other opposition leaders of seeking a coup with the help of the United States.

"You don't like Maduro? Well, deal with it," said Vice President Aristobulo Isturiz, who has repeatedly said there will be no recall referendum this year.

The opposition coalition, capitalizing on popular discontent over the economy, won control of the National Assembly in December elections. But all the legislature's measures have been shot down by the government-leaning Supreme Court.

The opposition wants a recall referendum against Maduro this year to force a presidential election. But ruling Socialist Party officials say there is no time to organize a vote in 2016 and the election board is dragging its feet on paperwork.

At the weekend, Maduro declared a 60-day state of emergency, widening his powers to sidestep the legislature, intervene in the economy and control the streets, because of what he called U.S. and domestic plots against him.

Authorities also closed subway stations in Caracas on Wednesday to impede the protesters.

"The people will stay in the street unless there is a recall referendum," said demonstrator Roberto Campos, 43, his forehead bleeding from where he said he had been hit by a tear gas cannister.

Protesters around him scrawled "recall" on security forces' riot shields. Many drivers honked their support, while government supporters shouted against the protesters from balconies of nearby buildings, even waving a sign that read: "'Chavista' territory."

Maduro retains the support of a significant, although dwindling, hard core of "Chavistas" who praise Chavez's oil-fueled social projects. Maduro's approval levels fell just under 27 percent in March, a key poll showed.

Latin America's leftist bloc is shrinking with swings to the right in Brazil and Argentina but Maduro still has strong support from Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Bolivia.

Bolivian President Evo Morales condemned what he called "aggressions" against the Venezuelan leader. But the secretary-general of the Organization of American States (OAS), Luis Almagro, who has often crossed swords with Maduro, wrote a stinging letter calling him a "puny dictator."


(Additional reporting by Mircely Guanipa in Punto Fijo, Daniel Kai, Diego Ore, and Corina Pons in Caracas, Daniel Ramos in La Paz; Writing by Andrew Cawthorne; Editing by Bill Trott)

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Se...unches-European-defense-system/2451463505980/

Russia to revive missile trains as U.S. launches European defense system

By Viktor Litovkin, Special to Russia Beyond the Headlines | May 17, 2016 at 1:40 PM

Russia is reviving the production of military trains with missiles, or, as the military call them, combat rail-based missile systems.

The new Barguzin rail-based missile system will be employed by the Russian armed forces no earlier than 2020 and will be equipped with six missiles, Col. Gen. Sergei Karakayev, the commander of Russia's Strategic Missile Forces, has said.

The decision of the Russian leadership to revive the production of rail-based missile systems may be interpreted as yet another response to the deployment of the U.S. missile defense system in Europe, which is able to launch Tomahawk long-range cruise missiles, in addition to interceptor missiles. Moscow considers the system a threat to its security.

New train-based missile

Three divisions of combat rail-based missile systems (four regiments in each and 12 trains carrying three Molodets strategic missiles) were already in service in the Soviet/Russian Strategic Missile Forces from 1984 to 2007.

The new rail-based missile systems will be equipped with the MS-26 Rubezh multiple-warhead missile, which is lighter, but no less efficient than the Molodets.

The Rubezh was created by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, which has designed all the country's domestic solid-fuel strategic missiles, such as the Topol-M, Bulava and Yars.

Old combat rail-based missile systems were in service from 1984 to 1994, entering their route from the Kostroma (200 miles northeast of Moscow) and Penza (400 miles southeast of Moscow) regions, as well as from the Krasnoyarsk Territory (2,500 miles east of Moscow).

But in the early 1990s, under the agreement between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the missile trains were immobilized and did not leave their deployment regions. In 2007, they were completely taken out of service.

Why were they discontinued?

The solid-fuel rocket missile Molodets, which were produced by the Pavlograd Mechanical Plant, located in Ukraine (then part of the USSR), did not have a very long service life (its warranty coverage from the plant quickly expired).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the signing of the START I treaty by Ukraine in 1992, Kiev was not allowed to produce strategic missiles. There were no other train-based missiles to replace them.

In addition, missile trains were very heavy (just one missile weighed more than 110 tons) requiring three locomotives to pull them. Additionally, maintenance crews had to be called out to strengthen the railway embankments each time the trains were used – a constant irritant to the management of the Ministry of Railways.

At the same time, although combat rail missile systems were indistinguishable from conventional refrigerated trains from the ground, from space they were still identifiable. No other freight train had three diesel or electric locomotives.

Since the new Rubezh missile, which will be used on the Barguzin, is much lighter than the Molodets, one missile will be placed in one rail car. And the train, of course, will be lighter. Consequently, it will have no tell-tale signatures such as three locomotives. The load on the railway network will be lower, too. And when you consider that the sheer size of the rail network in Russia, it will be extremely difficult to locate it on its route.

Incidentally, the United States was the first to create the first rail-mobile missile system in the early 1960s. But Washington gave up on the idea due to the fact that the rail network in the United States was not as extensive as in Russia, and, moreover, the cost of a missile train was much higher than that of silo basing for Minuteman missiles.

Compliance with New START

The creation of the Barguzin rail-based missile systems does not conflict with Russia's obligations under the New START treaty. The agreement requires each party to have no more than 700 deployed carriers and another 100 in storage facilities.

As of April 1, 2016, according to official data of the U.S. Department of State, the Russian arsenal amounted to 521 strategic missiles. So Moscow's ability to compensate for decommissioned missiles is high enough. In addition, New START expires in 2018 and it is unknown whether it will be extended.

This article originally appeared at Russia Beyond the Headlines.

Related UPI Stories
•New TH-119 helicopter unveiled for military pilot training
•Philippine Navy gets new landing dock ship
•U.S. Navy contracts Boeing for P-8A aircraft component repair

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-05-18/germany-is-very-very-tired

Europe

Germany Is Very, Very Tired

May 18, 2016 1:00 AM EDT
By John Micklethwait
Comments 208

Over the past few days the Brexit referendum has taken a nasty turn, with Boris Johnson, the former mayor of London and a prominent “leaver,” comparing the European Union to Adolf Hitler and complaining about Germany’s growing power in the EU. He should visit Berlin, which I did last week. Far from wanting to rule Europe, Germany’s leaders seem increasingly worn out by its endless crises and, from their point of view, downright ingratitude. This growing fatigue in the continent’s already reluctant hegemon could spell as much trouble for the EU as Brexit does.

Postwar Britain famously lost an empire but couldn’t find a role; now, Germany has acquired an empire of sorts but can’t work out how to run it. All of Europe’s problems -- the flood of Syrian refugees, the euro crisis, Vladimir Putin’s belligerence, the euro zone’s anemic growth, Eastern Europe’s drift toward rampant nationalism, Brexit -- keep landing in Angela Merkel’s lap. Germany’s chancellor has usually found some way to cope, most obviously by kicking each problem down the autobahn. But she lacks the power (and too often the inclination) to lead Europe, while her partners, even when they don’t obstruct her, do very little to help. So the problems drift, and frustration in Berlin mounts.

Look, for instance, at Europe’s two main enduring crises. On Sunday the Greek parliament is supposed to approve another package of structural reforms, prior to a meeting of euro-zone finance ministers in Brussels on May 24. Greece needs another dollop of aid to meet its July interest payments, but the International Monetary Fund has been (rightly) worried that the country’s debt burden is too big and it will miss its target of a 3.5 percent primary surplus in 2018. A Merkellian fudge has been readied: In return for the new reform package, Germany and the IMF will accept some of Greece’s more heroic forecasts and stretch out debt repayments.

Default has thus probably been skillfully averted again. But nobody in Berlin believes Greece will ever be able to pay off its debts. “It is really an emerging economy, not a developed one,” says one senior German, adding wryly that the Greeks should be dealing with the World Bank, not the IMF.

Worse, from Germany’s perspective, the lack of progress in Greece is symptomatic of the whole continent’s uncompetitive economy. Six years into the euro crisis, France has barely started structural reform (German ministers roll their eyes whenever you mention “Francois Hollande” and “reform” in the same sentence), and Italy is still trying to fix its banking system. The single market is worryingly incomplete. Very few of the structural underpinnings of a successful single currency are in place.

This contempt comes with a hefty dose of hypocrisy and self-delusion. Merkel has done few structural reforms herself; the hard work was done by her predecessor, Gerhard Schröder. Content in their prosperous economic bubble, German voters have condemned the rest of Europe to needless austerity, resisted liberalization (notably in the country’s lackluster service industries), and refused to stomach common Eurobonds and other long-term solutions to preserving the single currency. So the Germans are not the thrifty saints they imagine themselves to be. But, as they endlessly point out, they are the ones who write the checks every time there is a bailout -- and they don’t feel as if they get a lot in return.

Germans have more justification for their resentment when it comes to Europe’s other main crisis: the flood of Syrian refugees. On the plus side, Merkel has found a way to stem the flow of people that threatened to overrun her country (and her chancellorship). Turkey has agreed to hold refugees within its borders in exchange for 6 billion euros in aid from the EU, while Italy and Greece are also getting help in exchange for not letting refugees who land on their coasts surge northward.

These deals have brought some relief in Merkel’s court -- but not without nervousness and reproach. Nervousness, because the deals are fragile: Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is already howling about the terms of his (“Since when are you controlling Turkey?”). Reproach, because when Merkel pleaded for help, she got precious little assistance. While Germany has taken in perhaps 1 million refugees, Britain and France have each absorbed a fraction of that. Eastern Europe, which Germany helped rebuild, was more rudely uncooperative. And what, Merkel’s lieutenants wonder, will happen if the refugees start coming again?

So it is no wonder that Germany feels fatigue. A decade into her chancellorship (a somewhat tiring milestone for any government), Angela Merkel must have found Boris Johnson’s remarks ironic. Rather than dominating Europe, she has merely the same sort of negative clout that Barack Obama has over much of the rest of the world: She can often stop things, but rarely cause them to happen. Part of that is her fault: If she had dared to get ahead of the euro crisis, rather than sticking various Band-Aids on it, she might have staunched it. But Germany is reluctant to lead, and the rest of Europe is reluctant to follow.

Domestic politics don’t make this any easier: The rise of the Alternative for Germany party, Germany’s version of euroskepticism, is partly based on its claim to tell the harsh truths about the European Union that Merkel keeps papering over. If Merkel, who is still trusted, were to leave, chances are that her successor would have far less leeway to negotiate on Germans’ behalf.

The overriding worry is that a vicious cycle has begun: As Germany gets ever more frustrated with Europe’s inability to change, it gets ever less likely to lead, so the change it wants becomes ever less likely to happen. In a strange way, Brexit might alter this dynamic. Merkel is desperate to keep Britain within Europe because she sees David Cameron, for all his Little Englander elements, as a voice for reform.

Yet if Britain were to opt to leave and other countries threatened to hold referendums, then even the cautious Merkel might be forced to seize the moment and bully reforms through Brussels to create a more cohesive, modern euro zone with a deeper single market. Hence an irony for Johnson and his fellow Brexiters: The dominant Germany they fear is more likely to come into being if Britain votes to leave the union.

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

To contact the author of this story:
John Micklethwait at micklethwait@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story:
David Shipley at davidshipley@bloomberg.net

 

[mzkitty]

18m
Pentagon: Chinese tactical aircraft carried out 'unsafe' intercept of a US maritime patrol reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea - Reuters
End of alert

 

[Housecarl]

It might be time to take a page out of the RAF's Falklands War playbook with the Nimrod and mount AIM-9s on our aircraft at a minimum.....

http://www.aviation-news.co.uk/archive/media/nimrod.jpg

18m
Pentagon: Chinese tactical aircraft carried out 'unsafe' intercept of a US maritime patrol reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea - Reuters
End of alert

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-south-china-sea-idUSKCN0Y92ZA

Business | Thu May 19, 2016 6:19am EDT
Related: World, China, Aerospace & Defense, South China Sea

Chinese jets intercept U.S. military plane over South China Sea: Pentagon

WASHINGTON/BEIJING | By Idrees Ali and Megha Rajagopalan


Two Chinese fighter jets carried out an "unsafe" intercept of a U.S. military reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea, the Pentagon said on Wednesday, drawing a rebuke from Beijing, which demanded that Washington end surveillance near China.

The incident, likely to increase tension in and around the contested waterway, took place in international airspace on Tuesday as the U.S. maritime patrol aircraft carried out "a routine U.S. patrol," a Pentagon statement said.

The encounter comes a week after China scrambled fighter jets as a U.S. Navy ship sailed close to a disputed reef in the South China Sea.

Another Chinese intercept took place in 2014 when a Chinese fighter pilot flew acrobatic maneuvers around a U.S. spy plane.

The intercept occurred days before President Barack Obama travels to parts of Asia from May 21-28, including a Group of Seven summit in Japan and his first trip to Vietnam.

China claims most of the South China Sea, through which $5 trillion in ship-borne trade passes every year. The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei have overlapping claims.

Washington has accused Beijing of militarizing the South China Sea after creating artificial islands, while Beijing, in turn, has criticized increased U.S. naval patrols and exercises in Asia.

The Pentagon statement said the Department of Defense was addressing the issue through military and diplomatic channels.


"ENDANGERING SECURITY"

China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said the U.S. statement was "not true" and that the aircraft had been engaging in reconnaissance close to China's island province of Hainan.


Related Coverage
› China's foreign ministry calls on U.S. to stop close reconnaissance

"It must be pointed out that U.S. military planes frequently carry out reconnaissance in Chinese coastal waters, seriously endangering Chinese maritime security," Hong told reporters at a regular press briefing on Thursday.

"We demand that the United States immediately cease this type of close reconnaissance activity to avoid having this sort of incident happening again," Hong said, adding that the actions of the Chinese aircraft were "completely in keeping with safety and professional standards".

"They maintained safe behavior and did not engage in any dangerous action," Hong said.

China's Defense Ministry said in a fax that it was looking into reports on the incident.

The Pentagon has yet to release the precise location of the encounter.


SIGNAL OF DISPLEASURE?

In 2015, the United States and China announced agreements on a military hotline and rules of behavior to govern air-to-air encounters called the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES).

"This is exactly the type of irresponsible and dangerous intercepts that the air-to-air annex to CUES is supposed to prevent," said Greg Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies think-tank.

Poling said either some part of China's airforce "hadn't gotten the message", or it was meant as a signal of displeasure with recent U.S. freedom of navigation actions in the South China Sea.

"If the latter, it would be very disappointing to find China sacrificing the CUES annex for political gamesmanship."

Zhang Baohui, a security expert at Hong Kong's Lingnan University, said he believed the encounter highlighted the limitation of CUES, and shows that Chinese pilots would still fly close to U.S. surveillance planes if needed.

"Frankly, we're always going to see these kinds of incidents as China will always put the priority on national security over something like CUES whenever it feels its interests are directly threatened," he said.

While the precise location of the encounter is not yet known, regional military attaches and experts say the southern Chinese coast is a military area of increasing sensitivity for Beijing.

Its submarine bases on Hainan are home to an expanding fleet of nuclear-armed submarines and a big target for on-going Western surveillance operations.

The Guangdong coast is also believed to be home to some of China's most advanced missiles, including the DF-21D anti-ship weapon.

The Pentagon last month called on China to reaffirm it has no plans to deploy military aircraft in the Spratly Islands after China used a military plane to evacuate sick workers from Fiery Cross Reef, where it has built a 3,000 meter (9,800 ft) runway.

In April 2001, an intercept of a U.S. spy plane by a Chinese fighter jet resulted in a collision that killed the Chinese pilot and forced the American plane to make an emergency landing at a base on Hainan.

The 24 U.S. air crew members were held for 11 days until Washington apologized for the incident. That encounter soured U.S.-Chinese relations in the early days of President George W. Bush's first administration.

Last month, the Pentagon said that Russia had intercepted a U.S. Air Force aircraft over the Baltic Sea in an "unsafe and unprofessional" way.


(Additional reporting by David Brunnstrom in Washington, Greg Torode in Hong Kong, and Michael Martina in Beijing; Editing by Sandra Maler, Lincoln Feast and Mike Collett-White)

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm......

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/india-coul...apons-early-1964-says-us-intelligence-1560888

India could have developed nuclear weapons as early as 1964 says US intelligence

By Priyanka Mogul May 19, 2016 11:05 BST

A declassified State Department report has noted that India was in a position to develop nuclear weapons as early as 1964. The report was among a number of others to be published on 18 May by the National Security Archive and the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project.

According to the Press Trust of India, the report cited frequent changes in the fuel core of the Canadian-Indian Reactor (CIR) at Trombay – as often as every six months. At the time, US intelligence had raised questions about India's nuclear aims.

"The Indians are now in a position to begin nuclear weapons development if they chose to do so," the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) said in the report published on 14 May 1964. "We have no evidence, however, of a weapon research and development programme and would expect to see some if the programme existed."

The report raised concerns due to the fact that they believed a six-month period was too short a time for "normal research reactor operations". Instead, they noted that this was the ideal time for using fuel for producing weapons grade plutonium.

Although the INR report stated there was no evidence of a weapons programme for India, it was "unlikely" that India had decided to build a nuclear bomb. However, it also added that it was "no accident" that "everything the Indians [had] done so far" was suitable to building a weapons programme in the future.

The State Department report said: "India's leadership might have had nationalistic motives for building the Phoenix plant but if it wanted a nuclear weapons capability it would seek such a capability."

The report concluded that India had taken the "first deliberate decision in the series leading to a nuclear weapon". This meant that they had available and on-demand weapons-grade plutonium or the ability to produce it.

In 2013, India was estimated to have at least 110 nuclear weapons. Although the country has signed and ratified the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, it has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on the grounds that it allows the US, Russia, China UK and France to have nuclear arsenals without obligations to disarm.


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For links see article source.....
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http://www.business-standard.com/ar...o-pak-nuclear-cooperation-116051900812_1.html

'CIA in 1970s knew about Sino-Pak nuclear cooperation'

Press Trust of India | Washington
May 19, 2016 Last Updated at 15:22 IST

By late 70s, the CIA knew that China had aided Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme by providing it with weapons design information, according to just declassified US documents.

According to recently declassified State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) reports by the National Security Archive and the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, a few years after China's first nuclear test in October 1964 INR wondered whether China would help Pakistan, among other countries, acquire a nuclear capability.

INR experts believed China had limited resources and seemed "cautious and indecisive" on the question of nuclear assistance, but they saw "reasons for continued concern".

A year later, intelligence reports concerning visits to China by Pakistani defence and science advisers sparked the question, "will Communist China give nuclear aid to Pakistan?"

INR analysts downplayed their significance, arguing that both countries would see risks in nuclear weapons cooperation, although assistance for peaceful purposes was possible.

One of the visitors to China, presidential science adviser Abdus Salam, who was later awarded Nobel Prize in theoretical physics, later played a central role in the 1972 Pakistani nuclear weapons decision, but INR could not foresee that, the National Security Archive said in a media release yesterday.

In a report to the Secretary of State, the then INR Director Thomas Hughes had said that "several recent developments raised the possibility that Pakistan and Communist China may have entered into some sort of an agreement for collaboration on nuclear matters."

"We have two reports from Pakistanis that an agreement for unspecified Chinese assistance in the nuclear field was obtained during the recent visit of Defence Adviser Ghulam Faruque and Science Advisor Abdus Salem to Peking," he wrote.

"We have no supporting evidence of Sino-Pakistani nuclear collaboration although there is little reason to expect that we would have it at this time," Hughes had said.

INR analyst Thomas Thornton concluded that Pakistan was highly unlikely to seek a significant degree of Chinese nuclear assistance as it would cause severe strains in US relations with Pakistan and there were "few things that would be as certain to trigger an Indian decision to produce nuclear weapons as would a Sino-Pakistani arrangement for nuclear arms collaboration."

Moreover, China was unlikely to be responsive. "We remain unconvinced by the evidence thus far obtained that there is any definite plan for Sino-Pakistani cooperation of any type in the nuclear area, but if there is, it is most likely in the peaceful area," he wrote.

Whether Salam, who was later ostracised because of his adherence to a minority Muslim sect, played an affirmative role in the then Pakistan Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's decision in 1972 to build the bomb has been a matter of controversy.

Moreover, once Bhutto had made the decision to go ahead, Salam recruited top scientists to help carry it out, said the National Security Archive.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm......

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/ar...lar-warfare-options-to-counter-russian-aggres

Imposing Costs by Other Means: Strategic Irregular Warfare Options to Counter Russian Aggression

by Steve Ferenzi
Journal Article | May 18, 2016 - 12:42am

America’s comparative advantage in conventional military power guarantees that its adversaries will seek to confront it below the threshold of traditional “war” in order to achieve their objectives. Russia’s recent aggression in Ukraine demonstrates one aspect of this battleground with troubling implications for the viability of the NATO alliance. Eliminating sanctuaries of impunity, whether they be within the political space of the “gray zone” being manipulated by Russia, or physical territory utilized by al-Qaeda or the Islamic State to launch attacks on the US homeland, requires the US to employ unconventional measures to compete and win.

It is time to unleash US irregular warfare capabilities. All the controversy over today’s “gray zone” challenges leads one to believe that the United States is an amateur player in this game. Throughout the 1980’s the United States successfully competed below the threshold of conventional war within the framework of “low-intensity conflict.” While the Iran-Contra affair and blowback from supporting the Afghan mujahedeen remain black eyes to US prestige, America successfully bled the Soviet Union without resorting to either nuclear Armageddon or conventional escalation. One can debate the minutiae, but the US achieved its strategic objectives at a relatively low cost. How can the US attain similar results in today’s operational environment where political willpower is the limiting factor? The answer is to enable what Russia fears the most: indigenous resistance movements along the lines of the “color revolutions” that shattered post-Soviet Russian influence in its traditional backyard.

Article 5 Dilemmas

The most pressing issue vis-à-vis Russia today is the United States’ commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Article 5 of the NATO charter requires that “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against theman armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” Russia’s annexation of Crimea reinvigorated the debate over NATO’s utility in the post-Cold War era. The toothless US response may have been justifiable given the lack of legal commitments to non-member Ukraine, but what if Russia takes perceived American weakness as an invitation for a repeat performance in the Baltic States, actual NATO members? Both Russia’s “new generation” hybrid warfare doctrine and Moscow’s allies in the region exhort the use of non-military asymmetric means and “fifth columns” in targeted areas to achieve strategic outcomes. Is America’s solution more armored road marches through Eastern Europe and combined training exercises? Does the US have the political will to actually pull the trigger on a conventional military response with the potential for escalation? Unlikely. Other concepts like “hybrid defense” and resurrecting variants of Cold War extended deterrence offer alternative solutions, but they don’t optimize limited fiscal and military resources to confront Russia.

The traditional mindset leads one to believe that when you need a tank, you need a tank. The prowess of American armor, especially when married with US airpower, is undeniable. It crushed Saddam Hussein’s attempt to seize Kuwait in 1991, and it once again delivered a crushing blow in the early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom. While selectively validating the innate US superiority complex, America’s adversaries nonetheless realized that exposing themselves to a 120 millimeter round fired from an Abrams tank is not in their best interest. The solution? War by other means. In Iraq, this meant insurgency a la Che Guevara, Mao Zedong, and Carlos Marighella, overlaid with a jihadist veneer. In Ukraine, this meant Russia employing “little green men” to capitalize on indigenous ethnic Russian grievances and seize Crimea through salami tactics designed to plausibly stay below the threshold of prompting Western intervention. The key ingredient? Avoid American conventional military superiority, and paralyze its political willpower to employ unconventional options to successfully confront it.

Article 5 requires a collective defense against an armed attack; it doesn’t oblige a response against hybrid warfare, nor does it stipulate how a defense in either case should be executed. Instead of pretending that the US will actually go to war with Russia over an invasion of the Baltics enabled by subterfuge and disinformation, why not set the conditions for indigenous movements to thwart Russian occupation and block its strategic objectives? If Russia wants to invade the Baltics, no conventional state military response in the region will stand a chance. Russia demonstrated this in Georgia in 2008. The beauty of irregular warfare is its ability to impose significant costs with minimal resource expenditure. Robert Taber drew the analogy of fleas attacking a dog through protracted conflict to erode the opponent’s political resolve. Great powers throughout history, including the US, have suffered this when confronting nominally weaker foes.

Raise the Costs: Some Insurgencies are Good for the United States

This approach would succeed by raising the costs of Russian invasion to an unacceptable level. Executed covertly, it entails building indigenous resistance infrastructure to be unleashed once Russia crosses the line, bogging the great bear down in a morass of insurgency designed to nullify its comparative conventional advantage. This has historical Cold War precedent in the region: AECOB/ZRLYNCH was a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) program that supported the anti-Soviet Latvian Resistance Movement as part of the broader strategy of enabling underground resistance movements in Eastern Europe.

Executed overtly, the development of resistance infrastructure would proceed analogously to the covert approach, but it would serve as a signal to deter Russian aggression, fully broadcasting the capabilities of the hornet nest that Russia would be wading into. Recent support to the Syrian rebellion has set a precedent for overt backing to resistance elements by US Special Operations Forces. However, the Syria debacle offers significant lessons that must be learned for the future, namely the importance of developing underground and auxiliary capacity in addition to armed guerrilla elements, a critical but often-ignored element of Unconventional Warfare doctrine, as well as the significance of deliberate measures to mitigate divergent actions resulting from the adverse selection of proxy forces.

A key consideration for policy-makers is the role of non-violent and violent resistance within such a Baltic defense plan. Lithuania's defense ministry recently issued a manual entitled "How to Act in Extreme Situations or Instances of War" that specifically discusses the role of organizing civil disobedience to counter hybrid warfare. Non-violent resistance has historical precedent in the Baltics against the Soviet Union, and evidence supports its potential effectiveness against Russia today. Even the Office of Strategic Services, the CIA’s predecessor during World War II, issued guidance on how to sabotage occupying forces with civil resistance. However, the outcome of the Syrian uprising demonstrates that both non-violent and violent resistance must be planned for as part of a comprehensive strategy.

The Paradox of Strategic Irregular Warfare

Irregular warfare options often present a debilitating paradox for the US and other stable democracies. According to Colonel (Ret) Mark Mitchell, a former commander of 5th Special Forces Group, politicians are most resistant to implementing irregular warfare measures when they are most likely to be successful. When introduced prior to or very early in a conflict, minimal resource expenditures may have outsized positive effects on strategic outcomes; however, informational ambiguity and the twin dangers of escalation and unintended consequences create political hesitation that prevents implementation of the necessary actions at the earliest stages. By the time policy-makers realize that the situation has degenerated into a real problem impacting US national interests (think Syria today) and decide to act, the opportunity to implement a decisive or even an efficacious low-visibility/low-cost solution has long since passed. Such solutions can still be implemented but are highly unlikely to deliver the desired results.

Some may point to the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan as an example of an effective irregular warfare solution executed without a long lead. Such an assessment ignores the effects of US relationships with the Afghan resistance groups as a result of the efforts to impose costs on the Soviets in the 80s. Absent those relationships, built and sustained over the better part of two decades and exploited by the “horse soldiers” like Colonel Mitchell, the US would not have been able to rapidly implement an irregular warfare effort in 2001.

In 1948, George F. Kennan recognized the need to employ “political warfare” against the Soviet Union, integrating all national means, both covert and overt, to achieve national security objectives “in the absence of declared war or overt force-on-force hostilities.” This requirement remains the same today. Eliminating sanctuaries of impunity, whether they be within the political space of the “gray zone” being manipulated by Russia, or physical territory utilized by al-Qaeda or the Islamic State to launch attacks on the US homeland, requires the US to employ unconventional measures to compete and win.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Special thanks to Ambassador Michael Sheehan, former Ambassador-at-Large for Counter Terrorism and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, and Colonel (Ret) Mark Mitchell, former commander of 5th Special Forces Group, for their contributions to this article.

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About the Author »

Steve Ferenzi

Major Steve Ferenzi is an instructor in the United States Military Academy’s Defense and Strategic Studies (DSS) Program and Officer-in-Charge of West Point’s Irregular Warfare Group (IWG). He is an Army Special Forces officer with service in the 3rd Special Forces Group and the 82nd Airborne Division. He holds a Master of International Affairs degree from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA).

Comments 8

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mexicos-illicit-drug-networks-and-the-state-reaction

Mexico's Illicit Drug Networks and the State Reaction

by John P. Sullivan
SWJ Blog Post | March 17, 2016 - 2:27am

SWJ-EL Centro Fellow Nate Jones just published the book Mexico's Illicit Drug Networks and the State Reaction. The text is published by Georgetown University Press. The following synopsis describes the book:

Mexican drug networks are large and violent, engaging in activities like the trafficking of narcotics, money laundering, extortion, kidnapping, and mass murder. Despite the impact of these activities in Mexico and abroad, these illicit networks are remarkably resilient to state intervention.

Drawing on extensive fieldwork and interviews with US and Mexican law enforcement, government officials, organized crime victims, and criminals, Nathan P. Jones examines the comparative resilience of two basic types of drug networks―"territorial" and "transactional"―that are differentiated by their business strategies and provoke wildly different responses from the state. Transactional networks focus on trafficking and are more likely to collude with the state through corruption, while territorial networks that seek to control territory for the purpose of taxation, extortion, and their own security often trigger a strong backlash from the state.

Timely and authoritative, Mexico's Illicit Drug Networks and the State Reaction provides crucial insight into why Mexico targets some drug networks over others, reassesses the impact of the war on drugs, and proposes new solutions for weak states in their battles with drug networks.

Dr. Nathan P. Jones received his PhD from the University of California, Irvine, is a SWJ-El Centro Fellow, and is a nonresident scholar in drug policy and Mexico studies at the Baker Institute at Rice University. He currently serves as an assistant professor in the Department of Security Studies at Sam Houston State University.

-

About the Author »

John P. Sullivan

John P. Sullivan is a career police officer. He currently serves as a lieutenant with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. He is also an adjunct researcher at the Vortex Foundation in Bogotá, Colombia; a senior research fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism (CAST); and a senior fellow at Small Wars Journal-El Centro. He is co-editor of Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network (Routledge, 2006) and Global Biosecurity: Threats and Responses (Routledge, 2010) and co-author of Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency: A Small Wars Journal-El Centro Anthology (iUniverse, 2011) and Studies in Gangs and Cartels (Routledge, 2013). He completed the CREATE Executive Program in Counter-Terrorism at the University of Southern California and holds a Bachelor of Arts in Government form the College of William and Mary, a Master of Arts in Urban Affairs and Policy Analysis from the New School for Social Research, and a PhD, doctorate in Information and Knowledge Society, from the Internet Interdisciplinary Institute (IN3) at the Open University of Catalonia (Universitat Oberta de Catalunya) in Barcelona. His doctoral thesis was ‘Mexico’s Drug War: Cartels, Gangs, Sovereignty and the Network State.” His current research focus is the impact of transnational organized crime on sovereignty in Mexico and other countries.

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by WC Diaz | March 18, 2016 - 5:42pm Login or register to post comments

It drives me wild that we are considering at different levels involvement in either the civil war in Libya and/or the mess in Syria, while one of our neighboring countries has a dangerous war going on within its borders and has been for decades. Europe complains about the imposition of refugees from the Middle East, but I wonder how many time more refugees the US has received from South and Central America, as well as Mexico as a result of drug trafficking fueled civil war.

Mexico is a FAR more clear issue of US national interest than anyplace in the Middle East is.

Have a great day!

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.yahoo.com/news/catalonia-pushes-ahead-quietly-independence-plan-070826796.html?nhp=1

Catalonia pushes ahead quietly with independence plan

Daniel Bosque
May 19, 2016

Barcelona (AFP) - Catalonia is pushing ahead more slowly than expected with its independence plan as separatist leaders change tactics and avoid direct confrontation with Madrid in their bid to break away from Spain.

After winning a parliamentary majority in a regional election in Catalonia in September, the pro-independence parties vowed to implement an 18-month roadmap for independence from Spain by 2017.

The plan calls for the regional government to create basic laws, a tax system and state structure for the wealthy, industrialised northeastern region whose capital Barcelona is a major tourist draw.

But Catalonia has so far done little to implement the plan, to the relief of national political parties and the central government in Madrid which are gearing up for a repeat general election on June 26.

The polls -- the second in just six months -- come after bickering parties failed to reach an agreement on a coalition government following inconclusive élections in December that left Spain in political limbo with a caretaker government with limited powers.

"The separatists who thought a quick and unilateral solution was possible are realising that this is not the case. This is why they are looking for an interlocutor to talk to," said Miquel Iceta, head of the Socialists' Catalan faction which opposes independence.

Catalan separatists have restarted their talks with acting Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy's conservative government, which had been practically non-existent.

Catalan President Carles Puigdemont met with Rajoy for over two hours last month in Madrid, the first high-level talks between the Catalan regional government and Spain's central government in two years.

After their talks Puigdemont said "profound differences" remained regarding his region's demand for a referendum on independence which is opposed by virtually all Spanish political parties.

- Lack clear majority -

"Everything is slower and more complicated than what was announced and if they remained on the path of confrontation, it would only generate frustration," said political analyst Josep Ramoneda.

While support for independence has soared in recent years in Catalonia -- a region of 7.5 million people with its own language -- it does not have the backing of a strong majority.

Pro-independence parties won a majority in the 135-seat regional Catalan parliament in September but their share of the vote was 48 percent, giving their opponents a powerful argument against secession.

The pro-independence bloc is also weakened by divisions within its ranks over strategy and the poor state of Catalonia's public finances.

While the region accounts for about one-fifth of Spain's economic output, it is heavily in debt and not able to finance itself abroad.

It depends on loans from the central government of its liquidity and Madrid could turn off the tap if Catalonia takes significant steps towards implementing its roadmap for independence.

Spanish courts also monitor closely any moves by the Catalan government and are quick to intervene.

Spain's Constitutional Court suspended an independence referendum called by the Catalan government in 2014 as well as a resolution passed by Catalonia's parliament declaring the start of a secession process.

- Work behind the scenes -

Catalan officials say they are working quietly behind the scenes to advance the separatist roadmap.

"Work is being carried out away from the limelight, not even a comma has been changed from the plan," said a senior Catalan official who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

Pro-independence parties in November passed a motion in the Catalan parliament reaffirming their intention to split from Spain to form their own country.

"We have a state that does not let us do anything and at the drop of a hat turns to the courts. This is why we must be shrewd and rigorous," said Jordi Turull, the leader in parliament of Catalonia's ruling pro-separatist coalition.

This angers hardline separatists like the Catalan government's coalition partner, the tiny, anti-capitalist CUP party, which calls for regional institutions, including local police, to disobey the law.

"We prefer approaches that involve shock and disobedience" said CUP lawmaker Joan Garriga.

"If we increase political confrontation, Catalonia would cease to be an internal issue and would be on the international agenda."

But several Catalan government sources said Puigdemont prefers to wait.

When everything is ready by the start of 2017, he could approve the necessary laws and create independent state structures, launching a head on challenge to Madrid.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articl...lear-subs-are-ready-to-terrorize-the-sea.html

05.18.16 10:00 PM ET

China’s Nuclear Subs Are Ready to Terrorize the Sea

Beijing will soon be able to launch nuclear missiles from the sea. And that’s going to make it harder to deter any future Chinese aggression.

David Axe

China’s about to join an exclusive club for nuclear powers. After decades of development, 2016 could be the year the Chinese navy finally sends its ballistic-missile submarines—“SSBN” is the Pentagon’s designation—to sea for the first time for operational patrols with live, nuclear-tipped rockets.

If indeed the Jin-class subs head to sea this year, China will achieve a level of nuclear strike capability that, at present, just two countries—the United States and Russia—can match or exceed.

“China will probably conduct its first SSBN nuclear deterrence patrol sometime in 2016,” the Pentagon warned in the latest edition of its annual report on the Chinese military, published in mid-May. Once the Jins set sail, Beijing will command a nuclear “triad” composed of ground-, air- and sea-launched nuclear weapons.

China’s about to join an exclusive club for nuclear powers. After decades of development, 2016 could be the year the Chinese navy finally sends its ballistic-missile submarines—“SSBN” is the Pentagon’s designation—to sea for the first time for operational patrols with live, nuclear-tipped rockets.

If indeed the Jin-class subs head to sea this year, China will achieve a level of nuclear strike capability that, at present, just two countries—the United States and Russia—can match or exceed.

“China will probably conduct its first SSBN nuclear deterrence patrol sometime in 2016,” the Pentagon warned in the latest edition of its annual report on the Chinese military, published in mid-May. Once the Jins set sail, Beijing will command a nuclear “triad” composed of ground-, air- and sea-launched nuclear weapons.

That’s a big deal, according to the dominant theory of nuclear warfare. “The theory is that a diverse array of delivery systems creates survivability by complicating a first strike,” Jeffrey Lewis, an expert on nuclear geopolitics with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, told The Daily Beast.

In other words, if a country possesses all three kinds of nukes, it’s harder for an enemy to wipe them all out in a surprise attack. And if you can’t destroy your enemy’s entire atomic arsenal, he can nuke you back—so you’d better not attack at all.

The word for that is “deterrence.” And China could be on the verge of gaining a deterrence capability that most countries simply can’t afford. China reportedly possesses several hundred atomic warheads, but no one outside of the Chinese Communist Party leadership and, perhaps, top foreign intelligence agencies, knows the exact number.

Regardless, that’s far fewer than the roughly 7,000 warheads that the U.S. and Russia each possess but more than any of the world’s other nuclear powers, with the possible exception of France. And compared to Beijing only Moscow and Washington boast a wider range of launchers for their nukes.

The Chinese military’s rocket branch maintains around a hundred long-range rockets in land-based silos. The Chinese air force’s H-6 bombers first dropped atomic bombs back in the 1970s—and modern versions of the bombers can fire cruise missiles that are compatible with nuclear warheads. When the Jins are finally war-ready, they will complete Beijing’s land-air-sea atomic triad.

To be fair, the Chinese vessels are, in a sense, playing catch-up. The Soviet Union and the United States deployed the first nuclear ballistic-missile submarines at the height of the Cold War in the 1960s—and France and the United Kingdom soon followed suit. Today the U.S. Navy’s 14 Ohio-class missile subs take turns quietly sailing deep in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, ready to fire their 24 nuclear-tipped rockets on a moment’s notice.

Russia, France and the U.K. still operate SSBNs, and India is developing one of its own. The Chinese navy began tinkering with missile subs in 1981. The experimental Xia-class vessel and its JL-1 rocket were technological failures and never sailed on an operational mission.

Since 2007, the Chinese navy has completed four of the follow-on Jin-class subs and is reportedly planning on building four more. More than 400 feet long, a Jin can carry as many as a dozen JL-2 rockets, each with a range of 4,500 miles. A Jin sailing in the central Pacific Ocean could strike targets anywhere in the United States.

If the Jins finally deploy this year, a whopping 35 years will have passed since China first tried to develop a functional SSBN. But developing a missile sub is hard.

Expensive, too. China has not disclosed the cost of the Jins, but consider that the U.S. Navy plans to spend $97 billion replacing its 14 Ohios with a dozen new submarines. Missile subs are big and complex—and their rockets are, too. Training reliable crews and designing an effective command-and-control system are equally difficult to do. Chinese subs have been plagued with quality-control problems.

“While it is clear that the [Chinese navy] is making strides towards correcting these issues, the capabilities of China’s nuclear-powered submarine fleet remain in a process of maturity,” the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a Washington D.C.-based advocacy group, explains on its website.

To Beijing, achieving a nuclear triad is apparently worth the labor and expense. But Lewis cautions against reading the development of the Chinese atomic triad as the result of some sort of clear, top-down policy.

Officials in the U.S. and Russia take for granted the wisdom of a nuclear triad. But in fact, the triads in both of those countries developed as a result of rivalries within their respective militaries. During the early Cold War, the U.S. Navy lobbied lawmakers and the president for missile submarines in part to wrest from the U.S. Air Force some of the funding and prestige that came with being America’s main nuclear strike force.

The same internal conflict could be behind the Jins’ development. And whether China’s missile subs set sail for the first time this year could depend as much on politics as on technology and training. “There are a lot of rivalries and intrigues playing out that might result in a triad—or not,” Lewis said.

 

[vestige]

The winds are blowing harder.

bump

 

[mzkitty]

The winds are blowing harder.

bump

They are.

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7m
White House declines to 'ascribe motive' to incident when 2 Chinese military aircraft intercepted US military plane in international airspace - @markknoller

 

[Housecarl]

NATO Announces War Policy Against Russia
Started by Possible Impactý, Yesterday 07:04 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?491611-NATO-Announces-War-Policy-Against-Russia


For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realcleardefense.com/art...invites_montenegro_as_29th_member_109378.html

May 19, 2016

NATO Formally Invites Montenegro as 29th Member

By Associated Press

BRUSSELS — NATO invited the Balkan nation of Montenegro to become its 29th member, agreeing Thursday to expand for only the seventh time in its history despite Russia's angry objections.

The decision is still subject to formal approval by the U.S. Senate and the alliance's other national parliaments.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said it was the "beginning of a new secure chapter" in the former Yugoslav republic's history.

Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic attended the signing of an accession protocol at NATO headquarters in Brussels. He said his country, bombed by NATO warplanes 16 years ago, would stand "shoulder to shoulder" with the other members of the U.S-led alliance.

"You can count on us at any time," Djukanovic said.

Russia has accused NATO of trying to encircle it and friendly nations like Serbia, and vowed to do what's necessary to defend its national security and interests.

Sergei Zheleznyak, a prominent member of the Russian parliament, has said his country would have to alter its relations with Montenegro, historically close to Russia, if it joined NATO without holding a national referendum.

"We would have to change our policy in regard to this friendly country," Zheleznyak said. "If NATO military infrastructure were placed there, we would have to respond by limiting our contacts in economic and other spheres."

Other Russian officials have said their country could ban some imports from Montenegro and levy other trade sanctions.

The signing ceremony at NATO headquarters for Montenegro's membership invitation coincided with the start of a NATO foreign ministers' meeting, and Secretary of State John Kerry signed the document on behalf of the United States.

Since NATO's creation in 1949 as a bulwark of the West's Cold War defenses against the Soviet Union, it has grown from 12 founding members to absorb most of the Kremlin's former allies in the communist East Bloc. NATO last added new members in 2009, when Albania and Croatia joined.

Asked by reporters how long it will take for Montenegro to become a fully-pledged member, Stoltenberg said he couldn't predict how fast legislators in NATO member nations will act, but that ratification of the accession protocols took about a year in the last expansion round.

"I expect we will soon see 29 allied flags flying outside the NATO headquarters," Stoltenberg said. Until ratification is complete, he said Montenegro is guaranteed a "seat at the table" at all alliance proceedings as an observer.

Montenegro would be among NATO's smallest members, boasting active-duty armed forces of only 2,000. But Stoltenberg said that as an alliance partner, it has already contributed to NATO-led missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and that the document signed Thursday "shows once again that NATO's door remains open" to countries like Georgia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina that also aspire to become members one day.

"Montenegro is a signal that the alliance is not giving up on the enlargement process and that Russia holds no veto on the accession of an aspirant country," said Bruno Lete, senior program officer at the German Marshall Fund, a Brussels think tank.

Another U.S.-based NATO expert, though, said that for the alliance to open its ranks to Montenegro hardly constitutes a "brave challenge to Russia" and that NATO and the Kremlin alike are exaggerating the significance.

"Montenegro is joining NATO because it is small enough and far away enough from Russia's borders to be a relatively safe decision for NATO governments," said Jorge Benitez of the Atlantic Council in Washington.

___

A previous version of this story has been corrected to show that Zheleznyak didn't make the comments on Monday, and the style on the spelling of the surname of Montenegro's prime minister is Djukanovic, not Dukanovic.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-us-arms-race/27743573.html

Russia

New Weaponry, More Spending, Tough Rhetoric Stoke Fears Of New U.S.-Russia Arms Race

By Mike Eckel
May 18, 2016

WASHINGTON -- A new Russian intercontinental ballistic missile. Upgraded U.S. nuclear gravity bombs and air-launched nuclear cruise missiles. A European exclave freshly bristling with Russian ballistic missiles.

And all of that military hardware topped off with a warning from Russia's president one day after a U.S.-built missile-defense system went online in Romania.

"Until now, those taking such decisions have lived in calm, fairly well-off and in safety. Now, as these elements of ballistic missile defense are deployed, we are forced to think about how to neutralize emerging threats to the Russian Federation," Vladimir Putin told a meeting of top Russian defense and military industry officials on May 13. "All these are additional steps toward throwing the international security system off balance and unleashing a new arms race."

Even beyond the Kremlin, 25 years after the end of the Cold War and with Russia and Western powers squaring up over continuing conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, there are fears that Moscow and Washington are on the cusp of a new arms race -- nuclear, conventional, or both.

Russia has sent eye-catching signals about its weaponry in recent months: new cruise missiles fired from Caspian Sea naval ships at Syrian targets; the suspected deployment of short-range ballistic Iskander missiles to the Baltic Sea exclave of Kaliningrad; new ballistic-missile submarines going operational; and the Russian undersea fleet and long-range-bomber patrols approaching Cold-War tempos.

The United States has meanwhile ramped up its military operations in Eastern Europe and adjacent seas. The Pentagon is quadrupling its spending on European defense initiatives. Naval ships and U.S. aircraft are conducting more frequent surveillance patrols near Russia's borders.

An additional U.S. Army combat brigade is scheduled to start rotating into Europe and the top U.S. commander in Europe has suggested he would support a "permanently stationed armored brigade" on the continent.

And the Aegis Ashore missile-defense system went operational in Romania on May 12, incensing Putin.

"The thing with arms race dynamics [is that] no one has to intend to run an arms race for that dynamic to take over," said Jeffrey Lewis, an expert in nuclear nonproliferation at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. "I worry about the increasing intensity of the deployments."

Gravity Bombs, Nuclear-Tipped Missiles

Then there are the nuclear arsenals. Strategic warhead and delivery-system counts in both countries have been more or less dropping, thanks to the 2010 New START treaty.

But both countries are at the same time modernizing other parts of their arsenals. The United States is moving forward with a multidecade, multibillion-dollar upgrade of its weapons, which includes the B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb, 180 of which are based in Europe, about which the Kremlin has already expressed displeasure. The U.S. administration is also moving forward with a controversial new nuclear-tipped cruise missile.

Russia is expected this year to flight-test a new super-heavy, silo-launched, intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, capable of carrying up to 12 warheads and affectionately dubbed Satan-2, after its much-feared Soviet predecessor.

A breathless report by the Russian Defense Ministry TV channel Zvezda claimed the missile, scheduled for deployment by 2018, would be able to destroy the entire state of Texas.

"There's an arms race in the sense of, 'Hey, we can still keep up with what the U.S. is doing; the U.S. is building a fifth-generation fighter aircraft; we can build a fifth-generation fighter aircraft, but we're not going to buy 150 of them," said Dmitry Gorenberg, senior research scientist at the Virginia-based research group CNA, who specializes in the Russian military.

http://gdb.rferl.org/1A7F6D09-0DD4-4C68-8288-3347FC598769_mw1024_s_n.png

The prospect of a rekindled Cold War-style arms rivalry is in many ways a remarkable reversal from the situation early in U.S. President Barack Obama's first term, when Moscow and Washington tried to "reset" bilateral relations that had soured over issues like the 2008 war in Georgia and Russian opposition to the U.S.-led war in Iraq.

But now, with Putin asserting Russian power and influence in neighboring Ukraine and Syria, arms-control experts say, the chances of a new agreement to reduce arsenals further is slim to none.

A larger danger may be the fraying of existing ones, like the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, the 1987 treaty known as the INF that both Washington and Moscow have accused the other of violating.

Russian warhead counts under New START have also risen recently, prompting some concern, though experts say the fluctuation doesn't necessarily mean Russia will fail to meet a 2018 deadline for compliance.

"Unless a new arms-reduction agreement is reached in the near future, the shrinking of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal that has characterized the past two decades will likely come to an end," arms scholars Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris wrote in an article published this month in the Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists.

Russian officials have pointed to last week's activation in Romania of the missile-defense system, and specifically the launch system used to fire missile interceptors, as being in violation of the INF, something Putin pointedly raised in his comments. U.S. officials have countered that the system, which is similar to one used to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles aboard Navy ships, complies with treaty restrictions.

Last year, Russian TV aired purported plans for an underwater, nuclear-capable drone that would have the ability to shower a coastal area with radioactive fallout, making large regions uninhabitable for decades.

Soaring Spending

To be sure, there are politics holding back the push forward into a full-blown arms race. But more than anything, what may be constraining both are fiscal concerns.

Defense spending has soared under Putin, particularly since 2007, and was estimated at nearly 4.3 percent of gross domestic product in 2015. Since then, however, the country's economy has suffered due to low oil prices along with Western economic sanctions and retaliatory Russian bans, and the Kremlin is poised to cut its defense spending this year by 5 percent, the largest figure since Putin was elected president in 2000.

That has affected some notable weapons programs, including the planned revival of a railway-based ballistic-missile launch system, part of Moscow's effort to deepen the country's nuclear deterrent capabilities. Dubbed "death trains" or "phantom trains" by Russian state media, the network of covert boxcar-style launchers and missile complexes, initially designed by Soviet engineers, would boost the stealth, mobility, and counterstrike capability of Russia's arsenal.

The U.S. strategic arsenal, meanwhile, is undergoing a massive modernization that Defense Secretary Ash Carter has said will cost $350 billion, and outside experts say will in fact be closer to $1 trillion over 30 years. The U.S. House Appropriations Committee noted in the 2017 Department of Defense spending bill now making its way through Congress that that figure poses "an enormous affordability challenge."

Greg Thielmann, senior fellow at the Washington-based Arms Control Association, said Russia's deployment of the new Satan-2 -- its first flight is expected this summer -- was particularly troubling because silo-based missiles are considered more vulnerable to counterstrikes. Also, he said, Russia will need to deploy many more warheads in order to keep up their overall count as the older-generation Satan missiles are retired.

"There are a lot more things that need to be talked about on the margins," Thielmann said. "I'm much less worried about new Russian ICBMs in terms of keeping the overall balance stable, than I am about some of these things that are introducing new technologies into the strategic balance."

That includes armed drones or new hypersonic glide missiles being aggressively developed by the United States, along with Russia and China, he said.

"If both sides keep doubling down, you could see [things] kind of a spiral into an arms race that neither side really wants, but I see both sides somewhat reluctant to go too far in that direction," Gorenberg said. "At least for now."


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[Housecarl]

Applicable for a lot more than just Russia......

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://warontherocks.com/2016/05/nuts-and-bolts-solutions-to-deter-a-resurgent-russia/

Nuts and Bolts Solutions to Deter a Resurgent Russia

R. Reed Anderson, Patrick J. Ellis, Antonio M. Paz, Kyle A. Reed, Lendy Renegar and John Vaughan
May 17, 2016
Comments 6

In late February 2014, Estonians gathered to celebrate their annual independence day by hosting a parade and air display in the capital city of Tallinn. The viewing platform was full of distinguished visitors, including a representative of the Russian Federation. The crowd was waiting on a NATO fly-by that included four F-15 Eagle fighter jets from U.S. Air Forces Europe. The Russian turned to the Estonian Air Chief with a smile and remarked that he expected the F-15s to be late. A few minutes earlier, over 100 miles away, the F-15s had just completed an intercept of a Russian military aircraft violating Estonian airspace. They escorted it out of Estonia’s sovereign airspace and went supersonic over the Baltic Sea to make the fly-by on time, much to the delight of the crowd.

In the wake of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, Russian provocations such as this have become routine in northeastern Europe. Russia is clearly flexing its renewed military, economic, and informational capabilities to increase its influence in Europe, slow the expansion of NATO and the European Union, and create fractures within Europe. Given what some analysts say about NATO’s inability to repel a surprise Russian conventional attack into the Baltic States, the alliance’s ability to deter Moscow is highly questionable. There are yet more concerns about how Russia could use non-conventional means — cyberattacks or support for fringe European political parties — to create fractures in the alliance that it could exploit to prevent collective action without having to resort to conventional military operations.

The West has its work cut out for it. How can NATO deter Russia without provoking conflict or a spiraling security dilemma of the sort recently discussed by Michael Kofman in his recent War on the Rocks article? Can NATO deter both a conventional threat and an ambiguous threat? These challenges are daunting, but not insurmountable. Overcoming them will require a concerted effort by NATO allies to enhance particular non-combat capabilities and build national resiliency. Indeed, NATO has missed a huge opportunity offered by an existing planning process to enable each ally to field important capabilities in an integrated fashion. However, the upcoming Warsaw Summit is an opportunity for NATO to deliver on its goals for the Readiness Action Plan agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit. It is time to provide a clear way ahead to address the challenges of deterring an aggressive Russia.

Although a Russian advance into alliance territory with conventional forces is feasible and certainly represents the most dangerous scenario facing the West, many argue this is not likely. The more likely scenario is an indirect Russian approach using what many have referred to as “ambiguous warfare.” The threats from ambiguous warfare — a term that is sometimes interchangeable with hybrid warfare and gray zone warfare— are characterized by their employment in a fog of ambiguity wherein attribution is difficult, indirect or nonmilitary means are prominent, and adversary intentions may be difficult to discern. Examples include distributed cyberattacks, the exploitation of ostensibly independent mass media, or the leveraging of ethnic diasporas to foment discontent and instability. If left unchecked, this threat to Eastern Europe could prove extremely costly, undermining state authority and alliance unity.

The U.S. response to the conventional challenge includes Operation Atlantic Resolve and the European Reassurance Initiative, which appear to have contributed to both assurance of NATO allies and deterrence of Russia. However, presence and an increased tempo of activities are insufficient on their own. To achieve an effective deterrent — one that raises the costs to Russia and/or denies Moscow the benefits of aggression — U.S. European Command (EUCOM) needs to take a closer look at how it plans and executes cooperative military training and exercises with alliance members through its security cooperation programs.

Specifically, EUCOM should leverage NATO’s Defence Planning Process to improve how the United States conducts training, exercises, and other military-to-military activities with allies. The Defence Planning Process identifies specific military capabilities that each NATO ally agrees to maintain, develop, or otherwise obtain, such as military airlift, special operations forces, missile defense, or logistics. Considered collectively, these “capability targets” enable NATO to provide for the collective defense of its members and accomplish the military missions that the alliance has agreed to take on.

One might assume that the United States uses these capability targets and the related Defence Planning Process to guide military-to-military activities with allies and partners, but this is not always the case. A lack of understanding within EUCOM of the alliance process, competing priorities that often place other objectives ahead of broader alliance goals, and the inherent challenges of synchronizing multiple plans are all to blame for this shortcoming. Yet these challenges can be overcome . Using NATO’s own capability targets would enable the United States to ensure its military-to-military efforts are more focused and aimed at achieving worthwhile, necessary objectives. It further provides an opportunity to assist allies in developing specific capabilities that they have committed to provide for the alliance, without which NATO would need to assume operational and tactical risk.

Additionally, EUCOM can make allies’ participation in NATO exercises more effective. Given the positive trend in alliance members’ spending, this is an ideal time for EUCOM to emphasize the quality instead of the pace of its military exercise program. The extraordinarily high number of U.S. military exercises and other activities across Eastern Europe is impressive, but these efforts suffer from a lack of focus and risk overtaxing the very forces that would be called upon in the event of a crisis. Focusing on higher-quality exercises and other activities would be better for allied interoperability efforts and capability development. In particular, NATO should rigorously test its command structure during such exercises, including the integration of a two- or three-star U.S. joint task force. Such a force would arguably be the first headquarters element to command and control forces in the event of a crisis in Europe, and so it makes sense for NATO to practice how that might work. Planning and conducting high-quality exercises along NATO’s eastern borders with key allies such as Germany and France builds interoperability and reassurance among allies while also sending a clear message to Russia that NATO is committed to collective defense. This signal itself is a critical contributor to credible deterrence. Making better use of NATO’s capability targets to shape EUCOM’s security cooperation programs and improving the alliance’s combined conventional capabilities through focused exercises will all contribute to providing a more capable and credible conventional deterrent.

To improve the U.S. Army’s ability to better support military-to-military activities in Europe and provide options for deterrence, the Pentagon should reconsider how it manages forces in Europe. The U.S. Army has most recently relied on the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept to provide additional forces to Europe, a program designed to provide scalable and tailorable Army capabilities for all combatant command requirements. RAF forces are identified from among U.S.-based Army units and then aligned with combatant commands like EUCOM. However, the rotating nature of the RAF units — a new one identified each year — and the rotational nature of leadership within the units has rendered this tool less effective than it could be.

EUCOM would be better served by a continual heel-to-toe presence of an armored brigade combat team in Europe — when one brigade leaves, the next replaces it immediately without any underlap. The Obama administration has announced, as part of its fiscal year 2017 budget proposal, a plan for the provision of an armored brigade combat team and expanded prepositioned stocks in Europe, but Congress has not yet approved funding for this. A heel-to-toe rotational presence would reassure allies and provide a deterrent effect. A permanent presence of a heavy armored brigade combat team would be ideal, but this is currently not possible for many reasons. To effectively manage U.S. Army military-to-military activities in Europe, support alliance exercises, and position itself for wartime command, the U.S. Army should assign a joint task force-capable two-star headquarters to U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR). Such a headquarters would allow USAREUR—which is not staffed to serve as a joint task force and is stretched thin with the increasing quantity and tempo of activities in Europe—to continue to focus on its entire area of operation, while the two-star headquarters focuses on integrating and conducting security cooperation activities. This unit would also serve as a warfighting headquarters in the event of a crisis in Europe, integrating with the NATO command structure as necessary.

While these adjustments are small, they collectively contribute to increasing the probability of costs for Moscow in the event of a Russian conventional attack into alliance territory—that is, they strengthen deterrence by punishment. NATO’s deterrence strategy must, however, be underpinned by a concerted effort among all allies. The United States is not in a position to provide a credible deterrent on its own. It must be an alliance solution, which is why efforts to assist allies in developing, and then exercising capabilities, are crucial.

In addition to building capabilities through a more focused security cooperation program, EUCOM can also assist allies in enhancing their resilience against ambiguous threats that, if left unchecked, could expand into larger regional instability. Resilience in this context refers to the ability of individuals and institutions to function during crises. In the context of Eastern Europe, developing resilience against ambiguous warfare tactics might include cooperative activities to improve border security, intelligence collection and analysis, and cybersecurity, as well as finding solutions to rifts among diaspora or marginalized groups of the population.

Enhancing resiliency requires a broader approach not only within the U.S. Department of Defense, but also within the broader U.S. government and in coordination with allies and European partners. To that end, EUCOM should increase its efforts to synchronize country-specific sections of its theater-wide security cooperation strategy with the Integrated Country Strategies written by U.S. embassies in Europe. Resiliency would also be better served by leveraging the U.S. Army National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP). Through the SPP, the Guard has built dozens of long-term relationships with allies and partners in Europe. By using these relationships and expertise in crisis management, military support to civil authorities, as well as skills typically associated with the civilian world such as policing, the Guard would focus all SPP activities more explicitly on building and maintaining allies’ resiliency in the face of ambiguous warfare. These efforts will improve allies’ ability to identify, respond to, and ultimately deter ambiguous warfare by denying the ability of Russia, or any adversary, to use such means to fracture allied cohesion—that is, they strengthen deterrence by denial.

These enhanced efforts will, of course, provoke a Russian response, particularly in the form of the inevitable Russian media spin. To mitigate its efficacy, the Department of Defense should reverse plans to reduce information operations specialist staffing in Europe. Countering Russian information operations will require the Joint Staff and the U.S. Army to improve manning levels of appropriate staff expertise to plan and manage “inform and influence” activities in coordination with allies.

Finally, the alliance can take certain steps to strengthen the nuts and bolts of deterrence. Specifically, it must go beyond the Readiness Action Plan adopted at the Wales Summit in 2014 to address the challenge of moving forces long distances over multiple sovereign borders in the event of a crisis. During the Cold War, NATO forces were arrayed along the presumed battle front — the border between the former West Germany and the former East Germany. Now, alliance forces are mostly garrisoned in their home countries. Moving forces across borders in a timely manner is overly bureaucratic and has proven difficult. To mitigate this European time-distance risk, NATO should reexamine cross-border procedures and the Supreme Allied Commander’s authority to reposition forces in Europe to give him the flexibility to move forces as appropriate in a time of crisis.

Preparing to deter Russia requires a multifaceted approach that improves alliance conventional capabilities and allies’ resilience against ambiguous threats. Even though the likelihood of a Russian conventional attack on alliance territory is not likely, it is nevertheless feasible. Successful deterrence requires having the forces, capabilities, and plans in place that would convince Russia that should it choose to attack, the costs will be high. The Obama administration’s plan to rotationally deploy an armored brigade to Europe is a welcome step – assuming Congress funds it – but it must be a heel-to-toe rotation, accompanied by adequate command and control, reinforced by modifications to military-to-military planning, coordination, and implementation, and ultimately based on refinement of the Readiness Action Plan adopted in 2014. At the same time, the alliance cannot ignore the necessity of enhancing members’ resiliency against ambiguous threats, and denying Russia the ability to achieve its objectives through means short of a massive cross-border conventional force invasion. By fixing shortcomings in how the West engages and prepares during peacetime, the United States and its allies can strengthen deterrence and mitigate the risk of an armed confrontation with Russia.



The authors are all active-duty U.S. military officers and currently resident students at the U.S. Army War College. This article is based on their new book, Strategic Landpower and a Resurgent Russia. The views and opinions in this article do not represent those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.


Related:

- Do Not Oversell the Russian Threat in the Arctic

Robert Murray
May 16, 2016

- Fixing NATO Deterrence in the East or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love NATO’s Crushing Defeat by Russia

Michael Kofman
May 12, 2016

- The Bear in the Room: The U.S.-Nordic Summit and Dealing with Russia

Mark Seip
May 11, 2016

 

[Housecarl]

http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-fra...ess-of-nato-missile-defense-shield-1463578322

World

U.S., France Differ Over Readiness of NATO Missile-Defense Shield

U.S. officials worry delays in NATO taking operational control would be seen as a sign of weakness by Moscow

By Julian E. Barnes and Robert Wall
Updated May 18, 2016 1:13 p.m. ET
63 COMMENTS

PARIS—French officials said they are withholding their approval for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to take control of the U.S.-built European missile-defense system, a position alliance and American officials hope they can persuade Paris to change before an alliance summit in July.

U.S. officials say they are worried that any delay in having NATO take operational control of the system would be interpreted by Russia as a sign of weakness.

Russia has repeatedly expressed opposition to the system, arguing it is a threat to its nuclear deterrent. NATO officials insist the system is neither designed to nor capable of nullifying Russia’s missiles arsenal, and instead is intended to thwart a missile attack from countries such as Iran.

Alliance and U.S. officials believe that if NATO doesn’t use its July summit in Warsaw to take control of the missile-defense system and declare it operational, Russia will declare that the alliance is bending to its will.

A French official said Paris’s concerns have nothing to do with Russian opposition, but rather over whether the NATO command and control would work.

“We are not sold on IOC,” said the French official, using the acronym for initial operating capability, the military term for the next stage of the system’s development.

French officials say they want to make sure that the system is truly under alliance, not American control.

“It is not just a technical question, there is a political aspect,” the French official said. “If it is [a] NATO system, NATO takes the responsibility if you shoot down the missile. NATO takes responsibility if you miss.”

Another French official added that the NATO command and control system wasn’t ready and that the system remained an American one. “The C2 system is not sufficiently mature to allow NATO to control the situation,” the official said.

French officials are analyzing the results of an April exercise, Steadfast Alliance, designed to test whether the system is operationally ready. NATO’s top military officer will make a recommendation whether he considers the system ready.

Bob Bell, the top defense official in the U.S. mission to NATO, said last month that the U.S. remained “very confident we are on track” to declare in initial operating capability in Warsaw.

Mr. Bell, speaking last month at the Royal United Services Institute in London, acknowledged there was “some homework to do,” but expressed confidence that any remaining issues over the missile-defense system could be addressed. He suggested, though, that Paris harbored concerns. “The French are fond of saying: ‘Yes, it works in practice, but does it work in theory?’” Mr. Bell told the think tank.

The short flight time of ballistic missiles requires military commanders trying to shoot them down to make nearly instantaneous decisions. U.S. officials said that once NATO took command the system would intercept missiles based on rules laid down by alliance ambassadors.

Alliance military leaders and foreign ministers are gathering in Brussels this week but missile defense isn’t on the formal agenda, as officials work to answer French officials’ questions about the command-and-control system.

The alliance used common funding to build its own command-and-control system at Ramstein air base in Germany for the American-designed radar and missile systems. Alliance officials are also promoting other allies’ contributions, including British radar and Dutch ships.

If the system is transferred to NATO in July, U.S. officials hope that it will be at full operating capability in 2023, after the completion of an interceptor site in Poland. A NATO official involved in the process said the final decision on whether to declare the system operationally ready will likely go down to the wire.

The most important part of the system—the Romanian radar and interceptor site, the Turkey-based X-band radar used to help target the interceptors, and Spain-based U.S. naval destroyers capable of shooting down ballistic missiles—are U.S. equipment.

French and alliance officials said if the capability isn’t made official at Warsaw, the system could be transferred in the following months.

“Are we going to reach that goal by the time of Warsaw or will it take longer? The short answer is, we don’t know yet,” said Roberto Zadra, head of integrated air-and-missile defense at NATO’s defense investment division. “Collectively we are not there yet.”

Write to Julian E. Barnes at julian.barnes@wsj.com and Robert Wall at robert.wall@wsj.com