WAR 04-18-2020-to-4-24-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

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(413) 03-28-2020-to-04-03-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(414) 04-04-2020-to-4-10-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(415) 04-11-2020-to-4-17-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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Q&A
Pentagon Considers Extending Enlistments During Pandemic
Senior defense official expects to see more impacts to war readiness as the coronavirus outbreak hampers recruiting and halts travel.

By Jack Detsch | April 17, 2020, 3:59 PM

The U.S. Defense Department is trying to keep its strategy to get ready for a potential future war with China and Russia during the coronavirus pandemic by pushing the military to extend enlistments, Matthew Donovan, the Pentagon’s undersecretary for personnel and readiness, told Foreign Policy in an interview.

Donovan, who previously served as the Air Force’s No. 2 civilian and has held his current role in an acting capacity since December, had to step aside for confirmation in early March as the disease ravaged American society. By the time he took over late last month, “the whole world had changed,” Donovan recalled. “I knew that the personnel and readiness organization was going to be knee-deep in all of this stuff.”

Until the Pentagon has a vaccine for COVID-19 in hand, Donovan expects the agency “to be operating under a little bit different routine,” making up for gaps in recruiting by convincing would-be retirees to stay in the armed forces. The Defense Department will continue rotating troops forward toward Asia but in a “phased approach,” he said.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Foreign Policy: How will the U.S. military’s response to the coronavirus pandemic impact readiness for a future war?

Matthew Donovan: Everybody across the globe is kept informed as far as the impacts to readiness. I know that’s a concern a lot of folks have, [but] we’re not seeing impacts right now. We know anecdotally they’re happening. I can give you a couple of examples. We do a lot of joint and coalition exercises around the world with our coalition partners, with our allies, and with friendly nations. A lot of those have been either reduced in scope or outright canceled since about the February time frame. We know that there’s a high-level impact to readiness from those large-scale exercises that we do.

Now, as far as training and readiness activities at the local level, those are still continuing in most places around the world because they don’t have to travel. If you take the case of a fighter squadron, they’re still flying and maybe at a little bit more reduced schedule. So we’re not really seeing that core readiness being impacted. Even on the exercises that have been reduced in scope, a lot of them are reduced in scope to a tabletop exercise, if you will, or main players are probably called in virtually to work on a war game, which is not unlike the real world because we very rarely have all the players sitting in a room anyway. I think eventually we will see more impact, but as of right now, it’s nothing that we’re really that concerned about.

FP: Do the military’s geographic combatant commands have enough resources to deal with a major contingency with the USS Theodore Roosevelt currently pier-side in Guam and so many guardsmen and reservists tied up in fighting the pandemic?

MD: The Navy’s been pretty clear that if there was a contingency that required the use of the Teddy Roosevelt that they would be able to get her underway and be effective in a wartime scenario. Remember, they have crews all over the world that you could fly in and man the ship and move out. Now it’s not an ideal situation, obviously. But we’re not in that contingency situation right now.

FP: In light of what happened on the Roosevelt, are there other installations or platforms that the Defense Department is worried won’t allow for social distancing?

MD: The Navy has certain environments where it’s not possible to maintain social distancing. But there are other things we can do. Simply washing hands, cleaning, and disinfecting surfaces helps a lot with that. So the force health protection guidance that we’ve put out in its various supplements is sort of broad guidance across the force, and then the services take that guidance and tailor it to their individual situations. I think generally you will find that across the entire force, that’s what the services are doing.

Another example is the basic training that we do. The services institute isolation periods if any affected folks start presenting symptoms before they put them into the general population of a training base.
FP: Can you tell me about the impact you’ve seen on recruitment during the pandemic? The services have ambitious recruiting targets to prepare for a potential war with Russia and China.

MD: Our recruiting targets were actually being met up until the pandemic hit. From what I understand, the Marines, who have more of an attrition-style force, have met 100 percent of their recruiting goals through virtual meet. All the services are increasing the use of the virtual world and IT in order to process troops and get them through the recruiting process. They’ve had to reduce the throughput a little bit because of these mitigation measures that we’ve put into place in order to prevent the spread of COVID-19. So, generally, the services, plus or minus a percent or two, are running at about 60 percent of the capacity that they had before the pandemic.

That’s still a significant amount of people to get through the system. Because they’re only getting about 60 percent of the new recruits into the system, they’re also taking an increasing retention. What I have recommended to the services is that they take a real hard look at extensions of enlistment periods, or delaying dates of separation or retirements for folks who are eligible to do that, in order to keep that side of the equation up.

FP: How seriously is the Pentagon considering a measure like “stop loss,” which would keep troops in the ranks past their separation date?

MD: Defense Secretary Mark Esper has been clear that stop loss is one of the tools that he has, but he’s only going to use that as a measure of last resort. It has long-term impacts to folks who wouldn’t have otherwise separated and have follow-on plans.

If you think about the economy in the way it is right now with unemployment skyrocketing, over the next weeks and months, they’re probably worried about whether they will have a job when they get out. They probably are incentivized to agree to an extension for another year. Let the economy recover and then you’ll be in a better position on the way out. So I think the mitigation measures that we would do by extending those enlistments and allowing people to stay longer will minimize that.
Long term, we’re probably going to have constraints on us until we get to a vaccine for COVID-19. Once we get a vaccine, then it becomes more of a routine like smallpox or polio or all those vaccinations that you get as a child that you don’t think much about because it’s just not a problem anymore. I do believe that we have folks working hard on it. But in the meantime, we’re probably going to have to be operating under a little bit different routine than we had in the past until we get to that point.

FP: The Defense Department has hoped to rotate more troops to Asia. How will the travel restrictions from COVID-19 impact that?

MD: The secretary is very engaged in examining the travel restrictions that are in place. We’ve got a lot of lessons learned on what we would be able to do. We know more about COVID-19 too and the way it’s acting. We really need to get to a true screening test capability where we can give our commanders a high level of confidence that their folks are either test-positive and can be isolated and treated or they test negative and they have a high level of confidence in the safety and effectiveness of the rest of their unit. The available testing right now is diagnostic tests. The testing will confirm that you’re positive for COVID-19, but it will not confirm if you’re negative. So it causes us to have to put into place those isolation concepts to make sure that we’re minimizing the risk to our units and the families as well. But we’re learning that there are certain hot spots where it’s more prevalent, but there are other areas where we’re seeing very few infections. So we may be able to take a sort of phased approach on how we do this.

We have folks that the travel restrictions sort of froze in place of where they were and some folks got caught in the middle of a permanent change of station move. It came on so rapidly that, you know, some folks and their household goods moved but then they were told they couldn’t go, and now they’re sort of stuck in that limbo. We need to be able to prioritize which movements are going to be the most important that we can allow to continue. And then of course, we have folks who are in operational war zones as well who need to be rotated back so they can get home and take care of their families.

Jack Detsch is Foreign Policy’s Pentagon and national security reporter. Twitter: @JackDetsch
 

Housecarl

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What is Great-Power Competition, Anyway?

Alexander Boroff | April 17, 2020

Contemporary US defense policy has a common theme rippling through it. “Great-power competition” is the latest watchword of the defense enterprise. What was an “arcane term” just a few years ago is now firmly entrenched in conventional defense thinking, in large part due to its appearance in the 2017 National Security Strategy. Trickling downward, the 2018 National Defense Strategy mentions this concept (which it calls “long-term strategic competition”) fourteen times. Past this, the 2018 National Military Strategy specifically makes mention of great-power competition three times. In fact, there has been a recent flurry of analysis about the nexus of great-power competition and the COVID-19 pandemic—a sign of the remarkable extent to which the concept is linked to virtually every aspect of defense, strategy, and security.

And yet there is an unfortunate problem that, collectively, the defense establishment (or more accurately, the broader national-security and foreign-policy establishment) seems to have decided to ignore: none of these strategy documents truly define what this phrase means.

Even a cursory search yields a multitude of answers across a variety of sources. This inevitably leads to differing views on how to carry out the broad directives in the keystone defense policy documents. Some observers also note that the headlong charge into great-power competition without clearly defining the term risks triggering unforeseen consequences, including, but by no means limited to, new geopolitical challenges and, possibly, hindering American defense readiness.

Given the vast scale of the US national-security and foreign-policy enterprise, there are a multitude of stakeholders in this problem of definition. In looking at that long list, four main groups emerge. The American military is one of the prime stakeholders, in that it must train to fight with a clear understanding of the strategic environment. The disarray caused by the failure to explicitly conceptualize great-power competition is most clearly evident here. The defense industry is another key stakeholder. Looking beyond current contracts, where should it focus its long-term research and development investments? Elements of the diplomatic arm of the United States also need a clear idea of the environment they are supposed to be shaping. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, US policymakers must have a clear idea of how the United States expects to adopt any national-security posture in order to effectively legislate. Each of these four groups naturally looks at the world through a different lens, which means that—without a single definition—they will inevitably develop different, and possibly competing, interpretations of great-power competition, with consequent effects for US national security and foreign policy.

So, what options are available to begin to work toward a definition? Three alternatives present themselves as worthy of discussion (although others also exist; this is not an exhaustive examination but an effort to frame the problem). First, the status quo could simply be maintained, allowing each individual agency or governmental arm to continue to refine its own definitions of great-power competition. This, of course, is plagued by the challenges discussed above—yet it remains worth mentioning if for no other reason than the fact that it’s the course we’re currently on.

Second, policymakers could look to history to define the term. After all, America’s “unipolar moment” was called such because it was precisely that—a moment, noteworthy as an exception to the more frequent periods in which multiple rivals vied for power and influence. Using history as a guide, US policy would accept that national alliances and coalitions could shift, sometimes coercively or for convenience’s sake, and take shape around the poles of power—the United States and its competitors. This might also see proxy wars fought along buffer territories or for influence in undeclared states. Looking to the Crimean War gives an example of what this type of great-power competition might look like. Going to war over the interests of third-party countries in far-off lands is not a very attractive option.

Third, a hybrid approach could be applied to defining great-power competition, one that learns the lessons of history but also charts a new path where appropriate based on the characteristics of the contemporary strategic landscape. This might, for example, seek to mobilize democratically aligned states around the world as a force against authoritarian regimes, and aim to produce a truly whole-of-government policy that unites various agencies’ and departments’ respective agendas into a cohesive strategy. This, of course, sounds good. It includes the right buzzwords and comports with our values. That is in part why this option appears to be gaining a consensus in the defense policy community.

Ideally, a definition of great-power competition must (1) realistically reflect the current geopolitical environment, (2) be aligned with the ideals of the American public, and (3) enable strategic guidance at all levels of government. Retaining the status quo of allowing various stakeholders to refine their own interpretations of a question that has broad-reaching strategic implications is problematic, since it violates this third requirement. Modeling policy for a new era of competition on historical cases is incongruous to varying degrees with both the first and second requirements. Thus we’re left with the third alternative as the best option with which to understand great-power competition as it applies to each component of government.

The struggle begins, though, with this solution’s implementation across government. Adopting policies surrounding a definition of great-power competition that both acknowledges the lessons of history and accepts the unique characteristics—political, social, technological, environmental, and more—of today’s strategic landscape would absolutely require a mobilization of a wide array of entities within the US government to achieve, which raises a number of questions. What agencies, departments, or offices that traditionally have little to no involvement in national security or foreign policy should be incorporated? Would the potential scale require some form of coordinator at the national level who can manage and facilitate this strategy? Is there a risk that the US competition strategy could shift with elections and turnover of key officials? And would such a shift between extreme policy approaches be more dangerous than a strategy that enjoys widespread political support but is consequently less ambitious?

Unfortunately, there is no single correct definition among a set of clearly incorrect ones. There is a risk of getting it “wrong,” but that does not obviate the need for a basic, simple, and understandable definition of great-power competition than will help move the US government toward a clear strategy. What all stakeholders involved should be seeking is to get it as “right” as possible, and to do so collectively with a whole-of-government approach that sheds the status quo of letting everybody develop their own sense of just what great-power competition is.



Capt. Alexander Boroff is serving as an Army Joint Chiefs of Staff Intern. His previous publications include topics such as general organizational leadership in public and private sectors, as well as Army reconnaissance training. He tweets at @UnsolicitedArmy.
 

Housecarl

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World News
April 17, 2020 / 12:16 PM / Updated 10 hours ago
Photos capture North Korea ships' sanctions busting in Chinese waters: U.N. report
Michelle Nichols
4 Min Read

NEW YORK (Reuters) - On Oct. 10 last year, eight North Korean vessels - several carrying illicit coal shipments - were anchored in Chinese waters off the port of Ningbo-Zhoushan, according to a photo in a U.N. report published online on Friday.

A photo from the annual report to the U.N. Security Council by independent experts monitoring the implementation of U.N. sanctions on North Korea shows a North Korean-flagged vessel conducting a ship-to-ship transfer of coal near the Chinese port of Lianyungang with help from a floating crane in this August 20, 2019 photo provided to the U.N. experts by an unidentified U.N. member state. United Nations/Handout via REUTERS

That appears to be a lax enforcement by China of U.N. sanctions aimed at curbing Pyongyang’s nuclear program under which countries are required to inspect cargo destined to or coming from North Korea that is within their territory or being transported on North Korean-flagged vessels.

The annual report to the U.N. Security Council by independent sanctions monitors said North Korea continued to flout council resolutions “through illicit maritime exports of commodities, notably coal and sand” in 2019, earning Pyongyang hundreds of millions of dollars.

A U.N. Security Council diplomat, speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity, said China has the capacity to stop sanctions busting by its ally North Korea but “is simply choosing not to implement the Security Council resolutions.”

“According to a Security Council member, Chinese warships have received notification in real time on multiple occasions of vessels entering its territorial waters who have been observed to be in violation of the U.N. Security Council resolutions,” the diplomat said.

China’s policing of neighbor North Korea’s adherence to U.N. sanctions, first put in place in 2006, is considered crucial to the effectiveness of the measures, spearheaded by the United States and unanimously adopted by the Security Council.

Reuters first reported in February that the sanctions monitors report found North Korea continued to enhance its nuclear and ballistic missile programs last year.

CHINA SAYS IMPLEMENTS SANCTIONS
When asked if China had received the notifications and acted on them, the office of the spokesperson at the Chinese foreign ministry said in a statement on Thursday that China implemented U.N. sanctions.

“China has always earnestly fulfilled its international obligations and dealt with relevant issues in accordance with the resolutions,” it said.

The office said: “The report clearly states that this is information provided by ‘a member state’ and not the opinion of the expert group.”

North Korea’s mission to the United Nations in New York did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

A second photo from the U.N. report shows ten North Korean vessels anchored in Chinese waters on Sept. 15 last year near the port of Lianyungang. The photos were provided to the U.N. sanctions monitors by an unidentified member state.

Slideshow (4 Images)
The monitors reported that North Korea conducts ship-to-ship transfers of illicit cargo such as coal, which has been banned since 2017 in a bid to cut off funding to Pyongyang.

More photos in the report show floating cranes supporting “illicit ship-to-ship coal transfers.”

Under U.N. sanctions imposed in 2017 all countries were also required to repatriate North Koreans working abroad by the end of last year to stop them earning foreign currency for leader Kim Jong Un’s government.

A senior U.S. official in January accused China of failing to send home all North Korean workers.

The United States has said it believed Pyongyang was earning some $500 million a year from nearly 100,000 workers abroad, 50,000 of whom were in China.

In a March 20 letter to the council’s North Korea sanctions committee, China - which requested that its note remain private - said it had completed the repatriation by the Dec. 22 deadline.

“China will continue to implement Security Council resolutions and fulfill its international obligations,” China’s U.N. Ambassador Zhang Jun wrote in the note, seen by Reuters.

Additional reporting by Beijing newsroom; Editing by Mary Milliken and Alistair Bell
 

Housecarl

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Is the Infantry Brigade Combat Team Becoming Obsolete?

Daniel Vazquez
April 17, 2020
Commentary

The infantry community has a problem. The centerpiece of the Army’s operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the infantry brigade combat team, is in danger of becoming obsolete in the face of near-peer opponents. This formation of three infantry battalions, an engineer battalion, an artillery battalion, a cavalry squadron, and a support battalion needs to be restructured to maximize an infantry brigade’s chances of success in an era of fast-paced and rapidly evolving multidomain operations. For the first time in 50 years, the infantry brigade can expect to have its artillery outgunned and be under electronic and aerial attack. Army leaders often note that multidomain operations will not only have an impact on Army organizations and operations but will drive Army modernization efforts as well. I suggest that the Army needs to shift away from three infantry battalions in an infantry brigade to two. This will allow the brigade to bring in sorely needed electronic warfare and air defense capabilities that currently do not exist in the unit and increase other existing capabilities that will prove essential in a future fight.

Imagine the infantry brigade as a weapon system similar to a guided missile. You have the missile’s brain (brigade headquarters), the rocket motor (support battalion), the guidance system (cavalry squadron), the penetrator (engineers and artillery), and the warhead (infantry battalions). The purpose of the missile is to put its warhead on a target to destroy it; the purpose of the brigade is to put the infantry on their objectives. A big warhead is useless if the missile is spoofed, fired against the wrong target, or shot down. While I may be advocating for a smaller warhead (less infantry), I am simultaneously arguing that we need to improve the other components of the missile to ensure the missile still reaches its target to deliver the payload. A more precise and reliable missile will be more effective even with a smaller warhead. In this case, the infantry brigade is no different.

There are four limitations and four assumptions to note before getting into the argument for such a drastic change. The first limitation is that any change must exist within a zero-growth Army. In other words, to create a new position, an old one must first be eliminated. Next, the infantry brigade, while being optimized for multidomain operations and decisive action threat environments, should remain flexible enough to support other missions — such as ongoing counter-terrorism, security, base support, and advising operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Africa. Third, all numbers for this article are drawn from official Army publications, which may or may not reflect actual manning numbers. The final limiting factor is that recommended changes are only for the infantry brigade force structure and not for Stryker or armored brigade formations.

The assumptions driving these recommended changes are as follows. First, in a multidomain fight, enablers — such as engineers, air defense, and soldiers who specialize in electronic warfare — will be as important as infantry, if not more, to ensure the infantry is able to conduct its mission. Thus, the priority of an infantry brigade will remain to put the infantryman on the objective. Third, electronic warfare, air defense, and manned reconnaissance assets will increase in importance as communications and unmanned assets are increasingly disrupted, degraded, or destroyed. Finally, taking into consideration zero growth and the Army’s push to modernize the force technologically, it is more practical and socially acceptable to build and field new equipment than it is to grow the Army.

The Three-Battalion Team

The current infantry brigade combat team consists of approximately 4,413 soldiers assigned to seven subordinate battalions. The three infantry battalions form the core of the brigade’s combat power. This structure is the result of decisions made when the Army was downsized from four brigade combat teams in a division to three. Simultaneous with downsizing were the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and recently concluded operations in Iraq.

While the current structure is suitable for activity in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is anachronistic and ill-suited to perform well in the complex and fast-paced operating environment that current Army leadership expects in the future. Why? This is due in part to a lack of assets internal to the brigade that can deny opponents the use of airspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, but also to the 2015 downsizing and a general overreliance on airpower.

The current structure assumes that there will be time for a deliberate train-up and for “enablers,” like additional soldiers for electronic warfare and explosive ordnance disposal, to integrate with the brigade before being thrust into a combat environment. The current infantry brigade is well-suited for wide area security missions and stability operations in places like Iraq, where it is possible to have deliberate preparation and where the operating environment is mature — with supporting elements already in theater such as civil affairs, additional route clearance, additional intelligence, and more. But in a rapidly evolving fight where an infantry brigade could deploy as part of an immediate response force, commanders will not have the luxury of time to meet their external supporting units and go through a deliberate training progression with them. If the brigade is to remain the primary fighting formation in the U.S. Army, then it needs to be outfitted to succeed unilaterally.

Slower Infantry Brigades Will Be Sidelined

If the current formation had to go to war today against peer and near-peer opponents, the brigade would not be set up for success. Leaders would quickly find that the infantry brigade is too slow, too dependent on external support, and unable to control large swaths of land compared to Stryker and armor brigade formations. This is readily apparent when one looks at the differences between the National Training Center in California, where Stryker and armor brigades conduct pre-deployment training, and the Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana, where infantry brigades conduct theirs. The environments and simulated combat scenarios at both locations are as different as night and day, and from personal experience at both, the operational environment at the National Training Center is many times more “lethal” than at the Joint Readiness Training Center — the faster-paced, more mobile, and longer-range fights experienced at the National Training Center have only served to highlight the importance of mounted formations in a peer fight. Infantry brigades would quickly be forced into niche roles to enable armored formations to conduct the main operation.

This is not to say that current infantry brigades would not succeed, as success is dependent on more than just how a unit is structured, but the current setup does the brigade no favors. This would cause the formations not to survive a major war as they currently stand, likely either being drastically changed during the conflict or replaced completely afterwards.

In order to reorient the brigade’s capability to maintain relevance in a future combat environment, changes should be made to the current structure. Unfortunately, with zero growth as a constraint, there are no options where every military occupational specialty wins. The brigade must lose a perceived capability in one place in order to improve elsewhere. The challenge is how to do so while improving the brigade as a whole.

Continued.....
 

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Continued.....

My recommended, and no doubt controversial, change is to remove of one of the three infantry battalions to open up positions for use elsewhere. This is not the first time cutting elements of a brigade to stand up additional units elsewhere has been brought up, either. The positions freed up will allow the brigade to stand the special troops battalion back up, increase engineer and reconnaissance capabilities, and add additional firepower to the remaining infantry battalions. (Prior to the brigade combat team redesign, the special troops battalion was home to military intelligence, signal, and one engineer company. When the redesign occurred, a second engineer company was added, and the battalion was reflagged as a brigade engineer battalion.)

Why remove an infantry battalion, one might ask? The infantry battalions are the largest subordinate formations, and by removing one, the brigade maximizes the availability of new positions. The removal would make approximately 729 positions available (including the forward support company) for repurposing. By going from three to two infantry battalions, the brigade can increase its ability to better support the remaining two infantry battalions with a higher ratio of enablers to “shooters.” Lastly, remember that the move to a two-infantry-battalion brigade core is not a new idea, as there were only two infantry battalions per brigade before the 2015 reorganization.

Who’s Who in the New Brigade

Bringing back the special troops battalion increases brigades’ ability to affect the enemy in the air and the electromagnetic spectrum during combat operations. The special troops battalion would gain the signal and military intelligence companies currently in the engineer battalion and the forward support and headquarters companies from the defunct infantry battalion. Additionally, the battalion would be assigned an electronic warfare company to fill a critical gap in capability. The last addition to the new battalion would be an air defense company with short-range air defense platoons and a man-portable stinger (MANPADS) platoon. The short-range platoons and man-portable missiles will create a layered air defense that will be able to protect the brigade from both enemy attack jets and attack helicopters. This will prove crucial to preserving the brigade’s ability to fight throughout a high-intensity conflict. These layered air defense units will provide a critical resource against not only hostile drones but also opponents who have been improving their own ability to conduct close air support over the past decade.

Once the military intelligence and signal companies transfer to the special troops battalion, the engineer battalion will be able to focus entirely on engineer tasks and missions. With manpower positions freed up by the removal of an infantry battalion, the engineers can add one additional 35-man sapper platoon, bringing the total in the battalion to four platoons. The addition of more sappers will increase the brigade’s ability to conduct breaching and demolition operations in both high- and low-intensity conflicts. The engineer battalion can additionally reorganize its horizontal platoons into one horizontal company. This new company would consist of three horizontal platoons and one route clearance platoon. The horizontal platoons, with their backhoes and bulldozers, will increase the brigade’s ability to construct defensive obstacles and destroy buildings in an urban fight. Finally, the battalion headquarters would gain a single explosive ordnance disposal platoon to further aid route clearance and explosive disposal operations. The battalion forward support company would also see a slight increase in size to account for additional vehicles added to the battalion. These changes increase the flexibility of the engineer battalion and allow it to focus on engineer operations for both decisive action and low-intensity conflicts. The 2-to-1 ratio of sapper platoons to infantry battalions grants the brigade additional flexibility in how it wishes to use its sappers.

Cavalry Grows in Importance and Size

As seen in the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine, the vast increase in the use of drones has also led to an increase in the ability to counteract them. With an increasingly crowded electromagnetic environment making it harder to properly employ drones, traditional manned reconnaissance assets will again increase in importance. To support this, the cavalry squadron would grow with one additional 92-man mounted cavalry troop and gain one 28-man platoon to the dismounted troop. This would increase the cavalry squadron’s size from two mounted troops and two dismounted platoons to three and three. This increase improves the squadron’s ability to perform reconnaissance and security operations. Additionally, this growth preserves the brigade’s reconnaissance assets if a mobile protective firepower armor troop is added: Currently the Army is deliberating how to incorporate these light tanks into the infantry brigade formation. The Army will likely have to do so by removing one of the mounted cavalry troops in favor of the armored troop. Expanding the cavalry squadron to three mounted troops means the cavalry squadron will not lose any reconnaissance capability if this occurs.

The size of the two remaining infantry battalions would increase as well from approximately 726 (including support company personnel) to 770 each. Each battalion would gain an additional two weapons platoons and an additional weapons company headquarters, changing the battalion from one weapons company of four platoons to two weapons companies of three platoons each. This increases the options the infantry battalion commander has available by increasing the number of anti-armor platforms in the battalion and provides an additional company commander to help manage the fight. At the same time, the total number of anti-armor assets within the brigade remains the same. This ensures that there is no loss of TOW-ITAS missile platforms, a key weapon that will be essential in a near-peer fight.

After this realignment, there are approximately 60 positions left. These 60 positions could either be spread out among the brigade to go to a true zero-growth change or be inserted into the brigade’s field artillery battalion (likely accompanying additional equipment coming to the battalion as well) or support battalion. While improvement to the artillery battalion and their associated warfighting function would be ideal, I believe that this can be accomplished through the fielding of improved equipment and does not need to rely on a change to manpower. Another option is that those 60 positions are removed from the infantry brigade altogether for use elsewhere in the Army. The 60 positions multiplied across the 13 active-duty infantry brigade combat teams equals 780 positions, or roughly an infantry battalion’s worth of personnel, to stand up additional units elsewhere. Approximately 1,200 positions would be freed up for the National Guard if the same changes were applied to its 20 infantry brigades.

In summary, the current design of the infantry brigade combat team should be updated to better fight and win in a multidomain fight. The organization needs to change if it is to avoid being marginalized in future high-intensity conflicts. Restricted in its ability to grow the force, the Army does not have the easy option of simply adding additional personnel to meet the need. It is my recommendation that one of the three infantry battalions per infantry brigade combat team be removed to reorient the brigades for multidomain operations. With the loss of one infantry battalion, the brigade adds to the protection (air defense), fires (electronic warfare), movement and maneuver (engineers and infantry weapons companies), and intelligence (cavalry squadron) warfighting functions. This trade-off will increase an infantry brigade’s chances of success in a future conflict while retaining the flexibility to accomplish a wide variety of other missions.

The Army is not alone in the difficult decisions it currently faces — all of the U.S. armed services are coming to terms with what drastic changes may be required in order to ensure they remain capable of supporting the plans outlined in the National Defense Strategy. We live in an unstable world with even less stable defense budgets. The strength of an infantry brigade is that it is a rapidly deployable and flexible option for commanders. This flexibility, when coupled with a structure designed for multidomain threats, will ensure that the infantry brigade can continue to fight and win the nation’s battles for the foreseeable future.

Capt. Daniel Vazquez is a 2013 graduate of Norwich University’s Corps of Cadets and has a B.A. in history. Commissioned as an infantryman in 2013, he has served in both Stryker and infantry brigade combat team formations as a rifle platoon leader, company executive officer, and scout platoon leader. He is currently serving as the battalion operations officer in an Infantry Brigade Combat Team infantry battalion. He is the author of The War Yet to Come: A Story of the Future Battlefield, available on Amazon Kindle. The views and opinions described in the paper are his and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Army.
 

Housecarl

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News + Intel A religious war: Jihadists in the Sahel target Christians

by Steve Balestrieri 1 day ago

One of the underreported aspects of the violence in the Sahel is the ongoing targeting of Christians and their churches, which threatens to drive them out of the area for good.

According to an annual report by the Christian charity organization, Open Doors, 27 Islamist groups repeatedly target Christians in the Sahel.

Climate change played a role in how the violence against Christian began in the Sahel: The northern Sahel lands have always been traditionally Islamic and the southern Christian. But as prolonged droughts threatened what meager farmland there was in the north, nomadic Islamic Fulani tribes were forced to move south into Christian lands and began to take over them by force.

But the bigger issue has been Islamic extremists, among them ISIS, al-Qaeda, and Boko Haram. As these extremist groups have been forced from their bases in the Middle East, they’ve found the poor, failing states of the Sahel to be perfect grounds for establishing enclaves where only their version of Islam is tolerated.

The violence and extremism are now spreading westwards and southwards. In the northeastern corner of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, an Islamic terror group known as the Islamic Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) has been attacking the mostly Christian population of the region. The ADF has now aligned itself with the Islamic State. Their stated goal is to establish “a caliphate” in the region.

There have been reports by Open Doors that in DRC there been more than 20 attacks, resulting in around 90 deaths. More than 130 people have been kidnapped, and about 12,000 people have been displaced. At least six churches have been burned down and two church-run clinics and health centers have been destroyed.

In Burkina Faso, one of Africa’s poorest countries, ISIS terrorists have been dismantling the long-standing peaceful coexistence of the Christian and Muslim communities. The Islamic State has targeted the leaders of both Christian and Muslim faiths, who have spoken out against them. Those who do not subscribe to ISIS’s extreme ideology are either driven out or killed: During a four-month period in 2019, six different Christian churches were burned, 25 people murdered and thousands forced to flee as ISIS proclaimed the northeastern part of the country a caliphate.

As a result of threats by ISIS and other Islamic extremist groups over 200 churches in northern Burkina Faso have been forced to close their doors. In December a newly built Protestant church was burned by men on motorcycles (one of the preferred methods of transportation by the extremists). The attack left 14 dead. A prayer meeting in Dansi in February was also attacked resulting in 24 more dead Christians.

Boko Haram, on the other hand, has expanded its influence into Cameroon. It terrorizes the local Christian population by targeting Catholic priests and government officials. Hundreds have been killed in Cameroon thus far.

In Diffa, Niger, Boko Haram used a similar terror method. It kidnapped a Christian woman and after three days released her back to the community in order to inform all the Christians to leave the region in three days or be killed.

In June 2019, Fulani Muslim militants attacked the central Mali village of Sobame Da, near Sanga in the Mopti region. They rounded up and killed about a third of the villagers, 95 people in all. All of the dead were Christian. A survivor told the media, “About 50 heavily armed men arrived on motorbikes and pickups. They first surrounded the village and then attacked — anyone who tried to escape was killed. No one was spared — women, children, elderly people.”

The French have created a coalition to fight the extremist groups in the Sahel but they are waging an uphill battle. The governments of Africa and the U.N. have to urgently collaborate in extinguishing the violence in the Sahel before it spreads even farther.

About Steve Balestrieri View All Posts


Steve served as a Special Forces NCO and Warrant Officer before injuries forced his early separation. He writes for SOFREP and covers the NFL for PatsFans.com and his work is regularly featured in the Millbury-Sutton Chronicle and Grafton News newspapers

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Islamic Militants attack Nigerien base, kill 25 soldiers
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Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....



The News Scroll 17 April 2020 Last Updated at 11:29 pm | Source: PTI
Four dead in Chad after jet bomb ''accidentally'' hits army chief''s house

N''djamena, Apr 17 (AFP) A bomb "accidentally dropped" from a Chadian jet onto the home of a senior army officer Friday, killing four people and wounding two near N''Djamena, a prosecutor and an air force officer told AFP.

The blast destroyed the home of Mahamat Saleh Arim, deputy commander of the presidential guard and a close ally of President Idriss Deby Itno, an AFP journalist at the scene near the Adji Kossei airbase said.

The warhead struck just metres from the Chad headquarters of anti-jihadist Operation Barkhane, the French-led military campaign fighting militants in the region.

"An investigation is underway to determine the circumstances of this incident," said Youssouf Tom, public prosecutor at the N''Djamena High Court, who visited the scene.

Two women and two children were killed, an air force official said.

"The plane was taking off when the bomb broke loose, and hit a private residence in the city that houses soldiers'' families next to the airbase," an air force officer added on condition of anonymity.

Russian-made Sukhoi jets used by the Chadian air force at the base were recently involved in strikes against Boko Haram militants in the Lake Chad region.

That massive operation followed a militant attack on a Chad army base in March that killed 98 troops. At least 150 Chadian soldiers have been killed in the area since mid-March.

Deby has said his country''s troops, who have been fighting jihadists in the Lake Chad region and the Sahel, will no longer take part in military operations outside national borders.(AFP) RUP RUP
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

N. Korea continued nuclear activities in 2019: U.S. State Department

All Headlines 07:09 April 18, 2020

By Lee Haye-ah

WASHINGTON, April 17 (Yonhap) -- North Korea continued nuclear activities last year in violation of its commitments to abandon all nuclear programs, the U.S. State Department has said.

In a summarized report to Congress Wednesday, the department also said North Korea has likely had a biological warfare program since at least the 1960s.

The report discusses U.S. and other nations' compliance last year with various arms control and nonproliferation agreements.

"North Korea's continuing nuclear activities make clear that it ... has not adhered to its commitments in the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and to return at an early date to the NPT and IAEA safeguards," the department said, referring to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The U.S. also assesses that North Korea has an offensive biological warfare program in violation of its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.

"Although the United States has fragmented insight into North Korea's offensive BW program, continued reporting illustrates that North Korea has BW capabilities intended for use to counter U.S. and South Korean military superiority," the department said.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.......

Posted for fair use.....

State Department Report Highlights World’s Deadliest Weapons
Potential nuclear tests in China, a whole list of problems with Russia, and let's not forget North Korea and Iran.
Comments 3

The State Department has released the unclassified executive summary of its annual arms control report. Foggy Bottom is required by statute to submit the report to Congress each year and the unclassified version is a distillation of longer, classified analyses that aren’t released to the public. Much of the report is usually unsurprising. But there are almost always at least a few revelations, and this year’s report is no different.

Don’t let the dry bureaucratic text fool you—the report outlines some of the most pressing security challenges Americans face today and will have to continue worrying about in the future. No interest is more vital than safeguarding the U.S. from an attack utilizing a weapon of mass destruction. And the report provides a useful overview of how the world’s most dangerous nations—from global powers such as China and Russia to rogue states including Iran and North Korea—continue to develop the deadliest weapons mankind has ever known.

Let’s start with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

China advances on nukes.

Perhaps the most intriguing paragraph in the report concerns China’s Lop Nur nuclear weapons site and the possibility that the CCP has been conducting low yield tests there. The Wall Street Journal’s Michael Gordon first reported on these passages on Wednesday.

The State Department claims the Chinese “maintained a high level of activity” at the site “throughout 2019” and may be preparing to operate it “year-round.” The report’s authors point to China’s “use of explosive containment chambers, extensive excavation activities at Lop Nur, and lack of transparency on its nuclear testing activities.”

Regarding the lack of transparency, Foggy Bottom reports that China has been “frequently blocking the flow of data from its International Monitoring System (IMS) stations to the International Data Center operated by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization.” This move raises “concerns regarding [China’s] adherence to the ‘zero yield’ standard adhered to by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in their respective nuclear weapons testing moratoria.”

In other words, the State Department insinuates—but does not outright allege—that the CCP may be conducting low-grade explosives tests. This obviously has potential ramifications for future nuclear weapons negotiations and international compliance monitoring.

The CCP quickly dismissed the State Department’s report. During a press conference on Thursday, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Zhao Lijian, accused the U.S. of “fabricating” such issues. The U.S. has been “posturing as a judge or referee to criticize other countries’ arms control and non-proliferation measures and [stylizing] itself as a model,” Zhao sneered. He went on to portray China as the truly responsible international actor, denouncing America’s approach to diplomacy, arms control, and related matters under President Trump’s “America First” agenda. (There are many reasons to be skeptical. Among them: Zhao is the same senior official who suggested on Twitter that the U.S. Army might be responsible for bringing the coronavirus epidemic to Wuhan.)

China’s nuclear-related activities aren’t the only area of concern. The State Department reminds readers that the U.S. “does not have sufficient information to determine whether China eliminated its assessed biological warfare (BW) program,” as is required under the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). In past analyses, the U.S. concluded that China retained parts of its programs and never really came clean about its “offensive” biological capabilities.

Russia’s nuclear tests, chemical weapons, and nerve agents.

The U.S. thinks the Russians may be gearing up for additional low-yield nuclear tests of their own that could also circumvent the Kremlin’s notification commitments under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which is intended to cap the yield of such experiments and provide other safeguards. The section of the State Department’s report dealing with this issue is somewhat murky, reflecting the unknowns. Other sections are straightforward, including clear language regarding Russia’s SSC-8 SCREWDRIVER, a missile that violates the Kremlin’s previous commitments to avoid possessing, building or testing a ground-launched cruise missile “with a range capability of 500 kilometers (km) to 5,500 kilometers.”

Not all of Russia’s problematic weapons require an intermediate-range missile for delivery. The State Department continues to assess that Russia was indeed responsible for the March 4, 2018, assassination attempt on Sergei Skripal. The U.S. “certifies that Russia is in non-compliance” with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), pointing to the attack on Skripal, a former Russian military intelligence officer who served as double agent for the British.

U.K. intelligence reportedly recruited Skripal in the mid-1990s. After Skripal’s double role was discovered, he was tried and convicted on espionage charges in his home country. He received a 13-year sentence in 2006, but the U.K. and Russians swapped spies in 2010. Skripal went to live in Britain.

That could have been the end of the story, but Vladimir Putin couldn’t let it go.

Skripal and his daughter suddenly became ill in March 2018, after they were poisoned with a suspected exotic nerve agent. They survived, but with health complications. As the New York Times reported weeks after the assassination attempt, British and American officials were “struck by the symbolism of the attack,” because there “were many ways the former spy could have been killed.” These same unnamed Western intelligence officials told the Times that they suspect Putin’s assassins knew the nerve agent would be traced back to Russia, thereby making it clear to current and former spies that the Kremlin would never forgive treason.

The State Department also got the message and hasn’t forgotten it. Foggy Bottom cites the attack on Skripal as evidence that the Russians retain “an undeclared chemical weapons program.”

Russian-supported chemical weapons attacks in Syria.

The State Department also expresses “concerns regarding Russian assistance to the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the regime’s use of chlorine against Douma in April 2018.” The Syrian Arab Republic is, of course, Bashar al-Assad’s regime, which denies using weaponized chlorine. Despite Assad’s and Putin’s denials, the U.S., British, and French governments carried out punitive airstrikes on Assad’s forces after the attack.

The online world is a fever swamp with respect to the events at Douma, in part because of Russian disinformation. The Russian government has accused the U.K. of working with insurgents to stage the incident. The Russians have also alleged that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has cooked its investigatory books, even though the watchdog initially avoided assigning culpability. The latter charge picked up steam after two OPCW inspectors questioned the organization’s findings in personal writings, which were then leaked online.

The OPCW launched its own internal investigation of the matter in July 2019 and released its findings in February. The OPCW concluded that neither of the purported whistleblowers was well-positioned to offer their supposedly superior conclusions. One of the two inspectors played only a “minor supporting role in the investigation of the Douma incident” and “did not have access to all of the information gathered,” including “witness interviews, laboratory results, and analyses by independent experts.” The second inspector “never left” the group’s “command post in Damascus,” because he hadn’t “completed the necessary training required” to visit the site at Douma. He “separated from” OPCW in August 2018—that is, before the “majority” of the investigative team’s “work occurred.”

You can debate the merits and efficacy of the punitive airstrikes. The Syrian insurgency is riddled with jihadists, including al-Qaeda-affiliated groups that are not acceptable allies or partners for the West. The whole conflict is a multifaceted mess, with Assad committing non-chemical atrocities on a regular basis.

There’s little doubt in my mind that Assad and his benefactors have conducted a series of low-grade chemical weapons attacks on the Syrian population. These chemical weapon bombings didn’t begin or end in Douma. According to the new report, the State Department “assesses” that the Assad regime has used “chemical weapons against the Syrian people every year since” its accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2013. That accession was brokered by then Secretary of State John Kerry with the Russians in order to force the Syrian regime to turn over or destroy its entire chemical weapons program. While part of the regime’s chemical weapons architecture was accounted for, the agreement wasn’t nearly as effective as Kerry initially imagined. The State Department points to a separate chemical bombing in Kabana, Latakia, in May 2019 as another example of the ongoing campaign. The OPCW has documented still other suspected chemical weapons attacks as well.

The rogue states.

The State Department’s new report contains other observations that are unsurprising, but still worth repeating. North Korea’s ongoing “nuclear activities make clear that it also has not adhered to its commitments … to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs,” the report notes. Of course, Kim Jong-un has also resisted President Trump’s charm offensive, which is intended to cajole the North Korean leader into cooperation.

In early 2018, an elite team of Israeli spies absconded from Iran with a cache of nuclear-related research materials. In a statement of the obvious, the U.S. surmises that the Iranians “may have maintained this information at least in part to preserve technical expertise relevant to a nuclear weapons capability, and potentially to aid in any future effort to pursue nuclear weapons again, if a decision were made to do so.” The Iranians continue to block access to two suspect sites that the IAEA wishes to inspect, and they haven’t explained “particles of chemically processed uranium” that were discovered “at an undeclared location in Iran.”

The report also outlines various concerns regarding Iran’s and North Korea’s chemical and biological weapons programs, too. None of these issues are close to be resolving anytime soon.

It’s a dangerous world and this summary of the State Department’s new report only scratches the surface of some of the potentially devastating threats America and its allies face.

Photograph of nuclear-capable ICBMs in China by Greg Baker/AFP/Getty Images.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....So what's that say about Turkey? (sarcasm off)....

Posted for fair use.....

Turkey-based Libyan mufti authorizes suicide attacks against LNA forces
By
News Desk
-
2020-04-17
2

BEIRUT, LEBANON (8:45 P.M.) – The Libyan mufti, Sadiq al-Gharyani, authorized the Turkish-backed Libyan forces and their Syrian mercenary allies to carry out suicide bombings against the Libyan National Army (LNA).

Gharyani’s statement, made in Turkey, was shown on Al-Tanasah TV, which is owned by personalities supporting the extremists in Libya.

In response to a question about whether it is permissible for those whom he described as “revolutionaries” to blow themselves up for fear of being captured, he replied: “Killing the soul is forbidden, as a person may fall into captivity and God will deliver him, and he may fear that he will fall into captivity and someone who saves him will come.”

He added, “Detonation against the enemy means that there is a bombing of the enemy, that is, there is an impact, a shake and a break. This is legitimate and permissible.”

Gharyani considered the smuggling of hardcore detainees from prisons in western Libya as “a pillar of victory.”

It is worth noting that the Libyan National Army is engaged in military confrontations to impose control over the capital, Tripoli, and its extraction from armed groups linked to the Al-Wefaq government.

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No more peace: Tripoli-based Libyan gov’t refuses to negotiate with Haftar
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....



Libyan government forces attack Haftar militia
Government forces target locations of militias in western Tripoli
Hamdi Yildiz | 18.04.2020

Libyan government forces attack Haftar militia



TRIPOLI, Libya
Libyan government forces on Friday attacked locations of militias loyal to warlord Khalifa Haftar in western Tripoli.

The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) military spokesman Mohammed Kanunu issued a statement on developments of Operation Volcano Rage and said there was an air raid on the Al-Watiya airbase controlled by the militia.

Haftar’s locations were attacked after militias carried out strikes on civilian settlements using rockets that killed five and injured 18.

The Health Ministry spokesperson said a university dormitory allocated to the settlement of migrants in Libya was targeted by Haftar militias.

The GNA has been under attack by Haftar’s forces since last April, with more than 1,000 killed in the violence. It launched Operation Peace Storm on March 26 to counter attacks on the capital.

Since the ouster of longtime ruler Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, two seats of power have emerged in Libya: Haftar in eastern Libya, supported by Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, and the GNA in Tripoli, which enjoys UN and international recognition.
 

jward

passin' thru
US special operations forces are special — but they're not 'elite'
Lt. Col. Stewart "PR" Parker, Center a New American Security

Apr 16, 2020, 5:19 PM




US special operations airman jump parachute

An airman with Special Operations Command Europe, jumps out of a Black Hawk helicopter, 12,000 feet above the Malmsheim Drop Zone, Stuttgart, Germany, August 17, 2016. Visual Information Specialist Jason Johnston/US Army


Opinion banner

  • US special operations forces have only gotten more active in recent years, deploying to more countries for a wider range of missions.
  • Those troops have earned a reputation for their successes, but exalting them as "elite" misunderstands their role and risks corrupting the force as a whole, writes Lt. Col. Stewart "PR" Parker, a career Special Tactics Officer and senior military fellow at the Center for a New American Security.
  • Visit Business Insider's homepage for more stories.

America's special operations forces (SOF) are in high demand and their global presence is growing. In 2019, SOF operated in 141 countries, up from only 60 just over a decade ago. Rightfully, SOF have earned a reputation for their tremendous successes, like killing Osama bin Laden in 2011.

As the pace increases, so have concerns over their behavior. But the nation's reverence for its SOF may itself be part of the problem — for too long, media has labeled SOF as more "elite" than the rest of the military. But the term "elite" implies better, and this raises the question, better for what?

Throughout history, SOF have evolved in myriad ways, most memorably with the creation of US Army Special Forces, whose Green Berets were officially recognized by President John F. Kennedy in 1962.

Today, all military personnel assigned under United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), are known by the umbrella term "special operations forces" (SOF). But America's response to the 9/11 attacks pushed SOF into the limelight like never before, leading the way in global counter-terror (CT) and counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, and earning the media's label as the "elite" echelon of the US military.


US Army Green Beret special forces Rimpac MH-60S

A US Special Forces soldier and multinational special operations forces exit an MH-60S helicopter during the Rim of the Pacific exercise, July 5, 2018. US Navy/Chief Mass Comm Specialist William Tonacchio
Since 2018, the Trump administration's National Defense Strategy has been reorienting the military toward deterring state adversaries like China and Russia, simultaneously de-emphasizing CT and COIN. Unlike in current operations, during large scale conflict, SOF would primarily enable the main efforts of conventional military capabilities like fighter squadrons and infantry battalions.


Yet the obsession with "elite" SOF continues. As Dr. Tom Searle explains in the "General Theory of SOF," "too often, special operations attract inordinate attention in the media and a certain mystique due to the perceived elite-ness of the SOF that conduct these operations." The internet is littered with references to "elite" SOF units, from respected journals and news sources , to the sedate but authoritative Encyclopedia Britannica, which defines the "Green Berets" as an elite force in the US military.

It is surprising that the word "elite" has become a ubiquitous part of SOF's description in the media because it is simply incorrect.

Defense strategists obsess with using precise terminology to explain units, tasks, and operational environments. "Elite" is never used as a term of reference for SOF inside the military. Leaders do not present SOF as "elite" when speaking to the press or when testifying before legislative oversight committees. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff does not advise the president on military forces in terms of "elite-ness." The word "elite" does not appear in the USSOCOM mission statement. "Elite" is not even included in the official Department of Defense dictionary.

The word "elite" should never be used to describe SOF, because SOF are special, not elite.

While "special" and "elite" may be conflated in casual conversation, they do not mean the same thing. Elite implies better, whereas special is different. To say that SOF is better raises the question, for what purpose?


Navy SEALs

Navy SEALs U.S. Navy photo by Senior Chief Mass Communication Specialist Jayme Pastoric
For example, Navy SEALs are special sailors, because SEALs are trained to "lock-out of submarines, jump out of planes, leave large ships, operate mini-submarines, swim to meet the enemy, and SEALs often fight the enemy on land." But SEALs are not truly elite sailors, because SEALs are not better at doing the things that traditional sailors do, like operating warships, submarines, and aircraft.


Different military forces, like tools, are designed for different functions. A broad claim that SOF is elite, or better than the rest of the military makes no more sense than describing a screwdriver as a better version of a hammer.

Not only is the "elite" description of SOF incorrect, it is potentially dangerous. Over investment in SOF at the expense of conventional military forces would cause degradation in priority mission areas, including those normally assigned to SOF. USSOCOM is guided by the "SOF Truths," the fifth of which states "most special operations require non-SOF assistance."

The mission that killed ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in Syria in 2019 and hundreds more like it could not have been possible without robust support from conventional ground, air, maritime, space, cyber, and logistics capabilities. Conceiving of SOF as elite could also lead to assigning SOF missions that would be better suited for conventional forces, which could lead to mission failure.

Furthermore, the term "elite" is dangerous because self-perceptions of elite-ness can lead to unhealthy hubris among SOF personnel. Those who feel elite may believe they are entitled to act outside the law, or that they are exempt from military standards of discipline.

Unfettered public praise for SOF may be contributing to exactly this trend. Young men — and more recently, women — who enter the military with aspirations to join SOF units are unwittingly indoctrinated by the media in their formative years that they will become "elite" once they have finished the appropriate training.



Recently, SOF have been accused of so much criminal behavior that in 2019, Congress mandated a comprehensive review on SOF professionalism. Some of the more egregious allegations against SOF include murder in Afghanistan, war crimes in Iraq, cocaine smuggling from Colombia to the US, manslaughter of a SOF teammate in Mali, theft of official funds, and numerous cases of sexual assault.


America should always be able to trust that its SOF component is ready, competent, and professional, but these crimes alleged to have been committed by SOF personnel have shown beyond doubt that perceptions of "elite-ness" are unwarranted.

SOF have contributed and sacrificed greatly in America's bloody campaigns, but SOF are merely a tool set designed to accomplish missions that conventional forces cannot conduct on their own. Notions of SOF "elite-ness" expressed by the media and popular culture are unhealthy.

Allowing such perspectives to pervade public consciousness unchallenged damage the very SOF enterprise which Americans rely upon for their protection. Without recognizing that SOF are special, but not elite, SOF risks becoming less than what the country needs them to be.

Lt. Col. Stewart "PR" Parker is a career Special Tactics Officer currently assigned to the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) as a senior military fellow. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Department of Defense or the US government.

posted for fair use, additional photos at article source
US special operations forces are special — but they're not 'elite'
 

jward

passin' thru
The Coronavirus Threatens Saudi Arabia’s Global Ambitions
The Kingdom Tallies the Costs of the Pandemic Lockdown
By Krithika Varagur April 15, 2020


In late February, Saudi Arabia abruptly suspended all visas for umrah, the year-round pilgrimage to Mecca, the holiest city in Islam. Umrah is less important than the hajj, a pilgrimage that happens in the last month of the lunar year and is required of all able-bodied Muslims at least once in their lives, but it still draws nearly eight million annual visitors.
Today, the kingdom’s two holy cities, Mecca and Medina—which give the Saudi king his royal title, Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques—are on total lockdown. Even Saudi citizens are banned from visiting as pilgrims. Saudi authorities will likely cancel the hajj, which is set for late July this year, for the first time in over two centuries. (Though the cancellation has not been officially announced, the Saudi hajj minister is urging people to hold off booking trips, suggesting that a formal announcement is imminent. The Ministry of Hajj and Umrah did not immediately comment as to when it will make the final call.) Riyadh has moved more swiftly in responding to the pandemic than other Muslim-majority states and religious institutions. It took Egypt’s famed Al-Azhar University until late March to finally suggest that Friday prayers, which tend to convene large crowds in close quarters, should be optional. Other Muslim-majority countries such as Malaysia and Morocco have only recently begun to shutter their mosques.

Despite the obvious public health benefits of suspending the umrah and hajj, Saudi Arabia will pay a heavy cost for its prudence. Pilgrims bring in billions of dollars to the country every year, so the Saudi economy will suffer as long as the crisis lasts. Another loss is less quantifiable, but just as significant: pilgrimage remains one of the kingdom’s most important soft-power instruments after two decades during which its public image has deteriorated. By interrupting yet another transnational flow that was long taken for granted, the novel coronavirus reveals the dwindling clout of Saudi Arabia in the Muslim world. In the Middle East, as it is elsewhere, the pandemic is accelerating ongoing historical trends: in this case, the end of Saudi Arabia’s bid for pan-Islamic leadership and the emergence of a multipolar Muslim world.

WANING GLOBAL AMBITIONS
Ever since the 1960s, Saudi Arabia has tried to reshape the Muslim world in its image. The globally minded King Faisal, who ruled from 1964 to 1975, pioneered a foreign policy driven by al-tadamun al-Islami, or Islamic solidarity, a bold ambition for a nation-state that came into being only in 1932. Over the next few decades, various actors in the kingdom—from a ministry dedicated to religious affairs to global charities such as the Muslim World League to individual royals and businessmen—threw vast resources at dawa, or the call to Islam, across the Muslim world. Their call was to the Saudi state-sponsored brand of conservative Wahhabi Islam, a literalist Sunni tradition that frowns upon idolatry, shrines, and folk practices and virulently opposes minority groups such as the Shiite and Ahmadiyya sects.
The global Saudi project reached its apogee during the Cold War, when the United States found Saudi Arabia useful in its competition with the Soviet Union. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote approvingly of the kingdom in his memoirs: “Often I found through other channels a helpful Saudi footprint placed so unobtrusively that one gust of wind could erase its traces.” With Saudi help, the United States backed the guerrilla Afghan mujahideen in the Soviet-Afghan war of the 1980s, drawing foreign fighters from all around the world.

Saudi global ambitions waned just as other nations began promoting their own brands of Islam.
But after the September 11 attacks (in which 15 of 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia), Saudi dawa suddenly appeared as a dangerous force, a frightening wellspring of terrorism. Yes, the proselytization apparatus from the era of “peak dawa,” from 1973 to 1990, continued to chug on in more than two dozen countries, through educational outlets, embassy-affiliated religious attachés, and wartime relief charities in countries such as Bosnia and Kosovo. But with greater international scrutiny trained on the kingdom’s financial outflows, these venues have lost both resources and clout.
Recipients of Saudi dawa in Indonesia, Kosovo, and Nigeria all noted a drop-off in funds after 2001. Dr. Fadl Khulod, the head of the Nigerian branch of the Muslim World League—a Mecca-based, international nongovernmental organization that oversees dawa activities ranging from distributing Korans to building mosquestold me how his organization’s funding dried up for a full decade as Saudi Arabia subjected its charities to external investigation. He had to fire nearly every single employee. Today, he runs MWL Nigeria by himself.

Riyadh also grappled with declining oil revenues in the second decade of this century, culminating in the 2014 oil price crash. Saudi global ambitions waned just as other Muslim nations began promoting their own national brands of Islam. Turkey is a good example of this trend, with its vision for soft power based on historical ties to former Ottoman territories in the Balkans and, increasingly, in more distant theaters such as Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. So is Iran, which maintains low-key soft-power outlets focused on Persian culture in dozens of countries, including Indonesia and Bosnia, alongside its more well-known support for certain armed groups in the Middle East.

HAJJ DIPLOMACY
Although the strength of its call has diminished in recent years, 1.8 billion people still pray in the direction of Saudi Arabia every day. The obligatory pilgrimage remained a trump card in Saudi Arabia’s pocket, even as its soft power steadily decreased. For instance, Saudi Arabia affords Indonesia the world’s largest annual hajj allotment of about 230,000 people per year. Increasing that number is a perennial, top-agenda item for Indonesian officials in bilateral relations with Riyadh, sometimes to the detriment of actual economic investments. Jakarta has rarely pushed back on Saudi proselytization efforts in previous decades because it doesn’t want to imperil its hajj quota. Some Indonesians wait up to 20 years for their chance to undertake the pilgrimage.

But Riyadh’s entanglement in recent regional disputes has begun to politicize even the hajj. Imams in both Libya and Tunisia have called for boycotts of the pilgrimage owing to Saudi intervention in the Yemeni civil war. The Muslim Brotherhood’s spiritual leader Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who is based in Qatar, went so far as to issue a fatwa in 2019 banning the hajj on human rights grounds, citing Saudi human rights abuses in Yemen.
The hajj has not been completely shut down since Napoleon invaded the region in 1798.
This year’s potential cancellation of the hajj comes in the wake of these controversies. Although several pandemics, sieges, and wars have disrupted pilgrimages to Mecca from the eighth through the nineteenth centuries, the hajj has not been completely shut down since 1798, when Napoleon’s invasion of the region made it impossible. The ripple effects of the novel coronavirus pandemic may affect the pilgrimage’s resumption next year and potentially in years to come. As it is, the hajj is famous as a reservoir of sickness; pilgrims frequently return home with respiratory illnesses, known colloquially as the “hajj cough.”

The disruption of the hajj and of the travel of Muslims to and from Saudi Arabia imperil long-standing planks of Saudi foreign policy. Pilgrimages and person-to-person exchanges in the kingdom have been key to the Saudi proselytization efforts across three continents. The ostracized Indonesian founding father Mohammad Natsir, for example, was a frequent visitor to Saudi Arabia, won the favor of King Faisal, and in 1967 started the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council, which became a conduit for Saudi funds. The council endowed a boarding school in Central Java, where several of the perpetrators of the 2002 Bali bombings studied. Likewise, a young Nigerian scholar named Abubakar Gumi, who worked in Jeddah as a hajj officer, was entrusted in 1965 with channeling King Faisal’s funds into Nigeria, where he promptly embarked on a vigorous anti-Sufi campaign. Gumi went on pilgrimage to Mecca every year between 1955 and 1965, and it was there that he recruited Nigerian collaborators such as Khulod, whom he personally tapped to run MWL in Abuja.
COVID-19 shutdowns may also affect student exchanges, another important arm of Saudi dawa. The ambitions of the Islamic University of Medina, which opened in 1961 with the goal of turning foreign students into Salafi missionaries, depend on travel. IUM alumni have become influential in postwar Kosovo, where they created a new class of Salafi scholars within two decades, and in Nigeria. Jafar Adam, the most charismatic Nigerian Salafi of this century, studied at IUM, and his most famous disciple was Mohammed Yusuf—the founder of the group now known as Boko Haram. The closure of Saudi borders freezes these vectors of religious and ideological proselytization.

A NEW ERA
Riyadh may be able to accept the losses that will inevitably come with the disruption of pilgrimage and other travel. The kingdom is trying to move away from its late-twentieth-century global religious project. Vision 2030, the flagship modernization program of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, does not foreground religion. Only one of the 13 “realization programs” of Vision 2030 mentions religion at all. Officials at the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Dawa, and Guidance indicated in 2019 that the ministry had received fewer resources since the crown prince came to power.



As Saudi efforts recede, other Muslim countries assert their own religious programs. Gulf dawa today is a much more crowded field, with countries such as Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates all engaging in robust proselytization of their own. The UAE has funded Sufi groups and institutions abroad, while Qatar has been supporting Muslim Brotherhood–style Islamists. Particularly since the Arab Spring, Qatar has backed a variety of Islamist actors in the wider region, including the Free Syrian Army and Hamas. The Doha-based International Association of Muslim Scholars, founded in 2004, is a group of over 90,000 scholars who promote Islamic jurisprudence and fatwas in line with Muslim Brotherhood principles. The UAE, meanwhile, organizes international conferences around popular Sufi clerics such as the Mauritanian Sheikh Abdallah bin Bayyah. In the Balkans, Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs, known as Diyanet, supports the restoration of religious sites and organizes pilgrimages to Mecca for nearly all the region’s Muslims.

None of these government-backed initiatives will have quite the transformative impact of the twentieth-century Saudi project, which cemented the place of Salafism, mainstreamed anti-Shiite and anti-Sufi sentiments, and planted the seeds of Salafi jihad in many countries. And in the post-COVID-19 era, it will be extremely difficult for any single Muslim-majority country to facilitate the critical mass of international exchanges that enabled Saudi success in the twentieth century.
The coronavirus puts in perspective the decline of Saudi Arabia’s standing in and hold over the Muslim world. Six weeks after the suspension of the umrah—and the unforgettable accompanying images of an empty and desolate Kaaba in Mecca, the most sacred site in Islam—many Muslim countries did not fall into line behind Saudi Arabia. In Indonesia, homecoming for the Eid al-Fitr holiday, which could see up to 20 million people on the move, is still scheduled for May. In Pakistan, people continue to pray in larger gatherings in mosques. Rather than bringing the Muslim world together, COVID-19 shows its heterogeneity and how difficult it is for Saudi Arabia, or any other country, to lead by example.

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Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

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What India’s Covid-19 fight means for its nuclear strategy


Manpreet Sethi
  • Updated
  • :
  • April 18, 2020,
  • 8:44 PM
None of India’s adversaries must believe that the fear of economic pain would stop India from nuclear retaliation.

Springtime, a period of colourful blossoms, fresh leaves and outdoor festivals, was spent by all Indians in a state of national lockdown this year. In dealing with the challenge thrown up by Covid-19, India chose social distancing through an unprecedented countrywide shutdown. While this decision has nothing to do with nuclear weapons, interestingly enough, it signals something about the country’s nuclear strategy. Two aspects particularly stand out: the credibility of its nuclear deterrence; and, the wisdom of its nuclear strategy.

Credibility of nuclear deterrence rests on a tripod. It comprises the knowledge of the presence of nuclear weapons, existence of requisite command and control structures, and exhibition of resolve to use the capability. Many within the country and outside have often raised doubts about the third leg of this tripod, questioning India’s ability to take difficult decisions. This has particularly been suggested in the context of Pakistan’s projection of a threat to use low-yield nuclear weapons in the battlefield. In such circumstances, it is presumed that the loss to life and property would be small and mostly limited to military personnel and assets, and India would refrain from nuclear retaliation.

After the rather difficult decision that the Prime Minister took on the night of 24 March 2020 to order a complete nation-wide lockdown, such presumptions might need a rethink. The call to shut down an entire nation of India’s size and population for three weeks, extended subsequently by another 19 days, could not have been an easy one. Besides, it had to be taken amidst a thick fog of uncertainty and without knowing whether it would turn out right or not. The only thing evident was that it would involve a serious disruption of lives, millions of which were already living on the edge, in a developing country.

The hard choice demonstrated the resolve of the leadership. Even more importantly, as 36, often otherwise fractious provincial administrations, and over 1.3 billion diverse and argumentative Indians have largely moved collectively since then, indicates a national resolve. Political stability, when it rests on true democratic pillars, allows a nation to make and sustain difficult decisions with far greater public legitimacy than in more fragile, non-democratic states. Therefore, none of India’s adversaries should be tempted towards first nuclear use by doubting its resolve to undertake nuclear retaliation.

Another factor that adds to the credibility of nuclear deterrence, as highlighted by India’s handling of the current crisis, is the inherent strength of its economy and aspirational human resources. Even as the country bleeds while handling the health emergency, it has still taken upon itself the additional burden of grinding the economy to a halt. This is possible only when the country has faith in its socio-economic resilience and scientific and technological strength to get back on its feet. Additionally, the entrepreneurial spirit has risen to meet the challenges.

The decision to impose the lockdown, therefore, gives an indication of the innate capacity and forbearance of a young nation with ancient roots to withstand difficult times. None of India’s adversaries must believe that the fear of economic pain would stop India from nuclear retaliation. The strategic depth offered by its size, economic resilience, human resource potential and democratic polity collectively undergird the strength to take tough calls.

Meanwhile, at a more philosophical level, the current situation brings out the inherent wisdom in India’s approach towards nuclear weapons and the manner in which it pursues nuclear deterrence. India’s nuclear doctrine is premised on the understanding that such weapons have a limited utility to safeguard the nation against nuclear blackmail or coercion. Therefore, India subscribes to a strategy of nuclear retaliation only, rather than believing in the first use of nuclear weapons. This allows India to stay with the idea of credible minimum deterrence and away from overinvesting in capabilities that may be needed for nuclear war-fighting such as weapons for battlefield use, delivery systems for counter-force targeting, or active defences for damage limitation.

The novel coronavirus that rages across the globe has shown up the limitations of isolationist and hyper-nationalist strategies in pursuit of a chimera of security. As political leaders experience a sense of vulnerability from a shared risk, this appears to be a good time to draw their attention to the folly of racing to build large nuclear arsenals and war-fighting capabilities to conduct so-called limited nuclear wars. Any crisis involving nuclear weapons would be a humanitarian disaster beyond imagination. The raging pandemic has provided us with some sense of what such disasters entail in terms of lives lost, economies wrecked, livelihoods destroyed and societies devastated. A nuclear disaster would additionally involve property losses in blasts and fires, related ecological consequences, and long-lasting radioactivity effects.

Till such time as nations are ready to universally eliminate these weapons, nations would do well to remember that nuclear weapons have a limited deterrent role and small arsenals can perform the task of deterrence effectively. India’s nuclear strategy anchored in minimalism and no first use holds useful lessons for all. National resources, of India and others, would be better spent on human security and building habits of cooperation.

Manpreet Sethi is Distinguished Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

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Editors' Pick|211,577 views|Apr 15, 2020,07:50am EDT
Mystery Submarine In Service With Pakistan’s Navy SEALs
H I Sutton
H I Sutton
Contributor

Aerospace & Defense
I cover the changing world of underwater warfare.
Some of the best-kept secrets are hidden in plain sight. Sitting on the quayside at PNS Iqbal, a special naval base in Karachi, Pakistan, is a submarine that you won’t find in any reference books, including my own World Submarines Covert Shores Recognition Guide. To my knowledge this will be the first article detailing this submarine, which appears to be in service with Pakistani Navy SEALs.


New Pakistan Navy Midget Submarine


Artist's impression of the new Pakistan Navy submarine. The image is based on analysis of satellite ... [+]

H I Sutton
The submarine is a small special forces type, measuring around 55 feet long by 7 to 8 feet across. That is a fraction of the size of a regular submarine. Its location and size both point to use by the Pakistani Navy's Special Service Group, known as SSG (N). They are equivalent to the U.S. Navy SEALs and use the 'SEAL' terminology. They have a long tradition of training with the American unit.


This category of submarine is called an X-Craft in Pakistani Navy parlance. The term was inherited from the Italian manufacturer Cos.Mo.S (commonly written Cosmos) who sold Pakistan two sets of midget submarines in the past. The Italian firm itself borrowed the term from the Royal Navy midget submarines of World War II. The American equivalent to the X-Craft is the Dry Combat Submersible (DCS) now entering service with the U.S. Navy SEALs.


It may be intended to replace the Pakistani Navy's existing X-Craft. Pakistan operates three MG-110 X-Craft which were built locally between 1993 and 1996. They are getting long in the tooth and are due for replacement. But the Italian firm which designed them, Cos.Mo.S was closed down twenty years ago. Today its designs are continued by respected Italian manufacturer Drass. They offer a series of modern X-Craft that may be ideal for Pakistan.

Today In: Aerospace & Defense

But this mystery submarine does not appear to be a Drass design. The smallest publicly revealed Drass design is the DG-85, which is slightly larger than the boat seen in Pakistan.

One clue is that the boat first appeared in 2016. This may tie to a statement in the Pakistani Defence Production Division (MoDP) 2015-16 yearbook. It listed the "Indigenous design and construction of 01 Midget Submarine" as a target for 2016-2017.

Since then there have been reports that Turkish firm STM (Savunma Teknolojileri Mühendislik ve Ticaret A.Ş.) was jointly developing a mini-submarine with Pakistan. This could indicate that the mystery craft was not successful and so a new design is being developed. Another possibility is that the Turkish partnership will focus on smaller 'chariots.' These are similar to the U.S. Navy's SDVs (SEAL delivery vehicles). In the Pakistani Navy the Chariots can be carried by the larger X-Craft.

Analysis of commercial satellite imagery shows that the boat rarely (if ever) goes in the water. The only clear image showing it in the water is from 2016. The operational status is therefore unclear. The tent that covers it is often moved, however, suggesting ongoing maintenance. So the sub cannot be written off, but what it's called and what exactly it does remains a mystery.



H I Sutton
H I Sutton
 

TammyinWI

Talk is cheap
Terror Groups See Global Chaos from Virus as Opportunity

alshabab_fighters_2011-apha-200403.jpg
AP/Farah Abdi Warsameh
Hundreds of newly trained al-Shabab fighters perform military exercises in Somalia (Feb. 17, 2011)

JOHANNESBURG (AP) – Both the Islamic State group and al-Qaida see the coronavirus as a threat, but some of their fighters also see the upheaval from the pandemic as an opportunity to win over more supporters and strike harder than before.

Messages from the Islamic extremist groups show concern about the virus mixed with bravado, asserting that it is punishment for non-Muslims while also urging followers to repent and take care of themselves.

Al-Qaida suggested in a statement Tuesday that non-Muslims use their time in quarantine to learn about Islam. But in a sharp commentary in its al-Naba newsletter in mid-March, ISIS urged followers to show no mercy and launch attacks in this time of crisis.

In a commentary Tuesday, the International Crisis Group warned that the pandemic threatens the global solidarity that is key to fighting extremists, “allowing the jihadists to better prepare spectacular terror attacks.”

Though analysts said it was too soon to say which attacks can be blamed on militants exploiting the coronavirus, Islamic extremists in late March carried out their deadliest assault yet against the military of Chad, a significant contributor to Africa’s growing counterterrorism efforts, killing at least 92 soldiers near the border with Nigeria and Niger.

In Egypt, two military officials reported a spike in ISIS attacks in March in the restive northern part of the Sinai Peninsula. They spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to brief the media.

While Syria and Iraq have seen no uptick in attacks by ISIS since the virus spread there, the pandemic has prompted the U.S.-led coalition to halt training activities in Iraq amid a planned pullout from several bases.

There are signs elsewhere that the U.S., British and other militaries are pulling back because of the virus, leaving a possible opening for the extremists.

That is a danger in Africa’s hot spots of the Sahel, the Lake Chad region and Somalia, where the U.S. military already worried allies in recent months by contemplating cuts to focus on threats from China and Russia.

“Any state that was interested in pulling back in Africa will take the opportunity to do so,” said Clionadh Raleigh, executive director of the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, which tracks extremists’ activities worldwide. “That will be unbelievably bad.”

A U.S. Africa Command spokeswoman, Lt. Christina Gibson, told The Associated Press that “while the size and scope of some AFRICOM activities have been adjusted to ensure the safety and protection of forces—both U.S. and partner nation—our commitment to Africa endures.” She did not give details but said about 5,200 forces are on the continent.

The British army mission in Kenya, which provides counterterrorism training and other skills, this week announced that all army families are returning to the UK because of the virus.

African military units, already stretched thin and under attack, are likely to take protective measures as the virus threatens their ranks.

In Nigeria, which has struggled against the Boko Haram extremist group and an assertive ISIS-linked offshoot, the military has called for suspending much of its activities including large gatherings and training.

A leaked memo signed by Nigerian army’s policy chief says its vehicles might have to be used for mass burials or transferring the sick to hospitals.

While security forces are targets, under-guarded prisons could be too, said Laith Alkhouri, a counterterrorism adviser who researches extremists in West Africa. Both ISIS and al-Qaida-linked fighters have turned the Sahel into Africa’s most urgent extremism crisis, and even have engaged in some unprecedented cooperation.

Their fighters are likely to exploit the pandemic by accusing governments of mismanaging the crisis to try to win popular support, he said.

 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Terror Groups See Global Chaos from Virus as Opportunity

alshabab_fighters_2011-apha-200403.jpg
AP/Farah Abdi Warsameh
Hundreds of newly trained al-Shabab fighters perform military exercises in Somalia (Feb. 17, 2011)

JOHANNESBURG (AP) – Both the Islamic State group and al-Qaida see the coronavirus as a threat, but some of their fighters also see the upheaval from the pandemic as an opportunity to win over more supporters and strike harder than before.

Messages from the Islamic extremist groups show concern about the virus mixed with bravado, asserting that it is punishment for non-Muslims while also urging followers to repent and take care of themselves.

Al-Qaida suggested in a statement Tuesday that non-Muslims use their time in quarantine to learn about Islam. But in a sharp commentary in its al-Naba newsletter in mid-March, ISIS urged followers to show no mercy and launch attacks in this time of crisis.

In a commentary Tuesday, the International Crisis Group warned that the pandemic threatens the global solidarity that is key to fighting extremists, “allowing the jihadists to better prepare spectacular terror attacks.”

Though analysts said it was too soon to say which attacks can be blamed on militants exploiting the coronavirus, Islamic extremists in late March carried out their deadliest assault yet against the military of Chad, a significant contributor to Africa’s growing counterterrorism efforts, killing at least 92 soldiers near the border with Nigeria and Niger.

In Egypt, two military officials reported a spike in ISIS attacks in March in the restive northern part of the Sinai Peninsula. They spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to brief the media.

While Syria and Iraq have seen no uptick in attacks by ISIS since the virus spread there, the pandemic has prompted the U.S.-led coalition to halt training activities in Iraq amid a planned pullout from several bases.

There are signs elsewhere that the U.S., British and other militaries are pulling back because of the virus, leaving a possible opening for the extremists.

That is a danger in Africa’s hot spots of the Sahel, the Lake Chad region and Somalia, where the U.S. military already worried allies in recent months by contemplating cuts to focus on threats from China and Russia.

“Any state that was interested in pulling back in Africa will take the opportunity to do so,” said Clionadh Raleigh, executive director of the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, which tracks extremists’ activities worldwide. “That will be unbelievably bad.”

A U.S. Africa Command spokeswoman, Lt. Christina Gibson, told The Associated Press that “while the size and scope of some AFRICOM activities have been adjusted to ensure the safety and protection of forces—both U.S. and partner nation—our commitment to Africa endures.” She did not give details but said about 5,200 forces are on the continent.

The British army mission in Kenya, which provides counterterrorism training and other skills, this week announced that all army families are returning to the UK because of the virus.

African military units, already stretched thin and under attack, are likely to take protective measures as the virus threatens their ranks.

In Nigeria, which has struggled against the Boko Haram extremist group and an assertive ISIS-linked offshoot, the military has called for suspending much of its activities including large gatherings and training.

A leaked memo signed by Nigerian army’s policy chief says its vehicles might have to be used for mass burials or transferring the sick to hospitals.

While security forces are targets, under-guarded prisons could be too, said Laith Alkhouri, a counterterrorism adviser who researches extremists in West Africa. Both ISIS and al-Qaida-linked fighters have turned the Sahel into Africa’s most urgent extremism crisis, and even have engaged in some unprecedented cooperation.

Their fighters are likely to exploit the pandemic by accusing governments of mismanaging the crisis to try to win popular support, he said.


This does pose a dilemma. The established regimes and nation-states of the continent are artificial constructs left over from the Colonial and Cold War eras and as such won't want to raise the forces needed to truly fight this threat, both in terms of cost and the threat they represent to themselves if domestically raised. Alternatives to that get stickier and uglier depending upon the sensibilities of the reader.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

US: Naval Buildup in Caribbean Not Aimed at Ousting Maduro

18 Apr 2020

The Associated Press | By Joshua Goodman

MIAMI (AP) — The top U.S. military commander for Latin America said Friday that the Trump administration isn’t looking to use military force to remove Nicolas Maduro even as it expands counternarcotics operations in the Caribbean.

Adm. Craig Faller, head of U.S. Southern Command, said in an interview that the recent decision to double anti-narcotics assets in Latin America was months in the making and not directly tied to Maduro’s indictment in New York on charges of leading a narcoterrorist conspiracy that sent 250 metric tons of cocaine a year to the U.S.

Faller said economic and diplomatic pressure — not the use of military force — remain the U.S.’ preferred tools for removing Maduro from power.

“This is not a shift in U.S. government policy,” said Faller, who nonetheless celebrated that enhanced interdiction efforts would hurt Maduro's finances and staying power. “It's not an indication of some sort of new militarization in the Caribbean.”

The deployment announced this month is one of the largest U.S. military operations in the region since the 1989 invasion of Panama to remove Gen. Manuel Noriega from power and bring him to the U.S. to face drug charges. It involves assets like Navy warships, AWACS surveillance aircraft and on-ground special forces seldom seen before in the region.

Faller said the coronavirus did force some in the Pentagon to rethink the timing of the deployment out of concern for the safety of service members. While controls to protect the workforce have been enhanced, it was determined that over the long term, the U.S. is positioned to take advantage of the disruption in narcotics supply chains caused by the virus as drug cartels scramble to source precursor chemical and other inputs.

“We thrive in uncertainty and are going to try and capitalize on that," said Faller.

He cited two “quick wins” since the start of the deployment — a 1.7 metric ton seizure in the Pacific Ocean near Costa Rica last week and another 2.1 ton interdiction a few days ago.

He said growing instability in Venezuela is leading to an “uptick” in piracy in the Caribbean, although he didn't cite any statistics or evidence to back the assertion. He said the recent sinking of a Venezuelan naval ship after it allegedly rammed an Antarctic-hardened cruise ship without passengers near Curacao was indicative of the readiness of Maduro's armed forces.

“It was a bad day for them,” he said. “Their lack of seamanship and lack of integrity is indicative of how it all played out.”

This article was written by JOSHUA GOODMAN from The Associated Press and was legally licensed through the NewsCred publisher network. Please direct all licensing questions to legal@newscred.com.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

France Finds More Than 1,000 Virus Cases on Aircraft Carrier

18 Apr 2020

The Associated Press | By JEFFREY SCHAEFFER and ELAINE GANLEY

PARIS (AP) — The French navy is investigating how the coronavirus infected more than 1,000 sailors aboard the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, amid growing pressure on government leaders to explain how it could have happened.

The ship, France's biggest carrier and the flagship of its navy, is undergoing a lengthy disinfection process since returning to its home base in Toulon five days ago.

One person remains in intensive care and some 20 others hospitalized, navy spokesman Cmdr. Eric Lavault told The Associated Press.

Two of four U.S. sailors serving aboard the Charles de Gaulle as part of an exchange program also tested positive, according to a U.S. Navy statement. A British sailor was aboard another vessel, Lavault said, refusing to reveal the sailor’s health status.

Lavault insisted that the aircraft carrier's commander sought to increase the physical distance among the crew on the vessel, where there was no testing equipment and for most of its three months on operations, no masks.

It is “very difficult to apply social distancing measures … on a combat vessel,” Lavault said. But “security of the crew is the first concern. A combat ship, especially an aircraft carrier, is nothing without its crew.”

A similar outbreak on the USS Theodore Roosevelt and a dispute about how the at-sea health crisis was handled led to the firing of its captain and the resignation this month of the acting U.S. Navy secretary.

The French navy has been spared major controversy so far, but the defense minister and the head of the French military's health service arm were questioned Friday about the infections at parliamentary hearings.

Defense Minister Florence Parly told lawmakers that 1,081 of the 2,300 people aboard the Charles de Gaulle and its escort vessels have tested positive so far — nearly half the overall personnel.

While the virus has immobilized the immense and important ship, Parly insisted that otherwise “our forces continue to assure the defense of our country at sea, under the sea, on land and in the air.”

An investigation to retrace the paths of the personnel is in progress. Lavault noted that the aircraft carrier made a call in the French port of Brest, on the Atlantic Ocean, had been in the North Sea as part of a “naval diplomacy” mission with NATO partners, and had stopped in Cyprus during an operation in the eastern Mediterranean Sea to join in the fight against the Islamic State group.

Journalists had boarded the vessel at one point.

“All hypotheses are on the table,” Lavault said.

So far, 350 crew members have been grilled about their movements on and off the vessel, according to Lavault.

The defense minister defended the decision to allow the ship to stop in Brest in mid-March, even though France had already ordered all schools closed to fight the virus and the government was preparing confinement measures. Hours after the ship left, President Emmanuel Macron announced a nationwide lockdown, among the strictest in Europe.

With nearly 2,000 sailors on the aircraft carrier alone, there is a constant flow of people frequenting the infirmary. In the North Sea, temperatures sometimes dropped to -5 degrees Celsius (23 F), he said.

The number of infections “rose exponentially” from about April 4-5, and lung scans were taken on suspected cases, Lavault said.

“It’s from this date that the commander decided to alert Navy headquarters to propose ending the operation, a decision taken immediately by the (defense) minister,” he said.

The aircraft carrier was back in its home base at the Mediterranean port of Toulon on April 12.

“We are and will be transparent” about the health situation, the health director Maryline Gygax Genero told the parliamentary commission.

Lavault said the carrier was being cleaned top to bottom, first with high-pressure water at 60 C (140 F), then with an anti-viral product, a process that could take weeks. He said the goal is to get the carrier back to sea sometime in May.

France has been among the countries hardest hit by the virus, with more than 18,000 deaths confirmed as of Friday and more than 100,000 reported cases. As France heads into a second month of confinement, the head of the national health agency said Friday that the country is seeing "a slow but regular decline" in the virus, with the number of hospitalizations and people in intensive care continuing to drop.

This article was written by JEFFREY SCHAEFFER and ELAINE GANLEY from The Associated Press and was legally licensed through the NewsCred publisher network. Please direct all licensing questions to legal@newscred.com.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

Dozens of New Air Force Academy Graduates Are Heading Straight to Space Force



17 Apr 2020

Military.com | By Richard Sisk

For the first time, the graduating class of the Air Force Academy will have a contingent of cadets who have committed to serve in the newest branch of the military -- U.S. Space Force.

"We're going to commission [88] Air Force Academy cadets directly into the Space Force" from the graduating class of about 1,000, Gen. Jay Raymond, who serves as the first chief of space operations, said Thursday.

"They will take the oath of office and they will be commissioned into the Space Force, so we are really excited to get those cadets onto the team," Raymond said.

Saturday’s graduation ceremony has been drastically scaled back because of the novel coronavirus pandemic.

Related: These 23 Air Force Missions Are Transferring to the Space Force

Vice President Mike Pence is set to address the graduating class in person at the academy's Falcon Stadium in Colorado Springs, Colorado, but no family members, spectators or visitors will be allowed to attend. The ceremony has been shortened to 30 minutes, according to academy officials.

To comply with the official guidelines on social distancing, the cadets will march into the stadium eight feet apart and sit six feet apart, but the ceremony will end with a traditional flyover by the Air Force Thunderbirds.

Space Force, which was formally created only four months ago, is facing enormous personnel challenges ahead with decisions to be made during the pandemic.

However, "this is a historic opportunity" and "we get to start from scratch," Raymond said Thursday in a Facebook town hall with Chief Master Sgt. Roger Towberman, his senior enlisted adviser.

"There is no checklist on how to set up an independent service," Raymond said, adding he wants to make sure "we don't have a huge bureaucracy" that would stifle innovation.

Raymond and Towberman said they are sticking with the timetable of a 30-day window, to start May 1, for current Air Force personnel to decide whether they want to switch to Space Force.

"I understand it's a life-changing decision" and some may need more time, Towberman said. "If you just aren't sure, I want you to understand we've got a service we've got to plan for."

Those from other services can also apply to join the Space Force.

"If you're interested, we'd love to have you," Raymond said.

But Towberman cautioned that service members from other branches should check first with their leadership before volunteering.

In the rush to set up the new force, Raymond and Towberman said some of the fundamentals expected by the traditions of service and the culture of the U.S. military have yet to be decided for the Space Force.

Raymond said it's yet to be decided what a Space Force honor guard would look like, and Towberman said no decisions have been made on what the rank insignia will look like for enlisted personnel, or even what the ranks will be called.

-- Richard Sisk can be reached at Richard.Sisk@Military.com.
 

jward

passin' thru
44 Jihadists Found Dead in Chad Prison: Prosecutor




Hunters gather to prepare an offensive against the Boko Haram extremists.

FILE -- In this Nov. 25, 2014 file photo, hunters gather during a meeting in Yolo, Nigeria. Thousands of Nigerian hunters, armed with charmed amulets and intimate knowledge of harsh terrain, are preparing an offensive against the Boko Haram extremists who have ravaged the northeast for a decade, calling it "high time" they help soldiers end the deadly insurgency. (AP Photo/Sunday Alamba)

19 Apr 2020
Agence France Presse

A group of 44 suspected members of Boko Haram, arrested during a recent operation against the jihadist group, have been found dead in their prison cell, apparently poisoned, Chad's chief prosecutor announced Saturday.
Speaking on national television, Youssouf Tom said the 44 prisoners had been found dead in their cell on Thursday.

An autopsy carried out on four of the dead prisoners revealed traces of a lethal substance that had caused heart attacks in some of the victims and severe asphyxiation in the others, he said.
The dead men were among a group of 58 suspects captured during a major army operation around Lake Chad launched by President Idriss Deby Itno at the end of March.
"Following the fighting around Lake Chad, 58 members of Boko Haram had been taken prisoner and sent to Ndjamena for the purposes of the investigation," said Tom.

"On Thursday morning, their jailers told us that 44 prisoners had been found dead in their cell," Tom said, adding that he had attended the scene.
"We have buried 40 bodies and sent four bodies to the medical examiner for autopsy." An investigation was ongoing to determine exactly how the prisoners had died, he said.

"It's Horrible"
A security source, speaking on condition of anonymity told AFP that "the 58 prisoners were placed in a single cell and were given nothing to eat or drink for two days".
Mahamat Nour Ahmed Ibedou, secretary general of the Chadian Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (CTDDH), made similar accusations.
Prison officials had "locked the prisoners in a small cell and refusing them food and water for three days because they were accused of belonging to Boko Haram", Ibedou told AFP. "It's horrible what has happened."
The government denied the allegations.
"There was no ill-treatment," Chad Justice Minister, Djimet Arabi, told AFP by telephone.
"Toxic substances were found in their stomachs. Was it collective suicide or something else? We're still looking for answers," he said, adding that the investigation was still ongoing.
One of the prisoners was transferred to hospital on Thursday, but he was "faring much better" and had rejoined "the other 13 prisoners still alive and who are doing very well," the minister said.

Major Operation Against Boko Haram
Earlier this week, the minister told AFP the captured men had been transferred to Ndjamena on Tuesday evening and handed over to the court system for trial.
The military operation against Boko Haram killed more than a thousand of the group's militants and cost the lives of 52 soldiers, a Chadian army spokesman said. The operation ran from March 31 to April 8.
It was launched in response to a devastating attack on Chadian troops on March 23 on a base at Bohoma, in the Lake Chad marshlands, that killed 98 soldiers. It was the largest one-day loss the army has ever suffered.
Since then, Idriss has warned his allies in the region that Chad's army will no longer take part in operations outside the country.
The force, considered one of the best in the region, has fought Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region as part of the Joint Multinational Force with Nigeria, Cameroon and Niger.
But on Friday, French Defence Minister Florence Parly said Chad remained committed to the G5 Sahel anti-jihadist force operating in the region.
This article was from Agence France Presse and was legally licensed through the NewsCred publisher network. Please direct all licensing questions to legal@newscred.com.

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jward

passin' thru
Iran warns US Navy over Gulf incident

  • 19 April 2020

1587366675037.png
Navy said the Iranian vessels approached at "extremely close range and high speeds"
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has accused the US of giving a "Hollywood version of events" over an incident in the Gulf this week.



Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has accused the US of giving a "Hollywood version of events" over an incident in the Gulf this week.

The US said Iranian vessels had conducted "harassing" approaches of six of its ships on Wednesday.

But the IRGC said it had increased patrols in the Gulf after the US Navy blocked the path of an Iranian ship earlier this month.

Tensions rose after the US killed an Iranian general in Iraq in January.

The IRGC's statement said that US forces had blocked one of its ships in two separate incidents in early April, using "dangerous behaviour while ignoring warnings".

It added that Iran would respond "decisively" to any miscalculation.

The incident on Wednesday came a day after armed men - believed to have been IRGC personnel - seized a Hong Kong-flagged tanker in the Gulf of Oman and redirected it into Iranian waters before releasing it.

What did the US say happened?
The US Navy accused Iran's Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) of "dangerous and provocative actions" against its vessels, which were involved in a military exercise with US Army Apache attack helicopters in international waters.

Eleven IRGC Navy vessels repeatedly approached of six US Navy and Coast Guard ships at "extremely close range and high speeds on Wednesday", the US Navy said. One passed within 10 yards (9m) of a Coast Guard cutter.

"The US crews issued multiple warnings via bridge-to-bridge radio, five short blasts from the ships' horns and long-range acoustic noise maker devices, but received no response from the IRGCN."

"After approximately one hour, the IRGCN vessels responded to the bridge-to-bridge radio queries, then manoeuvred away from the US ships and opened distance between them," it added.

Skip Twitter post by @USNavy
BREAKING: 11 Iranian #IRGCN vessels repeatedly conducted dangerous & harassing approaches against U.S. naval ships operating in international waters of North Arabian Gulf. U.S. crews took actions deemed appropriate to avoid collision.

Details: Iranian Vessels Conduct Unsafe Interaction with U.S. Naval Forces in Arabian Gulf pic.twitter.com/lKJgDz0l2N
— U.S. Navy (@USNavy) April 15, 2020

Report

End of Twitter post by @USNavy

The US Navy said such "dangerous and provocative actions increased the risk of miscalculation and collision", and were not in accordance with international maritime conventions or customs.

What's happened in the Gulf?
The relationship between the two countries has been fraught for decades. But tensions increased after the US withdrew from a nuclear deal and reimposed sanctions on Tehran.

Last year, Iranian forces seized a British-flagged tanker in retaliation for the seizure of an Iranian tanker by the British territory of Gibraltar. Both vessels were eventually released.

The US also accused Iran of carrying out attacks on six tankers in the Gulf of Oman and launching missiles and drones at two oil facilities in Saudi Arabia. Iran denied any involvement.

Animosity between the two countries rose further in January, when the US killed a top IRGC general in a drone strike in Iraq. Iran responded by launching missiles at Iraqi military bases hosting US forces.

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Housecarl

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World News
April 19, 2020 / 4:49 AM / a day ago
Iran's Revolutionary Guards say have increased Gulf patrols

3 Min Read

(Reuters) - Iran’s Revolutionary Guards warned the United States about its military activities in the Gulf on Sunday, adding that their navy had as a result increased patrols, which would also secure the passage of Iranian ships and combat fuel smuggling.

The U.S. military said on Wednesday that 11 Revolutionary Guards naval vessels had come close to its navy and Coast Guard ships, describing the moves “dangerous and provocative”.

The Guards’ statement on Sunday, which said Iran will give a decisive response to any mistake by the United States in the Gulf, provided the first confirmation of the incident.
“We advise the Americans to follow international regulations and maritime protocols in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman and to refrain from any adventurism and false and fake stories,” the statement said.

“They should be assured that the Revolutionary Guards navy and the powerful armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran sees the dangerous actions of foreigners in the region as a threat to national security and its red line and any error in calculation on their part will receive a decisive response.”

The U.S. military statement said the Iranian vessels approached six U.S. military ships conducting integration operations with Army helicopters in international waters.
At one point, the Iranian vessels came within 10 yards of the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Maui, the U.S. military said.

In its statement the Guards navy denied the U.S. military’s account of the incident and said the U.S. had acted unprofessionally.

While such incidents occurred occasionally a few years ago, they had stopped. But tensions between the two states spiked this year after the United States killed Qassem Soleimani, the head of Iran’s elite Quds Force, in a drone strike in Iraq.

Iran retaliated on Jan. 8 with a rocket attack on Iraq’s Ain al-Asad base, where U.S. forces were stationed. No U.S. troops were killed or faced immediate bodily injury, but more than 100 were later diagnosed with traumatic brain injury.

Reporting by Babak Dehghanpisheh; Editing by Alexander Smith
 

Housecarl

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World News
April 20, 2020 / 1:38 PM / Updated an hour ago
Syrian air defences intercept Israeli aerial strikes on Palmyra: state media
1 Min Read

AMMAN (Reuters) - Syrian air defences responded to an Israeli aerial attack on the city of Palmyra in eastern Homs province in central Syria and downed several “hostile targets”, state media said on Monday.

A news flash on state media did not give any details of the aerial attack on the ancient city in eastern Homs where Iranian backed-militias are dug in on its outskirts according to Western intelligence sources.

The attack is the second in less than a month by Israel which has launched in recent years hundreds of attacks on Iranian-backed militias and their bases in Syria, where they have a large presence across the country.

Reporting by Suleiman Al-Khalidi; Editing by Chris Reese
 

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World News
April 20, 2020 / 12:44 PM / Updated 2 hours ago
Nicaraguan protesters capture policeman, demand release of jailed activists
Ismael Lopez
2 Min Read

MANAGUA (Reuters) - Anti-government protesters in southern Nicaragua held a police officer captive for seven hours before he was set free on Monday, as they demanded the release of several youths they claimed had been arrested for opposing President Daniel Ortega.

The protests in the town of Esquipulas on Ometepe island were among many small demonstrations and social media campaigns across Nicaragua over the weekend marking the two-year anniversary of the start of rallies against Ortega’s government.

The clashes between pro-government forces and protesters left more than 300 people dead and prompted thousands to go into exile.

Henry Ruiz, the leader of an Ortega opposition movement in Ometepe who lives in Esquipulas, said several young people who took part in peaceful protests were arrested after waving flags in Nicaragua’s traditional colors that symbolize opposition to Ortega.

“The youths raised blue and white flags and the police came firing to stop them. They injured two and took five to jail,” Ruiz said in an interview. “The people are furious.”

Videos on social media on Sunday night showed a group of people with machetes and sticks, including women and young people, standing in a circle around a bloodied police officer sitting against stone wall, and calling for the release of the activist group.

Early on Monday, Nicaraguan authorities sent special troops to surround the community and freed the police officer.

Nicaragua’s police said in a statement that the officer had been beaten and taken to a residential home on Sunday after police apprehended a group of locals in what it called a “state of drunkenness.”

The U.S. government in March imposed sanctions on Nicaragua’s police over accusations of human rights abuses, including shooting at peaceful protesters and carrying out extrajudicial killings, disappearances and kidnappings.

Reporting by Ismael Lopez, Writing by Daina Beth Solomon; Editing by Richard Chang
 

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Report says Burkina Faso forces killed 31 unarmed men

By SAM MEDNICK
today

The killings occurred on April 9, hours after the men were detained during a government counterterrorism operation in the town of Djibo in the Sahel region, the report said.

The West African nation continues to be wracked by violence linked to Islamic extremists and local defense militias, which has displaced nearly 840,000 people within Burkina Faso.

The country’s ill-equipped military has been previously accused by rights groups of committing human rights atrocities in an attempt to combat the violence. Since 2017, Human Rights Watch has documented the killing of several hundred men by government security forces for their alleged support of extremist groups.

“This is hardly an isolated incident. The Burkinabe security forces face a real and serious threat as armed Islamists murder civilians and terrorize the population,” Corinne Dufka, West Africa director for Human Rights Watch told the AP.

“But committing atrocities in the name of security is both unlawful and deeply counterproductive, for it only pushes more and more people seeking revenge into the ranks of the armed Islamists.”

The report’s writers interviewed 17 people with knowledge of the killings and found that all of the victims were ethnic Fulani. The Fulani have been increasingly targeted by the military and local defense militias for their alleged affiliation with Islamist groups.

Daouda Diallo, head of a Fulani rights group in Burkina Faso, said that attacks have increased significantly, from 20 per month last year to 20 per week this year. In March, armed men murdered at least 43 people in two villages in Yatenga province known to be largely populated by Fulani.

In a statement on Monday, the Ministry of Defense said that it doesn’t target its own people and that now more than ever success in ending the crisis depends on “the confidence and collaboration of local populations.”

The ministry said that if these allegations are true it will take action and noted that on April 10 it already requested that the director of military justice open an investigation into similar accusations against the army.

At a makeshift displacement site outside of Ouahigouya town just after the attacks in March, civilians told the AP that the attacks were carried out by the Koglweogo, a local defense group that has also been accused of ethnic targeting.

“In my 54 years I’ve never seen anything like it. I saw dead people, some who tried to prop themselves up against the wall and died,” said Boureima Tall, who survived the attack.

The father of five lost his nephew and had to rescue his 18-year-old son after he was shot in the leg by gunmen, he said. While he couldn’t confirm the attackers’ motive, he said none of the surrounding houses occupied by the Mossi ethnic group was hit.

Many Fulani are concerned that the government’s attempts to stem the violence will only make things worse.

In January, the parliament approved legislation to arm civilian volunteers in the fight against extremism. Now people are worried that more guns in people’s hands will mean more targeted attacks. Some Fulani have considered joining the volunteers, not to fight extremists but to protect themselves from other civilians.

“I’ll join because I’m afraid of what will come. Maybe those communities will turn on us,” said Amadi Ba, a resident of Hogore, a majority Fulani village.

Koglweogo spokesman, Samir Abdoul Karim Ouedraogo denied that any ethnic killing was taking place.

“Only terrorists are targeted,” he said.

As well as the escalating attacks, Burkina Faso is dealing with the rapid spread of the new coronavirus. The country is one of the hardest hit on the continent with 581 cases and 38 deaths as of Sunday. International observers are urging the government to hold people accountable and do more to get the country on track.

“If no action is taken, mistrust and resentment towards authorities will increase, furthering ethnic divisions, fueling communal violence and worsening the country’s already dire crisis,” said Flore Berger, a Sahel research analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
 

Housecarl

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Raytheon Wins Long-Range Standoff Nuke Program
Raytheon has won the LRSO design competition, but it remains uncertain whether it will nab the prime contract to actually build the next-generation cruise missile or be forced to share that with Lockheed Martin.

By Theresa Hitchens on April 20, 2020 at 4:45 PM

WASHINGTON: The Air Force, quietly and somewhat coyly, has chosen Raytheon as the sole-source contractor for development of the Long-Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO) — while at the same time maintaining a relationship with competitor Lockheed Martin to focus on specific “technology maturation” for the program.

The announcement made late Friday by the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center at Kirtland AFB, took pains to explain that while the decision effectively ends the competition for LRSO design, it does not represent a “down-select per se.”

Instead, it elaborates: “The Air Force previously awarded two contracts for the LRSO Technology Maturation and Risk (TMRR) phase, one to Raytheon and one to Lockheed Martin, in August 2017. After an extensive evaluation of contractor programmatic and technical approach during the TMRR’s preliminary design reviews, the Air Force decided to focus on Raytheon’s design.”


“We are reframing our relationship with Lockheed Martin to focus on specific technology maturation we believe either has future applicability for the final LRSO design or will reduce overall program risk,” added Elizabeth Thorn, AFNWC’s LRSO system program manager.

“The LRSO program office is now developing plans to pivot to a sole-source environment,” the Air Force release continued. “It is also exploring opportunities to redirect funding to critical areas and potentially move some activities into the TMRR phase currently scheduled for the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase, including flight tests.”

Raytheon offered this in a press release today: “Contract negotiations for the engineering and manufacturing development phase, with a strong focus on schedule realism, affordability, and cost capability trades, will start in fiscal year 2021. The contract award is anticipated in fiscal year 2022.”

So, in other words, Raytheon won the design competition, but it remains slightly uncertain whether it will eventually nab the prime contract to actually build the next-generation cruise missile or be forced to share that with Lockheed Martin (or, who knows, maybe another contractor).


The controversial LRSO is being developed to replace the Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), carried by B-52 bombers. It is a key part of the Air Force’s high-priority nuclear weapon recapitalization effort. The LRSO has been criticized by key Democratic lawmakers, including House Armed Services Committee Chair Adam Smith, as unnecessary and destabilizing to the US-Russia nuclear relationship.

The Air Force has asked for $474 million for LRSO development in 2021, down from $713 million in 2020.

According to Roman Schweizer, of Cowen Washington Research Group, the service is expected to buy around 1,000 missiles at a cost of about $10 billion. It plans to spend about $2 billion between fiscal 2021 and 2024, Schweizer said in a Cowen “Policy Note” today, “and total development cost is projected at $4.5B.”

Further, he noted that the Air Force and Congress have been discussing potential acquisition of conventionally-armed variants, which means the “market opportunity could be much larger.”

Recommended
DoD, Norway Partner On Ramjets For Navy Hypersonic Missiles
The partnership will “drive fielding of the critical technologies needed to ensure U.S. and Allied military superiority in hypersonic systems,” Mike Griffin says.
By Theresa Hitchens
 

Housecarl

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Posted for fair use.....

Deterrence, Norms, and the Uncomfortable Realities of a New Nuclear Age

Gerald C. Brown

April 20, 2020

Commentary

200204-F-MA978-9945


One of the most important events of the last century was one that never took place — that is, thermonuclear war. Following the U.S. nuclear strikes against Japan in 1945, further use of nuclear weapons seemed inevitable. The United States and the Soviet Union amassed arsenals of unprecedented power, and competed for nuclear superiority in a contest that seemed certain to end in all-out nuclear conflict. But instead, neither utilized their arsenals, competition drove the Soviet Union bankrupt, and the Soviet empire collapsed. The United States and its allies dominated global politics after the Cold War, and democracy spread further across the world than at any other time in history. The Cold War ended without the use of a single nuclear weapon.

However, the non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945 can be misunderstood, and the wrong lessons can be learned. It is sometimes assumed that the absence of nuclear war since World War II proves that nuclear weapons are not relevant for national security, will never be used in conflict, or that a taboo against nuclear weapons will deter their use in the future. This thinking is dangerous, and may bring about the very event it assumes can never occur.

Nuclear weapons were never used during the Cold War because national leaders, even in situations like the Cuban Missile Crisis, judged that there was never any clear advantage in launching a nuclear strike. The risks never outweighed the perceived benefits, as a nuclear attack would clearly lead to nuclear retaliation. Deterrence worked during the Cold War, but only because Washington and Moscow worked hard to convince the other that using nuclear weapons would never be worth it. With the possibility of a new Nuclear Posture Review in 2021, it is important that policymakers study what will drive countries to use, or not use, nuclear weapons in the future.

The Nuclear Taboo Exists, But it Can Be Broken
It is sometimes argued that a normative basis of restraint, a “nuclear taboo,” is responsible for the lack of inter-state nuclear conflict. While such a taboo almost certainly exists, it is unlikely to prevent states from using nuclear weapons on its own. The decision to use nuclear weapons, like the decision to engage in conflict in general, has had a lot less to do with morality and a lot more to do with assessments of the national interest and domestic political considerations.

The United States and the Soviet Union refrained from nuclear strikes during the Cuban Missile Crisis due to mutual vulnerabilities. The crisis only de-escalated when both sides gave each other strategic victories — the Soviets removed its nuclear missiles from Cuba, while the United States removed missiles from Turkey. U.S. government officials decided not to use nuclear weapons during the Vietnam War because the nature of the conflict made them impractical and not worth the cost. Military analysts calculated it would take around 3,000 nuclear weapons a year to accomplish their goals in Operation Rolling Thunder. Following the Korean War, policies were put in place to immediately respond with nuclear weapons if a return to hostilities occurred. Nuclear weapons were used in Japan in World War II because of this same calculus. The U.S. government calculated it could save 500,000 allied lives and massive amounts of time and money by using them.

This is not to say the nuclear taboo has no effect on policy. The fear of the moral, reputational, and political costs associated with using nuclear weapons — specifically, using nuclear weapons first in a crisis — has certainly acted as a deterrent. The taboo, combined with the mindset that the weapons would not be necessary for victory, contributed to President Harry Truman’s decision to not use nuclear weapons in the early days of the Korean War, and prevented Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s original war plans — which included the use of up to fifty nuclear weapons and a belt of radioactive cobalt to prevent reinforcements — from being implemented. Even Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara is reported to have privately advised against waging nuclear war under any circumstances.

Arms control agreements, for their part, have reinforced the nuclear taboo by seeking to control potential escalation, provide transparency, and minimize the situations where it would be advantageous to use nuclear weapons. However, arms control agreements are not signed primarily for normative reasons. Countries — specifically Russia and the United States — have pursued arms control agreements as a means of furthering competition and offsetting an adversary’s advantages in specific sectors.

These agreements were pursued when there was a disparity in capabilities to curb competition and abandoned when the strategic conditions for the agreements were no longer favorable. For example, the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty limited both the Soviet Union and the United States to maintain comparable capabilities and avoid a costly arms race. But Washington withdrew from the treaty in 2001 when it had a clear advantage in developing missile defense technology. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, signed in 1987, allowed both sides to reduce tensions in the European theater, while strategically allowing continued competition in the realm of air and sea-launched missiles where the United States had a clear advantage. Russia began violating the treaty decades later when the strategic calculus changed, in the face of a proliferating Chinese intermediate-range missile force.

Thinking Through Deterrence
Nuclear deterrence is often assumed to work automatically, but in practice, nuclear states are inherently difficult to deter. Deterrence is not a condition achieved from simply possessing nuclear weapons; it is based on the perception of military power in general. Nuclear weapons drastically enhance a state’s strength by creating the capacity to cause catastrophic amounts of damage in a very short period of time, with strikes that are largely indefensible. Due to the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, nuclear states become less likely to engage in conflict with each other. However, this makes it even harder to deter a nuclear state from campaigns against non-nuclear states.

Continued.....
 

Housecarl

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Continued.....

The United States has extended its deterrence commitments to its allies in Asia and Europe. Unfortunately, this may be an empty promise. In the case of a crisis with a nuclear state like Russia or China, the potential for escalation to the nuclear level always exists. This begs the question: How far is Washington really willing to go to defend an ally, and how would the American people respond to risking nuclear war to defend an ally when there is no threat to the U.S. homeland?

If a nuclear power decided to use nuclear weapons against a state within the American nuclear umbrella (e.g., Australia, Japan, South Korea, and NATO allies, among others), the United States might refrain from responding with nuclear weapons, since doing so would risk its own survival. This dynamic is one of the reasons that the United States maintains a strong military presence and forward-deployed nuclear weapons in the territory of its European allies: The United States is far more likely to respond to aggression if American citizens are killed. This vulnerability allows states to build “theories of victory” that involve the use of nuclear weapons at the tactical level to offset conventional inferiority and deter foreign involvement.

Theories of Nuclear Victory
Nuclear use may be more plausible than many would like to believe. America’s adversaries invest a lot of resources in nuclear weapons, and a considerable amount of time thinking about situations in which they would use nuclear weapons and how to fight the United States under nuclear conditions. For example, if China decided to militarily retake Taiwan — a primary goal of the People’s Liberation Army — it faces two considerable obstacles. While it is possible it could succeed in an amphibious landing and take Taipei, the costs would be immense. Additionally, an invasion risks U.S. intervention and the outbreak of a war between the United States and China over the sovereignty of Taiwan. One of the goals of Chinese war planning against Taiwan is to ensure a quick and decisive occupation that would deter the United States from getting involved in the first place. Though China’s stated nuclear weapons posture claims a no first-use policy, this could be a situation where the cost-benefit ratio of using nuclear weapons is too good to easily overlook. The use of low-yield nuclear weapons against specific targets, such as Taiwanese military bases or coastal defenses, would have two effects. It would clear the way for a Chinese occupation with possibly fewer costs than a conventional approach, and would likely deter U.S. intervention. With no U.S. forces being harmed and China having demonstrated a willingness to escalate to the nuclear level, the United States is unlikely to find it worth the risk to intervene.

China would face economic and diplomatic costs from the international community, but it would face significant costs from annexing Taiwan anyway. Beijing could judge that using nuclear weapons would be worth it. Analysts have to honestly assess how much using nuclear weapons would improve Beijing’s chances of success, and weigh that against the repercussions of doing so.

Russia, with its aggressive nuclear posture, massive arsenal, and recent expansionist actions in Ukraine is another alarming case. Moscow’s calculated use of escalation controls shows a willingness and ability to calculate the appropriate use of force. If Russia can annex territory in Ukraine, it can conceivably do the same in the Baltics. A 2016 RAND study argued that Russian forces can rapidly move through and capture one or all of the Baltic states quicker than NATO would be able to effectively respond. Additionally, the Russian territory of Kaliningrad and its anti-access/area-denial capabilities provide an effective means of defending against NATO intervention. Countering such an offensive would almost certainly require strikes against Russian territory, which could trigger a nuclear response from Moscow. Russia is well practiced in utilizing the fear of further escalation and uncertainty to its advantage; limited nuclear strikes, or a nuclear demonstration in key areas, could be used to create uncertainty and fear of conflict escalating to a larger scale, deterring conflict at a lower level of escalation. If push came to shove, would NATO be willing to risk nuclear conflict for a small state in Russia’s backyard?

Of course, nuclear deterrence is most credible as a means to prevent foreign invasion. This has been the primary reason numerous states have sought nuclear weapons in the first place, including India, Pakistan, Israel, and even North Korea. A significant threat to the homeland of a nuclear state could lead to the use of nuclear weapons to make up for conventional inferiority, especially if the state is losing ground to advancing forces. The state may utilize a limited strike against an invader’s military bases, to cut off supply trains, or even against an adversary’s cities to coerce them into backing down. Furthermore, if the state feels its nuclear deterrent is being threatened, it may escalate by using its nuclear weapons under fear of a “use it or lose it” situation. Theoretically, this dilemma prevents invasion from occurring in the first place. But, if an adversary truly believes in this normative restraint and invades despite this deterrent, is it really believable that the state will continue to refrain from using nuclear weapons when its survival is at stake?

In the Cold War, analysts learned that it was very difficult to credibly engage and win in strategic-level warfare against a nuclear state. But this same lesson does not apply to nuclear versus non-nuclear states. The United States and Russia are unlikely to target each other in nuclear conflict — it is too risky. But nuclear weapons can be used against a non-nuclear state — outside of a nuclear adversary’s homeland — without triggering a suicidal response. There is a major difference between striking a nuclear power’s cities and threatening their survival and using low-yield weapons against a state that cannot retaliate at the nuclear level.

A counterargument is that it would not be necessary to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state. However, this assumption may not always hold true, and the fear of inter-state nuclear conflict may be the edge a nuclear state needs to deter against foreign interference. If an American adversary uses nuclear weapons — in a manner that does not threaten the United States — will America blink? Is the United States truly willing to respond with nuclear weapons when doing so could quickly turn a situation that did not originally threaten it into one of mutual suicide?

Nuclear Restraint Is Not Based on Morality
Nuclear weapons may have increased deterrence between nuclear-armed states, but it is increasingly difficult to deter them in other campaigns. There are situations when a state may be able to use nuclear weapons to their advantage, and deterring against this requires hard work.

Nuclear weapons have not been used in combat in 75 years. Considerations of nuclear warfare have become taboo, which has contributed, in part, to the non-use of nuclear weapons for so long. But the taboo does not guarantee that nuclear weapons will not be used in the future, and history shows us that taboos are often broken. Recent evidence suggests that the nuclear taboo may not be as robust as many assume. An increasing number of Americans have even declared they would support using nuclear weapons to save American lives — a sentiment unlikely to be unique to the United States. In one study, 59 percent of respondents stated that they would support the use of nuclear weapons against Iran to save U.S. soldiers, and a different study showed that 77.2 percent would support a nuclear strike against al-Qaeda if nuclear weapons were deemed twice as effective as conventional weapons.

Unfortunately, the use of nuclear weapons may be increasingly plausible in the years ahead. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or “Iran deal,” meant to slow the inevitable proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, but was undermined when the United States withdrew from it in 2018. North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles have proven to be an effective means of deterring U.S. intervention and will not go away anytime soon, bringing fears of proliferation both in East Asia and to other dictatorships around the world. Bilateral arms control agreements are becoming less relevant as they weaken signatories against states outside of the agreement, and multilateral arms control agreements have become less likely to have meaningful content due to the wide variety of conflicting capabilities, arsenal sizes, and security concerns. The unfortunate reality is that the nuclear taboo is falling apart. If we wish to continue to see a world where nuclear weapons are not used, deterrent postures must be based on the assumption that states will use these weapons when it is in their interest to do so.

Gerald C. Brown (
@GeraldC_Brown) is an analyst with Valiant Integrated Services, where he supports the Department of Defense nuclear enterprise and conducts nuclear strategy research and exercise analysis. Previously, he spent six years in the U. S. Air Force, Global Strike Command, working in nuclear security operations. All views expressed here are his own.

CORRECTION: An earlier version of this article stated that Dwight Eisenhower was president in the early days of the Korean War. That was incorrect. Harry Truman was president at the start of the Korean War.
 

Housecarl

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Posted for fair use.....


Naval
Defense Department study calls for cutting 2 of the US Navy’s aircraft carriers

By: David B. Larter   4 hours ago



YO2TXKKSL5HJLLKGU7HGICXHFQ.jpg
The aircraft carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower sailed in the Atlantic Ocean on Sept. 28. An internal DoD study calls for cutting two aircraft carriers from the Navy's inventory. (MC3 Kaleb Sarten/Navy)


WASHINGTON – An internal Office of the Secretary of Defense assessment calls for the Navy to cut two aircraft carriers from its fleet, freeze the large surface combatant fleet of destroyers and cruisers around current levels and add dozens of unmanned or lightly manned ships to the inventory, according to documents obtained by Defense News.

The study calls for a fleet of nine carriers, down from the current fleet of 11, and for 65 unmanned or lightly manned surface vessels. The study calls for a surface force of between 80 and 90 large surface combatants, and an increase in the number of small surface combatants – between 55 and 70, which is substantially more than the Navy currently operates.

The assessment is part of an ongoing DoD-wide review of Navy force structure and seem to echo what Defense Secretary Mark Esper has been saying for months: the Defense Department wants to begin de-emphasizing aircraft carriers as the centerpiece of the Navy's force projection and put more emphasis on unmanned technologies that can be more easily sacrificed in a conflict and can achieve their missions more affordably.

A DoD spokesperson declined to comment on the force structure assessment.

"We will not comment on a DoD product that is pre-decisional,” said Navy Capt. Brook DeWalt.

Defense Secretary Mark Esper on how the Navy can get to 355 ships

Defense Secretary Mark Esper on how the Navy can get to 355 ships
In an exclusive interview with Defense News, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper makes the case of how and why the Navy can hit 355 ships by 2030.

By: Aaron Mehta, David Larter

The Navy is also working on its own force structure assessment that is slated to be closely aligned with the Marine Corps’ stated desire to become more closely integrated with the Navy.

Cutting two aircraft carriers would permanently change the way the Navy approaches presence around the globe and force the service to rethink its model for projecting power across the globe, said Jerry Hendrix, a retired Navy captain and analyst with the Telemus Group.

“The deployment models we set – and we’re still keeping – were developed around 15 carriers so that would all fall apart,” Hendrix said, referring to standing carrier presence requirements in the Middle East and Asia-Pacific. “This would be reintroducing reality. A move like this would signal a new pattern for the Navy’s deployments that moves away from presence and moves towards surge and exercise as a model for carrier employment.”

A surge model would remove standing requirements for carriers and would mean that the regional combatant commanders would get carriers when they are available or when they are needed in an emergency.

With 9 carriers, the Navy would have between six and seven available at any given time with one in its mid-life refueling and overhaul and one or two in significant maintenance periods. The net result would be significantly fewer carrier deployments in each calendar year.

The assessment reducing the overall number of carriers also suggests that the OSD study didn’t revamp the Carrier Air Wing to make it more relevant, Hendrix said.

Esper has taken a keen interest in Navy force structure, telling Defense News in March that he had directed the Pentagon’s Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), along with the Navy, to conduct a series of war games and exercises in the coming months in order to figure out the way forward toward a lighter Navy, but said any major decisions will be based around the completion of a new joint war plan for the whole department, which the secretary said should be finished this summer.

“I think once we go through this process with the future fleet — that’ll really be the new foundation, the guiding post,” Esper told Defense News. “It’ll give us the general direction we need to go, and I think that’ll be a big game changer in terms of future fleet, for structure, for the Navy and Marine Corps team.”

When it comes to carriers, Esper said he saw a lot of value in keeping carriers in the force structure, and that it wasn’t going to be an all-or-nothing decision.

“This discussion often comes down to a binary: Is it zero or 12?” Esper said. “First of all, I don't know. I think carriers are very important. I think they demonstrate American power, American prestige. They get people's attention. They are a great deterrent. They give us great capability.”



The carriers Dwight D. Eisenhower and Harry S. Truman in the Arabian Sea March 18. (Photo: Navy)
The carriers Dwight D. Eisenhower and Harry S. Truman in the Arabian Sea March 18. (Photo: Navy)

Revamped Surface Fleet

The OSD assessment also calls for essentially freezing the size of the large surface combatant fleet. There are about 90 cruisers and destroyers in the fleet: the study recommended retaining at least 80 but keeping about as many as the Navy currently operates at the high end.

The Navy’s small surface combatant program is essentially the 20 littoral combat ships in commission today, with another 15 under contract, as well as the 20 next-generation frigates, which would get to the minimum number in the assessment of 55 small combatants, with the additional 15 presumably being more frigates.

The big change comes in the small unmanned or lightly manned surface combatants. In his interview with Defense News, Esper said the Navy needed to focus integrating those technologies into the fleet.

“What we have to tease out is, what does that future fleet look like?” Esper said. “I think one of the ways you get there quickly is moving toward lightly manned [ships], which over time can be unmanned.

“We can go with lightly manned ships, get them out there. You can build them so they’re optionally manned and then, depending on the scenario or the technology, at some point in time they can go unmanned.

“To me that's where we need to push. We need to push much more aggressively. That would allow us to get our numbers up quickly, and I believe that we can get to 355, if not higher, by 2030.”

The surface Navy needs to fundamentally reshape itself to defeat the Chinese threat, study finds

The surface Navy needs to fundamentally reshape itself to defeat the Chinese threat, study finds
A new study calls for radical changes to the structure and operation of the U.S. Navy's surface fleet.

By: David Larter

The Navy is currently developing a family of unmanned surface vessels that are intended to increase the offensive punch for less money, while increasing the number of targets the Chinese military would have to locate in a fight.

That’s a push that earned the endorsement of the Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday in comments late last year.

“I know that the future fleet has to include a mix of unmanned,” Gilday said. “We can’t continue to wrap $2 billion ships around 96 missile tubes in the numbers we need to fight in a distributed way, against a potential adversary that is producing capability and platforms at a very high rate of speed. We have to change the way we are thinking.”

Aaron Mehta contributed to this report from Washington.
 

jward

passin' thru

Two Air Force F-35s Make Rapid Deployment To Jordan To Get Closer To Syria Action
The deployment showcased the Air Force's ability to operate advanced aircraft from untraditional locations and put them closer to a strategic outpost.
By Joseph TrevithickApril 20, 2020


The U.S. Air Force sent two F-35A Joint Strike Fighters to an "undisclosed location" in the Middle East earlier this year, which appears to be Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, demonstrating its ability to rapidly shift assets within the region to respond to emerging contingencies. Just days ago the U.S. military also publicized the flight of an F-35A over an isolated and strategic outpost in southern Syria, which has repeatedly come under attack from Iranian-backed militias and Russian forces in the past.

The two F-35s from 34th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron began flying sorties from their temporary deployment location on Feb. 16, but the Air Force's 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing's public affairs office only posted images of Joint Strike Fighter flight operations from the "undisclosed location" on the official Defense Visual Information Distribution Service website on Apr 20. The 332nd is based at Ahmad Al Jaber Air Base in Kuwait, but also oversees the 407th Air Expeditionary Group, which manages operations at Muwaffaq Salti. Elements of the 34th arrived at Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates, home of the 380th Air Expeditionary Wing, in November 2019, marking the start of the second F-35A deployment to the Middle East that year.



U.S. Air Force F-35A's First Combat Deployment To The Middle East Has BegunBy Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone
Stealth Pushes Forward: B-2s Refuel On Wake Island, F-22s Fly From Austere Base In MideastBy Tyler Rogoway Posted in The War Zone
Russia Threatens To Attack Key U.S. Outpost In Southern SyriaBy Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone
Docs Show US To Massively Expand Footprint At Jordanian Air Base Amid Spats With Turkey, IraqBy Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone
American Bradley Armored Vehicles Were Pulled Out of Syria After Less Than Two MonthsBy Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone
"The 34th EFS [Expeditionary Fighter Squadron] is demonstrating the Rapid Unit Dynamic Employment, a concept for the 5th generation Lightning II enterprise, by forward deploying a small team of aircraft, maintainers, and pilots," a caption for one of the pictures reads.


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One of the F-35As at the "undisclosed location" in the Middle East on Feb. 16.

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A pilot gets ready for one of the first F-35A sorties as part of the Rapid Unit Dynamic Employment mission on Feb. 16.
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This is not the first time that Air Force F-35As have gone to Muwaffaq Salti. In August 2019, elements of the 4th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron flew there from Al Dhafra as part of Exercise Agile Lightning, which "demonstrated the adaptive basing methodology where personnel and aircraft can operate in austere environments to complete essential missions vital to the defense of U.S. assets and personnel," according to the Air Force.
Last year, Air Force plans to dramatically increase the available facilities at Muwaffaq Salti to support both longer and shorter-duration deployments also emerged, which The War Zone was first to report on.
More broadly, the Air Force has been experimenting with a number of rapid deployment concepts in recent years as it works to expand its ability to quickly deploy various types of aircraft, manned and unmanned, especially stealth aircraft that typically require more robust infrastructure and logistics chains, to austere locations during expeditionary and distributed operations. Concerns about the vulnerability of existing fixed bases have been a major driving force behind these efforts and are pushing the service to explore ideas for how it might establish all new airfields right in the midst a major conflict.

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More photos of the F-35As from the 34th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron at the "undisclosed location" on Apr. 16.
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The service's F-22 community had already pioneered this with the Rapid Raptor concept of operations, which has continued to evolve since it first appeared in 2014. At its core, Rapid Raptor, which you can read about in more detail in this past War Zone piece, allows the service to quickly send four F-22s and necessary supporting personnel and equipment anywhere in the world and get them flying combat sorties all within 72 hours.
In 2018, the Air Force performed a Rapid Raptor-like deployment to Muwaffaq Salti, as well. A KC-10A Extender aerial refueling tanker, also demonstrating its ability to serve as a cargo aircraft, helped the F-22s and their supporting elements deploy from Al Dhafra to the base in Jordan.


When F-35As from the 34th expeditionary Fighter Squadron first arrived at Al Dhafra in April 2019, they took the place of F-22s that had regularly deployed to that base since 2009. As the U.S. expanded its activities against ISIS in Syria in the late 2010s, Raptors were among the aircraft most commonly employed to conduct patrols over that country. The F-22s had also regularly served as quarterbacks for broader U.S. and coalition air operations in Syria, a role that the F-35As, with their impressive sensor fusion and data sharing capabilities, now provide.
Air Force F-35As have been conducting a variety of combat operations, including airstrikes, against ISIS in Syria, as well as Iraq, for months now. However, the rapid deployment to Jordan is likely linked, at least in part, to the continued U.S. presence at a garrison near the city of At Tanf, which lies along a major highway in the region and is situated fewer than 15 miles from both the Iraqi and Jordanian borders. U.S.-backed Syrian forces and American troops, primarily special operations forces, occupy this highly strategic location.
On Apr. 10, a Joint Strike Fighter made a pass by the At Tanf garrison. Special Operations Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, the top special operations component of the U.S.-led coalition fighting ISIS, publicized the sortie. It was a clear signal to potential opponents about the U.S. military's willingness and capability to defend the base. It also offered a rare look at an F-35 on an actual operational mission.

A USAF F-35A Lightning II fighter jet flies near the #ATG in Syria, April 10, 2020. Coalition and partner forces continue to strike at extremist organizations in Syria despite COVID-19, reflecting the world-wide unity to see an enduring defeat delivered against Daesh #DefeatDaesh pic.twitter.com/z474lPHpuB
— Special Ops Joint Task Force-OIR (Iraq/Syria) (@SOJTFOIR) April 13, 2020
At Tanf, which the U.S. government has directly linked to challenging the ability of Iranian forces and Iran's regional proxies to move unfettered overland between Iran and Syria, as well as Lebanon, by way of Iraq, has certainly come under threat before. In 2017, American airpower countered a number of attempted attacks by Iranian-backed militias aligned with Syrian dictator Bashar Al Assad and armed with heavy armor and artillery. They also shot down multiple Iranian drones in the vicinity of the garrison.
Russia also conducted multiple strikes on the base on June 16, 2016, but there were no U.S. troops there at the time. U.S. combat jets responded to the initial strike, but the Russians returned after those aircraft left to refuel. The incident prompted the United States to reinforce the garrison. In 2018, the Kremlin again threatened to attack the base.
The Air Force's ability to send F-35As to Muwaffaq Salti, where it also has F-15E Strike Eagle combat jets deployed and which is significantly closer to At Tanf than Al Dhafra, further demonstrates its ability to rapidly move reinforcements to the area to help protect the garrison, as well as conduct other contingency operations in the region.
The overflights of At Tanf are also likely a valuable morale boost for the personnel manning the secluded outpost, the future of which is uncertain as the U.S. military sputter-starts its way through often-changing plans about drawing down its overall presence in Syria.

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An F-15E Strike Eagle is seen in the background of this picture of one of the F-35As at the "undisclosed location" on Feb. 16.
A USAF F-15E Strike Eagle fighter jet conducts a flyover near #ATG, Syria, after a practice strafing run on Apr.14, 2020. @usairforce provides immediate threat response and air superiority in the 55 km deconfliction zone in southern Syria in support of OIR @CENTCOM @DeptofDefense pic.twitter.com/yxxuNsIeSu
— Special Ops Joint Task Force-OIR (Iraq/Syria) (@SOJTFOIR) April 20, 2020
But, no matter what the future of the At Tanf garrison might look like, the Air Force's rapid deployment of F-35As to Muwaffaq Salti definitely reflects expeditionary and distributed concepts of operations that the service looks set to increasingly employ in the Middle East, as well as elsewhere around the world to quickly respond to a wide array of contingencies.
Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com

posted for fair use
 
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jward

passin' thru
Russian Government Says It Sent Its New T-14 Tanks To Syria For Combat Testing
The Kremlin has long used the Syrian conflict as a testing ground for new weapons and other military equipment.
By Joseph Trevithick
April 20, 2020

A Russian government official says that the country field-tested its T-14 Armata main battle tanks in Syria, which, if true, would be the type's first trip overseas. The Kremlin has long used the Syrian conflict as an opportunity to test new weapons and other military equipment, but it's unclear how rigorous the testing of the T-14s in the Middle East actually was, if it even occurred.
Russian Minister of Industry and Trade Denis Manturov made the comments about the T-14s in Syria on Apr. 19, 2020, in an interview with Nailya Asker-Zade on Deistvuyushchiye Litsa, or "Political Actors," a program on Russia's state-owned Rossiya-1 television channel. Alexander Potapov, CEO of the state-run T-14 manufacturer Uralvagonzavod, had told the Vedomosti newspaper in February that his company would deliver the first production batch of T-14 tanks sometime this year.



Russia Just Imported More World War II Era T-34 Tanks Than They Will Buy New T-14s This YearBy Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone
Russia Can't Afford Its New T-14 Armata Tanks, Turns To Updated Older Designs InsteadBy Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone
Moscow Has A "Syrian Fracture" Propaganda Train Loaded With War Trophies Crisscrossing RussiaBy Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone
Russia Releases First Official Video Of Its Su-57s On Their Absurdly Short Trip To SyriaBy Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone
Russia Admits Su-57s Were In Syria But Claims They Left After Just Two DaysBy Joseph Trevithick and Tyler Rogoway Posted in The War Zone
"Yes, that’s right. They [Armata tanks] were used in Syria," Manturov told Asker-Zade. "They were used in field conditions, in Syria, so, we took into account all the nuances."


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T-14 tanks at the Alabino military training ground near Moscow in 2018.
The Minister offered no additional details about when or where in Syria the trials had taken place, how many total tanks were involved, and what the testing consisted of, specifically. There has been no word, as yet, from the Russian Ministry of Defense confirming the deployment or offering any additional information.
The Russian military has tested other existing and new weapon systems and military equipment in Syria for the first time in the past, including its Kalibr sea-launched land-attack cruise missiles, Kh-101 air-launched cruise missiles, Su-35S Flanker-E combat jets, BMPT Terminator ground combat vehicles, and unmanned ground combat vehicles, under actual combat conditions.

Among other issues discovered during the Uran-9’s Syrian tests, there were problems with its running gear, 30mm cannons (could not fire on the move), its optics had reduced range, and it suffered 19 cases when it stopped responding to its operator. 2/on Instagram: “Как тебе такое, Илон Маск? #робот #уран” pic.twitter.com/1TftlpZ3VC
— Rob Lee (@RALee85) December 2, 2019
However, with the exception of the small numbers of BMPTs, Russia has not previously sent heavy armor like the T-14s to Syria for its own use. Even if some number of T-14s did go to the country, it's also very possible that the Russian military limited their actual use in order to curtail the potential for accidents or actual combat losses.
Militant groups and terrorists who have been fighting the regime of Syrian dictator Bashar Al Assad, who relies heavily on Kremlin support to remain in power, have made good use of guided anti-tank missiles throughout much of the conflict, which first began 2011, and continue to do so. The T-14 does feature improved passive armor over older Russian tanks and has an active protection system specifically intended to defeat anti-tank missiles and shoulder-fired infantry anti-tank rocket. The design is also intended to make the crew less vulnerable by positioning them all low inside the hull and using an unmanned turret. However, there would still be a possibility that a confluence of factors could lead to a damaged or disabled tank, either of which would be extremely embarrassing for Russian authorities and a likely propaganda coup for anti-Assad groups.
Similarly, in 2018, the Russian Air Force notably sent a pair of its pre-production Su-57 advanced combat jets to Syria, but only for a matter of days. Satellite imagery later showed that at least one of the aircraft sitting at Russia's Khmeimim Air Base outpost surrounded by sandbags to protect it from militant attacks. In December 2019, General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, said Su-57s had returned to the Middle Eastern country for another deployment, but did not say when specifically that had occurred and otherwise offered very limited details.


Sending the T-14s to Syria, no matter how briefly, could still be valuable for Russia's own propaganda purposes and otherwise to demonstrate the country's continued to commitment to the advanced tank project despite its persistent troubles. Russia first publicly unveiled the T-14 in 2015 during the annual May Victory Day parade, which commemorates the country's victory over Nazi Germany in World War II, and announced plans to purchase thousands of them by the end of this year.
Various issues, particularly the Armata's high cost compared to other existing designs, threw a wrench in these plans and Russia now only expects to buy around 100 in the initial production batch. In 2019, Russia notably took delivery of more World War II-era T-34/85 tanks, obtained from Laos to use for parades and other promotional events, than T-14s. The Russian Army continues to receive larger numbers of upgraded variants of the Soviet-era T-90, T-80, and T-72 series, as well.



In his interview on Deistvuyushchiye Litsa, Manturov expressed hope the T-14's costs would come down as serial production expanded. "It [the T-14 Armata tank] is expensive because it is still undergoing extra trials and modernization after the defense ministry requested additional technical solutions in order to begin serial supplies starting from the next year under the existing contract," he said.
The Minister also talked about potential export orders, which could further help drive down unit costs, and said that there were "preliminary orders," but declined to talk about who those possible customers might be. "Next year, when serial supplies of these tanks to the defense ministry are launched and an exports [sic] certificate is obtained, we will begin to work with foreign clients," he added.
Being able to say the T-14 has been "combat-proven" or otherwise employed successfully in Syria would help the Kremlin in marketing the tanks abroad.

#tanktwitter T-14 MBT on Armata heavy universal tracked platform. We can see how Afganit active protection system hard kill interceptor launchers look inside. pic.twitter.com/mSUFLM54KH
— Damian Ratka (@DRatka1) March 31, 2020
Whether or not Russia's own production plans for the T-14 come to fruition remain to be seen, regardless of any Syrian deployment. The country's defense budgets have seen regular cuts in recent years and the Kremlin has often shifted money around to meeting morphing priorities, especially in financing high-profile strategic weapon systems, including hypersonic missiles, controversial nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise missiles, and ultra-long-range torpedoes.
A drop in the global price of oil in 2014 had had significant impacts on the Russian economy, overall, and Russia and Saudi Arabia had just recently engaged in a new oil price war. U.S. diplomacy helped ostensibly bring an end to that spat. Unfortunately, just today a U.S. oil futures contract collapsed, with its price per barrel dropping below zero dollars, the first time this has ever happened. This highlighted serious volatility in the global oil market, especially because of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.
It will certainly be interesting to see what other details about the T-14's supposed reported trip to Syria actually entailed and what impacts it might actually have on the tank's future production and fielding.
Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com
 

jward

passin' thru
Afghan officials: Taliban attacks on checkpoints kill 29
By RAHIM FAIEZ
yesterday

KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — A wave of Taliban attacks on checkpoints across Afghanistan has killed 29 members of the security forces, officials said Monday.
In northern Takhar province, 19 security personnel were killed in a battle Sunday night in the district of Khwaja Ghor, according to Jawad Hajri, spokesman for the provincial governor. The Taliban fled the scene after reinforcement arrived, Hajri added.
Meanwhile, in northern Balkh province, a Taliban attack on Sunday morning in the Sholgara district killed seven, according to Adil Shah Adil, spokesman for the provincial police chief. A child was caught in the crossfire and wounded during the attack, which also killed five Taliban, he added.

And in western Badghis province, the Taliban struck an army checkpoint early on Sunday morning, killing three soldiers and wounding 10, said Tahsel Haideri, spokesman for the provincial police chief.
The Taliban, who have not claimed responsibility for the attacks, and President Ashraf Ghani’s government in Kabul are in the process of exchanging prisoners as part of a peace deal signed by the U.S. and the Taliban at the end of February in Doha, Qatar.
The release of up to 5,000 Taliban prisoners and 1,000 government officials held captive by the insurgents ahead of intra-Afghan negotiations is a condition of the U.S.-Taliban deal.
At the heart of most of the talks, say Taliban and U.S. officials, is the demand for a reduction of violence. The Taliban have not been attacking U.S. and NATO troops since the agreement was signed but have struck Afghan forces in outlying areas. Washington wants a reduction in those attacks.


 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Afghan officials: Taliban attacks on checkpoints kill 29
By RAHIM FAIEZ
yesterday

KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — A wave of Taliban attacks on checkpoints across Afghanistan has killed 29 members of the security forces, officials said Monday.
In northern Takhar province, 19 security personnel were killed in a battle Sunday night in the district of Khwaja Ghor, according to Jawad Hajri, spokesman for the provincial governor. The Taliban fled the scene after reinforcement arrived, Hajri added.
Meanwhile, in northern Balkh province, a Taliban attack on Sunday morning in the Sholgara district killed seven, according to Adil Shah Adil, spokesman for the provincial police chief. A child was caught in the crossfire and wounded during the attack, which also killed five Taliban, he added.

And in western Badghis province, the Taliban struck an army checkpoint early on Sunday morning, killing three soldiers and wounding 10, said Tahsel Haideri, spokesman for the provincial police chief.
The Taliban, who have not claimed responsibility for the attacks, and President Ashraf Ghani’s government in Kabul are in the process of exchanging prisoners as part of a peace deal signed by the U.S. and the Taliban at the end of February in Doha, Qatar.
The release of up to 5,000 Taliban prisoners and 1,000 government officials held captive by the insurgents ahead of intra-Afghan negotiations is a condition of the U.S.-Taliban deal.
At the heart of most of the talks, say Taliban and U.S. officials, is the demand for a reduction of violence. The Taliban have not been attacking U.S. and NATO troops since the agreement was signed but have struck Afghan forces in outlying areas. Washington wants a reduction in those attacks.



I've got to wonder how many Nepalese/Gurkas we could recruit, equip and train for what we've spent annually on Afghanistan.....
 

Zagdid

Veteran Member

Taiwan Starts Construction On 3rd & 4th Mine Laying Ship
Xavier Vavasseur 21 Apr 2020 fair use

The keel laying ceremony for the first-in-class ship took place on May 24 last year (along with three catamaran corvettes) while construction on the second ship of the class in ongoing. The event also marked the “mast raising” event for the first vessel.


The first mine laying vessel is expected to be delivered this year, according to plans. Some media reports refer to the vessel as the “Min Jiang-class”, however Naval News’ Taiwanese sources explained that this name has yet to appear in official documents.


The four mine laying ship are expected to be completed in 2021, which will greatly enhance Taiwan’s offensive mine fighting capacity and effectively counter the threat of the communist army.
Taiwan defense ministry
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During the keel laying ceremony of the first-in-class ship, Taiwanese defense officials were quoted saying:the mine layer ships were designed to face down an attack by amphibious vehicles trying to land in Taiwan, and would be equipped with a more precise automatic mine laying system”.

According to Lungteh Shipbuilding, the vessels have a length of 41 meters, a width of 8.8 meters, a draft of 1.7 meters and a full load displacement of 347 tons. The maximum speed is 14 knots.

In addition to the sea mines (carrying capacity is unknown) the vessel is fitted with a 20mm T75 gun mount (as main gun) and two T74 machine guns (manned 7.62×51 mounts).
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

USS America Now Steaming Near South China Sea Standoff

By: Dzirhan Mahadzir
April 20, 2020 5:13 PM

KUALA LUMPUR — USS America (LHA-6) is steaming towards waters in the South China Sea where a Chinese government survey ship and its China Coast Guard escorts are in an international maritime dispute with Malaysia.

As of Saturday, America was operating with at least five Marine F-35B Lightning II fighters as well as MV-22Bs tiltrotors and CH-53 helicopters as part of the typical Marine air combat element configuration aboard the amphibious warship. With the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) temporarily sidelined in Guam, America is currently the most significant operational naval asset the U.S Navy has in the region as China flexes its maritime presence.

The Chinese are operating in disputed waters about 200 nautical miles off the coast of East Malaysia that are claimed by Malaysia, Vietnam and China. The region is believed to be mineral-rich and has been an active area of contention since the drillship West Capella, under contract to Malaysia’s state oil company, Petronas, began exploration activities in October.

The Malaysian exploration triggered a flurry of patrols and presence operations by China Coast Guard and maritime militia ships, Vietnamese maritime militia ships and ships of the Royal Malaysian Navy and Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (also known as the Malaysian Coast Guard). China Coast Guard ships have also been maintaining a continuous presence at the Luconia Shoals, which lies in Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone and is also claimed by China. These ships have also made patrols close to Malaysian oil platforms in Malaysia’s EEZ. Despite all the activity, no at-sea incidents have been reported, and all three governments are content to keep matters out of the public eye.

Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency head Admiral Zubil Mat Som confirmed to Malaysian media on April 16 that Haiyang Dizhi 8 had entered Malaysia’s EEZ and that the MMEA was monitoring the ship and indicated the ship was operating legally. The Malaysian Foreign Ministry and Defence Ministry declined to comment to the press. With the Royal Malaysian Navy also busy monitoring the Andaman Sea entrance of the Malacca Straits to prevent Rohingya refugee ships from entering Peninsular Malaysia, as well as conducting routine operations throughout Malaysian waters, the service’s 45-ship fleet is often hard-pressed to maintain presence.

Over the weekend, the U.S. called out China’s “bullying” actions related to the ship, according to a report in Reuters.

“The United States is concerned by reports of China’s repeated provocative actions aimed at the offshore oil and gas development of other claimant states,” the U.S. State Department said in a statement over the weekend.
China “should cease its bullying behavior and refrain from engaging in this type of provocative and destabilizing activity.”

For its part, China is denying any wrongdoing in the disputes.

Malaysia and China have a strong economic relationship, and Malaysia has ordered four 68-meter Keris-class Littoral Mission Ship (LMS) from China. First-of-class KD Keris arrived in Malaysia in January, but the second ship, Sundang, has had its delivery and commissioning, which was scheduled to take place in April in China, delayed due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 virus. The remaining two ships were to be delivered in 2021, which could also be delayed because the ships are to be built in Wuhan, the origin of the current outbreak.

Meanwhile, the two U.S Littoral Combat Ships rotationally deployed to Singapore, USS Montgomery (LCS-8) and USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS-10), are both operating in the South China Sea, according to Navy news releases.
 

jward

passin' thru
Russia, Turkey, and Iran To Meet On Syria
April 22, 2020 02:36 GMT
Turkish and Russian military vehicles take part in a joint patrol in the Idlib province, April 15, 2020.

Turkish and Russian military vehicles take part in a joint patrol in the Idlib province, April 15, 2020


The foreign ministers of Russia, Turkey, and Iran will hold a video conference on April 22 to discuss Syria and a de-escalation deal in the last rebel-held enclave in Idlib.

Turkey and Russia, which back opposing sides of the conflict, brokered a March 5 cease-fire in rebel-controlled Idlib province following a monthslong Russia-backed offensive by Syrian forces that displaced nearly one million people and threatened to send a flood of refugees into Turkey.

The escalation earlier this year brought the Turkish military and Syrian government into direct blows. Ankara retaliated for the death of some 60 Turkish troops by increasing support for opposition groups and unleashing a devastating drone campaign on Syrian government forces.

As part of the cease-fire deal, Turkish and Russian troops conduct joint patrols in a buffer zone between rebel fighters and Syrian government forces along a section of the strategic M4 highway, which connects Aleppo to Latakia on the Mediterranean coast.

On April 20, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accused the Syrian government of taking advantage of the world’s distraction with the coronavirus pandemic to increase attacks in Idlib.
“Should the regime, which has violated the cease-fire and other conditions of the agreement, continue in this way, it will pay a price with heavy losses,” he added.

The threat comes amid reports of minor clashes between Syrian forces and Turkey-backed opposition forces and extremist rebel factions, although the buffer zone appears to be limiting fighting.
Ahead of the foreign ministers video conference, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke by phone with Erdogan and Iranian President Hassan Rohani on April 21.

The three countries are part of the so-called Astana process designed to support a diplomatic solution to Syria’s 10-year civil war.
On April 20, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif met in Damascus with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
Along with Russia, Tehran has provided crucial military support to Assad during the country's civil war.

With reporting by AP, Interfax, Reuters, and Haber Turk


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jward

passin' thru
i24NEWS - AFP
April 22, 2020, 12:56 AM
1 min read
Iranian Revolutionary Guard vessels sail close to U.S. military ships in the Persian Gulf near Kuwait. April 15, 2020.
U.S. Navy via APIranian Revolutionary Guard vessels sail close to U.S. military ships in the Persian Gulf near Kuwait. April 15, 2020.

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More to follow
Iran's Revolutionary Guards announced they had successfully launched the country's first military satellite on Wednesday, a programme that the US alleges is a cover for its missile development.
The satellite -- dubbed the Nour -- was "successfully launched... from the Qassed two-stage launcher from the Markazi Desert of Iran", the Guards' Sepahnews website said.
View: https://twitter.com/i24NEWS_EN/status/1252839217152946177?s=20
 
Last edited:

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
i24NEWS - AFP
April 22, 2020, 12:56 AM
1 min read
Iranian Revolutionary Guard vessels sail close to U.S. military ships in the Persian Gulf near Kuwait. April 15, 2020.
U.S. Navy via APIranian Revolutionary Guard vessels sail close to U.S. military ships in the Persian Gulf near Kuwait. April 15, 2020.

heart
More to follow
Iran's Revolutionary Guards announced they had successfully launched the country's first military satellite on Wednesday, a programme that the US alleges is a cover for its missile development.
The satellite -- dubbed the Nour -- was "successfully launched... from the Qassed two-stage launcher from the Markazi Desert of Iran", the Guards' Sepahnews website said.
View: https://twitter.com/i24NEWS_EN/status/1252839217152946177?s=20

Whether it is a "legit" functionally useful vehicle or a propaganda blivet, if it got into a stable orbit and weights more than 1000 lbs we are in a whole different zone of "relations" with regards to Iran....in other words Iran has to be considered to have an ICBM capability....
 
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