WAR 03-28-2015-to-04-03-2015_____THEWINDSofWAR

Housecarl · Mar 28, 2015

(155) 02-28-2015-to-03-06-2015_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...06-2015_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(156) 03-07-2015-to-03-13-2015_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...13-2015_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(157) 03-14-2015-to-03-20-2015_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...20-2015_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(158) 03-21-2015-to-03-27-2015_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...27-2015_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
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Saudi Arabia/10 Nation coalition are bombing YEMEN
Started by Lilbitsnana‎, 03-25-2015 04:28 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...-10-Nation-coalition-are-bombing-YEMEN/page11

In Yemen, It’s The Bad Guys Vs. The Bad Guys
Started by BREWER‎, Today 12:03 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?466028-In-Yemen-It%92s-The-Bad-Guys-Vs.-The-Bad-Guys

WNW 183-War in Yemen, Crazy Middle East US Policy, Iran Nuke Deal
Started by Hfcomms‎, Yesterday 03:34 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...en-Crazy-Middle-East-US-Policy-Iran-Nuke-Deal

IRAN MOVES TO CONTROL SUEZ CANAL AND YEMEN 1-21-2015
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...-CONTROL-SUEZ-CANAL-AND-YEMEN-1-21-2015/page8

Main Islamic State (ISIS) thread
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?451597-Main-Islamic-State-(ISIS)-thread/page84

Islamic State calls on backers to kill 100 U.S. military personnel ( IN THE US )
Started by mzkitty‎, 03-21-2015 02:29 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...kill-100-U.S.-military-personnel-(-IN-THE-US-)

NY gang boss resurfaced at Florida mosque, sending radicalized jihadists overseas say feds
Started by Dennis Olson‎, Yesterday 01:45 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...nding-radicalized-jihadists-overseas-say-feds

Islamic State attack on Italy coming
Started by imaginative‎, Yesterday 06:59 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?465981-Islamic-State-attack-on-Italy-coming

The Iran game (all of it)
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?439024-The-Iran-game-(all-of-it)/page16

US considers letting Iran run centrifuges at fortified underground bunker
Started by Lilbitsnana‎, 03-26-2015 09:27 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...n-centrifuges-at-fortified-underground-bunker

UN says Israel, not Iran, North Korea or Syria worst violator of human rights
Started by Dennis Olson‎, Yesterday 12:49 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...Korea-or-Syria-worst-violator-of-human-rights

Obama declassifies Top Secret Israel Nuclear Secrets, But Not European Countries
Started by TerryK‎, 03-25-2015 03:56 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...lear-Secrets-But-Not-European-Countries/page2

ISRAEL heating up again...
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?461079-ISRAEL-heating-up-again.../page22

Main Russia/Ukraine invasion thread - NATO: Russian Tanks and Artillery Enter Ukraine
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...ian-Tanks-and-Artillery-Enter-Ukraine/page402

China's Next Move: A Naval Base in the South Atlantic?
Started by Housecarl‎, 03-26-2015 11:37 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...-Next-Move-A-Naval-Base-in-the-South-Atlantic

Moscow demands that US return home its foreign deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons
Started by Possible Impact‎, 03-24-2015 11:48 AM

Pentagon: 'Disturbing' new cyber threats from China, Russia
Started by TerriHaute‎, 03-26-2015 09:57 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...isturbing-new-cyber-threats-from-China-Russia

The National Power Grid Is Under Almost Continuous Attack, Report Says
Started by Housecarl‎, 03-26-2015 12:17 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...Is-Under-Almost-Continuous-Attack-Report-Says

"Huge surge' of 'unscreened' Muslims flooding U.S.
Started by Be Well‎, Yesterday 02:22 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...Huge-surge-of-unscreened-Muslims-flooding-U.S.

Enemy in the Gates - Friday, 03/27/2015
Started by Ragnarok‎, Yesterday 07:11 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?465982-Enemy-in-the-Gates-Friday-03-27-2015

Enemy in the Gates - Thursday, 03/26/2015
Started by Ragnarok‎, 03-26-2015 06:28 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?465925-Enemy-in-the-Gates-Thursday-03-26-2015
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Islamists storm Mogadishu hotel with gov't officials inside
Started by Housecarl‎, Yesterday 07:54 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...m-Mogadishu-hotel-with-gov-t-officials-inside

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2015/mar/27/officials-siege-by-gunmen-in-somali-hotel-enters/

Official: Siege of gunmen in Somali hotel ends, 17 dead

By ABDI GULED
Associated Press
9:50 p.m.March 27, 2015

MOGADISHU, Somalia (AP) — Somali government officials say they have taken control of the hotel where extremist gunmen were holed up for more than 12 hours in an attack that has left at least 17 people dead.

Capt. Mohamed Hussein said Saturday the gunfire had stopped and security agents have accessed the whole building. Hussein had earlier said the gunmen were believed to have occupied the third and fourth floor of the the Maka Al-Mukarramah hotel in the capital Mogadishu.

Al-Shabab, an al-Qaida-linked Islamic extremist group that has carried out many attacks in Somalia, claimed responsibility for the assault on the hotel, which is popular with Somali government officials and foreigners.

Al-Shabab controlled much of Mogadishu between 2007 and 2011, but was pushed out of Somalia's capital and other major cities by African Union forces.

Housecarl · Mar 28, 2015

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/w...le-out-building-nuclear-weapons-10139229.html

Saudi Arabia says it won't rule out building nuclear weapons
'It is not something we would discuss publicly'

Jon Stone
Friday 27 March 2015

Saudi Arabia will not rule out building or acquiring nuclear weapons, the country’s ambassador to the United States has indicated.

Asked whether Saudi Arabia would ever build nuclear weapons in an interview with US news channel CNN, Adel Al-Jubeir said the subject was “not something we would discuss publicly”.

Pressed later on the issue he said: “This is not something that I can comment on, nor would I comment on.”

The ambassador’s reticence to rule out a military nuclear programme may reignite concerns that the autocratic monarchy has its eye on a nuclear arsenal.

Western intelligence agencies believe that the Saudi monarchy paid for up to 60% of Pakistan’s nuclear programme in return for the ability to buy warheads for itself at short notice, the Guardian newspaper reported in 2010.

The two countries maintain close relations and are sometimes said to have a special relationship; they currently have close military ties and conduct joint exercises.

The Saudi Arabian regime also already possesses medium-range ballistic missiles in the form of the Royal Saudi Strategic Missile Force.

In addition it has significant nuclear expertise in the form of a civilian nuclear programme of the kind Iran says it wants to develop.

In 2012 the Saudi Arabian government threatened to acquire nuclear weapons were neighbouring regional power Iran ever to do so.

“Politically, it would be completely unacceptable to have Iran with a nuclear capability and not the kingdom,” a senior Saudi source told The Times newspaper at the time.

The United States and other Western allies say a deal with Iran on its nuclear programme is possible. Iran denies it is building nuclear weapons.

The news comes days after Saudi Arabia launched a military operation in neighbouring Yemen aimed at suppressing a rebel group that is attempting to form a central government.

Saudi’s military operation against the advancing Shia Houthi group has been joined by Egyptian, Jordanian and Moroccan forces.

Housecarl · Mar 28, 2015

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://guests.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/5030/the-korla-missile-test-complex-revisited#more-5344

Korla Missile Test Complex Revisited

By catherine | 26 March 2015 | 4 Comments

Catherine here. For the past year, Jeffrey and I have been looking at China’s Korla Missile Test Complex in Xinjiang, which is where we believe China conducts test launches of its hit-to-kill interceptor. Jeffrey put up a brief post about part of the site in August, after China conducted a missile defense test this summer on July 24, 2014. The US State Department characterized the event as an anti-satellite test, but Jeffrey likes to point out that it’s better to call it a hit-to-kill test. What it kills isn’t so important.

In this test, as well as tests on January 11, 2010 and January 27, 2013, China has reportedly launched the HTK interceptor, usually called the SC-19 in the US press, from a site near Korla (库尔勒市), in Xinjiang province. A possible test occurred on September 25, 2010, but was not officially acknowledged. In that past, China used a CSS-11 missile launched from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center as a target. (Side note, the US intelligence community calls Jiuquan “Shuangchengzi”, which is where the SC in in SC-19 comes from.)

We can now say with high confidence, based on some open-source research, many things about the Korla MTC including the location of many of its assets, that it is subordinate to the General Armaments Department (GAD) and the location of a number of previous missile defense tests.

The main base is located at 41°42’37.76″N 86°11’22.69″E. The hit-to-kill launch site is located at 41°32’14.18″N 86°21’11.82″E.

1.

General Armaments Department in Korla

We were able to identify these bases—and link them to the GAD—with a little help from our colleague Iain Johnston, who sent us an email after the July post:

I enjoyed your Arms Control Work piece on tracking down the Korla test site. You mentioned in the post that you didn’t know if it was a GAD site. Perhaps you’ve already tracked this information down, but FWIW I found a website that lists GAD bases. There is one at Korla and it is identified as the 63618 unit. I also found a reference to this unit in a local government webpage for the Bayinguoleng Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture in Xinjiang, within which Korla is situated. The unit is identified as being situated in the outskirts of Korla city. Here’s a video from the unit made in 2010 to celebrate soldiers leaving the force. The credits at the end note that the movie was made by unit 63618 in Korla. The webpage of the Korla city government also refers to this unit. Judging from the topics of articles on CKNI that are co-authored by scholars affiliated with unit 63618, its work appears to be related to satellites and missiles (e.g. “Location Model and Error Analysis of Space Target Location by Early Warning Satellite” in Aerospace Electronic Warfare; “Detecting Probability Calculation on Moving Space Target of Space Detector” in Electronic Information Warfare Technology; and “Research on the effectiveness of early warning satellites to detect early warning indicator system” in Aerodynamic Missile Journal.

Unit 63618 appears to be subordinate to the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center from the list of GAD bases Iain provided. Even without the GAD listing in Chinese, one can infer that Korla falls under Jiuquan. The ever-useful Directory of PRC Military Personalities lists the Jiuquan SLC as Base 20 (63600). The next base is Base 21 (63650). The Korla unit—numbered 63618—falls logically under Jiuquan.

The available information confirms that Korla is subordinate to the General Armaments Department, which is responsible for developing things like hit-to-kill interceptors, and that personnel at Korla work on targeting things — missiles and satellites — in space.

The Unit 63618 alumni video, though, was the real goldmine and crucial in geo-locating the unit. Videos bidding farewell to rotating personnel or remembering the anniversary of a particular unit often appear in internet searches. This type of media can provide helpful context of the environment in which a military unit spends its time and the necessary daily tasks of life it undertakes.

Screenshot of the Unit 63618 alumni video title.

The Unit 63618 video contains ground-truth images of both the main base and the hit-to-kill launch site. The most prominent features of the main base to match to the available satellite imagery include the main gate, the back of the building, and the base’s basketball court. These images provide visual confirmation of the location of the KMTC.

The main gate of the KMTC.

Basketball courts at the KMTC.

Administrative building at the hit-to-kill launch site.

Construction at the hit-to-kill launch site.

The alumni video, made in 2010, clearly shows the hit-to-kill launch site under construction. This timeline also fits with the satellite images of the site, as well as the general development of the SC-19 interceptor program that began at the KMTC with the 2010 missile defense test.

2.

Testing

One thing we wanted to check was whether an interceptor launched from the KMTC could hit a test missile launched from the Jiuquan SLC, which is how the press reported a previous intercept test. David Wright from the Union of Concerned Scientists kindly modeled the test for us and analyzed the trajectories of the target and the interceptor vehicles (You can read a more thorough analysis on the test from David here).

Two trajectories for both the interceptor (blue) and target (red) missiles. The dots show 30-second intervals, with the target missile launched at t = 0.

Based on known and assumed parameters of the CSS-X-11 and SC-19 vehicles, David is reasonably confident that the intercept is possible and matches known timelines of the test.

At this point, we’re probably polishing the cannonball, but we acquired satellite imagery of the KMTC on the day of a known missile defense test. That image also confirms the base’s involvement in missile defense testing.

Through a generous imagery grant from the DigitalGlobe Foundation, we have a satellite image of the test facility on January 27, 2013. We weren’t lucky enough to capture the TEL on the launch pad, but there are many visible features that show preparations for an interceptor test.

The hit-to-kill launch site on January 27, 2013. Image © DigitalGlobe.

The launch pad has been cleared and there is significant vehicle activity at the facility, which is normally unused except during periods related to testing. Most important, the instrumentation sites have trailers in them, something that only occurs for tests.

The administrative facilities and launchpad on the day of the January 27, 2013 test. Image © DigitalGlobe.

We checked with a few missile defense experts. Here is a summary of the signatures they found interesting:

Near launch-photo documentation
Short range radar tracking
Telemetry reception for pre-launch and early flight testing
Tracks caused by moving non-permanent generators and other instruments in support of data recording
Data reception and communications equipment
Cables for instrumentation and remote recording
Dishes 3-6m in diameter for telemetry
Radio antennas and radar
Mini-dines for sheltering optical equipment
Cameras

The available satellite imagery strongly suggests the facility is active in HTK vehicle testing activities.

3.

LPAR near Korla

Last thing! There is also a Large Phased Array Radar (LPAR) facility between the main base and the test base. Sean O’Connor identified the LPAR in 2009, located at 41°38’30.46″N 86°14’15.27″E. Obviously, an LPAR would be useful for looking at missile intercept tests. As you can see from the image, it turns. We weren’t able to get a picture of the LPAR on the day of the test — the picture cuts off — but that’s a signature for future use.

In the left image, taken shortly before the January 2013 test, the LPAR is angled differently than in the right image, taken in October 2013.

4.

Conclusion

The satellite imagery, alumni videos, and listings of GAD units strongly indicate that the Korla Missile Test Complex is the test facility for HTK technology. The question of whether the tests at the KMTC are for missile defense purposes or ASAT development is far trickier to answer, as the HTK vehicle can be utilized for either purpose.

This geo-location exercise raises a larger issue to which to return in future posts—although China is not very transparent in releasing official information on military programs, this is not the case when it comes to the ubiquitous information available on Chinese social media information platforms. Much incidental information, most of it mundane and about ordinary life, exists and helps to inform a broader picture of Chinese military capabilities. Of course, analysis of Chinese social media information requires diligence and caution, and review of official releases requires considering whether information was released as a part of “selective transparency.” But at the very least, policy experts should consider helping government-to-government exchanges to catch up to the transparency present in social media. In the case of missile defense testing, a reasonable step might be for China and the United States to exchange notifications of upcoming tests.

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4 Responses to “Korla Missile Test Complex Revisited”

Allen Thomson | March 27, 2015

Slightly off topic, the SC-19 designator would appear to indicate that the US first detected the missile at Jiuquan/Shuangchengzi. Is there any indication that it was ever launched from there, perhaps in a non-HTK role?

(Even more OT, have any other SC-xx designators ever surfaced?)
Reply

Stephen Young | March 27, 2015

Good stuff! My question is, where would the intercept have occurred? Can you post an image of flight paths between the two sites you suggest? US intercepts, of course, occur over water, but does China have the luxury of safely intercepting over land?
Reply

Stephen Young | March 27, 2015

Okay, I stopped being so lazy. From the Shuangchengzi Space and Missile Center (40.9622°N 100.2888E)to the Korla Missile Test Complex (41.5377°N, 86.3721°E)is clearly lots of pretty unoccupied – but gorgeous – land.

Stephen Young | March 27, 2015

Also, about the January 27 image you have, what is the closest date you could get before that? So you could see if the TEL was there?
Reply

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Housecarl · Mar 28, 2015

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/28/us-yemen-security-idUSKBN0ML0YC20150328

World | Sat Mar 28, 2015 3:53am EDT
Related: World, Yemen
Yemen Houthi rebels advance despite Saudi-led air strikes
ADEN | By Mohammed Mukhashef

(Reuters) - Yemen's Houthi rebels made broad gains in the country's south and east on Friday despite a second day of Saudi-led air strikes meant to check the Iranian-backed militia's efforts to overthrow President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi.

Shi'ite Muslim Houthi fighters and allied army units gained their first foothold on Yemen's Arabian Sea coast by seizing the port of Shaqra 100km (60 miles) east of Aden, residents told Reuters.

Explosions and crackles of small gunfire rang out across Aden late on Friday as Houthis made a push on the southern port city's airport, a witness said.

The advances threaten Hadi's last refuge in Yemen and potentially undermine the air campaign to support him.

The spokesman for the Saudi-led operation, Brigadier General Ahmed Asseri, told a news conference in Riyadh that defending the Aden government was the campaign's "main objective".

"The operation will continue as long as there is a need for it to continue," Asseri said.

Warplanes targeted Houthi forces controlling Yemen's capital Sanaa and their northern heartland on Friday. Asseri said that planes from the United Arab Emirates had carried out their first strikes in the past 24 hours.

In a boost for Saudi Arabia, Morocco said it would join the rapidly assembled Sunni Muslim coalition against the Houthis. Pakistan, named by Saudi Arabia as a partner, said it had made no decision on whether to contribute.
Related Coverage

› Saudi navy evacuates diplomats from Yemen's Aden: Saudi TV
› SLIDESHOW Yemen Houthi rebels advance despite Saudi-led air strikes

REGIONAL CONTEST

Riyadh’s military intervention is the latest front in a growing regional contest for power with Iran that is also playing out in Syria, where Tehran backs Assad’s government against mainly Sunni rebels, and Iraq, where Iranian-backed Shi’ite militias are playing a major role in fighting.

Sunni monarchies in the Gulf are backing Hadi and his fellow Sunnis in the country's south against the Shi'ite advance.

Yemen's powerful ex-president Ali Abdullah Saleh, whose military units fight alongside the Houthis, called on Friday for a cessation of hostilities by both sides, according to a statement carried by his party's website.

Yemeni Foreign Minister Riyadh Yaseen said the air campaign could end within days.

He said the door was still open for dialogue with the Houthis, while in a Facebook posting, Hadi urged Yemenis to be patient and predicted the Houthis would soon be gone.

But the Houthis and allied army units seized the southern town of Shaqra in Abyan province on Friday, gaining access to the Arabian Sea, residents said.

Their entry into the city means they control most land routes to Aden and can block tribal fighters trying to come in to reinforce Hadi's troops.

Residents said dozens of pickup trucks loaded with tribal fighters have reached the town of Mudyah and were expected to clash with the Houthi forces based in Shaqra and the town of Lodar.

During a week of intense fighting, the Houthis have taken the Red Sea port of al-Mukha to Aden's northwest, and the city's northern outskirts, suggesting Aden is danger, despite the air strikes against the Houthis.

Witnesses in Sanaa said Houthi fighters and allied military units were re-positioning some anti-aircraft units at police stations in some neighborhoods, causing panic among residents, who fear they will become targets for air strikes. Residents said aircraft targeted bases around Sanaa of Republican Guards allied to the Houthis, and also struck near a military installation that houses missiles. The Houthi-controlled Saba news agency put the death toll in Sanaa at 24 and said 43 were wounded and 14 houses were destroyed.

Houthi-run al-Masirah television also said 15 people were killed in an air strike on a market in the northern city of Saada.

OIL REGION HIT

The Republican Guards are loyal to Saleh, who retains wide power despite having left office in 2012 after mass protests.

Earlier air strikes south of the city and in the oil-producing Marib region appeared to target military installations also affiliated with Saleh.

Warplanes also hit two districts in the Houthis' northerly home province of Saada, tribal sources said.

The coalition began air strikes on Thursday to try to roll back Houthi gains and shore up Hadi, who has been holed up in Aden after fleeing Sanaa in February.

Hadi left Aden on Thursday to attend an Arab summit in Egypt on Saturday, where he aims to build support for the air strikes.

U.S. President Barack Obama expressed his support for the Saudi-led military action in a phone call with Saudi King Salman on Friday, the White House said.

In his first reaction to the attacks, Houthi leader Abdel-Malek al-Houthi on Thursday called Saudi Arabia a bad neighbor and "Satan's horn", saying in a televised speech Yemenis would confront the "criminal, unjust and unjustified aggression".

Mosques in Riyadh on Friday preached fiery sermons against the Houthis and their Iranian allies, describing the fight as a religious duty. Saudi Arabia's top clerical council gave its blessing to the campaign.

In the Iranian capital Tehran, Friday prayer leader Ayatollah Kazem Sadeghi described the attacks as "an aggression and interference in Yemen’s internal affairs".

Iran has denounced the assault on the Houthis and demanded an immediate halt to Saudi-led military operations.

While U.S. officials have downplayed the scope of the ties between Iran and the Houthis, Saudi ambassador to Washington Adel al-Jubeir said members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and Iranian-backed Hezbollah are on the ground advising the Houthis.

The Saudi military spokesman said there were no plans at this stage for ground force operations, but if the need arose, Saudi and allied ground forces would repel "any aggression."

(With additional reporting by Sami Aboudi, Maha El Dahan, and Ali Abdelatti and Eric Beech in Washington; writing by William Maclean; editing by Philippa Fletcher, Giles Elgood and Andrew Heavens)

Housecarl · Mar 28, 2015

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://au.news.yahoo.com/thewest/world/a/26823502/

Boko Haram fighters told to 'kill wives' as troops take its 'HQ'

AFP
March 27, 2015, 10:39 pm

Nigeria's military on Friday announced that troops had retaken the town of Gwoza from Boko Haram, from which the group declared their caliphate last year.

Defence spokesman Chris Olukolade told a news conference in the capital, Abuja, that the recapture came after "concerted and well-coordinated land and air operations".

"A lot of arms and ammunition have been recovered and the administrative headquarters (of Boko Haram) completely destroyed," he said.

"A massive cordon and search has commenced to locate any of the fleeing terrorists or hostages in their custody."

Earlier this month, residents who fled the town in Borno state told AFP that militants had been massing in Gwoza and killing local people who were unable to flee.

That led to speculation that the group, which has been pushed out of a number of towns in three northeast states in recent weeks, was preparing for a final assault.

Olukolade said dead bodies had been discovered in a well, while one man who was forcibly conscripted into the militants' ranks said the group's leader had ordered women in the town to be killed.

Usman Ali, a 35-year-old farmer, said Abubakar Shekau addressed his fighters on March 15 and told them to kill the women they have taken as wives.

"He said they should go back to Gwoza and kill all of their women they left behind. He said if they didn't kill them they would not join them in paradise," he told AFP after managing to escape.

"They took us along to Gwoza where we witnessed the carnage."

Earlier this month residents who fled Bama, also in Borno state, had also reported that dozens of women forced into marriage with Boko Haram fighters were killed.

- Boko Haram 'fleeing' -

On August 24 last year, Shekau declared that Gwoza was "part of the Islamic caliphate", adding to speculation the militants were imitating the Islamic State group.

Shekau had the previous month praised IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi but stopped short of pledging allegiance. He has since formally allied himself to the group in Syria and Iraq.

Nigeria's national security spokesman Mike Omeri said last week that troops had begun the "final onslaught" against Boko Haram, saying Gwoza was one of three areas yet to be retaken.

Olukolade said on Friday: "As at yesterday, the military has been able to take over virtually all the enclaves and hideouts where the terrorists were marauding.

"It is observed that some of the terrorists are currently fleeing towards border areas."

He said fleeing Boko Haram fighters were likely to "run into subsequent encounter(s) with contingents" of the Multinational Joint Task Force who have been mandated to contain them, he added.

A four-nation coalition of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon has claimed a number of successes since the turn of the year to end the insurgency which has claimed more than 13,000 lives since 2009.

The ongoing operation was cited as a reason to delay Nigeria's general election on February 14 to this Saturday, as soldiers would not be able to provide security nationwide.

In a televised address broadcast on Friday before weekend elections, President Goodluck Jonathan hailed troops for having "successfully stemmed the seizure of Nigerian territories".

But Chad's President Idriss Deby accused Nigeria of failing to cooperate with the regional coalition battling the jihadists, saying there had been zero contact between their armies.

"The whole world is asking why the Nigerian army, which is a big army... is not in a position to stand up to untrained kids armed with Kalashnikovs," Deby told French magazine Le Point, in an interview published this week.

Morning news break – March 28

Housecarl · Mar 28, 2015

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://atimes.com/2015/03/obama-leashes-the-saudi-war-dogs/

Obama leashes the Saudi war dogs

Author: M.K. Bhadrakumar March 28, 2015
2 Comments
Asia Times

The international dimension to the conflict in Yemen has surged dramatically. This is not surprising because the fact of the matter is that the civil war in that country is entangled with global challenges and big-power relations, notwithstanding the simplistic perception that it is yet another manifestation of Saudi-Iranian rivalry. There is no denying that terrorist groups are operating in Yemen; Yemen is a strategically located country; Saudi Arabia’s security is affected; energy security could get disrupted; Shi’ite empowerment is a crucial template of regional stability; the impulses of the Arab Spring are from exhausted; and, the prestige of the United Nations is under challenge in Yemen.

President Barack Obama spoke with King Salman bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia on Friday and “emphasized the United States’ support” for the Saudi air attacks on Yemen. Obama “underscored” the US’ commitment to Saudi Arabia’s security. Thereupon, they agreed on “our collective goal” to steer Yemen through a “negotiated political solution facilitated by the United Nations and involving all parties as envisioned in the GCC Initiative” so as to achieve “lasting stability.”

The Saudi ambassador in Washington has also acknowledged that the US has been “very supportive” of the operation in Yemen not only politically but logistically as well and that Riyadh is “very pleased” with the level of military and intelligence coordination with the US. The National Security Council spokesperson separately confirmed in Washington that Obama has authorized the provision of logistical and intelligence support for the Saudi-led military operations. Other reports mention that the US is establishing a Joint Planning Cell with Saudi Arabia and that the US Navy handled a rescue operation involving two Saudi pilots.

From the above, It is tempting to rush to a facile conclusion that Obama is leading from behind the Saudi operations in Yemen. But such a conclusion will be judgmental. The key expressions in the White House readout on Obama’s conversation with King Salman are: “lasting stability” and “a negotiated political solution”. The formulation suggests that Obama recognizes the imperative need of a power-sharing arrangement in Sana’a that would also accommodate the Houthi demand for an inclusive government. (The ousted president Hadi was a Saudi puppet for all purposes — something that the Houthis (and Iran) have militated against all along.)

It is important to note that Obama has advised King Salman at this early stage of the military intervention itself to go back to the drawing broad in New York which first worked out the transition in Sanaa three years ago, and to re-negotiate a political solution “facilitated by the United Nations and involving all parties.”

Simply put, the conclusion becomes unavoidable that while Obama has no option but to be seen openly holding the hands of King Salman, a key ally, the US would have serious misgivings about the efficacy of the military intervention achieving anything of lasting value. The Saudis, after all, have no known record in modern history of being great performers in wars and the Americans willy-nilly factor in that if and when the Saudi operations in Yemen fail, a direct US military intervention may become unavoidable, which means involvement in another Middle eastern war, which is something that Obama has refused to contemplate.

Most certainly, Washington would also see that the weakening of the Houthis at the present juncture can only shift the balance of forces in favor of the extremist Islamist groups affiliated with the al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

Meanwhile, the standoffish stance taken by the European Union would also imply an early warning to the US from Brussels that it will essentially have to opt for a ‘coalition of the willing’ to carry forward any sustained military intervention in Yemen. In a clear-cut statement on Thursday, the EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini has disapproved of military actions on the whole and has counseled that the aim should be to reach “a political consensus through negotiations” so that a “sustainable solution” becomes available. She specifically warned about the danger of extremist and terrorist groups taking advantage of the situation “dramatically”.

Mogherini also advised the regional actors to “act responsibly and constructively, to create as a matter of urgency the conditions for a return to negotiations”. She saw in particular a role for the UN and the regional actors (read Iran). On the whole, her remarks hint at a distancing from the precipitate Saudi operation.

Conceivably, Obama and Mogherini’s thinking converge. And that brings in the role of Russia and Iran. Of course, Moscow and Tehran have held consultations. President Vladimir Putin received a phone call on Thursday from his Iranian counterpart Hassan Rouhani and has been reported as stressing “the urgency of an immediate cessation of hostilities and of stepping up efforts, including the UN, to develop options for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.”

Clearly, Moscow is reading the tea leaves correctly that US will turn to the UN Security Council shortly to open a political and diplomatic track and that Russia’s cooperation becomes vital. Moscow is positioning itself accordingly. On Friday, Putin took a meeting of Russia’s Security Council (Russia’s highest policymaking body) to discuss Yemen. Later, he also held a telephone conversation with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during which he “stressed the need to step up the international community’s efforts to reach a peaceful and long-term settlement of the situation in Yemen.”

In sum, what emerges is that the US, Russia and the EU have been in unison that an intra-Yemeni political solution negotiated through the good offices of the UN only can ensure lasting peace and stability.

This dominant thinking in the world capitals make it very difficult for the Saudis to push ahead with the military operations and expand them to a ground offensive. Interestingly, Riyadh has since advised Islamabad to postpone the visit by a high-level Pakistani delegation including military officials that was to have taken place on Friday. (See my blog Pakistan’s Yemeni War.) Sensing that the Saudis are having a rethink, Islamabad has also quickly re-calibrated its earlier enthusiasm to be part of the Saudi-led coalition. The latest mantra is, “We [Pakistan] have made no decision to participate in this war. We didn’t make any promise. We have not promised any military support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.” (Daily Times).

All in all, the Saudi operations in Yemen are lacking a sense of direction and may have to give way to the political and diplomatic track sooner than later. Iran will be pleased that the prospect of the Houthis being accommodated in Yemen’s power structure in Sana’a as a legitimate constituent party looks brighter than ever. If that happens, Shi’ite empowerment in the region gains further ground. Indeed, the suppressed Shi’ite communities in Bahrain (where Shi’ites are in majority) and other regional states in the Gulf, including even in Saudi Arabia, are watching closely the denouement in Yemen.

As the best-organized force in Yemen, the Houthis can afford to play the long game. Their winning trump card, in the ultimate analysis, is that they are the bulwark against the al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Yemen — and not the GCC states.

Housecarl · Mar 28, 2015

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http://english.alarabiya.net/en/vie...Decisive-Storm-is-Iran-s-worst-nightmare.html

Why 'Operation: Decisive Storm' is Iran’s worst nightmare

Saturday, 28 March 2015
Majid Rafizadeh

Often, scholars and politicians have made the argument that regional powers in the Middle East are opposed to a nuclear deal between Iran and the six world powers due to the nuclear technicalities of the deal or restoring relationships between Tehran and the U.S. Nevertheless, this premise fails to shed light on the underlying concerns, nuances and intricacies of such a nuclear deal as well as Iran’s multi-front role in the region.

The underlying regional concerns are not primarily linked to the potential reaching of a final nuclear deal with the Islamic Republic or easing of ties between the West and Tehran. At the end of the day, regional powers would welcome and be satisfied with a nuclear deal that can ratchet down regional tension, eliminate the possibility of the Islamic Republic to become a nuclear state, and prevent a nuclear arms race.

But what is most worrying is the expanding empire of the Islamic Republic across the Arab world from Beirut to Baghdad, and from Sanaa to Damascus, as the nuclear talks reach the final stages and as no political will exists among the world powers to cease Iran’s military expansion.

Establishing another proxy in Yemen

Iran’s Quds forces have long being linked to the Houthis. The Islamic Republic continues to fund and provide military support to the Houthis (by smuggling weapons such as AK-47s, surface-to-air missiles as well as rocket-propelled grenades) in order to establish another proxy in the Arab world.

Iran’s long-term strategic and geopolitical objectives in Yemen are clear. The Islamic Republic's attempt to have a robust foothold near the border of Saudi Arabia, as well as in the Gulf Peninsula, will tip the balance of power in favor of Tehran.

By empowering the Houthis, Tehran would ensure that Saudi Arabia is experiencing grave national security concerns, the possibility of conflict spill-over, and internal instability. In addition, by influencing Yemeni politics through the Houthis, Iranian leaders can pressure Saudi Arabia to accept Iran’s political, strategic and economic dominance in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon as well.

Regional robust actions such as Operation Decisive Storm are sometimes required in order to set limits to Iran’s hegemonic, imperialistic objectives

Majid Rafizadeh

The latest advancement of the Houthis supported the interests of the Islamic Republic until recently. There was a need for robust action against Iran’s hegemonic ambitions. Nevertheless, the West was resistant to act.

From geopolitical, strategic and humanitarian perspective, the robust military action, Operation Decisive Storm, is a calculated and intelligent move to send a strong signal to the Islamic Republic that its interference in another Arab state will not be overlooked. In other words, Arab states do not have to wait for the West to act against Iran’s covert activities and support for Shiite loyalist-militias in the region.

The tightening grip over another Arab capital

As the nuclear talks between Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States - the five permanent members of the Security Council - plus Germany (P5+1) and the Islamic Republic appear to show progress towards a final agreement to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the world powers (specifically the United States) have chosen to turn a blind eye on Iran’s military expansion in the Arab states, and particularly in Yemen.

Iran’s long term strategic and geopolitical agenda should not be overlooked. Iranian leaders’ hegemonic ambition is to consolidate and strengthen its grip on the Arab states, and to have control over Arab capitals from Beirut to Baghdad and from Sanaa to Damascus.

The Islamic Republic’s ambitions to expand its empire during the nuclear talks and regional insecurities are carried out through several platforms. Central figures, such as Quds Force commander General Qassem Soleimani, hardliners such as Ali Reza Zakani, Tehran's representative in the Iranian parliament and a close figure to the Iranian supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the Supreme Leader himself, play a crucial role in fulfilling Iran’s regional hegemonic ambitions.

Iranian leaders are not even concerned about repercussions from boasting about their grip over Arab capitals. Zakani recently bragged about having control over Arab capitals, "Three Arab capitals have today ended up in the hands of Iran and belong to the Islamic Iranian revolution". He added that Sanaa will soon be under the grip on the Islamic Republic as well. According to him, most of Yemen’s territories will soon be under the power of the Shiite group, the Houthis, supported by the Islamic Republic.

The second platform that the Islamic Republic utilizes is sponsoring, financing, equipping, training and advising loyalist and heterodox Shiite groups across the region. The number of these militia groups is on the rise and they operate as a pawn to serve the geopolitical, strategic, economic, ideological and national interests of the ruling clerics.

America's lack of political willingness to act

As the Islamic Republic creates such Shiite groups across the region to “protect” Arab capitals, Tehran centralizes its power across the region. In addition, after the creation of new Shiite groups, the elimination of these proxies will not be a simple task, for they will be ingrained in the socio-political and socio-economic fabric of the society.

In addition, these loyalist militia groups are game changers in the region, tipping the balance of power further in favor of the Islamic Republic and its regional hegemonic ambitions.

The expansion of Iran’s military and loyalist-militia groups in the region transcends Tehran’s political ambitions. The ideological tenet of this expansion and of Tehran’s overall growing regional empire (under the banner of Popular Mobilization Forces: an umbrella institution of Shiite armed groups) are crucial facets to analyze.

More fundamentally, as the final nuclear deal approaches, and as Tehran witnesses the weakness of Washington and other powers when deciding to overlook Iran’s militaristic and imperialistic activities in the region, Tehran has become more emboldened and vocal when it comes to its military expansion.

Iranian leaders boast about their role in Arab states projecting Tehran as a savior for the Arab world. As Zakani stated, according to Iran’s Rasa new agency “had Hajj Qassem Soleimani not intervened in Iraq, Baghdad would have fallen, and the same applies to Syria; without the will of Iran, Syria would have fallen”.

Nevertheless, by the U.S. being so concentrated on a nuclear deal and President Obama being so focused on leaving behind a historic legacy regarding a nuclear deal with Iran, the unintended consequences of such an inefficient foreign policy are being ignored and overshadowed. Although the U.S. has military bases in the region, it has evidently chosen to ignore Iran’s military expansion.

The concerns of regional countries about the nuclear deal is not solely linked to the nuclear technicalities of the deal or Iran-West rapprochement, but are primarily related to Iran’s growing empire as well as the consequences of such a nuclear deal leading Tehran to apply more assertive and expansionist foreign policy in the region.

Regional robust actions such as Operation Decisive Storm are sometimes required in order to set limits to Iran’s hegemonic, imperialistic objectives, and interference in other Arab states’ affairs, as well as in order to prevent the destabilizing effects emanating from the growing militia rebels sponsored by the Islamic Republic.

_____________

Majid Rafizadeh is an Iranian-American scholar, author and U.S. foreign policy specialist. Rafizadeh is the president of the International American Council. He serves on the board of Harvard International Review at Harvard University and Harvard International Relations Council. He is a member of the Gulf 2000 Project at Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs. Previously he served as ambassador to the National Iranian-American Council based in Washington DC.

Last Update: Saturday, 28 March 2015 KSA 10:56 - GMT 07:56
Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in the opinion section are their own and do not reflect Al Arabiya News's point-of-view.

Housecarl · Mar 28, 2015

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http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2015/03/obamas_iran_deal_the_salt_precedents.html

March 28, 2015
Obama's Iran Deal: The SALT Precedents
By John C. Wohlstetter
Comments 3

President Obama’s decision to avoid congressional scrutiny of his emerging nuclear deal with Iran led 47 GOP senators to write a letter warning Iran – and the president – that the Senate expects to be consulted. A subsequent bipartisan letter signed by 367 members of the House of Representatives also urged the president to consult Congress. A look at major 20th-century strategic arms accords lends decisive weight to the position taken by Congress.

It is apparent that if President Obama inks a deal with Iran over its nuclear program, it will be in the form of an executive agreement, to escape the inconvenience of submitting it to the Senate as a treaty. Given the two-thirds supermajority treaty consent requirement of Article II of the U.S. Constitution – formal legal ratification occurs only if the president signs – the president’s giveaway deal with Iran, if reached, would face a brick wall in the GOP-controlled Senate.

Consider the experience with the SALT I, SALT II and START accords. They illustrate when executive agreements should be used and when formal treaties should be submitted. Informing that debate was the 1961 statute establishing the Arms Control & Disarmament Agency (ACDA), which then governed arms treaties (emphasis added):

POLICY FORMULATION

SEC. 33. The Director is authorized and directed to prepare for the President, the Secretary of State, and the heads of such other Government agencies, as the President may determine, recommendations concerning United States arms control and disarmament policy: Provided however. That no action shall be taken under this or any other law that will obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States, except pursuant to the treaty making power of the President under the Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States.

So, executive agreements were expressly disfavored in the nuclear arms arena. The exception that evolved is for interim accords. But major interim accords received congressional scrutiny, most notably with the 1972 SALT I executive agreement on offensive systems.

In May 1972, President Nixon signed two accords in Moscow. The ABM Treaty sharply limited superpower deployment of missile defense systems. Ratified 88-2, it lapsed when in 2002 President George W. Bush exercised the treaty’s unilateral right-to-exit clause, and after a six-month waiting period, the U.S. exited. Moscow, already under Vladimir Putin’s rule, could not – and did not – protest. Had it done so, it would have been solely of political significance, raising the political cost of exiting a treaty the U.S. had a clear legal right to exit without Moscow’s formal consent.

Also executed in Moscow was an interim five-year agreement on deployment of offensive strategic nuclear systems. It was submitted as an executive agreement, hence not subject to treaty ratification. However, senators insisted that they have a say regarding the executive agreement as part of the Senate’s treaty consent process. They accomplished this via the Jackson Amendment, named for legendary defense hawk Democrat Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson, and aimed squarely at the executive agreement. Passed by a 56-35 majority, it provided that any accord would allow equal levels of force quantity and quality – what became known in strategic parlance as “essential equivalence.” In pertinent part, Jackson’s amendment stated that the Senate

… urges and requests the President to seek a future treaty that, inter alia, would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union; and the Congress considers that the success of these agreements and the attainment of more permanent and comprehensive agreements are dependent upon the maintenance under present world conditions of a vigorous research and development and modernization program as required by a prudent strategic posture.

The parties signed a third document in Moscow: a general statement of principles governing U.S.-Soviet relations. This was not submitted to Congress.

In December 1974, the Ford administration negotiated a further interim accord at Vladivostok, to go into effect in October 1977 and expire December 1985. In the face of strong rising domestic opposition, the accord never was formally submitted.

In June 1979, President Carter signed the SALT II Treaty in Vienna, which formalized limits on offensive systems. It was to expire in December 1985, but when submitted to the Senate in September 1979, it stalled. Moscow’s December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan sealed the treaty’s fate. Though SALT II was never ratified, the Reagan administration adhered to its U.S. limits, if only because a Democratic House of Representatives would not appropriate funds for systems beyond the SALT II number. SALT II duly passed its intended expiration date at the end of 1985. Yet subsequent Congresses still refused to appropriate funds to enable the U.S. to exceed any treaty limits.

With the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the George H.W. Bush administration began the era of deep cuts in superpower arsenals via the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START): START I (1991); START II (1997, never ratified by the Russian parliament); and START III – the so-called Moscow Treaty (2002). President Obama won 2010 ratification of the New START, but the vast share of strategic nuclear arms reductions had taken place in the earlier post-Cold War treaties, in the three preceding administrations.

Thus we see that final accords were submitted as formal treaties seeking advice and consent of the Senate. Executive agreements were used for interim accords only. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Congress played a central role in arms control, using its power of the purse to curb growth of American strategic nuclear forces. ACDA was abolished in 1999, its functions folded into the State Department’s Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance. By then, three decades of active congressional participation in arms control accords had established well-grounded historical precedent.

Nonetheless, President Obama’s apparent intention to style the Iran accord an executive agreement –as a final settlement between the parties – clearly runs counter to the precedent set in earlier strategic nuclear arms agreements. And his emerging option to submit a final nuclear arms control deal to the United Nations Security Council rather than to the Senate is wholly unprecedented.

The deal would give Iran a “right to enrich” never given to any nation since the Nonproliferation Treaty went into effect in 1970. Iran has been offered a “sunset” provision, believed to be ten years, after which all nuclear activities of Iran will be legitimized, including weapons-related development and deployment. Yet Iran has stated that it will reject even this minimal limit on its nuclear ambitions.

Adam J. White offers a further note in The Weekly Standard, as to Vice President Biden’s position taken while in the Senate, which insisted that the Senate play a major role in arms accords:

"The essence of the treaty power," Biden concluded, "is that the president and the Senate are partners in the process by which the United States enters into, and adheres to, international obligations."

Back then, Senator Biden was taking a victory lap for having convinced the Senate to limit its approval of President Reagan's treaty with the Soviet Union on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, by attaching a "condition" that would require the executive branch to defer to the Senate's interpretation of the treaty's terms.

But the condition – which, with characteristic modesty, Bidencalled "the Biden Condition" – did even more than that. As Senator Biden put it in 1989, the Senate's move did nothing less than "repudiate decisively" the Reagan administration's theory of the president's diplomatic authority under the Constitution.

While questions pertaining to executive agreements were not before the Senate as to the INF Treaty, it is inconceivable that then-senator Biden would have generously interpreted the scope of executive branch discretionary authority to bypass such accords. Rather, as a longtime ardent proponent of capacious senatorial prerogative – and especially as to arms control, then his prime national security concern – he surely would have sought an active role in concluding any presidential arms accord, regardless of the form it took.

In the event, given adamant senatorial opposition to the president’s proposed Iran deal, the president will gamble that the courts declare the matter a “political question” and hence decline to intervene. The president takes the position, in domestic matters as well as foreign policy and national security, that if Congress declines to do his bidding, he has a constitutional right to bypass the legislature entirely.

But the extent of power accorded the legislative, executive, and judicial branches is the same, regardless of whether they act prudently, and regardless of whether they act out of benevolent or malevolent motive. Whether a GOP Congress opposes a presidential initiative out of political expediency, personal animus toward the president, or sheer lassitude matters not one whit in determining the constitutional powers of Congress. No president has a constitutional entitlement to have any presidential proposal passed. And no prior president has claimed such a power in the face of legislative opposition. Even Ronald Reagan, who won twice by landslides, regularly negotiated with an often hostile Democratic House of Representatives throughout his two terms in office.

In stark contrast, President Obama takes a “my way or the highway” approach, with his fallback being circumventing congressional opposition by executive fiat. If the courts uphold such exercise as constitutional, or even if the courts simply stand aside by hiding behind the “political question” doctrine, the result will be to leave in ruins the venerable constitutional doctrine of separation of powers among co-equal branches.

And in the policy context of allowing the president to evade the Senate’s “advise and consent” power, the result will leave the global nuclear nonproliferation regime in ruins, with regional nuclear arms races and, eventually, one or more nuclear wars likely to follow.

John C. Wohlstetter is a senior fellow at the Discovery Institute and London Center for Policy Research, author of Sleepwalking With the Bomb, and founder of the issues blog Letter From the Capitol.

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Housecarl · Mar 28, 2015

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https://ca.news.yahoo.com/iran-powers-close-2-3-page-nuclear-deal-005722703.html

Iran, powers close in on two-three page nuclear deal; success uncertain: officials

By By Louis Charbonneau and Parisa Hafezi | Reuters – 5 hours ago

LAUSANNE, Switzerland/ANKARA (Reuters) - Iran and major powers are close to agreement on a 2- or 3-page accord with specific numbers that would form the basis of a long-term settlement aimed at ending a 12-year standoff over Tehran's nuclear ambitions, officials said on Friday.

Western and Iranian officials familiar with the negotiations between Iran, the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China cautioned that they still had not agreed on the framework of a deal and key details were still being hotly negotiated.

"The sides are very, very close to the final step and it could be signed or agreed and announced verbally," a senior Iranian official familiar with the talks told Reuters on condition of anonymity. Other officials echoed the remarks while warning that negotiations in the coming days might still fail.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif have been discussing the political framework agreement for days in Lausanne, Switzerland. Other foreign ministers from the six-power group are expected to arrive over the weekend.

There were discussions under way about whether to make the 2- or 3-page document public, but two officials said it would be released. It was expected that some details of the agreement would be kept confidential, officials noted.

"The plan is for the 2-3 page (document) to be made public," one official said.

Earlier a senior U.S. official said it was now time for Iran to make the necessary hard decisions to make a deal possible.

If agreed, the document would cover key numbers for a future nuclear agreement between Iran and the six - such as the maximum number and types of uranium enrichment centrifuges Iran could operate, the size of uranium stockpiles it could maintain, types of atomic research and development it could undertake and details on lifting sanctions that have crippled Iran's economy.

One of the key numbers in the agreement is expected to be the duration of the agreement, which the officials said would have to be in place for more than 10 years. And once the main agreement would expire, there would likely be a period of special U.N. monitoring for Tehran's nuclear program.

The goal of the negotiations, under way for nearly 18 months, is to hammer out an accord under which Iran would halt sensitive nuclear work for at least a decade in exchange for lifting sanctions, with the ultimate aim of ending Iran's 12-year nuclear standoff with the West and reducing the risk of a war in the Middle East.

The two sides have been working to agree on a preliminary framework accord by the end of March, to be followed by a comprehensive deal by June 30 that includes all technical details on limits Tehran would place on sensitive nuclear activities in exchange for the easing of sanctions.

It remains unclear whether the agreement between the two sides will be formally signed or agreed to verbally. The Iranians have been opposed to the idea of a written agreement, fearing that committing to something in writing would limit Tehran's negotiating space while the technical details would be worked out in the coming months.

Even if such a preliminary deal is accepted in the coming days, the officials said, there was no guarantee the two sides would be able to agree on the many technical details by June 30. The negotiations could still fall apart afterward, they cautioned.

There are some details that have been out in the open for months. An Iranian government website said in November that Washington could let Iran keep some 6,000 early-generation centrifuges, down from nearly 10,000 now in operation.

Along with lifting U.N. sanctions, officials say the biggest sticking point in the talks remains centrifuge research and development. They say Iran wants to conduct advanced centrifuge research at the underground Fordow site, but the Western powers dislike the idea of Iran operating centrifuges there.

The deal would call for U.S., European Union and United Nations Sanctions to be lifted gradually according to a specific schedule. Some sanctions could be lifted very quickly, the officials said.

Iran denies allegations by Western powers and their allies that it is seeking the capability to produce atomic weapons.

(Additional reporting by John Irish; Editing by Ken Wills)

Housecarl · Mar 28, 2015

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http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/no-china-isnt-abandoning-north-korea/

No, China Isn't Abandoning North Korea

The idea that Beijing will abandon North Korea remains wishful thinking.

By David Volodzko
March 27, 2015
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The idea going around in the West these days is that Beijing and Pyongyang are not on good terms. Given the regional importance and historic strength of this relationship, such claims deserve careful attention.

According to a 2015 European Council on Foreign Relations scorecard, China began distancing itself from North Korea after its 2013 nuclear test. China took further steps in 2014, meeting several times with South Korean leaders, including the July 2014 trip when Xi broke tradition by visiting Seoul before visiting Pyongyang. At the time, the Atlantic Sentinel reported that Xi is “distancing China” from Pyongyang, while The Guardian wrote, “China Snubs North Korea” and a New York Times headline read, “Chinese Annoyance with North Korea Bubbles to the Surface.” Other commentators went even further writing, “China Kinda Hates North Korea” or discussing “Why China Hates North Korea.”

Meanwhile, in an article for The Diplomat last February titled, “What China and North Korea Really Think of Each Other,” Kerry Brown reported on Xi’s “glaring” failure to visit Pyongyang and quoted Dear Leader, the memoir of former North Korean counter-intelligence operative Jang Jin-sung, who defected to South Korea in 2004. In his book, Jang says, “the country Kim Jong-il hates most is China.” So then, do Beijing and Pyongyang hate each other?

The simple answer is that it probably doesn’t matter. Beijing and Pyongyang are too important to each other to end their relationship anytime soon. Brown points out that North Korea is increasingly a worry as Xi promotes the “China Dream” and the new Silk Road and improves relations abroad. However, the reason North Korea is a worry is because of its importance to the future of Asia. This is something Beijing leaders, including Xi, fully realize. In a recent Stratfor study, Rodger Baker writes that China is “growing frustrated with North Korea’s behavior,” but points out that the relationship between these nations, rather than being ideological in nature, is actually based on “security calculations.” Baker argues that North Korea is important to China as a buffer state, shielding China from Western influence in much the same way that the Ukraine now shields Russia, and he points out that North Korea is crucial in ensuring that any future Korean reunification leans toward Beijing.

Baker adds that Beijing might be pretending to grow tired of North Korea in order to “trade their assistance with North Korea for political concessions elsewhere.” The problem with playing the long game, however, is that time is running out. North Korean actions are beginning to trigger “expanded U.S. missile defense,” “Japanese remilitarization,” and “increased potential for closer Japanese-South Korean military cooperation.”

In trying to calm the waters, Beijing has remained a member of the Six-Party Talks over the North Korean nuclear program, since the program has the potential to draw China into war. Still, China’s distaste for Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions doesn’t necessarily mean that Beijing is walking away from the relationship, as Western media suggest.

As for Pyongyang, it is currently too dependent on China to consider alienating it. For instance, the 1961 Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty, which promises Chinese military aid to North Korea in the event of an attack, was resigned again in 2001 and is now valid until 2021. Also, North Korea gets most of its oil and gas from China, and half of China’s foreign aid goes to North Korea, giving it breathing room when facing the United Nations. Most importantly, China is North Korea’s largest trade partner, accounting for 57 percent of North Korean imports and 42 percent of its exports. In other words, for all its saber-rattling, North Korea cannot afford not to negotiate if Beijing applies enough pressure, although so far Beijing has shown no interest in forcing Pyongyang’s hand.

Beijing also knows that much of North Korea’s seemingly short-sighted military actions are in fact anything but that. According to analysis by Sung-Yoon Lee, since North Korea cannot compete with South Korea economically, it relies “on military and political brinkmanship to make up ground.” By doing so, despite its limited resources, Pyongyang has been able to move impressive amounts of political weight.

While North Korea relies heavily on Chinese trade and energy, it is also a central part of Beijing’s regional strategic goals. Therefore, Beijing’s position regarding Pyongyang’s nuclear program should not be taken as a reflection of its attitude toward Pyongyang in general. While reports of a change in mood are perhaps partly true, they have been inflated by Western wishful thinking.

Housecarl · Mar 28, 2015

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Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/28/us-mideast-crisis-idlib-control-idUSKBN0MO0M020150328

World | Sat Mar 28, 2015 10:14am EDT
Related: World
Islamist fighters control Syrian city of Idlib: monitor
BEIRUT

(Reuters) - Islamist groups including al Qaeda's Nusra Front have seized the Syrian city of Idlib for the first time since the conflict in the country began, fighters and a monitoring group said on Saturday.

By taking Idlib, the capital of a northwestern province of the same name, the insurgents now control a second province after Raqqa, a stronghold of the Islamic State group and target of U.S.-led air strikes.

Syrian officials could not be immediately reached for comment.

(Reporting by Mariam Karouny; Editing by Toby Chopra)

brudog · Mar 28, 2015

Thanks for the briefing, Housecarl.

Housecarl · Mar 28, 2015

brudog said:
Thanks for the briefing, Housecarl.

You're most welcome.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://apnews.myway.com/article/20150328/ml-arab-force-qa-10af5839c1.html

Questions and answers about the Arab peacekeeping force

Mar 28, 4:43 PM (ET)

CAIRO (AP) — Arab League member states have agreed in principle to form a joint inter-Arab military peacekeeping force. While details of how such a force would actually operate remain thin, the agreement is a telling sign of a new determination among Saudi Arabia, Egypt and their allies to intervene aggressively in regional hotspots, whether against Islamic militants or spreading Iranian power. Here's a look at some of the questions surrounding the plan:

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HOW WILL THE JOINT FORCE WORK?

Senior officials from participating counties have been dispatched to collectively examine the issue and report back within about a month. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi, a strong proponent of the idea, has described the force as an absolute necessity. Egyptian military and security officials have said the proposed force would be made of up to 40,000 elite troops and will be headquartered in either Cairo or Riyadh, the Saudi capital. The force would be backed by jet-fighters, warships and light armor.

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WHO WILL LEAD IT?

Saudi Arabia, as the region's economic powerhouse, will likely take a leadership role. Egypt, which boasts the Arab world's largest standing army, will also be a major player. However Egypt is heavily dependent on financial aid from Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Gulf Arab nations who have donated billions to bankroll the country's struggling economy. The combination of common concerns between Riyadh and Cairo and economic dependence will probably mean that the specific concerns and fears of the Gulf Arab monarchies will hold sway.

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IS THERE ANY PRECEDENT FOR THIS?

Creation of such a force has been a longtime goal that has eluded Arab nations in the 65 years since they signed a rarely used joint defense pact. Gulf nations, under the umbrella of the Gulf Cooperation Council joined forces to defeat a string of destabilizing Arab Spring protests in 2011 by the Shiite majority in Sunni-ruled Bahrain

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WILL THE JOINT FORCE BE DEPLOYED IN YEMEN?

All indications from participants in the Arab League summit in the Egyptian resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh are that the force could take months to truly come together. That is most likely too long for it to play a meaningful role in the current Yemeni crisis. However the current ad hoc Saudi-led coalition that is conducting airstrikes against Shiite rebels who have conquered most of Yemen could serve as a template for what the force will eventually become.

---

WILL THE FORCE REPRESENT ALL 22 ARAB LEAGUE NATIONS?

Unlikely, since already there are indications in Sharm el-Sheikh that joining the force will be optional. The force, as currently envisioned, would essentially be a Sunni Muslim Arab force representing the interests of Sunni nations like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In addition to potentially combatting radical Sunni forces like al-Qaida and the Islamic State group, it may also be deployed in ways designed to counter the influence of Shiite regional powerhouse Iran. Arab countries like Iraq, where Iran wields significant influence over the government, have already expressed public reservations about the plan.

Housecarl · Mar 29, 2015

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.france24.com/en/20150328-eu-ukraine-summit-take-place-april-27-poroshenko/

28 March 2015 - 18H06
EU-Ukraine summit to take place on April 27: Poroshenko

KIEV (AFP) -

A summit between top European Union officials and Ukraine's leaders will take place in Kiev at the end of April, Ukraine President Petro Poroshenko announced on Saturday.

During a phone conversation with European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, "the parties... confirmed that the Ukraine-EU summit would be held on April 27," a statement on Poroshenko's official website said.

The holding of annual summits was set down in the association agreement signed by the EU and Kiev's pro-western government after it came to power in June 2014.

That followed the fall of the pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014, who left the country following three months of bloody protests sparked by his decision to suspend preparations for the signing of the EU agreement.

Juncker was due in Kiev on Monday, but has cancelled the trip due to "unforeseen health conditions," Poroshenko's office said.

The April summit is expected to address Poroshenko's request for European peacekeepers to help monitor a truce signed last month between Kiev and pro-Russian separatists in the east, aimed at ending nearly a year of fighting.

Officials will also discuss a possible aid boost for Ukraine's struggling economy, the statement said.

The European Parliament on Wednesday formally approved new economic aid worth 1.8 billion euros ($2 billion) for Ukraine, two-thirds of which could be disbursed by the end of the 2015.

Both Juncker and European Council President Donald Tusk are expected to attend, as well as EU heads of state and government, according to reports.

Brussels has also imposed heavy economic sanctions on Moscow, which is accused of sending weapons and troops in support of the pro-Russian rebels.

? 2015 AFP

Housecarl · Mar 29, 2015

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://apnews.myway.com/article/20150329/ml--yemen-9c678cebca.html

Saudi Arabia says strikes push Yemen rebels out of air bases

Mar 29, 1:55 AM (ET)
By AHMED AL-HAJ

SANAA, Yemen (AP) — A Saudi-led airstrike campaign targeting Shiite rebels who control much of Yemen has pushed them out of contested air bases and destroyed any jet fighter remaining in the Arab world's poorest country, the kingdom has said.

Saudi Brig. Gen. Ahmed bin Hasan Asiri said the airstrike campaign, now entering its fourth day Sunday, continued to target Scud missiles in Yemen, leaving most of their launching pads "devastated," according to remarks carried by the state-run Saudi Press Agency.

However, he warned Saturday that the Shiite rebels, known as Houthis, could control more of the missiles. His account could not be immediately corroborated.

The Houthis began their offensive in September, seizing the capital, Sanaa, and later holding embattled President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi under house arrest. The rebels later took over government in Yemen and ultimately forced Hadi to flee the country in recent days.

A Saudi-led coalition of some 10 countries began bombing Yemen on Thursday, saying it was targeting the Houthis and their allies, which include forces loyal to Yemen's former leader, Ali Abdullah Saleh.

On Saturday, Hadi directly accused Iran of being behind the Houthi offensive as leaders at an Arab summit considered creating a military reaction force in the Mideast, raising the specter of a regional conflict pitting Sunni Arab nations against Shiite power Iran. Iran and the Houthis deny that Tehran arms the rebel movement, though the Islamic Republic has provided humanitarian and other aid.

Meanwhile Sunday, Pakistan planned to dispatch a plane to the Yemeni city of Hodeida, hoping to evacuate some 500 citizens gathered there, said Shujaat Azim, an adviser to Pakistan's prime minister. Azim told state-run Pakistan Television more flights would follow as those controlling Yemen's airports allowed them.

Pakistan says some 3,000 of its citizens live in Yemen.

Ali Hassan, a Pakistani in Hodeida, told Pakistan's private GEO satellite news channel that hundreds there anxiously waited for a way home.

"We had sleepless nights due to the bombardment in Sanaa," Hassan said.

---

Associated Press writers Munir Ahmed in Islamabad and Jon Gambrell in Cairo contributed to this report.

mzkitty · Mar 29, 2015

I stuck this on the Iran thread; can't find the Israel thread right off the bat, so I'll stick this here too:

1m
Netanyahu says expected Iranian nuclear deal even worse than Israel had feared - @Reuters
End of alert

Housecarl · Mar 29, 2015

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/...regional-reset-among-egypt-sudan-and-ethiopia

Nile Deal Signals Regional Reset Among Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia

By Alex de Waal, March 27, 2015, Briefing

On Monday in Khartoum, the leaders of Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia signed an initial accord on mutual water rights to the Nile River, removing another obstacle to Ethiopia’s massive Grand Renaissance Dam, which has been a source of tension with its neighbors since construction began just 10 miles from Sudan’s border in 2011. But the agreement is about a lot more than water. It may signal a seismic shift in the politics of northeastern Africa and could lead to a new axis of cooperation to manage, if not resolve, conflicts in one of the world’s most turbulent regions.

The accord’s details are not yet public, and it is likely that Egypt is still not ready to accede to an earlier 2010 agreement reached under the auspices of the Nile Basin Initiative, a partnership among all the riparian states, that increased upstream countries’ share of Nile waters, at Egypt’s expense. But no matter: The real significance of the deal is that the door is now open for Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia to cooperate on many more pressing political and security issues around them.

Four crises top the list: Libya, interlinked problems in Yemen and Eritrea, and the civil war in South Sudan.

For Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi, in particular, the deal helps secure his activist foreign policy, aimed at stabilizing Egypt’s neighborhood so that the Muslim Brotherhood, whether at home or abroad, and Islamist militants in the Sinai Peninsula on one side and Libya on the other no longer threaten his regime. Improving Egypt’s ties with its African neighbors offers strategic depth to that policy, and for that Ethiopian cooperation is necessary. Ethiopia is the strongest state in the Horn of Africa and the seat of the African Union, from which Egypt was suspended following el-Sissi’s 2013 military takeover. Egypt was reinstated last year after ratifying a new constitution and holding presidential elections, which el-Sissi won easily.

In an address to the Ethiopian parliament Wednesday in Addis Ababa, which he visited after Khartoum, el-Sissi declared that Egypt wanted “to turn the page in the history of relations between the two countries,” referring to the two countries’ long history of rivalry. El-Sissi stressed the need for cooperation against the “epidemic of terrorism.” But for that, el-Sissi first had to settle the Nile waters dispute. With the new deal, Ethiopian Prime Minister Haile Mariam Dessalegn and Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir have shown they are ready to work with him.

Libya is Egypt’s foremost security challenge, and to achieve his goal of a victory for Gen. Khalifa Haftar in Libya’s proxy war, el-Sissi needs Sudanese cooperation. It was a little-known fact that Sudan provided essential military support to the Islamist rebels fighting Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi in 2011, and still has an influential role in the country, including reports of continued support for the coalition of Islamist militias currently fighting Haftar. El-Sissi neither likes nor trusts Bashir’s Islamist regime in Sudan—and Bashir, for his part, has criticized Egypt’s involvement in Libya—but el-Sissi knows Bashir is set for a comfortable win in next month’s presidential election and believes he can work with his Sudanese counterpart.

Meanwhile, Yemen’s slow-motion meltdown, which accelerated Thursday with Saudi-led, U.S.-backed airstrikes and talk of a ground invasion against Houthi rebels, is not just an Arabian Peninsula crisis. It is also a Red Sea crisis, as whoever controls the country’s coast and islands also controls the shipping lanes from the Suez Canal to Asia. Both Egypt and Sudan are keenly aware of that, and both have joined in the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen—with Cairo providing four naval vessels to secure the Gulf of Aden and possibly even ground forces, and Sudan promising air support and combat troops, too. Signing the preliminary water deal Monday, el-Sissi declared “We have chosen cooperation, and to trust one another for the sake of development.” This trust might also extend to regional security issues much sooner than he had expected.

For Ethiopia, the water deal is a way to turn longtime rivals into partners as it tries to become a kingmaker in its own backyard. That was evident last weekend, when Ethiopian fighter jets attacked two strategic sites—an arms depot and a copper mine—in Eritrea. Since the Algiers accords that ended the bitter and costly border war between the two countries in 2000, the two neighbors have been locked in a local cold war in which Eritrea has tried to destabilize Ethiopia, and Ethiopia has tried to isolate Eritrea. Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki had been trying to leverage his country’s strategic position across the Red Sea from Yemen to become the favored recipient of Egyptian-Saudi largesse for their interventions in the region. Afewerki recently restored diplomatic relations with Yemen—severed since a 1995 war over the Hanish Islands in the Red Sea—but also received a Houthi delegation in Asmara earlier this week. Eritrea’s military base on the lesser Hanish Island near the Yemeni coast has suddenly acquired huge strategic value. Last weekend’s air raid served as a signal from Addis Ababa that Ethiopia can stand in the way of Afewerki’s gambit.

Finally, the water deal also has implications for South Sudan, where peace talks to end that country’s civil war have broken down. The mediators, representing the neighboring African countries, are profoundly frustrated with South Sudan’s leaders, who have proven themselves incapable of even modestly working together. Despite common support for the peace talks, there is a danger of the war becoming a theater for regional rivalries, particularly between Sudan and Uganda, which has already deployed troops in support of South Sudanese President Salva Kiir. The prospect of a common, regional security strategy between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia could help avert that danger.

Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan have long histories of mutual suspicion to overcome, from tensions over sharing the Nile to being on opposite sides of many of the region’s conflicts. But the turmoil on their borders threatens them all, and the Nile water deal is the first sign that all three recognize the need for cooperation to face those hazards.

Alex de Waal is executive director of the World Peace Foundation and a research professor at the Fletcher School at Tufts University.

Housecarl · Mar 29, 2015

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.politico.com/magazine/st...aftermath-116464.html?ml=m_t2_2h#.VRfhFY55spp

An Iran Deal Would Only Start A Long Game

Many carrots—and sticks—would remain in place

By SIMOND DEGALBERT
March 27, 2015

A comprehensive Iran deal looks ever more likely today than it did recently, even if many issues remain to be solved. Western leaders have repeatedly stated their view that no deal would be preferable to a bad one—a point that’s yielded intense debate about what exactly would constitute a good deal versus a bad deal. Considering the highly technical nature of the issues at stake, it’s no surprise the devil will be in the details. It will be hard to assess the deal before every provision of the last annex to the comprehensive agreement is signed on, if it ever happens. But assuming we do, assessing the quality of the agreement should mostly be done in light of its objectives and of the agreement’s ability to fulfil them.

If a comprehensive deal is struck, it’s important to remember that the deal is just the beginning. As hard as the negotiations have been, the implementation and enforcement of the deal over the coming years will be an ongoing challenge—but it can be surmountable as long as the P5+1 set clear enforcement mechanisms.

To understand what a deal will mean in the years ahead, it’s important to understand how the negotiations unfolded. As a matter of fact, our expectations about what a comprehensive agreement could achieve have changed over time. Since 2002, concerns about the nature of Iran’s nuclear program have mostly been fueled by the covert development of enrichment activities, but also by their obvious inconsistency with any identifiable civilian needs and the acquisition of nuclear militarization know-how. Hence the long-term objective, enshrined in United Nations Security Council resolutions, to establish the exclusively peaceful nature of the program, through a full suspension of enrichment in Iran.

It is the assumption that this prerequisite would prevent a negotiated breakthrough that led P5+1 to alter the terms of their negotiation with Iran in the 2013 Joint Plan of Action. From that point forward, an agreement was not to be based on an unambiguous Iranian strategic shift, but rather on the insurance that Tehran’s program would not be turned from its existing dual nature to an entirely military one. Such “constructive” ambiguity about Iran’s program and intentions could be achieved through agreed upon enrichment restrictions, the conversion of the heavy-water reactor of Arak and intrusive monitoring and verification.

This evolution of the negotiation’s objectives relates today to many of the concerns about the time-limited nature of the restrictions that will be imposed on enrichment in Iran. Critics point out that such time limitations, referred to as the “sunset clause,” will enable Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon after restrictions would end, or at least to develop industrial-scale enrichment capacities then. Iran’s insistence to continue R&D activities on advanced centrifuges does not bode well in that respect.

As many experts have rightly said, the reality is that Iran will always remain subject to its Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations. As a result, if Iran nuclear activities continue to have a questionable civilian credibility after restrictions do end, the international community will remain entitled to challenge Tehran through international non-proliferation mechanisms and eventually through diplomacy, sanctions or coercive options. A comprehensive agreement is not a blank check; Iran should not interpret it as such.

While pursuing an altered objective, an agreement that efficiently prevents and deters Iran from breaking out of its obligations and of the NPT, while reducing the risk of military escalation, will protect the P5+1 interests. This is especially true considering the lack of current realistic alternatives, and it will remain so as long as Iran respect it.

We shall keep in mind, though, that it may not entirely solve the Iranian nuclear issue if Tehran keeps insisting in a decade or more on building a program that does not make any sense from a civilian nuclear energy standpoint. It’s also worth remembering that Iran may change in the future, thanks to the benefits that a comprehensive agreement will bring to her economy and her people. But what matters even more is, if that does not happen, the P5+1 will remain politically determined to enforce the NPT and stands ready to play the long game with Iran. If a comprehensive agreement is finally reached, that long game will require multiple tracks.

First, P5+1 must be determined to enforce the deal and set clear mechanisms to answer to any Iranian violations. It is easy to say today, but running away from the agreement in the future will be politically costly: Absent a blatant violation such as the discovery of further covert activities or facilities, the comprehensive agreement may over time become “too big to fail.” Short of obvious violations, P5+1 will also need to ensure that Iran refrains from testing the boundaries and ambiguities of the deal—something that Tehran may realistically try to do based on past records. The threat of sanctions snap-back could help to deter Iran, but the political will to expose all violations and/or “excursions” will also be critical to protect the integrity of the deal overtime. Individuals and entities that may conduct activities going against the objectives and provisions of the agreement could and should be sanctioned by the U.S. and the European Union.

Second, P5+1 will need to retain over the years ahead the relevant expertise and intelligence to be in a position to complement the verification mechanisms that the comprehensive agreement will put in place. Those tools should enable the IAEA to have all access that it will deem necessary. But Iran’s nuclear program shall remain a priority for all national agencies dealing with non-proliferation. Sufficient funding should be provided to them to do that. It will seem obvious in a year from now, but less so overtime while everyone’s focus will shift to tomorrow’s crisis.

Third, some countries in the Middle East will ask for reassurance following a comprehensive agreement with Iran. Some may be willing to find self-reassurance by developing domestic enrichment capacities to prepare themselves to reciprocate an Iranian break-out or Iranian long-term ambitions. Such sensitive technologies proliferation in the region would be very dangerous and P5+1 shall try to discourage them by convincing their allies that enhanced security assurances and their determination to oppose eventual Iranian destabilizing regional behavior will protect them more than acquiring uranium enrichment.

Finally, P5+1 will need to remain determined to go back to a confrontational approach if Iran’s nuclear ambitions remain mostly inconsistent with the NPT in the future, a possibility that an agreement will not discard. Iran has been very consistent over the past two decades in its pursuit of a dual-capable nuclear program. The agreement under discussion is the most realistic way to deal with it in the near future. But beyond it, the international community will need to be as consistent as Iran to defend its own strategic objective: an exclusively peaceful nuclear program in Iran.

Before we ever get there, Iran still has to make hard choices if it really wants to start building the international community’s trust in its intentions.

Simond DeGalbert is a former French diplomat and former member of the French negotiating team in the P5+1 discussions with Iran. He is now a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Follow him online at @simonddegalbert.

Housecarl · Mar 29, 2015

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/let-iraq-die-case-partition

March/April 2015
Let Iraq Die: A Case for Partition
Michael J. Totten
Comments 139

Iraq is finished, an expiring, cancerous nation on life support. Pulling the plug might be merciful. It might be cruel. But either way, it’s time to accept the fact that this country is likely to die and that we’ll all be better off when it does.

The Kurds in the north, who make up roughly twenty percent of the population, want out. They never wished to be part of Iraq in the first place. To this day, they still call the bathroom the “Winston Churchill,” in sarcastic homage to the former British prime minister who shackled them to Baghdad. Since the early 1990s, they’ve had their own government and autonomous region in the northern three provinces, and they held a referendum in 2005 in which 98.7 percent voted to secede and declare independence. The only reason they haven’t finally pulled the trigger is because it hasn’t been safe; the Turks—who fear the contagion of Kurdish independence inside their own country—have threatened to invade if they did.

The Sunni Arabs in the west, who make up another rough twenty percent of Iraq, aren’t itching for independence necessarily, but they sure as hell aren’t willing to live under the thumb of Shiite-dominated Baghdad any longer. Millions of them live now under the brutal totalitarian rule of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, which has declared its own state not only in a huge swath of Iraq but also in much of northeastern Syria. ISIS either controls or has a large presence in more than fifty percent of Iraq at the time of this writing.

Iraq’s Shiite majority, meanwhile, is terrified of its Sunni minority, which oppressed them mercilessly during Saddam Hussein’s terrifying rule and which now flies the black flag of al-Qaeda and promises unending massacres.

President Obama campaigned on ending the war in Iraq. For years—and for perfectly understandable reasons—he was very reluctant to wade into that country’s eternally dysfunctional internal problems, but even he was persuaded to declare war against ISIS in the fall of 2014 when its fighters made a beeline for Erbil, the capital of Iraq’s Kurdish autonomous region and the only stable and America-friendly place in the country.

But however engaged the US chooses to be, the current war in Iraq is likely to drag on for years. If Iraq somehow manages to survive its current conflict in one piece, another will almost certainly follow. Its instability is both devastating and chronic. Far better at this point if Iraq simply terminates itself as a state and lets its various constituent groups peaceably go their own way, as Yugoslavia did after its own catastrophic series of wars in the 1990s.

In his limited response to ISIS after its seizure of Mosul in early June, Obama called for, among other things, Iraq’s “territorial integrity” to be respected.

Obviously it would have been preferable had ISIS not invaded from Syria and conquered Iraqi territory, but generally speaking there is nothing holy about Iraq’s current borders. It has never been a coherent nation-state. Nor, for that matter, has Syria. Both are geographic abstractions that never would have existed had European colonial mapmakers not created them in the early twentieth century for their own self-interested reasons, now long obsolete and forgotten. Had Middle Easterners drawn their own borders, whether or not they did so peacefully, the map would be strikingly different—and more organic.

As Lebanon Renaissance Foundation co-founder Eli Khoury put it [1], “Syria and Iraq have so far only been governed by ruthless centralized iron. It’s otherwise hard to make sense of these places.”

Theoretically, Iraqis and Syrians still could have forged collective identities and ideals of patriotic nationalism between the time of their nations’ founding and now, but that didn’t happen in their neighborhood any more than it did in the former Yugoslavia. The dictators of Syria, Iraq, and Yugoslavia all tried to paper over the disunity in their countries with a theoretically binding international ideology—Baathist Arab nationalism, communism—but totalitarian regimes always crash in the end, and their ideologies inevitably go down along with them.

In the absence of tolerant pluralism and democratic political liberalism, the basic incoherence of these states guaranteed one of two outcomes. They’ll either be governed by “centralized iron,” as Khoury put it, or they’ll come apart at the seams. Centralized iron only holds incoherent nations together so long. Removing Hussein blew Iraq apart, and Syria blew apart even without its tyrant Bashar al-Assad being forced into exile or dragged from his palace.

Iraq’s current troubles began just one day after the US finished withdrawing its forces, when Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki issued an arrest warrant for Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, accusing him of planning terrorist attacks against Shiite targets and of murdering Shiite officials. Hashimi fled to Iraqi Kurdistan before security forces could grab him and now lives in Turkey.

In 2012, he was convicted in absentia and sentenced to death, along with his son-in-law Ahmed Qahtan.

Is he guilty? Did he do it? I have no idea. Iraq has no shortage of vicious individuals, inside and outside the government, willing to use deadly force both overtly and covertly against rivals. Some of Hashimi’s bodyguards confessed, but it’s entirely possible they were coerced or even tortured.

Whether or not Hashimi was guilty, Shiite militias carried out death squad attacks against Sunnis all over Baghdad both before and after this happened. Iraq’s sectarian violence never entirely dissipated during the American occupation, and after the withdrawal it rose again.

The following year, Maliki’s government accused Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi of the same thing Hashimi had been accused of. Some of his bodyguards were also arrested and charged with committing terrorist acts. But now the conspiracy theories were getting ridiculous. Issawi was and is known as a reasonable and peaceable man. Accusing him and his people of terrorism is like accusing Alan Greenspan of operating his own secret prison on the side when he was running the Fed.

Issawi convinced plenty of the implosive chaos at the heart of the Maliki government when he said [2], “The tyrant of Baghdad will not keep quiet until he targets all of his opponents.” If the finance minister, of all people, could be accused of something like this, any Sunni leader or even civilian could be rounded up and placed in front of a Stalinist show trial.

As spasmodic as his actions seemed, however, Maliki had his reasons. “When [he] looks at Iraq’s Sunni minority,” reporter Dexter Filkins told Frontline, “he sees al-Qaeda, he sees the Baathists, he sees military coups, he sees plots against him. He sees a population that despises him and wants to come back into power.”

He wasn’t entirely wrong. Remnants of Hussein’s old Baath regime really do still exist among the Sunnis. Support for al-Qaeda never entirely evaporated. Even moderate and reasonable Sunnis wanted Maliki out of power. But his panicky paranoia drove him to act in such a way that eventually guaranteed a much larger portion of Iraq’s Sunnis would be willing to do anything to remove him and the Shiite boot they felt pressing down on their necks.

Massive nonviolent protests erupted in Sunni cities in early 2013. Activists erected tent cities as Arab activists before them had in Beirut and Cairo. The BBC reported [3] seeing a banner saying, “We warn the sectarian government against dragging the country into sectarian war.”

In theory, these tensions could have been resolved if Maliki were a civilized leader of a properly functioning democracy, but these protests never would have begun in the first place if he were a civilized leader of a properly functioning democracy.

While all this was happening, al-Qaeda in Iraq had moved into Syria after its decline as a mostly vanquished force hiding out in the middle of nowhere, all but destroyed by the United States, the Iraqi army, and Sunni militias. But the Syrian civil war gave the remnants of this shattered organization a place to go where there were no American soldiers, Iraqi soldiers, or Sunni militias willing to fight them. On the contrary, plenty of Syrian Sunnis, who had not gone through the Iraqis’ horrendous experience that led to the Anbar Awakening and an American-backed purge of terrorists from their midst, gleefully welcomed them as allies against the Assad regime.

Something was bound to fill the vacuum in Syria after Assad lost control of vast swaths of territory. The White House was spectacularly uninterested in backing even moderate rebels, but wealthy Gulf Arabs supported the more extreme elements with tremendous enthusiasm, so al-Qaeda mushroomed as the US did nothing. Soon its fighters no longer needed backing from outside. They captured Syrian oil fields and sold crude on the black market. They even robbed banks.

And they eventually changed their name from al-Qaeda in Iraq to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, partly because the al-Qaeda leadership elsewhere disavowed them in favor of the Nusra Front, but also because they decided that instead of being just a terrorist organization they would build an actual state. And their name had to reflect that.

Back in Iraq near the end of 2013, Maliki, more paranoid than ever, snapped and sent security forces [4] to dismantle demonstrators’ tent cities outside Ramadi. He accused the demonstrators of harboring al-Qaeda terrorists. Maybe he was right and maybe he wasn’t. Either way, several people were killed. ISIS, still in the shadows, smiled and sensed an opening.

Just a few weeks later, in early 2014, with their numbers, arms, and coffers swollen, and detecting at least tacit support from Iraqi Sunnis fed up with Maliki, ISIS fighters exploded out of Syria and back into Iraq. They captured one city after another, starting with Fallujah, and massacred hundreds of people at a time, recording it all on video. In June, they even took Mosul, the second-largest city in the entire country. The Iraqi army, armed and trained by the US for years, dropped its weapons and ran. ISIS suddenly found itself in possession of American arms, including Abrams tanks and up-armored Humvees.

Since then, ISIS has “liberated” most of Anbar Province from Baghdad, but it created a vastly more oppressive “state” in its place. The Sunnis must now think they were out of their minds when they welcomed these guys into their territory. But their fear of the ancient Shiite foe—which they exaggerated beyond recognition even with Maliki’s depredations—led them to foolishly believe they’d be better off severely oppressed by their own than moderately oppressed by the other.

So Iraq has three governments now. The Kurdistan Regional Government rules the tranquil and functional north, the Shiite-dominated Baghdad government rules the center, east, and south, and the psychopaths of ISIS rule most of western Iraq’s vast Anbar Province and points beyond.

Perhaps it makes a twisted sort of sense that the Sunnis would fight ISIS under its previous name and later form an alliance with that very same enemy against Baghdad. They did the exact same thing with the US, first launching an insurgency against Americans and later forming an alliance with Americans when they discovered belatedly that ISIS (then al-Qaeda in Iraq) was immeasurably worse. If they believe today that their nominal Shiite countrymen are even more despicable than US occupation forces or ISIS, it’s unlikely that they will ever be able to live together in peace without a tyrant enforcing another cold and brutal peace of a military dictatorship. With so many Iraqis willing to pick up rifles and fight, what’s far more likely than another Hussein “fixing” the place is a state of endless war or permanent fracture.

Permanent fracture is the least of these evils.

The Kurds will be happy to go and will likely declare independence if the United States finally ceases championing “the territorial integrity of Iraq.” Washington should drop the phrase and at least quietly back the only true allies it has over there, and guarantee their safety from the Turks or anyone else who finds Kurdish independence inconvenient.

A free Kurdish state would be as reliable an American ally as Israel. It might also embolden the Kurds of Syria to declare their own state. Both could function as permanent buffers—and perhaps even beachheads—against the likes of ISIS, Assad, or any other bad actors whom we haven’t yet heard of in this region filled with aspirants.

If the Kurds go, the Sunnis may follow whether or not they are “governed” by ISIS. Everyone in what’s left of Iraq would benefit from that decision. The Sunnis would finally be able to govern themselves without fear of the Shiite oppressor. The Shiites could finally breathe a sigh of relief knowing al-Qaeda and the remnants of the old Baathist regime are finally and permanently on the other side of an international border. And the rest of us could rest easier knowing that the Sunnis would have no more reasons to tolerate fanatics like ISIS since they wouldn’t need protection from Baghdad.

The United States should not, however, go in there and redraw any borders. Let the Iraqis do it themselves, beginning with Kurdistan. We know the Kurds want out because they have been saying so longer than most of us have been alive.

Maybe the Sunnis and Shias will figure out a way to live together in peace. It seems unlikely at this point, but who knows? The Middle East is full of surprises. But if they want a divorce—for all of our sakes—let them have it.

The only real allies Americans have in Iraq are the Kurds. If we’re going to live by that famous foreign policy maxim, that you reward your friends and punish your enemies, then we are required to let the Kurds go and to let Iraq die.

Michael J. Totten is a contributing editor at World Affairs and the author of six books, including Tower of the Sun: Stories from the Middle East and North Africa [5], published in November.
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More about:
Middle East [6],
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Source URL: http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/let-iraq-die-case-partition

Links:
[1] http://www.city-journal.org/2013/23_3_beirut.html
[2] http://www.washingtonpost.com/world...60b1c6-4b9f-11e2-9a42-d1ce6d0ed278_story.html
[3] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20887739
[4] http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304591604579290272418038460
[5] http://www.amazon.com/Tower-Sun-Sto...ook/dp/B00P8ZB4OS/ref=asap_B00431132Q?ie=UTF8
[6] http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/world-news/region/middle-east
[7] http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/world-news/country/iraq
[8] http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/world-news/country/uk
[9] http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/world-news/people/kurds-0

Housecarl · Mar 29, 2015

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/ukraine-invasion-one-year-later

March/April 2015
The Ukraine Invasion: One Year Later
David J. Kramer
Comments 53

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine posed the most serious challenge to European security in decades. In one stroke, he thumbed his nose at the Helsinki Accords of 1975, the Paris Charter of 1990, the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, and other agreements and commitments that had kept the peace in Europe—with the exception of the Balkans—since the end of World War II. Suddenly, the post–Cold War order was torn to shreds, and many worried that if Putin’s brazen act was left unchallenged, other authoritarian regimes would think they, too, could get away with aggression against their neighbors.

On balance, the Western reaction to Putin’s invasion of Ukraine was much stronger than Putin anticipated, even if it was less than what many advocated. At the time Putin made his move, few would have thought that a year later the West would have in place a harsh sanctions regime against Russian officials and entities. Russia was too big and important, both strategically and commercially—or so Putin and others assumed. But Putin left the West little choice. His thuggish treatment of his own population belied his claims that he cared about the plight of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine. His cold-blooded reaction to the tragic shoot-down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 turned around the mood in Germany, among other places, overnight.

The combination of Putin’s misplaying his hand numerous times during 2014 and the resolve of the West to take a stand against his aggression has left the Russian leader facing the gravest crisis of his presidency. There is some talk that Putin might not even serve out his current term, which runs until 2018.

After President Viktor Yanukovych fled Ukraine on February 22, 2014, Putin apparently panicked, fearing that what happened in Ukraine could spread to other countries, including his own. By first invading and annexing Crimea with stealth forces and then moving into and occupying eastern parts of Ukraine, Putin was sending clear signals to his neighbors that attempts to democratize, liberalize, and integrate more closely with Western institutions like the European Union—NATO was not an issue at that time—would not be permitted. Moscow would decide what was best for Ukrainians, Georgians, Moldovans, and others, denying them the right to choose their own destiny. And the West, Putin thought, would do nothing about his efforts to carve out a real sphere of influence.

At first it seemed that he was right. The West was slow to understand the gravity of the threat Putin posed to European security and to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and other countries. Europe was reluctant to lose business opportunities in Russia and feared a tough response would mean a new cold war, for which none on the continent had an appetite. After all, the West had done very little after Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, and in fact the Obama administration came to office five months later eager to “reset” relations with Moscow.

As Crimea fell, the West, instead of implementing hard-hitting measures at the outset of the crisis to preempt and prevent further Russian aggression, took only limited steps and let Putin set the agenda. As a result, Putin decided to parlay his success in Crimea by moving into eastern parts of Ukraine. But he overreached, underestimating Ukrainians’ willingness to fight for the Donbas region (in contrast to the conscious decision by Kyiv to not resist the takeover of Crimea) and overestimating the interest of those living in the east to join Russia. At the same time, Putin was less interested in taking over more of Ukrainian territory—after all, he had no plan for assuming responsibility for Crimea and has since discovered how costly it is at a time when Russia can least afford to absorb such costs—than in simply destabilizing Ukraine, quarantining the threat it posed to his regime, and turning it into a basket case in which the West would lose interest.

But instead of halting Ukraine’s westward shift, Putin has accelerated it. While still facing huge challenges, Ukraine has never been more united. The December 23rd vote in the Rada (three hundred and three to ten) in favor of revoking Ukraine’s “non-bloc” status and enhancing cooperation with NATO never would have happened had Putin left Ukraine alone. Similarly, the leaders of Belarus and Kazakhstan, founding members of Putin’s Eurasian Economic Union, visited Kyiv in December to express support for Ukraine, worried that they could be next on Putin’s hit list. Instead of winning over his neighbors, Putin is repelling them—and badly damaging Russia’s standing and national interests in the process.

And yet pursuing Russia’s national interests has never been at the forefront of Putin’s thinking. His only real objective is staying in power no matter the cost, even at the risk of harming Russia’s interests. His return to the presidency in 2012 was driven by his lack of confidence in the ability of interim president Dmitri Medvedev to sustain the corrupt, authoritarian regime Putin had built up over the years. The ill-gotten accumulation of wealth and assets of Putin and his clique were threatened by any domestic liberalization or tolerance for Russia’s neighbors to pursue closer ties with the West.

To justify his way of governing, Putin has needed to perpetuate the myth that the West, and the United States in particular, represented threats to Russia. As far back as his speech following the Beslan hostage crisis in 2004 and continuing with his Munich speech in 2007, Putin has hyped the threat of outside powers. Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine cites NATO enlargement as the greatest military danger, a theme repeated in the Military Doctrine that Putin approved in December 2014. (The reality is that NATO enlargement has provided Russia with its most secure, stable borders.)

And yet it is Putin himself, notwithstanding his high levels of support, who poses the greatest danger to Russia by pursuing policies against Ukraine that have led to Russia’s isolation as a pariah state; by failing to diversify Russia’s economy (a problem that became clear with the significant decline in the price of oil); and by insisting on increases in defense spending at a time when the country cannot afford them. Under Putin’s watch, Russia’s economy is in deep crisis: by the end of 2014, the value of the ruble dropped by roughly half, capital flight was more than twice that of 2013, inflation and interest rates were up, and hard currency reserves had fallen below $400 billion. Because of Western sanctions, Russian companies are unable to refinance the massive debt they owe to Western banks—roughly $150 billion in 2015 alone, and Russian banks are turning to the government for bailouts, further draining foreign currency reserves. Things got so bad by the end of the year that China offered Russia financial assistance in December, a gesture that many Russians must find humiliating. The drop in the price of oil accounts for much of Russia’s current problems, but there is no denying that Russia’s economic situation at the end of 2014 was far worse than it was at the start of the year due to Putin’s decisions (or lack thereof).

One wouldn’t know that, however, from watching Kremlin-controlled television. On a daily basis, Russians are reminded how wonderful Putin is, which accounts for his strong poll numbers. Meanwhile, domestic critics and opponents face spurious charges and trials, such as the one that opposition activist Aleksei Navalny and his brother Oleg endured. (Oleg was sentenced to three and a half years in December, and Aleksei’s house arrest continues). Nongovernmental organizations are branded “foreign agents,” and journalists and foreign diplomats are constantly harassed and monitored. But to many of his supporters in Russia, Putin was reestablishing Russia as a global player to be taken seriously and, in invading Crimea, righting a historical mistake made by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in 1954 when he gave Crimea to Ukraine.

If the drop in the price of oil has been the main factor in Russia’s economic crisis, it must be acknowledged that Western sanctions have played a key role, too. Even Putin admitted in his end-of-year news conference that they were responsible for twenty-five to thirty percent of Russia’s troubles. While Russia still claims control over Crimea and occupies parts of eastern Ukraine, many believe that further Russian aggression—not just against Ukraine but toward Moldova—was prevented by the sanctions imposed by the West. The sanctions may have started small in March, primarily targeting Putin cronies, but over several rounds they were ramped up to include a number of large Russian entities and sectors and have made refinancing of Russian debt virtually impossible.

The last major round of sanctions, imposed in September, likely would not have happened, however, had Russian-supported forces not shot down the Malaysian airliner on July 17th, killing all two hundred and ninety-eight persons on board. Putin’s callous reaction to that tragedy elicited a disgusted response in the West—in Germany, fairly strenuous opposition to more sanctions disappeared almost overnight—and led to the toughest set of penalties against Russia. Until then, President Obama had refused to move ahead with unilateral sanctions, insisting that the US and EU act together in dealing with Russia. But this was a time that called for stronger American leadership and less “strategic patience,” as the president put it later.

Thinking the sanctions would be merely symbolic and face-saving, Putin had essentially dared the West to respond to his brazen moves, and he was surprised when the West rose to the challenge, albeit not as quickly and aggressively as some would have preferred. Indeed, there is no denying that the sanctions in place against the Putin regime represent a sea change from where the West’s relations with Russia were when the year started.

Another unintended consequence of Putin’s moves is that NATO has beefed up its defenses along Russia’s borders and found a new purpose in defending its member states from Putin’s potential aggression. The European Union has proceeded with free trade and cooperation agreements with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova despite Russian threats (although Ukraine’s deal will not take effect for another year). Russia has been kicked out of the Group of 8, and Putin left the November Group of 20 meeting in Brisbane, Australia, early after receiving a browbeating from other leaders. All of this is due to his decision to invade Ukraine and annex Crimea.

Yet while Putin has edged Russia onto shaky ground and the West has reacted more strongly than anticipated, questions abound about the EU’s ability to maintain unity when sanctions are up for renewal in the summer of 2015, and about those in the West who think we have made far too much of the Ukraine situation at the expense of the more important issue of relations with Moscow. Maintaining a hard line toward Russia will require continued engagement not only by the Europeans but by the American president and his top officials, which is in no way a given. (Indeed, the February 12th Minsk cease-fire deal, which Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko was pressured into signing, augurs badly for Western support for Ukraine and reveals an unwillingness to stand up to Putin.)

The crisis is far from over for Ukraine, much less for Russia, but there are conclusions one can draw that will be important for the remaining two years of the Obama administration, for the new Congress, and for 2016 American presidential aspirants.

The first one is that Vladimir Putin is a threat to virtually everything the West stands for. The system he has overseen at home for the past fifteen years is antithetical to our own; the effects of his foreign policy have been damaging to Western interests. Putin has consciously supported Bashar al-Assad’s slaughter of the Syrian people by arming Syrian forces; he has agreed with the mullahs to construct new nuclear reactors in Iran; he has menacingly reminded the world of Russia’s nuclear weapons capability; and, continuing his energy blackmail by other means, he has challenged NATO states and others with provocative military flights and submarine maneuvers. Given these challenges, we should set aside the reset button as long as he’s in power.

Second, we are in a crisis because of Putin, not because of us. We should stop seeing him as anything other than a paranoid authoritarian leader who oversees one of the most corrupt regimes in the world. Preventing his corruption from infiltrating and infecting our own systems should be a top priority. The West had no interest in picking a fight with Russia and turned to sanctions reluctantly. While Western policies over the years have not been perfect by any means, those who argue that NATO enlargement, EU outreach to Russia’s neighbors, or American policies over the years are to blame make an unconvincing case.

Moreover, the problem has not been lack of engagement or dialogue with Putin. German Chancellor Angela Merkel particularly, who has been a strong leader on sanctions, has spent many hours on the phone and in person with Putin—to no avail. Other Western leaders, including Obama, have tried and failed to talk sense into the Russian leader. There is no need for special channels, as some have suggested, since Henry Kissinger, Gerhard Schröder, and others already see Putin whenever they want—and have nothing to show for it.

It is also true that we’ve seen now that Putin only understands strength and views Western weakness as an opening to exploit. He thought that he was stronger than all the other Western leaders, and for a while, he appeared to be right. But by the end of 2014, in one of those about-faces that make history, Putin’s position was much weaker than that of many of his Western counterparts. Despite his efforts to sow divisions in Europe (it remains to be seen whether he has made lasting inroads there), Putin faces a West less inclined to back down (though developments in early 2015 suggest Putin might be snatching victory from the jaws of defeat).

The West should understand that it is time to stop talking about easing sanctions—US Secretary of State John Kerry and German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier are especially guilty of such talk—unless and until there is a real change in Russian policy. Sanctions are as much psychological as they are punitive, and loose chatter about lifting them prematurely will indicate to Putin a lack of resolve on the part of the West. He knows what he needs to do to ease the sanctions—he simply chooses not to do it. Rather than step back, Western leaders should instead tell him that more sanctions are coming unless he reverses policy, including, it bears remembering, on Crimea.

And we should see our support—not only of Ukraine, but also of Moldova, Georgia, and other neighbors of Russia—as critically important in the period ahead. The first Obama administration ignored these states while it focused on the reset with Russia. But the US should stipulate that supporting these countries’ efforts to democratize and create market economies is in the US national interest and helps to advance the decades-old vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. Along these lines, we should not close the door to NATO for Ukraine or to any other potentially qualifying country that meets the alliance’s standards. The December 23rd Rada vote signaled Ukraine’s rejection of those in the West who want to rule out membership in NATO and “Finlandize” the region.

A major mistake on the part of the West, and especially of the Obama administration, has been the refusal to provide Ukraine with the means to defend itself. Indeed, the public and repeated rejection of Ukrainian requests for antitank and antiaircraft weapons, among other things, sent Moscow a green light. An opportunity was missed when Congress unanimously passed legislation in December authorizing the provision of such military assistance to Ukraine, and the White House failed to say anything about its intentions in this regard in the signing statement. Since the onset of the crisis, Ukrainians have been disappointed by the Obama administration’s lack of support in this area, and they are right to feel so. Had we provided such assistance soon after Russia’s aggression, Putin might have thought twice before he sent in Russian forces in late August as the Ukrainian military was making headway in retaking parts of Donetsk and Luhansk. It’s important also to remember that the Russian public lacks the stomach for major casualties from fighting in Ukraine, as is clear from the Kremlin’s efforts to censor coverage of fighters’ funerals.

Finally, it is important that we not telegraph the boundaries of our policies. Too often, American officials, including the president, would indicate what the United States will not do instead of leaving Putin wondering what we might do. He should ponder our intentions with fear and uncertainty.

David J. Kramer is the senior director for human rights and human freedom at the McCain Institute, in Washington, and previously served as the president of Freedom House and, before that, as an assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and labor in the George W. Bush administration.
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More about:
Europe and Central Asia [1],
Ukraine [2],
Russia [3],
France [4],
Europe [5],
Vladimir Putin [6]
Source URL: http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/ukraine-invasion-one-year-later

Links:
[1] http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/world-news/region/europe-and-central-asia
[2] http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/world-news/country/ukraine
[3] http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/world-news/country/russia
[4] http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/world-news/country/france
[5] http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/world-news/country/europe
[6] http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/world-news/people/vladimir-putin

mzkitty · Mar 29, 2015

Really good article ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^. Thanks, Carl.

Housecarl · Mar 29, 2015

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Posted for fair use.....
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-real-reason-chinas-massive-military-buildup-12502

The National Interest
Published on The National Interest (http://nationalinterest.org)

The Real Reason for China's Massive Military Buildup
[1]
Harry J. Kazianis [2]
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Over several different articles, I have been exploring the dynamics of the budding U.S.-China security dilemma [4]—a high-tech drama pitting anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) against what we used to refer to as Air-Sea Battle (ASB)—and have offered several different ways to lessen the possibility of such a dynamic from becoming cemented into the Asia-Pacific’s security architecture. However, China’s development and implementation of A2/AD clearly has various origins. One such origin that deserves to be explored is the “historical nightmare” of China’s subjugation at the hands of various colonial and Asian powers.

In many respects, China is trying to solve a centuries-old problem that never went away: how to defeat in battle military forces that are at least in a symmetrical sense superior to its own and will be for some time to come. If we alter our perspective and take a much longer view of Beijing’s own military obsolescence, a strategy that emphasizes anti-access makes tremendous sense. According to Admiral Wu Shengli, former commander of the PLA Navy, “in China’s modern history, imperialist and colonists initiated more than 470 invasions of China, including 84 large ones, from the sea.” If China’s military were to deter or halt the deployment of superior military forces into areas of Chinese territory or areas Beijing perceives as a core interest, another period of what leaders in China might see as a new form of subjugation could theoretically be avoided. A2/AD allows Beijing to compete with the United States asymmetrically—an important point when one thinks through how many years away China is from competing with America ship for ship or plane for plane.

The following serves as an account of what many Chinese consider their own historical nightmare at the hands of foreign forces and why A2/AD would protect China from being subjugated yet again.

A Lost Opportunity

There are several events in Chinese history that mainland scholars, politicians and academics point to that weakened the collective power of the Chinese nation and diminished its global standing for generations. Indeed, Chinese strategic planners are keenly aware they have missed multiple “revolutions” in military affairs looking back several centuries [5]—a driving factor in China’s subjugation by the West and other Asian powers. Critical transitions from cold-weapon warfare (knives or blunt striking instruments) to hot-weapon warfare (such as guns and firepower) and from hot-weapon warfare to mechanized warfare (tanks, armored naval vessels, airplanes and so on) were lost opportunities to transform the military establishment into a modern fighting force. The consequences were shocking [5]. When well-armed Western powers forced their way into China two centuries ago, the Chinese were defenseless, thanks to obsolete technology. When Western powers developed mechanized weapons during and after World War II, China was in the midst of internal turmoil and suffered from foreign invasion (i.e., the Chinese Civil War and Japanese invasion); it did not have the capacity to keep up with the devel*opments of new military technology.

“Century of Humiliation” Begins: The First Opium War

Numerous current Chinese scholars speak of China’s “century of humiliation” or subjugation by various powers that led, according to their line of argument, to the loss of China's great-power status, loss of territory, and in many respects, national sovereignty. Defeat on the battlefield marked the beginning of this century of loss and humiliation. The first major military loss at the hands of Western powers that had wide-ranging repercussions for China and large parts of the Asia-Pacific was its defeat at the hands of the British during the First Opium War (1839-1842). As scholar Richard Harris explained: “The Chinese have one very broad generalization about their own history: they think in terms of ‘up to the Opium war’ and ‘after the Opium war’; in other words, a century of humiliation and weakness to be expunged.”

The consequences of the conflict—China’s crushing defeat—were felt far and wide. Beijing’s geostrategic position in Asia was weakened dramatically. China’s military was crushed in a series of defeats by a vastly smaller, but technologically superior, British force. Chinese military technology, tactics and strategy were not on par with the West’s. This defeat sparked the first of what has been referred to as the “unequal treaties.” Five ports were opened to foreign traders, and the British colony at Hong Kong was founded (which would not be returned until 1997).

The Sino-Japanese War

A second military defeat, this time at the hands of Japan, during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, also had wide-reaching consequences for Beijing. For several decades, Japan and China had spared in various domains—largely political and diplomatic—over control and influence on the Korean Peninsula. For China, Korea had been a vassal state, having been heavily influenced by Chinese culture. Japan, having undertaken a massive effort to Westernize under the Meiji Restoration, was undertaking efforts to bring Korea under its sphere of influence. Both nations were actively pursuing efforts to modernize their armed forces.

While a larger study of the conflict has been done across many formats and is beyond the scope of this article, the war and its aftermath are of extreme importance. Japan would defeat China convincingly, most importantly at the Battle of the Yalu, an important naval victory. While China had by this time been clearly passed by Western powers and had lost considerable stature and territory, to now be defeated by a neighboring Asian nation-state was even more humiliating. Korea would be declared free of Chinese influence and placed effectively under Japanese control. China would be forced to pay large reparations to Japan. Tokyo would also receive the Liaodong Peninsula, which it was forced to give up, due to Western pressure.

A Chaotic 1930s, Civil War and World War II

A series of events from the early 1930s until the eventual victory of Mao’s communists in 1949, establishing the People’s Republic of China, would also have a lasting effect on today’s China. While each event is worthy of its own larger study, a narrow focus will be utilized for the purposes of this article.

In 1931, Japan occupied the Chinese territory of Manchuria, creating a puppet state named Manchukuo. In 1937, tensions flared once more when an incident at the Marco Polo Bridge would become the catalyst for full-scale war between China and Japan. Both nations waged a bloody conflict until the end of World War II in 1945. Large sections of Chinese territory were held by Japan, and vast areas of Chinese commerce, industry and farmland were destroyed. China was also in the midst of a civil war from 1927 until 1937, which was halted to combat the Japanese invasion. The civil war resumed in 1946, when China once again suffered severe losses. The Kuomintang or KMT under Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan in 1949. The status of Taiwan to this day has yet to be resolved and is a major factor in Chinese strategic thinking on A2/AD.

China suffered dearly during this period of its history. Countless lives were lost during Japan's invasion and during the civil war. In 1937, China suffered the “Rape of Nanking” among other countless humiliations at the hands of imperial Japanese forces. Even though almost seven decades have passed since the end of World War II, Chinese and Japanese emotions on the subject are considerably heated [6], serving as a source of tension, which drags on positive bilateral relations.

Such a tumultuous period of Chinese history would have far and wide repercussions on the Chinese people, its collective sense of history and its national psyche. Chinese scholars have debated for several decades the role of such a period when thinking about its place in today’s international order. During this century, China would have to redefine itself, its place in the global order, its place in Asia and its own sense of history. As one scholar notes [7]:

China had to redraw its world map: where it had for millennia sat comfortably at the center of a ring of tributary relationships with neighboring countries, it now found itself a weak competitor in a world of dozens or even hundreds of nation-states. Where Chinese rulers and intellectuals had before had little concept of an international arena, they now had to grapple with the notion that there existed a global system of power relationships whose dynamics – though almost entirely out of China’s control – would determine her fate.

Chinese History: Chinese A2/AD?

As noted by many analysts (including myself), Chinese A2/AD strategy seeks to target selected perceived weaknesses in U.S. military technology, force structure and strategic doctrine—all while not having to match U.S. forces in all combat domains. At present, even though China possesses the second-largest economy in the world, it still does not have the economic or technological base to challenge America in a symmetrical military matchup. What China can do is devise an asymmetric strategy that is designed to inflict maximum damage on American forces if they were to intervene militarily close to China’s perceived interests along its coasts and out towards the first island chain.

History clearly shows us China has suffered from technological obsolescence on the battlefield for some time—allowing various nations to take advantage. A century of humiliation has taught Chinese planners that to allow military forces to be able to approach the coast and be able to build up forces for a possible attack invites strategic weakness and possible subjugation by foreign powers. Beijing does not feel it has the luxury of time to wait for the development of a first-class military if it were challenged by Washington or another great power. A2/AD solves an age-old problem for China and might just be able to at least deter America and others from possible infringement on China's core interests. And if history is any guide, it seems clear that is exactly the outcome Beijing wants.

Harry J. Kazianis serves as Editor of RealClearDefense [8], a member of the RealClearPolitics [9] family of websites. Mr. Kazianis is also a Senior Fellow for Defense Policy at the Center for the National Interest [10] (non-resident) and a Senior Fellow at the China Policy Institute (non-resident). He is the former Executive Editor of The National Interest [11] and former Editor of The Diplomat [12]. Follow him on Twitter: @grecianformula [13].

Image: [14] Wikimedia Commons/Flickr/Israel Defense Forces
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Source URL (retrieved on March 29, 2015): http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-real-reason-chinas-massive-military-buildup-12502

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[1] http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-real-reason-chinas-massive-military-buildup-12502
[2] http://nationalinterest.org/profile/harry-j-kazianis
[3] http://twitter.com/share
[4] http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-ultimate-nightmare-are-the-us-china-destined-war-12331
[5] http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB995.pdf
[6] http://thediplomat.com/new-leaders-forum/2012/08/30/the-tide-of-history-breaks-in-august/
[7] http://www.researchgate.net/publica...hinese_Perceptions_Of_the_International_Order
[8] http://www.realcleardefense.com/
[9] http://www.realclearpolitics.com/
[10] http://www.cftni.org/
[11] http://nationalinterest.org/
[12] http://thediplomat.com/
[13] https://twitter.com/grecianformula
[14] http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/F..._of_Cooperation_with_the_Chinese_Navy_(5).jpg
[15] http://nationalinterest.org/topic/security
[16] http://nationalinterest.org/region/asia

Housecarl · Mar 29, 2015

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Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/29/us-yemen-security-idUSKBN0ML0YC20150329

World | Sun Mar 29, 2015 3:41pm EDT
Related: World, Yemen

Fighting and air strikes across Yemen; dialogue remains distant

ADEN | By Mohammed Mukhashaf and Sami Aboudi

(Reuters) - Yemeni fighters loyal to the Saudi-backed President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi clashed with Iranian-allied Houthi fighters on Sunday in Aden, the absent leader's last major foothold in the country.

Hadi loyalists in the southern port city reported a gunbattle in the central Crater district in which three people were killed, and said they recaptured the airport, which has changed hands several times in recent days.

The Health Ministry, loyal to the Houthi fighters who control the capital, said Saudi-led air strikes had killed 35 people and wounded 88 overnight. The figures could not be independently confirmed.

The Houthi fighters, representing a Shi'ite minority that makes up around a third of Yemen's population, emerged as the most powerful force in the Arabian Peninsula's poorest country last year when they captured the capital Sanaa.

Saudi Arabia has rallied Sunni Muslim Arab countries in an air campaign to support Hadi, who moved to Aden in February and is now in Riyadh after leaving Yemen in the past week.

The fighting has brought civil war to a country that was already sliding into chaos and which had been a battlefield for the secret U.S. drone war against al Qaeda.

While the Houthi fighters and their army allies continued to make gains after the air strikes were first launched early on Thursday, they appeared to suffer reversals on Sunday on three fronts -- in Aden's northern suburbs, in Dhalea province north of the city and in the eastern province of Shabwa.

A Saudi military spokesman said the coalition it leads would step up pressure on the Houthis and their allies in the next few days. "There will be no safe place for the Houthi militia groups," Brigadier General Ahmed Asseri told reporters.

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› SLIDESHOW Fighting and air strikes across Yemen; dialogue remains distant

Coalition warplanes struck military targets at airports in the capital Sanaa and in Hodeida, the main Red Sea port. However, Asseri said operations over Hodeida were halted for two hours to allow the evacuation of 500 Pakistani nationals.

In the northern city of Saada, a Houthi stronghold near the Saudi border, strikes hit bases belonging to the militia and their ally, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who still controls most army units.

Asseri said strikes on Saturday night had targeted former Yemeni air force planes which the Houthis had moved from Sanaa to another air base. Very few jets remained in Houthi hands and they too would be destroyed, he said.

Saleh stood down after a 2011 uprising but still wields wide influence in Yemen. He appealed on Saturday to Arab leaders meeting in Egypt to halt their four-day offensive and resume talks on political transition in Yemen, promising that neither he nor his relatives would seek the presidency.

Hadi's Foreign Minister Riyadh Yaseen dismissed his comments as "the talk of losers".

Saudi Arabia's military intervention is the latest front in its widening contest with Iran for power in the region, a proxy struggle also playing out in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon.

Iran denies accusations from Sunni Gulf rulers that it has armed the Houthis, who follow the Zaidi branch of Shi'ite Islam.

Zaidi Shi'ites led a thousand-year kingdom in Yemen until 1962. Former leader Saleh himself is a member of the sect, although he tried to crush the Houthis while in office, only allying with them after his downfall.

SAUDIS SAY CAMPAIGN TO GO ON

Across the country, there were heavy clashes in seven southern and eastern provinces between the Houthis and pro-Saleh army units on the one hand, and Sunni tribesmen, pro-Hadi loyalists and armed southern separatists on the other.

Forces loyal to Hadi said on Sunday they had recaptured Aden airport. Heavy fighting in the area during the last week meant that foreign diplomats had to be evacuated from the city by boat, ferried by Saudi naval vessels to Jeddah on Saturday.

An Aden port official said a Chinese warship docked on Sunday to evacuate Chinese diplomats and expatriate workers.

Saudi King Salman told the Arab summit that military operations would continue until their objectives were met.

But a diplomat in the Gulf said it was unclear exactly what those military objectives were. "There is no political vision for the process. They don’t know the shape of the end game," he said. "They did not even determine how they can claim victory".

In Egypt, the Arab leaders announced the formation of a unified military force to counter growing threats including Yemen's conflict. Working out the mechanism and logistics of the unified force, an idea floated by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, could take months.

In a rare move, Saudi-owned television channel Al-Arabiya broadcast a detailed account of what it said was a proposal last week to the Saudi leadership by Saleh's son Ahmed to head off military intervention by breaking with the Houthis.

Al-Arabiya said Prince Mohammad rejected the proposal. "There must be a return to legitimacy in the form of President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi to lead Yemen from the capital Sanaa," it quoted him as saying.

(Additional reporting by Angus McDowall in Riyadh, Noah Browning in Dubai, Mohammed Ghobari and Ahmed Tolba in Cairo and Yara Bayoumy in Sharm el-Sheikh; Writing by Dominic Evans; Editing by Andrew Roche)

Housecarl · Mar 29, 2015

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.sentryreview.com/politics/what-else-is-iran-hiding-h7165.html

What else is Iran hiding?

Ali Alfoneh and Reuel Marc Gerecht are senior fellows at the Basis for Protection of Democracies.
We really don't know all that has transpired in the talks on Iran’s nuclear plan getting conducted in Switzerland, but we do know that the White Household...

Ali Alfoneh and Reuel Marc Gerecht are senior fellows at the Basis for Protection of Democracies.

We really don't know all that has transpired in the talks on Iran’s nuclear plan getting conducted in Switzerland, but we do know that the White Household has shied absent from a perhaps paralyzing challenge: the “possible military dimensions” — the PMDs — of the regime’s program. As Olli Heinonen, a previous No. two at the Worldwide Atomic Electricity Agency, has warned, outsiders definitely can have no plan in which and how quickly the mullahs could make a nuclear weapon unless of course they know what Iranian engineers have finished in the past. With out “go any where, anytime” entry for IAEA inspectors and a thorough accounting of Tehran’s weaponization exploration, we will be blind to the clerics’ nuclear capabilities.

And one particular of the most critical problems — possible North Korean nuclear cooperation with the Islamic Republic — warrants distinctive scrutiny. This disturbing partnership casts critical question on the Obama administration’s hope that President Hassan Rouhani and his staff have any intention of restricting Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

The unfinished North Korean-created reactor that was wrecked by Israeli planes on Sept. 6, 2007, at Deir al-Zour in Syria was in all probability an Iranian job, maybe one meant to provide as a backup web page for Iran’s possess nuclear crops. We attract this conclusion for the reason that of the timing and the near link between the two regimes: Deir al-Zour was started about the time Iran’s nuclear amenities were disclosed by an Iranian opposition team in 2002, and the romantic relationship in between Shiite-ruled Syria and Shiite Iran has been exceptionally restricted since Bashar al-Assad came to electrical power in 2000. We also know — because Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the previous Iranian president and majordomo of the political clergy, proudly tells us in his multivolume autobiography — that sensitive Iranian-North Korean armed forces cooperation started in 1989. Rafsanjani’s commentary leaves tiny question that the Iranian-North Korean nexus revolved all-around two merchandise: ballistic missiles and nuclear-weapons technology.

In his memoirs, the bulk of which is composed of journal entries, Rafsanjani overtly discusses Iran’s arms and missile procurement from North Korea. Having said that, from 1989 ahead, his entries on Pyongyang turn into much more opaque — a improve, we think, indicating emerging nuclear cooperation. By 1991, Rafsanjani discusses “special and delicate issues” similar to North Korea in entries that are notably different from his candid commentary on tactical ballistic missiles. Rafsanjani mentions summoning Majid Abbaspour, who was the president’s technological adviser on “chemical, organic, radiological, and nuclear industries,” into the conversations. Rafsanjani expresses his fascination in importing a “special commodity” from the North Koreans in return for oil shipments to Pyongyang. He insists that Iran gain unspecified “technical know-how.”

The Iranian-North Korean contacts intensify in 1992, the yr that Rafsanjani, with Rouhani at his facet, launches a plan of industrial engagement with the Europeans. On Jan. thirty, Rafsanjani receives intelligence minister Ali Fallahian and Mostafa Pourmohammadi, the ministry’s director of overseas espionage, to discuss “procurement channels for sensitive commodities.” On Feb. 8, Rafsanjani writes, “The North Koreans want oil, but have nothing to give in return but the particular commodity. We, too, are inclined to resolve their difficulty.” Rafsanjani orders defense minister Akbar Torkan to arrange a job power to review the challenges and advantages of obtaining the “special commodity.” This task pressure endorses that the president accept the “risk of procuring the commodities in dilemma.” Rafsanjani provides that “I discussed [this] with the Chief [Ayatollah Ali Khamenei] in a lot more typical phrases and it was made a decision to consider motion dependent on the [task force’s] evaluation.”

It is most unlikely that the “special commodity” and the technological know-how surrounding it have just about anything to do with ballistic missiles Rafsanjani expresses anxiety that the “special commodity” could be intercepted by the United States, but doesn’t share this be concerned about missile procurement. In a March 9, 1992, journal entry, the cleric gloats about the U.S. Navy getting tracked a North Korean ship sure for Syria but not two ships destined for Iran. Two days later on, when the “special commodity” is unloaded, he writes: “The Americans ended up definitely ashamed.”

Odds are substantial that even now the Central Intelligence Agency doesn’t know what Rafsanjani obtained from Pyongyang, but it is harmless to surmise that the North Koreans weren’t clandestinely making a peaceful nuclear reactor at Deir al-Zour . CIA Director John Brennan has frequently asserted that U.S. intelligence does not feel that the clerical regime is on the verge of earning atomic weapons, and he more claimed that Langley could detect any Iranian determination to sneak toward the bomb. But Washington has not guessed the right way at the time due to the fact Globe War II about the timing of nuclear weaponization by foreign powers (the A-bombs of close allies Britain and France do not count). Odds are fantastic that North Korea served to jump-start Iran’s nuclear-weapons software. If so, how extended did this nefarious partnership keep on?

Rouhani was Rafsanjani’s change ego. He’s without doubt the proper guy to solution all of the PMD queries that the IAEA retains inquiring and the Obama administration retains staying away from.

Read through far more:

Michael Gerson: How to block a bad deal with Iran

Jennifer Rubin: On an Iran offer, reports of concessions galore

The Post’s Check out: The rising Iran nuclear deal raises big worries

Our editors found this article on this site using Google and regenerate for our readers for better reviews.29 March 2015 Sunday 20:17

Housecarl · Mar 29, 2015

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http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/how-will-pakistan-respond-to-the-crisis-in-yemen/

How Will Pakistan Respond to the Crisis in Yemen?

As Arab states head to war in Yemen, Pakistan weighs its options.

By Ankit Panda
March 30, 2015
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Reports late last week in the Wall Street Journal and elsewhere suggested that Pakistan, given its close ties to Saudi Arabia, was considering its involvement in the Saudi-led campaign against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. Last week, Saudi Arabia, on the request of ousted Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, initiated air strikes and a naval blockade against the Iran-backed Shia Houthi rebels who had captured the Yemeni capital of Sana’a earlier this year. The Yemeni government claimed that the Houthis were planning to overthrow the government and create a Shia state in Yemen while the Houthis see themselves as combating religious intolerance from the government.

Pakistan, a Sunni Islamic state, maintains close defense and strategic ties with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Last week, after the air strikes began, Saudi Arabia’s state media reported that Pakistan was one of the Muslim countries outside of the Middle East that was considering providing material support. Among Muslim countries, Pakistan is perhaps the most capable militarily. With an active nuclear weapons program and a large military — primarily to counter its greatest perceived threat from neighboring India — Pakistan is an important provider of military training and arms to Saudi Arabia’s armed forces.

Additionally, Riyadh has been a major source of financial assistance for the fiscally fragile Pakistani government. According to Reuters, last year, Pakistan received $1.5 billion in aid from Saudi Arabia to meet debt obligations and bolster its foreign exchange reserves. Given these factors, Pakistan’s involvement in a Saudi-led military campaign is far from unthinkable. Indeed, in 1990, Pakistan agreed to join an international force to defend Saudi Arabia from Iraqi aggression — Pakistani troops protected Saudi holy sites at the time.

“Pakistan enjoys close and brotherly relations with Saudi Arabia and other GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] countries and attachés great importance to their security,” noted a statement that came out of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s office. Sharif reportedly met for several hours with senior Pakistani military personnel last week, including the Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army, General Raheel Sharif (no relation), who recently traveled to Saudi Arabia for a high-level visit focused on military cooperation between the two countries. “The meeting concluded that any threat to Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity would evoke a strong response from Pakistan,” the prime minister’s statement added.

However, over the weekend, the Pakistani foreign office noted that “rumors” of Pakistani military participation in the ongoing military campaign against the Houthis in Yemen were just that. “These are several reports in the media which are completely baseless,” Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhary told the press on Saturday evening, according to Pakistan’s Geo news agency. He did note that a senior Pakistani delegation is heading to Riyadh to discuss possible options, but the country hasn’t conclusively determined the extent of its military participation in the Saudi-led campaign.

Khawaja Asif, Pakistan’s defense minister, made it clear that no Pakistani combat troops were currently in Saudi Arabia. ”We have made no decision to participate in this war. We didn’t make any promise. We have not promised any military support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen,” Asif said. He noted, hearkening back to Pakistan’s involvement in Saudi Arabia in 1990, that Pakistan would only step in if Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity was threatened.

Variables outside the bilateral Saudi-Pakistani relationship could affect Islamabad’s calculus. On Sunday, the League of Arab States announced that they would form a joint military force to counter the Houthi insurgency in Yemen and more generally combat the spread of Iranian influence across the region. Broader regional support for the Saudi initiative may make it more likely that Pakistani will participate in the conflict in the future.

Within Pakistan, Imran Khan, a prominent opposition politician who led widely destabilizing anti-government protests for the greater part of 2014, cautioned against Pakistan’s involvement in the conflict. Sharif’s government faces widespread criticism domestically for Pakistan’s ailing infrastructure and internal security situation and involvement in a far-flung foreign conflict could lead to a bad situation getting worse for his government. “Given our close ties to both Saudi Arabia and Iran and our own internal sectarian terrorism, Pakistan simply cannot afford to get embroiled in any Shia-Sunni conflict in the Gulf and Middle East regions. Pakistan must stay strictly neutral,” a lawmaker with Khan’s Tehreek-e-Insaaf party told the WSJ.

So far, the extent of Pakistan’s involvement in Yemen since Saudi air strikes began has been focused on rescuing Pakistani citizens in the country. The government evacuated 500 Pakistan nationals from Yemen after strikes began with the use of the national airline. One Pakistani frigate was also reported to have assisted in the rescue operation.

Housecarl · Mar 29, 2015

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http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/29/us-egypt-brotherhood-idUSKBN0MP0T620150329

World | Sun Mar 29, 2015 2:17pm EDT
Related: World, Egypt

Egypt lists top Brotherhood leader, 17 others as terrorists: state media

CAIRO

(Reuters) - Egypt's public prosecutor has listed the Muslim Brotherhood's leader and 17 other top members of the group as terrorists, state media said on Sunday, part of a sustained crackdown by the authorities on Islamists.

Egypt has already listed the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization and jailed thousands of its supporters since the army removed Islamist president Mohamed Mursi from power in July 2013 following mass protests against his rule.

The Brotherhood's General Guide Mohamed Badie and Khairat El-Shater were listed alongside other members of the group's leadership, state news agency MENA said.

The move by public prosecutor Hesham Barakat was the first application of a terrorism law passed this year that requires the authorities to identify and list terrorist individuals and entities, MENA said.

Most members of the Brotherhood's leadership in Egypt are in custody and have already been given lengthy jail sentences or the death penalty. Badie has already been sentenced to death several times and Shater to life in prison.

The government blames the Brotherhood for attacks on Egyptian security forces that have killed hundreds of police officers and soldiers since Mursi's ouster.

The Brotherhood denies it is responsible for the attacks by suspected Islamist militants and says it is committed to political change through peaceful means.

(Reporting By Ahmed Tolba; Writing By Shadi Bushra; Editing by Gareth Jones)

Housecarl · Mar 29, 2015

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http://apnews.myway.com/article/20150329/af--cameroon-rebels_killed-4a182c47af.html

Cameroon residents kill suspected C. African Republic rebels

Mar 29, 9:20 AM (ET)
By EDWIN KINDZEKA MOKI

YAOUNDE, Cameroon (AP) — Residents of eastern Cameroon killed several suspected fighters from a Central African Republic rebel group who were trying to carry out a large-scale kidnapping, a local official said Sunday.

The incident occurred Saturday night near the border town of Garoua-Boulai, said Samuel Dieudonne Ivaha Diboua. He said 15 heavily armed men initially seized eight people before the residents, who had armed themselves with guns and machetes, attacked. The eight would-be hostages were released, several fighters were killed and two are being held by the population.

The area is remote, making it impossible to immediately confirm how many fighters were killed and if residents were also killed, Ivaha Diboua said.

"Some residents were wounded in the ambush and we are still finding out if the attackers killed some," he said.

Central African Republic has experienced widespread and brutal fighting since a mostly Muslim coalition of rebel groups known as Seleka toppled the president of a decade in 2013. Widespread human rights abuses committed by Seleka gave rise to Christian militias, unleashing sectarian violence in which thousands have been killed.

Earlier this month, fighters from Central African Republic attacked a bus in Cameroon, kidnapping 16 people including local politicians and clergy. That incident also occurred near the border and the assailants drove the bus back into Central African Republic.

No one has claimed responsibility for either attack, but officials including Ivaha Diboua believe the perpetrators are members of the Democratic Front of the Central African People, a rebel group once linked with Seleka. Last year, the group kidnapped several Cameroonians and a Polish priest in a bid to win the release of their leader from a Cameroonian jail.

Housecarl · Mar 30, 2015

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http://theweek.com/articles/546762/obamas-real-failure-iran

Opinion
James Poulos

Obama's real failure on Iran

March 30, 2015

Conservatives love to direct ire at President Obama's domestic agenda, particularly his stated goal of "fundamentally transforming" America — halting and amateurish as his progress might be.

Fewer critics on the right have surmised that the president may have the same degree of ambition when it comes to the Middle East. But for a small group of observers, the only way to make sense of the administration's largely reactive and scattershot foreign policy is to see it as the tip of a radical iceberg. Obama, they say, aims to transform the Muslim world by replacing the Saudis with the Iranians as the Mideast's top dog.

This thesis is compelling, if unproven. But the reality is that if Obama has such a plan, he is failing to execute it — an even bigger problem than the alleged strategy itself.

In a sweeping essay, former NSC heavyweight Michael Doran recently made the case that the administration's Mideast moves reveal the grand strategy Obama is often said to lack. In proactive and reactive ways, the president has shifted America's main constructive relationship away from the Sunni-dominated Arab nations, especially in the gulf — and toward the mullahs in Tehran.

The most important thing about Obama's grand pro-Iran strategy, according to Doran and his supporters, is its secrecy. To dramatize his case, Doran cites a top Obama aide, quoted by David E. Sanger in his book Confront and Conceal: Obama's Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power. In 2011, the aide told Sanger "there were more meetings on Iran than there were on Iraq, Afghanistan, and China in year one. It was the thing we spent the most time on and talked about the least in public."

Obama's alleged Iran plan had to be secret, the argument goes, because so few allies and constituents would support it.

But for years, those opposed to a new Iranian-dominated order in the Mideast have come to believe they could see right through to Obama's true intentions. The Saudis have watched all but helplessly as Obama has allowed Iran's regional influence to spread and take root, from Syria to Iraq to Yemen and beyond. And here at home, Obama's most vociferous Republican critics have slammed the president for weakening our Arab allies and Israel to nobody's benefit but Iran's.

For Obama's harshest critics on Iran, the secret strategy — assuming it exists — has long been seen as an open secret.

But the central problem is not the concept of an Iran-led Mideast, but the execution. Despite Iran's clear animosity toward America, the Saudis have been horrendous allies — all but unpunishable despite 9/11 and its aftermath, the kingdom's abysmal human rights record, its shadowy relationship with terrorists, and its extraordinarily punitive and reactionary response to the so-called Arab Spring. Unlike Iran, Saudi Arabia lacks the kind of middle tier of society that lends durability and order to a regime. Iran's progress toward a nuclear weapon may be a ticking time bomb. But, politically speaking, the Saudis themselves are a ticking time bomb, too. Conceptually, finding a way to peacefully reorder the Mideast under Iranian dominance is a better idea than managing its slide into violence under bankrupt Saudi leadership.

But this concept, brilliant as it may be, requires genius in its execution — a visionary understanding of statecraft, civilizations, and the painfully slow workings of time, culture, and authority. This the administration blatantly lacks. Sadly, such an understanding is all but impossible to learn on the job.

To wind up with a stable, peaceful, and influential Iran — one which we can successfully incentivize and disincentivize — we need to embark on a massive geopolitical program with clear and strong support at home and abroad. At a minimum, we need confident buy-in from Europe and from the American people. It would be nice to have it from Israel and at least some of our Arab allies as well.

Obama has none of these things. His secrecy has been paired with a strange mix of sloth and haste — dragging out negotiations with Iran on the one hand, while, on the other, neglecting negotiations with those whose support he needs to succeed. He has completely lost Republicans, some of whom have had it with the Saudis and many of whom would prefer to leave the Mideast to its own fate so long as Israel is spared. He has let our relationships with the Sunni Arab states slip into disarray and hypocrisy. He has even let down Europe: The same France that didn't want to rush toward war with Iraq now opposes his rush toward peace with Iran.

That's why his administration is scrambling now to unleash an aggressive, full-court PR campaign aimed at every powerful skeptic in town. It hopes to do in a few weeks what needs many years to accomplish. Forging ahead without any strong backing, at home or abroad, only made sense if Obama was convinced that the alternative to his plan was disaster. But disaster could come anyway. And an alternative approach might well head it off. It is too late to convince the world to put its faith in this administration.

Regardless of how grand his vision of a new Mideast may be, Obama is moving too fast and too arrogantly to bring it to fruition. Perhaps he could have made more headway had he not devoted so much energy in his first term to pursuing grand transformations at home. Regardless, everyone knows the clock is ticking on his administration. And nobody really expects what he does in the Mideast to last.

As essential to good statecraft as grand strategies may be, this president is not the first leader to discover just how insufficient they can become.

Housecarl · Mar 30, 2015

Hummm......

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http://theweek.com/articles/545969/americas-greatest-danger-there-are-no-more-easy-wars-fight

Opinion

America's greatest danger: There are no more easy wars to fight

James Poulos
March 25, 2015

Bad news, America: At some point soon, within 10 years or less, we're all but certain to fight a full-blown war. With a presidential election around the corner, we need to understand why — and make sure we know what we're voting for when 2016 arrives.

Premonitions of the crisis have already taken center stage in the Republican pre-campaign. It's a terrible time to be a candidate with a light reputation on foreign policy. Even Rand Paul, the least hawkish of the nascent 2016 field, has had to rein in his dovish tendencies.

Despite the apparent political retread on the way, profound puzzles lurk beneath the GOP's seemingly predictable hard line. At first glance, it's all American greatness and Democratic weakness. Peel back the surface, however, and a more complicated — and sobering — picture emerges.

As is now plain, it's just wrong to say President Obama is a wimp on foreign policy. That's why Republicans have been able to bash him for being too militaristic in some respects and not enough in others. But Democrats have been drawn toward this schizophrenia because of the same alarming strategic landscape Republicans are struggling with.

The problem is simple: There are no easy wars to fight.

Because we can't find any easy wars, Obama has lost the hard ones. Because we can't find any easy wars, the neoconservatives are still distrusted. Americans didn't feel betrayed just because they were hustled into war in Iraq, but also because the war in Iraq turned out to be hard. And like Americans since the time of the founding, we don't have the stomach for difficult wars.

We love easy wars. The 19th century was a boom time for them — from the Mexican War to the Indian Wars to the Spanish-American Wars — and so it was boom time for America, too. Even World War I was, for us, almost laughably easy. Relative to Hitler's other combatants, our fight with the Nazis was (let's face it) easy on us.

What's that? I left some things out? Oh, right: the Civil War and the War in the Pacific, against Imperial Japan. Interestingly enough, these two have something in common. It's important to remember that we fully expected the Civil War to be easy — people picnicked to watch the first real clash between North and South. But the War with the Confederates turned out to be very hard, as did the one with the Japanese, but once we got going, there was no turning back. Why? Because our enemies were absolute enemies: adversaries in a clash of civilizations.

It was widely assumed after 9/11 that we would follow this pattern and fight Islamic extremism to the death. For a couple years, we followed the script pretty closely. But then something happened. It turned out that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were hard to win. They were also hard to lose. We lacked both smashing victories and stunning reversals. There was no second 9/11. Instead of a single, well-defined, demonic foe, suddenly we faced a crazy quilt of rival Islamic factions.

Our vision of the enemy disintegrated. The mullahs in Tehran were bad, but the Saudi princes were good. The Sunnis hated us even more than the Shiites, but then switched, before some of them switched again. The Arab Spring confused us all the worse. Egypt's military was bad, yet better than the Muslim Brotherhood. From Yemen to Libya to Syria, countries that threw off their dictators replaced them with warlords. In theory, there was even a "moderate liberal opposition"; in practice, it was the weakest piece on the board.

And then ISIS. What the hell was happening?

We still don't know. And in our not knowing, we lost the one factor that has always gotten America through its very few difficult wars: righteous wrath. Overcome by risk aversion, we soured on the idea of total victory, unconditional surrender, and full-dress war. And here we are today, lacking conspicuously in both easy wars and in the demonized foes that justify hard ones.

Meanwhile, the deterioration of our global security situation continues to accelerate.

This is an insane aggravation for neoconservatives, who cannot inspire the American people to confront Russia, parry China, or even stage a coup in Venezuela. Americans can't even imagine attacking Iran. The risks are too high, the wars too hard. Why fight if you can't win?

The importance of the resurrected hawkishness of the GOP is that many of its candidates believe in the same harsh but true answer: Fight sooner, and you might create a possibility for victory that will certainly be gone if you fight later. This is a piece of military wisdom so old it even transcends conservatism, but other new-wave conservatives making a splash in Washington — like Sen. Tom Cotton of Arkansas — believe it, too.

From this age-old standpoint, it is an absurdity to think of war as a last resort. Instead, we must think of it as simply a fateful gamble. It is never to be undertaken lightly, but only for a massively risk-averse people must a fateful gamble be a last resort. And without any easy wars out there to win, Americans are stuck in the same frame of mind as a struggling sports team or a person who just suffered a bad breakup.

We need confidence-builders. We have none to choose from.

Whatever your politics, it is true that America has lost the strategic initiative around the world, and that dangerous people and wicked ideas have gained it. In the absence of easy wars, we will not fight until backed into a corner.

Unless, that is, our leaders take us to war first. After eight years of Obama, whether Republican or Democrat, the safe bet is that they will.

Housecarl · Mar 30, 2015

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https://news.vice.com/article/threa...n-nigeria-but-not-necessarily-from-boko-haram

Africa
Threat of Post-Election Violence Looms in Nigeria — But Not Necessarily From Boko Haram

By Johnny Magdaleno
March 29, 2015 | 8:09 am

Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan has been accused of giving more than $40 million to local militias to fan election violence. Politicians have demanded that their supporters "kill" and "crush" competitors like "cockroaches." Police chiefs have threatened to shoot 20 people for any one police officer's death during voting season.

These are just a few examples of the alarming vitriol present in the run-up to Nigeria's hotly contested 2015 elections, where Jonathan is competing for a second term against ex-military commander Muhammadu Buhari, who is pursuing his fourth presidential bid. Voting was extended to Sunday after polling difficulties in some areas, and the two candidates are apparently locked in a dead heat.

Recurring hate speech, reports of small arms circulation among politically backed militias, and gangs and government officials attempting to influence the police have made human rights groups monitoring the elections worry that political violence will once again shatter Nigeria's promise of a peaceful democratic result.

According to the Nigerian Human Rights Commission, every election since 1922 in the West African country has been beset by politically motivated violence. This year is shaping up to be no different.

The election, originally scheduled for February 14, was delayed due to Boko Haram's bloody insurgency in the country's northeast. While an African Union-backed regional force of troops from Chad, Niger, and Cameroon have helped the Nigerian army retake 17 of the 20 local governments once held by the militant group, violence perpetrated by Boko Haram is not the only threat Nigeria faces. At least 40 people have been killed across the country since voting began Saturday. Boko Haram was responsible for most of the bloodshed, but not all of it.

Related: Election day in Nigeria marred by Boko Haram attacks and voting difficulties

Late Saturday morning, gunmen reportedly attacked a polling team convoy in Rivers state in the country's south, leading to a firefight between police and the attackers that lasted nearly half an hour. In Kano, a populous northern state, a mob assaulted two members of Jonathan's People's Democratic Party (PDP) while they registered at a local polling station in the late afternoon, forcing both to flee on foot.

On Sunday, groups of armed men stormed voting stations in the southeastern Ebonyi state and shot to disperse crowds before stealing ballot boxes and other electoral materials, though no one was killed. In Osun state in southwest Nigeria, gunmen accused of being associated with the incumbent party killed one person and injured 12 when they stormed a town in the early morning. Another group of gunmen attacked a town in the state's south, killing one and razing a house reportedly owned by a National Assembly member.

Representatives from both parties have thrown accusations back and forth, blaming each other for leading the violence.

"The country and its leaders, institutions and citizens must learn the lessons from 2011 and before," Dr. Chidi Odinkalu, head of the Nigerian Human Rights Commission, told VICE News. In 2011, Buhari and the All Progressives Congress (APC) lost to Jonathan in their first time campaigning against each other. The election was followed by a three-day surge of sectarian rioting across Kaduna, Gombe and other states that killed more than 800 people, displaced more than 65,000, and destroyed $200 million worth of property.

"If the pathology of pre-election violence is any pointer, however, then it suggests 2015 will be much tougher," Odinkalu said.

A report on the 2011 post-election riots published February 17 by NHRC labeled "inflammatory campaign utterances" by competing political parties as a key cause of the violence. Pastors and imams at churches and mosques across the country also stoked political enmity by giving "divisive sermons of hate and hostility," the report said.

The incendiary rhetoric returned to the campaign trail this election season. Last August, the APC threatened to break off and form a parallel government if Buhari does not win. Earlier this month, a PDP spokesperson accused Buhari of being funded by the Islamic State.

Related: Why electricity, or a lack of it, is an election concern for many Nigerians

The NHRC report also found that between December 3, 2014 and January 31 of this year, election-related violence killed 58 people across 22 different states and injured "thousands" more.

A follow-up report issued by the commission a few days ago outlined an even bleaker picture: Since February, political violence had infiltrated every state in Nigeria, and complaints of politically motivated attacks were up 200 percent in February and March compared to December and January.

The NHRC responded by sending teams to various Nigerian states to speak with local government officials, police officers, political party leaders, and branches of the country's Independent National Electoral Commission.

The NHRC claims to have discovered a worrying amount of small arms and light weaponry circulating throughout Kaduna, Lagos and Rivers, the three states that have experienced the most election-related violence and documented the most deaths since December. The report didn't offer a specific number, but a Nigerian government committee said last year that more than 1 million small arms and light weapons circulate illegally every year in Nigeria, making the country a hub for the regional arms trade.

The justice systems in some states are also poorly equipped to handle election-related violence, according to the NHRC. In Rivers state, the court system was shut down after court buildings in Port Harcourt and two other cities were bombed with improved explosive devices in February. As a result, police say they are running out of space for prisoners and unable to properly bring suspects to trial.

Nigerian police have also claimed they "suffer interference from politicians" as they attempt to prevent and stanch election-related violence. But Alhaji Ali Ahmed, a resident of Yobe state, told VICE News that he worries corrupt or trigger-happy police might also be contributing to the instability.

"Use of force or live ammunition at the slightest opportunity by our security agents is one thing that leads to this violence," Ahmed said.

The NHRC's follow-up report concluded that the "only winner in these elections should be the Federal Republic of Nigeria," demanding all candidates to drop their political animosity and see elections as a civil service to the public.

Related: 'If Buhari returns we will all end up in jail': History hangs over Nigeria's election candidates

The presidential candidates have acknowledged these threats with encouraging responses. Last week, Buhari and Jonathan signed an agreement to help curtail election violence in the country by accepting the election's outcome as authentic, and communicating messages of co-existence to their supporters. But despite the proactive approach, some Nigerians are still worried about what lies ahead in the coming days and weeks.

"The hope and expectation of our government is limited," Mallam Goje told VICE News in Yobe state, recalling how some of her friends were killed as they tried to escape post-election violence in 2011 in Yobe and Kaduna. "It gave rise to orphans and widows, loss of businesses, bankruptcy — and above all a loss of confidence in government and those in authority."

Additional reporting from Yobe state by Hassan Jirgi.

Follow Johnny Magdaleno on Twitter: @johnny_mgdlno

Housecarl · Mar 30, 2015

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http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/03/29/does-iran-have-secret-nukes-in-north-korea.html

HIDE AND SEEK
03.29.15
Does Iran Have Secret Nukes in North Korea?
Gordon G. Chang
Comments 7

Washington’s nuclear deal with Tehran depends on aggressive inspections inside Iran. But the mullahs may well have a secret program outside their borders.

In October 2012, Iran began stationing personnel at a military base in North Korea, in a mountainous area close to the Chinese border. The Iranians, from the Ministry of Defense and associated firms, reportedly are working on both missiles and nuclear weapons. Ahmed Vahidi, Tehran’s minister of defense at the time, denied sending people to the North, but the unconfirmed dispatches make sense in light of the two states announcing a technical cooperation pact the preceding month.

The P5+1—the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany—appear determined, before their self-imposed March 31 deadline, to ink a deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding its nuclear energy program, which is surely a cover for a wide-ranging weapons effort. The international community wants the preliminary arrangement now under discussion, referred to as a “framework agreement,” to ensure that the country remains at least one year away from being able to produce an atomic device.

The P5+1 negotiators believe they can do that by monitoring Tehran’s centrifuges—supersonic-speed machines that separate uranium gas into different isotopes and upgrade the potent stuff to weapons-grade purity—and thereby keep track of its total stock of fissile material.

The negotiators from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia and China are trying to get Tehran to adhere to the Additional Protocol, which allows anytime, anyplace inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N.’s nuclear watchdog. If Iran agrees to the IAEA’s intrusive inspections, proponents of the deal will claim a major breakthrough, arguing for instance that Iran will not be able to hide centrifuges in undisclosed locations.

But no inspections of Iranian sites will solve a fundamental issue: As can be seen from the North Korean base housing Tehran’s weapons specialists, Iran is only one part of a nuclear weapons effort spanning the Asian continent. North Korea, now the world’s proliferation superstar, is a participant. China, once the mastermind, may still be a co-conspirator. Inspections inside the borders of Iran, therefore, will not give the international community the assurance it needs.

The cross-border nuclear trade is substantial enough to be called a “program.” Larry Niksch of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., estimates that the North’s proceeds from this trade with Iran are “between $1.5 billion and $2.0 billion annually.” A portion of this amount is related to missiles and miscellaneous items, the rest derived from building Tehran’s nuclear capabilities.

Iran has bought a lot with its money. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, thought to be Tehran’s chief nuclear scientist, was almost certainly in North Korea at Punggye-ri in February 2013 to witness Pyongyang’s third atomic test. Reports put Iranian technicians on hand at the site for the first two detonations as well.

The North Koreans have also sold Iran material for bomb cores, perhaps even weapons-grade uranium. The Telegraph reported that in 2002 a barrel of North Korean uranium cracked open and contaminated the tarmac of the new Tehran airport.

In addition, the Kim Jong Un regime appears to have helped the Islamic Republic on its other pathway to the bomb. In 2013, Meir Dagan, a former Mossad director, charged the North with providing assistance to Iran’s plutonium reactor.

The relationship between the two regimes has been long-lasting. Hundreds of North Koreans have worked at about 10 nuclear and missile facilities in Iran. There were so many nuclear and missile scientists, specialists, and technicians that they took over their own coastal resort there, according to Henry Sokolski, the proliferation maven, writing in 2003.

Even if Iran today were to agree to adhere to the Additional Protocol, it could still continue developing its bomb in North Korea, conducting research there or buying North Korean technology and plans. And as North Korean centrifuges spin in both known and hidden locations, the Kim regime will have a bigger stock of uranium to sell to the Iranians for their warheads. With the removal of sanctions, as the P5+1 is contemplating, Iran will have the cash to accelerate the building of its nuclear arsenal.

So while the international community inspects Iranian facilities pursuant to a framework deal, the Iranians could be busy assembling the components for a bomb elsewhere. In other words, they will be one day away from a bomb—the flight time from Pyongyang to Tehran—not one year as American and other policymakers hope.

The North Koreans are not the only contributors to the Iranian atom bomb. Iran got its first centrifuges from Pakistan, and Pakistan’s program was an offshoot from the Chinese one.

Some argue that China proliferated nuclear weapons through the infamous black market ring run by Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. There is no open source proof of that contention, but Beijing did nothing while Khan merchandised Chinese parts, plans, and knowhow—its most sensitive technology—from the capital of one of its closest allies. Moreover, Beijing did its best to protect the smuggler when Washington rolled up his network in the early part of last decade. The Chinese, for instance, supported General Pervez Musharraf’s controversial decision to end prematurely his government’s inquiry, which avoided exposing Beijing’s rumored involvement with Khan’s activities.

And there are circumstances suggesting that Beijing, around the time of Khan’s confession and immediate pardon in 2004, took over his proliferation role directly, boldly transferring materials and equipment straight to Iran. For example, in November 2003 the staff of the IAEA had fingered China as one of the sources of equipment used in Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons effort. And as reported in July 2007 by the Wall Street Journal, the State Department had lodged formal protests with Beijing about Chinese enterprises violating Security Council resolutions by exporting to Tehran items that could be used for building atomic weapons.

Since then, there have been continual reports of transfers by Chinese enterprises to Iran in violation of international treaties and U.N. rules. Chinese entities have been implicated in shipments of maraging steel, ring-shaped magnets, and valves and vacuum gauges, all apparently headed to Iran’s atom facilities. In March 2011, police in Port Klang seized two containers from a ship bound to Iran from China. Malaysian authorities discovered that goods passed off as “used for liquid mixing or storage” were actually components for potential atomic weapons.

In the last few years, there has been an apparent decline in Chinese shipments to Iran. Beijing could be reacting to American pressure to end the trade, but there are more worrying explanations. First, it’s possible that, after decades of direct and indirect illicit transfers, China has already supplied most of what Iran needs to construct a weapon. Second, Beijing may be letting Pyongyang assume the leading proliferation role. After all, the shadowy Fakhrizadeh was reported to have traveled through China on his way to North Korea to observe the North’s third nuclear test.

Fakhrizadeh’s passage through China—probably Beijing’s airport—suggests that China may not have abandoned its “managed proliferation.” In the past, China’s proxy for this deadly trade was Pakistan. Then it was China’s only formal ally, North Korea. In both cases, Chinese policymakers intended to benefit Iran.

In a theoretical sense, there is nothing wrong with an accommodation with the Islamic Republic over nukes, yet there is no point in signing a deal with just one arm of a multi-nation weapons effort. That’s why the P5+1 needs to know what is going on at that isolated military base in the mountains of North Korea. And perhaps others as well.

Housecarl · Mar 30, 2015

http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougban...uld-switch-from-coercion-to-engagement/print/

World Affairs 3/30/2015 @ 7:00AM 32 views

North Korea Advances Along The Nuclear Path: Washington Should Switch From Coercion to Engagement

Doug Bandow
Comment Now

North Korea continues along the nuclear path. A new report warns that Pyongyang could amass a nuclear arsenal as large as 100 weapons by 2020. With that many warheads the North would move from marginal local player to significant regional power in the same league as India, Israel, and Pakistan. Iran’s potential program, currently the subject of frenzied negotiation, suddenly looks much less threatening.

Washington has no realistic strategy to deal with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Some policymakers have advocated offensive military action, but that likely would trigger a war which would devastate South Korea. In contrast to Iran, U.S. presidents long ago stopped intoning that “all options” are on the table. The price of war simply would be too high.

The Obama administration’s chief policy has been to reaffirm Washington’s defensive alliance with the South. Then-U.S. military commander Gen. James D. Thurman said in 2013: “We’ve got to keep a close watch on [Kim Jong-un], every day, and that’s what we try to do.”

Some 28,500 U.S. troops are on station, backed by conventional forces elsewhere in the region. The Center for a New American Security recently recommended that the Pentagon draft contingency plans “for the possibility of limited military campaigns on the Korean peninsula” short of the full-scale war. The administration also is prepared to deploy Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense. Moreover, Washington maintains a nuclear umbrella over the South.

However, such steps have little effect on the North’s nuclear development since offensive action is not the program’s purpose. Rather, the DPRK sees nukes as protection against the allies’ overwhelming military strength, prestige for an otherwise geopolitical nullity, potent tool of extortion, and domestic reward for North Korea’s military. In fact, the more ostentatious the allies’ military preparations, the greater Pyongyang’s incentive to expand its nuclear capabilities.

A U.S. Army soldier from the 25th Infantry Division’s 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team and a South Korean Army soldier take their position during a demonstration of the combined arms live-fire exercise as a part of the annual joint military exercise Foal Eagle between South Korea and the United States at the Rodriquez Multi-Purpose Range Complex in Pocheon, north of Seoul, South Korea, Wednesday, March 25, 2015. (AP Photo/Lee Jin-man)

Some analysts look to more economic sanctions to stop a North Korea bomb. A United Nations Panel of Experts recently proposed penalizing the North’s space agency, the National Aerospace Development Administration. Zach Przystup of Tufts University’s Fletcher School called for “the U.S. and its partners to work to tighten sanctions and stop the flow of luxury goods into North Korea.” Undoubtedly, more could be done, but neither China nor Russia is likely to approve new UN penalties. Additional U.S. sanctions alone aren’t likely to cause the North to surrender a program deemed essential to the regime’s international standing and domestic stability. Only if China agreed to end all aid, investment, and trade would sanctions reach critical effect, but Beijing so far refuses to destabilize its recalcitrant neighbor.

There also is the increasingly forlorn hope for negotiation. U.S. officials confidently assert that North Korea would be better off trading away its nuclear program, but the DPRK obviously has concluded otherwise. And why should Pyongyang trust paper guarantees against the sort of regime change and territorial dismemberment which Washington has imposed on Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya? What could Washington offer that would be more valuable than a nuclear arsenal? Voluntary disarmament seems especially unlikely given the critical political role played by the military in North Korea.

Some policymakers look to Chinese pressure on the North as a panacea. However, Beijing has yet to fully enforce existing sanctions. The People’s Republic of China is not inclined to cut off energy and food, as requested by Washington, which might violently collapse the North Korean state. Certainly Beijing won’t do so unless the U.S. convinces the Chinese government that doing so would be in the PRC’s interest, which is unlikely so long as Washington’s Asian military policies—especially maintaining the Republic of Korea as an advanced base—remain unchanged.

The Obama administration should adopt a different approach. Instead of attempting to micro-manage the region, Washington should leave the Korean Peninsula’s future up to the two Koreas and their neighbors.

The world has changed dramatically since the U.S. got involved in the Korean Peninsula in 1945. What happens in Pyongyang today is of vastly greater interest to others in the region than America.

Indeed, the North matters to Washington primarily because U.S. forces are stationed in the South. Otherwise America would have little reason to worry about North Korea—and the latter would have no interest in the U.S. The Kim regime cares about Washington because the latter’s forces directly confront North Korea.

Of course, a DPRK deploying nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles theoretically could strike America. In practice that possibility is quite some time off. The North’s long-range missiles are inaccurate and unreliable; the South Korean defense ministry rejects claims that Pyongyang has miniaturized nuclear warheads. More important, attacking the U.S. would ensure that North Korea ceased to exist. And the Kims always wanted their virgins in this world, not the next.

While the U.S. retains an interest in a stable Northeast Asia, even more so do the surrounding nations. The best American “leadership” would be to turn responsibility for the peninsula over to neighboring states. Let them deal with the “North Korea problem.”

America’s defense guarantee has deformed South Korean policy. Once an economic and political wreck, today the ROK enjoys a GDP around 40 times that of the North, population twice as big, and vast technological and international lead. Yet the South has continued to underinvest in the military despite facing an aggressive neighbor with geographically advanced conventional forces, threatening missiles, and growing nuclear program.

The South does not even command its own military in war. More than six decades after the conclusion of the Korean War Washington controls the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command. Transfer to Seoul, now set for December 2015, has been steadily pushed back. The South cites its own military insufficiencies, as if they were beyond its control.

Worse, South Korea has routinely subsidized its northern antagonist. For a decade Seoul followed the “Sunshine Policy,” which transferred roughly $10 billion in cash and resources to the North while the latter was pursuing nuclear weapons. Even though more conservative governments since stopped attempting to purchase Pyongyang’s friendship, the South continues to provide the DPRK with roughly $100 million annually in hard currency through the Kaesong industrial park. Indeed, Seoul recently agreed to hike wages by some five percent, money which will go to the Kim regime, not Kaesong’s workers.

Today South Korea is pushing for renewed negotiations and pursuing reunification with Pyongyang, while the U.S. recently increased sanctions on the DPRK. Said Choi Kang of the Asan Institute: “The U.S. is going in one direction, and South Korea is going in the other.” The ROK is entitled to set its own policy, but should bear the cost of doing so. It should not expect the American cavalry to ride in and save it in the event of disaster.

U.S. policy has had a similarly negative effect on Japan. American military support has left Tokyo as a geopolitical dependent, vulnerable to its potentially aggressive neighbors, both North Korea and China. Moreover, Tokyo’s relationship with Pyongyang has been convulsed by the fate of Japanese kidnapped by the North decades ago. In terms of Korean security Japan largely has been a nullity, even though the latter has far more at stake than does America. Only recently have Tokyo and the DPRK again been attempting to reach a modus vivendi; in fact, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe suggested the possibility of a summit if the North accounts for its earlier misbehavior.

Russia’s relations with the North dipped substantially after the end of the Cold War. Ties now are on the rise. Last year Russia sent more official visitors to the DPRK than did China and ratified an earlier agreement to write off North Korean debt. Moscow is pressing to increase trade and make the DPRK into a transportation link to the South. The Putin government even invited Kim Jong-un to Russia’s World War II anniversary celebrations in May. Yet these activities sound more impressive than their likely practical impact, given the North’s limits—and the fact that closer relations more reflect the new “cool war” between Washington and Moscow than genuine Russian interest in North Korea. The ROK continues to offer far more to Moscow, providing investment and technology and acting as a market for Russian goods and services, including weapons.

Finally, America’s dominant regional role has encouraged China to manipulate the instability created by the North. Washington’s ill-disguised effort to contain the PRC, which would be aided by the South’s absorption of the DPRK, reinforces China’s commitment to preservation of the Kim regime even at cost of the North’s denuclearization. Obama administration lectures about Beijing’s international responsibilities matter less to the Chinese government than U.S. military activities. At the same time, the North, frustrated in its attempt to develop alternative relationships, has had little choice but to rely on the PRC.

America should begin to act as a normal nation in Northeast Asia. Washington should end its defense guarantees and withdraw its troops from South Korea and Japan. The pull-back should be carried out in consultation with Washington’s allies, but the U.S. should develop a more equal relationship based on cooperation to advance mutual objectives rather than unilateral support for other nations’ interests.

A South Korean man watches a television screen showing North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un’s New Year speech, at a railroad station in Seoul on January 1, 2015. North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un said he was open to the ‘highest-level’ talks with South Korea as he called for an improvement in strained cross-border relations. AFP PHOTO / JUNG YEON-JE (Photo credit should read JUNG YEON-JE/AFP/Getty Images)

Disengagement would transform the region’s dynamics. First, the North would face a significantly reduced threat environment. While Pyongyang’s protestations should be viewed with great cynicism, even paranoids have enemies, once observed Henry Kissinger. American officials, including current Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, have proposed military action against the North. Washington has routinely bombed, invaded, and occupied non-nuclear states. America’s alliance with the South encourages the North to maintain an oversize military establishment, highlighted by WMDs.

Second, North Korea’s neighbors would be accountable for the results their own policies toward Pyongyang. They could confront or bribe, challenge or enable, or do whatever else they desired concerning the North. But they no longer could rely on the U.S. to underwrite their defenses, subsidize their policies, restrain their adversaries, and mitigate their mistakes.

In particular, Beijing no longer could evade responsibility for its continued support for the Kim regime. Without a regional American military presence the PRC would have little reason to preserve an artificial buffer state. Nor could Beijing blame U.S. hostility for causing the North to take a nuclear course. Moreover, China would face the full cost of a nuclear DPRK: absent American military guarantees, South Korea and Japan would have to rethink their commitment to a non-nuclear course. Further proliferation likely would discomfit Beijing more than North Korea.

Third, the end of overt U.S. hostility would ease Pyongyang’s entry into more normal relationships around the world. Although the DPRK has been called the Hermit Kingdom, it has been reaching out in recent days. For instance, the Kim regime has been improving links with African and Middle Eastern states. Trade even is expanding in Asia and Europe. This process empowers the DPRK, but also creates greater incentives for the North to behave more reasonably.

Fourth, the U.S. would find it easier to improve relations with North Korea from a distance. The North has proved to be a difficult actor, but long desired direct talks with Washington. Indeed, the 1994 Agreed Framework included a promise to “move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.” Ironically, Pyongyang wants a better relationship for the same reason that Seoul does: as a distant power the U.S. would help the North balance its more immediate, overbearing neighbors.

Although the Obama administration recently tightened sanctions in response to the hacking of Sony Pictures, the U.S. and North apparently have been talking about having talks. An unnamed U.S. official said that “we want to test if they have an interest in resuming negotiations,” but “we’ve made it very clear that we could like to see them take some steps first.” One proposal is for a North Korean meeting with Sung Kim, America’s special envoy for North Korea.

The U.S. also has agreed with China, the ROK, Japan, and Russia to exploratory talks with the North on restarting the Six-Party Talks. Exactly how preliminary Six-Party Talks would differ from formal Six-Party Talks is unclear, but the last negotiations broke down in 2008 and Pyongyang officially dropped out the following year. Until now Washington has insisted that the North take concrete steps toward denuclearization before resuming negotiations.

As noted earlier, that remains unlikely. North Korea is more interested in receiving validation as a nuclear power than abandoning its nuclear ambitions. Rather than push multilateral discussions unlikely to generate a positive result, the U.S. should cede leadership to other participants. At the same time, Washington should initiate bilateral talks intended to open low level diplomatic relations, create selected economic opportunities, and offer expanded ties if the North responds positively. While transformation via engagement is a long-shot, transformation via coercion has failed. Opening a regular dialogue offers a better chance for human rights improvement than increased threats.

Diplomacy may have a small chance of success, but the young Kim appears serious about reforming the DPRK’s economy. His government has made a public commitment to growth, which has been aided by the influx of Chinese money. Pyongyang has implemented market-oriented reforms in both agriculture and industry and expanded special economic zones. Periodic attempts to reign in private markets only have stoked dissatisfaction with the state. Opined the Economist magazine: “To an extent, the recent top-down measures may be an acknowledgement that the bottom-up change of the past 15 or so years is irreversible.” Pyongyang might have a greater interest than before in an economic opening to America.

As part of this process, Washington should indicate its willingness to sign a peace treaty and end the formal state of war. (South Korea should do the same.) This step would not be a reward, but simple recognition of peace, which would eliminate a justification for continued U.S. military presence and might help allay any genuine North Korean security concerns.

North Korea is Northeast Asia’s biggest security problem. But it is not—or at least should not be—America’s security problem. The U.S. is overextended overseas and perpetually at war and risk of war because Washington insists on making virtually every other nation’s conflict America’s conflict. That strategy should have ended along with the Cold War. The Korean Peninsula matters primarily to the Koreas and their neighbors. They, not America, should be responsible for reshaping Northeast Asia.

Housecarl · Mar 30, 2015

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http://www.voiceofjournalists.com/safety-and-security-of-pakistans-nuclear-installations/

Opinion
Safety and Security of Pakistan’s Nuclear Installations
March 30, 2015 9:44 am·0 Comments
Author: Sidra Kayani The author is a researcher at Strategic Vision Institute.

Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is primarily based on the policy of ambiguity. There are different speculations regarding the exact number of its nuclear weapons however the accurate number is yet unknown. By and large, it is assessed that Pakistan could have 90 to 120 nuclear warheads.

The numbers debate aside, Pakistan has taken numerous steps to ensure security of its nuclear weapons and other related assets. A number of initiatives have been taken in this regard. The weapons are apparently kept separate from their delivery systems just to minimize chances of any catastrophe. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s former President, affirmed that Pakistan warheads and missiles are not ready to fire with a button in hand.

The concerns regarding the accidental launch of the nuclear weapon are also addressed by attaching nuclear warheads with a code lock device ‘Adaptation of Permissive Action Links’ (PALs). By doing this, any nuclear-lunched decision is not plausible unless the decision is taken be two or three men who are authorized to do so. Such a strictest procedure shows Pakistan’s maturity and competence in keeping its nuclear weapons safe.

Measures have also been taken to secure fissile material under the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) net. Not a single incident has been reported regarding the mishandling or mismanagement of fissile material produced within Pakistan. There is also a tight security of nuclear facilities with highly trained personnel and electronic devices. Like advanced nuclear weapons states, Pakistan has also taken strong measures to make its fissile material security perfect.

SPD conducts external audits on all nuclear inventories inside the country. SPD also launches regular and surprise inspections of the nuclear facilities to check and confirm its control and accounting of fissile material. SPD is also accountable for the Physical protection of nuclear facilities. Under the Inner perimeter security and outer perimeter security, protection of facilities has been ensured.

Pakistan also ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) in October 2000 and all transportation of its sensitive nuclear materials comes under the guidelines of this convention.

Four nuclear facilities of Pakistan, KANUPP, the Pakistan Atomic Research Reactors I and II at Rawalpindi and Chasma-1 power reactor, are working under the safeguards of the IAEA. Other non-attached facilities also bind themselves with strict safeguards procedures of the IAEA.

Pakistan has taken all the necessary measures to affirm secured transportation of fissile material. As fissile material is highly radioactive in nature especially when it is burnt out in a nuclear reactor, so on that stage transportation of that material becomes very much risky. As far as the transportation of fissile material in Pakistan is concerned, most of the nuclear reactors and reprocessing units are at the same places which eradicate probability of any mishap. Pakistan follows international norms of transporting such material.

Like USA, Pakistan also follows Personnel Reliability Program. This program deals with personnel screening and clearance, who work in nuclear facilities, strategic organizations and other related installation.

In western discourse, a concern which is often expressed regarding the security of Pakistan nukes is that, terrorist may attack or get hold of its nuclear installations. However, factual assessment clearly reveal that not a single terrorist attack or other related incident has been recorded to date.

The initiatives taken by Pakistan to provide foolproof security to its nuclear assets shows the country’s strong commitment, capability, and credibility to be a responsible nuclear state. No one should remain under the illusion that terrorists could attack Pakistan’s nuclear installations. To attack the GHQ and the Mehran Navel Base located in congested cities like Rawalpindi and Karachi is different than attacking Pakistan’s nukes that are scattered and under multi-layered command and control system.

Housecarl · Mar 30, 2015

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http://apnews.myway.com/article/20150330/ml--iran-us-disputed_strike-662903aa3b.html

Iran says US drone kills 2 advisers in Iraq; US denies claim

Mar 30, 7:15 AM (ET)
By VIVIAN SALAMA

BAGHDAD (AP) — Iran's Revolution Guard says a U.S. drone strike has killed two of its advisers in Iraq, though the U.S. said Monday it has only struck militants in its campaign against the Islamic State group.

The claim came as negotiators on Monday attempted to reach a deal on Iran's contested nuclear program, which hard-liners in the Islamic Republic have opposed as giving away too much to the West.

The Guard said on its sepahnews.ir website the strike happened March 23, just after the U.S.-led coalition began airstrikes to support Iraqi forces trying to retake the Islamic State-held city of Tikrit. It identified the dead as Ali Yazdani and Hadi Jafari, saying they were buried Sunday. It called them advisers, without elaborating on whether Iran contacted Iraqi or U.S. forces after the strike.

The U.S.-led coalition began a campaign of airstrikes and reconnaissance missions around Tikrit, Saddam Hussein's hometown, on March 21.

Reached by The Associated Press, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad said: "The international coalition is aimed at Daesh only," using an alternate Arabic acronym for the Islamic State group.

"All airstrikes are carried out through the alliance with the Iraqi government and in full coordination with the (Iraqi) Ministry of Defense," the embassy said, without directly addressing the Iranian claim.

The Islamic State group now controls a third of both Iraq and neighboring Syria. The U.S. began airstrikes against the group in August, while Iran has offered advisers and other assistance to Iraq to fight the extremists.

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Associated Press writers Adam Schreck in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and Jon Gambrell in Cairo contributed to this report.

Housecarl · Mar 30, 2015

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NATO chief seeks closer cooperation with the European Union

Mar 30, 11:13 AM (ET)

BRUSSELS (AP) — NATO'S secretary-general wants more joint action with the European Union to face the security challenges coming from Russia and the violent Islamic extremism plaguing some countries in the Middle East and North Africa.

Jens Stoltenberg told a European Parliament hearing Monday that NATO and the EU should combine efforts to make member countries more "resilient" to the so-called hybrid brand of warfare that Western governments accuse Russia of waging in Ukraine. Along with military force, hybrid warfare includes cyber-attacks, the use of social media, deception and disinformation.

The NATO secretary-general also said the EU should assist friendly countries to its south and southeast like Jordan to combat the spread of Islamic extremism.

Stoltenberg told European lawmakers that "the time has come to spend more on defense."

Housecarl · Mar 30, 2015

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Pakistani, Saudi armies hold joint military exercise

Mar 30, 1:00 PM (ET)

ISLAMABAD (AP) — The Pakistani military says it is holding a joint military exercise with Saudi Arabia.

The military's statement on Monday says the drill is taking part near the city of Taif, in the mountains near Mecca in the western part of Saudi Arabia. It has been underway since March 19, with 292 Pakistani troops taking part.

The drill is an annual event and was held in Pakistan last year.

The exercise, dubbed Samsam-5, comes as a Saudi-led coalition of Sunni Arab countries is targeting Iran-backed Shiite rebels and their allies in Yemen in a campaign of airstrikes that began last week.

Pakistan has voiced support for the mission but is not taking part in the strikes and has started evacuating its citizens from Yemen.

Housecarl · Mar 30, 2015

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Blogger hacked to death in Bangladesh's capital

Mar 30, 12:37 PM (ET)
By JULHAS ALAM

(AP) A Bangladeshi policeman escorts Jikrullah, left and Ariful Islam, two among three...
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DHAKA, Bangladesh (AP) — A blogger was hacked to death by three men in Bangladesh's capital on Monday, and two of the attackers were caught near the scene, police said.

The killing took place a month after a prominent Bangladeshi-American blogger known for speaking out against religious extremism was hacked to death in Dhaka.

In the latest incident, Washiqur Rahman Babu, 26, was declared dead at a hospital shortly after being attacked in Dhaka's Tejgaon area, police official Biplob Kumar Sarker said.

Two suspects, both students at Islamic schools, were captured and three meat cleavers were recovered, Sarker said. The third suspect fled, he said.

(AP) Shilpi, a cousin of late Bangladeshi blogger Washiqur Rahman Babu, wails outside a...
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One of the suspects told reporters they attacked Babu because he had disrespected Islam's Prophet Muhammad.

"I stabbed him because he humiliated my prophet," said Jikrullah, a 20-year-old student at Hathajari Madrassah in the southeastern district of Chittagong, without elaborating.

Jikrullah said he traveled from Chittagong and stayed overnight at a mosque to attack Babu.

The other detained suspect, Ariful Islam, also 20, is a student at an Islamic school in Dhaka's Mirpur area. They named a third suspect, but details about him were not available.

It was not immediately known what kind of blogging Babu did, but the suspects told police they targeted him for anti-Islamic writings, Sarker said.

The deputy spokesman for the U.N. secretary-general, Farhan Haq, expressed concern at the latest death. "We have been calling for the respect of basic rights in Bangladesh, including the right to freedom of expression," he said. "It's a matter of tremendous concern that journalists and other intellectuals have been attacked."

Two of Babu's cousins told reporters at Dhaka Medical College Hospital, where his body was being kept, that he recently joined a travel agency in Dhaka after finishing his studies, and they were not aware of any blogging he had done.

Local media reported that Babu had a Facebook page that contained the line "IamAvijit," meaning he was a follower of Avijit Roy, the Bangladeshi-American blogger who was hacked to death late last month.

Roy, a Bangladesh-born U.S. citizen, died after being attacked at Dhaka University as he was leaving a book fair with his wife. A previously unknown militant group, Ansar Bangla 7, claimed responsibility for the attack. Detectives have arrested one suspect in the case, and the FBI is helping with the investigation.

Housecarl · Mar 30, 2015

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Red Cross truck attacked in Mali; 1 dead, 1 wounded

Mar 30, 3:58 PM (ET)
By BABA AHMED

BAMAKO, Mali (AP) — Armed men attacked a Red Cross truck on Monday, partially setting it on fire and killing the driver and wounding a passenger, the International Committee of the Red Cross said.

The truck was clearly marked with the Red Cross emblem and heading to neighboring Niger on Monday to pick up medical supplies when it came under attack, according to a statement from the ICRC. The driver who was killed was an employee of the ICRC, which coordinates humanitarian relief operations for the Red Cross movement in conflict zones. The passenger, who is in stable condition, works for the Malian Red Cross.

The attackers set the truck partially ablaze about 25 miles (45 kilometers) outside of the city of Gao, said Valery Mbaoh Nana, a spokesman for the ICRC.

"We are going to suspend our activities to learn more about the circumstances (of the attack), which are unacceptable for us," he said. "We have been here during the most difficult periods, and we don't understand that we would be attacked now."

Mali's northern half came under control of al-Qaida-linked Islamic extremists following a military coup in 2012. A French-led intervention in early 2013 scattered the extremists, but the country is growing increasingly unstable, and U.N. troops are struggling to maintain peace.

Housecarl · Mar 30, 2015

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Saudi Arabia, Egypt show discord over Syria

Mar 30, 3:34 PM (ET)
By SARAH EL DEEB

(AP) Saudi Foreign Minister Saud bin Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud reviews a document...
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CAIRO (AP) — Egypt and Saudi Arabia are cooperating militarily to thwart a power grab in Yemen by Shiite rebels, but the agreement on how to deal with the region's complex and intertwined conflicts may stop there. The two countries' diverging interests were evident at the Arab summit over the weekend, particularly over the crises in Syria and Libya.

In Syria's civil war, Saudi Arabia has staunchly stuck by its demands for President Bashar Assad's removal. In a speech to the summit in the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh, Saudi King Salman railed against "those with blood on their hands" and said he cannot be any part of a resolution to the war, now in its fifth year.

In contrast, President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi in his speech urged a political solution, pointing to the need to "confront terrorist organizations" and prevent the collapse of Syrian state institutions. He said Egypt would host a conference of Syria's opposition aimed at unifying its position for political talks.

The speech reflected what el-Sissi has made his top priority since rising to office last year — fighting Islamic militants. Egypt's rhetoric has emphasized the need to preserve Syria as a bulwark against terrorists over the need to remove Assad, though the government has avoided saying that outright. On Friday, a government official told The Associated Press that the Egyptian stance is that Assad's regime "must be part of the negotiations and the transitional period."

(AP) Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi chairs an Arab foreign ministers meeting...
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"It is not about personalities," the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss the diplomatic efforts.

The differences led to an embarrassing moment after el-Sissi proudly had a letter from Russian President Vladimir Putin read out loud at the summit's closing session Sunday. Russia is a key supporter of Assad and has strong ties to el-Sissi, who gave Putin a lavish welcome in Egypt last month.

In his letter, Putin urged a political solution to the Syria war. After it was read, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal took the microphone and lashed out at Russia in a speech aired live on TV.

"They (Russians) speak about the misery the situation in Syria while they are a main part of the miseries that affects the Syrian people," al-Faisal said, pointing to Moscow's arms sales to Damascus.

El-Sissi thanked al-Faisal for his remarks and, in an apparent attempt to put the best spin on the awkward situation, commented that all Arab leaders emphasize that they seek solutions to regional crises in their contacts with international players. El-Sissi then gave a closing speech praising the new hopes for future joint action sparked by the summit, where the leaders agreed to create a new joint Arab military force. Egypt has been the strongest advocate for the force.

In Libya, el-Sissi wants regional action against the growing power of Islamic militants, whom Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have already hit with airstrikes several times the past year. In his opening speech to the summit, el-Sissi repeatedly spoke of the need for action in Libya. In contrast, the Saudi king hardly mentioned it — a sign of their differing priorities.

Egyptian columnist Abdullah el-Sinnawi, who is close to the military and el-Sissi, said the lack of agreement is likely to paralyze any future communal action, including through the joint military force.

The two sides don't agree on who the "enemy is, how to hit and what is the priority," el-Sinnawi told AP.

Notably, Assad — who did not attend the summit — told Russian reporters ahead of the gathering that Egypt understands the crisis in Syria and that there is limited security cooperation between the two countries. "We hope to see closer Syrian-Egyptian relations," he said.

After al-Faisal's speech, a prominent Egyptian TV political show host lay into Saudi Arabia, saying it was equally to blame for Syria's bloodshed with its support of anti-Assad rebels.

"Will you keep lying to us and yourself and the world?" Eissa barked. "Yes, the repressive dictator is killing his people. And this Gulf Arab oil money from Saudi Arabia and Qatar is also killing the Syrian people."

That prompted an angry response from prominent Saudi columnist Jamal Khashoggi, who said in a tweet that Eissa's "excesses" required action.

"If the media there (in Egypt) was free, I wouldn't have said that. But it is the regime's media," Khashoggi wrote.

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Associated Press Zeina Karam contributed to this report from Beirut.

Housecarl · Mar 30, 2015

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.commentarymagazine.com/2015/03/29/iran-and-the-problem-of-off-site-research/

Iran and the Problem of Off-Site Research

Michael Rubin | @mrubin1971
03.29.2015 - 11:55 AM
Comments 2

The current U.S. approach to the P5+1 nuclear negotiation seems so bizarre as to be lifted from the Twilight Zone: The deal as it is taking shape fails to address the key concerns which sparked the crisis. Both President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry treat Iranian redlines as sacrosanct, but readily dispense with those of the United States or its allies. Obama effectively acts like a battered spouse: he insists the abuser truly loves him, and he lashes out at any friend who speaks honestly about how self-destructive his attitudes are.

As a result, John Kerry’s triumph not only fails to constrain Iranian enrichment or to answer questions about possible military dimensions and past military nuclear research, but also doesn’t address basic fallacies of logic such as why Iran says its motivation is an indigenous energy supply when its gas and oil resources provide far greater security at a fraction of the price, as well as why an above-board program would seek to construct covert, undeclared nuclear sites in the first place.

When it comes to potential weaponization work, there is one other major problem Kerry leaves unaddressed: the problem of off-site research. The Iranians have always been out-of-the-box thinkers. Putting aside that even inside Iran, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does not have the right by its own bylaws to inspect any covert site—it will only access declared nuclear facilities and sites—nothing in the agreement prevents Iran from setting up collaborative laboratories in countries like North Korea. North Korean and Iranian engineers already are present at each other’s ballistic-missile tests. Former Iranian nuclear negotiator Hossein Mousavian has already called North Korea a model for the Islamic Republic to emulate.

And while North Korea is the most secure and likely venue for Iranian scientists to establish satellite laboratories, theHermit Kingdom is not alone as a possible venue for offsite Iranian nuclear work. Russian President Vladimir Putin has quietly encouraged Iran’s nuclear work from the get-go, and may see provision of laboratory space as a way to keep tabs on Iranian work he recognizes is going to continue anyway. Saudi Arabia is trying to flip Sudan, but may not be successful; Khartoum provides another possibility, even if less secure. And should Bashar al-Assad reassert control—as Obama and Kerry now seem to hope—then Syria too might provide some facilities.

Alas, the adage where there’s a will, there’s a way increasingly applies not only to the ability to achieve a preliminary agreement, but also to Iran’s ability to bypass inspections to achieve the weaponry so many Iranian figures have claimed they seek.

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