WAR 03-11-2017-to-03-17-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

(258) 2-18-2017-to-02-24-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...24-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(259) 2-25-2017-to-03-03-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...03-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(260) 03-04-2017-to-03-10-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...10-2017_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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North Korea isn’t testing its missiles. It’s preparing for a nuclear first strike.
Started by China Connection‎, Today 01:58 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show....-It%92s-preparing-for-a-nuclear-first-strike.

China is NOT HAPPY with the THAAD deployment in S. Korea
Started by Heliobas Disciple‎, Today 08:25 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...T-HAPPY-with-the-THAAD-deployment-in-S.-Korea

US nukes just got a lot deadlier — and experts say it could cause Russia to attack
Started by michaelteever‎, Today 06:03 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...d-experts-say-it-could-cause-Russia-to-attack

Europe: Politics, Trade, NATO. March 2017
Started by Plain Jane‎, 03-04-2017 12:57 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?513073-Europe-Politics-Trade-NATO.-March-2017

The Four Horsemen - 03/06 to 03/13
Started by Ragnarok‎, 03-06-2017 03:31 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?513172-The-Four-Horsemen-03-06-to-03-13

Another Ax Attack, Germany 3/9/17; MORE ATTACKS
Started by Cascadians‎, Yesterday 12:39 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?513316-Another-Ax-Attack-Germany-3-9-17-MORE-ATTACKS

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For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.janes.com/article/68625/iran-successfully-tests-radar-guided-anti-ship-ballistic-missile

Weapons

Iran successfully tests radar-guided anti-ship ballistic missile

Jeremy Binnie, London - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly
10 March 2017

Iranian and US reports have corroborated a successful test of Iran's new Hormuz-2 radar-guided anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) in early March.

Iran's Tasnim news agency reported on 9 March that the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) had carried out the test. "We fired the Hormuz-2 missile this week," it quoted Brigadier General Amir Hajizadeh, the head of the IRGC Aerospace Forces, as saying. "It successfully destroyed a target within the range of 250 km."

When it was unveiled in May 2014, the Hormuz-2 appeared to be an active radar-guided variant of Iran's Khalij Fars ASBM, while the Hormuz-1 was said to be a passive radar-guided variant.

The Khalij Fars is a development of the Fateh-110 solid-fuel tactical ballistic missile fitted with an infrared seeker to enable it to home in on a ship's heat signature.

The radar-guided versions should be more capable than the Khalij Fars of locking on to ships that are obscured by cloud or haze, but the Hormuz-2 is potentially vulnerable to electronic warfare countermeasures.

Three days earlier, Fox News cited US officials as saying Iran carried out two ASBM tests on 4-5 March, with the second successfully hitting a floating platform 155 miles (250 km) away. One US official said the tests involved a "Fateh-110 Mod 3" with a "new active seeker".

The first ASBM was launched from the IRGC base in Bandar-e-Jask on the Gulf of Oman and landed "in the vicinity" of the floating platform it was aimed at on 4 March, and a second launched on the following day hit the target, the official said.

"It's a concern based on the range and that one of the missiles worked," one official was quoted as saying.

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[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-security-idUSKBN16I06S

WORLD NEWS | Sat Mar 11, 2017 | 2:23am EST

Indonesia arrests nine suspected militants

Indonesian police arrested nine suspected militants on the island of Sulawesi, a police spokesman said on Saturday, in an operation that media reported had targeted a group with affiliations to Islamic State.

With investigations continuing, police spokesman Martinus Sitompul declined to give further details, but media reported police had also seized bomb-making materials meant for use in attacks on police and official buildings.

The suspects were all members of Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, a group that had been controlled until last year by one of the first Indonesian militants to pledge loyalty to Islamic State.

Santoso had been the country's most-wanted men before he was killed in a gunbattle with police and military forces last July, and security officials have been expecting reprisal attacks.

Some members of his group were believed to be still hiding in Sulawesi's dense jungles.

Security experts say that Indonesia, an officially secular state with the world's largest Muslim population, faces a growing threat from supporters of Islamic State.

Last month, police killed a militant after he detonated a small bomb in the city of Bandung. Authorities said they were investigating whether he had links to a radical network sympathetic to Islamic State.

(Reporting by Agustinus Beo Da Costa; Writing by Gayatri Suroyo; Editing by Simon Cameron-Moore)

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.wtoc.com/story/34726199/...-iraqis-battling-isis-block-by-block-in-mosul

US jets, artillery helping Iraqis battling ISIS block-by-block in Mosul

Friday, March 10th 2017, 2:34 pm PST
Friday, March 10th 2017, 2:34 pm PST

Video

(CNN) - The roar of gunfire echoes through the rubble-strewn streets of the Tayaran neighborhood in west Mosul. A group of civilians scurries for cover.

Additional Links
Assyrian artifacts found under Tomb of Jonah in Iraq
Rubble and ash in Mosul museum retaken from Islamic State

A man carrying his child in his arms looks back over his surroundings with unease after huddling in his home for days as intense fighting raged outside.

Suddenly, a huge blast erupts nearby, cattering Iraqi soldiers and civilians in the city's war-torn streets as a massive plume of black smoke rises. This is the dramatic footage, shot by freelance cameraman Ricardo Garcia Vilanova, more than two weeks after the offensive to drive ISIS out of west Mosul began.

The scenes are a snapshot of the complex conditions facing the country's military as soldiers work to clear the region of militants. Since then, Iraqi forces have been fighting house-by-house, block-by-block against ISIS extremists.

American artillery units, drones and jets are taking part in the operation, aiding Iraqi-allied soldiers.

ISIS' weapon of choice

The source of the explosion: A suicide car bomb just down the street, which sent shreds of metal and cement flying into the air and clanking onto the pavement.

An Iraqi Federal Police Humvee is in flames. A soldier sits on the curb, clutching his chest. Screams of others - whose limbs were blown away - can be heard down the street. Another soldier runs away from the burning vehicle with a wounded comrade slung over his shoulder.

The police responded to the car bomb by shooting thousands of rounds. Suicide car bombs are ISIS' preferred weapon here, and car bombs are often followed by ISIS counterattacks. Dozens have been driven toward Iraqi troops.

Despite this, Iraqi forces have managed to retake half of western Mosul since the western offensive began on Feb. 19.

Earlier this week, the Iraqi prime minister told remaining militants to surrender or face death. The warning was issued after security forces made significant gains in western Mosul, retaking key government buildings and a bridge.

It is the first time these buildings have been under Iraqi government control since Mosul - Iraq's second largest city - fell to ISIS in 2014. More than 70,000 people have been displaced as a result of the ongoing operation to retake Mosul and surrounding areas, according to Iraq's ministry of displacement and migration.

Residents trapped amid operation

Caught in the middle of this battle are as many as 800,000 civilians, according to the United Nations. It said UN humanitarian agencies in Iraq are preparing to aid civilians caught in the fighting.

The Iraqi Air Force has dropped millions of leaflets on western Mosul, where food and water are scarce and electricity sporadic, warning residents of the ongoing offensive and remain in their homes if they feel safe. The leaflets also advised residents to hang white flags or sheets outside their homes to indicate civilians are inside.

One family in the Tayaran neighborhood couldn't leave. The grandmother is wheelchair bound and her new-born granddaughter equally vulnerable. Federal policemen came to their home to find them huddled in a back room for safety. They wheeled the old woman out into the street while another one carried the baby girl.

Iraqi forces have continued their push into Mosul's old city, an area of narrow streets and narrower allies, which forces are seeking to recapture. Officers believe Islamic State militants have dug in deep there, knocking holes between adjoining buildings to allow them maximum mobility with minimum exposure to Iraqi and U.S. drones and aircraft.

ISIS have also built a complex system of tunnels and bunkers, and no doubt will unleash even more suicide car bombs as Iraqi forces move in.

U.S. officials believe that around half of the once-5,000-strong ISIS fighters in Mosul at the beginning of the overall offensive last October have been killed or severely wounded. But that still leaves 2,500 militants alive, and clearly many are ready to fight to the death.

Copyright 2017 CNN. All rights reserved.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/ar...and-the-coming-diffusion-of-terror-in-nigeria

The War Has Just Begun: Boko Haram and the Coming Diffusion of Terror in Nigeria

by Jacob Udo-Udo Jacob
Journal Article | March 10, 2017 - 2:49pm

In December 2016, the theatre commander of Operation Lafiya Dole (the Nigerian military counter-insurgency operation against Boko Haram), Major-General Lucky Irabor declared that the Nigerian military has won the war against Boko Haram. I couldn’t help but be reminded of President George W. Bush’s 2003 Mission Accomplished speech after the fall of Baghdad. Considering how resilient Boko Haram has been over the years and the recent spate of attacks, I believe the war is anything but won. In this article, I explain why, and argue that instead of being over, the war has entered a new, and much more perilous phase.

Beaming with confidence, before a packed room of journalists and top Nigerian military brass and with various audio-visual and military props, Major-General Lucky Irabor, head of Nigerian military Counter-Insurgency (COIN) operations against Boko Haram, announced the fall of Sambisa forest, the last Boko Haram bastion and declared, “we have won the war, we now need to win the peace”. Almost 24 hours later, Boko Haram’s eccentric leader, Abubakar Shekau released a video denying the victory, and threatened more attacks, and declared, “the war has just begun”.

Shekau has since made good his threat, with attacks on military bases and villages in Borno and Adamawa states. There have also been suicide attacks by increasingly younger bombers in Maiduguri, Madagali and surrounding towns. Though some of the attacks have been successfully stopped or repelled, it does show that the sect is anything but defeated and is still capable of launching surprise attacks at locations and at times of their choosing.

Nigeria’s Many Problems

Nigeria is in an incredibly difficult situation. The country’s economy is in recession, there is a huge unemployed under-35 male population, prices of basic everyday goods and house rents have skyrocketed and crime rates have naturally increased. While the Buhari government is doing its best to hold the centers together, there are several ungoverned territories including vast swamps, forests and remote villages in this massive country.

A rather faulty disarmament program was implemented in 2009 to disarm the many militant groups in the Niger-Delta region. However, the region is still restless. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger-Delta (MEND), arguably the most organized armed group in the region, recently withdrew its support to the Buhari government, citing a pattern of unfulfilled promises. In the middle belt as well as north-eastern and north-central regions of the country, environmental pressures have led nomadic Fulani herdsmen to push deeper and deeper into the tall grass savannah south for pastures for their cattle, leading to violent clashes with local farmers over cattle grazing fields. In the Southeastern region, armed robbery and kidnapping gangs have proliferated. These, coupled with tensions between security forces and Shia Muslim groups in Kaduna, have created a capricious cocktail waiting to explode.

The New Phase of the Boko Haram Insurgency

Far from being over, the Boko Haram insurgency has evolved into a much more complex network of guerrilla insurgency. The frontier has now moved from the Sambisa forest to markets, city centers, various other irregular targets and more worryingly, the society itself. The insurgency has entered a whole new phase. In this new phase, critical systems that support the Nigerian economy, possibly including oil installations, will be targeted. The insurgency will likely become open-sourced and diffused through and around critical infrastructures and other irregular locations. This is no longer going to be a traditional insurgency, but a cold war against the Nigerian state, waged through a network of criminals and an infiltration of social spaces.

The new phase of the Boko Haram insurgency is not unlikely to involve outsourcing of terror attacks to the many shadow militant groups, criminal and kidnapping gangs that now exist in various parts of Nigeria. Possible terror contractors and entrepreneurs will include Fulani herdsmen who have consistently carried out attacks in various parts of the country, Niger-Delta militants, and the many armed robbers, unscrupulous businessmen and unemployed youths both in the South East and South West regions of Nigeria. With the current rate of unemployment in the country and a very difficult economic outlook, it will not be impossible for armed robbers and kidnapers to switch focus and become Boko Haram contractors for the right pay. The diffusion of terror in Nigeria can have a very significant impact on the country’s ability to produce oil and support its government and economy.

Another possible feature of the next phase of Boko Haram will be a campaign of systems disruption; targeting critical systems such as electricity grids, mobile phone masts, key bridges, oil pipelines and flow stations, airports and other critical infrastructure that keep the country going. John Robb, some ten years ago, in his brilliant book, Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization[1], predicted that the next stage of terrorism would involve ‘super-empowered’ terrorist groups, enhanced by easily available technologies, attacking critical economic and technological nodes to ignite cascades of systems failures.

This will likely be the case with Boko Haram. The sect will evolve from merely deploying suicide bombers and attacking military bases to an organized terror network, integrating with criminal gangs to hold Nigeria and possibly its neighbors hostage. Another possibility in this new phase is that the sect will resort to an ISIS-styled system of attacks, where an operative walks into a nightclub in downtown Lagos, Abuja, Calabar or Port-Harcourt and spray bullets on everyone. Highbrow hotels, clubs and other locations with high numbers of Westerners would be key targets. If it can happen in Turkey, France, United States, (all with much stronger and agile security systems) there is no reason it cannot happen in Nigeria. Further compounding the problem is that neither the Nigerian security apparatus nor response systems are enabled to cope with such systems of attacks and the consequent cascades of destruction.

Chasing Boko Haram out of Sambisa forest will now force the group to revert to its former de-territorialized network system but this time with much more complex and even rhizomatic structures and capabilities. As in a rhizome, the Boko Haram cells will operate independent of its larger structure, but will work within its underground nodes to stretch out its roots and shoots. The critical challenge for the Nigerian intelligence agencies and security forces, which to be fair, have become stronger and more disciplined under the current government of Muhammadu Buhari, will be to infiltrate and intercept such nodes.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/sites/default/files/jacobjacob1.jpg
Figure 1: The Changing Phases of the Boko Harem Insurgency

But there is little that even a well equipped and trained intelligence agency or security force can do to challenge a national crowdsourcing of terror. If Boko Haram should outsource its terror operations to a rhizomatic network of sub-contractors recruited from the swarming mass of unemployed youths in Nigeria, then the country is in deep trouble. A coordinated open-source insurgency would completely cripple Nigeria. This would have inevitable consequences on the entire West African sub-region. The West will not be immune to the ensuing crises.

Worryingly, Boko Haram will not need much to acquire this new rhizomatic capability. The critical capability upgrade that they will need, will be the development of a more intricate cell system and a secure means of maintaining communications with and within their cells, and of course a marriage of convenience with criminal gangs and a network of unemployed, angry young men and women.

The more worrying truth is that Nigeria is not the only country facing such a threat. Such threats are generally outside the conventional capability of governments to tackle. If anything, in the new global insecurity architecture, governments, not just Nigeria will increasingly be incapable of guaranteeing security for all its citizens in the face of a sustained open-source insurgency.

It is unclear weather the Nigerian security agencies have envisaged and prepared for this possible phase. The lack of preparedness of the Nigerian military was exposed in its rather haphazard response to the insurgency in the summer of 2013 when it shut down mobile phone networks in three northeast states, in response to a sudden upsurge in Boko Haram attacks at the time. My 2015 study of the impacts of the mobile phone shutdown showed that the shutdown succeeded in reducing Boko Haram attacks during the shutdown period, but not without consequences[2]. The study, which was part of a special project on ICTs, Statebuilding and Peacebuilding in Africa, showed that while the mobile phone blackout led to a reduction in Boko Haram attacks in the short term, it inspired the sect to make the important strategic move of relocating to the Sambisa forest, which they eventually turned into their stronghold. See Figure 1 for the changing phases of the Boko Haram insurgency.

Moreover, it fundamentally altered the nature of their operations, resulting in a more closed, centralized system rather than the previous open, basic cell or network system. Indeed, the development of Boko Haram from a ragtag band of insurgents into a regional security threat was, to an extent, impelled by the sometimes-haphazard response of Nigerian security forces. While the mobile phone blackout helped checkmate Boko Haram in the short term, it forced the sect to develop new coping strategies and to evolve. In the coming new phase, the military will not be able to shut down mobile phone networks across the country. So it will have to develop a more coherent COIN strategy.

Local Solutions

It is almost cliché to say that the Nigerian government must find ways to empower its citizens and provide those that are already vulnerable, an alternative to fighting. There is a prevailing culture of extremism in northern Nigeria, even among children. A culture that sees the religious Other as an infidel, hence worthy of all calamities and unfit to hold a political or leadership position is not only troubling but also dangerous. And this seems to be a common view among young Muslims in northern Nigeria.

A long-term and very deliberately planned effort to deradicalize the population, challenge extremism, and give voice to moderate religious leaders is needed to counter religious extremism. Most of the fight against Boko Haram will have to be ideological and educational. The ideological base upon which Boko Haram recruits and deploys fighters, is a most extreme form of salafist Islam which condemns anything different from the original teachings of the prophet Mohammed and his associates. Transforming this ideology will demand a comprehensive educational campaign founded on the basis of a more moderate and tolerant Islamic religion that preaches the knowledge, peace, tolerance and mercy espoused both in the Quran and in the Hadiths. It has to be comprehensive and thorough and must be ‘cool’ enough to bring young people in. The place to start ideally would be universities and secondary schools. An excellent model for inspiration is the Peer-to-Peer Challenging Extremism project of the US State Department, Facebook and Edventure Partners (EVP). The project is a global university competition that draws students from hundreds of universities around the world to develop digital and social tools to counter violent extremism. Students from various universities have developed incredibly innovative and context-sensitive campaigns and tools to counter violent extremism. Students from the Public Diplomacy and Strategic Media Intervention class at the American University of Nigeria in Yola, northeast Nigeria, developed an exciting campaign, tagged #IAmABeliever to help bring Muslims and Christians together. The campaign, which won the top prize in the African regional competition, sought to create a multidimensional space for different beliefs and believers to co-exist in harmony.

The beauty of efforts such as this is that is that it does not need to originate from the government or from outside. Neither is it expensive. Students and local community-based organizations can form a network to create their own initiatives that can counter extremism in their own local contexts. If Boko Haram resorts to a network of cells (which they will most likely do), the best way the state can counter this would be to develop a means of fighting the network with a network of ideas and education. Education is incredibly important. Another interesting and highly innovative project is a Feed-and-Read program, funded until recently by the USAID Nigeria under the Technology Enhanced Learning for All (TELA) Project. Implemented, interestingly also by the American University of Nigeria, over 300 Almajiri boys are taught basic literacy and numeracy in exchange for a balanced meal a day. For most of the children, it is their only meal of the day. The objective of the program is not just to improve the literacy and numeracy competencies of the beneficiaries, but also to introduce them to an alternative way of thinking. Part of the TELA project is a radio drama program broadcast four times a week on the local Gotel radio in Adamawa state. The program, Mallama Rasheeda da Abokai and Mallam Nuhu Ya Je Makaranta uses local folk songs, stories and compelling characters to teach literacy and numeracy respectively. A research undertaken by the university showed that after 6 months of exposure to the radio program, children improved their literacy and numeracy skills by an average of 98%[3]. If versions of such programs are implemented across the country as a deliberately designed tool to challenge extremism, then there could be hope for Nigeria.

In addition, there is need for the Nigerian military to launch a comprehensive Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) program, with an additional component of Reconciliation. A well planned, designed and targeted campaign will have to convince fighters that it is in their own interest to lay down their arms and join a peace process. Such a campaign should seek to erode the support that commanders have from their fighters. Normative appeals, using credible religious voices can be hugely influential. Like most successful normative campaigns, the challenge would be to raise both the profiles and voices of such religious leaders in a way that would convince Boko Haram fighters and their emerging contractors that it is in their own interest to lay down their weapons. For such a campaign to be successful however, the Nigerian government will have to provide an alternative to fighting and do more to engage its teeming mass of unemployed young men and women.

End Notes

[1] Robb, J (2008). Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

[2] Jacob, J.U. & Akpan, I., (2015). ‘Silencing Boko Haram: Mobile Phone Blackout and Counterinsurgency in Nigeria’s Northeast region’. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development. 4(1), pp1-17. 8.

[3] Ensign, M & Jacob J.U. (2017) Where There is No School: Radio and Mobile Technologies for Education in Crises and Post-Conflict Societies. Evaluation Brief, American University of Nigeria. February 2017.

About the Author

Jacob Udo-Udo Jacob

Dr. Jacob Udo-Udo Jacob, author of Convincing Rebel Fighters to Disarm: UN Information Operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Degruyter, 2017) teaches Communications and Media Studies at the American University of Nigeria in Yola, Northeast Nigeria. He earned his PhD in Communications Studies from the University of Leeds, United Kingdom.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.stripes.com/news/report...rest-in-afghan-security-1.458038#.WMPci2_yvmF

ANALYSIS

Reported patrols by China underline Beijing’s interest in Afghan security

https://www.stripes.com/polopoly_fs...e.jpg_gen/derivatives/landscape_900/image.jpg
In November, an Indian news outlet published photographs of vehicles on patrol in the Wakhan corridor close to Afghanistan's border with China, which it said could be a Chinese variant of the MRAP.
PHOTO COURTESY OF WIONEWS.COM

By E.B. BOYD | STARS AND STRIPES
Published: March 10, 2017

Reports that Chinese forces are patrolling inside Afghan territory near the countries’ shared border, if confirmed, would underline China’s desire to play a larger role in regional stability.

“Assuming it’s true, this should not be concerning for U.S. forces at all,” said Michael Kugelman, deputy director of the Asia Program at the Washington-based Wilson Center. “Given how troubled the Afghan forces are, they can use all the help they can get.”

In November, an Indian news outlet, WION, published photographs of what experts said appeared to be Chinese military trucks in the Wakhan corridor, a narrow stretch of mountainous territory extending from northeastern Afghanistan to China that separates Tajikistan from Pakistan.

Last month, a Western journal, the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, said there was “overwhelming evidence” that Chinese units have been inside Afghanistan.

Gallery:
In November, an Indian news outlet published photographs of vehicles on patrol in the Wakhan corridor close to Afghanistan's border with China, which it said could be a Chinese variant of the MRAP. Reports of such patrols suggest Beijing is seeking to play a larger role in regional stability.
PHOTO COURTESY OF WIONEWS.COM

Afghan officials have denied the reports. A Defense Ministry spokesman said only that Afghanistan and China, as well as Tajikistan — which borders the two countries — are sharing intelligence and stepping up individual patrols as part of an agreement to combat smugglers, drug traffickers, and terrorists.

A Pentagon spokesman declined to say whether the United States had any intelligence on possible Chinese activity, saying only, “We’re aware of the reporting.”

Like other neighbors of Afghanistan, China is concerned about the country’s worsening security situation and its potential impact on prized economic initiatives. Beijing’s “One Belt, One Road” project is planning a network of trade routes through Central Asia and the Middle East, and its China-Pakistan Economic Corridor seeks to improve pathways for Chinese cargo.

In addition, China is battling a separatist movement among Muslim Uighurs, who live in the country’s western regions. Uighur militants have fought with an al-Qaida affiliate in Syria, and they’ve carried out terrorist attacks in Central Asia. In the past, they’ve taken refuge in Pakistan and Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province, which includes the Wakhan corridor

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“China has shown deepening concern over this, which has found expression in its increasing emphasis on security in its dealings with its neighbors to the West,” said Frederick Starr, chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at Johns Hopkins University.

Beijing mostly stayed out of Afghan security affairs during NATO’s 13-year ISAF mission, but it has stepped up its involvement since the drawdown of Western forces two years ago.

China has donated military supplies to Afghanistan and has trained Afghan police officers. The two countries have signed several security agreements, including one focused on increased cooperation between border police forces. China has also joined various peace initiatives.

“Since the formation of national unity government (in 2014), the security relations between Kabul and Beijing have increased unprecedentedly,” said Ahmad Bilal Khalil, a researcher with the Kabul-based Center for Regional and Strategic Studies.

Last month, a Chinese military spokesman said Afghan and Chinese “law enforcement authorities” had conducted “joint law enforcement operations” to fight terrorism “in border areas.” The spokesman said the Chinese military has not been inside Afghanistan, but he did not address whether units such as border police had.

The 47-mile Afghanistan-China border is surrounded by some of the world’s highest mountain ranges, and no roads exist to connect the two countries. Had Chinese units entered Afghanistan, they most like would have come in via Tajikistan.

Two years after NATO ceased combat operations in Afghanistan, the Taliban have regained more territory than they’ve ever held since the U.S. invasion in 2001. Afghan security forces control only two-thirds of the country’s districts. American officials say 20 of the 98 U.S.-designated terrorist organizations in the world now operate in the country.

Though relations between the United States and China are tense elsewhere around the globe, including in the South China Seas, Kugelman said any Chinese operations inside Afghanistan probably wouldn’t worry NATO.

“In Afghanistan, the U.S. and China have very similar interests,” he said. “They want Afghanistan to become a more stable place ... and they want any form of militancy to be kept at bay.”

The Pentagon’s silence on any Chinese operations would likely stem from a reluctance to draw attention to an adversary’s activity in an area that should be a U.S. sphere of influence, Kugelman said.

“It could be that the U.S. doesn’t want to make a big deal of the fact that a strategic rival is taking on a bigger role in Afghanistan,” he said.

Zubair Babakarkhail contributed to this report.

boyd.eb@stripes.com
Twitter: @ebboyd

 

[Housecarl]

Fox reporting USMC on the ground inside of Syria
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...ting-USMC-on-the-ground-inside-of-Syria/page2

Reuters: Turkey seals off Dutch embassy - foreign ministry sources (1979 level event?)
Started by Possible Impact‎, Today 11:46 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...gn-ministry-sources-(1979-level-event-)/page2

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Posted for fair use.....
http://lobelog.com/malaysias-future-role-in-saudi-arabias-islamic-military-alliance/

Published on March 10th, 2017 | by Giorgio Cafiero
Comments 2

Malaysia’s Future Role in Saudi Arabia’s Islamic Military Alliance

by Giorgio Cafiero and Daniel Wagner

Saudi King Salman is currently on a three-week tour across six Asian countries. The duration of the trip underscores the commercial and geopolitical importance which Saudi Arabia attributes to Asia. It comes at a time when the kingdom is promoting Vision 2030—an ambitious agenda aimed at ending the country’s reliance on oil and creating a prosperous and sustainable knowledge-based economy—and seeking to strengthen its geopolitical influence across the Asia-Pacific region. While Riyadh assesses the Trump administration’s policies, it is hedging its bets on the future of its post-War alliance with the West by continuing the “Asia Pivot” initiated by King Abdullah in the mid-2000s.

Significantly, the first leg of the king’s Asia tour was in Malaysia, which no Saudi monarch had visited since 2006. While in Kuala Lumpur, King Salman sought to identify new markets for Saudi Arabia’s non-oil exports and secure more Malaysian investment in Vision 2030. The two governments signed several agreements to enhance bilateral cooperation in sectors including construction, aerospace, halal products, and hajj services. Most importantly, Aramco agreed to invest $7 billion in a Petronas refining and petrochemical project, marking the kingdom’s largest downstream investment outside of Saudi Arabia.

Symbolic, religious, and political dimensions contribute to Malaysia’s importance in Saudi Arabia’s grand vision for the Asia-Pacific region. Determined to extend influence among Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia, the kingdom sees Malaysia as having an important role to play in Saudi Arabia’s 41-member Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT). To showcase unity in the struggle against terrorism, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia announced the King Salman Center for Global Peace (KSCGP) to “intensify and concert the Islamic world’s effort to confront extremism, reject sectarianism and to move the Islamic world toward a better future.” The center, which is set to launch later this year, will focus on the threat of international terrorism without associating it with “any race, color or religion.” The Intellectual Warfare Center at the Saudi Ministry of Defense and the Center for Security and Defense at the Malaysian Ministry of Defense will jointly set up the institution. The Malaysian University of Islamic Societies and the Jeddah-based Muslim World League will be stakeholders in KSCGP.

Beyond the diplomatic rhetoric, will Malaysia and Saudi Arabia step up cooperation in counter-terrorism efforts in a meaningful way? Given a host of lingering complications and confusion regarding Malaysia’s actual role in IMAFT at the alliance’s outset, it is not entirely clear how Kuala Lumpur will contribute to the Saudi-led alliance in the future.

When Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) announced IMAFT in late 2015, Malaysia was one of the original 34 participants, but at that time Kuala Lumpur denied having joined. Malaysian officials maintained that their country would not contribute to IMAFT militarily but would instead support it politically in order to strengthen international anti-terrorism efforts. Last February, however, Malaysia’s military participated in North Thunder (a joint exercise held in northern Saudi Arabia that included 19 IMAFT members), which perhaps suggested that Kuala Lumpur had reassessed its stance on IMAFT and had decided to fully support it. Malaysia’s military backing for the Riyadh-led coalition in Yemen—although mainly symbolic since all participating Malaysian forces have remained on Saudi soil and none has entered Yemen—has also further fueled speculation that it is considering a closer alliance with Saudi Arabia, either on a bilateral basis or within IMAFT’s framework.

Malaysia has always played a key role in Riyadh’s vision for a multinational force comprised of only Muslim nations. This is not a new idea. Back in 2011, when the kingdom began discussing such an alliance, Riyadh officials spoke to their counterparts in Kuala Lumpur about their grandiose plan. That year, Saudi Arabia’s then-national security advisor, Prince Bandar bin Sultan (BnS), raised recruits for the pan-Sunni Muslim force in Malaysia and planned to establish training bases in Central Asian states. At that time, BnS toured Malaysia, as well as Indonesia and Pakistan, and signed draft contracts with Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, and Islamabad to secure greater collaboration for a “rapid response force” to be based in each of these countries for deployment to any area of the Muslim world where a new terrorist threat might emerge.

Trans-Regional Terrorist Threats

Earlier this year, high-ranking Malaysian officials, along with their counterparts in other Southeast Asian governments, put their countries on alert in response to recent developments in the Levant. As the Islamic State (ISIS or IS) loses its grip on the Caliphate’s strongholds in Mosul and Raqqa, several states in the Asia-Pacific are increasingly unsettled by the threat of IS members, especially Southeast Asians, relocating to Malaysia and other parts of the region.

Since 2013, several hundred Malaysians have joined IS in the Levant, and an estimated 60 are currently fighting with the group in Syria. Security officials in Malaysia have foiled 15 terror plots, which uncovered information about IS stockpiling of weapons and fundraising in the country, in addition to its plans to establish an Islamic State in Malaysia. Last year, authorities arrested 119 Malaysians—a notable increase from 85 and 59 in 2015 and 2014, respectively—on suspicions of terrorism.

Reports surfaced after the Saudi king’s visit that Malaysian authorities had arrested one Malaysian and six foreigners—four from Yemen, one from Indonesia, and one from an unidentified Southeast Asian country—based on their alleged affiliation with militant groups including IS. The Yemenis were apparently seeking to attack King Salman and his entourage. An anonymous Saudi source suggested that the Yemenis were Iranian-backed Houthis, rather than IS members. Although the facts surrounding this foiled plot remain a mystery to the public, the episode can only reinforce Saudi Arabia’s view of Malaysia as a country that has become vulnerable to international terrorist networks and thereby worthy of additional support from Riyadh.

Particularly troubling for Kuala Lumpur is the proven ability of IS to recruit Malaysians who serve in the country’s security apparatus, a problem that has persisted since al-Qaeda’s rise in the previous decade. That IS waged its first attack on Malaysian soil last summer, targeting a restaurant in the Puchong district outside of the capital, underscores how the organization can carry out its agenda in Malaysia through “lone wolf” attacks, which is extremely difficult for any government to address. From Riyadh’s perspective, the potential of IS and al-Qaeda to recruit more Southeast Asians is unsettling, given how many individuals from the Asia-Pacific region enter Saudi Arabia each year as low-skilled foreign workers or on pilgrimages.

It remains unclear to what extent the kingdom will be successful in its quest to deepen counter-terrorism cooperation with Malaysia either at the bilateral level or within the IMAFT’s framework. Many Southeast Asian Muslims have voiced concerns about the kingdom’s tactics for spreading influence in the region through its Wahhabi foundations and state-sponsored religious charities. As Muslim nations in the Asia-Pacific undergo an “Islamic revival,” various groups in the region argue that Saudi Arabia’s ultra-orthodox interpretation of the creed does not sit well with Malaysia and Indonesia’s Islamic traditions. Some Malaysians believe that they have lost touch with their national identity and risk falling victim to “Arab colonization.”

Although controversial, Wahhabism has a growing number of adherents in Malaysia. Strict Islamic law is already enforced in some capacity in the more conservative parts of the country, where, for example, religious authorities already check patrons’ religion in hotels and bars. The authorities can already jail those who do not practice official interpretations of the religion. Some members of Malaysia’s opposition party, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, want Muslims convicted of drinking alcohol to receive up to 80 lashes of the rattan cane, and for adulterers to receive up to 100 lashes, echoing the punishment already dispensed in other Muslim countries, including Brunei and some parts of Indonesia. More than 86 percent of Malaysian Muslims support the imposition of Sharia law in their country, according to a 2013 survey.

The Iran Factor

Last October, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani travelled to Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand, and delivered an address at the Asia Cooperation Dialogue Summit outlining Iran’s determination to promote its trade and investment relationships with the Asia Pacific region. As Malaysia and other countries in the region find themselves embroiled in the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, they are increasingly finding the need to balance these two powers off each other in order to advance their own interests. Malaysia sees the lifting of sanctions on Iran as a promising opportunity to boost exports of its palm oil, timber, and rubber products to the country, which has an economy worth approximately $400 billion. Saudi Arabia is concerned that Malaysia and other ASEAN members will attribute so much potential value to doing business with Iran that they will resist the temptation to broaden their scope of relations with the kingdom.

King Salman and the Malaysian leadership issued a statement condemning Iran’s alleged meddling in foreign countries’ affairs, and Kuala Lumpur generally views Tehran through Riyadh’s lens. The angry response from the Iranian Foreign Ministry to Malaysia’s anti-Iranian statement underscores how Kuala Lumpur’s deepening ties with Riyadh and Tehran will complicate the country’s position in this geopolitical rivalry. It is a delicate balancing act that will probably result in Malaysia having to make difficult decisions about its allies, partners, and friends in the chaotic Middle East.

Daniel Wagner is Managing Director of Risk Cooperative (@RiskCoop) and co-author of the book Global Risk Agility and Decision Making. Photo of Saudi King Salman and Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak courtesy Wikimedia Commons.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/11/north-korea-tried-sell-nuclear-weapons-material-ma/

North Korea tried to sell nuclear weapons material to make miniaturized warhead: U.N. inspectors

By L. Todd Wood - The Washington Times - Saturday, March 11, 2017

The regime of North Korean strongman Kim Jong-un tried to sell a specialized material used in the miniaturization process for nuclear warheads, according to U.N. weapons investigators, who are attempting to document the regime’s nuclear weapons program and activities.

North Korean agents tried to sell a form of lithium metal to unnamed international buyers last year, according to a report by the Wall Street Journal.

“The U.N. Panel of Expert’s report on North Korea provides further evidence that North Korea will stop at nothing to advance its illicit nuclear and missile programs,” said Sen. Cory Gardner, Colorado Republican, who has been instrumental in attempting to highlight Pyongyang’s nuclear proliferation.

Experts believe the fact that North Korea is producing Lithium-6 is proof they are attempting to miniaturize nuclear warheads to place on the ICBMs they have been testing repeatedly over recent months.

“Lithium-6 is ideal, not only for making tritium for boosting fission devices, but also for directly fueling advanced weapons—including thermonuclear bombs,” said Henry Sokolski, a former Pentagon official who heads the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a Washington think tank, reported Fox News.

The Trump administration has recently deployed the THAAD missile-defense system to protect South Korea and U.S. forces in theater from a North Korean missile attack. This has angered the Chinese who are now threatening the U.S. with a first strike nuclear attack to neutralize the system.

-

Comments 3

hewdoc • 3 hours ago
The US needs to re-introduce nuclear armed IRBM's, and cruise missiles, into the Asian theater.

Long range bombers and ICBM's are not visible therefore not feared.

Multiple launch systems throughout the region, as well as ship's assets are visible to even the most ignorant of foes.

Red China is not helping maintain international safety, regarding their client state, North Korea.

Red China plays Mutt, to NK's Jeff. The world knows that if Red China tells NK to stand down, they will stand down.

It is time to call a spade a spade, and take the initiative, and move Pershing like land based weapons systems into South Korea, and Japan if those states wish to abide.
There is no apparent move by Red China, to ease the situation in North Korea, and NK is threatening the world.

NK is attempting to sell nuclear materials to rogues, and assisting Iran in development of nuclear weapons, and delivery systems.

NK is directly verbally threatening the free world, as Red China ignores the threats.

Defensive systems THAAD, are a start, but we need to introduce to NK and Chinese some 'concern', with hugely destructive offensive nuclear weapons on their doorstep.

주체 • 7 hours ago
The United States Military needs Lithium for its suiciders.

Avatar
johnnyengelsseed 주체 • 7 hours ago
DPRK could gift it to them at Panmunjom. This would be a nice goodwill gesture.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-security-idUSKBN16J089?il=0

WORLD NEWS | Sun Mar 12, 2017 | 4:44am EDT

German police end operation over attack threat in southwest town

German police said on Sunday they had ended a major operation launched after they received information about a possible threat of an attack in the south-western town of Offenburg on Saturday night.

Officers stepped up security in the town center and on public transport and police said one possible target was a night club which was not named. Investigations were continuing but no further details on the nature of the threat were available.

A spokesman in Offenburg, in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg and close to the French border, did not give any further details.

Germany is on high alert following deadly militant Islamist attacks in France and Belgium and after a failed asylum seeker from Tunisia drove a truck into a Berlin Christmas market in December, killing 12 people.

On Saturday, police in the city of Essen closed a shopping mall after security services warned of a possible attack.

(Writing by Madeline Chambers; Editing by Mark Potter)

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/...formal-talks-with-north-korea-as-threat-grows

U.S. Group Seeks Informal Talks With North Korea as Threat Grows

by David Tweed
March 12, 2017, 3:06 AM PDT

- Talks may lead to formal dialogue between U.S., North Korea
- North Korea with an ICBM would be ‘existential threat’ to U.S.

A group of former U.S. officials plans to seek its latest round of informal talks with North Korean officials as tensions escalate in the region.

Joseph DeTrani, a former U.S. intelligence specialist who helped broker a 2005 agreement on North Korea’s nuclear program, said unofficial talks between the two sides usually take place about every six months. He said his group plans to contact the North Korean mission to the United Nations in New York at the end of this month or the beginning of April to arrange the meetings.

DeTrani said he is hopeful that informal talks will eventually lead to exploratory meetings between current U.S. officials and North Korean diplomats. That would allow North Korea to explain its insistence on having a nuclear deterrence, talk about a peace treaty and discuss objections to U.S.-South Korea military exercises, DeTrani said.

“You have to give it a shot, re-engage, have some exploratory talks, and see if you can get some momentum on halting what they are doing, because it is beyond the pale right now,” DeTrani said in a March 10 interview.

Tensions over North Korea have increased as dictator Kim Jong Un accelerates his push for more powerful nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. China, Kim’s most prominent ally, has lashed out at South Korea for agreeing to the deployment of a U.S. missile-defense shield known as Thaad.

Tillerson Trip

So far the U.S. has rejected China’s calls for a new round of multilateral talks on North Korea, saying that Kim’s “bad behavior” shouldn’t be rewarded. Even so, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson plans to travel to Tokyo, Seoul and Beijing this week in search of a new approach to the regime.

A similar effort at engaging Pyongyang was reportedly blocked by the State Department, which refused visas to North Korean officials planning to travel to the U.S. for a round of informal talks in early March with a different set of former U.S. officials. That decision was taken after Kim’s half-brother was murdered at a Malaysian airport in February.

The last meeting involving DeTrani’s group of former American officials took place in Kuala Lumpur in October with North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister Han Song Ryol. Locations of previous meetings included London and Singapore.

Kim last week fired four ballistic missiles into waters near Japan, his latest provocation as he pursues an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of hitting North America with a nuclear weapon. Commercial satellite imagery indicates Kim is preparing another nuclear test, 38 North, a website that analyzes North Korea run by the US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University, wrote last week.

‘Existential Threat’

DeTrani said that if North Korea doesn’t respond to the talks by stopping its nuclear and missile tests and production of fissile material, then the U.S. should continue to build its missile defense capabilities and increase military coordination in the region. The U.S. and UN should still pursue further sanctions against North Korea even as talks take place, he said.

“Kim Jong Un is making it difficult for anyone to sit down with the North Koreans,” DeTrani said. “But North Korea isn’t prepared to give up its nuclear weapons and will continue to upgrade its missile delivery systems until they perfect them. They are an existential threat to the region now, and with an ICBM they will be an existential threat to the United States.”

 

[cooter]

seems to me,

with the length of flight, there would be plenty of warning and time to get something up there to knock down one or more of their toys, if they really did launch on us,

and I thought we had the basic tools to do that ??

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.nationalreview.com/artic...military-may-soon-defeat-isis-what-comes-next

The ISIS Endgame

by MATTHEW CONTINETTI
March 11, 2017 12:00 AM @CONTINETTI

Beware mission creep in Syria

The Islamic Caliphate announced in 2014 by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the head of ISIS, is approaching the end of its short and terrible life. Iraqi forces, supported by Americans, have reclaimed the eastern half of Mosul and are retaking the western one. Kurdish militias in Syria, also backed by the United States, are homing in on the ISIS capital of Raqqa. Word came this week that a contingent of Marines has been deployed in Syria to position heavy artillery for the fight ahead. “We expect that within a few weeks there will be a siege of the city,” a militia spokesman tells Reuters.

ISIS doesn’t have a chance. American air and ground forces, working with local proxies, are about to terminate its existence as a state. “Crushed,” to paraphrase President Trump. A just — and popular — cause.

But that won’t be the end. Recent events suggest that the military defeat of ISIS is just the beginning of a renewed American involvement in Iraq and Syria. And whether the American public and president are prepared for or willing to accept the probable costs of such involvement is unknown. That is reason for concern.

To glimpse the future, look at the city of Manbij in northeast Syria. Humvees and Strykers flying the American flag have appeared there in recent days. The mission? Not to defeat ISIS. Our proxies kicked them out last year. What we are doing in Manbij is something altogether different from a military assault: a “deterrence and reassurance” operation meant to dissuade rival factions from massacring one another. If you can’t remember when President Obama or President Trump called for such an operation, that’s because they never did.

And there’s a twist. One of the factions we are trying to intimidate is none other than the army of Turkey, a NATO member and purported ally. Turkey moved in on Manbij not because of ISIS but because of the Kurds. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish autocrat, opposes one of our Kurdish proxies. He says the YPG is the Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, which has conducted an insurgency against his government for decades. Yet the YPG is also the most effective indigenous anti-ISIS force on the ground. We need it to take Raqqa.

Things get even more complicated. Also in Manbij are the Russians, who are helping units of the Syrian army police a group of villages. The Kurds invited them, too, presumably as a separate hedge against Turkey. To keep score: The Americans, the Russians, the Turks, the Kurds, and the Syrians are all converging on an impoverished city in the middle of nowhere that has no strategic importance to the United States.

One needn’t have read The Guns of August to fret about the risks of miscalculation and misinterpretation. Which is why, on Tuesday, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Joseph Dunford, met with his Russian and Turkish counterparts. “One American official described the situation around Manbij as a potential tinderbox,” reports the New York Times. As if we didn’t have enough to worry about.

U.S. intervention in Syria is following a pattern that has ended in regret. Having entered the conflict to pursue the narrow aim of destroying ISIS, we are likely to assume much more abstract and open-ended responsibilities once our immediate goal has been achieved. Similar vague and unspecific policies led to Americans being killed in Lebanon in 1983 and in Somalia a decade later. Where peacekeeping has been successful, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the mission was clear from the beginning, authorized by all parties by treaty, and adequately resourced — tens of thousands of troops, most of them American. None of these conditions apply today.

It is one thing to maintain a presence in Iraq, a country whose fate seems to be entangled with our own. It is another to expand our involvement in Syria with little public rationale or debate. At the very least Congress deserves an opportunity to take up the issue. But don’t get your hopes up. The GOP Congress resisted taking ownership of the war in Syria when the president was a Democrat. There is little reason to think it will do so now when the president is a Republican.

What happens the day after Raqqa falls? Should American troops remain in Syria once ISIS has been defeated, and if so for what purpose? Will there be clear lines of authority between CENTCOM and SOCOM? Just what is America’s position on the Kurds — are we for an independent Kurdistan, and if so are we prepared to resist Turkish and Iraqi attempts to quash it? Who is making key military and diplomatic decisions: the president, the secretary of Defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, or the combatant commanders?

The president is charged with answering such questions. And he must be ready to defend his answers. To do otherwise risks complacency and drift. This is an unstable and murky situation. And it could end, as so often happens, in lost lives, reduced credibility, and an even wider conflict.

A contributor to The Weekly Standard likes to tell the following story: Covering the Lebanese civil war in 1983, he visited an outpost of U.S. Marines. They came under sniper fire from one militia. Then another militia started shooting. Then the Syrians joined in. At which point a lance corporal turned to him and said, “Sir, never get involved in a five-sided argument.”

— Matthew Continetti is the editor-in-chief of the Washington Free Beacon, where this column first appeared.

 

[Housecarl]

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Posted for fair use.....
http://www.geopolmonitor.com/russia-begins-modernization-naval-facility-syria/

Russia begins modernization of naval facility in Syria

Russia has launched a modernization project of it’s naval facility in the Syrian port city of Tartus.

by GEOPOLMonitor Staff
a day ago

According to the head of the Federation Council Committee on Defense and Security Viktor Ozerov, the plans were presented during a visit of Russian senators to the base in October 2016.

The work is expected to include extra piers and structures to facilitate naval logistics vessels and warships.

In January this year, Russia and Syria signed an agreement to expand the territory of the Russian naval facility in Tartous. The signed document refers to an agreement of 49 years.

The agreement also makes provisions for free use of the territory – officially Russian – with conditions of immunity from the jurisdiction of the Syrian state.

The agreement, according to Viktor Ozerov, is subject to ratification by the Russian parliament in Spring, as it will be “a higher level of consolidation of existing agreements.”

As the destination of much of Russia’s manpower in Syria — the Russian naval supply route from the Black Sea Fleet headquarters in Sevastopol — Tartus has long served as a kind of beachhead for Russian arms and equipment deliveries to Syria.

Tartus has been an entry point for Russian arms deliveries to Syria since 1971, when it was leased to Moscow, but the base was doubly significant for serving as a home away from home for the Soviet Mediterranean flotilla.

Russia has been looking to rebuild its presence at Tartus since at least 2010, when the former head of the navy Vladimir Vysotsky unveiled plans to equip the facility to handle ships as big as Russia’s aircraft carrier the Admiral Kuznetsov.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archi...qi-militia-forms-golan-liberation-brigade.php

IRGC-controlled Iraqi militia forms ‘Golan Liberation Brigade’

BY AMIR TOUMAJ | March 12, 2017 | amir@defenddemocracy.org | @AmirToumaj

The Iranian-controlled Iraqi militia Harakat al Nujaba this week announced the formation of its “Golan Liberation Brigade.” While it is not uncommon for entities to name themselves after areas they aim to “liberate,” the militia’s spokesman has said that the unit could assist the Syrian regime in taking the Golan Heights, a region in the Levant that has been controlled by Israel since the 1967 Six-Day War.

If true, the unit would likely participate in a future offensive to capture territory from Syrian opposition in the part of the Golan Heights still controlled by Syria, before moving on to the much taller order of dislodging the Israelis across the border. This week’s announcement reflects Tehran’s priorities in southern Syria since finally taking the fiercely contested city of Aleppo late last year: crush Syrian opposition, and pose military threat to Israel from the Golan Heights. While the Islamic Republic is incapable of credibly challenging the Jewish state’s fortress in the Golan, reaffirming ideological commitment to fighting Israel signals defiance to a global audience amid a reportedly converging American-Arab-Israeli military alliance against Tehran.

Harakat al Nujaba, or Movement of the Noble, has sustained operations in the Syrian and Iraqi combat zones. An offshoot of the Iranian-backed militias Asaib Ahl al Haq and the Hezbollah Brigades, Harakat al Nujaba was formed in 2013 to fight in the Syrian Civil War as part of Iranian-led Iraqi expeditionary forces. The militia joined the Popular Mobilization Forces, the umbrella organization of Iraqi militia, the following year, after the Islamic State incursion into Iraq. Operating as one of the largest Iraqi-Shiite militia contingents in Syria, the militia has claimed to field 10,000 forces. Harakat al Nujaba played an important role in assisting Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and pro-Syrian regime forces conquer Aleppo late last year.

The Iraqi militia functions as an extension of the Islamic Republic. Having sworn full allegiance to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the militia promotes velayat-e faqih (guardianship of jurisprudence), the Islamic Republic’s founding ideology. Harakat al Nujaba takes direct orders from Major General Qassem Soleimani, the chief of the IRGC extraterritorial branch the Qods Force. Last year, the Iraqi militia, which is also known as Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, proclaimed that it and Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran’s most powerful foreign militia, were “the twins of resistance.”

The militia leader Akram al Kabi is close to the top Iranian leadership, including the supreme leader. A co-founder of the Asaib Ahl al Haq – itself an offshoot of the Mahdi Army – Kabi was designated in September 2008 by the US Treasury as a terrorist for aiding Iraqi insurgents. In 2015, he openly said he would depose the Iraqi government if Khamenei issued the order. Last year, top Iranian officials close to Khamenei gave Kabi a highly publicized reception in Tehran, unprecedented in scope and scale for a militia leader. This past December, Harakat al Nujaba publicized Kabi’s meeting with Khamenei on the sidelines of a conference in Tehran.

Harakat al Nujaba has divulged some details about the Golan Liberation Brigade. The commander of the militia’s forces in Syria released a statement declaring the unit to be a synthesis of combat experiences gained in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. The militia’s official spokesman confirmed the event as a press conference March 8 in Tehran at the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency, saying the unit was formed following “recent victories” (an implicit reference to Aleppo). He claimed the Golan unit is comprised of “special” forces.

“Should the Syrian government make the request, we are ready to participate in the liberation of occupied Golan with our allies,” the spokesman said. “We will not permit the soil of Arab countries to remain in the grasps of occupiers.”

Harakat al Nujaba also released a video promoting the Golan unit that showed fighters marching in columns and carrying a banner reading, “Israel will be destroyed.”

Tehran’s goal of establishing a foothold in the Golan Heights is not a secret. Last year, the head of the Israeli foreign and defense legislative committee revealed without divulging details that Israel had repelled several Iran-directed attempts to move forces into Syrian Golan Heights.

Senior Iranian military commanders are known to operate in Syrian Golan. Last July, the then-commander of the IRGC Basij paramilitary publicized an inspection of Quneitra by the Israel border. In January 2015, an Israeli strike in the area killed several high-value targets including IRGC Brigadier General Mohammad Ali Allah-Dadi and multiple Hezbollah operatives.

A chasm remains between the capabilities and ambitions of Harakat al Nujaba and the IRGC to retake the Golan from Israel. The combined forces of the Syrian regime and IRGC-led militias are no match for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and this disparity is expected to hold for the foreseeable future. Israel could also adopt a more proactive approach in Syria to foil IRGC encroachment by the Golan, for example coordinating with Syrian rebels positioned in the area. Syrian Golan’s flat geography furthermore denies the IRGC suitable terrain to replicate the southern Lebanon model of concealing rocket launch sites dispersed across a widespread area, making it easier for the IDF to search and destroy weapons systems. For years, the IDF has been fortifying positions in the rocky plateau of Golan to face greater capabilities than the IRGC and its allies can muster.

Yet the claim to retake Israeli Golan underscores Harakat al Nujaba’s ideological commitment to the IRGC’s and Khamenei’s declared goal of destroying Israel. Khamenei and his top Guard generals have frequently spoken that that the divine hand would aid the faithful who take steps towards “divine-inspired” ideological principles.

Brandishing the formation of the Golan unit also challenges Arab countries on the Palestinian issue, as the Tehran has accused them of abandoning the cause in service of Israel. The Islamic Republic has slammed reported Arab-Israeli rapprochement and talks to form a US-brokered military coalition with the goal of countering Tehran, as covered in The Wall Street Journal. Last month, top Iranian government officials hosted another round of the Support of Palestinian Intifada Conference in a show of unity and defiance. This past week, Tehran’s interim Friday prayer leader this week excoriated “some leaders in Islamic countries who are with Zionists,” calling them “not human.” Suffering from loss of legitimacy over support of Syrian President Bashar al Assad against a Sunni-Arab uprising and nervous over a converging Israeli-Arab alliance, the Islamic Republic is projecting to the globe and “sell-out”Arab leaders a defiant commitment to fighting Israel.

The Iraqi militia’s Golan unit and IRGC-led expeditionary forces could help pro-Syrian regime forces take opposition-held areas in the south. In February 2015, IRGC-led forces launched a failed campaign in the Daraa and Quneitra in the south. Since conquering Aleppo last year, the IRGC-led expeditionary forces and other pro-Syrian regime forces have been able to redirect their dwindling assets to several fronts in north, central, and south Syria. Pro-regime forces backed by Russian air power have been pounding Daraa in the south for more than a month to slow an opposition offensive, and have recently launched a new bid to capture it. An IRGC colonel was also killed last month in the area. A pro-Syrian regime propaganda outlet late last month reaffirmed the government’s intention to retake all of Daraa and open a major border crossing with Jordan. Meanwhile, pro-regime forces have made progress in the northern pocket of Quneitra Governorate, located in the Syrian-controlled part of the Golan.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/southern-Syria-768x399.png
Map 1: southern Syria front, March 2017. Red: pro-Syrian regime forces. Green: rebel forces including Free Syrian Army and al Qaeda-affiliate Jabhat Fath al Sham. Black: Islamic State affiliates. Credit: Liveuamap.

The IRGC’s goals in southern Syria are to crush Syrian opposition forces, and build the capability to open another front against Israel. The IRGC hopes a viable Golan foothold would serve as deterrence against Israel and US, and that it could activate in a future conflict, such as another Israel-Hezbollah war. For now, the IDF’s fortified posture in the Golan remains a difficult, if not futile, target for the Guard and its allies. The IRGC nevertheless intends to project steadfast commitment to ideological principles and defiance of adversaries.

Amir Toumaj is a Research Analyst at Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/staying-course-against-mexicos-cartels

Staying the Course Against Mexico's Cartels

Analysis MARCH 11, 2017 | 14:18 GMT

Summary
Mexico's next presidential election is around the corner, and it has many people wondering how the new leader will tackle the country's enduring security problems. Mexican citizens will head to the polls in July 2018 to choose a head of state to lead their nation through the next six years, and according to a recent poll, populist candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador is poised to win a third of their votes. Should he perform as well as he is expected to, Lopez Obrador could bring even greater uncertainty to Mexico as he assumes the country's highest office.

Analysis
At least, that is, if his statements are an accurate gauge of his actions as president. Lopez Obrador has routinely criticized the security strategy of his old political rival, former President Felipe Calderon, who defeated the populist politician in 2006 by a margin of less than 1 percent of the popular vote. Lopez Obrador has argued that Mexico City's long-standing policy of using the country's armed forces to target criminal organizations has led to greater violence. And as groups fracture under the pressure of law enforcement, their competition for the resources and territory left in the wake of military operations has certainly intensified. Meanwhile, Lopez Obrador's vehement opposition to the views of U.S. President Donald Trump has also raised questions about how he would treat with Washington if he is elected. After all, the United States is an important intelligence-sharing and defense partner to Mexico in its efforts to rein in rampant crime.

Still, appearances can be deceiving. Mexico's approach to security is largely shaped by forces at home and abroad rather than by the whims of any one leader. In fact, Lopez Obrador would probably follow his predecessor's lead and, for the most part, leave the government's tactics unchanged. This isn't to say that he won't make some cosmetic adjustments to Mexico's security strategy, such as scaling down the number of troops across the country that are permanently deployed to combat crime. But pressure from the United States, federal budget cuts, institutional corruption and the prevalence of violent crime will limit just how many forces Lopez Obrador could actually withdraw from the fight.

A Difficult Promise to Keep
As is true of many politicians, Lopez Obrador's policies will not necessarily match the promises he makes on the campaign trail. For example, his pledge to pull Mexican troops back from their war on organized crime is probably a bid to set himself apart from his predecessors and competitors; it is not a decision any new administration would take lightly once in office.

Even so, Lopez Obrador might have at least one way to make good on his vow if he decides to fulfill it. Two draft bills aimed at regulating and eventually reducing the armed forces' role in securing the public's safety have been put before the Mexican Congress. Both pieces of legislation call for mechanisms to determine when the military's presence is necessary in carrying out such duties — a measure that would, in theory, give the next president a means to withdraw forces more easily. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether Congress will be able to agree on a final draft, let alone pass it, in the 16 months left before the election.

Even if the legislature does strike a deal in time, cutting back on the military's involvement in cracking down on crime will not be easy. If Lopez Obrador begins to call back forces in large numbers, Washington would be quick to protest. Mexico's fight against crime is critical to the U.S. government's own efforts to stem the flow of illegal drugs northward across the Mexican border. With fewer Mexican troops disrupting the country's cartels, the United States would have fewer options for interdicting overland trafficking of cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine and heroin through Mexico. Moreover, Washington may not hesitate to leverage negotiations on NAFTA (assuming they are still underway during the next administration) to persuade Mexico City to change tack.

The Same Limited Options
Impediments to reshaping the military's mission would arise within Mexico's borders, too. After violence spiked toward the end of Calderon's administration, which wrapped up in 2012, the incoming Pena Nieto government searched for a way to end the military-centric approach to combating cartels by prioritizing the creation of a civilian-led gendarmerie to take the soldiers' place. But the initiative has since stalled, thanks to the government's weighty financial burdens and the inherent difficulties of building a new security force amid persistent problems like corruption. Though federal tax revenues have risen by about 55 percent since 2010, plunging oil prices and rapidly rising national debt in 2014 siphoned away the money intended to finance the gendarmerie's creation. Even if Mexico City could scrape together the funds for the force, there is no guarantee that an expanded police branch would be any more effective than the military has been in tamping down on crime. So, although Pena Nieto's successor will likely continue his efforts to create new local and state police forces, they will complement — rather than supplant — the military's current role in law enforcement.

Enduring security threats in certain parts of the country, meanwhile, will make it impossible for Mexican troops to withdraw nationwide. After a three-year dip, Mexico's national homicide rate has begun to inch back upward, rising from 12 deaths per 100,000 people in 2014 to 15 deaths per 100,000 people in 2016. (This number peaked at 18 deaths per 100,000 people in 2011 during the height of Mexico's bloody drug war, though murders were likely underreported.) At the same time, security has noticeably deteriorated in several cities and regions, including Tierra Caliente in the country's southwest, areas of the Pacific coast formerly controlled by the Sinaloa Federation, and the border towns of Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez. The heightened violence and crime stemming from feuds between the regions' cartels — and from federal operations against them — will doubtless continue beyond 2018, making it tough for the next administration to order a troop withdrawal without risking a sharper decline in public safety.

These issues will shape the options — and actions — of Mexico's next president, regardless of who it may be. If Lopez Obrador wins the race, he will enter office with a popular mandate to pursue his populist agenda. But that will not change the fact that when it comes to security, Lopez Obrador will have little choice but to stay the course his predecessors have set.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.thedailybeast.com/articl...n-chaos-cozy-up-to-beijing-and-pyongyang.html

DESERTION?

Will a South Korea in Chaos Cozy Up to Beijing and Pyongyang?

The removal of South Korea’s president appears to open the way for “progressives,” who could scuttle part or all of the alliance with Washington.

GORDON G. CHANG
03.11.17 9:13 AM ET

Three people died on Friday and many more were injured as crowds supporting Park Geun-hye clashed with police on the streets of Seoul following her dismissal as president.

Hours earlier, South Korea’s Constitutional Court, in a unanimous decision, removed her from office after finding evidence of corruption and violations of the constitution. She is the first South Korean president to be ousted after a vote of impeachment, which occurred last December by a lopsided margin in the National Assembly.

The election for Park’s replacement must now be held by May 9, which is also considered the most probable day for the contest.

“Progressives,” who are supportive of “Sunshine” or “engagement” policies toward North Korea, are leading in the polls and could dramatically change the balance of power in North Asia.

Park, even before murky allegations of criminal conduct surfaced, was deeply unpopular. She went missing for seven hours on the day of the sinking of the Sewol, a ferry, which resulted in the deaths of 295 passengers and two rescue divers in April 2014. She has never publicly explained her absence. Her approval ratings, which plunged after the tragedy, never recovered. And South Koreans have not forgotten. In fact, the Constitutional Court considered charges stemming from the Sewol incident.

Her unpopularity came back to haunt her. The court’s decision reads like a political verdict more than a legal one. At the end, she was alone. Even members of her Liberty Korea Party deserted her.

Yet for all the miscues, mistakes, and disasters marking her governance at home, her external policies were resolute, even courageous. For instance, in early 2016 she closed the Kaesong Industrial Complex, where about 125 South Korean companies engaged in light manufacturing just north of the Demilitarized Zone—and shoveled about $120 million a year into the hands of the regime of Kim Jong Un.

Moreover, she agreed, in the face of sustained criticism at home and fierce opposition from Beijing, to base on South Korean soil the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile-defense system.

Her departure puts at risk the deployment of THAAD, as the Lockheed Martin system is known, because a progressive successor may not stick with her decision. The frontrunner in the polls, Moon Jae-in of the Minjoo Party, has been cagey, insisting on a public review of Park’s controversial decision to go with the American missile defense plan. In the public review Moon proposes—a decision by the next government with ratification by the National Assembly—the decision to deploy the system would almost surely be reversed if a progressive wins.

Yet now there’s a race. Monday evening, the first elements of the THAAD system arrived at Osan Air Base, south of Seoul, and deployment should be completed next month, just ahead of the election of Park’s successor.

A decision to reverse THAAD deployment or even limit the placement of further batteries would be a victory for an angry China that has been trying, through boycotts and other economic means, to intimidate South Korea into not cooperating with the United States. And a victory for this coercion would almost surely embolden the more belligerent elements in Beijing and Pyongyang.

So more than THAAD is at stake. In a larger sense, the election of a progressive will mean the end of a long period of strategic agreement between South Korea and the only nation pledged to defend it, the United States. Washington, since the failed Leap Day Deal of 2012, has given up on engaging the Kim regime. So had Park, the result of the apparent failure in her first years in office of her soft “trustpolitik” approach to Pyongyang.

Moon or another progressive is bound to try to reach out to Kim Jong Un, however. President Kim Dae-jung, another progressive figure, immediately adopted the Sunshine Policy, named after the Aesop fable in which the Sun, not the North Wind, is able to persuade a man to take off his coat. In his inaugural address in 1998, Kim set a new tone for relations with the other—and darker—Korea. “We will actively push reconciliation and cooperation between the South and North beginning with those areas which can be most easily agreed upon,” he promised.

There was, however, very little agreement with the North during the Sunshine years, which lasted during the administrations of Kim and his successor, Roh Moo-hyun. Furthermore, the new South Korean approach did not cool down military tensions. On the contrary, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea even increased infiltrations and incursions. Pyongyang just took Seoul’s cash—Kim Dae-jung effectively purchased the June 2000 summit with Kim Jong Il for at least $150 million—and continued developing nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them.

The Sunshine Policy also weakened Seoul’s ties with America. That is what Washington policy analysts are now worrying about.

There are, however, at least three reasons why Seoul, even under a progressive like Moon, may not move too far from Washington’s orbit.

First, North Korea’s regime always saw the Sunshine Policy as especially threatening. As Korea watcher Selig Harrison has noted, Kim Dae-jung’s strategy, in the eyes of the Kim regime, was “more dangerous” than Seoul’s previous policies “precisely because it was more subtle.” By making the North dependent on the South’s aid, the South Korean Kim, as Pyongyang saw it then, was enticing the North Koreans Kims into a trap, making them beholden to Seoul.

So the North, despite taking Seoul’s aid during the Sunshine years, did not respond positively. And there is another reason North Korea is unlikely to act in good faith now. Kim Jong Un, in short, is apparently unsure of his grip on power and so is in no position to work cooperatively with archenemy Seoul. And if he does not work cooperatively, he will delegitimize South Korea’s progressive president.

Second, the South Korean public may vote for a progressive, but it may be in no mood to embrace an obviously hostile North, especially after the Kim regime’s killing of 50 South Koreans in 2010 in two incidents: the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel and the shelling of a South Korean island. Polls show even young South Koreans, traditionally progressive in their outlook, are now particularly hawkish after the 2010 killings.

“I don’t think there is much support for major engagement anymore,” Robert Kelly of Pusan National University told The Washington Post. “I think Moon would have to fight hard to get that kind of engagement off the ground—he’d be pushing against the Americans and against his own people.”

And, third, maybe South Korea will stick with the conservatives. That seems unlikely now, but Kim Jong Un and Chinese leader Xi Jinping are perfectly capable of overplaying their hand and creating a backlash in South Korea. Kim’s serial missile tests are the best advertisement for missile defense, and Xi’s vociferous campaign against THAAD has already stirred up anger in Seoul.

The South Korean electorate is extremely volatile, and Moon Jae-in, once a senior aide to Roh Moo-hyun, should know. All Moon has to do is remember the 2002 presidential election. In the days preceding the voting, Roh looked like a sure loser. The human rights lawyer was thought to be behind by the middle of election day and won only because young supporters mounted a noontime Internet campaign. The last-minute effort resulted in a late-day surge of voting that put Roh over the top.

Moon has already lost one race for the top spot, to Park in 2012. And he could lose another. He’s riding high now, but South Korean politics changes by the hour, and there are still two months to go.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article...ng-trump-administration-mulls-un-funding-cuts


$2.4 Billion for Peacekeeping? Trump Administration Mulls UN Funding Cuts

By Patrick Goodenough | March 14, 2017 | 4:42 AM EDT

U.N. peacekeepers with the MINUSCA mission in the Central African Republic in September 2014. (UN Photo/Catianne Tijerina)

(CNSNews.com) – With the Trump administration looking at ways to reduce U.S. contributions to the United Nations, the approximately $2.4 billion of taxpayers’ money that goes towards peacekeeping missions each year is in the spotlight.

The U.S. is liable for 28.57 percent of the total budget for global peacekeeping missions. The Obama administration’s request for FY2017 was $2.394 billion.

The FY2016 U.S. funding estimate was $2.460 billion.

http://www.cnsnews.com/s3/files/styles/content_100p/s3/unpkmissionchart.jpg?itok=zsnCoQLU

U.S. taxpayers accounted for 28.57 percent of the total U.N. peacekeeping budget in 2016. The next highest contributors were China at 10.29 percent and Japan at 9.68 percent. (Graph: CNSNews.com)

The next biggest contributors in 2016 were China (10.29 percent), Japan (9.68 percent) and Germany (6.39 percent). At the other end of the scale, more than 70 U.N. member-states contributed 0.001 percent or less.

Some of the current 16 missions around the world, comprising more than 125,000 personnel today, have been in existence for well over half a century, while the newest – in the Central African Republic – is just three years old.

Nine of the 16 missions are in Africa, three are in the Middle East, two are in Europe, with Asia and the Western Hemisphere accounting for one each.

http://www.cnsnews.com/s3/files/styles/content_100p/s3/unpkmissionmap.jpg?itok=M8R9-IsD

A State Department map shows current U.N. peacekeeping missions around the world. (Two entries – the standing police capacity in Brindisi, Italy and UNSOM in Somalia, are not current peacekeeping missions.) (Map: State Department)

Three of them – a 13-year-old mission in Haiti; a 14-year-old mission in Liberia; and a 13-year-old mission in Côte d’Ivoire – are in the process of winding down.

But others offer little sign of following suit.

U.S. taxpayers in FY 2016 accounted for $440.6 million for a seven-year-old mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo; $368.2 million for a decade-old mission in Darfur, Sudan; $342 million for a six-year-old mission in South Sudan; $286.7 million for a three-year-old mission in Central African Republic; $267.6 million for a four-year-old mission in Mali; and $147.8 million for a 39-year-old mission in southern Lebanon.

The 193 U.N. member-states’ contributions to the U.N. peacekeeping budget (like the regular U.N. budget) are assessed according to their relative “capacity to pay,” a formula based on factors including population size and gross national income.

The U.S. assessment of 28.57 percent is more than three percent higher than allowed by legislation signed by President Clinton in 1994, which set a 25 percent cap on the U.S. contribution to U.N. peacekeeping.

The discrepancy between that cap and the U.N. assessment led to arrears mounting up, but under Helms-Biden legislation negotiated in 1999, the U.S. agreed to settle the arrears in return for a U.N. pledge to gradually reduce the assessment, then above 30 percent, to 25 percent.

According to Heritage Foundation senior research fellow Brett Schaefer, the previous administration’s inability to persuade the U.N. to keep to its commitment cost U.S. taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars.

The current peacekeeping missions range in size from a 116-strong team observing the “line of control” dividing Indian- and Pakistani-controlled areas of disputed Kashmir since 1949 to a 22,500-strong force in DRC.

While peacekeeping missions established after the end of fighting and signing of peace agreements have tended to be more successful, some of the more recent ones, in Africa especially, face far more challenging conditions.

“Today, a growing number of missions operate in remote and austere environments where no political agreement exists, or where efforts to establish or re-establish one have faltered,” a U.N.-commissioned report by a high-level independent panel stated in 2015.

“They face ongoing hostilities and parties who are unwilling to negotiate or otherwise undermine the presence of a mission by condoning or inflicting restrictions on its ability to operate,” it said, citing the missions in Mali, DRC and Darfur in particular.

The Better World Campaign, which advocates strong U.S. engagement with the U.N., argues that the money going to peacekeeping operations is well spent.

It points to a 2006 Government Accountability Office report which estimated that the then-14-month-old U.N. peacekeeping mission in Haiti, if carried out by U.S. forces, would have cost about eight times as much as the U.S. contribution to the U.N. mission ($876 million compared to $116 million

“Over the past two decades, both Republican and Democratic administrations have used U.S. influence at the [Security] Council to champion new missions with more complex mandates,” the advocacy group states.

“This bipartisan support stems from the fact that countries undergoing conflict threaten U.S. national security, risk becoming safe havens for terrorist and criminal organizations, and feature levels of deprivation and abuses of human rights that are an affront to American values.”

-

Current U.N. peacekeeping missions

Below is a summary of each mission, including its age, location, number of personnel (military and civilian), its total budget for the current two-year budget cycle, and the amount the Obama administration requested for it in the FY2017 budget.

U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)
Established: 1948 (69 years old)
Based: Middle East, headquartered in Jerusalem
Personnel: 385
Budget (2016-2017): $68.9 million
Administration’s FY2017 request: –

U.N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)
Established: 1949 (68 years)
Based: Islamabad, Srinagar (Kashmir)
Personnel: 116
Budget (2016-2017): $21.1 million
Administration’s FY2017 request: –

U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
Established: 1964 (53 years)
Based: Nicosia
Personnel: 1,105
Budget (2016-2017): $55.5 million
Administration’s FY2017 request: $9.5 million

U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)
Established: 1974 (43 years)
Based: Golan Heights
Personnel: 970
Budget (2016-2017): $47.7 million
Administration’s FY2017 request: $14.0 million

U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
Established: 1978 (39 years)
Based: Southern Lebanon
Personnel: 11,425
Budget (2016-2017): $488.6 million
Administration’s FY2017 request: $149.0 million

U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
Established: 1991 (26 years)
Based: Western Sahara
Personnel: 477
Budget (2016-2017): $56.5 million
Administration’s FY2017 request: $17.5 million

U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
Established: 1999 (18 years)
Based: Kosovo
Personnel: 364
Budget (2016-2017): $36.4 million
Administration’s FY2017 request: $11.1 million

U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
Established: 2003 (14 years)
Based: Liberia
Personnel: 2,976
Budget (2016-2017): $187.1 million
Administration’s FY2017 request: –

U.N. Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)
Established: 2004 (13 years)
Based: Cote d’Ivoire
Personnel: 3,400
Budget (2012-2013): $153.0 million
Administration’s FY2017 request: $99.5 million

U.N. Stabilization Mission In Haiti (MINUSTAH)
Established: 2004 (13 years)
Based: Haiti
Personnel: 6,131
Budget (2016-2017): $345.9 million
Administration’s FY2017 request: $106.5 million

African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
Established: 2007 (10 years)
Based: Darfur, Sudan
Personnel: 20,806
Budget (2016-2017): $1.039 billion
Administration’s FY2017 request: $324.0 million

U.N. Organization Stabilization Mission in the D.R. Congo (MONUSCO)
Established: 2010 (7 years)
Based: D.R. Congo
Personnel: 22,500
Budget (2016-2017): $1.23 billion
Administration’s FY2017 request: $440.0 million

U.N. Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)
Established: 2011 (6 years)
Based: Abyei, Sudan/South Sudan
Personnel: 4,725
Budget (2016-2017): $268.6 million
Administration’s FY2017 request: $86.5 million

U.N. Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
Established: 2011 (6 years)
Based: South Sudan
Personnel: 15,298
Budget (2016-2017): $1.081 billion
Administration’s FY2017 request: $372.0 million

U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Established: 2013 (4 years)
Based: Mali
Personnel: 13,275
Budget (2016-2017): $933.4 million
Administration’s FY2017 request: $298.0 million

U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)
Established: 2014 (3 years)
Based: Central African Republic
Personnel: 13,071
Budget (2016-2017): $920.7 million
Administration’s FY2017 request: $285.0 million

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-china-paracels-idUSKBN16L2SS

South China Sea | Tue Mar 14, 2017 | 7:10pm EDT

China begins new work on disputed South China Sea island

By Greg Torode | HONG KONG

China has started fresh construction work in the disputed South China Sea, new satellite images show, a sign that Beijing is continuing to strengthen its military reach across the vital trade waterway.

Regional military attaches and experts believe the work shows China's determination to build up its network of reefs and islets, even if it is seeking to avoid a fresh confrontation with the new administration of U.S. President Donald Trump.

An image of North Island in the Paracels group taken on March 6 shows recent work including land clearing and possible preparation for a harbor to support what experts believe may be eventual military installations. Initial work was damaged in a typhoon last year.

The pictures, provided by private satellite firm Planet Labs, follow reports in January showing work undertaken on nearby Tree Island and other features in the Paracels, which are also claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan.

Diplomats briefed on latest Western intelligence assessments say Beijing is pursuing efforts to dominate its maritime 'backyard', even if it tweaks the timing of moves to avoid being overtly provocative.

"The Paracels are going to be vital to any future Chinese attempt to dominate the South China Sea," said Carl Thayer, a South China Sea expert at Australia's Defence Force Academy.

"We can see they are committed to militarization, whatever the official rhetoric tells us, even if they are going to do it bit by bit."

UNCERTAINTIES OVER TRUMP
The more widely disputed Spratlys archipelago to the south are higher profile but the Paracels are key to China’s presence in the South China Sea,
China has in recent years temporarily based surface-to-air missile launchers and crack jet fighters at long established bases on Woody Island on the Paracels, helping protect its nuclear submarine facilities on Hainan Island.

Also In South China Sea
Exclusive: Japan plans to send largest warship to South China Sea, sources say
China waits to hear why Japanese warship going to South China Sea

North Island is part of an arc of reefs that are expected to form a protective screen for Woody, which includes civilian facilities and a listening post.

Zhang Baohui, a mainland security expert at Hong Kong's Lingnan University, said he believed China was pursuing long-held goals of strengthening its facilities in the Paracels, and had calculated the Trump administration would not over-react given other pressing priorities.

"There’s also uncertainty with this young Trump administration, but this is very important work to the Chinese…the Paracels are vital to defending Hainan, which is in turn important to China’s nuclear deterrent," he said.

"The calculation here is that it is really only Vietnam that will be rattled by this."
The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

China's Defence Ministry said it was "not familiar" with any work at North Island.
"What needs to be stressed is that the Xisha Islands are China’s inherent territory," it said, using the Chinese name for the Paracels. China fully occupied the Paracels in 1974 after forcing the navy of the-then South Vietnam off its holdings.

News of fresh Chinese activity comes as Rex Tillerson prepares for his first visit to the region as U.S. Secretary of State later this week. Tillerson sparked alarm in Beijing when he said in January China should not be allowed access to islands it has built in the South China Sea.

A U.S. official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, was unable to confirm new construction work on North Island but said it would not be surprising.

"It would be in line with what they have been doing, why else would they clearing land on the islands but for militarization," the official said. "There is no other reason to have a presence there."

Diplomatic sources in Beijing say China is not looking for confrontation with the United States over the South China Sea, pointing to China’s low-key reaction to last month’s patrol of a U.S. aircraft carrier strike group in the waters there.

China has recently sought to portray itself as being conciliatory over the disputed waterway, saying it and Southeast Asian nations are committed to a peaceful resolution.

Last week, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said a draft code of conduct for behavior in the South China Sea had now been completed and that tensions had "distinctly dropped".

For a graphic of China's reclamations in the Paracels, click here

(Additional reporting by Ben Blanchard in BEIJING and Idrees Ali in WASHINGTON; Editing by Lincoln Feast)

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.militarytimes.com/articles/manbij-syria-us-troops-army-rangers-russia-turkey

U.S. and Russian troops are now in the same Syrian city

By: Andrew deGrandpre, March 13, 2017 (Photo Credit: Delil Souleiman/AFP/Getty Images)

WASHINGTON — The U.S. military's "reassurance and deterrence" mission in the Syrian city of Manbij is achieving its goal of*preventing key American allies from battling one another, the Pentagon said Monday, but what's already a tense situation could become more complicated with the arrival of Russian troops and continued advances by Turkish-backed rebels.

Fewer than 100 elite Army Rangers are in Manbij to keep the peace between Syrian Kurdish forces and those loyal to Turkey, said Navy Capt. Jeff Davis, a Pentagon spokesman.*Russian troops are there providing security for humanitarian convoys that have entered the war-torn city, a development he called unsurprising in light of last week's high-level talks between the senior-most military commanders from Russia, Turkey and the U.S.


Military Times
Pentagon: U.S. troops play new role in Syria


The Americans and Russians have had no close interaction on the ground, Davis said. Moscow, he added, has "kept us abreast of their operations" in Manbij, but the two militaries do not*coordinate in Syria. Rather, the Pentagon prefers the term "deconflict."

The dynamic in Syria is deeply complex. U.S. troops there are focused on training and assisting local forces fighting the Islamic State. Their presence has swelled to around 1,000 in recent weeks with the addition of a Marine Corps artillery unit focused on the ISIS capital of Raqqa and the Army Rangers sent to Manbij. The Russians are backing Syrian President Bashar al Assad, whose military continues to battle rebel groups seeking to oust him from power.

Meanwhile, Turkey's president has called for the liberation of Manbij from the Kurds. Ankara considers the Kurds to be terrorists linked to a militant group responsible for carrying out deadly attacks across the border.

Video posted to social media from Manbij shows the Americans' armored vehicles — a mix of Strykers, humvees and mine-resistant tactical trucks — sitting idle or traveling in convoys. "They tend to find a place to park, and look out and watch," Davis said of the Rangers' mission. "They are, for the most part, static, but they do move."

The Americans moved in during early March amid signs of violence between Syrian Kurdish militias, who hold the city proper,*and Turkey's Syrian proxies, who've made several recent* land grabs nearby.*

"Why we're there, and why we care, is we want to make sure the parties on the ground aren't shooting at each other," Davis said.


Army Times
The U.S. is sending 2,500 troops to Kuwait, ready to step up the fight in Syria and Iraq


In that regard, the mission has been "relatively successful in keeping all forces there focused on the common enemy of ISIS," he said. "We have not seen a large amount of sparring or skirmishing."

The Rangers' vehicles*display brightly colored American flags meant to make their presence abundantly obvious and, it is hoped, ward off direct attacks should hostilities erupt again. Davis declined to discuss what the U.S. military's response would entail if the soldiers come under fire, saying only that they maintain the right to defend themselves.

For now, the mission appears to be open-ended. Asked whether the Russians' presence in Manbij means the small American force there can pull out, Davis said there are no immediate plans for that occur.*

Andrew deGrandpre is Military Times' senior editor and Pentagon bureau chief. On Twitter:*@adegrandpre.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/14/nuclear-missile-programs-in-north-korea-iran-need-/

Home
Opinion
Commentary

Nuclear missile programs in North Korea, Iran need watchful eye

By Peter Vincent Pry - The Washington Times - Tuesday, March 14, 2017

ANALYSIS/OPINION:

Rogue states are closer to achieving capability than elites will admit
The United States and its allies, informed largely by opinions of Washington foreign policy and media elites, have for years regarded nuclear weapon and missile programs in North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan as technologically primitive.

If their assessment is wrong, and nuclear missile programs of rogue states are significantly more advanced technologically than Washington and media elites suppose — we could stumble into a nuclear Pearl Harbor.

Evidence continues to mount that the establishment view is wrong. They are grossly underestimating the technological sophistication of rogue state nuclear and missile programs.

Consider the latest technological surprises that happened just recently in 2017:
• In March, the United Nations disclosed North Korea has tried selling lithium-6, used to make tritium and fuel H-bombs.

• In March, Iran successfully tested Hormuz-2, an anti-ship ballistic missile with a maneuvering warhead that located and destroyed a target vessel at a range of 250 kilometers.

• In January, Pakistan successfully tested Babur-3, a nuclear-armed, submarine-launched cruise missile with a terrain-matching, radar-avoiding guidance system of great accuracy.

• In March, the press disclosed the Obama administration used cyber-attacks to sabotage North Korean missile tests, and WikiLeaks published the CIA’s cyberwarfare tool kit.

Allow me to connect the dots.

Washington elites and media “instant experts” claim North Korea has only enough entry-level nuclear fuel, plutonium and uranium, for a small number of primitive A-bombs.

But the U.N.’s lithium-6 discovery proves not only does North Korea have an advanced nuclear fuel for sophisticated thermonuclear weapons — including neutron bombs and super-EMP warheads — but it has such an abundance of lithium-6 that Pyongyang is trying to sell its surplus online. Now the U.N. admits in its latest report, “North Korea is believed to have abundant stockpiles of lithium” and “abundant stockpiles of fissile material.”

For years, the Obama administration and its allies in the media claimed North Korea could not miniaturize a nuclear weapon, to make it small and light enough for missile delivery. Lithium-6 and tritium solves that problem for North Korea by making possible higher yields in compact bombs, and weapons for specialized nuclear effects, too.

United Press International reports, “Tritium allows for the production of nuclear bombs with less required amounts of plutonium and uranium — and the small warheads they produce can be mounted on projectiles like intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States.”

Since North Korea, Iran and Pakistan are strategic partners that share technology, it is prudent to judge that a technological breakthrough by one will be shared with the others, and that these actors are all at the same level of sophistication technologically.

Thus, Iran’s development of a maneuvering re-entry vehicle — the acme of sophistication for ballistic missile warheads — belies the mainstream Washington view that North Korea is incapable of making even a simple re-entry vehicle for an intercontinental missile.

Pakistan’s development of a submarine-launched cruise missile, armed with a nuclear warhead, that launches through a 22-inch-diameter torpedo tube, belies the mainstream view that North Korea does not have miniaturized warheads. North Korea has done more nuclear testing than Pakistan and has been building nuclear weapons for a half-decade longer.

The mainstream view that North Korean missiles are unreliable because of their failures during flight tests is now challenged by the revelation of Obama administration cyber-attacks and other means of disrupting Pyongyang’s missile tests. Unfortunately, now that WikiLeaks has revealed the CIA’s cyber-playbook, it may be no accident that North Korea’s recent barrage of missiles into Japan’s home waters was largely launched successfully.

No doubt the Washington foreign policy establishment and their allies in the mainstream media will not want to connect the dots. Even though North Korea has fielded two classes of intercontinental ballistic missile, the KN-08 and KN-14, and has possibly nuclear-armed satellites orbiting over the United States, they will continue to predict Pyongyang cannot yet “reliably” deliver a nuclear attack. They will continue to pretend Iran does not have nuclear weapons, even though Iran probably does (see “Iran — The Worst Deal,” Family Security Matters Oct. 3, 2015). And they will act as if Pakistan’s nuclear missile programs do not even exist. Yet Pakistani nuclear missiles have larger consequences for proliferation to North Korea, Iran and others.

Alas, Washington liberal and media elites are less afraid of North Korea, Iran and Pakistan than they are of the United States modernizing its nuclear deterrent to protect the American people from these bad actors. They are howling louder against the Trump administration’s planned nuclear upgrades than they ever did against North Korea.

The truth is that the nuclear and missile genies are out of their bottles.

Stopping the spread of these technologies through the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the alphabet soup of other liberal arms control agreements has failed catastrophically.

It’s time to defend ourselves.

Nuclear missile surprises

Peter Vincent Pry is chief of staff of the Congressional EMP Commission, served in the House Armed Services Committee, the CIA, and is author of “Blackout Wars” (CreateSpace Independent Publishing, 2015).

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/03/15/picking_at_the_tangled_knot_of_libya_110978.html

Picking at the Tangled Knot of Libya

By Stratfor
March 15, 2017

In the five years since the ouster of longtime strongman ruler Moammar Gadhafi, Libya has fractured into pieces. Competing governments and associated rival militias wrestle for power, allowing jihadist militants to establish themselves. Outside powers have intervened in an attempt to piece Libya back together, but the U.N.-led peace process aimed at forming a unity government instead led to the creation of a third rival government and increased the polarization among the country's factions.

Today marked one of the heaviest days of fighting in multiple theaters in Libya over the past three years. In eastern Libya's vital "Oil Crescent" region, the Libyan National Army, under the control of Field Marshal Khalifa Hifter, recaptured the oil terminals of As Sidra and Ras Lanuf, which it had lost to Islamist-linked militias just two weeks ago. In western Libya, meanwhile, rival militias supporting two different governments battled in the streets of Tripoli with support from tanks in an attempt to win the backing of the capital's populace and seize business and residential centers.

What is a Geopolitical Diary?
Outside powers, including Arab states, countries in the West and, increasingly, Russia are each backing whichever factions they think will help them achieve their disparate objectives in Libya. Right now, the country's divisions are so deep that no outside power has the means or the influence to force a solution that will unify the various factions. But that has not stopped those powers from attempting to wield more influence, either directly or indirectly, over the parties involved in the conflict. Russia, for example, has spent the past year building connections with groups across the country in hopes that it can shape the negotiating process.

Libya's divisions, rooted in tribal rivalries that were unleashed after Gadhafi's downfall, only recently were not as contentious as they are today. In 2014, Libya had just a single government in Tripoli, the General National Congress (GNC), which was voted into power by popular election after the civil war ended. After the GNC failed to hold elections before its term ended, however, Hifter demanded that it step down. The GNC persisted, and three months later, Hifter — backed by Egypt — launched what he called Operation Dignity to try to force it from power. The GNC then did hold elections, but turnout was low, and Islamists backed by groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood were defeated. The low turnout led to claims that the elections lacked legitimacy. A coalition backed by Islamist militias and fighters from the powerful western city of Misrata formed Libya Dawn, dislodging the newly elected government — the House of Representatives — which fled to eastern Libya to ally with Hifter. The Misratan-Islamist coalition then restored the GNC's power in Tripoli, giving the country two governments.

Between late 2014 and early 2015, forces from Operation Dignity and Libya Dawn waged battle, but their fighting created power vacuums that gave al Qaeda-linked groups the opportunity to embed themselves with local tribal militias that were fighting Hifter. Moreover, many of those tribal militias found support as proxies from Libya Dawn's Islamist militias. As a result, residual deep connections remain between anti-Hifter Islamist groups in Libya's west and al Qaeda-affiliated jihadist groups in Libya's east. Their ties helped reinforce the Benghazi Defense Brigades, the group that was able to defeat Libyan National Army forces March 2 to take control of the two oil terminals that Hifter's forces reclaimed today. Amid the fighting, the Islamic State gained a foothold in Sirte and used that city as a springboard for operations in western Libya that targeted Tripoli and Misrata.

It was the Islamic State's rise in the country that prompted the West to increase its efforts to form a unity government bridging the two rivals. As the more business-oriented merchant Misratans found themselves under attack from the Islamic State, they threw their support behind the Western peace process. That led to the dissolution of their coalition with the Islamists, who opposed the peace plan because of the prominent role it would give Hifter. But the plan progressed, leading to the birth of the Government of National Accord (GNA), which won the backing of the U.N. Security Council. Once the GNA was formed, however, neither of the other rival governments fully supported it. The more hard-line Islamist factions of the GNC remain, and the remnants of the House of Representatives never approved its formation.

The three years of alignments, realignments and proxy wars have left a tangled knot of alliances and rivalries among the country's political and militant factions that has eluded the power of any outside force to untie. But countries with interests in North Africa, through support of various groups, still hope to achieve whatever they can in Libya.

Arab countries have played a key role in the conflict. Hifter has benefited from the support of countries inclined to oppose populist movements, Islamist political groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and jihadist militants. Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia all view Hifter as the country's strongest military leader, and his anti-Islamist agenda aligns with their objectives. The three have pressed for the unity government to succeed, but they want to ensure that Hifter plays a key role in that government. If he is given significant power, it would limit the chances that an Islamist-dominated government would emerge, and it would ensure that military pressure on extremist groups will remain high.

Over the past year, Russia has begun increasing its presence in Libya, courting officials from the GNA and Misrata. It, too, appears to have thrown more support behind Hifter and the Libyan National Army. Russia's interests lie in opposing extremist groups, although it has provided limited levels of support thus far. Russia is also trying to solidify its long-term presence in North Africa. In tandem with its expansion into Libya, Moscow has deepened its relationship with Egypt through military, agricultural and energy ties. The expansion into Libya is just one component of Russia's much broader strategy of strengthening ties in the Southern Mediterranean — resurrecting a Soviet-era axis of influence. The Kremlin, which knows that the conflict in Libya is intensifying, wants to ensure that it has a seat at the negotiating table so that it can help shape talks and possibly use its involvement as leverage against the West.

While Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have backed Hifter, Qatar and Turkey have taken the opposite approach, providing closer support to Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated groups and the Misratans. In Turkey, the Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) has used Muslim Brotherhood affiliates to enlarge its own influence in the region and counter rivals such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which espouse a different version of Sunni governance. For Qatar, support for the Muslim Brotherhood and other political Islamist groups is not as much about an alignment of worldview as it is Doha seeking to grow its influence across the Middle East. By allowing leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, the Taliban and similar groups to set up offices in Doha, Qatar is strategically investing in populist groups to build a network of allies across the region. Still, Qatar and Turkey have not provided the Islamist-leaning groups with the same level of support that other Middle Eastern powers have given to Hifter and his forces.

Finally, for most Western powers, the core interest is still to limit the areas in which jihadist groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State can operate. Over the past year, even though the West has largely supported the unity government in Tripoli, underneath the surface, some Western governments have also backed Hifter's forces. In the east, for example, France had lent some support to Hifter until the Benghazi Defense Brigades shot down a helicopter carrying three French soldiers in July. In support of the GNA, the United States launched nearly 500 airstrikes against the Islamic State as Misratan militias were trying to seize control of Sirte. Though the fight against militants is a focus, the West hopes to shepherd through a unity government to return long-term stability to Libya so that secondary issues — such as the migrant crisis affecting European powers — can be resolved.

In Libya's current conflict, the splits remain too strong, with too many divisive figures, for any solutions to emerge in the near future. Nevertheless, the country's proximity to Europe and its chaotic environment — a breeding ground for jihadist groups — has attracted almost every strong actor in the region. As a result, Libya will grow as a point of tension between those outside powers, and their support for competing groups will only deepen the severity of the country's divisions.

This article originally appeared at Stratfor.
Related Topics: Khalifa Haftar, Gen. Khalifa Hifter, Libyan National Army, Libya Civil War, Libya

 

[Housecarl]

Whack-a-mole.....

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http://freebeacon.com/national-security/islamic-state-expands-north-africa/

Islamic State Expands Into North Africa
Attacks by new terror group threaten Western interests in region

A Malian police officer stands guard after a deadly terrorist attack on the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, Mali in November 2015 / Getty Images

BY: Bill Gertz
March 15, 2017 5:00 am

A new Islamic State affiliate is gaining strength in sub-Saharan Africa as part of efforts by the Syrian-based Islamist terror group to take over large parts of the continent.

A relatively new group known as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara has stepped up terrorist attacks in the swath of north Africa known as the Sahel. The Sahel is a semi-arid region that stretches from the western states of Mali and Nigeria, through Niger, Chad, and Sudan and into part of Ethiopia.

ISIS-GS, as the group is identified in U.S. intelligence reports, was formed in 2015 from al Murabitun, an Islamist terror group once linked to al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Militants from Murabitun and a second AQIM splinter group called al Mulathamun Battalion founded ISIS-GS.

According to a State Department security report, al Murabitun was "one of the more active militant groups in the Sahel" and carried out the November 2015 attack on the Radisson Blu hotel in Mali that killed 20 people.

The March 8 report by the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), a State Department-private sector group, said the new ISIS-GS had been relatively quiet for about a year before reemerging with three significant terror attacks in late 2016.

The Islamic State officially recognized ISIS-GS in October in what security analysts regard as an indication the broader terror movement is stepping up operations in northern Africa.

"Since the Islamic State proclaimed its so-called caliphate in June 2014, it has expanded in both symbolic and real terms in North and West Africa," said a report by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.

The OSAC report said the official ISIS recognition of the new group likely reflects "the group’s desire to strengthen its African presence after setbacks in Libya, creating a possibility that this new group could receive increased material support from ISIS in the future."

The Islamic State suffered setbacks in Libya, where it had controlled key parts of the largely ungoverned state. ISIS in Libya had imposed its ultra-violent version of Sharia law, with sex slaves and beheadings, in the city of Sirte. It was driven out of the port city in December by Libyan government forces.

Marine Corps Gen. Thomas Waldhauser, commander of Africa Command, told a Senate hearing last week that ISIS is regrouping after its expulsion from Sirte and that many of its militants were moving to southern Libya.

In prepared testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Waldhauser said countering the ISIS threat in both the Sahel and Libya is among one of five "lines of effort" for his command.

"The instability in Libya and North Africa may be the most significant, near-term threat to U.S. and allies' interests on the continent," he said.

"The multiple militias and fractured relationship between factions in east and west Libya exacerbate the security situation, spilling into Tunisia and Egypt and the broader Maghreb, allowing the movement of foreign fighters, enabling the flow of migrants out of Libya to Europe and elsewhere."

The terrorist groups are working to incorporate large areas of Africa under Islamist ideology and are networking and targeting young people for recruitment, he said.

Waldhauser also stated that Africa Command "must be ready to conduct military operations to protect U.S. interests, counter violent extremist organizations, and enable our partners’ efforts to provide security."

Jason Warner, an assistant professor at the Combating Terrorism Center, stated in January that ISIS headquarters delayed recognizing the Sahel affiliate until after the attacks in late 2016. The attacks "signaled to the Islamic State that ISIS-GS was more than just a nominal fighting force," he said.

Warner said ISIS-GS appears better organized than two other new ISIS affiliates in Africa: the Islamic State in Somalia, in northern Somalia, and the southern Islamic State of Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.

"While recent news on the Islamic State centers on the siege of Mosul in Iraq, the group's ideological hold in sub-Saharan Africa has been quietly growing, and not simply in relation to its well-known merger with Boko Haram," Warner wrote in the West Point journal CTC Sentinel. "Indeed, over the past year-plus, three new Islamic State affiliates have gained prominence in sub-Saharan Africa."

ISIS-GS "is the only one of these groups to have carried out multiple attacks," Warner said.

The Sahel affiliate of ISIS is led by al Murabitun commander Adnan al Sahrawi, who pledged his group's loyalty to ISIS in May 2015.

ISIS-GS conducted its first attack in Burkina Faso in September on a border post. That was followed by attacks in October in Burkina Faso and an assault on a prison in Niger in an apparent bid to free jihadists that could bolster its forces.

The Islamic State conducted similar prison attacks in Iraq prior to taking over large portions of Iraq and Syria in 2014.

ISIS-GS is also suspected of carrying out the December 2016 attack on a military convoy in Burkina Faso that killed 12 soldiers.

"The emergence of an ISIS affiliate in the Sahel will likely increase the security threat to the private sector, as western interests are routinely targeted by militant groups in the Sahel," the report said.

The Islamic terror group Boko Haram, active in Nigeria, aligned with ISIS in March 2015, another sign of the terror group's growing influence on the continent.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm....

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http://www.defensenews.com/articles/boeing-soups-up-old-avenger-for-short-range-air-defense-gap

'80s flashback: Boeing soups up old Avenger for short-range air defense gap

By: Jen Judson, March 14, 2017 (Photo Credit: Jen Judson/Staff)
Comments 4

HUNTSVILLE, Ala. – Boeing has modernized its 1980s-era Avenger air defense system to answer the Army’s call to fill its Short-range Air Defense gap within the maneuver force.

The Avenger first came off the production line at Boeing in 1987 and is known for defending the National Capitol Region. But it’s an old, non-mobile system that relies on Stinger missiles, which are passive infrared munitions. Boeing has fielded 1,100 systems to the U.S. and international partners over the years.

There are only four Avenger batteries in the active component – the rest resident in the reserve forces -- while the Army is expecting to fight in the future in highly contested and congested environments against adversaries with fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, an abundance of UAS and other threats where SHORAD capability will be vital.


Defense News
US Army Grapples With Short-Range Air Defense Gap in Europe


Boeing is looking to address all of those threats by outfitting Avenger like a multi-mission launcher. The company brought its concept to the Association of the U.S. Army’s Global Force Symposium with AIM 9X Sidewinder missiles on one side and Hellfire Longbow missiles on the other and affixed to the top is a directed energy laser system.

Boeing has also fired Stinger and Javelin from the platform.

While the Army is flirting with the idea of building old Avengers and fielding them with Stinger missiles as the solution to the SHORAD gap, Boeing has what it believes is a more flexible and capable system in the modernized version.

Army acquisition chief Steffanie Easter told Defense News in an interview Monday at AUSA Global that the service right now – to fill the gap in the mid-term – is focused on using the Avenger capability – perhaps “reusing and repurposing a little bit.”


Defense News
Short-range air defense making a fast comeback

According to Jim Leary, the company’s director of Integrated Air & Missile Defense and Directed Energy, Boeing can build the new, souped up version for twice the capability for a third of the price of an older system.

While it would better serve Boeing economically to just go ahead and build more of the old system, Leary said this was developed to bring better capability to the warfighter, not to purely make money.

So ahead of a procurement decision from the Army on how to proceed in filling the SHORAD capability gap, Boeing is hoping its modernized Avenger will start a conversation with the service on how to increase the capability rather than just build up a force of older systems, Leary told Defense News.

Boeing originally made the upgrades to the Avenger system a few years ago for U.S Army Program Executive Office Missiles & Space, but the option became less attractive in favor of the fast-maturing Indirect Fire Protection Program.

Yet, now the Army is in a situation where it needs to rapidly field a maneuver SHORAD gap, Leary said. IFPC is going to be too heavy, on a too-large truck, to be effective for the maneuver force, he noted.

The new Avenger is “an immediate solution that we can have the first platoon ready to go to testing within six to nine months after contract,” Leary said.

The system has been integrated onto a palette but also a platform as small as a Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. Next week, the system will be integrated onto a Stryker Armored Vehicle in conjunction with General Dynamics Land Systems.

And there are plans to integrate the system onto a Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle with BAE Systems as well, Leary said.

In May, Boeing will bring the capability to the Army Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and will demonstrate the new Avenger on a Stryker. At the same time, it will demonstrate a high energy laser on another Stryker.

Boeing just wrapped up testing of its high energy laser on Stryker at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, where it had 80 engagements against threat targets, Leary said.

The company plans to attend a demonstration in September at White Sands, where anyone from industry with a SHORAD capability can come exercise it, to help inform the Army way ahead.

Because of the recent success with the high energy laser, Boeing is thinking about bringing that capability along with the Avenger to the demonstration.

Since Boeing designed the Avenger to fire the various weapons remotely, there is room in the turret to accommodate the laser’s components, according to Leary.

Boeing is eager to see forward movement on a program to fill the SHORAD gap, noting the Army has a lot of demonstrations set up.

“Our concern is how many more demonstrations are they going to have? At what point do they decide to procure something to address the problem the chief of staff has laid out,” Leary asked.


-----


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https://www.cnet.com/news/someone-shot-down-a-200-drone-with-a-3m-patriot-missile/

Business

Someone shot down a $200 drone with a $3M Patriot missile

"That quadcopter that cost 200 bucks from Amazon.com did not stand a chance against a Patriot," said US Army General David Perkins.

CNET
12 hours ago

We've heard about people shooting down drones buzzing over their property, but this takes things to a whole new level: A store-bought quadcopter drone has been shot down by a Patriot surface-to-air missile.

"That quadcopter that cost 200 bucks from Amazon.com did not stand a chance against a Patriot," said Gen. David G. Perkins, commander of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, in a speech posted to YouTube on Monday by the US Army and first reported by the BBC.

The missile wasn't fired by the US, but by someone Perkins described as an ally "dealing with an adversary," suggesting it wasn't a test.

Patriot missiles are radar-guided missiles designed to shoot down other missiles, meaning they're suited to small, fast-moving targets like drones. However, Perkins explained that while the Patriot made short work of the quadcopter, it wasn't a very economically sound way of dealing with malicious drones. A single Patriot missile can cost around $3.4 million (roughly £2.7 million or AU$4.4 million).

Describing small unmanned aerial vehicles as a commander's problem rather than an air defense problem, Perkins suggested alternative methods for tackling enemy drones such as electronic warfare and cyber measures. You can see Perkins' talk below, with the relevant section starting about 14 minutes in.

Video

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.defensenews.com/articles...g-us-army-training-to-defeat-airborne-threats

Drone warfare in Mosul shapes US Army training to defeat airborne threats

By: Jen Judson, March 14, 2017 (Photo Credit: Courtesy of the Oregon Army National Guard)
Comments 1

HUNTSVILLE, Ala. — The U.S. military has been studying the drone threat from the Islamic State group in Iraq for some time now and the Army’s training branch is no exception, taking lessons learned and applying them to major training rotations.

As the Iraqi army continues to engage in heavy fighting in Mosul against the Islamic State, the Army has been watching how the enemy has been using unmanned aerial systems. And a counter-unmanned aircraft system on an Army medium tactical vehicle has even recently been spotted in the city.

The U.S. Army’s Combined Arms Center’s Center for Army Lessons Learned and Training and Doctrine Command’s Asymmetric Warfare Group are both in Mosul at the tactical and operational level reporting back on observations from the fight, the CAC’s commander Lt. Gen. Michael Lundy said Tuesday at the Association of the U.S. Army’s Global Force Symposium.

The reports coming from the fight have been “driving our counter-UAS training and technology significantly,” Lundy said. “The use of small UAS in Mosul right now by Daesh and ISIS [other names for the Islamic State], they’ve actually gone to almost swarm-level capability in a couple of cases. That is a big area that we are learning.”


Defense News
Pentagon Asks for More Money To Counter ISIS Drones

While some capabilities, tactics, techniques and procedures of the Islamic State observed in the fight are seen as one-offs and unique to the specific fight, Gary Phillips, a senior intelligence advisor within TRADOC’s G-2, said UAS threat capabilities are seen as enduring and worth incorporating in training as well as technology and capability development within the U.S. military.

Brig. Gen. William Cole, the program executive officer for simulation, training and instrumentation, said at AUSA Global that his shop is introducing new enemy drone threats into Combat Training Center rotations as a direct result of what has been observed in the Middle East from Islamic State.

The organization rapidly provided an inexpensive drone — the Outlaw — normally used to simulate a target threat for Avenger air defense units and outfitted it with commercial cameras and sensors, quickly incorporating it into a National Training Center rotation, Cole said.

“What really got me excited was to see how quickly the rotational units learned to react to this type of threat,” he said.

The first time the drone flew overhead, “the first unit just stood there and they kind of looked at it and, of course, they paid the price in the simulated battlefield,” Cole said.

But it didn’t take long, he added, before the units started providing better camouflage and shooting back. Finally, one unit saw the drone, cued its own aviation asset, which tracked it back to its base where the unit destroyed the base and took out the drone for the rest of the rotation.

Last summer the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization went on a fact-finding mission at the request of then-Defense Secretary Ash Carter to determine how the Pentagon might be able to help the Iraqi government stabilize and secure Baghdad.


Defense News
JIDA: Iraqis Want Counter-Drone Gear, Layered Security in Baghdad


They found there were no counter-UAS capabilities that worked in Iraq. Among the threats observed then were drones being used as improvised explosive devices.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2...tons-problem-kim-jong-un/136137/?oref=d-river

China Won’t Solve Washington’s Problem with Kim Jong Un

BY MINXIN PEI
THE ATLANTIC
READ BIO
MARCH 14, 2017

TOPICS

NORTH KOREA
CHINA
NUCLEAR
KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY

Beijing’s current policy risks such a disaster, but the alternatives are hardly more palatable.

When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi gave a news conference during the annual session of the National People’s Congress on March 8, he warned that the United States and North Korea were behaving “like accelerating trains coming toward each other,” and wondered whether the countries were “ready for a head-on collision.”

Wang’s remarks and the accompanying imagery certainly drew the attention of the international media. But as Wang surely knew, this proverbial train wreck would also do grievous damage to Sino-U.S. relations: China would inevitably be dragged into a military conflict, should one erupt as a result of North Korea’s provocations. Indeed, as Pyongyang continues ratcheting up tensions through its repeated nuclear and missile tests, Beijing faces stark strategic choices, each of which comes with its own fraught trade-off.

China could, of course, always elect to maintain its current policy of pushing the United States to talk (and offer concessions) to North Korea while applying only modest pressure on its client state across the Yalu River to roll back its nuclear and missile programs. But the long-term feasibility of this approach appears doubtful. Circumstances may well eventually draw the Trump administration back to the negotiating table with North Korea, but it is unlikely to be blackmailed by Pyongyang into making any substantive concessions, like a peace treaty coupled with economic aid, without a credible commitment to nuclear disarmament.

Barring such a miracle, the status quo, as Wang argued, is untenable. North Korea is on the brink of a nuclear breakout. With its recent advances, the Kim Jong Un regime may acquire a large number of powerful nuclear warheads and the long-range missiles to deliver them, posing a direct threat to America. A burgeoning nuclear arsenal would also tempt a cash-starved North Korea to proliferate nuclear materials and missiles in exchange for foreign currency.

Such developments would force the United States and its regional allies, Japan and South Korea, to beef up their deterrence and even consider pre-emptive strikes to defang Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal. The military deployment required for such efforts, such as the recent installation of Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), an advanced anti-missile system, will raise fears in China. Beijing, as is widely reported in the Chinese press, believes that the United States wants to use the brewing crisis on the Korean peninsula as a pretext to introduce capabilities that will make the Chinese military more vulnerable. As a result, China regards the U.S. response, not North Korean provocations, as the primary threat to its security. This underlying dynamic could eventually spark a collision between China and the United States.

Related: US Anti-Missile Batteries Arrive in South Korea, Touching Off Geopolitical Tumult

If Beijing’s current policy risks such a disaster, the alternatives are hardly more palatable. China may be tempted to increase its aid to North Korea in hopes of bribing Kim Jong Un to slow his nuclear and missile programs. But the chances of success for such a strategy are slim. Relations between Beijing and Pyongyang are at an all-time low, with the Chinese and the North Koreans barely on speaking terms. And an increase in Chinese support would risk violating UN sanctions. The Kim regime would also view such an about face by Beijing as an acknowledgement that its policy of penalizing Pyongyang for its provocations was wrong headed, and fresh Chinese aid as compensation for its mistake. In any case, North Korea has a track record of taking Chinese aid without moderating its behavior. The Kim dynasty knows perfectly well that China values North Korea as a strategic buffer so much that it simply cannot afford to lose it.

Another alternative would be a complete reversal of China’s current stance. Under this scenario, rather than keeping North Korea on life support, China would work with the United States to force Kim Jong Un to abandon his nuclear ambitions. This revolutionary shift in policy would require that Beijing demonstrate it is prepared to tolerate the collapse of the Kim dynasty, whatever the costs or consequences.

In practical terms, executing such a policy would necessitate strategic trust between China and the United States. Both sides would have to engage in a serious dialogue on the endgame in North Korea. Negotiations over that endgame would include the restoration of peace and security in the event of the Kim regime’s collapse. North Korea’s nuclear weapons and materials would have to be secured through a combined American, Chinese, and South Korean effort. This would require joint planning over issues such as demarcation lines, temporary settlement of refugees, and disposal of Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal.

In such a scenario, the United States would have to address China’s long-term security concerns over the Korean peninsula. Beijing would almost certainly demand that Washington end its military alliance with Seoul and withdraw its troops from the peninsula. China may sweeten this deal by proposing that the United States work to jointly guarantee the security of a neutral unified Korea.

But given the strategic distrust between America and China and their great-power rivalry, it’s hard to imagine either government embracing this radical alternative. There is good reason why they have not yet engaged in official or semi-official discussion on the future of the Korean peninsula (no such meeting has ever been reported in the media, and my colleagues both in China and America know of no such discussions). In Beijing, a regime collapse in Pyongyang is a taboo subject the Chinese official media has never broached. At the same time, Washington would likely reject the idea that it should accommodate China’s security concerns and withdraw its forces after the reunification of the two Koreas (leaving aside whether a reunified Korea would want the U.S. troops to leave). An obvious concern of Washington’s is that an American exit from the Korean peninsula could perhaps fatally undermine the U.S.-led system of alliances in East Asia. Once the U.S.-Korea military alliance dissolves, Washington would be left with Japan as its sole treaty ally in northeast Asia.

If Beijing’s current policy risks such a disaster, the alternatives are hardly more palatable.

With the alternatives appearing either infeasible or unthinkable, China is likely to stick with its current policy for the foreseeable future, despite the fact that this is unlikely to reverse the dangerous dynamics on the Korean peninsula. In the short term, the political turmoil in South Korea may give China a chance to complicate the life of the Trump administration. The impeachment of President Park Geun-hye has created an opening for South Korea’s leftists, who favor a softer line toward North Korea.

In the event that Moon Jae-in, the leader of the opposition Minjoo Party, wins the special presidential election in May, China is expected to pursue two immediate priorities. First, it will push Seoul’s new government to back out of the THAAD deal with the United States. Second, it will throw its weight behind Moon’s more conciliatory approach to Pyongyang, thus raising the pressure on Washington to reengage Pyongyang diplomatically.

The combination of China’s continuation of its current policy and South Korea’s political uncertainty has made Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s upcoming trip to the region a challenging task. In all likelihood, the most he can hope for is some non-committal reassurance from Chinese leaders about working with the United States. To be sure, the just-announced summit between Presidents Donald Trump and Xi Jinping in Mar-a-Lago in April should be welcomed as a positive indicator of potential improved U.S.-China cooperation on the Korean peninsula.

But we should also temper expectations. Unless the upcoming summit reaches a grand bargain that stabilizes U.S.-China relations across the board, the risks that the Trump administration will push back against China on trade and security will remain high and China will have little incentive to help America out where North Korea is concerned. If anything, the unfolding crisis in North Korea could get far more dangerous.

Minxin Pei is a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and a non-resident senior fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States. FULL BIO
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[Housecarl]

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Winning Indefinite Conflicts: Achieving Strategic Success Against Ideologically-Motivated Violent Non-State Actors

by Mark E. Vinson
Journal Article | March 15, 2017 - 12:45am

“This broader challenge of countering violent extremism is not simply a military effort. Ideologies are not defeated with guns, they are defeated by better ideas...”

-- President Barak Obama, July 6, 2015

Elusive Success

If, as President Obama asserted, “ideologies are not defeated by guns,” but by “better ideas,” then how should the U.S. military be used to help achieve strategic success in the growing number of protracted, irregular conflicts with ideologically-motivated violent non-state actors (VNSAs)? In Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, the Philippines, and many more countries around the globe, VNSAs, motivated by religious, political, ethnic and other status-quo-challenging ideas, have been remarkably resilient, perseverant, and influential. By surviving and rapidly recovering from punishing attacks by the United States and its partners—while continuing to carry out violent agendas against local, regional, and even global adversaries—these VNSAs can credibly claim that they are succeeding strategically. With broad, ambiguous long-term strategic objectives, and an open-ended, evolving path to strategic success, the United States has generally conducted limited military operations intended to disrupt and degrade such VNSAs, followed by the hopeful but indefinite objective of “ultimately defeating” them. In view of the VNSAs’ resilience, persistence, and ideological basis for conflict, the path to strategic success for the United States has remained elusive. Although its military has achieved tactical and operational successes against such adversaries, the U.S. government has struggled to define, much less achieve, strategic success. If military success is not sufficient against ideologically-motivated VNSAs, then how can the United States achieve strategic success and what is the military’s role?

Based on the results of a cooperative examination by the U.S. and Israeli militaries, this article examines key challenges associated with achieving strategic success in protracted conflicts with VNSAs. It then offers ideas on how to address the challenges and suggests some key conditions required to achieve strategic success. The article concludes with thoughts on how the U.S. military might implement the ideas.

An Accelerating Treadmill

U.S. intelligence capabilities are ill-suited for irregular conflicts with VNSAs, which tend to take place in complex, uncertain foreign operational environments. These operational environments are dynamic ecosystems containing a multitude of actors, each with unique tribal, religious, national, and ethnic identities that produce complex relationships based on myriad factors, all of which combine to make it impossible to predict system-wide effects of an action against any part of the system. In such unfamiliar environments, threat actors are conducting protracted, ideological conflicts, blending into populations, urban areas, and complex terrain. The U.S. military inevitably enters conflicts with a lack of local knowledge, language abilities, and cultural experience. Planners struggle to accurately understand and frame the operational problem, leading to flawed campaign design and planning.

The U.S. military generally lacks the essential support, both among the local population in a conflict zone and at home, to sustain its direct involvement in a protracted conflict with VNSAs. Local populations will naturally distrust the motives and long-term commitment of external forces, especially extra-regional forces with no tie to the local land or its people. As a foreign force, the U.S. military will naturally struggle to gain and maintain the local legitimacy required for successful direct involvement in a protracted campaign. Likewise, the sustained support of the U.S. public for direct involvement in such conflicts is unlikely unless political leaders can communicate a clear and compelling argument for U.S. interests. The protracted nature of conflicts with VNSAs, the huge cost of military operations, and the public’s reluctance to accept casualties, make the substantial and long-term commitment of ground combat forces problematic for the United States and other western democracies. The current U.S. strategy against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) clearly reflects the lack of public and political support for ground force commitment after the extended conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, giving rise to the oft-heard expression of official non-commitment “no boots on the ground.”

In the face of complex and uncertain conflicts, U.S. leaders are challenged to describe specific long-term strategic objectives that align with those of its partners. As a result, leaders initially provide broad, ambiguous objectives that may be insufficient to enable national or coalition unity of effort. Without specific strategic objectives, and in light of VNSA threats that persist, adapt, and even expand in the form of dramatic terrorist attacks in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, Asia, and the United States, it is unclear whether U.S. operations are making progress toward strategic success.

Besides ambiguous strategic objectives, military operations against VNSAs generally suffer from a lack of effective strategic and operational orchestration. As a result, a series of tactically or operationally successful operations may not be integrated with interagency or other partners’ lines of effort, and may not contribute to strategic success. However, without clear strategic objectives that find common ground with partners’ various and competing objectives, U.S. operational planning will be unable to establish the integrating framework necessary to unify effort among all contributing actors.

In 2005, while the United States was responding to the 9-11 attacks with a global counter-terrorism effort, struggling to design and execute successful campaigns against VNSAs in Iraq and Afghanistan, Douglas Feith, then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, warned that if the nation’s efforts were limited to “protecting the homeland and attacking and disrupting terrorist networks, you’re on a treadmill that is likely to get faster and faster.…” Twelve years later, the United States is arguably still on the accelerating treadmill, asking what strategic success looks like against such adversaries, what its role should be, and how its military should be used.

A Comprehensive and Indirect Approach

Fundamentally, political leaders should not conflate military success with strategic success, particularly in complex conflicts with VNSAs. Although military and police operations play a critical security and stability role in a comprehensive approach, their contributions cannot be strategically decisive. As James Dorsey pointed out in his International Policy Digest article,

… even such a hypothetical defeat [of the Islamic State (IS)] would not solve the problem. Al Qaeda was degraded, to use the language of the Obama administration. Instead of reducing the threat of political violence, it produced ever more virulent forms which are embodied in IS.…it is a fair assumption that defeat of the group without tackling root causes would only lead to something that is even more violent and vicious.

Addressing the foundations of a conflict with VNSAs requires a tailored, integrated, strategic approach, comprehensively applying all elements of national and coalition partner power. This approach was reflected in President Obama’s 6 July 2015 statement on U.S. strategy against ISIS, when he said “[o]ur comprehensive strategy against ISIL [ISIS] is harnessing all elements of American power across our government—military, intelligence, diplomatic, economic development, and perhaps most importantly the power of our values.” But how can the strategy succeed without the sustained public support at home and in the conflict area?

To enable a sustainable, long-term campaign that gains and maintains public support, the U.S. military must employ an indirect approach. This approach requires a sustainable patron–regional partner–local partner relationship that will enable a long-term campaign to succeed against a VNSA adversary (Figure 1). To enable such a partnership, trust and cooperation based on an alignment of strategic objectives regarding the VNSA adversary must be sustained. The key ideas behind the indirect approach result from two complementary concepts: a top-down go local concept and a bottom-up grassroots concept. An external patron, such as the United States, goes local by encouraging and supporting regional partner states with a direct stake in the conflict and historical ties to the vulnerable territory and its local populations, who in turn encourage and enable local actors to be committed partners that holistically address their populations’ needs. This means that vetted local partners—who are intrinsically committed to and inherently knowledgeable of the local population’s needs—must be identified and enabled with sustainable support during a protracted conflict. In turn, the empowered local actors use a bottom-up grassroots approach to establish local security, legitimate governance, economic opportunity, and sustainable services, tailored to their constituent populations.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/sites/default/files/markvinson1.jpg
Figure 1: Indirect Approach Model to Enable Sustained Support to Regional and Local Partners

The primary conditions for strategic and operational success are security, legitimacy, and sustainability. Trained by regional partners, and equipped, supported, and coordinated by external patrons, local police and militia forces establish and maintain security. Likewise, local leaders are best suited to establish legitimate governance of local population groups. U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine describes legitimacy as “the acceptance of an authority by a society….” Further, it states that “[t]he population of a particular society determines who has legitimacy to establish the rules and the government for that society.” Local leaders have the obvious and essential advantage of intrinsically understanding the governance and other basic needs—security, economic, social, services—of their constituents. If legitimacy is a result of their success in addressing the population’s needs, then local leaders have the best opportunity to gain and maintain the population’s legitimacy and support. Local leaders are directly enabled by regional partners, who leverage their historical relationships with the local populations to gain trust and legitimate influence, while external patrons with international legitimacy and influence indirectly support them through their regional partners. Finally and critically, a campaign is sustainable when each actor (local, regional, external), in consideration of its interests and likely long-term levels of public and political support, commits time, manpower, and resources to achieve its objectives. For example, committing large U.S. ground forces to provide security against ISIS at the local level in Syria or Iraq is not likely to receive long-term U.S. public and political support. Likewise, the local populations in these states will not count on (and may resist) the long-term commitment of external forces. Legitimate, capable local actors are much more likely to garner long-term support with their local populations. Likewise, regional state partners—host nation or other regional states—with a national security interest in supporting local actors, are more likely to receive long-term domestic and local support.

Comprehensive Containment and a Better Idea

Harleen Gambhir summarized ISIS’s strategy, writing that “ISIS intends to expand its Caliphate and eventually incite a global apocalyptic war. In order to do so, ISIS is framing a strategy to remain and expand across three geographic rings: the Interior Ring, the Near Abroad, and the Far Abroad.” How would a comprehensive and indirect approach be applied to contain such a threat?

Containment operations include complementary military and civilian lines of effort to build and manage a coalition, to halt VNSA territorial expansion, to prevent VNSA recruits from entering a regional partner’s territory, to support local governance and economic opportunity, and to deny VNSA access to weapons, funds, and resources. A containment operation is a defensive approach unlikely to be decisive on its own, but it could provide a stable basis for follow-on offensive operations. Thus, containment should be considered as an intermediate objective in a broader campaign designed to ultimately succeed operationally against a VNSA. Such an operation might be employed early in a campaign to prevent expansion and to stabilize and protect vulnerable regional and local partners.

While territorially containing a threat is essential, the idea must be extended beyond the physical to comprehensively contain the influence of VNSAs that embody and promote violent ideologies. As James Dorsey observed, “[c]ontainment addresses the immediate problem but ignores factors that fuel radicalization far from the warring state’s borders and make jihadism attractive to the disaffected across the globe.” Addressing the spread of violent ideas and associated violent acts requires a different approach. This challenge returns us to President Obama’s statement that “deologies are not defeated with guns, they’re defeated by better ideas.” However, this begs the practical question of how can a better idea be applied to defeat a violent, ideologically-motivated VNSA? Or more specifically, how can a better idea produce the key conditions of security, legitimacy, and sustainability?

More than information operations or a persuasive philosophy, better ideas require a fusion of compelling messages and congruent actions. To counter or defeat an ideology-driven VNSA, better ideas must be formed and legitimized by tangible actions and measured by concrete results. These ideas and actions must address the fundamental issues that produced and supported the VNSA, and they must be tailored to achieve the key aforementioned conditions of security, legitimacy, and sustainability for each relevant local population. Only by successfully achieving these conditions, will the United States and its regional and local partners demonstrate the idea’s credibility, the integrity of which can then be used to influence other relevant populations and to proliferate the idea. As the idea is successfully implemented, using the indirect approach described earlier, it could then be spread incrementally via a cellular approach that first establishes an outer defensive containment ring of local security forces that consolidates their gains by establishing legitimate governance and sustainable services. As the containment ring succeeds, the idea and supporting actions could be extended to contract the VNSA territory, counter the credibility of its ideology, and ultimately to achieve the critical security, legitimacy, and sustainability conditions described earlier.

Implications for the U.S. Military

While the U.S. military needs to be able to fight and win major wars, it also needs the ready capabilities and capacity to sustain and eventually achieve strategic success in long-term campaigns against VNSAs.

To improve its ability to achieve strategic success in such conflicts, the military first needs improved intelligence capabilities to better understand local and regional populations, to assess root-cause issues, and to enable effective campaign design, planning, execution, and assessment. The U.S. military should consider developing more tailorable command and control capabilities to better enable a unified planning and execution effort with U.S. government agencies, and across a broad coalition of patron states, regional partners, and myriad local partners.

To sustain its support to partners, the U.S. military requires sufficient regionally-focused and trained personnel—with language and cultural training—to rotate forces and sustain trusting relationships for the duration of a long-term campaign. Given the specialized nature of U.S. enabling operations, the military needs special operations forces and other high-demand forces that can directly engage with partners. They must have the language skills and cultural knowledge to adequately understand the situation, and to gain and maintain influence. While special operations forces are best suited for these roles, many of the traditional intelligence, communications, joint fires, and logistics support functions reside in the conventional forces. Likewise, in view of persistent, region-wide conflicts, the military requires the capability to rapidly and effectively organize, train, and deploy conventional forces to expand its special operations forces’ capabilities and capacity without breaking the conventional force.


About the Author


Mark E. Vinson
Mark E. Vinson retired as a U.S. Army colonel after 27-years of service in various command and staff positions. Since 2005, he has worked for the Institute for Defense Analyses, conducting joint studies and analysis, and providing joint concept and capability development support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the United States Joint Forces Command, and the Joint Staff on a number of joint and multi-national projects (including work with NATO, the Israel Defense Forces, and the Colombian General Staff).

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by Bill M. | March 15, 2017 - 2:25pm Login or register to post comments
Why do we continue to promote stale ideas tied to winning the war by pushing better ideas? It is a fool's errand in most cases. Throughout history both Muslims and Christians have pushed their "better" ideas upon others, just as certain groups have pushed their political ideologies upon others via the sword. We have no right or credibility to imply or dictate what it means to be a good moderate Muslim. At best we can support credible voices to convince those who seek change through violence, to use other means. Challenging their identity simply puts more energy in the system resulting in greater resistance.
To the author's other points, I see little indication the USA doesn't have the political will to sustain a protracted fight against extremists. The original fight in Iraq wasn't part of GWOT, so the conflict was unpopular, while the current fight is very much about fighting extremists,and as long as it is right sized with politically acceptable goals Americans will demonstrate sustained political will. As for the indirect approach, I wonder where the author has been, that has been 80 percent of our effort for years. We really need some fresh thinking on feasible aporoaches, the limits of legitimacy, assumptions on american's will, the limits of our ability to sway people's beliefs, and or desire to cling to the cuurent order, where the establishment of new states are required to undo the damage Western Europe imposed on much of the world via creating unsustainable political borders.

by Bill C. | March 15, 2017 - 1:25pm Login or register to post comments
One can get a better handle on these matters by understanding what the term "Achieving Strategic Success" means to the U.S./the West.
"Achieving Strategic Success" -- for the U.S./the West -- this means (a) transforming the outlying states and societies of the world more along our (often alien and profane) modern western political, economic, social and value lines and (b) incorporating these outlying states and societies more into the western sphere of power, influence and control.
Thus, "Achieving Strategic Success" for the U.S./the West, as defined immediately above, this applies to:
a. Those cases where there is no outlying state and/or societal resistance to this such U.S./Western-desired transition/transformation. To:
b. Those cases where (a) there IS such state and/or societal resistance to this such U.S./Western-desired transition/transformation but (b) this such resistance HAS NOT, as yet, reached the point where these such states and/or societies have decided to resort to political warfare, "violence," etc.; this, so as to achieve their "resistance to unwanted transformation" ends. And to:
c. Those cases where (a) there IS state and/or societal resistance to this such U.S./Western-desired transition/transformation and (b) this such resistance HAS, in fact, reached the point where certain states and/or societies have decided to resort to the use of political warfare, "violence," etc.; this, so as to achieve their "resistance to unwanted transformation" ends.
Thus, as can easily seen by my thoughts above, the "status-quo-challenging ideas" -- that give rise to "resistance" (violent or no) to unwanted transformation (in this case, more along our alien and profane modern western political, economic, social and/or value lines) -- these such "status-quo-challenging ideas" are, in fact:
a. Those of the U.S./the West. And not as it were:
b. Those of the "threatened" states and societies themselves, to wit: those states and societies that the U.S./the West has targeted for "alien and profane" transition/transformation. (In truth, this includes the entire non-western-oriented world.)
Thus, as seen in this light, to understand former President Obama's thought that local/native ideologies per se (to wit: those relating more to the traditional ways of life, the traditional ways of governance and the traditional values, attitudes and beliefs of outlying states and societies); these such local/native ideologies:
a. Are not best defeated by "guns." But, rather,
b. By different (and from our former President's perspective "better") ideas/ideologies; for example, those of the U.S./the West.
This suggesting that -- for the the U.S./the West to "Achieve Strategic Success" (again: transformation of the outlying states and societies of the world more along modern western political, economic, social and lines; incorporation of these states and societies more into the Western sphere of power, influence and control) -- this must be done:
a. Less by way of our "guns." And
b. More by way of our successful promotion of our unusual and unique ideas, our unusual and unique ideology and our unusual and unique way of life/way of governance/values, attitudes and beliefs, etc.?
Bottom Line: Such things as "Winning Indefinite Conflicts," thus, to be understood in this exact light?

 

[Housecarl]

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WORLD NEWS | Tue Mar 14, 2017 | 3:07pm EDT

Moscow moves to absorb rebel Georgian region's military

Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday ordered his officials to seal an agreement which will, in effect, incorporate the armed forces of Georgia's breakaway South Ossetia region into the Russian military's command structure.

Georgia condemned the move, which is likely to spark accusations from its Western allies that the Kremlin is absorbing the breakaway region into Russia by stealth, even though under international law it is part of Georgia's sovereign territory.

Moscow has de facto controlled South Ossetia, a sliver of mainly mountainous land in the northeast of Georgia, for years. But it has, on paper at least, treated South Ossetia as a separate state, not part of Russia.

According to the text of the draft agreement that Putin ordered his officials to conclude, the separatists will adopt new operating procedures for their armed forces which will be subject to approval by Moscow, and the forces' structure and objectives will be determined in agreement with Russia.

The agreement also states that members of the South Ossetian armed forces can transfer to serve as Russian soldiers on a Russian military base in South Ossetia. The separatists will shrink their own armed forces by the number of servicemen employed at the Russian base.

On Tuesday, the Kremlin issued an order signed by Putin instructing the Russian defense and foreign ministries to work with the separatists to conclude and sign the agreement.

Georgian Foreign Minister Mikheil Janelidze said in a statement: "Any agreement between the Russian Federation and de-facto leadership (of South Ossetia) is illegitimate."

"Such steps are not aimed at protecting peace and are impeding peaceful process, which is necessary for the conflict resolution," he said.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, South Ossetia broke away from Georgia in a war. In August 2008, Russia sent in troops, saying it was protecting civilians in South Ossetia from attack by Georgian forces.

Georgia, backed by the United States and European Union, said the Russian operation was a naked land grab.

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After a brief war, Russia recognized South Ossetia as an independent state. Only a handful of other states recognize it as a state.

Russia's critics say the war in South Ossetia was a dress rehearsal by Russia for its annexation in 2014 of Ukraine's Crimea Peninsula, and its support for separatist fighters in the eastern Ukrainian Donbass region.

(Reporting by Katya Golubkova; Additional reporting by Margarita Antidze; Writing by Maria Tsvetkova and Christian Lowe; Editing by Alison Williams)

 

[Housecarl]

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http://38north.org/2017/03/wmckinney031517/

Understanding North Korea’s Nuclear Coercion Strategy

By William R. McKinney
15 March 2017


Chess pieces on the board: North Korea's Nuclear Coercion StrategyNorth Korea’s Supreme Leader, Kim Jong Un, proclaimed during his annual 2017 New Year’s address that the DPRK military is in the “final stages in preparations to test-launch an intercontinental ballistic rocket.” A North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, would be capable of threatening the continental United States. As a counter-response, the United States and its allies in Northeast Asia, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, have forcefully condemned the frequent missile tests by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), particularly when coupled with a nuclear test, as clear signals of the North’s threatening stance toward the alliances and even the US homeland. In this vein, US Defense Secretary Jim Mattis promised an “effective and overwhelming” response to any use of nuclear weapons against America or its allies, delivering a firm message to North Korea. And the Trump administration is in the process of conducting a comprehensive North Korean policy review, with all options on the table.

Bellicose statements, such as in Kim’s address, and provocative North Korean actions including the recent missile launch toward Japan, are manifestations of the DPRK’s coercive nuclear diplomacy. Strategically, the main coercive objective focuses on forcing the United States to abandon the two key principles underpinning its longstanding commitment to the “complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization” (CVID) of North Korea’s nuclear program—the overriding goal of US policy toward the DPRK.

The first principle reflects the US refusal to acknowledge the North as a nuclear power and resistance to substantial improvements in relations with Pyongyang until it first undertakes significant steps to freeze and dismantle its nuclear and ballistic missiles programs. The second principle embodies Washington’s continued preference for negotiating a multilateral diplomatic solution to the North Korean problem within the framework of the Six-Party Talks (6PT), while maintaining strong alliances with Japan and South Korea and improving relations with China and Russia.

North Korea seeks to collapse Washington’s commitment to these principles by:

- Forcing the US to abandon the strategy of “strategic patience.” By demonstrating its resolve and capacity to make continuing improvements in its missile and nuclear capabilities, Pyongyang shows that strategic patience has not worked. North Korea’s determined efforts to evade and mitigate the effects of sanctions, to deflect pressure and threats, and to end its isolation are all integral to these efforts.

- Changing the dynamics of security talks. North Korea sees improvements in its nuclear weapons capability as a way to shift the format and dynamics of regional security talks in its favor. Instead of five countries arrayed against it in the Six-Party Talks, Pyongyang hopes to leverage its nuclear status to gain a more equal footing with the United States. Further, the North uses its relationships with China and Russia to strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis Washington. Finally, and maybe most importantly, acknowledging North Korean membership in the “nuclear club” serves to marginalize the ROK and Japan among 6PT participants.

- Elevating its status. Possession of nuclear weapons strengthens North Korea’s hand in Northeast Asia and elevates its status in the world as one of a handful of countries that possesses nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities. While many see the North as a rogue nation because it continues to violate UN Security Council resolutions and flouts the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in the face of strong opposition from the international community, numerous other states either openly or quietly admire it for such independence.

- Leveraging greater security and economic benefits. Past North Korean brinkmanship has led to offers of engagement and assistance from countries that want to bolster regional stability. North Korea has seen that its threatening actions can compel concessions from its opponents as well as extract diplomatic and monetary gains. It appears that Kim Jong Un is continuing this pattern of coercive diplomacy.

- Driving wedges between its opponents. In the past, the DPRK has experienced some success in driving wedges between divergent US and ROK policy positions. Depending on the outcome of this year’s presidential election in South Korea, the North may find ample opportunity for wedge driving. However, the DPRK’s coercive strategy is vulnerable to being over-played, and in the hands of a young and relatively inexperienced leader there is an even greater likelihood of blowback from South Korea and China.

So what options do the US and its allies have to counter the DPRK’s coercive strategy?

Maintain the status quo: The response of the United States and its allies to North Korean provocations—more sanctions, more appeals to China to pressure Pyongyang, and tougher rhetoric—and the results have become very predictable. It is likely that the North’s decision-making calculus has anticipated—and discounted the importance of—these responses, which only reinforce the North’s negative behavior. In addition, these responses provide further proof to Pyongyang that its nuclear coercion strategy is working. In short, there really is no upside to business as usual and plenty of downsides.

Expand and strengthen allied defenses: The US, ROK and Japan could take additional measures to protect and defend against a heightened North Korean missile and nuclear threat (e.g., testing of the long-range KN-08 or KN-14 missiles and highly accurate, short-range SCUD missile). Yet, even with increased US focus on ICBMs, highlighted by increased US-ROK-Japan trilateral missile defense, there should be no expectation it will bring about a significant change in the DPRK’s nuclear coercion strategy. More likely, it will harden it.

Undertake kinetic military action: Focused and proportional kinetic US-ROK military action in response to a North Korean provocation could effectively counter the DPRK’s coercive nuclear strategy, and alter its behavior by sending the message to Pyongyang (and Beijing) that Pyongyang’s strategic nuclear weapons and missiles are destabilizing. A kinetic response could signal to Kim Jong Un and other potential adversaries (e.g. Iran) that the US will not allow itself to be threatened. But, and a big but, such US-ROK military action would entail significant risk to the US and its allies, ranging, for example, from a West Sea warship battle or island shelling to an attack on a DMZ guard post to long-range artillery shelling of Seoul.

Demonstrate our Extended Deterrence strategy: Another possible and less risky course of action would be an unambiguous demonstration of US extended nuclear deterrence capability, such as strategic nuclear capable aircraft temporary deployments to Korea, which would be viewed as credible by the DPRK. However, such a demonstration would need to be carefully considered both strategically and operationally. This demonstration would have to involve a much-needed “shot across the bow” of the North to establish its credibility, not only with the North but also with Korea and Japan.

Seek broader engagement with the DPRK: Ending or neutering the North’s nuclear coercion strategy will ultimately require a genuine US-ROK combined effort to address North Korea’s security concerns. This will require a concerted effort to “normalize” North Korea through game-changing engagement, and employing a full set of tools in a concerted and coordinated fashion to support a US-ROK plan with well-defined and reasonable end states. Such an approach offers a more positive direction for both US-ROK relations and their relations with the DPRK than the present strategy, which relies on sanctions and isolation to force the North’s preemptive capitulation.

In conclusion, the North is pursuing a strategy to force the United States and South Korea to abandon their policies of minimal engagement with and isolation of the DPRK. US military efforts, both strategic and operational, are required to address the worsening North Korean nuclear threat, but are likely to further cement DPRK hard line positions. Moreover, kinetic action could alter the North’s behavior but only at significant risk to the US and its allies. A safer and equally effective course of action would be an unambiguous demonstration of credible US extended nuclear deterrence. Ending the DPRK nuclear coercion strategy, however, will require a genuine effort to address Pyongyang’s security concerns within the broader framework of normalizing US-ROK relations with North Korea.

Found in section: Foreign Affairs
Tags: kim jong un, nuclear strategy, Six Party Talks, strategic patience, william mckinney, william r. mckinney

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.longwarjournal.org/archi...nctions-kuwait-based-al-qaeda-facilitator.php

Treasury sanctions Kuwait-based al Qaeda facilitator

BY THOMAS JOSCELYN | March 14, 2017 | tjoscelyn@gmail.com | @thomasjoscelyn

The US Treasury Department announced today that Muhammad Hadi al-`Anizi, who is “based in Kuwait,” has been designated as a terrorist. Al-`Anizi, a “terrorist facilitator and financier,” has “provided extensive material and financial support” for both al Qaeda and its arm in Syria.

Today’s designation is the latest in a series targeting al Qaeda’s support network inside Kuwait.

Treasury traces Al-`Anizi’s career back at least a decade to 2007, as he allegedly supported al Qaeda at the time.

Much of his work since 2014 has been in service of al Qaeda’s Syrian branch, formerly known as Al Nusrah Front. He has “obtained passports for an AQ associate in Syria, provided medical supplies to an injured Syria-based AQ associate,” and “worked with an [Al Nusrah] associate to provide hundreds of thousands of dollars to [Al Nusrah] members in Syria.” He has also “solicited donations” for Al Nusrah members, sending “approximately $20,000” to one of them in late 2015.

At some point in 2014, al-`Anizi “was appointed as AQ’s representative in Syria by AQ senior leadership.”

Treasury previously identified another jihadist, Abu Khalid al Suri, as “al Qaeda’s representative in Syria.” Al Suri, a senior figure in Ahrar al Sham, was killed in Feb. 2014.

Treasury ties al-`Anizi to two other designated al Qaeda supporters, one of whom is his brother, Abdullah al-`Anizi. “Prior to 2014,” Treasury says, al-`Anizi provided his sibling with “financial support” that was used “to fund terrorist operations.”

In 2015, Al-`Anizi “sought assistance from AQ financier” Sa’d al-Ka’bi “to facilitate the travel of AQ-associated individuals.” Al-Ka’bi has organized fundraising efforts for Al Nusrah in Qatar.

“From raising funds to facilitating the travel of terrorists, al-`Anizi is responsible for providing key financial and logistical support to Al Nusrah Front and Al Qaeda,” John E. Smith, the director of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), said in a statement. “The Treasury Department will continue to aggressively target Al Nusrah Front’s and Al Qaeda’s financial structures to further disrupt their ability to conduct terrorist attacks.”

Although Treasury refers to al Qaeda’s arm in Syria as Al Nusrah Front, the group has actually changed names twice since July 2016. Al Nusrah was first rebranded as Jabhat Fath al Sham (JFS). Then, in January of this year, JFS merged with four other organizations to form Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS). Other factions inside Syria have reportedly joined HTS since then.

Al Qaeda’s fundraising and facilitation network in Kuwait

The US Treasury Department has repeatedly targeted al Qaeda’s facilitators and fundraisers inside Kuwait. Al Qaeda’s operations in Kuwait are part of a network that stretches throughout the Gulf, Syria, Turkey, and into South Asia. The Kuwaiti al Qaeda supporters are tied to their counterparts inside Iran and other countries, according to Treasury.

A timeline of relevant designations is included below. The designations highlight the degree to which al Qaeda maintains a cohesive network, as the jihadists often work on behalf of al Qaeda’s senior leadership and the group’s regional branches, which operate in several countries. Several jihadists in Kuwait identified by Treasury have assisted al Qaeda’s guerrilla army in Syria.

Jul. 28, 2011: Treasury exposed the Iranian government’s formerly “secret deal” with al Qaeda. Their “agreement” allows al Qaeda to operate its “core pipeline” inside Iran. This facilitation hub is used for moving “money, facilitators and operatives from across the Middle East to South Asia.” [See FDD’s Long War Journal report, Treasury targets Iran’s ‘secret deal’ with al Qaeda.]

Yasin al Suri headed al Qaeda’s network inside Iran at the time and he relied on facilitators living in other Gulf countries to support his operations. One of them, ‘Ali Hasan ‘Ali al-’Ajmi, was Suri’s “Kuwait-based associate.”

Al-’Ajmi “provides financial and facilitation support to al Qaeda, [al Qaeda in Iraq] and the Taliban,” Treasury said. Al-‘Ajmi “has collected money from individuals in Gulf countries and provided these funds to AQI facilitators as well as to the Taliban” and “has also supported al Qaeda by facilitating travel for individuals associated with the group so that they could take part in fighting in Afghanistan.”

Oct. 18, 2012: Yasin al Suri was temporarily sidelined as the head of al Qaeda’s Iran-based operation after the US government shed light on his activities. In Oct. 2012, Treasury identified his replacement as Muhsin al Fadhli, a Kuwaiti al Qaeda veteran. [See FDD’s Long War Journal report, Treasury ‘further exposes’ Iran-al Qaeda relationship.]

Fadhli’s thick dossier included ties to several plots, including the Oct. 8, 2002 attack on US Marines on Kuwait’s Faylaka Island. From Iran, Fadhli and his men were “providing funding for al Qaeda activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” according to Treasury. They were also moving “fighters and money through Turkey to support al Qaeda-affiliated elements in Syria.”

The US government put a spotlight on the role played by donors in Kuwait. Treasury said Fadhli was “leveraging his extensive network of Kuwaiti jihadist donors to send money to Syria via Turkey.”

Muhsin al Fadhli was killed in a US airstrike in Syria in July 2015.

Aug. 6, 2014: Treasury designated three jihadists, two of whom supported Al Nusrah Front and the third backed the Islamic State. Treasury also argued that the Kuwaiti government needed to do more to disrupt al Qaeda’s network. “We and our international partners, including the Kuwaiti government, need to act more urgently and effectively to disrupt these terrorist financing efforts,” David S. Cohen, then Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, said.

Shafi Sultan Mohammed al-Ajmi “operates regular social media campaigns seeking donations for Syrian fighters and is one of the most active Kuwaiti fundraisers for” Al Nusrah. In July 2014, according to Treasury, al-Ajmi “publicly admitted that he collected money under the auspices of charity and delivered the funds in person to” Al Nusrah. He has “also acknowledged purchasing and smuggling arms on behalf of” al Qaeda’s arm in Syria.

Hajjaj Fahd Hajjaj Muhammad Shabib al-‘Ajmi, another Kuwaiti, “serves as a funnel for financial donations to [Al Nusrah] facilitators in Syria, traveling regularly from Kuwait to Syria to engage in financial activity on behalf of [Al Nusrah] and deliver money to the group.” He “agreed to provide financial support to [Al Nusrah] in exchange for installing Kuwaitis in” the group’s “leadership positions.” Treasury noted that he also “offered” Al Nusrah “money to lead a battlefield campaign in Homs, Syria” in Jan. 2014.

The third jihadist designated on Aug. 6, 2014, ‘Abd al-Rahman Khalaf ‘Ubayd Juday’ al-‘Anizi, has supported both al Qaeda and the Islamic State. He has worked with Islamic State officials to transfer “funds from Kuwait to Syria” and also secured funds “to pay for the travel of foreign fighters moving from Syria to Iraq.” Al-‘Anizi “worked to smuggle several foreign fighters from Kuwait to Afghanistan, likely to join al Qaeda and was involved in extremist facilitation activities with Iran-based al Qaeda facilitators, including the movement of extremists to Afghanistan via Iran.”

Aug. 22, 2014: A Kuwaiti national named Hamid Hamad Hamid al-‘Ali was designated. Al-‘Ali has “referred to himself” as an “al Qaeda commando” and has raised funds for both Al Nusrah and its parent al Qaeda, Treasury reported.

Al-‘Ali “has raised tens of thousands of dollars to help” Al Nusrah Front “purchase weapons and supplies as well as directed donors in Kuwait to send financial and material support to the terrorist organization.” He has personally “traveled to Syria to deliver funds to” Al Nusrah and has also “used students in Kuwait to courier funds to the group.” In addition to his fundraising activities, al-‘Ali has “facilitated the travel to Syria of individuals wishing to fight for” Al Nusrah and “provided these individuals with money to deliver to the terrorist organization.”

In addition, Hamid Hamad Hamid al-‘Ali has reported ties to Jund al Aqsa, which operated as a front group for al Qaeda until its dissolution.

[See FDD’s Long War Journal reports, Treasury designates 2 ‘key’ al Qaeda financiers and Analysis: Jund al Aqsa’s deep Gulf roots.]

Sept. 24, 2014: Treasury identified six al Qaeda facilitators and financiers, two of whom were based in Kuwait at the time. ‘Abd al Aziz Aday Zimin al-Fadhil was described as a “Kuwait-based facilitator who provides financial services” for Al Nusrah Front and also “facilitates travel for individuals seeking to join the terrorist organization.” Al Nusrah was not the only part of al Qaeda he supported, according to Treasury, as Fadhil has transferred funds to Yemen “in support of AQAP” (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula).

Hamad Awad Dahi Sarhan al-Shammari is a “Kuwait-based facilitator who provides financial services to or in support of al Qaeda by transferring money to support extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Treasury said. Shammari has coordinated the transfer of funds for al Qaeda and Al Nusrah, and has also facilitated travel for both. [See FDD’s Long War Journal report, Treasury designations target al Qaeda’s international fundraising and facilitation network.]

Aug. 5, 2015: Treasury designated Sa’d bin Sa’d Muhammad Shariyan al-Ka’bi, “a Qatari financier of” Al Nusrah Front. Al-Ka’bi “set up donation campaigns in Qatar to aid with fundraising in response to a request from an [Al Nusrah] associate for money to purchase both weapons and food.” He also acted as “as an intermediary for collecting a ransom for a hostage being held by” Al Nusrah and “worked to facilitate a ransom payment in exchange for the release of a hostage.”

Although​ al-Ka’bi’s operations were based in Qatar, Treasury noted that he “worked closely” with the aforementioned Hamid Hamad Hamid al-‘Ali, a Kuwaiti fundraiser for Al Nusrah. And as today’s action makes clear, Al-Ka’bi works with Muhammad Hadi al-`Anizi as well.

May 19, 2016: Treasury designated six individuals, two of whom are Kuwait-based supporters of al Qaeda.

Treasury said that Abdullah Hadi ‘Abd al-Rahman Fayhan Sharban al-‘Anizi and Abd al-Muhsin Zabin Mutib Naif al-Mutayri had both provided assistance to Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda’s Syrian arm. [See FDD’s Long War Journal report, Treasury sanctions al Qaeda, Islamic State ‘financiers and facilitators’.]

Al-‘Anizi’s role hasn’t been limited to al Qaeda’s operations in Syria, as he has also allegedly served al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He was even a “communications conduit for al Qaeda senior leadership.” In addition to sending money to al Qaeda in South Asia and the group’s arm in Syria, Al-‘Anizi has also “made plans to solicit funds from donors to help move al Qaeda extremists from Pakistan to Syria.”

Al-Mutayri has likewise funneled funds to Al Nusrah, “collecting money for the group from other Gulf-based facilitators” and using “charities to raise money for the terrorist organization.” Al-Mutayri has assisted “individuals” seeking to travel from abroad to Syria, where they can join Al Nusrah’s ranks.

*Note: The spellings of Al Qaeda and Al Nusrah Front were changed to make them consistent, including in quotes reproduced in this article

Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for FDD's Long War Journal.

Tags: Abd al-Muhsin Zabin Mutib Naif al-Mutayri, Abdullah al-`Anizi, Abdullah Hadi ‘Abd al-Rahman Fayhan Sharban al-‘Anizi, Al Nusrah Front, Al Qaeda in Kuwait, AQ-Kuwait Network, Hamad Awad Dahi Sarhan al Shammari, Hamid Hamad Hamid al ‘Ali, Hay'at Tahrir al Sham, Iran-Al Qaeda, Iran-AQ Network, Jabhat Fatah al Sham, Jabhat Fath Al Sham, kuwait, Kuwait-AQ Network, Muhammad Hadi al-`Anizi, Muhsin al Fadhli, Sa’d al-Ka’bi, US Treasury Department Designation, ‘Abd al Aziz Aday Zimin al Fadhil, ‘Ali Hasan ‘Ali al-’Ajmi

 

[Housecarl]

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https://www.yahoo.com/news/china-military-power-worlds-largest-180932858.html

World

China Military Power: World's Largest Army to Expand from Asia to Africa

Tom O’Connor,Newsweek 6 hours ago

The world's biggest military is about to grow. Beijing announced last week it would increase military spending by about 7 percent, totaling about $147 billion. Beijing also plans to increase its marine corps by 400 percent in a bid to expand the nation's economic and military influence across Asia and into Africa, according to News Corp. Australian Network. With 2,3 million soldiers, Chinese leaders already command the largest standing army on the planet.

The initiative is reportedly part of China's "One Belt, One Road" campaign. Chinese President Xi Jinping announced in 2013 that the country would invest in historic "Silk Road" trade routes across the continent of Asia to Europe and Africa. China has since reportedly decided to increase the presence of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the Indian Ocean to protect intercontinental maritime links.

"The PLA marines will be increased to 100,000, consisting of six brigades in the coming future [to] fulfill new missions of our country,” Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post quoted an unnamed military source as saying. The source added that there was also an anticipated 15 percent increase of China's navy from 235,000 to over 270,000 personnel.

China's military activity has concerned the U.S. and neighboring nations, which dispute Beijing's vast territorial claims over the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea. China reportedly began building a large port Wednesday on one of the contested islands in the South China Sea, further straining relations with neighboring countries such as Vietnam and Taiwan, which also claim sovereignty over islands in the region. Both the U.S. and Japan have recently sent large naval fleets to counter China's presence. Beijing-based naval expert Li Jie said China's latest military boost could help enforce the country's foreign policy abroad.

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/C69T0xOW0AICBj8.jpg

https://twitter.com/DrPippaM/status/841983830789656576?ref_src=twsrc^tfw

“Besides its original missions of a possible war with Taiwan, maritime defense in the East and South China seas, it’s also foreseeable that the PLA Navy’s mission will expand overseas, including protection of China’s national security in the Korean peninsula, the country’s maritime lifelines, as well as offshore supply depots like in Djibouti and Gwadar port in Pakistan,” Li told the South China Morning Post.

China reportedly planned to develop a naval base in the east African nation of Djibouti where the U.S. and France have already established military facilities, and dock its ships at Gwadar, a strategically located port city near the Strait of Hormuz through which it anestimated one-fifth of the world's oil flows. In addition to its physical expansion, Chinese arm sales around the world have dramatically increased with Pakistan being the largest recipient.

Defense experts estimate that China possesses the third-most powerful military in the world, behind the U.S. and Russia. The country also reportedly maintains the fourth-largest arsenal of nuclear weapons. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who once advocated for military force as a means of blocking China's access to disputed islands in the South China Sea, was scheduled to visit China this week in hopes of aligning Washington and Beijing's views on North Korea and its renegade nuclear weapons program.

Graphiq


More from Newsweek Europe

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Why China Doesn't Want a Trade War With the U.S.

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[Housecarl]

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http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u...n-mosque-after-dozens-reported-killed-n734696


NEWS
MAR 17 2017, 3:33 AM ET

U.S. Denies Striking Syrian Mosque After Dozens Reported Killed

by ALEX JOHNSON and COURTNEY KUBE

U.S. forces struck an al Qaeda meeting in Syria, killing several suspected terrorists, and are investigating reports that civilians were killed or injured in a nearby mosque, military officials told NBC News on Thursday night.

The officials made the comments after the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a nonpartisan group based in Britain that catalogs military actions in Syria, said at least 42 people were killed in an airstrike on a mosque in the rebel-held village of al-Jinnah in Idlib province.

The organization said it didn't know who launched the attack.

Related: Syria Children Killed, Forced to Fight In Record Numbers: UNICEF

Some human rights activists and monitors alleged that the United States hit the mosque. But a senior U.S. military official told NBC News that while there was a mosque about 50 feet from the U.S. target, the United States has photographic evidence that the mosque was not hit and was still standing.

The official wouldn't rule out the possibility that the mosque may have been struck or blown up later by someone else.

Al-Jinnah is located in one of the main rebel-held parts of Syria, the northwest that includes Idlib province and the western parts of Aleppo province, and its population has been swollen by refugees, U.N. agencies have said.

https://media4.s-nbcnews.com/j/news...a5034ed086331184ffb495.nbcnews-ux-320-320.jpg
Image: Syria
Google Maps
Rebels in northwest Syria fighting to oust President Bashar al-Assad also include groups supported by Turkey, the United States and Gulf monarchies.

The conflicting reports come one day after at least 25 people were killed in a suicide bombing at the main court complex in Syria's capital, Damascus, on the sixth anniversary of the start of the uprising against Assad.

U.N. investigators reported early this month that both sides in Syria's civil war committed repeated war crimes during the battle for Aleppo last year.

The Syrian and Russian militaries have carried out many airstrikes in Aleppo and Idlib provinces. The United States has also carried out strikes there in recent months, targeting a rebel group that until last year was an affiliate of al Qaeda.

NBC News reported Tuesday that the Trump administration is moving ahead with plans to make it easier for the CIA and the military to target terrorists with drone strikes, even if it means tolerating more civilian casualties.

The plan is part of a broad policy shift to grant the CIA and the military more autonomy to target and kill al Qaeda and ISIS militants without presidential authorization in Syria and other countries, U.S. officials said.

 

[Housecarl]

Israel has bombed Syria
Started by twincougars‎, Yesterday 11:08 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?513681-Israel-has-bombed-Syria


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https://www.washingtonpost.com/worl...d3afa0f7e2a_story.html?utm_term=.baa947e66f48

Middle East

Missiles fired from Syria at Israeli jets after airstrikes

By Ian Deitch | AP March 17 at 3:23 AM


JERUSALEM — Anti-aircraft missiles were launched from Syria into Israeli-controlled territory early on Friday, following a series of Israeli airstrikes inside Syria, the Israeli military said.

The military said its warplanes struck several targets in Syria and were back in Israeli-controlled airspace when several anti-aircraft missiles were launched from Syria toward the Israeli jets.

Israeli aerial defense systems intercepted one of the missiles, the army said, but did not elaborate. It would not say whether any other missiles struck Israeli-held territory, but it said the safety of Israeli civilians and the safety of the Israeli aircraft “were not compromised.”

The army said the incident set off sirens in Jewish settlement communities in the Jordan Valley in the West Bank.

The firing of missiles from Syria toward Israeli aircraft is extremely rare, though Israeli military officials said there was a shoulder-fired missile a few months ago.

There was no immediate comment from the government in Damascus, nor its ally Hezbollah, a Lebanese militant group that is believed to possess such missiles.

Israeli Channel 10 TV reported that Israel deployed its Arrow defense system for the first time against a real threat and hit an incoming missile intercepting it before it exploded in Israel.

It also showed footage from Jordan of what was described as remnants of the missile. It said the Israeli military had been on a mission to destroy a weapons convoy destined for the Iranian-backed Hezbollah.

It was not immediately clear how debris from the missile may have ended up in neighboring Jordan.

Other Israeli media also reported that the Arrow was deployed. The Haaretz daily said the interception took place north of Jerusalem. However, the Arrow is designed to intercept missiles in the stratosphere so it remained unclear why the system would have been used in this particular incident.

The military had no immediate comment on the reports.

The Arrow is mainly designed for ballistic missiles. It is part of what Israel calls its “multilayer missile defense” comprised of different systems meant to protect against short and long range threats, including the thousands of missiles possessed by Hezbollah in neighboring Lebanon and rockets used by Hamas and other Islamic militant groups in Gaza.

Israel has been largely unaffected by the Syrian civil war raging next door, suffering mostly sporadic incidents of spillover fire over the frontier that Israel has generally dismissed as tactical errors by Syrian President Bashar Assad’s government forces. Israel has responded to these cases lightly, with limited reprisals on Syrian positions in response to the errant fire.

The Jordan Valley part of the West Bank borders Jordan. Israel captured it along with the rest of the West Bank in the 1967 Mideast war. Palestinians demand the areas for a future state.

Israel is widely believed to have carried out a number of airstrikes on advanced weapons systems in Syria — including Russian-made anti-aircraft missiles and Iranian-made missiles, as well as Hezbollah positions — but it rarely confirms them.

Hezbollah is a close ally of the Syrian government and is fighting alongside Assad’s forces in Syria’s civil war. The Shiite Lebanese militant group is a fierce enemy of Israel and fought a bitter month-long war with the Jewish state in 2006.

 

[Housecarl]

Well this appears to have been missed with everything else going on today....

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http://dailycaller.com/2017/03/16/taiwans-military-claims-it-can-strike-deep-into-chinese-territory/

Taiwan’s Military Claims It Can Strike Deep Into Chinese Territory

RYAN PICKRELL
3:31 PM 03/16/2017
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Taiwan’s military announced publicly for the first time Thursday that it could carry out strikes on the Chinese mainland in the event of a conflict.

Reporting on the island’s military capabilities, Defense Minister Feng Shih-kuan told parliament that the military had the ability to launch missiles deep into Chinese territory. Officials claim Taiwan can fire missiles at Chinese bases 620 miles away, reports The China Post. During a Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee, Lt. Gen. Chiang Chen-chung confirmed that Taiwan has these capabilities. “We do have the capability and we are continuing to reinforce such capability,” he said.

Feng also said he wanted to raise the defense budget to its highest level in 10 years.

“Should the enemy insist on invading, we will weaken their capabilities by striking enemy troops at their home bases, fighting them at sea, crushing them as they approach the coastlines and wiping them out on the beaches,” an accompanying defense report explained.

“It is the first time the ministry has confirmed this,” lawmaker Wang Ting-yu told AFP reporters.

If Taiwan actually has the capabilities it claims, most Chinese military bases are in range. The closest base is 150 miles away, and the farthest is around 800 miles away.

Taiwan’s military capabilities are dwarfed by those of China, which has an estimated 1,500 missiles aimed at Taiwan and has an army with two million more men.

The Chinese civil war that left the island of Taiwan and the Chinese mainland governed by separate administrations never ended, as a peace treaty resolving the conflict was never signed. The Communists seized control of the mainland in 1949, establishing the People’s Republic of China, and the ousted Republic of China government fled to Taiwan with the Nationalist troops.

After years of ignoring China and recognizing Taiwan, the U.S. severed ties with Taipei in the 1970s to develop relations with Beijing. While the U.S. does not have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the U.S. has a security agreement with the island and regularly supplies arms and other services. The U.S. also maintains an informal diplomatic outpost.

The relationship between Beijing and Taipei is extremely tense. It has deteriorated significantly since Tsai Ing-wen, who has pro-independence leanings, was elected as president last summer.

China is firmly against Taiwan’s independence.

“We will never tolerate any activity, in any form or name, which attempts to separate Taiwan from the motherland,” China’s Premier Li Keqiang said earlier this month.

A top Chinese adviser revealed recently that voices demanding reunification by force are growing louder. In recent months, Beijing has said over and over again that the one China principle is a non-negotiable bottom line.

Follow Ryan on Twitter

Send tips to ryan@dailycallernewsfoundation.org.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201703170022.html

Taiwan military to upgrade fighters, seek stealth capability

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
March 17, 2017 at 12:50 JST

TAIPEI--Taiwan is planning to upgrade its F-16 fighter jets and will seek cutting-edge stealth aircraft from the United States in the face of a growing military threat from rival China, the Defense Ministry said Thursday.

The announcement follows the release of this year's $11.4 billion (1.3 trillion yen) defense budget, an increase of less than 1 percent from last year, reflecting strains on the government's finances resulting from a heavy entitlements burden and slowing growth in the high-tech, export-oriented economy.

That compares to China's 7 percent rise in defense spending, announced this week, bringing its defense budget to about $151 billion, the world's second largest after the United States.

In response, Defense Minister Feng Shih-kuan told lawmakers that Taiwan is focusing on inexpensive but effective "asymmetric warfare" techniques to combat threats in the air and seas.

Feng said the budget amounted to 2.05 percent of Taiwan's economy but that he hoped it would increase to nearly 3 percent next year.

Taiwan's forces are also capable of striking Chinese bases across the 160-kilometer-wide Taiwan Strait, operations planning chief Lt. Gen. Chiang Chen-chung said at the hearing. Asked if that strike ability extended to bases charged with operations against Taiwan as far as 1,300 km away, Chiang said yes.

China considers the self-governing island to be its own territory, to be brought under its control by force if necessary. China has threatened to attack if Taiwan declares formal independence or if it considers peaceful unification no longer achievable. The sides split during a civil war in 1949.

In a quadrennial defense review mapping out challenges and strategies for coming years, the Defense Ministry said Taiwan faces an increased threat from the air, sea and by missiles, thousands of which China has targeted at the island. It said China's immediate goals in a conflict would be to blockade Taiwan, use "diverse military means" to attack and take control of outlying island groups.

The report also warned of the threat of cyberwarfare, saying China has the means to attack both military and civilian networks on the island.

Without giving details, the report said Taiwan would also seek fighters able to take off vertically, more surface-to-air missiles and a revitalized navy deploying domestically made submarines and fast attack craft.

President Tsai Ing-wen's government has renewed efforts to develop the domestic arms industry in response to difficulties in procuring weapons abroad because of Chinese diplomatic and economic pressure.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

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http://www.express.co.uk/news/world...ar-weapons-NOW-EU-tension-Germany-Netherlands

NUCLEAR TURKEY? Imam close to Erdogan calls for weapons NOW amid tensions with EU

TURKEY should ignore rules set by ‘the West’ and build its own NUCLEAR WEAPONS - an Imam close to president Recep Tayyip Erdogan has advised - as the fallout between Brussels and Ankara deepens.

By ZOIE O'BRIEN
PUBLISHED: 21:29, Thu, Mar 16, 2017 | UPDATED: 22:27, Thu, Mar 16, 2017
Comments 13

The worrying advice has been called weeks ahead of a Turkish referendum aimed at giving more power to President Erdogan - and in the midst of a keeping fallout between Ankara and EU leaders.

Hayrettin Karaman, the Turkish AK Party’s go-to religious leader, attacked ‘the West’ in a letter which insisted Erdogan should immediately invest in weapons of mass destruction.

In the online post the imam accused Christian countries in the West of egotism and racism - stating the bad attitude towards Turkey has been “accelerated”.

President Erdogan is in the midst of a deep fall out with European nations including Germany and the Netherlands after both countries banned rallies and kicked out his ministers who had sworn to campaign for his referendum.

Mr Erdogan retaliated by comparing them to Nazis and protests were held outside the Dutch embassy in Ankara.

The fallout threatens the £5billion one-for-one migrant deal.

But, if Mr Erdogan listens to his favourite religious leader, the tensions could be ramped up even further.

In a post online Mr Karaman called for the swift development of nuclear weapons.

He wrote: “Once upon a time, military forces are arrows and horses, and now weapons are effective weapons invented by the age of science and technology, especially nuclear, and are the means by which they can be used.

“We need to look at inventing these weapons, not buying them, without losing any time and listening to the words and obstacles of the West.

“We invent, balance, but do not use weapons of mass destruction unless it is necessary; the way of not using it is to have the enemy or stronger.”

The Imam launched a scathing attack on the United States and Europe - insisting modern day developments have been paid for by crimes of the past.

He said: “When it comes to values ​​such as human rights, conscience, morality, justice, everyone knows and sees that the West implements a very ugly double standard without being embarrassed and ignorant.

“Today, the wealth that the West (including the United States) has is derived from the East more extensively through extortion and robbery (colonialism).

“It is not even possible to account for the material and moral values ​​that the West has inflicted on the East for its bloody material benefit.”

Mr Karaman wrote the post for the Yeni Şafak Newspaper in his column titled ‘What to do’.

In his post the Imam referred to the West “dismantling the great Ottoman Turks” and “digging up the roots of Islam”.

He said Turkey must fight fire with fire - and match the weaponry in Europe.

He said: “The West relies on material and military power, not on the right, the law, the adjective, the power of contemporary values ​​while doing what it wants to the East and especially the leading potential Turkey.

“If you want to get rid of being an oppressed and victim of the East, your right to religion is not justified; You need to be stronger than your enemy, not when you are right, but when you are strong.”

As the relationship between Washington and Ankara wavered in 2016, Nato nuclear weapons were in in Turkey were being moved to Romania, it was claimed,

According to a report by the Simson Center, since the Cold War, some 50 US tactical nuclear weapons have been stationed at Turkey’s Incirlik air base, approximately 100 kilometres from the Syrian border.

But after the failed coup a removal project began, it was reported.

Related articles
Trouble brewing in Netherlands as Erdogan supporters win first seats
Holy wars will soon begin in Europe' Turkey issues warning to EU
Belgium rejects working visa applications for four Turkish imams

 

[Housecarl]

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https://news.usni.org/2017/03/15/china-putting-pressure-taiwan-push-increase-regional-power-panel

China Putting More Pressure On Taiwan In Push To Increase Regional Power: Panel

By: John Grady
March 15, 2017 1:55 PM

China is increasingly focused on becoming a dominant military and economic power in Asia and is ratcheting up pressure on Taiwan and other neighbors, four experts on international relations agreed Monday.

Chisako Masuo, an associate professor at Kyushu University, said at the Brookings Institution on March 13 that “its influence over its neighbors is growing” and that “now no one wants to make China angry.”

Yasuhiro Matsuda, a professor at the University of Tokyo, agreed, saying “China moved from the negotiation mode to the pressure mode.” With Taiwan, China warned neighbors and partners to be careful about their relations with Taipei, and several African nations downgraded their diplomatic relations with Taiwan as a result.

The window of opportunity for constructive talks between Taiwan and China has closed, Matsuda said, describing the situation now as a “not lose, not lose” relationship, with trade and tourism continuing but official communications almost non-existent since June.

But “neither is willing to push each other to the corner” of armed conflict.

Since the government of Tsai Ing-wen took office in Taiwan in 2016, Masuo said Japan “is the only country that dared to say no to China” among its closest neighbors in an island dispute with Beijing. Reasons for this include Japan’s alliance with the United States, its position as the world’s third largest economy and the fact that “relations with China [are] not going well anyway” on a variety of issues.

Russell Hsiao of the Global Taiwan Institute and the others on the panel agreed that the congratulatory call between Tsai and then-President-Elect Donald Trump surprised Beijing. It appeared to be a move away from the United States’ acceptance of a “one-China” policy, meaning Taiwan was not an independent nation.

“All hell broke loose” after the call, Hsiao said. The December flight by four Chinese strike aircraft around the island was not only a signal to Taiwan but also to the United States of its displeasure with the conversation. That event also followed closely on the heels of Beijing sending its aircraft carrier near Japan the month before.

But how the Trump Administration will follow up on its relations with China and Taiwan is not clear, Richard Bush of the John L. Thornton China Center said during the discussion.

“Beijing really doesn’t want to deal with the DPP government,” Bush said, adding China prefers the Kuomintang Party, which was defeated in the 2016 presidential and parliamentary elections despite China trying to influence the elections on the island.

Beijing now wants to see from Taiwan an explicit acceptance of the “one-China” policy, rather than the nuance and ambiguity that mark its relations with the United States. Tsai did not renounce the policy in her inaugural address.

To get its way in this information struggle with Taiwan, China is “very good at stating a version of reality over, and over, and over again” until it becomes an accepted fact to its public and others.

Video

Masuo pointed to the strategic significance of Taiwan about halfway between the East China and South China seas. If Beijing controlled the island, it would be a major maritime power, she said.

To gauge what might happen to achieve that goal, she pointed to Beijing’s crackdown on Hong Kong as possible on Taiwan. If that were the case, Vietnam would be next, she said. It has adopted a “more power-centered approach” to relations with other nations. If they don’t agree or cooperate, China “treat them as if … they were the enemy,” she said.

In addition to the diplomatic and security pressure it is applying in the Asia-Pacific, “China is clearly intending to compete with the United States’ economic hegemony” with its “one belt, one road” approach to trade in Asia and Africa. That approach is made easier with the Trump Administration’s decision not to pursue the Trans Pacific Partnership trade agreement, she said.

 

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Taiwan takes possession of two US frigates

POETIC LICENSE: Despite calls for the two decommissioned US vessels to be named after naval heroes, they are to be named after a former Taiwan governor and a poet

By Chen Wei-han / Staff reporter
Comments 10

The US signed over two decommissioned Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates to Taiwan last week, which are scheduled to enter the navy’s service by the end of May.

The vessels were signed over on Thursday at a ceremony in Charleston, South Carolina, attended by Commander of the Navy Admiral Huang Shu-kuang (黃曙光), Representative to the US Stanley Kao (高碩泰) and unnamed US officials.

The event was a deliberately low-key affair, purportedly in a bid to avoid provoking diplomatic conflict, particularly with China.

The Ministry of National Defense refused to comment on the transfer, but Democratic Progressive Party Legislator Tsai Shih-ying (蔡適應) yesterday confirmed the handover.

The navy dispatched a team of officers to the US to receive training in how to operate the frigates and the vessels would be sailed to Taiwan either jointly or separately, depending on the progress of the training, with both vessels expected to arrive within two months, Tsai said.

“The two frigates have been retrofitted to extend their service lives by about 30 years, making them a highly cost-effective option for the navy,” Tsai said.

The USS Taylor and the USS Gary were in service between 1984 and 2015. They were purchased for a total of about NT$5.5 billion (US$177.21 million) making them substantially cheaper than Taiwan-made Cheng Kung-class frigates — the design of which is based on Perry-class frigates — which cost up to NT$17 billion each.

The US Navy began to deploy Perry-class guided missile frigates in the 1970s and 1980s. The US built 51 of the frigates for its navy and authorized its allies to build them. Eight such frigates have been built in Taiwan.

Despite calls to rename the two vessels after naval heroes, the two frigates have been named the Mingchuan after Qing Dynasty Taiwan governor Liu Ming-chuan (劉銘傳) and the Fengjia after poet Chiu Feng-jia (丘逢甲), who led the resistance against Japan following the Qing Dynasty’s cession of Taiwan to Japan.

In related news, Huang is scheduled to have meetings with high-level US officials, likely from the White House and the Pentagon, although details of the meetings were not revealed, Tsai said.

Huang is the first high-level Taiwanese military official to visit the US following the passage of the US National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, which for the first time included a section on senior military exchanges with Taiwan.

“Huang is not the first and will not be the last high-level official visiting the US…. I believe there will be military exchanges involving higher-level officials in the near future,” including the minister of national defense and the chief of general staff, reflecting closer defense ties between the two nations, Tsai said.

 

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Turkish strategy paper sees more local input in defense procurement

By: Burak Ege Bekdil, March 14, 2017

ANKARA,Turkey — A Turkish government whitepaper shaping the next five years of defense procurement sees more efforts to maximize local input in the country’s thriving programs, now mostly indigenous.

Turkish Defence Minister Fikri Isik defines the plan's goal as making the Turkish industry “a global player with technological superiority.”

The 124-page Strategic Plan for 2017-2021 was prepared by Turkey’s defense procurement agency, the Undersecretariat for Defence Industries, or SSM in its Turkish acronym.

It boasts that the annual turnover in Turkey’s defense and aerospace industry rose from $1.3 billion in 2002 to $5 billion now, and exports from $247 million to $1.655 billion.


Defense News
Nurol finalizes export deal for Turkish armored vehicle Ejder Yalcin


The whitepaper says the “priority programs” in the next five years would include an effort to develop and build an indigenous, light-weight helicopter; drones and engines for drones; a fighter jet (TF-X); a new-generation main battle tank (Altay); conventional and anti-tank missiles; armored vehicles; a basic trainer aircraft with assault capabilities; coast guard and patrol boats; radars, electronic systems and flight simulators; corvettes and frigates; and a mine-resistant, ambush-protected armored vehicle (Kirpi).

Other planned indigenous programs for the period up to 2021 include rockets, torpedoes, smart ammunition and artillery guns. SSM currently administers about 400 different arms programs.

“For full operational independence it is essential to develop local platforms and subsystems,” the report concludes.

It also envisages the construction of a layered air and anti-ballistic missile defense capability “with maximum local input.”

For space efforts, the plan calls for local work in design, production and testing capabilities for platforms.

Ankara also thinks boosting defense exports would be critical in enhancing the local industry. “Different financing methods will be devised to increase local companies’ international competitiveness,” the report reads.

Another means to support the local industry, according to the whitepaper, will be to award prototype development and production work to more than one contractor.

“This is a new approach,” an industry source noted, as most Turkish programs commission one manufacturer to develop and build prototypes.

With the new plan, the government promises to increase support for research and development work, now standing at an annual $900 million, and encourage technology transfer and subsidized intermediary goods to help boost exports. Government departments will be encouraged to buy local systems when they can choose.

“All that is in line with the government’s primary goal of enhancing the local industry,” said Turgut Senol, CEO for RBSS, an armored vehicles venture between Turkey’s BMC, Germany’s Rheinmetall and Malaysia’s Etika. “The plan aims to create a momentum whereby the local industry sells more [locally and to export markets], further flourishes, then invests in new technologies and sells more. … A kind of productive cycle.”

The strategy paper also mentions critical dates for some of the country’s leading programs. For instance, it claims a serial production contract for the Altay tank program would be signed this year. At least three local companies including the Altay’s prototype maker, Otokar, are expected to compete for the first batch of the serial production phase, at 250 units. The Altay program involves an eventual production of 1,000 tanks.

The paper goes on to say Turkey’s indigenous light-weight helicopter, being developed by the aerospace major Tusas Turkish Aerospace Industries, will make its maiden flight in 2018.

Some other critical dates include:

Indigenous engines for land platforms: 2021.
Locally developed turboshaft engines: 2021.
Delivery of coast guard radars (Phase 1): 2018.
Contract signing for coast guard radars (Phase 2): 2019.
Acceptance of operative drones with imagery intelligence capabilities: three in 2017; 10 in 2018; 13 in 2019; and four in 2020.
Acceptance of tactical drones with imagery intelligence capabilities: 20 in 2017, and eight in 2018.
Completion of design work for the TF2000, an indigenous effort to build frigates: 2020.
Delivery of Altay tanks (units): 15 in 2020, and 20 in 2021.
Contract for the development of stand-off jammer, or SOJ, capabilities for aerial platforms: 2017.
Delivery of the first aircraft with SOJ capabilities: 2020.
Missile warning systems for fighter aircraft: 2020.
Conceptual design for longer-range air and anti-missile defense systems: 20 percent in 2018; 20 percent in 2019; 30 percent in 2020; and 30 percent in 2021.
Delivery of first portable electronic warfare radar system: 2021.

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Phil Salvatore
If Mr. Erdogan keeps insulting the Germans and Dutch and leans on the US too hard over Mr. Gulen the Turks will have to build everything on their own out of necessity.
Like · Reply · Mar 14, 2017 3:02pm

Waheedullah Taj · Estiqlal High School
The whole idea of this article was to point out that Turkey indeed is building everything on their own. Now come to think of it, what will the US and EU do once Turkey is not dependent on them?
Like · Reply · 1 · Mar 14, 2017 11:22pm

Phil Salvatore
Waheedullah Taj I think the Turks are planning to leave NATO anyway and know they will lose access to western hardware. Just a guess but Mr. Erdogan seems more interested in accumulating personal power and reconstructing the Ottoman Empire to the extent it is even possible than being a loyal NATO member or part of the west in general.
Like · Reply · Mar 15, 2017 7:48am · Edited
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China's Evolving Nuclear Deterrent
Major Drivers and Issues for the United States

by Eric Heginbotham, Michael Chase, Jacob Heim, Bonny Lin, Mark R. Cozad, Lyle J. Morris, Christopher P. Twomey, Forrest E. Morgan, Michael Nixon, Cristina L. Garafola, Samuel K. Berkowitz

Related Topics: Ballistic Missiles, China, India, Japan, Missile Defense, Nuclear Deterrence, Nuclear Disarmament, Russia, United States

DOWNLOAD EBOOK FOR FREE
Format File Size Notes
PDF file 1.9 MB Technical Details »
Research Questions

What are the primary international and domestic factors shaping Chinese nuclear forces and policy, and how are those variables likely to evolve over the next 15 years?
How do Chinese strategists perceive the strategic environment, and how might nuclear developments in the United States affect Chinese nuclear decisionmaking?
How might multilateral dynamics between the nuclear states of Asia shape Chinese calculations?
How will bureaucratic processes and politics affect decisions about the future direction of Chinese nuclear forces and policy?
How will Chinese nuclear forces evolve through the 2020s, and to what extent (if at all) will Chinese nuclear policy change?

China's approach to nuclear deterrence has been broadly consistent since its first nuclear test in 1964. Key elements are its no-first-use policy and reliance on a small force of nuclear weapons capable of executing retaliatory strikes if China is attacked. China has recently accelerated nuclear force building and modernization, and both international and domestic factors are likely to drive faster modernization in the future. Chinese nuclear planners are concerned by strategic developments in the United States, especially the deployment of missile defenses. Within the region, Beijing is also an actor in complex multilateral security dynamics that now include several nuclear states, and the improving nuclear capabilities of China's neighbors, especially India, are a growing concern for Beijing. Constituencies for nuclear weapons have gained in bureaucratic standing within the People's Liberation Army (PLA). With few, if any, firewalls between China's conventional and nuclear missile forces, new technologies developed for the former are already being applied to the latter, a trend that will almost certainly continue. Given these changes, China is likely to increase emphasis on nuclear deterrence, accelerate nuclear force modernization, and make adjustments (although not wholesale changes) to policy.

Key Findings

China's Approach to Nuclear Deterrence Has Been Broadly Consistent Since Its First Nuclear Test in 1964
China has, however, recently accelerated nuclear force building and modernization.
Chinese Nuclear Strategists Still Key Primarily on Nuclear Developments in the United States
Strategists are especially concerned about the development of U.S. missile defenses and conventional prompt global strike capabilities.
But planners are also concerned about the growth of nuclear inventories in Asia and the complex nuclear dynamics emerging there.
Some strategists say privately that China might not accept a push from India for nuclear parity, should New Delhi embark on such a course.
Bureaucratic Processes and Politics Are Likely to Affect the Development of Chinese Nuclear Forces and Thinking
Civilian leaders are reportedly less involved than they once were in the details of decisionmaking about nuclear research, development, and production.
The nuclear constituency within the PLA is also gaining increased status and voice.
There is no firewall between China's conventional and nuclear missile forces, and technologies and practices developed for the former are already being applied to the nuclear forces.
In the future, this may give China some limited counterforce capability.
China Is Likely to Increase Emphasis on Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Forces in the Coming Years
Although unlikely to change formal policy formulations, China may adjust its definitions of key terms or add caveats.
It may, for example, hedge its language on no-first-use to include a conventional attack on its nuclear forces as "first use," thus permitting a nuclear response.
Recommendations

The United States and China should deepen their dialogue on strategic issues to better understand where restraint might have the greatest positive impact.
The United States should limit national missile defense to a scale commensurate with the its stated purpose, defense against attack by rogue regimes. Missile defenses are one of the primary drivers of Chinese nuclear force building.
China, for its part, should work toward visibly separating its conventional and nuclear missile force elements to reduce the possibility of confusion in the event of a conflict.
China should also minimize the MIRVing of missiles, especially missiles that might be vulnerable to preemptive attack. Decades of arms control experience suggest that MIRVs can, under some circumstances, diminish crisis stability by increasing the incentives for both sides to strike first.
U.S. leaders should take steps to fortify the credibility of extended deterrence. As Chinese capabilities improve, some regional states, especially Japan and South Korea, may request more than purely rhetorical reassurance. They may also seek the redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Asia, and Washington will want to consider how far in this direction it is willing to go.
Table of Contents

Chapter One
China's Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Introduction
Chapter Two
Baseline: China's Evolving Strategic Nuclear Concepts
Chapter Three
China's Nuclear Force Structure
Chapter Four
China's View of the Global Security Environment
Chapter Five
Chinese Views of U.S. Nuclear Forces and Policy
Chapter Six
Nested Security Dilemmas and China's View of Other (Non-U.S.) Nuclear Powers
Chapter Seven
Internal Drivers: Political Leadership and Bureaucracy
Chapter Eight
Material Resources and Constraints
Chapter Nine
Outputs: Potential Developments in China's Nuclear Future
Chapter Ten
Contingent Futures
Chapter Eleven
China's Accelerating Nuclear Modernization: Implications
Research conducted by

 

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FROM CLOCKS AND CLOUDS VOL. 7 NO. 1

Reevaluating Military Strategy: The Effectiveness Of Conventional Deterrence

By Dan Fitzgerald
CLOCKS AND CLOUDS
2016, VOL. 7 NO. 1 | PG. 1/2 |

ABSTRACT
The rise of modernized and efficient militaries competing for dominance against the United States' military has resulted in increased eruptions of conflict globally. A majority of decisions by the Joint Chiefs and EUCOM about long-term U.S. military policy in these areas are currently being based off personal and historical observations, along with blatant speculation. The question that should be asked before formulating these positions is if crisis management techniques, like conventional force movement, have a positive effect on the response to crisis triggers. The aim of this research is to understand the effectiveness of forward deployed forces to conventionally deter adversaries and reduce or stop conflict. A majority of previous deterrence researchers have focused on the change in utility during a crisis between actors to determine if deterrence was successful. However, there is still a lack of research on whether force variables have had an effect on conflict dynamics during non-conflict years. The answer for this research will be found by testing the level of hazard for conflict using cox regression based on U.S. troop levels and position during the time difference between conflicts in singular countries. Based on initial inquiry and extensive background research, this research hypothesizes that forward deployed troops will have either no effect or a worsening effect. The results from this research should provide greater insight into future military policies toward conflict situations and whether troop deployment is the effective.

The past five years has seen an upsurge in organized violence and conflicts, contradictory to the overall trend of the past fifty years. These conflict escalations are occurring across the globe with higher and higher frequency, particularly in Eastern Europe. Such instances include an increase in unannounced Russian military exercises, the invasion of Ukraine by proRussian separatists, and the rising threat of nuclear engagement after Russia's boycott of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit. To a lesser but important extent, this also includes the aggressive island-building in the North China Sea.

It is pre-supposed that the deployment of the United States Army to these regions would reduce the outbreak of violence, because its mission has been to deter as well as reassure its Allies since WWII. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work recently remarked on the Third U.S. Offset Strategy for the Army, "our ability to project dominant military forces across the trans-oceanic distances underwrites U.S. conventional deterrence" (Department of the Army 1985). These dominant military forces take the form of forward deployed forces within the European and East Asian theaters, and in the Middle East with Operation Spartan Shield. Just recently, within President Obama's Fiscal 2017 summary, it mentions "deterrence" three separate times in concern with Chinese and Russian aggression, and an increase in funding for the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) (Office of the University of Defense 2016).

However, there is a lack of evidence to suggest that these deterrence strategies against Russia and China are successful (French 2014). In recent months, the United States has sent naval forces into the North China Sea to "reiterate" international maritime movement to the Chinese. Likewise, the US government announced an increase in military bases, weapons, and forward deployed forces along the Eastern European frontier in NATO countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). This comes on the heels of Russia's second invasion of Ukraine and growing attempts of coercion against the three Baltic Republics, all of which have sizable ethnic Russian populations. Yet, in both cases of deterrence strategies, the exact opposite occurred. China released a statement vehemently condemning the actions of the United States and demanding that they stay out of China's zone of influence. Russia has also continued its own military build-up along its Western frontier. If the deployment of conventional forces does not deter these aggressions, significant questions emerge about the structure, size, and application of military power in the modern world.

This research seeks to estimate the extent to which forward deployed conventional forces deter conflict. This inquiry sits within a broader body of scholarship that struggles to accurately disseminate what is causing determent (Harvey 1999; Huntington 1984; Huth 1988; Ladwig III 2015; Mearsheimer 1983; Smith 2004; Wilner 2015). Previous military policy scholars have focused on the change in utility throughout the progression of a crisis between actors to determine the success of deterrence. In other words, they focused on the push and pull of cost-benefit strategies between the various actors. Yet, there is still a lack of sufficient analysis on whether military forces have had a positive effect on conflict de-escalation between conflict events. Thus the question emerges: do forward deployed troops actually deter conflict situations?

Based on recent research on deterrence strategies, scholars are beginning to question the overall effectiveness of the U.S. military's current strategy of deterrence. If empirical analysis shows that forward deployed forces do not deter, this raises significant questions about the U.S.'s military posture and spending. If forward deployed forces actually escalate conflict situations, their entire logic of conventional deterrence is misguided and dangerous. If forward deployed forces have no effect on crises, then the entire conventional deterrent posture is suboptimal. The United States is either engaging in dangerous policy or bad policy. In this research, I focus directly on these forward deployed troops in conflict zones and, contrary to current scholarly trends, argue that conventional forces still have an effective, de-escalating effect in crises. The results of this analysis should be utilized to reassess future military postures toward conflicts and whether forward troop deployment is effective.

Theoretical Framework
In contemporary research on conflict aversion, the realist paradigm has been the foundational theory of rationalization. Based on the logic of John Mearsheimer, Niall Ferguson, and Hans Morgenthau, interest defined as power and the security of the state constitutes the reoccurring actions and reactions of state movements and patterns (Ferguson 2003; Mearsheimer 1983; Morgenthau 1978). The emphasis and supremacy of state interest, and the necessity of state intervention when their interests are threatened was at the core of all actions. This threat of intervention has been the standard method used by states to manipulate their adversary's prudence toward their potential act. Scholars have since studied this practice as deterrence theory, and seek to further understand the benefits and consequences of using conventional deterrence. The argument at the center of this theoretical debate is whether conventional deterrence is applicable and effective in both the pre and postCold War world.

Understanding the sheer complexity of conventional deterrence is challenging based on the number of factors simultaneously affecting a conflict. Almost every variable that influences the success or failure of deterrence is interconnected and dependent on each other to the point that a majority of scholarly research on the topic has a shared theme. For the sake of clarity and consistency, this paper will define conventional deterrence as "the direct or indirect persuading of an adversary, through threat of military retaliation, that the costs of their actions far out-weigh the benefits" (Huth 1988). Huth and Gelpi, as well as Wilner, describe cost and benefit analysis as both the challenger and the defender's threat and consideration of using military force (Huth and Gelpi 1993; Wilner 2015). This working definition will provide a more concise scope when analyzing the aspects of deterrence later in the research by specifically focusing on potential military action.

Beyond understanding the theoretical framework of deterrence, scholars have further categorized the concept into two distinct practices with varying subparts; general and immediate deterrence, and central and extended deterrence (Smith 2004; Wilner 2015). General deterrence is seen as the anticipation of potential enemies in the future and the seeking of the rebalancing of power through coercion, whereas immediate deterrence is the more well-known practice of using threats of attack in order to prevent potential conflict escalation. Central deterrence is the classical sense of a bipolar world where superpowers seek to prevent attack on each other through a balance of powers system. This can be seen in conflicts in during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union (e.g. Cuban Missile Crisis). Extended deterrence, on the other hand, involves the protecting of proxy allies from war through the use of threats, as well as a more "distance-iscomfort" protection strategy (e.g. Vietnam War) (Thränert 2015).

During the Cold War, a majority of research on deterrence analyzed not only the success of conventional deterrence, but also the factors that determine how to conduct successful deterrence. This type of deterrence research is known as Classical Deterrence Theory. Classical scholars have since classified the success of conventional deterrence into four distinct variables: (A) a clearly defined behavior that is deemed unacceptable, (B) communication to the adversary a commitment to punish violations, (C) possessing the capability to defend this commitment, and (D) demonstrate resolve to carry out the retaliation if the adversary fails to comply (Huntington 1984; Zagare 1990). While they emphasize the importance of the capability of defenders to follow through on their commitment, almost all agree that the effectiveness of the psyche against the adversary is of the utmost importance. If these four conditions are satisfied, the expected net costs of the threatened sanction should be greater than the expected net benefits (Harvey 1999). In other words, much like a formula, the presence of these factors create successful results of deterrence strategies.

Certain neo-classical deterrence scholars have since revisited this theoretical framework and have made further contributions. They argue that the absence of certain variables with the presence of others in this deterrence formula will worsen conflict situations (Ibid; Soloman 2013). An example pointed out by Frank Harvey is that the absence of resolve (D) is more likely to provoke noncompliance when defenders clearly communicate a threat of retaliation (A) along with a strong commitment to the issue (B) (Harvey 1999). The deterrence formula that was supposed to guarantee successful deterrence now may lead to further conflict escalation. Despite this finding, scholars continue to argue in favor of deterrence strategy and that the adoption of an action-retaliation tactic would work in favor of defending states.

In the post-Cold War era, however, deterrence research has seen an increase in post-structural analysis that is now questioning the validity of many previous notions of deterrence theory. These new-era scholars argue that the world is no longer a bipolar structure, where escalation was linear between superpowers. Instead, they argue that the world is a multipolar structure that is interwoven in a web of four types of deterrence: conventional, strategic (nuclear), cyber, and space (Blackwell 2011; Payne 2001). Particularly, the new domains of cyber and space represent the growing awareness that conventional Land-Air-Sea forces and Nuclear/ICBMs are no longer sufficient. A good example of this is the Iran Nuclear Crisis, when Iranian nuclear facility networks were attacked by the online program Stuxnet, a computer worm used by foreign hackers in 2010 (Aronson 2009; Coleman 2012). Thus, postdeterrence theorists argue that electronic warfare, or "cyber-politque," is the preferred way to augment conventional threats and strikes in order to achieve campaign objectives (Soloman 2013). Unlike new technology and tactics, scholars are also beginning to analyze the effectiveness of unconventional methods of deterrence.

Scholars have observed that this multipolar world generates such tactics for adversaries to "design around" a conventional deterrent once its outlines are evident (Ibid; Beattie 2010). For example, the use of geography by Pakistan, analyzed by Walter Ladwig III, is used to counter-deter the growing presence of a modernized military in India (Ladwig III 2015). The current argument emphasizes that the multipolar world of global communication and information sharing is eroding the power of conventional deterrence and traditional power simultaneously.

http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/imgs/640/scale/article-images/j34/i86/a1489184101/00493b.jpg
Figure 1.0: Theoretical Framework

Current conventional deterrence is at a cross road between two schools of thought: the realist/classical and the post-structural. The free flow of information and rapid communication has deteriorated the classical formula for deterrence success; however, the reoccurrence of military modernization and build-up across the world continues to keep the threat of force alive. Conventional deterrence has been around since the strategies of Thucydides, and it would certainly be unwise to abandon a policy of deterrence outright (Monten 2006). The aim of this research is to question the effectiveness and power of conventional deterrence strategies and provide adequate support for their continuation (Ferguson 2003). Analyzing the theoretical framework that scholars have produced vis-à-vis deterrence through extensive methodologies will better frame what is missing to accomplish this.

Literature Review
The methodological approach most often used to research the effectiveness of deterrence has not changed much in the past 25 years. What has changed is how researchers define the success and failure of deterrence based on their chosen dependent variable. These variables have predominantly focused on statements and movements to acknowledge the deterrent action as success or failure; however, as Danilovic Vesna points out, it is near impossible to define true success and failure of deterrence by observing post-conflict actions. While this research is more focused on whether military forces have a deterring effect, it is essential to note that most research has been on analyzing variables post-conflict. This lack of a solid definition has created a lack of clarity on how to measure success and failure, resulting in case bias based on selection (Danilovic 2001).

Huth and Russett's 1990 approach to testing deterrence attempts to set a standard for the measurement and testing of deterrence effectiveness. What sets their work apart from previous research is how they measured success and failure: as either the absence of force by the attacker, lack of defender concession, or a limited force fatality of at least 250. While the specificity of their definition allows for a more concise case selection to strengthen their research, the allowance of force absence as a factor created a subjective measurement. Lebow and Stein pointed out this subjective measurement when they conducted a cross-study of Huth and Russett's research, which resulted in differing successes and failures. They argued that in order to accurately define success and failure, deterrence research should focus more on contextdependent generalizations (Lebow and Stein 1990).

Quackenbush tries to accommodate this in his own research through his quantitative analysis of general deterrence. Using a Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset by Ghosn, he measures success and failure by whether the attacker or defender concedes or if there is conflict (Ghosn 2004). He observes utility as the independent variable for each possible outcome in order to determine which action will result in successful deterrence, or game outcome. This was done by measuring it through Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's equations for utility and simulating the variables in a multinomial logit (Quackenbush 2010). However, his research resulted in five separate outcomes from these equations, which calls into question the effectiveness of this methodology. Furthermore, Quackenbush's research also proves problematic for the accuracy of which outcome the players preferred, resulting in the inability to designate as success or failure of deterrence.

The closest research to testing for variable effectiveness in deterrence is Frank Harvey's 1998 testing of hypotheses by previous researchers to prove the weakness of deterrence overall (Harvey 1998). The method he used was assigning each "overestimated" hypothesis a categorical weighted percentage, then calculating each for strength of deterrence. What is important to note is that Harvey's approach highlights the problems with using utility as a measurement of deterrence. However, his research still lacks sufficient empirical analysis of other possible variables that determine successful deterrence besides utility measurement.

The overarching lack of clarity and variation in dependent variables within deterrence research, along with reliable case selection, is detrimental to accurately testing deterrence. What current testing on deterrence lacks most is an analysis of non-conflict times in order to observe if the same independent factors prevent a rise in crisis dynamic. This would provide a more contextual analysis of the changing dynamics pre and during the crisis based on the given factors.

Methodology
Throughout this research, a large-n methodological approach was most appropriate in order to analyze the effect that U.S. troops positioned in conflict countries have over an extended period of time. It also proved to be effective in acquiring enough cases when using hazard model testing, like the cox proportional hazard model, which will be discussed later. The variables chosen for this specific research are tested for their effectiveness via the cox regression test, with US troop data as the covariant in assessing the hazard of a conflict occurring over a given time span.

This research focuses on conflict occurrence as the dependent variable in order to observe influence during time change. In order to control for the variation in interpretation of what constitutes a crisis for case selection, this research will be using data from the International Crisis Behavior Version 10.0 (ICB10) (Brecher et al. 2016). The dataset contains 1000 crisis actors and 455 crises with a time span from 1950-2001. The chosen crises were selected based on the accumulation of three databases previously assembled by the researchers: dyadic crisis data, crisis-density rivalries, and one-sided crisis data (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2010). In order to accommodate the time-dependent model necessary for this research, the dataset was altered to also include all non-conflicts years for every actor with at least one crisis. This will assist in providing a more accurate test for the level of hazard between crises.

The analysis of U.S. troop force presence over the course of the time frame is integral to finding whether it has a direct, and hazardous, correlation to conflicts. As the independent variable, the level of impact that these forces have before, during, and after the selected crises should indicate whether they play a significant role on the overall hazard. In order to accommodate the data to fit the model test for this research, the data were transformed into five different subcategories: (0) 0 troops, (1) 1-50, (2) 51-100, (3) 101-500, (4) 501-1000, and (5) for 1000+. This categorization of the data will be more useful when inserting them into the model, as they can be compared in a repetitive fashion. Additionally, it provides greater clarity as to which cases have predominantly more troops because of alliances during conflicts (e.g. Germany has consistently had well over 1000+ since 1950, while India has relatively been between 51-100).

The application of Cox Proportional Hazards Modeling (PH) is integral in assessing whether the presence of US troops in crisis zones has a positive or negative effect. Cox regression, as it stands, is a type of "survival analysis," or the length of time before the occurrence of the specified event happens (Smith, B. and Smith, T. 2000). The hazard function for cox regression describes the concept of risk as the outcome (e.g. failure, conflict eruption) in an interval after time t. The probability that the outcome occurs somewhere between t and t plus the change in time, divided by the probability the event doesn't occur beyond t. The hazard function h(t) is given by the following:



What makes cox PH effective compared to non-proportional hazard tests, like Kaplan-Meier, is that the baseline hazard h0(t) does not entirely depend on X (the covariate), but also on t. Typically reserved for research analyses of disease and prescription drugs until death, this test has proven to more useful within the field of IR in measuring time until next crisis eruption (Box-Steffensmeir and Zorn 1998). Cox PH relies specifically on the effectiveness of covariates to fit into the time sequence within the model. This allows for distinct sub-variables to be observed in cases, along with differences that arise from them over the course of time until the next event.

The practicality of this model for this research is sufficient enough to achieve reliable results needed to answer the proposed question. In terms of explaining the effect of the covariate on time until event, cox PH is best for relative risk and non-parametric assumptions (Box-Steffensmeir, Reiter, and Zorn 2003). The relative risk is desirable in measuring the difference between the exposures of covariates instead of knowing whether they are different, especially for the differences between U.S. troop levels. The lack of parametric assumptions is also useful in controlling the hazards as proportional over time. With this method of proportional hazard testing, it is sufficient to say that enough control of bias will allow for an accurate analysis of hazard variation associated with the different levels of U.S. troop presence.

Continued.....

 

[Housecarl]

Continued.....

This goes without saying that conducting PH tests in IR research has its critics, who point out such flaws of the model, like biased estimates, incorrect standard errors, and faulty inferences about the substantive impact of independent variables (Goodman and Chandalia 2010). Critics have cited that the time-independent variable of the hazard ratio may not be correct, and may in fact be fitted for a non-proportional hazard test. This ultimately comes down to reexamining whether the chosen covariate for the model has any potential for time impact change (Ibid). This does pose a potential risk for this research, as trying to analyze a specific variable's impact on conflict and using hazard to measure deterrence effectiveness can result in misinterpretations; however, this research is confident that by turning U.S. troop data into categorical variables that can individually be analyzed in the model will create an unbiased conclusion.

Results
Conducting the testing of this research first involved the integration of various prevalent data into one unified dataset. As stated previously, this involved using the International Crisis Behavior Version 10.0 as the foundation within the model. Then, an addition of all non-conflict years was plugged into the existing country cases that had been involved in at least one conflict between 1950-2001. Finally, the U.S. troop data was incorporated into the dataset with their corresponding countries and years. In order to make U.S. troop data more significant within the model, it was ideal to transform the data into categorical sub-covariates. With these, the model can test each individual variable, and more accurately test which holds a significant relationship with the status (conflict).

Once the data were integrated, the testing for hazard could begin. The test was conducted in IBM SPSS's Cox Proportional Hazard Regression model. The time variable used was "time since last crisis trigger," the status variable was crisis (1) or no crisis (0) in order to select which events would be used, and the covariate pattern was U.S. troops split into six categorical variables. The criteria for significance to deny the null hypothesis was a 95% curve, or a p-value=.05.

Out of a total of 6805 cases, 553 (8.1%) crisis events were available for analysis with none censored and the rest dropped for incompatibility with the model. The first analysis was to determine whether the model with the covariates demonstrates a relationship to the overall model, and was significant enough to reject the null hypothesis. Referring to Table 1.0, the difference between -2log likelihood without covariates in the model and the -2log likelihood with the covariates resulted in a Chi-Square value of 11.152. With a df of 5, the critical value was .048, less than p=.05. This shows that the model is significant enough to reject the null hypothesis.

http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/imgs/640/scale/article-images/j34/i86/a1489184101/2a9ea6.jpg
Table 1.0: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficientsa1

Since the model is significant enough to use with the given covariates, the research advanced with observing the different ratios of hazard associated with each category of troop levels and whether they were significant. Referring to Table 1.1, we can see that U.S. troop variables, with a df of 5, are significant at .051, close to the p-value of .05. For this research's purpose, it will continue to find this significant, as it is relatively close, but should be noted with an air of caution. When the variables are furthered analyzed, it can be noted that US troops (2) of 50-100 troops and (5) of 1000+ troops demonstrate significance under p-value=.05. These two variables also show 95.0% confidence interval without including 1, suggesting that there is a difference in hazard.

http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/imgs/640/scale/article-images/j34/i86/a1489184101/05d0e7.jpg
Table 1.1: Hazard Ratios (Exp(B) and Sig. of Deterrence Variables in Model

For conflict zones with US troops between 51-100, the hazard ratio is .762 times more likely to cause another conflict than without troops present. In other words, instances with troop levels between 51-100 pose a 24% decrease in risk to conflict eruption compared to non-troop conflicts. Even more interesting is that having 1001+ troops present has a hazard ratio of being .549 times more likely for a conflict to occur than without troops, also considered a 46% reduction in risk compared to conflicts without troops. Interestingly enough, this trend of reduction in risk occurs with all levels of troop presence; however, for variables (1), (3), and (4), the p-value was not statistically significant and the 95% confidence interval for the hazard ratio included 1, suggesting no difference in risk compared to no troops. Overall, there is a proportional level of hazard that is attributed to troop presence on conflict occurrence. As shown with Figure 1.0, the lines of the two significant variables are about standard to each other. These results can be interpreted into two different ideas: the presence of troops does have a risk-reducing effect on conflict occurrence, and relative small-scale or large-scale troop presence have varying reduction capabilities.

The first idea supports the general idea that conventional deterrence does reduce the chance for conflict outbreak or escalation. This would be supportive of Huth's argument of the importance of forward deployed troops in deterring the situation between the aggressor and the defender (Huth 1988). This would make for a compelling argument; however, three out of the five variables showed no sign of statistical significance. The two variables (2) and (5) that did show statistical significance do leave room for interpretation of the importance that U.S. troops play in conflicts. Given that Figure 1.0 highlights the risk-ratio line for no troop presence as being relatively equal to the lines of variables 2 and 5, the strength of their risk-reduction should be questioned. The interpretation of these results finds that the presence of troops does have an overall effect on reducing the chance for a future conflict to occur.

It goes without saying that there is room for possible error during the testing of this data. One possible error would be an incorrect assumption of proportionality for the model. It is assumed with conducting this test that the covariant of U.S. troops does not change over time. This research has attempted to control this by constructing a controlled time variable that can apply constituently for all designated events, while also splitting the original covariate into categorical sub-variables. Another possible conflict with the research is not also conducting non-proportional hazard model tests on the data. Due to time constraints of this research, it would be wise to further test the data in non-proportional models like the log-rank test. This would confirm the effectiveness of using a proportional hazard test for this specific use of data.

Conclusion
Given the findings of the cox regression hazard test of U.S. troops presence in conflicts, this research concludes that troops do have a risk reducing effect on preventing future conflicts from occurring. The risk reduction of conflict eruption by troops can be analyzed as effective deterrence in the prevention of future conflicts within a given country. This is similar to the findings previously conducted by Huth and Quakenbush, that military flexing in conflict situations does reveal a trend of successful conventional deterrence. It can also be inferred that if this trend works for the deployment and stationing of troops on the ground, then it may also be applicable to all forward deployed forces, including naval and air forces.

Furthermore, this is a confirmation of the U.S.'s continued support of its allies through military stations in conflict regions in order to reduce the overall risk of conflict escalation. Much of the data supported this argument for the United States' troop presence in Europe and Asia, for the overall length between conflict occurrences. This is further parallel to the general realist paradigm of conventional deterrence, where a show of force by a more militarily superior country against weaker countries is effective. This research does not attempt to answer the complex question of conventional deterrence; however, it does contribute to the argument that military presence in conflictridden areas does work.

Future research that would build upon this research would be an analysis of forward deployment naval units and naval exercises' proximity in relation to conflict areas. Michael Gerson's and Daniel Whiteneck's overview research of the navy's role in conventional deterrence is an excellent starting point in incorporating maritime power; however, what their research is lacking is the comprehensive testing of naval data as my research does with ground troops (Gerson and Whiteneck 2009). This additional testing can further strengthen the argument either for or against the effectiveness of conventional deterrence whatever the results may be.

As the global political dynamic continues to change and new conflicts begin to escalate, it would be in the general interest for the United States and regional military alliances like NATO and EUCOM to deploy their forces earlier into conflict escalation zones. It would also be in their best interest to retain some manageable force level in these conflict zones after the initial escalation in order to prevent future conflicts, as this research has shown.

Author
Dan Fitzgerald is a student of International Studies and Economics. He graduates in December of 2017. School of International Service (SIS) and College of Arts & Sciences (CAS), American University. Email: df2310a@student.american.edu

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Dr. Joseph Young, Dr. Thomas Zeitzoff, and Dr. Benjamin Jensen of American University for all of their comments and support throughout this research. I would also like to thank the School of Public Affairs for providing me with the funds to produce this research through the Peace and Violence Research Lab Fellowship.

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