WAR 03-05-2016-to-03-11-2016_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
And why don't we see this kind of analysis in US media?....:shk:

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...assinate-Kim-Jong-un/articleshow/51325043.cms

Are the US and South Korea really planning to assassinate Kim Jong-un?

Eric Talmadge | The Independent | Mar 9, 2016, 01.44 PM IST

The big question: Joint military exercsies are reportedly incorporating a 'beheading mission' against the North Korean leader.

Why are we talking about this now?

Massive joint US-South Korea military exercises are a spring ritual on the Korean Peninsula guaranteed to draw a lot of threat-laced venom from Pyongyang. This time, not only are the war games the biggest ever, but the troops now massed south of the Demilitarized Zone have reportedly incorporated a new hypothetical into their training: a "beheading mission" against Kim Jong-un himself.

It's the kind of option military planners tend to consider but almost never use. Neither the US military nor South Korea's defense ministry has actually said it is part of the Key Resolve-Foal Eagle exercises that began this week and will go on for about two months.

But Pyongyang, already feeling the squeeze of new sanctions over its recent nuclear test and rocket launch, is taking a plethora of "beheading mission" reports from the South Korean media very seriously. That goes a long way toward explaining why its own rhetoric has ratcheted up a decibel - even by its own standards of bellicosity. It could also explain some subtle rejiggering afoot in the North's military strategy.

What is a beheading operation?

That's what the North and South Korean media have been calling it. The military prefers to call them decapitation strikes. But, by whatever name, it's hardly a new concept.

They are targeted attacks to eliminate an adversary's leader, or leaders, in an attempt to disrupt or destroy its command chain as soon as a crisis breaks out or appears imminent. They are seen as particularly effective against enemies with a highly centralized command focused on a small group, or one leader. With the leader out of the way, the thinking goes, it's a lot easier to take the rest of the enemy's forces down - or at least keep them from maintaining a coordinated and sustained offensive.

North Korea is a prime example of such an adversary.

The US has used such strikes, often employing drones, to take out key figures in terrorist groups. Pyongyang tried one on South Korean President Park Chung-hee, current President Park Geun-hye's father, at his residence in 1968. So it's no surprise to anyone - especially Pyongyang - that Washington and Seoul would consider such an option if a war were to break out in Korea. That they wouldn't publicly trumpet training for it is also par for the course. And, officially, they haven't.

All we really know is Washington and Seoul agreed last summer on a new plan for how to train for and deal with a major North-South crisis. It's called OPLAN 5015. The "O" stands for operation. Officials have not announced details of how the new OPLAN - which, like all OPLANs, is classified - differs from the previous one.

What have reports been saying?

Since about June, when the new plan was signed, South Korean media have been reporting the new operation plan includes pre-emptive and decapitation strikes. More has come out since the North's nuclear test in January and rocket launch last month, as Seoul's government has tried to underscore its tough stance vis-a-vis Pyongyang.

According to South Korea's Yonhap news agency, the Key Resolve-Foal Eagle exercises will include training and simulations of surgical, pre-emptive strikes on nuclear and missile sites, along with training for a "beheading operation" aimed at removing Kim Jong-un and toppling his government in the event of a war. It has also reported that another set of exercises, now being held by US and South Korean marines, features training for amphibious landings on North Korean shores and, again, attacks on North Korea's leadership.

The reports have generally been thinly sourced or anonymously reported. They have not given any details about how the troops would train for such attacks, though the presence of US special operations units has been noted as ominous.

North Korea, meanwhile, has been almost theatrically apoplectic over the ink being spilt that its leader has a target on his back.

The Supreme Command of the Korean People's Army issued a statement late last month calling a decapitation plan the "height of hostile acts." Warning the doom of the US has been sealed, it said the North's weaponry is "ready to open fire." The day the exercises began, the North's Minju Joson daily said "a historical moment has just come" and its enemies "will sustain the bitterest defeat" from the North's "ground, naval, underwater, air and cyber warfare means, including nuclear strike means."

What is behind the bluster?

Potentially, quite a lot.

North Korea has increasingly shifted its military toward "asymmetrical" warfare tactics that involve surprise, stealth or other means to gain an outsized advantage against a bigger, better-equipped enemy. Its focus on cyber, special forces and nuclear weapons are classic examples.

A decapitation strike could potentially neutralize all of that. Somebody needs to call the shots.

Its long-held ace in the hole, the threat of a massive artillery attack that would devastate Seoul, has also lost some of its credibility. Some experts believe its weaponry has grown older and less reliable. Seoul, meanwhile, has been testing new missiles with precision-strike and bunker-buster capabilities - exactly the kind of weapons that could figure into a decapitation strike.


Recommended By Colombia

Never one to roll over under pressure, the North last week made quite of a show of its latest answer to that problem: a large-caliber, multiple-launch rocket system with a range some experts believe could allow it to be positioned out of reach of US or South Korean counterattacks and fire projectiles hard to intercept with missile defense systems.

It is conceivable the North could design nuclear-armed shells for such a weapon.

Latest Comment

The sooner they do it the better.

Fuman Chu Chu

Even before the current media barrages, experts have been seeing an "action-reaction" cycle fanned by the North's fears of a decapitation strike and signs Seoul and Washington are at least considering the option, according to Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, in California.

"The appearance of a new long-range artillery system that is specifically linked to North Korean fears about decapitation strikes deserves our attention, even if the possibility of nuclear armament is only hinted at," he wrote in a recent analysis for the influential 38 North website. "Far more attention needs to be paid to North Korea's evolving nuclear doctrine, on the one hand, and South Korea's development of conventional doctrines that involve pre-emption and decapitation on the other."
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://en.yibada.com/articles/10849...uclear-talks-urges-china-foreign-minister.htm

'Flexibility Vital' in North Korea Nuclear Talks, Urges Chinese Foreign Minister

Alvin Ybanez | Mar 09, 2016 06:58 AM EST

China is open to any initiatives in resolving the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, Foreign Minister Wang Yi said on Tuesday, adding that maintaining stability in the region is Beijing’s top priority.

At a news conference in Beijing, Wang said that parties involved in the negotiations have "suggested some ideas, including flexible contacts allowing three-party, four-party or even a five-party format."

After North Korea conducted a nuclear test and a rocket launch earlier this year, China has urged for calm and the resumption of the Six-Party Talks.

Citing the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2270, Wang said that the new sanctions against Pyongyang should be implemented in its entirety.

The sanctions are key to "maintaining stability and is the pressing priority, and only negotiations could provide a fundamental solution," Wang added.

The Six-Party Talks, which involves China, North Korea, South Korea, the United States, Russia and Japan, were established in 2003 but stalled in 2008.

Ruan Zongze, vice president of the China Institute of International Studies, said that Wang's latest comments "shows both a sense of duty and flexibility."

"No matter what the format of contacts will be, the goal is to achieve negotiation and avoid war," he said in an interview with China Daily.

However, Ruan noted that Pyongyang should be part of the negotiations as without them the talks would be of no use.

"Other parties should encourage the DPRK to get back to the table," Ruan said.

"Currently, the most demanding task is to secure stability, as the DPRK has responded fiercely to the U.N. resolution, while the U.S. and the ROK are conducting more military drills on the peninsula," Ruan stated.

Huang Youfu, a Korean studies professor at Minzu University of China in Beijing, said the China's flexibility is providing space for all parties involved.

Success in the resumption of talks on the nuclear issue will depend on the attitudes of Pyongyang, Washington and Seoul, Huang added.

When asked about recent China-North Korea ties, Wang said Beijing "will not accommodate" Pyongyang pushing forward with its nuclear and missile, although North Korea's need for development and security remains supported.

"China and the DPRK enjoy a normal state-to-state relationship with a deep tradition of friendship," Wang added. "China both values friendship and stands on principles."
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm...Article from the Shanghai Daily....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/article_xinhua.aspx?id=322730

S. Korea refutes DPRK's claim to have miniaturized nuke warheads

Mar 09,2016

SEOUL, March 9 (Xinhua) -- South Korea's defense ministry on Wednesday refuted claims by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) that it has successfully miniaturized nuclear warheads small enough to mount on ballistic missiles.

Seoul's defense ministry said in a statement that Pyongyang hasn't secured operational capability for miniaturized nuclear warheads and KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missiles to deliver the warheads, adding that Seoul and Washington are jointly trailing this issue in a precise manner.

The statement came after top DPRK leader Kim Jong Un said his country's nuclear warheads "have been standardized to be fit for ballistic missiles" through miniaturization, during his field guidance on nuclear scientists and technicians, according to the DPRK's official KCNA news agency.

Pyongyang tested what it claimed was its first hydrogen bomb on Jan. 6, the fourth of its nuclear detonations. The DPRK launched a long-range rocket, which was condemned by outsiders as a disguised test of ballistic missile technology, on Feb. 7.

Many of South Korean experts estimated that Pyongyang may have advanced its technology of miniaturizing nuclear warheads given that the United States took seven years to secure it.

Seoul's defense ministry also evaluated the DPRK's significant level of such technology in its Defense White Paper published in late 2014, though it assessed that Pyongyang had yet to complete it.

Calling Kim's comments as reckless threats, the South Korean military said that the threats were an intolerable challenge to the international community which is implementing tougher new sanctions on the DPRK for its latest nuclear test and rocket launch.

The Seoul ministry said such rash acts by the DPRK only prove why strong and comprehensive sanctions by the international community are mandatory against Pyongyang, urging the DPRK to come to a path of denuclearization.

Tensions escalated on the Korean peninsula after Seoul and Washington kicked off on Monday their largest-ever joint annual war games, codenamed Key Resolve and Foal Eagle, set to run through April 30.

The DPRK threatened nuclear strikes against South Korea and the U.S. mainland in response to the spring military drills, while top DPRK leader Kim Jong Un ordered nuclear warheads to be placed always on standby for use at any time.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://news.yahoo.com/commander-likely-killed-syria-air-strike-us-official-140021459.html

IS commander 'likely killed' in Syria air strike: US official

AFP
By Laurent Barthelemy
1 hour ago

Washington (AFP) - The Islamic State group's battle-tested equivalent of a defense minister is believed to have been killed in a US air strike in northeastern Syria, a US official here said.

The target of the March 4 attack was Omar al-Shishani, a red-bearded Georgian fighting with the jihadist group in Syria, the Pentagon said Tuesday, cautioning that results of the operation were still being assessed.

A US official speaking on condition of anonymity later said Shishani "likely died" in the assault by waves of US warplanes and drones, along with 12 other IS fighters.

Al-Shishani is the nom de guerre of Tarkhan Batirashvili, who ranked among the most wanted under a US program with a $5 million bounty on his head.

The United States stopped short of declaring him dead.

The lack of a US presence on the ground makes it difficult to assess the success of operations targeting militants in Syria, and Shishani's death has been falsely reported several times.

Pentagon spokesman Peter Cook described Shishani as "a battle-tested leader with experience who had led ISIL fighters in numerous engagements in Iraq and Syria."

His death, if confirmed, would hinder IS's foreign recruitment efforts, especially from Chechnya and the Caucasus regions, and its attempts to defend its strongholds in Syria and Iraq, according to the Pentagon.

.. View gallery
Jordan estimates than nearly 4,000 of its citizens …
Jordan estimates than nearly 4,000 of its citizens belong to jihadists groups, such as Islamic State …

Shishani's father, Taimouraz Batirashvili, told the Russian news agency Interfax that he was unable to confirm the death. "I know nothing about the death of my son. They announce his death almost every month."

The US Treasury designated Shishani a foreign terrorist fighter in 2014, and said he maintained "unique authority" within IS.

The Georgian was "the ISIL equivalent of the secretary of defense," the US official said, using an alternative acronym for the group.

In the recent assault, waves of US aircraft struck near Al-Shadadi, a town in northeastern Syria that was retaken from IS last month by local anti-IS fighters allied with the US-led coalition.

- Chechen rebel -

The US official said it was "unusual and noteworthy" that Shishani had traveled from IS's self-proclaimed capital of Raqa to Al-Shadadi.

"This was likely to bolster the sagging morale of ISIL fighters there, who have suffered a series of defeats by Syrian Democratic Forces," the official said, alluding to one of the local, US-allied fighting groups.

Shishani comes from a town in Georgia that is populated mainly by ethnic Chechens, the official said.

He fought as a Chechen rebel against Russian forces before joining the Georgian military in 2006, and fought Russian forces again in Georgia in 2008.

After being discharged from the Georgian military on health grounds, he entered Syria in 2012 and joined IS the next year.

Among his feats on his way to the top ranks of Islamic State military operations, Shishani turned one rebel group into an effective fighting force to take on the Syrian army by "mixing Syrians who knew the terrain with the Chechens' fighting ability," the US official said.

Shishani is believed to have led a prison in Tabqa near Raqa where foreign hostages may have been held.

He later headed IS military operations in northern Syria, according to the US official.

Many foreign IS fighters hail from the former Soviet republics -- in almost equal numbers as those from Western Europe -- according to the US-based intelligence consultancy the Soufan Group.


View Comments (2)

Related Stories

1. IS commander 'likely killed' in Syria air strike: US official AFP
2. Officials: US airstrike targeted IS military commander Associated Press
3. [$$] U.S. Says Airstrike Likely Killed a Top Islamic State Military Commander in Syria The Wall Street Journal
4. Islamic State's de facto 'minister of war' possibly killed: U.S. officials Reuters
5. U.S. advisors within miles of battle for key Syrian town: military Reuters
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...-helicopter-borne-raid-in-Somalia-US-official

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://news.yahoo.com/special-forces-stage-helicopter-raid-somalias-shebab-083932693.html

US troops in helicopter-borne raid in Somalia: US official

AFP
11 minutes ago

Washington (AFP) - US troops took part in a helicopter-borne special forces raid against Shebab insurgents in Somalia, a US official said Wednesday.

The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, described the operation overnight Tuesday to Wednesday as a "US partnered raid" with US troops accompanying Somali forces.

The raid came just days after a US warplanes and drones killed an estimated 130 Shebab fighters training for a major operation, according to the Pentagon.

Special forces operatives in two helicopters targeted the Shebab-controlled town of Awdhegele, about 50 kilometers (30 miles) west of Somalia's capital Mogadishu, Somali government officials and a Shebab spokesman said.

"We have reports Shebab militants suffered casualties," local district commissioner Mohamed Aweys told reporters.

It was not immediately clear what the objective was, but helicopter raids in the past have been hostage rescue missions, such as a US commando operation in 2012 to free two aid workers who had been held for three months by the group.

Shebab has stepped up their attacks since the start of the year.

View Comments (44)
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://news.yahoo.com/taiwan-sees-increasing-militarization-south-china-sea-032118700.html

Taiwan sees increasing militarization in South China Sea

Reuters
12 hours ago

TAIPEI (Reuters) - In rare public comment on territorial disputes in the South China Sea, Taiwan's defense ministry warned on Wednesday that countries in the region were spending more on bolstering their military strength as tension in the area increased.

Taiwan's claim to the South China Sea reflects that of mainland China, with both staking their territorial assertions on maps Chinese Nationalists drew up when they ruled the country before fleeing to Taiwan in 1949.

But Taiwan has stayed relatively low-key on the issue unlike mainland China, which has been backing up its claims with the construction of ports and airstrips on remote islands in the disputed waters.

"Neighboring countries have increased their military budgets and weapons procurement and are adjusting some of their military deployments and conducting joint drills at sea," Taiwan Defence Minister Kao Kuang-chi told parliament as he presented it with his ministry's latest defense report.

Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam also have overlapping claims to parts of the energy-rich waters through which more than US$5 trillion of maritime trade passes each year.

Last month, Taiwan's defense ministry cautioned "interested parties" to refrain from taking unilateral measures that would increase tension in the area, after it confirmed Chinese forces had deployed surface-to-air missiles on a tiny island in the South China Sea.

The ministry said in its report that Taiwan continued to pay attention to the modernization of China's military, which reflected its determination "to protect its core interest".

Beijing considers Taiwan one of its core interest and sees the island as a wayward province to be taken back by force if necessary.

(Reporting by J.R. Wu; Editing by Robert Birsel)

View Comments (34)


Related Stories

1. China accuses US of militarizing South China Sea Associated Press
2. Kerry critical of South China Sea militarization ahead of talks Reuters
3. Vietnam protests China missile deployment, Australia, NZ urge restraint Reuters
4. China says media ignores other claimants' weaponry in South China Sea Reuters
5. U.S. accuses China of raising tensions with apparent missile deployment Reuters
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
"Democracy Ends In Turkey": Prominent Anti-Erdogan Newspaper Seized In Midnight Raid
Started by Possible Impact‎, 03-05-2016 06:28 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...nti-Erdogan-Newspaper-Seized-In-Midnight-Raid


For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.politico.eu/blogs/spence...itor-the-eu-is-scared-of-pissing-off-erdogan/

Spence on Media

Politics, power and media in Europe. Send tips: aspence@politico.eu

FOURTH ESTATE

Today’s Zaman editor: The EU is ‘scared of pissing off’ Erdoðan

Days after Turkey seized control of the newspaper, Sevgi Akarcesme expects to be fired soon.

By Alex Spence | 3/8/16, 9:00 PM CET

Today’s Zaman editor-in-chief Sevgi Akarcesme has been speaking, tweeting and writing tirelessly since her newspaper was seized by Turkish authorities (along with its sister paper Zaman and the Cihan news agency) over the weekend. POLITICO spoke to her briefly Tuesday evening to get an update on the mood in the paper’s Istanbul newsroom:

European Union leaders didn’t seem to push press freedom very aggressively with Turkey at the migration summit Monday. What did you make of the talks in Brussels?

They are scared of pissing off [President Recep Tayyip] Erdoðan because of their fear of an influx of refugees. Their priority is now not democracy and freedom of expression in Turkey, but their own well-being. In a rational world, we cannot blame them, but in a world of ideas and values, I think [the] European Union does not live up to its philosophy. They are unfortunately violating their own values. Any time they talk about values from now on, they are going to have a serious credibility problem. From my perspective it’s a huge disappointment that [the EU] turns a blind eye to the severe suspension of the constitution at home.

Should Europe be accelerating membership talks with Turkey?

I don’t buy the argument that Turkeys’ ascension to the EU is any closer. Everybody knows Turkey has never been this far away from membership, with a poor record of human rights at home. In Turkey, the government has to save face, by saying we are getting closer to the European Union. Both parties pretend otherwise, but deep inside everybody knows that neither the visa requirements will be removed for Turks, nor Turkey will enter the European Union any time soon. All Europe cares about is one way or another stopping the refugees to Europe.

You’ve been critical of other Turkish media for not covering the Zaman seizure.

There is such a huge amount of fear. There is not even much media, except for minor newspapers, to cover this incident because over a decade Erdoðan has been swallowing all the critical media outlets by creating his own media empire, directly or indirectly. I call Erdoðan the biggest media owner in Turkey.

What happens next for you and the other journalists at Zaman and Today’s Zaman?

It’s a very, very tough question. There is a great deal of uncertainty. In the newsroom my colleagues are working under police surveillance. In the garden, in the corridors, around the newspapers, there is a heavy police presence. Even today, the police told one of the reporters that they cannot use the cafeteria during working hours just because she did not want to listen to propaganda. Even the police has been intervening in the behavior of the journalists.

I don’t know why they didn’t fire me. I had previously applied for leave because of a business trip abroad for March 5. So I am officially on leave for about a week. The day before I left, the seizure took place, the police raid took place. I went to the newspaper for the next two days, but when I saw the new trustees, the new administration has been interfering with the editorial policies, I just thought that I couldn’t stand it. I told my managing editors to deal with the extremely ignorant and rude group of trustees who have been censoring the newspaper.

Will you go back?

I don’t want to give them the pleasure of resigning. I’m delaying my resignation. I expect them to fire me in the next couple of days. If they don’t, I’ve already said on Twitter that I don’t respect and recognize the trustees. I don’t think they are legitimate.

At this point, do you see any hope in Turkey for independent, opposition voices?

There is little hope in the short or middle run. There is no independent media left. There’s a huge amount of fear in society, among intellectuals, among businesspeople, among civil society. Democracy is suspended effectively in Turkey at the moment.

(This transcript has been lightly edited for clarity and length.)
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realclearworld.com/blog/2016/03/is_ukraines_military_ready_for_a_fight_111752.html

Is Ukraine's Military Ready for a Fight?

Posted by Samuel Bendett on March 9, 2016
5 Comments

Two years ago, the Ukrainian military found itself badly outmatched and unprepared to fight Russian special forces who quickly took over the Crimean peninsula. They also struggled against Moscow-backed separatists in the Donetsk region of Eastern Ukraine in 2015. While Kyiv is finally getting much-needed training and limited support to its various military and security branches from NATO, its forces are far from reaching the desired degree of readiness to take on its security challenges. Among Ukraine's problems is a lack of modern equipment and professional service capable of dealing with advanced Russian weapons and tactics. Trying to reverse these developments, Ukrainian Interior Minister Arsen Avakov recently stated, during a televised address on Ukraine's 1+1 network, that his country needs to modernize its military in order to return Crimea to Ukraine.

According to Avakov, "Ukraine will have to recreate and rebuild the army, the National Guard and the police, since the country had virtually nothing prior to the start of hostilities. ... and then, by our will, the Crimea will be with us -- in this I have no doubt." He added that the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, along with Ukrainian lawmakers, is working on creating a special National Guard unit in order to be "ready for the return of the Crimea." According to the minister, Ukraine failed to defend Crimea two years ago because of the Kharkiv Agreements signed by previous Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych -- the man who was chased out of his country to Russia by the Maidan protests, an event which in turn triggered Russia's military involvement. Avakov criticized the agreements for allowing Russia to significantly increase its military presence on the peninsula prior to the takeover: "We could not do anything when the Russian planes landed at the Crimean airfield, because Yanukovych signed the agreement."

The same TV program featured Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin, who spoke on the information methods to return the peninsula to Kyiv. According to Klimkin, the inhabitants of the peninsula should be shown the advantages of living in a democratic and European country, which is what Ukraine is today as it seeks to join the European Union: "The residents of Crimea are under fierce (pro-Russian) propaganda, we must show them by our example that their future is in the European democratic Ukraine and not in Crimea under Russian occupation, where they can go nowhere."

As Russian daily Moskovskiy Komsomolets noted, the Crimean peninsula became part of the Russian Federation following the results of the 2014 referendum after the annexation of the region by Russian special forces. According to Moscow, the region's reunification with Russia was supported by nearly 96 percent of the population -- a fact that Kyiv and a number of Western countries have refused to recognize, instead imposing sanctions against the region and Russia. Recently, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said that the question on the status of Crimea is "closed forever -- the peninsula is part of Russia."

While Ukrainian forces could indeed raise their effectiveness through training, much-needed reforms, and inclusion of new military technologies and tactics into their concept of operations, these things take time. Such steps, morevoer, increase the likelihood of a costly confrontation with Russia over Crimea, which is probably out of the question for a Ukrainian government struggling with political upheaval and a worsening economy. Nonetheless, such issues are apparently not stopping other members of the Ukrainian government from making statements that call for additional military action against Russia-backed insurgents in the country's eastern regions. According to Ukrainian daily Obozrevatel.ua, Col. Peter Nedzelskiy, a senior military intelligence officer, recently said that military forces are ready to take action "on the liberation of temporarily-occupied areas of Donbass -- the Army awaits the relevant decision of the military-political leadership of the country." He added:

"Our soldiers are mentally ready for defense -- and they are also waiting for the command to attack. The moral and psychological state of the Ukrainian army is high enough -- we have learned to fight. If not for the Minsk Agreements, we would have expelled these terrorists from our land long ago."

Nedzelskiy assured: "Supposedly these terrorists are training to attack us or they are imitating an offensive -- this is laughable. We are always ready to give them an answer that will be very adequate and very strong." At the same time, the colonel stressed that " the Army is an instrument of policy, and the war is a continuation of the policy by armed methods -- of course, we cannot act without a decision by the military-political leadership -- we are waiting for such a decision."

While such statements may indeed raise the confidence of Ukrainian military forces, the facts on the ground may be very different, especially given visible improvements in Russian military capabilities following Moscow's involvement in the Syrian civil war.

(AP photo)

The views expressed here are the author's own.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realclearworld.com/blog/2016/03/there_is_no_hollywood_ending_for_syria_111742.html

There Is no Hollywood Ending for Syria

Posted by Aaron David Miller on March 4, 2016
8 Comments

Maybe the U.S.-Russian cease-fire will hold in Syria, or at least tamp down the level of violence in that country. But whether it does or not, there are a few American assumptions about the U.S. approach to the Syrian civil war that need to be seriously revisited. Maybe Washington policymakers don't really believe in these assumptions. I suspect that's the case; after all, those assumptions are not holding true. And here's why.

Must Bashar Assad go? The logic is certainly compelling. He's a war criminal responsible for the deaths of scores of thousands of innocents. Without his departure, ISIS will continue to feed on Sunni disaffection and alienation; Sunni opponents will never give up the fight; and Russia and Iran will have won. The only problem is that in reality, Assad is not going, and there is no constellation of forces that appear willing or able right now to make that happen. Unless the Iranians and Russian President Vladimir Putin are willing to sacrifice him -- and for what, you might ask -- it seems Assad is here to stay. That's hard to accept if you argue that there can be no definitive solution with Assad around. But perhaps that is precisely the point. There will be no determinative end state; perhaps just a stalemate locked in with a predictable level of accepted violence. Which leads us to the next point.


The notion of a unified, cohesive Syria is dead, and that begs a related and broader question: Is there an end game in Syria? Perhaps, but not one that provides the stable, inclusive, non-sectarian future envisioned by the International Syrian Support Group. Once the authoritarians in Iraq, Syria, and Libya went the way of the dodo, the odds that the polities in these countries could hold together were long indeed. Tribes with flags, one observer said of the Arab states -- excepting Egypt.

This doesn't mean the redrawing of these countries' borders. But it does mean that what happens within those borders is likely to be quite different than what we've seen for the past half century or so. It's hard to imagine -- and Iraq is no great precedent -- that in Syria, Alawite and Kurds would agree to surrender power to a centralized Syrian state on the assumption that it would protect their interests to do so, and certainly not after five years of bloody civil war. The age of Alawite dominance in Syria, furthermore, is over, and in that context you can count on Iran to ensure a decentralized Syria so that Tehran's Alawite allies remain relevant. On the other side, the country's Sunni majority and its Saudi backers wield predominant influence in Damascus.

The exact nature of the new Syria is unclear. But it will be based on some kind of a confederal structure where various confessional groups will maintain control of autonomous areas. Syria will continue to be messy, with areas that include a mix of Sunnis and Alawite. But it's hard to envision a workable alternative.

Arabs and Turks will not come to the rescue: They will all continue to meddle, but their goal will not be to save Syria so much as to protect their own, narrow interests. And the elusive notion of a regional Sunni army will not rescue Syria. The Saudis are overstretched in Yemen and talk a bigger game than they're willing to play. Their real goal in Syria is to check Iran's growing influence, but Riyadh is simply unwilling to commit sufficient resources to do so -- a reticence not shared by Tehran. As for Turkey, if Ankara did send in ground forces, it would be to check the Kurds, not to fight the Islamic State or overthrow Assad.

So will the U.S. cavalry? We need to be honest about what the United States has been and will be willing to risk in Syria. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry made clear in his Congressional testimony this week that the United States has a Plan B should the cessation of hostilities fail. That seems to imply a more concerted effort to support the Syrian opposition, and perhaps consideration of some kind of no fly zone or safe area that would put more U.S. assets on the ground and in the air. Is this a bluff, or a real contingency? And more important, what would it accomplish? Is Washington prepared to challenge the Russians and Iran and trigger a hotter proxy war by upping the level of U.S. assistance, or even intervening directly? Would that produce the kind of painful stalemate that would compel Russia to negotiate a transition without Assad? There really are no good options, let alone choices free of risk, in pursuit of such a goal. And nothing indicates that U.S. President Barack Obama is prepared to risk more than the Russians are in Syria in order to force them to the table.

The shadow of Iraq and Afghanistan still looms large, and there's no will in Washington to own Syria, or to engage in nation-building. Listening to the Republican and Democratic candidates only suggests that none of them has ideas that are compelling, new, or workable -- from John Kasich's Sunni army, to Ted Cruz's carpet bombing campaign, to Hillary Clinton's no fly zone -- an idea in search of a strategy.

If there ever were really good options in Syria, there aren't anymore. Iran and even Russia are willing to sacrifice quite a lot to protect what they believe are their vital interests. The United States is not, and that should be clear by now. Whatever is done in Syria can be coordinated by Washington, but the United States isn't going to pay the estimated $100 billion required to rebuild the country, nor to provide the peacekeepers needed to oversee the process.

Syria is only part of the problem: If Syria's were the only crisis in the region, or neatly cut off from the interests of a range of regional actors, perhaps the problem would be more tractable. But Syria is part and parcel of a turbulent region that is on the whole in crisis. No regional party or set of parties is prepared to co-own a Syria solution, and neither are the big outside powers. Russia has its own agenda, and the U.S. administration seems determined to avoid confronting Moscow and being drawn deeper into conflict. A U.S.-Russian agreement on the core issues, including Assad's future, might be the first step in imagining a transition to a more stable future. If you're looking for Hollywood endings you won't find one in the blood and tragedy of Syria. I suggest you go to the movies instead.

(AP photo)


Aaron David Miller, a Vice President at the Woodrow Wilson Center, served as a Middle East negotiator, analyst and adviser in Republican and Democratic Administrations. The views expressed here are the author's own.

____

Hummm......

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/bosnia-model-securing-syria-15440?page=2

Bosnia as a Model for Securing Syria

A modified version of what followed the Dayton Accords is the only path forward.

Edward P. Joseph, Michael O'Hanlon
March 9, 2016
Comments 8

Strangely, as a very shaky and probably temporary cessation of hostilities begins in parts of Syria, the idea of restoring a strong unified Syrian state remains official American policy. State Department spokesman John Kirby went so far as to argue that the cessation agreement actually reduces the chances of the country’s eventual partition, whether de jure or de facto.

In a conflict that has killed at least three hundred thousand; displaced twelve million, of whom four million are refugees in foreign lands; created the greatest refugee crisis in Europe since World War II; inflamed Sunni-Shia passions across the Middle East; and created sanctuaries for ISIS as well as the Nusra Front, such a goal seems unrealistic. It also seems unnecessary, and almost romantic—somehow the ideal of a nonsectarian centrally run state must be preserved, even as far more basic human needs are trampled by this terrible war. With virtually all Sunnis in Syria and throughout the Middle East adamantly opposed to the continued rule of an Alawite leader with so much blood on his hands, all while President Bashar al-Assad is unwilling to step down, emboldened by Russian aid and recent battlefield victories, the basic ingredients for a stable and unified country are wantonly lacking. The current ceasefire cannot last.

Still, opponents of a “soft partition” of the country do have several valid concerns. By soft partition, we mean the creation of a confederal arrangement in which most governance and most security is provided in regions that are stitched together by a relatively weak central government, as in Bosnia after the 1995 Dayton Accords. Critics of such arrangements point out that they can make long-term peace harder by reinforcing and validating sectarian divisions. If done wrong, they can also weaken minority rights and legitimate ethnic cleansing even after the violence, producing additional foment and suffering. They can also harden the identities of each of the separate sectors—further complicating relations with Turkey, which will worry about a Kurdish independence movement, reinforcing its own Kurdish fears. A hard partition, or breakup of the country, would also be highly undesirable, not only magnifying the Turkish-Kurdish confrontation but causing grave concerns about a future rump state run by Assad with the influence of Russia and Hezbollah, unleavened by more constructive elements and dangerously opaque to most other states in the region.

Along with an increasing number of other scholars and former government officials, we believe that some kind of confederal arrangement for Syria may be the only realistic path forward. International negotiators will have to get the idea into the conversation when peace talks resume next month. Only Syrians can make the decision to proceed down this path. But at present, the outside world is perpetuating the fiction that confederation is not even an option—that somehow the fundamentally incompatible aims of the various belligerents can be reconciled through patience and brilliant diplomacy. This sentiment may sound noble at one level, but dangerous at another, for it prevents us from recognizing what will ultimately need to be done to facilitate a more realistic path to peace.

To be negotiable in coming months, and stable once adopted, a peace deal for Syria will likely have to include the following elements:

1) At least four main sectors of the country, including areas where Alawites and Christians now predominate near the coast, Kurdish regions in the north, Sunni Arab strongholds in the center and east of the state, and a shared zone that includes the major intermixed cities—which should stay intermixed as much as possible in any confederation arrangement. An alternative deal could effectively share the major cities between the Alawite/Christian region and the Sunni Arab region, keeping at least Aleppo as part of the latter.

2) Legal codes and monitoring mechanisms to protect minority rights, including property rights, in each sector, unlike the case in Bosnia, where Serbs were officially encouraged to leave Sarajevo and relocate in the Serb Republic. Means of safe relocation should be part of any deal, but should not be preferred.

3) Governance structures and security forces for each zone, created in the implementation phase of a deal, with economic and security aid conditioned on compliance with all elements of the peace deal, and with an end to fighting inside each zone (except of course for ongoing operations against ISIS and Nusra for as long as needed, undertaken in concert with outside powers).

4) Deployment of a peace implementation force that will patrol along internal borders, use force robustly against spoilers, and conduct community policing in the intermixed cities including Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo. This force can include Russians; it will probably need to include Americans at least for logistics, counterterrorism operations and command/control arrangements; clearly, it will also need a Muslim backbone and substantial European participation.

This should be our vision for the future. It will likely not be negotiable for a range of reasons in the near term. But it has a number of immediate implications for policy. First, as noted, the idea itself needs to be introduced into a diplomatic conversation that has perpetuated the delusion of putting Humpty Dumpty fully back together again for too long.

Additionally, it should shake us out of the false hope that we can avoid creating a strong Sunni Arab opposition force. A credible capability to counter Assad, Russia and Hezbollah is needed in more than just the Kurdish sector. Without it, Assad and Putin will almost surely not be serious about compromise. Even if negotiations are successful, Sunni Arab security forces will be needed to police their own populations, enforce laws developed by a future Sunni Arab regional government, help us defeat ISIS and Nusra, and then sustain that defeat over the longer term. We will, in particular, need to put many more trainers and advisors into Syria than the fifty that President Obama sent last fall, and we will need to be somewhat less skittish about vetting procedures for those who once had tangential links to extremist groups.

Finally, with a confederation model in mind, concepts can be developed now for creating legal codes for the protection of minorities, as well as economic recovery strategies, for each of the sectors. Some could even be implemented before a final peace deal were reached, if safe zones could be made adequately safe and stable in certain parts of the country. This approach would, among other things, begin to address the refugee problem at its source, if not immediately, then perhaps over the coming months. This thinking could also extend to initial election processes—which, we would argue, should focus first and foremost on the autonomous regions and smaller jurisdictions, and not lead to near-term national elections, which can be extremely divisive if done wrong or too soon, as in Iraq.

Today’s Syria ceasefire is like a Hail Mary pass without Aaron Rodgers. But as poor as its prospects may be, it may help us identify a constructive path forward, which can be relevant to our Syria policy even if the current cessation of hostilities soon gives out.

Edward P. Joseph is Executive Director of the Institute of Current World Affairs, and a lecturer at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; Michael O’Hanlon is senior fellow and director of research in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution.
 
http://dailycaller.com/2016/03/08/r...on-if-north-korea-nuclear-rhetoric-continues/


Russia Threatens Invasion If North Korea Nuclear Rhetoric Continues


National Security/Foreign Policy Reporter
6:55 PM 03/08/2016



Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) and new North Korea

North Korea’s provocative nuclear rhetoric has gotten so bad even the Kremlin has come out against the hermit kingdom, warning continued nuclear threats could justify an invasion.

The warning was issued in the form of a written statement from the Russian foreign ministry. It follows North Korea’s threat it would engage in a “preemptive and offensive nuclear strike” in reaction to the start of joint U.S.-South Korean war games Monday.

“We consider it to be absolutely impermissible to make public statements containing threats to deliver some ‘preventive nuclear strikes’ against opponents,” said the statement, as translated by the Russian TASS news agency. “Pyongyang should be aware of the fact that in this way the DPRK [North Korea] will become fully opposed to the international community and will create international legal grounds for using military force against itself in accordance with the right of a state to self-defense enshrined in the United Nations Charter.”

Russia also had harsh words for the U.S. and South Korea, condemning the “unprecedented” exercises. “The development of the situation on the Korean peninsula and around it is causing growing concern,” said a statement issued Monday, as reported by the Kremlin-funded RT news channel.

Part of the planned war games involved the U.S. and South Korea simulating strikes against North Korea’s nuclear facilities and special forces raids against Pyongyang leadership. Around 17,000 U.S. personnel and 300,000 South Korean personnel are participating in the ongoing eight-week war game. The troop levels represent about a one-third increase from last year’s similar war game.


North Korea’s sabre-rattling has reached a fever pitch in recent months. The pariah state carried out its fourth nuclear test in January and launched a rocket in violation of international sanctions in February. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper warned Congress in early February that North Korea had restarted its plutonium reactor and was poised to produce weapons-grade nuclear material within weeks.

In response to North Korean provocations, the United Nations security council voted unanimously last Thursday to pass a new round of sanctions against the country.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
http://dailycaller.com/2016/03/08/r...on-if-north-korea-nuclear-rhetoric-continues/


Russia Threatens Invasion If North Korea Nuclear Rhetoric Continues


National Security/Foreign Policy Reporter
6:55 PM 03/08/2016



Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) and new North Korea

North Korea’s provocative nuclear rhetoric has gotten so bad even the Kremlin has come out against the hermit kingdom, warning continued nuclear threats could justify an invasion.

The warning was issued in the form of a written statement from the Russian foreign ministry. It follows North Korea’s threat it would engage in a “preemptive and offensive nuclear strike” in reaction to the start of joint U.S.-South Korean war games Monday.

“We consider it to be absolutely impermissible to make public statements containing threats to deliver some ‘preventive nuclear strikes’ against opponents,” said the statement, as translated by the Russian TASS news agency. “Pyongyang should be aware of the fact that in this way the DPRK [North Korea] will become fully opposed to the international community and will create international legal grounds for using military force against itself in accordance with the right of a state to self-defense enshrined in the United Nations Charter.”

Russia also had harsh words for the U.S. and South Korea, condemning the “unprecedented” exercises. “The development of the situation on the Korean peninsula and around it is causing growing concern,” said a statement issued Monday, as reported by the Kremlin-funded RT news channel.

Part of the planned war games involved the U.S. and South Korea simulating strikes against North Korea’s nuclear facilities and special forces raids against Pyongyang leadership. Around 17,000 U.S. personnel and 300,000 South Korean personnel are participating in the ongoing eight-week war game. The troop levels represent about a one-third increase from last year’s similar war game.


North Korea’s sabre-rattling has reached a fever pitch in recent months. The pariah state carried out its fourth nuclear test in January and launched a rocket in violation of international sanctions in February. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper warned Congress in early February that North Korea had restarted its plutonium reactor and was poised to produce weapons-grade nuclear material within weeks.

In response to North Korean provocations, the United Nations security council voted unanimously last Thursday to pass a new round of sanctions against the country.

Hummm....Unless that would be a joint operation with Beijing, there's going to be a lot of gnashing of teeth over such an operation. And considering the degree of "operational spread" the Russians are running right now, cooperation with the Japanese, South Koreans and US on this issue, perhaps including the use of Russian bases and airspace and Russian "insider" intel, is likely to have an interesting "price tag" on it.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Well this ought to go over real well.....:whistle:

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-islamicstate-files-idUSKCN0WC0UN

World | Thu Mar 10, 2016 3:20am EST
Related: World

TV channel says obtains details of 22,000 Islamic State supporters

LONDON

Thousands of documents identifying 22,000 supporters of Islamic State in over 50 countries were handed over to Sky News by a disillusioned former member of the group, the British television channel reported on Thursday.

It said it had informed the authorities about the documents, which were on a memory stick stolen from the head of Islamic State's internal security force by a man who had been part of the Free Syrian Army rebel group before joining Islamic State.

The man, who called himself Abu Hamed, handed over the memory stick during a meeting at an undisclosed location in Turkey, according to the Sky News report.

The documents looked like enrolment forms with 23 questions and contained names of Islamic State supporters and of their relatives, telephone numbers and other details such as the subjects' areas of expertise and who had recommended them.

Sky News said some of the names were already well-known, but the documents could also help identify some extremists who were previously unknown to the authorities in their countries.


(Reporting by Estelle Shirbon; editing by Guy Faulconbridge)
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-missiles-irgc-idUSKCN0WC0K0

Business | Thu Mar 10, 2016 1:59am EST
Related: World, United Nations, Aerospace & Defense

Revolutionary Guards commander says Iran's missile work will not stop: TV

ANKARA

Iran's ballistic-missile program will never stop under any circumstances and Tehran has missiles ready to be fired, said a senior commander of the country's elite Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) according to state TV on Thursday.

"Iran's missile program will not stop under any circumstances ... The IRGC has never accepted the U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iran's missile work ... we are always ready to defend the country against any aggressor. Iran will not turn into Yemen, Iraq or Syria," Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh told state TV on late Wednesday.

The IRGC test-fired several ballistic missiles on Tuesday and Wednesday, state media reported. The tests are seen as a challenge to a United Nations resolution and the 2015 nuclear deal under which Tehran agreed to curb its atomic program in exchange for relief from economic sanctions.

Iranian officials said the missile tests were not in violation of the deal, which led to lifting of sanctions in January.

"Iran's missile program and its test-firing of missiles in the past days during a military drill are not against its nuclear commitments and the nuclear deal reached with the six powers," said Foreign Ministry spokesman Hossein Jaberi-Ansari said on Thursday, state TV reported.

The test-firing of several missiles since Tuesday were part of a major military exercise that the IRGC said were aimed at displaying the country's "deterrent power and its ability to confront any threat”.

"The missiles were fired from northern Iran and hit targets in the southeast of the country," Hajizadeh told state TV.

"Some of the missiles carried 24 warheads and one tonne of TNT."

Secretary of State John Kerry spoke on Wednesday with Iran's foreign minister about the test-firing of two ballistic missiles, a State Department spokesman said.

The IRGC maintains dozens of short and medium-range ballistic missiles, the largest stock in the Middle East. It says they are solely for defensive use with conventional, non-nuclear warheads.


(Writing by Parisa Hafezi; Editing by Michael Perry)
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-idUSKCN0WB2S1

Business | Thu Mar 10, 2016 2:20am EST
Related: World, United Nations, South Korea, North Korea

North Korea fires missiles, liquidates Seoul's assets in its territory

SEOUL | By Jack Kim and Ju-min Park

North Korea fired two short-range ballistic missiles into the sea on Thursday, Seoul said, as South Korea and the United States conducted massive war games.

The North also announced it has scrapped all agreements with the South on commercial exchange projects and would "liquidate" South Korean assets left behind in its territory.

North Korea has a large stockpile of short-range missiles and is developing long-range and intercontinental missiles as well. The missiles fired on Thursday flew about 500 km (300 miles) off its east coast city of Wonsan and were likely from the Soviet-developed Scud series, South Korea's defence ministry said.

Japan, which is within range of the longer-range variant of Scud missiles or the upgraded Rodong missiles, lodged a protest through the North Korean embassy in Beijing, Japan's Kyodo news agency reported.

North Korea often fires short-range missiles when tensions rise on the Korean peninsula. Pyongyang gets particularly upset about the annual U.S.-South Korea drills, which its says are preparations for an invasion.

The U.S. and South Korea remain technically at war with the North because the 1950-53 Korean War ended in an armed truce instead of a peace agreement.

Around 17,000 U.S. military personnel are participating alongside some 300,000 South Korean troops in what South Korea's Defence Ministry has called the "largest-ever" joint military exercises.

North Korea on Sunday warned it would make a "pre-emptive and offensive nuclear strike" in response to the exercises.


Related Coverage
› Japan's Suga: urging North Korea to refrain from provocative action


"LIQUIDATING" ASSETS

After the short-range missile launches on Thursday, North Korea announced it would "liquidate" South Korean assets left behind in the Kaesong industrial zone and in the Mount Kumgang tourist zone.

Seoul suspended operations in the jointly-run zone last month as punishment for the North's rocket launch and nuclear test.

Mount Kumgang was the first major inter-Korean cooperation project. Thousands of South Koreans visited the resort between 1998 and 2008. Seoul ended the tours in 2008 after a North Korean soldier shot dead a South Korean tourist who wandered into a restricted zone.

North Korea is also livid about stepped up United Nations sanctions following its recent nuclear test and long-range missile launch.


MINIATURISED WARHEADS

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said his country has miniaturised nuclear warheads to mount on ballistic missiles, state media reported on Wednesday, and called on his military to be prepared to mount pre-emptive attacks against the United States and South Korea.


Related Coverage
› Japan lodged protest to North Korea over missile launch: Kyodo

It was his first direct comment on the technology needed to deploy nuclear missiles. North Korean state media released photographs it said showed Kim Jong Un inspecting a spherical miniaturised warhead. State media has previously made that claim, which has been widely questioned and never independently verified. [nL4N16G5IY]

South Korea's defence ministry said it did not believe the North has successfully miniaturised a nuclear warhead or deployed a functioning intercontinental ballistic missile.

State Department spokesman John Kirby declined to comment on Kim's claim to have miniaturised nuclear warheads and accused him of "provocative rhetoric."

"I'd say the young man needs to pay more attention to the North Korean people and taking care of them than in pursuing these sorts of reckless capabilities," Kirby said.

The Pentagon said this week it had not seen North Korea demonstrate a capability to miniaturise a nuclear warhead. But Captain Jeff Davis, a Pentagon spokesman, said the department was working on U.S. ballistic missile defences to be prepared.

North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test on Jan. 6 but its claim to have set off a miniaturised hydrogen bomb last month has been disputed by the U.S. and South Korean governments and many experts, who said the blast was too small to back it up.


(Additional reporting by Kaori Kaneko in Tokyo and David Brunnstrom and David Alexander in Washington. Editing by Bill Tarrant.)
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-japan-suga-idUSKCN0WC091

World | Wed Mar 9, 2016 9:45pm EST
Related: World, Japan

Japan's Suga: urging North Korea to refrain from provocative action

TOKYO

Japan's top government spokesman said on Thursday the nation continues to closely cooperate with countries such as the United States and South Korea and is urging North Korea to refrain from taking proactive action.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga told a news conference the government remains vigilant and is prepared for all circumstances.

North Korea fired two short-range ballistic missiles into the sea off its east coast city of Wonsan early on Thursday, flying approximately 500 km (300 miles), South Korea's military said.


(Reporting by Kaori Kaneko; Editing by Chang-Ran Kim)
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-china-philippines-idUSKCN0WC0VE

World | Thu Mar 10, 2016 3:34am EST
Related: World

China expresses alarm at Philippines-Japan aircraft deal

BEIJING

China expressed alarm on Thursday about an agreement in which the Philippines will lease five aircraft from Japan to help patrol the disputed South China Sea.

Philippine President Benigno Aquino said the five TC-90 training aircraft would help the navy in patrolling what the Philippines views as its territory.

The Philippines has made the modernization of its air and naval forces a priority as China deploys missiles and fighters on a number of artificial islands in the South China Sea.

China claims almost the entire South China Sea, where about $5 trillion worth of ship-borne trade passes annually. Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam also have claims to parts of the sea.

"If the Philippines' actions are to challenge China's sovereignty and security interests, China is resolutely opposed," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei told a daily news briefing.

"I also want to point out that Japan is not a party to the South China Sea issue and we are on high guard against its moves. We demand that Japan speak and act cautiously and not do anything to harm regional peace and stability."

China, the world's second-largest economy, and Japan, the third largest, have a difficult political history, with relations strained by the legacy of Japan's World War Two aggression and conflicting claims over a group of uninhabited East China Sea islets.

The Philippine military, for decades preoccupied with domestic insurgencies, has been shifting its focus to territorial defense, allocating 83 billion pesos ($1.77 billion) until 2017 to upgrade and modernize its air force and navy.

Allies the United States and South Korea have already offered help to bolter air capabilities and Aquino announced the arrival this year of two refurbished C130 transport planes from the United States.

Already in the Philippines military's plans is the acquisition of a squadron of multi-role fighters, air-to-ground missile batteries, early warning aircraft and drones.

Last week, the Philippines and Japan signed a deal on the transfer of military equipment and technology, a document Japan needs to allow it to export weapons and guarantee they will not be transferred to a third party.


(Reporting by Ben Blanchard)
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/why-weak-states-test-powerful-weapons

Why Weak States Test Powerful Weapons

Geopolitical Diary
March 10, 2016 | 02:06 GMT

If the international community routinely condemns the pursuit of strategic weapons such as ballistic missiles, not to mention the nuclear warheads they can carry, then why do so many countries insist on pursuing them? It's a question worth asking, and to answer it, we need only look at Iran and North Korea, relatively weak states that have both been pretty provocative of late.

Early this morning, Iran launched two ballistic missiles — its second launch in two days — and in doing so raised the question of whether the West would reapply sanctions against it. Separately, North Korea announced today that it had successfully miniaturized a nuclear warhead, something that would, in theory, enable the country to finally deliver its payloads. While different in scale, these kinds of actions are undertaken for one reason alone: military necessity.

Iran is opening its economy, thanks in part to the implementation of the nuclear deal and the electoral victory of the pragmatic conservative coalition of President Hassan Rouhani. But for Iranian policymakers, neither one of these things actually makes the country more secure. Maintaining and improving its ballistic missiles does. The ballistic missile program touches on the country's core security issue of deterrence, which actually transcends politics.

No matter who is in charge in Iran, the government will need to hedge against rival states including Saudi Arabia, Israel and, to a lesser extent, Turkey. Saudi Arabia is particularly alarming for Iran because of its geographic proximity, robust alliance within the Gulf Cooperation Council and years of sanctions-free spending on top-end Western military platforms. Tehran cannot realistically expect to win a conventional military conflict with Saudi Arabia, so it must rely on asymmetric responses — namely, ballistic missiles — to deter Riyadh's actions.

Notably, ballistic missiles are only tangentially related to Iran's nuclear program. A conventional ballistic missile program still has strategic value without nuclear weapons. This is why the sanctions associated with Iran's ballistic missile program are different from the sanctions related to the nuclear deal — and why Iran is compelled to continue to pursue them.

In North Korea, the pursuit of nuclear weapons likewise stems from insecurity. Leaders in Pyongyang believe a U.S.-led alliance, whose military capability far exceeds their own, is dead set on removing them from power. And though their concerns may appear irrational, it is important to bear in mind that the United States has brought down governments in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya in the past 12 years alone. And in no instance did the old ruling class survive and wield actual power.

With those concerns in mind, North Korea sought to mitigate the threat its leaders thought the United States posed. At one point, North Korea appeared to believe it could trade its nuclear capability for a long-term security guarantee. But as the years dragged on, the North Koreans developed an increasing sense that American hostility was implacable. Rightly or wrongly, North Korea now equates the possession of a viable nuclear weapon to the survival of the regime itself. And it is willing to endure hideous costs to survive. Even the recent U.N. sanctions brought against Pyongyang — the toughest sanctions in history — will not be enough to change the country's mind. To forego a nuclear program as Iraq did would be to remain vulnerable to invasion. To cooperate with the international community, as Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi did, would be to consign themselves to death.

Of course, the strategies of Iran and North Korea differ fundamentally. Iran is willing to curb its nuclear program in exchange for concessions; that it probably would not even be able to weaponize a device without incurring a pre-emptive military strike certainly informed its decision. North Korea doubled down on its program, creating just enough ambiguity to deter a pre-emptive strike. But the motivation behind the strategy — the preservation of national security — is the same. Both countries will therefore continue to test their weapons and make sure their neighbors see them do it.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.defensenews.com/story/de...ry-nato-must-reopen-nuclear-dossier/81494310/

Commentary: NATO Must Reopen the Nuclear Dossier

Karl-Heinz Kamp 10:29 a.m. EST March 9, 2016

Months before NATO's Warsaw summit in July, there is hesitance to tackle the issue of nuclear deterrence. Some allies push for clear deterrence messages against a neo-imperial Russia, others try to avoid the issue given the delicacy of nuclear questions in societies.

Still, considering the developments since 2014, the alliance will not be able to dodge the fundamental nuclear question of how to deter whom with what.

NATO’s nuclear consensus, enshrined in the 2012 “Deterrence and Defense Posture Review,” was based on the condition that Russia is a partner of NATO who will not employ its nuclear posture against the alliance. These conditions, plus a number of other basics of the previous nuclear debates, are no longer valid.

• After the annexation of Crimea, Russia ended its partnership with the alliance. The post-Cold War “European peace order” based on such institutions as NATO, EU or OSCE no longer exists. Under President Putin, who is likely to stay at the helm in Moscow until 2024, a change of Russia’s current confrontational stance should not be expected. Hence, the current realities of the Article-5 world of collective defense with its demands for deterrence are presumably to remain.

On the contrary, Putin seems caught in a “patriotism trap,” which forces him to constantly take foreign policy risks in order to fuel Russian patriotism and preserve his domestic support in light of worsening economic conditions.

• Russia considers nuclear weapons an integral part of its military power and especially as a way to compensate for its relative lack of conventional forces compared with NATO. Furthermore, nuclear forces are regarded as one of the last remaining elements of the former Soviet superpower status. Meanwhile, Russia increasingly uses its nuclear posture as a means of nuclear messaging. Flying nuclear-capable Bear bombers close to NATO’s borders or simulating nuclear strikes against Sweden or Poland in conventional exercises project are signals of intimidation and nuclear resolve.

• In light of Moscow’s current nuclear reasoning, nuclear arms control in Europe — i.e. the mutual reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons — is no longer an option. For understandable reasons, Russia will not be willing to give away nuclear weapons it regards as a compensation for its conventional weakness.

Moreover, in December 2014, Russia finally terminated the Nunn-Lugar Act, a pillar of US-Russian nuclear cooperation and a core instrument to help Russia dismantle its excessive nuclear arsenal.

• North Korea is fervently pursuing its nuclear weapons program, despite international sanctions and distinct criticism of its protector, China. Since China is apparently unwilling to discipline the stone-age leadership in Pyongyang by cutting or at least interrupting the lifelines of money or energy, North Korea’s nuclear stockpile will rise.

In less than a decade, the country is likely to have more nuclear warheads than France or the UK. This could spur neighboring countries to strive for nuclear weapons, further nuclearizing the region. South Korean and Japanese think tanks air these options already.

• Many nuclear powers never fully subscribed to the idea of a nuclear-free world as proclaimed by US President Obama in 2008. Besides, Asian nuclear powers never experienced a Cuban missile crisis, which prompted the West to reassess nuclear weapons. Thus, nuclear reductions are not regarded as a value in itself in countries like India, China, Pakistan, North Korea or Israel.

In light of these changes, NATO cannot avoid reopening the nuclear dossier to reassess the needs for nuclear deterrence in the “Article-5 world,” even if some allies hesitate for political and domestic reasons. Given the sensitiveness of the topic, the alliance should proceed in two steps.

At the Warsaw summit, member states should agree on wording that highlights the need for nuclear deterrence against any threat to NATO territory, in order to reassure the allies in Eastern Europe. Given the profound changes ignited by Russia annexing the territory of a sovereign European state, just repeating previously agreed language would not be appropriate.

After the summit, NATO should initiate a comprehensive nuclear debate comparable to the process that led to the Deterrence and Defense Posture review. This debate should focus on the questions of how to get a consensus in NATO on the future role and relevance of nuclear deterrence.

How can NATO best communicate its nuclear deterrence messages; which signals have to be sent to a potential aggressor? What shall be NATO’s declaratory policy? What does it take to make US extended nuclear deterrence for their European allies credible? Is the deployment of US nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear countries necessary and if so, which hardware (weapons and means of deployment) is required? What is the relation between nuclear deterrence and NATO’s missile defense capabilities?

Even if some allies don’t like these questions, kicking the can down the road is not an option for NATO.

Karl-Heinz Kamp is the president of the Federal Academy for Security Policy in Berlin. These views reflect only those of the author.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.defensenews.com/story/de...nee-talks-tough-love-mideast-allies/81531130/

CENTCOM Nominee Talks 'Tough Love' for Mideast Allies

Joe Gould, Defense News 7:57 p.m. EST March 9, 2016

WASHINGTON — The general tapped to oversee US Central Command said he would show “tough love” to Middle Eastern allies reluctant to shoulder more of the fight against the Islamic State group.

At his Senate Armed Services confirmation hearing Wednesday, Gen. Joseph Votel acknowledged the US needs to further engage regional powers.

“We have to, in some cases, exercise tough love with our partners to ensure that they develop the capabilities … so that they take care of their security requirements,” Votel said, adding later: "I think part of our challenge here is looking at the various interests and objectives ... and I look forward to trying to bring coherence to that with the partners we have invested in over a long period of time."

As the US seeks to avoid committing large numbers of its ground troops, its military approach hinges on working “by, with and through,” regional powers and local militias. Yet Sunni Arab allies of the US have in some cases exhibited reluctance to take on the Islamic State as robustly as the US would like because they view Iran as their main enemy and the Islamic State as a hedge against an ally of Iran, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad.

Votel currently commands US Special Operations Command (SOCOM). If confirmed, Votel would replace Army Gen. Lloyd Austin. Votel’s replacement to command SOCOM would be Army Lt. Gen. Tony Thomas, currently commander of Joint Special Operations Command.

After the hearing, the committee’s chairman, Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., said he did not foresee problems advancing the Votel and Thomas nominations to the Senate.

During the hearing, Votel took a hard tack on Iran, saying he supports tougher sanctions in light of its recent missile tests, and that Iran’s links to the barrel-bombing Assad regime need to be exposed.

“We should use the full measure of our resources: information, diplomatic, to bring the matter to people’s attention and hold them accountable,” Votel said.

More broadly, Votel expressed “concerns” with the administration’s strategy against the Islamic State, also called ISIS or ISIL.

“I do have concerns about our broader strategy against ISIL, about how we applying our resources, about how we are focusing our authorities, about how we are leveraging all of the required instruments of government — our own and our partners — in going after that,” Votel said.

Last month, Defense Secretary Ash Carter outlined broad plans to retake Islamic State’s power centers in the two countries, including encircling key cities with Iraqi security forces and U.S.-backed rebels. Just days later, the top US general in Iraq hinted that type of conventional warfare approach may require a boost in US ground forces.

About 3,700 U.S. troops are deployed in Iraq, in training and advising roles. A special operations force of nearly 200 more is also active in the region, conducting more aggressive, offensive operations against the Islamic extremist group.

Special Operations forces continue to coordinate local rebel militias. In the hearing, Thomas said he was “quite pleased” with SOCOM’s progress with US-backed rebel militias in northern Syria, which have “performed extraordinarily” and shown “tenacity” despite combat claiming 75 of them.

“By, with and through them we have been able to secure a swath of terrain that is the size of New Jersey, Delaware and most recently Rhode Island in and around Shadaddi” Thomas said, referring to an area captured by Syrian Democratic Forces last month.

In separate Capitol Hill testimony Tuesday, Votel told lawmakers he supposed a revised effort to train and equip moderate Syrian rebels battling the Islamic State.

The Obama administration had scrapped a previous effort after it emerged that the $500 million program had only four or five fighters after others had been captured, wounded or fled.

The program has hit other snags with reports of these groups fighting each other and controversy over whether they should be restricted from fighting the Assad regime.

Amid questions from Sen. Deb Fischer, R-Neb., on Wednesday, Thomas said the US is vetting leaders of these groups and including human rights and the rule of law in their training.

Asked if these groups should be disqualified from the US program if they attack one another, Thomas said, “I do.”

Email: jgould@defensenews.com

Twitter: @reporterjoe
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-savchenko-idUSKCN0WC11B

World | Thu Mar 10, 2016 5:23am EST
Related: World, Russia

EU tells Russia to free hunger-striking Ukrainian pilot Savchenko

MOSCOW

The European Union's foreign policy chief on Thursday told Russia to free Nadezhda Savchenko, a Ukrainian pilot accused over the killing of two Russian journalists, as Savchenko relaxed a hunger strike by starting to take liquids.

The 34-year-old is regarded as a national hero by many Ukrainians, but is charged in Russia with complicity in the killing of two Russian TV journalists during fighting between Ukrainian government troops and separatists in eastern Ukraine in 2014. She denies wrongdoing.

On Thursday, Federica Mogherini, the EU's foreign policy chief, called on the Russian government to set Savchenko free, following similar calls from U.S. officials.

"This is no longer just a judicial or political case: now it's a matter of human compassion," Mogherini said in a statement released by the bloc's Moscow embassy.

"Her health condition is deteriorating rapidly and we all fear terrible consequences," said Mogherini, demanding Savchenko be set free on humanitarian grounds.

Nikolai Polozov, Savchenko's lawyer, told Reuters on Thursday his client had relaxed a hunger strike she embarked upon to protest against what she saw as the Russian court's overly lengthy proceedings and had started to take liquids while still refusing food.

She stopped consuming liquids last Thursday. Polozov said she had changed her mind after a request to do so from Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and her supporters.

Her plight has prompted angry Ukrainians to pelt the Russian embassy in Kiev with eggs and Russians to picket the Ukrainian embassy in Moscow to demand justice for the killed journalists.

Savchenko, who was captured by pro-Moscow rebels in June 2014 and handed over to Russia, will be sentenced on March 21-22. She faces up to 25 years in a Russian jail if found guilty.

She has raised the possibility she will starve herself to death unless a deal is quickly struck after the verdict to return her to Ukraine.


(Reporting by Dmitry Solovyov; Editing by Christian Lowe/Andrew Osborn)
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Man, talk about selling a bridge to the EU...

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-turkey-minister-idUSKCN0WC0Z6

World | Thu Mar 10, 2016 4:32am EST
Related: World

Turkey EU minister: Migrants readmitted only after EU deal goes into effect - Anadolu

ISTANBUL


A deal between Turkey and the European Union to readmit migrants does not apply to refugees already on Greek islands but to those who arrive once the agreement is in effect, Anadolu Agency quoted EU Affairs Minister Volkan Bozkir as saying on Thursday.

The number of migrants Turkey will take back will be in the thousands or tens of thousands, not in the millions, Bozkir also told state-run Anadolu, according to its Twitter account.

He also said that candidate country Turkey will meet its obligations to win visa-free travel to the EU by May 1. The EU promised Turkey 6 billion euro in aid for Syrian war refugees and an acceleration of Ankara's long-stalled membership talks in exchange for a clampdown on illegal migration to the bloc, which experts say has hit 130,000 so far this year.


(Reporting by Ayla Jean Yackley; Editing by David Dolan)

___


For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35772206

Migrant crisis: Merkel condemns closure of Balkan route

52 minutes ago
From the section Europe

German Chancellor Angela Merkel has blamed European nations for "unilaterally" shutting the Balkan route for migrants.

She said this had put Greece in a "very difficult situation" and such decisions should be taken by the whole of the EU.

Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, and non-EU members Serbia and Macedonia have all acted to stem the migrant flow.

The EU and Turkey, from where migrants reach Greece, have set out a plan to ease the crisis.

Under the proposals, hammered out at a summit in Brussels on Monday but still to be finalised, all migrants arriving in Greece from Turkey would be sent back. For each Syrian returned, a Syrian in Turkey would be resettled in the EU.




European Council President Donald Tusk has said the plan would spell the end of "irregular migration to Europe".

It is the worst such crisis in Europe since World War Two.


More on the migrant crisis
◾Could Turkey carry out the migrant plan?
◾Doubts over EU-Turkey deal
◾Crisis explained in seven charts
◾Key migrant crisis questions answered
◾Have previous EU migrant deals delivered?


The move to close the Balkan route began with Austria announcing it would limit the number of migrants crossing its border.

Then, late on Tuesday, Slovenia said it would allow in only migrants who planned to seek asylum in the country, or those with clear humanitarian needs.





Jump media player

Media player help



Out of media player. Press enter to return or tab to continue.

Media captionChristian Fraser at the Idomeni camp: "It's beginning to dawn on people that the gate isn't going to open any time soon"

Serbia and Croatia quickly announced similar border restrictions. Then on Wednesday, Macedonia, which had slowed the number of migrants crossing its border with Greece to a trickle, shut it completely.

Some 14,000 migrants are now left stranded in a sprawling tent camp at the Idomeni crossing.

A draft statement from the Brussels summit had declared the Balkan route "closed". But Germany objected to the wording and it was changed.

Mrs Merkel said at the time that declaring the closure was wrong.





Jump media player

Media player help



Out of media player. Press enter to return or tab to continue.

Media captionChinese artist and dissident Ai Weiwei visited the camp on Wednesday





Jump media player

Media player help



Out of media player. Press enter to return or tab to continue.

Media captionGreek minister: EU states 'obliged' to take migrants

Speaking to MDR radio on Thursday, she repeated her position, saying that closing the route "does not resolve the problem" and would "not be sustainable or lasting".

She said: "Personally I think that Austria's unilateral decision, and then those made subsequently by Balkan countries, will obviously bring us fewer refugees, but they put Greece in a very difficult situation.

"If we do not manage to reach a deal with Turkey, then Greece cannot bear the weight for long.

"That's why I am seeking a real European solution, that is, a solution for all 28 [EU members]," she said.

However, Austria on Thursday insisted the closure of the Balkan route was "permanent". Interior Minister Johanna Mikl-Leitner said only a "consistent signal" would deter people from seeking asylum in Europe.


Map locator

Map
The EU-Turkey deal is far from certain to be adopted. Talks will continue ahead of an EU meeting on 17-18 March.

On Thursday, Turkey insisted the one-in, one-out deal for Syrian migrants would not apply to those already in Greece.

The deal also raises legal questions. Thorbjorn Jagland, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, told the BBC the proposal to send migrants back would contravene international law.

More than a million migrants and refugees crossed into Europe in 2015.

Germany itself had more than 476,000 asylum applications last year but officials there believe more than a million migrants, from all countries, are in its system for counting and distributing people before they make claims.


What's in the EU-Turkey proposal?

The EU heads said "bold moves" were needed, and made the following proposals:
◾All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to Greece will be returned to Turkey. Irregular migrants means all those outside normal transit procedures, ie without documentation.
◾In exchange for every returned Syrian, one Syrian from Turkey will be resettled in the EU
◾Plans to ease access to the EU for Turkish citizens will be speeded up, with a view to allowing visa-free travel by June
◾EU payment of €3bn ($3.3bn; £2.2bn) promised in October will be speeded up, with the possibility of further aid to help Turkey deal with the crisis. Turkey reportedly asked for the sum to be doubled
◾Preparations will be made for opening new chapters in talks on EU membership for Turkey


A note on terminology: The BBC uses the term migrant to refer to all people on the move who have yet to complete the legal process of claiming asylum. This group includes people fleeing war-torn countries such as Syria, who are likely to be granted refugee status, as well as people who are seeking jobs and better lives, who governments are likely to rule are economic migrants.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
:dot5::dot5::dot5:

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.rt.com/news/335069-kurds-turkey-syria-rebels-sarin/

Syrian Kurds accuse Turkey of aiding sarin gas delivery to rebels after fresh chemical attacks

Published time: 10 Mar, 2016 01:09
Edited time: 10 Mar, 2016 02:18

In an interview with RT, a spokesman for the Kurdish YPG militia accused Turkey of providing a clear transit route for the chemical weapons that were deployed against them near the city of Aleppo on Tuesday.

READ MORE: ISIS shelled Kurdish-controlled Iraq village with 'poisonous substances' – governor

Syrian anti-government militants “took advantage of the ceasefire” to launch attacks against a Kurdish-controlled area near Aleppo in northern Syria, Redur Xelil told RT. The attackers targeted a civilian district of what was once Syria’s biggest city, and has since become a key battleground. According to Xelil, the shells emitted an “unnatural smell” and “yellow smoke” upon impact, indicating that chemical weapons were involved.

“Our sources inside the rebel groups have confirmed that toxic substances were used. We also have verified information that sarin gas was delivered to them from Turkey. All signs point to the fact that these factions were using banned weapons, but we cannot access the launching area, as it is located on the front between the Turkish and rebel forces,” Xelil told RT by Skype from Rojava in Syria.

Kurdish deputies in the Turkish parliament have previously accused Ankara of supplying Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL) and other jihadist groups inside Syria with chemical weapons, which are used both in their fight against the Syrian government and to pin responsibility for their deployment on the regime of President Bashar Assad.

Tuesday’s attack, which also involved phosphorus, did not result in any severe casualties.

“This attack was a failure, but this doesn’t mean that there won’t be another one. We are convinced the enemy has improvised shells containing phosphorus and sarin gas,” said Xelil.

READ MORE: Who’s behind alleged Aleppo chemical weapons attack?

Last month, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) accused IS of using chemical weapons against Kurdish forces throughout 2015. Reports emerged on Wednesday revealing that the jihadist group had launched a new chemical attack on the Kurdish village of Zaza in northern Iraq, in which more than 40 civilians suffered chemical burns and lung damage.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/mar/10/refugee-crisis-turkey-deal-europe-values

Refugees
Opinion

This Turkish deal is illegal and betrays Europe’s values

Guy Verhofstadt

The refugee crisis won’t be solved by the EU signing a pact with an increasingly authoritarian regime

Thursday 10 March 2016 02.00 EST
Comments 103

Our increasingly divided and desperate European leaders are failing to deliver an effective collective response to the escalating refugee crisis. Instead of devising a strategy to protect those fleeing the barbarity of Assad, Islamic State (Isis) and the Russian air force, EU leaders are obsessed with devising a system to “stem the flow” – in other words to push desperate refugees back into the Aegean sea.

At the EU-Turkey summit on Monday, the Turkish prime minister, Ahmed Davutoðlu, offered European leaders the illusory “quick fix’’ they sought, in return for a number of concessions. The basic principle of the “one in, one out” deal on offer is that any economic migrant or Syrian refugee trafficked to a Greek island will be forcibly returned to Turkey. For every Syrian sent back to Turkey from Greece, another Syrian would be accepted by EU countries and distributed under a quota scheme. It seems that both the EU and Ankara are willing to take the bait and a deal may be concluded next week, but Europe’s leaders should be careful what they wish for.

There are a number of reasons why this approach is not just immoral, but fundamentally flawed. First, compulsory mass expulsions are, quite rightly, outlawed by the 1951 UN convention on refugees. This treaty has been signed and promoted by the EU. Article 19 of the EU’s own charter of fundamental rights specifically states that “collective expulsions are forbidden”. The UN has already made it clear that mass returns would not be consistent with international law. We know Turkey has an appalling human rights record and a non-functioning asylum system. There is even evidence that Turkey has been forcibly expelling Syrian refugees back into Syria. Does Europe really want to be responsible for an expansion of this?

Given that we are simultaneously paying Turkey money to stop the flow from Turkey to Greece, one can only conclude that EU leaders are now deliberately attempting to construct a system to ensure that Europe doesn’t have to take any more refugees despite our international obligations, including under the Geneva conventions, to do so. This is deeply wrong.

Other parts of the draft agreement with Turkey offer a number of concessions, including more money, accelerated accession talks and a visa waiver from June. These are also hugely problematic, given the deteriorating human rights situation in Turkey and its government’s brutal clampdown on the free press.

Just last week, we saw the appalling occupation of Turkey’s largest independent newspaper, Zaman. The EU’s priority should be to bring Turkey back from the verge of becoming an authoritarian regime and using the EU accession process, to which it is party, to cement human rights values and good governance.

Instead, by offering visa-free travel across Europe’s crumbling Schengen zone, we will be complicit in handing Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoðan a domestic political victory. Any agreement must include enforceable commitments from it to reverse its crackdown on media freedom and civil liberties.

Instead of trying to outsource our problems by signing up to a dodgy deal with Turkey, we should be working together to take matters into our own hands, by delivering three immediate actions. The first action we should take is to fast-track the establishment of a well-funded and well-resourced European border and coastguard service, capable of managing the European Union’s external border and processing asylum claims, instead of relying on Turkey to do this for us.

Second, instead of giving Turkey billions of euros, this money should be given directly to the UNHCR, to provide education facilities and a humane existence to people stuck in the refugee camps. And we should be working much harder as a bloc to provide a political solution to the Syrian conflict and doing more to contain Russian military aggression, by agreeing enhanced EU sanctions against Moscow.

The European Union is a community of nations which, despite being ravaged by two world wars and divided by the cold war, managed to come together to deliver peace, security and prosperity for a generation. Despite its failings, the EU has broadly succeeded in these aims.

One of the reasons for this is that the EU has never just been one giant internal market, as British prime minister David Cameron and many others would like it to become. It has been, and must continue to be, a community of nations where fundamental human rights are safeguarded and furthered. As much as it is a free trade area, it is a community of values.

We are mistaken if we think that Turkey can take away our problems or the refugee crisis; it cannot. Only a genuine European approach, based on solidarity and humanity can do this. Signing up to this cynical deal with Turkey will mean tearing up the very legal order Europe built from the rubble of the second world war. Drinking from Erdoðan’s poisoned chalice is not the solution.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.thenation.com/article/turkey-is-fighting-a-dirty-war-against-its-own-kurdish-population/

Turkey Is Fighting a Dirty War Against Its Own Kurdish Population

A report from behind the lines, as PKK rebels resist a ferocious government campaign to crush their uprising.

By Jesse Rosenfeld
Yesterday 1:26 pm

Cizre, Turkey – The streets here are almost desolate, except for the armored personnel carriers that patrol this war-wrecked Kurdish city. The few children who have recently returned or withstood two and a half months of curfew and intense fighting kick around a ball, while their parents salvage the remnants of their homes, scorched black and blown apart by intense shelling. Pavement ripped up by tank tracks is pocked with craters where Kurdish rebels detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against their enemy. Pain and suffering are etched on the faces of survivors, who now live under the close surveillance of an invading army.

This is not Syria, nor is it Iraq. It is Turkey, America’s NATO partner, now in the throes of a rapidly expanding war against its Kurdish population in the country’s southeast. Lazar Simeonov and I are the first foreign journalists to pass through the ring of steel that surrounds Cizre since Turkish government forces started a military campaign last year to crush an uprising by the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

Checkpoints surrounding the city prevent access to almost everyone but local residents, and police thoroughly search anyone entering. We observe heavily armed special forces as they search a pregnant woman trying to leave the city. She looks agonized and helpless, reclining on a stretcher, as the troops order her husband and young children out of the emergency ambulance for pat-downs as they sift through medical equipment in search of weapons.

Hundreds of civilians were killed before the military assault ended on February 11. Human-rights groups say government forces have carried out massacres of civilians and extrajudicial killings. However, according a Cankýz Çevik, a spokesperson for the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (an Ankara-based organization that is recognized by Amnesty International, the Council of Europe, the Red Cross, and the UN for its documentation of human-rights violations and support for survivors of torture across Turkey), gathering accurate information has been hampered by the Turkish government. She says her organization’s forensic specialists have been denied access to autopsies and blocked from the city, which remains under curfew.

Cizre and the old city of Diyarbakir—the de facto capital of Turkish Kurdistan—have seen the most severe fighting in an urban rebellion that has spread across what Kurds call northern Kurdistan. It’s a homeland the Turkish government refuses to recognize. Nor does it guarantee national minority status for an ethnic group that makes up some 20 percent of the country’s population, concentrated in the southeast but also a large minority in Istanbul.

According to PKK fighters and commanders that The Nation spoke to behind barricades in the embattled city of Nuysabin, on Turkey’s border with Syria, it was the government’s unwillingness to accept national minority rights during peace negotiations nine months ago that led to the collapse of talks. They say this new war—the latest phase in a three-decade conflict—will expand, and they vow that the PKK will move its guerrillas into eastern, Kurdish-majority cities in the coming months while also bringing the war to the country’s major metropolises, like Istanbul.

The government claims that it’s engaged in a war against terrorists who are destabilizing the country. Indeed, the government lists the PKK as a terrorist organization, as do the European Union and the United States. It’s clear that the government granted us access to Cizre in the hope that we would see the war through its eyes. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has little interest in discussing Kurdish demands for rights and autonomy. An hour after Turkish police violently broke up a demonstration we covered in Diyarbakir, a local AKP representative canceled our scheduled interview.

***

Passing through a checkpoint in Cizre, where soldiers wearing balaclavas and carrying submachine guns hold up residents for hours, the commander in charge is hesitant about giving us access.

“If we don’t let them in to see what things look like, they will only hear the PKK propaganda,” Samih Deniz, a representative from the prime minister’s press office who coordinated our visit, tells the commander, who finally relents, though he insists on an armored police escort. They follow us closely, trying to direct our interviews and monitor the photos we take.

“Smile,” the cops instruct terrified Kurdish residents standing in front of their battered homes and shops as Simeonov snaps photos. “You see what the terrorists did here,” Deniz tells me as I walk through a second-floor room of a house with a huge hole in the wall, one clearly caused by a government tank shell. “Look at this destruction they cause,” he adds, in the charred room where heat from the blast had melted the shattered glass.

Under fear of reprisal from these occupying forces, the residents, whenever they’re in earshot of Deniz or the police, say only that they are trapped between the PKK and government forces. It’s only after Simeonov and I split up and lose our escorts on the rubble-filled side streets that we start to hear the real stories from survivors of a merciless government onslaught.

“Kurdish people are fighting for our rights, and Turkey is trying to finish us off,” says 53-year-old Ramazon Sakci as he stands in the garden of his home, which is riddled with bullet holes. His house is in better condition than most—its walls are intact, while his neighbors’ homes have been blown apart. Sakci hid with his 12 children in his basement during the 10 days of bombardment before they were finally able to leave.

“Turkey may give us [Turkish] ID cards, but they attack us all because we are Kurds,” he adds, accusing the Turkish government of collective punishment intended to suppress the community’s political demands.

As he vents his frustration, we hear the rumble of armored personnel carriers patrolling the adjacent main road. The smell of death is everywhere, three weeks after the end of fighting. Residents describe how the military first surrounded them with tanks in the mountains overlooking the city, then rained shells down on them from all directions. After weeks of bombardment, police special forces and soldiers entered the city, going house to house.

“Where is America?” fumes a middle-aged woman with a traditional white head scarf. She declines to give her name, fearing reprisal, and lashes out at the United States’ silence regarding its NATO ally’s treatment of the Kurds.

Surrounded by neighbors on a street corner, she describes bloody, close-quarter combat. Rebels had punched holes in the upper-level apartments to provide firing positions against government forces. “We lost 21 people in this street to army snipers,” she says, pointing to the high ground overlooking the neighborhood. She can only see a future of more intense fighting. “Our children now grow up with feelings of revenge.”

A sense of betrayal is common among Cizre’s survivors, who want to know why the West supports the Kurdish rebels in Syria but calls their allies in Turkey terrorists, even though they have the same leader and ideology.

All we here is Kobani, Kobani, Kobani; what about Cizre?” says Zahila Sahin, 50, referring to the Syrian Kurdish city whose defenders were celebrated around the world in 2014-15—and supported by Western airpower—as they withstood a months-long siege by the Islamic State, or ISIS. As she drinks tea with her husband in the front yard of their shrapnel-filled house, Sahin condemns as hypocrisy the US policy of supporting Kurds when fighting for their rights against ISIS but not when doing the same against Turkey.

According to Çevik of the Human Rights Foundation, at least 92 civilians were killed in this town of 132,000 between December 14, when the curfew began, and February 11. Casualty numbers between February 5 and 11 have not been fully calculated, but she says that at least 178 additional people were killed in three basements where people took shelter during the security forces’ final advance at that time. It’s unclear if they were hit with government shells, grenades, or rockets, but the bodies were burned so badly, Çevik says, that 101 of them have still not been identified.

The government claims they were all PKK fighters, but Çevik disputes this, saying, “Maybe just one or two of those killed in the basement were militants.” The Human Rights Foundation has called it a massacre. “[Turkish security forces] imposed the curfew on Cizre. They are responsible for what happened inside it,” she says bluntly over the phone from her Ankara office.

The gruesome way these 178 people were killed has outraged Turkey’s Kurds. In neighborhoods now filled with barricades in the border town of Nusaybin, “Revenge for Cizre” is scrawled on the walls.

* * *

Nusaybin, a PKK guerrilla stronghold, a base for hit-and-run attacks on Turkish security forces, has been a frequent victim of government curfews since the peace process broke down in July. Just outside the bustling downtown of this small city, which is only a few miles from Syria, barricades of paving stones in working-class neighborhoods block the streets. Multicolored blankets with slits for wind to pass through are strung between balconies to block the view of government snipers. Drones circle overhead.

Teenage boys stand on the corners, serving as scouts for rebels and delivering messages on foot to relay information about suspicious activity. Nothing here is communicated by cellphone.

Tensions are running high when we arrive in the city. Two weeks earlier, the PKK kidnapped and then released three Turkish journalists. Just two days before our visit, rebels launched a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attack on police special forces, killing one officer and wounding two others. Dubbed the Civil Protection Units (YPS), these PKK militias are modeled on the US-backed Syrian Kurdish armed wing, known as the People’s Protection Units, or YPG.

At first, Nusaybin seems like any other Kurdish municipality in Turkey. Police stations are protected behind sandbags and reinforced walls, while up-armored police and military vehicles are parked outside, but the downtown cafés and shops are bustling with midday commerce. As we arrive for a meeting with the legally recognized Democratic Regions Party (DBP), a left-leaning organization representing Kurds at the municipal level, the pressure from the crackdown becomes clear. Turkish police had come to the DBP offices 15 minutes ahead of us and arrested the local party cochair, Zinet Algoin. Our meeting is canceled.

Turkey’s targeting of legally recognized Kurdish parties is nothing new. Nationally organized Kurdish parties have been banned on several occasions, accused of being fronts for the PKK. The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), a coalition of Turkish socialist and Kurdish parties formed out of the 2013 Gezi Park protests, is regularly accused by the government of advocating terrorism.

A small crowd has gathered outside the shuttered storefront office, and local residents chatter excitedly, anxiety etched on their faces. Nearby, we meet a local activist from the embattled Yenisehir neighborhood. He leads us out of the downtown and through a network of side streets, walking at a brisk pace and constantly looking over his shoulder. “Take off your sunglasses,” he instructs me. “You stick out as foreign.”

We cross a parking lot edged with rubble and mounds of dirt and encounter a pimply-faced teenager. He looks at us for a second, flashes a grin, and nods in our direction. We continue into a maze of barricaded streets while the kid slips away to let the fighters know of our arrival.

Old women hang their laundry under the cover of the concealing blankets while kids play in the dirt street under a cloudless sky. Only a few cobblestones are now left on the roads and sidewalks between barricades. It’s as if this Kurdish community has put into practice a famous slogan from the 1968 Paris revolt—“Beneath the paving stones, the beach.”

On these near-empty roads where surveillance drones circle overhead, it seems beyond coincidence when we encounter the same three-person construction crew carrying a large drill on four separate occasions. Indeed, it turns out they are PKK fighters observing our movements. Eventually, they introduce themselves and lead us to a house that serves as their operations center.

Posters of jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan are plastered on the living-room wall next to pictures of fallen guerrillas from the neighborhood. In the back garden, young men and women in green fatigues and cargo pants sit around, drink tea, and watch their walkie-talkies. The PKK puts great focus on gender parity and an even greater propaganda emphasis on the feminist nature of its struggle.

Mustafa, who doesn’t give his real name, pulls out chairs on the porch and insists we sit down for tea. “First we have tea, then we will take you to the commander,” says the 26-year-old with a mustache bushy enough to send an envious Stalin spinning in his grave.

“We can’t leave the neighborhood, because it’s too risky,” he says, donning a vest and green cargoes. Still, he points out that police forces haven’t attempted to raid the community in two months. He says their biggest problem is not the surveillance drones but police snipers.

Mustafa then cuts his explanation short and disappears into the house, reappearing moments later with a double-barreled shotgun. Stepping into the street and taking aim at the white dot buzzing in the sky, he fires. But the drone is far out of range. He then grabs two more shells, opens the barrel, and stuffs them inside. As he takes careful aim again, I can’t seem to shake the image of him as a frustrated kid playing duck hunt on the original Nintendo. But this is no video game. Once again he fires, still too far out of range. “These drones just take pictures,” he reassures me.

We finish our tea and are then led by a different guide through another maze of barricaded streets where “PKK” and “YPS” are scrawled on the walls. Jumping into the back of an unmarked white van, we are driven across town to the neighborhood of Frat, which has also joined the rebellion. The bridge connecting the district to the city center is partially blown up; a gas truck riddled with bullets has become a barricade on the other side. “They blew up the truck when security forces tried to invade the other day,” our guide says, referring to PKK guerrillas. We had also seen blown-up trucks in many areas of intense fighting in Cizre; these makeshift bombs are a common weapon deployed against government forces.

Navigating yet another network of dirt roads and cobblestone barricades, we reach the commander’s post. Going by the nom de guerre Botan Dersim, the tall, thin 40-year-old guerrilla leader shows us into a locked back room with large, glossy posters of martyrs on the walls. He has come down from the PKK bases in the Qandil Mountains, across the border in Iraqi Kurdistan, to train and organize local YPS volunteers.

When negotiations fell apart last year, Turkey began a bombing campaign against this irregular army’s cross-border havens, targeting their bases in the mountains. (As a first step in the talks in early 2015, the PKK had recalled its fighters from Turkey to Qandil, from where they had also been deploying to fight ISIS’s advance on the northern Iraqi front lines in Sinjar and near Kirkuk. PKK forces not only fought ISIS but trained the besieged Yazidis of northwestern Iraq to do so as well.)

Dersim blames Erdogan for the collapse of the peace process, pointing to the Turkish president’s refusal to recognize a distinct national status for the Kurds. Dersim says the aim of the PKK’s current offensive is to create the conditions for a political solution, not to move toward sovereignty.

“The [negotiation] table is important, but for it to work, we have to get rights [enshrined] in the Constitution,” he contends, arguing that the PKK’s goal is to end Turkish police control of Kurdish communities and gain political and cultural autonomy. “We are not fighting to replace the Turkish state; we are fighting for rights and recognition,” he adds, citing Ocalan’s recent calls for local democratic control—much as the Kurdish cantons in northern Syria have put in place. “It’s OK if there are Turkish soldiers on the border, but not their police in our streets,” he insists.

* * *

Abdullah Ocalan has achieved a status among Kurds much like that of Nelson Mandela. A political theorist who first pursued a Marxist national liberation struggle uniting the Kurds across four countries (Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran), he cofounded the PKK in 1978, leading the movement in a protracted and bloody guerrilla resistance in the 1980s and ’90s, until his capture in 1999. Ocalan’s original death sentence was commuted, and he officially abandoned Marxism and the goal of independence before last year’s peace talks. He adopted the philosophy of the late American anarchist Murray Bookchin, developing a theory of loosely federated Kurdish communities that would not necessarily cause the breakup of Turkey’s national territory. Ocalan has become a symbol of a struggle that crosses many of the divides in Kurdish national politics. While there are large differences among Kurdish national movements, Ocalan as a figure stands above them.

For Dersim, real negotiations can only begin when Ocalan is released from his island prison and leads the Kurds at the negotiating table. Until then, Dersim promises an expanded war. He contends that thousands of guerrillas will soon be coming down from the Qandil Mountains and fanning out across southeastern Turkey. “We expect heavy clashes across northern Kurdistan in the spring. There will also be clashes in Turkish metropolises,” Dersim insists.

Dersim, who claims there are hundreds of fighters in Nusaybin, says the YPS militia primarily uses RPGs, AK-47s, and IEDs against Turkish government forces. He claims the PKK has killed hundreds of Turkish soldiers already; official Turkish numbers are considerably lower. He also implies the PKK has taken heavy losses, but he won’t give numbers. Along with lots of new recruits and the return of fighters from Qandil, he says, they have received an additional boost from Turkish Kurds who fought in Syria alongside the YPG against ISIS. Those battle-hardened troops are now returning to join the resistance in Turkey.

* * *

The war in Syria has had a profound military and political impact on Turkey. On February 17, a PKK splinter group carried out a bombing in Ankara that killed 27 Turkish soldiers and one civilian. Turkey, quick to blame not only the PKK but also its Syrian sisters in the YPG, began shelling Kurdish positions across the border in the Syrian province of Aleppo, as the YPG advanced amid the chaos created by Russian bombing.

Kurds blame Turkey for not doing enough to combat ISIS, accusing Ankara of giving the jihadists leeway to attack them. They also generally hold Turkey responsible for the ISIS bombing last July in the town of Suruc, which killed 33 people, mostly young leftist students who were meeting there to help rebuild the Syrian city of Kobani, just across the border.

That attack put the final nail in the coffin of an already moribund peace process. The PKK avenged the blast with an attack on Turkish police, killing two officers. The Turkish government responded with a bombing campaign in northern Iraq and Syria that primarily targeted the PKK—although Ankara claimed it was equally targeting ISIS. The offensive was accompanied by mass arrests that were also supposedly targeting the PKK and ISIS but in fact focused on Kurdish civilians and banned left-wing organizations. Kurds again lashed out at Turkey after an ISIS bombing in Ankara last October of a pro-Kurdish and pro-peace demonstration led by the HDP; 102 civilians died.

When peace talks began last April, there was much optimism in the Kurdish community. The HDP had positioned itself as the central broker between the PKK and the government. Its leaders met with Ocalan in jail and carried his demands to Erdogan.

However, that all started to change after the parliamentary elections last June, when the HDP did better than many expected, winning 13 percent of the vote, well over the heightened 10 percent threshold that most believe was intended to block them from participation in Parliament. The HDP’s success denied Erdogan’s AKP a majority.

“In the June elections the HDP was successful, but Erdogan saw that and went on a war footing,” says Omer Onen, cochair of the Diyarbakir branch of the party. He accuses Erdogan and his party of deliberately sabotaging the talks and cracking down across the southeast, using war with the Kurds to raise tensions and change the parliamentary poll results. As conflict raged throughout the summer and fall, the AKP delayed forming a government. After another vote was held in November, the AKP regained its majority.

Now the HDP has found itself on the sidelines in both Kurdish and Turkish politics. “We tried to stop the PKK from its threats to expand the conflict,” says Gulsen Ozer, the other regional party cochair. “If this war expands, we will have no role to play,” she adds.

According to Ercan Baran, an organizer in Diyarbakir with DISK, a large Kurdish-majority labor union, the hope that infused the HDP’s vision of the peace process is evaporating. “Kurds saw a place for themselves in a new, democratic vision of Turkey,” he says, sitting in his living room. “But with the way that this has hit everyone, people increasingly can’t see themselves reconciling with Turkey.”

* * *

Now, on the streets of the de facto Kurdish capital of Diyarbakir, the example the YPG has set of liberating Kurdish territory by force in Syria is increasingly popular. Turkey’s siege and bombardment of the district of Sur, lasting more than 90 days, has become a driving force in this changing attitude. Reports of civilians trapped by the fighting and stories of women fighters killed in action being stripped naked and left in the streets to rot for weeks have incensed the population. The few dozen guerrillas still fighting to hold off Turkish security forces have become a symbol of inspiration to many Kurds.

The shelling of Sur can be heard from around the city, and helicopters constantly circle overhead, while the large military and police barracks in the heart of the city are a constant reminder of life under occupation.

Inside Sur, the staging area for the Turkish offensive is filled with military vehicles. Next to the bombed-out buildings of this UNESCO world heritage site, recaptured buildings are draped in massive Turkish flags.

Alongside their military campaign, security forces have invited the media to observe the formation of a two-hour humanitarian corridor to allow civilians and the wounded to leave. Placing ambulances in front of their armored vehicles, the authorities announce over loudspeakers that they will provide assistance to anyone wanting to escape the fighting.

Not a single person emerges. The residents of Sur look on helplessly behind police barricades about 50 yards away. “This is all theater,” a woman in her 40s says of this window of reprieve. “Our children have been in there for 90 days.”

An armored Humvee pans its rooftop machine gun menacingly across the crowd. When the security forces notice me talking to people behind the barricade, they start screaming frantically and order me to go look at the empty ambulance. “This will be the last time we create this corridor,” a government press official says as the clock winds down. “After this, the final push will begin.”

Thousands take to the streets of Diyarbakir the next day to demand that security forces end the siege and create an extended humanitarian opening. But it’s not just those caught up in the fighting who feel the repression. Throughout the city, water cannon and APCs patrol the streets, constantly on the alert for protests, which invariably end with tear gas barrages and high-pressure water blasts. Kurdish journalists are routinely arrested and jailed for writing critically about the government or security forces. Thirty of them are currently behind bars.

As people gather in a park and on the street next to it, riot police move in on both sides. As if repeating a choreographed chain of events, middle-aged women, dubbed “the mothers of peace,” form a barrier between young people and the police. “Everywhere is Sur, everywhere is revolution!” the crowd chants, followed by calls of “The PKK is the people, this is the people!” Chants like these are usually followed by attacks on the protesters. As a result, fewer young people see political action as a path to achieving their rights.

“We don’t believe in this fake peace process anymore,” says 25-year-old Yeter, who declines to give her full name because she worries about future police harassment. Wearing a dress with bright traditional Kurdish colors, she expresses the frustration, disillusionment, and determination of a generation that grew up with war and has been let down by failed negotiations. “I believe in both the armed and the popular struggle together,” she says, pointing to the YPG’s success in Syria as her main source of inspiration for the future of the struggle in Turkey.

Interestingly, she speaks in Turkish. Most of this generation grew up when the Kurdish language was banned, students were forbidden to speak it in school, and parents were discouraged from teaching it to their kids. While the ban has been lifted since the end of military rule, Kurdish is still not taught in public schools, and no state resources are spent on its promotion. Although Kurdish is more common in smaller communities, in Diyarbakir, almost all the signs are in Turkish, even though the city is almost entirely Kurdish. Most of the young people who do speak Kurdish have learned it as a second language, and study it as part of their cultural and political activism.

As the speeches wind down, the police come on the loudspeakers. “We have given you time for your democratic expression,” a booming voice echoes. “Now it’s time for you to go home.” No sooner is the announcement made than the crowd is beset with volleys of tear gas and water cannon laced with Mace.

Yet it is what happens to those detained that opens a window into the totality of the repression. According to Raci Bilici, chairperson of the Human Rights Association based in Diyarbakir, torture and beatings are on the rise again. He describes a routine police practice of beating arrested Kurds on the floor of armored vehicles all the way to the interrogation centers. Since the beginning of this round of conflict, he says, his organization has documented 101 cases of torture, and he adds that many don’t report it because they fear additional reprisal from the state.

Amid the omnipresence of war and repression, it is common to hear Kurds compare their current situation with the violence of the 1990s and early 2000s, when Turkey carried out a brutal counterinsurgency in the countryside, where it torched an estimate 2,400 villages. Those displaced ended up mostly moving into the working-class neighborhoods of Kurdish cities, which were largely spared from the violence in that round of fighting.

This new battle is primarily urban and fought by the children of those who fled the countryside. It’s a story exemplified in the life of Mahmut Oruc, a 23-year-old guerrilla killed in Sur. His older sister, 33-year-old Selvinaz Coban, is part of a family that has gone on a hunger strike and keeps a constant vigil in a downtown Diyarbakir park to demand the return of their loved one’s remains.

“In our village, he saw people dragged out of their homes and beaten in the streets,” she says, reflecting on what set her brother on the path to armed struggle. “We used to hear the screams of those taken to the nearby army base and tortured.”

Coban talks about how the exploitation and poverty experienced by Kurdish workers and the discrimination against Kurdish students led her brother to join the PKK when he was 17.

“We tried dialogue during the peace process, we tried to find a middle way,” she says, exasperated. “But the other side always wanted to assert their power. I no longer believe in peace.” •
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.thenation.com/article/kiev-increasingly-resembles-an-american-colony/

War and Peace
Cold War
Audio

Kiev Increasingly Resembles an American Colony

The possibility that an American may become Ukraine’s prime minister increases the impression that Kiev’s major decisions are made in Washington.

By Stephen F. Cohen
Yesterday 10:54 am

Audio of John Batchelor Show

Nation Contributing Editor Stephen F. Cohen and John Batchelor continue their weekly discussions of the new US-Russian Cold War. (Previous installments are at TheNation.com.) With Kiev sinking into political and economic crisis, Washington is pushing for the American Natalie Jaresko, currently Ukraine’s finance minister, to replace the immensely unpopular Arseniy P. Yatsenyuk as prime minister. Cohen asks why a country of 40 million citizens has to appoint so many foreigners to high-level government positions. As a result, Kiev increasingly resembles an American colony or dependency. That the Western-backed “Maidan Revolution” for “independence,” in February 2014, may be in its death agony, with Ukraine mired in civil war and in economic ruin, was dramatized, Cohen reports, by a top European Union official’s recent statement that the country could not even aspire to EU membership, the professed goal of the Maidan leadership, “in the next 20 to 25 years.” Nearly 10,000 people have died and millions been displaced for a purpose that was ill-fated and unwise from the outset. In the United States, only “Putin’s Russia” is blamed for the tragedy, but Cohen argues that the Obama administration and EU leadership are equally, if not more, responsible.

Batchelor asks if longstanding Russophobia is driving Washington’s fervent opposition to cooperation with Moscow both on Ukraine and now, in regard to the partial ceasefire, on Syria. Cohen thinks that Russophobia, which can be traced to czarist pogroms and the arrival of many Jews in America before the 1917 Russian Revolution, and the revival and intensification of such sentiments during the 40-year Cold War clearly play a role. But, he adds, the current US demonization of Putin is an even more important, virulent, and largely unprecedented factor.

Meanwhile, the Russian Communist Party, long a minority opposition in the post-Soviet parliament, or Duma, is showing new strength among voters as a result of the economic hardships due to the collapse of world prices for Russia’s energy and, to a lesser extent, Western economic sanctions imposed in connection with the Ukrainian crisis. The extent to which this might affect Russian politics and the role of the new parliament to be elected in September remains to be seen. But how seriously Putin takes this potential challenge was indicated by his scathing public attack on the historical role of Lenin, the founder of the Communist Party, in January, essentially for the first time. Cohen and Batchelor discuss various aspects of this new development in domestic Russian politics, especially now, as the 25th anniversary of the end of the Soviet Union and 100th anniversary of the Revolution approach. •
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/09/opinions/china-military-reform/index.html

Opinion: China's military is gearing up to compete with the U.S.

By Yvonne Chiu
Updated 9:06 PM ET, Wed March 9, 2016

Editor's Note: Yvonne Chiu is an assistant professor at The University of Hong Kong specializing in China's military and diplomacy. The views expressed here are solely her's.

index.html

http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/09/opinions/china-military-reform/index.html

Watch this video
How big is China's military? 02:20

Story highlights
China is setting up its first military base overseas
It's also changing its command structure and cutting troop numbers
Do these efforts undermine China's claims of a "peaceful rise?"

Hong Kong (CNN)—China's military is sending strong signals that it's gearing up to compete with the U.S. as a global superpower, engaging in a multi-faceted reform effort to modernize and professionalize its military.

One of the most significant developments is China's plans to establish an overseas military base—which would be contemporary China's first—in Djibouti. Construction started last month.

There has been some speculation that China negotiated a 10-year contract, although China will not confirm details for what it carefully calls "military support facilities."

The stated purpose is to provide "better logistics and safeguard Chinese peacekeeping forces in the Gulf of Aden, offshore Somalia and other humanitarian assistance tasks of the U.N." including anti-piracy missions, according to Ministry of National Defense spokesman Wu Qian.

China's new base will be near the only U.S. military base in Africa, also in Djibouti.

It is an extremely strategic location and would offer greater ability to protect oil shipments from and give greater access to the Arabian Peninsula.

China parades military hardware in streets of Beijing
China parades military hardware in streets of Beijing

Watch this video
China parades military hardware in streets of Beijing 02:38

Budget cut; troops trimmed

China announced Saturday that its military budget would grow by 7.6% in 2016 -- slower than the double-digit increases in previous years --- but the real increase will likely be much higher.

Its announced 300,000 troop reduction in September at a massive military parade initially seemed to be about trimming a little deadweight, as the People's Liberation Army would still be over two-million strong, but there are recent indications that cuts will target the officer corps—including political officers.

This is part of a broader transformation program over the next two years to restructure the military.

In February, the seven military command regions were streamlined into five (north, south, east, west, central); some agencies governing armaments, logistics, personnel, and politics have been placed directly under the authority of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Military Commission.

And there are ongoing efforts to turn the PLA from a military dominated by the army to one that better integrates ground forces with the now-peripheral navy, air force, and missile (PLA Rocket Force) units, into joint command operations.

These are efforts to not only upgrade the military's efficacy but also to bring to bear more Party control over the PLA, which has been more autonomous in the past.

Parade lifts curtain on China's opaque military

Weapons sales

In nearly doubling its weapons sales during this decade so far, China has become the world's third-largest weapons exporter behind the U.S. and Russia, and last month, it displayed its older J-10 fighter jet at the Singapore Airshow in order to sell it.

(Potential buyers might include Pakistan, Iran, or Syria, although this is speculative.)

Being able to sell weapons is not only a source of revenue, but also a sign of military influence and global leadership, and can help bolster political alliances.

China also acquired its first aircraft carrier by retrofitting an incomplete former-Soviet carrier, and had its first successful carrier-based fighter (J-15) landing in 2012. it is also trying to build its second carrier indigenously.

This is commonly taken as an indication that it will develop a blue-water navy (one capable of operating across open oceans), which at the time of its aircraft carrier purchase seemed less plausible, but must now be reconsidered in light of institutional restructuring to enable joint force command.

Beyond its borders

With each of these developments, China is trying to tick off the boxes for the characteristics required of a global superpower. This marks a significant historical and ideological shift.

The PLA has until recently focused on protecting China's own borders, in part because, ideologically, China has rejected activities (especially maintaining overseas military bases) that it considers fascist or imperialist.

Efforts to restore and reclaim China's rightful standing in the world also serve a domestic purpose and they have also unwittingly become one of the benchmarks for the Party's legitimacy, insofar as it is able to deliver on the nationalist flames it fans.

Taken together, do these developments belie China's claim of pursuing a "peaceful rise?" Yes and no. Clearly, China wants to compete with the U.S. and not just in the Asia-Pacific.

It has started doing so regionally by laying claim to the South China Sea and building "islands" in order to test international reactions to its attempts to extend its sovereign territory.

Exclusive: China warns U.S. surveillance plane

Future long-range capabilities that will be afforded by joint operational command, aircraft carriers, and overseas bases, however, unmistakably indicate that China intends to be a global superpower one day.

This doesn't mean that China wants a conflict in either the South or East China Seas. It would likely lose against most significant enemies in the near future, especially the U.S.

China has not fought a war since 1979, and a contemporary war would require very different practices from those used in Vietnam. In the meantime, a significant military loss would call into question the very legitimacy of the Party and have enormous consequences for its longevity.

A "peaceful rise" is clearly prudential: the Party would like China to become a global superpower without ever fighting a war, but it is walking a dangerous line.

China's military 'not ready to fight and win' future wars
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realcleardefense.com/art...hina_and_the_inevitability_of_war_109127.html

March 10, 2016

Crouching Tiger: John Mearsheimer On Strangling China And The Inevitability of War

By Peter Navarro
Video
https://youtu.be/yXSkY4QKDlA


As part of the research for my Crouching Tiger book on the rise of China’s military and its companion documentary film, I interviewed 35 of the top experts in the world from all sides of the China issue. These are key edited excerpts from my sit-down at the University of Chicago with Professor John Mearsheimer, author of the realist classic work The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.

"My argument, in a nutshell, is that if China continues to grow economically over the next 30 years, much the way it has over the past 30 years, that it will translate that wealth into military might. And it will try to dominate Asia, the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. And my argument is that this makes good strategic sense for China. Of course, the United States will not allow that to happen if it can. And the United States will, therefore, form a balancing coalition in Asia, which will include most of China's neighbors and the United States. And they will work overtime to try to contain China and prevent it from dominating Asia. This will lead to a very intense security competition between the United States and China's neighbors on one hand, and China on the other hand. And there will be an ever-present danger of war."

Of course from this observation rises the imperative if not to strangle China’s economy then to certainly slow it down.

"There's no question that preventive war makes no sense at all, but a much more attractive strategy would be to do whatever we could to slow down China's economic growth. Because if it doesn't grow economically, it can't turn that wealth into military might and become a potential hegemon in Asia. I mean, what really makes China so scary today is the fact that it has so many people and it's also becoming an incredibly wealthy country. Our great fear is that China will turn into a giant Hong Kong. And if it has a per capita GNP that's anywhere near Hong Kong's GNP, it will be one formidable military power. So the question is, Can you prevent it from becoming a giant Hong Kong?

My great hope is that China's economy will slow down on its own. I think it's in America's interest, and it's in the interest of China's neighbors to see the Chinese economy slow down in terms of its growth rate in really significant ways in the future because if that happens, it then can't become a formidable military power."

As for the possible hegemonic intentions behind China’s rapid military buildup, Professor Mearsheimer is unequivocal:

"I think it's very clear that China is a revision of state. The Chinese have made it clear that they think that Taiwan should be made part of China. They believe that the Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands, in the East China Sea, should become Chinese. The Japanese, of course, now control them. And they believe that they should dominate the South China Sea in ways that they don't at the moment. And what the Chinese would like to do, is they'd like to push the United States back towards the United States. And the first step would be to push them beyond the First Island Chain, which would allow them to control all of the waters in between that First Island Chain and the Chinese mainland. And then, of course, if they push the Americans out beyond the Second Island Chain, they'd control most of the West Pacific. They'd control the waters off their coastline."

On the inevitably of conflict between the US and China, its roots lie in the necessity of adopting a “containment strategy” much as the US had to do with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Says Mearsheimer:

"I think that the optimal strategy for the United States for dealing with China is to pursue a containment strategy similar to the one that we pursued with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. There will be some people who will argue for preventive war or for a rollback strategy, but it would be remarkably foolish, in my opinion, to pursue that option. It makes much more sense for the United States just to work with China's neighbors to try and contain it and to prevent it from becoming a regional hegemon.

The problem that we face, however, is that as we move towards a containment strategy now, we almost certainly guarantee that there will be an intense security competition between the United States and China. One might say to me: "John, the argument you're making for containment now, basically creates a situation where you have a self-fulfilling prophecy, where it guarantees that China and the United States will compete for security and they will always be a danger of war.”

My response to that is it's true, but we have no choice because we cannot afford to let China grow and dominate Asia for fear that it might have malign intentions. So, therefore, we have to contain it now, and it is a self-fulfilling prophecy. And my argument is that this is the tragedy of great power politics."

As for whether the Hillary Clinton “pivot to Asia” is simply an old-style containment in a new rhetorical bottle, there is this bit of history:

"Now, in the 1990s, the Clinton administration did pursue engagement. There was little evidence of containment: and you could do that in the 1990s because China was then weak enough that it didn't matter.

So I believe in the 1990s that the Clinton administration really did believe in engagement and thought that containment was a bad idea and pursued this policy of engagement.

But we're now reaching the point where China is growing economically to the point where its going to have a lot of military capability, and people are getting increasingly nervous. So what you see is we're beginning to transition from engagement to containment; and this, of course, is what the pivot to Asia is all about.

Hilary Clinton, who is married to Bill Clinton and pursued engagement in the 1990s, is now the principle proponent of the pivot to Asia; and she fully understands that it is all about containment.

Of course, what's going to happen here given that we live in the United States is that we're going to use liberal rhetoric to disguise our realist behavior. So we will go to great lengths not to talk in terms of containment even though we're engaged in containment and even though the Chinese know full well that we're trying to contain them. But for our own sake and for our public we will talk in much more liberal terms. So it's liberal ideology disguising realist behavior."

As for the idea that economic engagement itself is a viable peace strategy, Professor Mearsheimer sees this as decidedly counter-historical:

"Many people find it hard to believe that countries that engage in security competition also continue to trade with each other economically. But if you look at Europe before World War I-- and, indeed, if you look at Europe before World War II, what you see is that there was a great deal of economic interdependence on the continent and with Britain before both world wars. So I believe that if China continues to grow economically, there will still be much economic intercourse between China and its neighbors and China and the United States. And I still think that you will have a lot of potential for trouble between these two countries. And don't forget, even though you had all this economic intercourse between World War I and World War II, you still got World War I and you still got World War II.

If you look at Europe before World War I, there were extremely high levels of economic interdependence between Germany and virtually all of its neighbors, certainly between Germany and Russia, Germany and France, and Germany and Britain, these were the main players. And despite this economic interdependence, these high levels of economic interdependence, you still got World War I.

Another example would be the period before World War II. The Germans invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. And for the previous two years, Germany and the Soviet Union-- this is Nazi Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union-- had been close allies in Europe. In fact, in September 1939 they had invaded Poland together and divided it up.

So there was a great deal of economic intercourse between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union between 1939 and 22 June, 1941. Nevertheless, that economic interdependence did not prevent World War II from escalating into a major war between Moscow and Berlin.

And, in fact, there are all sorts of stories about the German forces invading the Soviet Union and passing trains that were going into the Soviet Union that were carrying German goods, and trains coming from the Soviet Union towards Germany that were carrying Soviet raw materials and some Soviet goods as well. So there was economic interdependence between Germany and the Soviet Union and yet you still got a war."

Closely related to the argument that economic engagement will prevent war between the US and China is the economic interdependence argument. In Professor Mearsheimer’s world that’s a dangerous gamble because politics and nationalism can often trump economics.

"I've talked about the fact that I think China cannot rise peacefully, probably a hundred times; and the argument that is used against me most often is clearly the economic interdependence argument, and it goes like this:

The United States and China, and China and its neighbors are all hooked on capitalism and everybody is getting rich in this world of great economic interdependence; and nobody in their right mind would start a war because you would, in effect, be killing the goose that lays the golden egg. So that what is happening here is that economic interdependence has created a situation where it's a firm basis for peace.

I think this is wrong. Let me explain. I think there's no doubt that there are going to be certain circumstances where economic interdependence will be enough to tip the balance in favor of peace; but I think as a firm basis for peace, it won't work because there will be all sorts of other situations where politics trumps economics.

People who are making the economic interdependence argument are basically saying that economics trumps politics. There are no political differences that are salient enough, right, to override those economic considerations?

Again, there will be cases where that's true. But there will be many more cases, in my opinion, where political considerations are so powerful, so intense, that they will trump economic considerations.

And just to give you an example or two. Taiwan: The Chinese have made it clear that if Taiwan were to declare its independence now, they would go to war against Taiwan, even though they fully understand that that would have major negative economic consequences for Beijing. They understand that, but they would go to war anyway. Why? Because from a political point of view, it is so important to make Taiwan a part of China, that they could not tolerate Taiwan declaring its independence.

Another example is the conflict in the East China Sea between Japan and China, over the Diaoyu or Senkaku Islands. It is possible to imagine those two countries, China and Japan, actually ending up in a shooting match over a bunch of rocks in the East China Sea. How can this possibly be because it would threaten the economic prosperity of both countries? It would have all sorts of negative economic consequences.

But the fact is, from the Chinese point of view and the Japanese point of view, these rocks are sacred territory. The politics of the situation are such that it is conceivable that should a conflict arise, it will escalate into a war because politics will trump economics."

One of the equally enduring themes of American foreign policy is that the existence of nuclear weapons will insure the peace in Asia. However, Professor Mearsheimer is not so sure of that at all – and makes a powerful case the existence of nuclear weapons actually opens the door to more limited conflicts in Asia over key flashpoints like Korea and the Senkaku Islands.

"The existence of nuclear weapons makes it virtually impossible for the United States and China to end up fighting World War III, in other words, a large conventional war. I think that the presence of nuclear weapons makes that one scenario impossible; but I do think it's possible that the United States and China could end up in a limited war over, let's say, Taiwan, over Korea, over the Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, or over a series of islands in the South China Sea. These are more limited conflicts, and I think that nuclear weapons do not make them impossible.

So I think that nuclear weapons are a force for peace between the United States and China in the sense that they rule out World War III; but there are all sorts of other kinds of war, more limited in nature, that I believe are not ruled out by the presence of nuclear weapons.

And I would note to support this that during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union both had thousands of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, they maintained large conventional forces, and they even thought about fighting a conventional war in the heart of Europe.

Of course, that was almost unthinkable because of the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe. World War III with nuclear weapons in Europe was virtually unthinkable.

But nevertheless, we still had very powerful conventional forces, and we worried about all sorts of contingencies where we could end up fighting against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the most prominent of which, by the way, was the Persian Gulf, where we thought there was some possibility after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979 that they might invade the Middle East or the Persian Gulf. We, therefore, built the rapid deployment force; and that was built, in large part, to deal with a war against the Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf."

As a final argument for that China’s rise will surely be peaceful, there is Confucian Pacifism. Professor Mearsheimer, however, wants no part of that argument:

Many Chinese believe that there will not be trouble in Asia because China is a Confucian culture. This is what I called the Confucian Pacifism argument; and the argument is that China has historically not behaved in an aggressive way towards its neighbors. It's behaved in a Confucian way, which is to say that it has behaved very defensively. It's not been aggressive at all; and to the extent that China has been involved in wars, it's due to aggression on the part of its neighbors. In other words, China is always the good guy, and its adversaries in wars are always the bad guys.

This is a lot like “American Exceptionalism,” right? Americans believe that they're almost always the good guy, and it's the other side that is the bad guy. We tend to see the world in very black and white terms, where we're the white hats and the other side is the black hats. The same thing is true with Confucian Pacifism. It's basically a story that says, you know, the Chinese are the white hats.

The fact is if you look at Chinese history, what you see is that the Chinese have behaved, over time, much like the European great powers, the United States, and the Japanese. They have behaved very aggressively whenever they can; and when they have not behaved aggressively, it's largely because they didn't have the military capability to behave aggressively.

But the idea that China is a country that has not acted according to the dictates of realpolitik and has always been the victim, not the victimizer, is clearly contradicted by the historical record. China is like everybody else."

As hard as Professor Mearsheimer is on China’s hegemonic intentions, he is equally critical of an American pattern of aggression that has, in his view, helped give rise to China’s own increasingly militaristic behavior.

"Many Americans think that because the United States is a democracy and it is a hegemon, that it is a benign hegemon. And those same Americans think that the rest of the world should view the Americans in those terms. They should see us as a benign hegemon. But that's not the way most other countries around the world see us, and it's certainly not the way the Chinese see us.

The United States has fought six separate wars since the Cold War ended in 1989, the first of which was against Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1991. Then we fought against Serbia over Bosnia in 1995, and again, in 1999 against Serbia, but this time over Kosovo. And then we went to war against Afghanistan in the wake of September 11th, and then in 2003, March 2003, we invaded Iraq. And in 2011 we went to war against Libya.

So anyone who makes the argument that the United States is a peaceful country because its democratic, right, is confronted immediately with evidence that contradicts that basic claim. It's not an exaggeration to say that the United States is addicted to war. We are not reluctant at all to reach for our six-shooter. And countries like China understand this.

And when countries like China see the United States pivoting to Asia, and they see what our record looks like in terms of using military force since 1989. And when they think about the history of US-Chinese relations, when they think about the Open Door policy and how we exploited China in the early part of the 20th century. And when they think about the Korean War – most Americans don't realize this, but we were not fighting the North Koreans during the Korean War, we were fighting the Chinese from 1950 to 1953. We had a major war, not with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but with China. China remembers all these things. So they do not view the United States as a benign hegemon. They view the United States as a very dangerous foe that is moving more and more forces to Asia and is forming close alliances with China's neighbors. From Beijing's point of view, this is a terrible situation."

On the inevitability of war between China and the US, Professor Mearsheimer sees it rooted in how the competition between China and the United States will ultimately play out on the world stage -- and on the high seas of the East and South China Seas.

"So one of the really interesting questions here is what is the competition between China and the United States going to look like? First of all, I think there's going to be a serious arms race. I think that the Chinese will spend increasing amounts of money on defense and they will build more and better military capability.

At the same time, the United States is going to increase defense spending, and it's going to send more and more of its military assessments to Asia than it has in the past because the United States is going to be bent on containing China, and this will lead to an arms race.

The Chinese will try and best us, and we will try and best them, much the way the United States and the Soviet Union did during the Cold War.

I think it's almost for sure you'll have crises. You'll have crises in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. I wouldn't be surprised if you had a crisis on the Korean peninsula that threatened to bring the United States and China into the fray. That would be a very dangerous situation.

So I think, in addition to arms races, you'll have crises. And then, of course, you'll have the ever-present danger that those crises will escalate to wars. And given the geography of Asia, it is possibly that you could have a war between the United States and China. Just to give you one example:

If a conflict were to break out between Japan and China over the Diaoyu or Senkaku Islands, the United States would almost certainly come in on the side of Japan; and it's possible to imagine shooting starting in that situation because you're talking about a war that would be fought at sea, and where there would be no need to use nuclear weapons.

This is not like a war on the central front during the Cold War where the United States and the Soviet Union, were they to fight, would end up fighting World War III with nuclear weapons; and because that possible scenario was so horrific, it was extremely unlikely.

We're talking about fighting a war over a series of rocks out in the East China Sea. It's easy to imagine such a war starting.

It's easy to imagine North Korea collapsing and a conflict breaking out between North and South Korea that pulls the United States and the Chinese in.

It's easy to imagine a war being fought over Taiwan and the United States coming in on the side of Taiwan, presenting a situation where the United States and China are fighting each other."

Against the backdrop of these rapidly rising tensions in the Asia-Pacific, Professor Mearsheimer offers some serious advice to a China that he sees badly misplaying its strategic hand of late:

"Where the Chinese have gone wrong, in my opinion, is they have overreacted in almost every case; and, as a consequence, they have scared their neighbors, and they have scared the United States. The Chinese argue that it's imperative in these crises to lay down markers and to make it clear where China stands on the conflict or the dispute in question; and I understand that, but they do it in ways that seem very aggressive in tone and -- or aggressive in nature, and they end up scaring people. And that's not smart.

Now, some people might say, a lot of countries have pursued hegemony in the past and they have ended up destroying themselves. Look at what happened to imperial Germany, look at what happened to imperial Japan, look at what happened to Nazi Germany. Look at what happened to the Athenians.

Now, there's no question that, in the past, countries have pursued hegemony and have ended up getting destroyed in the process. What subsequent countries do, looking back, is say to themselves: We're going to be much smarter the next time. We're going to pull it off. We're going to be like the United States.

Just take China for example. The Chinese understand full well what happened to Imperial Germany, what happened to the Soviet Union; and the Chinese do not want to end up committing suicide. So what the Chinese are doing is thinking about how to maximize their power in smart and sophisticated ways.

So my argument would be that, given the tragedy of great power politics, they will pursue regional hegemony. They will try to push the Americans out of Asia, they will try to dominate Asia, and they will try to do it smartly. Whether they're successful or not is another matter."

Finally, Professor Mearsheimer offers a firm rebuttal to the case for American isolationism. It is a rebuttal firmly rooted in his theory of Great Power Politics that says an American retreat will only invite an unwelcome Chinese advance.

"One might argue that what the United States should do if China continues to rise is that we should retreat to Hawaii or retreat to the continental United States; and we should pursue an isolationist strategy. And the argument here would be that it doesn't really matter whether China dominates Asia because it can't get at the United States anyway.

This is actually a very powerful argument. If you think about it, we're separated from China as we separated from Europe by two giant moats. The Chinese would have to come 6,000 miles across the Pacific Ocean to get to California. There's not going to be an amphibious operation that's 6,000 miles long across the Pacific Ocean.

So not only do we have these oceans, we also have thousands of nuclear warheads, which are the ultimate deterrent. Furthermore, we dominate the Western Hemisphere.

So the United States is an incredibly secure country; and one can make a quite persuasive argument that, even if China dominates Asia, it's not going to affect the United States in any meaningful way.

My view is that there's one powerful counter to that argument; and it's the main argument again isolationism; and it says that if China dominates all of Asia, if it's a regional hegemon, it is then free to roam around the world much the way the United States, as a regional hegemon, is free to roam around the world.

Most Americans don't think about this, but the reason that the United States is wandering all over God's little green acre, sticking its nose in everybody's business, is because we are free to roam. We have no threats in the Western Hemisphere that pin us down.

Now if China is free to roam because it's a potential hegemon, it can roam into the Western Hemisphere. It can develop friendly relations with a country like Brazil or country like Mexico. It could put a naval base in Brazil much the way the Soviets were putting troops in Cuba, right?

So what the United States fears about China dominating Asia is the possibility that it will not invade the United States, but that it will move into the Western Hemisphere, form a close alliance with a country like Brazil or Cuba or Mexico, and become a threat to the United States from inside the Hemisphere."


Peter Navarro is a professor at the University of California-Irvine. He is the author of Crouching Tiger: What China’s Militarism Means for the World (Prometheus Books) and director of the companion Crouching Tiger documentary film series. For more information and to access film interview clips, visit www.crouchingtiger.net or see his book talk on CSPAN2.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2016/03/10/the_us_and_israel_drift_apart_111755.html

March 10, 2016

The U.S. and Israel Drift Apart

By George Friedman

U.S. Vice President Joe Biden arrived in Israel on March 8 in the wake of another meaningless crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations. Diplomatic circles are agog with the fact that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not only declined an invitation to visit Washington, but leaked his decision to the press before formally informing the White House. To the cognoscenti of U.S.-Israeli relations, this flows from the deep mutual dislike between Netanyahu and President Barack Obama. And from their point of view, that dislike is driving U.S.-Israeli relations.

It is possible that the two leaders dislike each other. The leak may have been a deliberate insult by Netanyahu or just a typical leak, which is as common in Israel as it is in the U.S. But whichever it is, it is not driving U.S.-Israeli relations, and a new president and a new prime minister would be experiencing the same tensions even if they loved each other. The tension is not personal. It comes from fundamental shifts in U.S. and Israeli interests.

It must be remembered that the United States and Israel were not close prior to the 1967 war. France provided most of Israel's weapons, and the U.S. hardly provided any. It was after the 1967 war and France's break with Israel that the U.S. became Israel's major benefactor. And the flow of arms and aid only became substantial after the 1973 war between Israel, Syria and Egypt. I point this out to make clear that the intimate relationship between Israel and the United States did not exist for the first quarter-century of Israel's history. The relationship is not a given, and it should not be surprising that it is fraying.

There were two parts to the relationship. Israel had security requirements that outstripped its financial and industrial capability. It could defend itself only if it had a great power underwriting its national security. In order to entice such a power, Israel had to be prepared to be useful to the great power, but also prepared to trim its foreign policy to fit within the framework of the great power's interests. France saw value in Israel until 1967 and then broke with it because the war was not in France's interest. Israeli foreign policy was then built around being of value to and aligning with the United States.

The American interest in Israel as a strategic asset doesn't arise until a major shift in the Cold War. In the mid-1960s, there were pro-Soviet coups in Syria and Iraq. Turkey, the critical American ally in the region, was being pressed from the north by the Soviets. If pressure arose from the south as well, Turkey might buckle. Iran served to tie down the Iraqis. Israel tied down the Syrians and, as a bonus, served as a strategic threat to pro-Soviet Egypt. Under these circumstances, aid to Israel was an investment in U.S. national security. Israel threatened Soviet assets in a cost effective way and, along with the Shah's Iran, was a foundation of U.S. strategy in the region.

The Cold War has been over for a quarter-century and for most of that time, the relationship continued. This was in part out of habit and in part out of other interests they shared. But over the past decade, the foundations of the strategic relationship have weakened, and as they weakened, a constant drum beat of mutual dissatisfaction emerged.

From Israel's point of view, it no longer requires a major power to underwrite its national security. Egypt is officially neutral and cooperates with Israel on an array of security issues. Syria is in chaos. Israel has a close relationship with Jordan, and even Hezbollah has greater concerns in Syria than fighting Israel. Israel has a notional enemy in Iran but it is far away, and its nuclear capability is still theoretical at best. With the diminution of a strategic threat, Israel does not need the United States as it once did. It does not want to break the tie with the United States, but U.S. aid is now a very small percentage of Israel's GDP, where it was once a huge part. It is valued, but not to the point of allowing it to keep Israel contained in U.S. foreign policy.

The United States' interests in the region have shifted as well. The experience in Iraq taught the United States that occupying a hostile country is difficult, expensive and may not achieve the fundamental aims. The U.S. saw Iraq as an opportunity to fight terrorism. The pacification of Iraq failed, but even if it had succeeded, it is unlikely that Islamist terrorism would have disappeared.

The United States understands that without a massive commitment of forces - many times the number of troops sent to Iraq and more than the U.S. military has available - the probability of both defeating the Islamic State and winning the resulting insurgency is unlikely at best, and probably impossible.

So the U.S. could let the Middle East take its own course, or try to manage its course through relationships with the major powers in the region: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Israel. Iran is already engaged in Iraq supporting the Baghdad regime, as is the United States. Saudi Arabia is deeply weakened by the collapse of oil prices. Turkey is more focused on the Kurds and has little appetite for incurring the cost of fighting IS. Israel's standing army has 160,000 troops, of which a small fraction are combat forces. It has a large reserve, but like all reserves, the quality is highly variable. Plus, Israel is fairly distant from IS and its logistical ability to sustain a force for an extended period of time at that distance is limited.

If the U.S. decides to allow the region to proceed on its own, Israel's strategic value drastically diminishes. If the United States decides to create a coalition with other nations prepared to bear the primary burden of the fight, Israel has minimal military relevance to that force and would be a political hindrance. Israel's presence would destroy any coalition the U.S. would try to build. Saudi Arabia is not a major military force, which means the United States' prime focus would be Turkey and Iran. And that moves us back to thinking about disengagement.

Israel cannot be a surrogate for the United States if it chooses to wage this war. Where it was invaluable in the Cold War, its impact on this war would be negligible to negative. It is therefore no surprise that U.S. tolerance for some Israeli actions is minimal. Israel, on the other hand, is not threatened by regional powers and for now is not as dependent on a great power patron. It just doesn't need the U.S. to the extent it once did. The U.S. is an insurance policy, but it can't carry a high premium.

Focusing on Obama and Netanyahu's personal relationship is missing the crucial point. The tension is rooted in shifting national interests. As the interests shift, the tolerance for various demands on both sides declines. And as it declines, the background noise in the relationship shifts. But it is only background noise. The real events are taking place silently, but in full view. Israel and the United States were close when they needed to be and are drifting apart when they can afford to. This does not mean they are enemies. But then they aren't friends. Nations have no permanent friends or enemies. Only permanent interests.


Reprinted with permission from Geopolitical Futures.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
:dot5::dot5::dot5::siren::siren::siren::dot5::dot5::dot5:

http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...-Germany-Enters-a-Dangerous-New-Political-Era

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.spiegel.de/international...sis-has-change-german-politics-a-1081023.html

Third Republic: Germany Enters a Dangerous New Political Era

An Essay by Dirk Kurbjuweit
March 08, 2016 – 12:06 PM
Comments 31

Stability used to define Germany's political system. But the refugee crisis has fundamentally changed the country's party landscape. The rise of the fringe has eroded the traditional centers of power.

Seven or eight months ago, Germany was a different country than it is today. There were no controversial political issues demanding immediate action and Chancellor Angela Merkel's leadership was uncontested. It was quiet and comfortable. But then the refugees began streaming into Europe and the country's sleepy tranquility came to a sudden end. Since then, disgusting eruptions of xenophobia have come in quick succession, a right-wing populist party is on its way to holding seats in several state parliaments, Merkel has gained approval from the center-left Social Democrats and from the Greens, some conservatives want to throw her out and the state is overwhelmed. Does anyone know what is happening? What is wrong with this country?

For Germany, this is the second democratic republic, if one leaves out East Germany, since it was only a faux democracy. First came the Weimar Republic, from 1918 to 1933, and then, since 1949, the Federal Republic, which simply continued following the momentous events of 1989. But now, it looks as though the refugee crisis has brought a significant rupture. To be sure, the German constitution and the country's institutions won't be called into question any time soon. But the conventions governing Germany's political interactions are changing with incredible speed.

A crisis of representation is necessarily accompanied by jolts to the political party system. Some of those jolts have been a long time in the making, but they are now becoming apparent as the refugee crisis takes hold. It could be that our country is currently experiencing lasting change. The contours of a Third Republic are becoming apparent.

In modern democracies, politics takes place in a space of dual representation. Politicians represent their voters in parliaments and governments, while in between elections the electorate can exert influence on the public debate, primarily through representation in the media. Tabloids such as Bild operate as the "voice of the people," while outlets like Die Zeit speak for intellectuals. In truth, though, it is two elites speaking with each other: politicians and journalists. They almost seem like members of the same caste, which would be a problematic state of affairs because it is the media's job to keep a critical eye on the politicians.

Spinning Out of Control

The Internet has broken apart this intimate twosome. Now, anyone can join the discussion. That in itself is a good thing, but in the refugee crisis, the debate has spun out of control. One of the roles long played by journalists is that of gatekeeper, largely filtering out the hate, conspiracy theories and other lunacy. That allowed for a more temperate, constructive debate. Despite at times passionate disagreement, politicians and journalists were able to find common ground and make compromise possible. Germany worked.

The crisis of representation is particularly intense in eastern Germany. Prior to 1989, East Germans were led to believe that the Communist Party completely represented the will of the people. The claim was easy to see through, but difficult to confront -- until East Germans ultimately got rid of their state. But when the revolution was over, those who had risen up as one, found themselves once again represented by others. The refugee crisis has revealed the lack of acceptance that many in eastern Germany have for the federal republic system. They don't trust the politicians and take action themselves, in the form of protests. They don't trust the journalists and believe in their own truths. All of that exists in western Germany as well, but it's not as pronounced.

The two main pillars of political representation in Germany have long been the Christian Democrats (CDU) (along with their Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union, CSU) on the one hand, and the Social Democrats (SPD) on the other. For decades, these two parties were able to represent the various positions on the right and left side of the political spectrum, respectively. They did so in a media landscape that was likewise divided to the left and right, with each camp serving a like-minded public. Because the two milieus have begun to fragment in recent years, Germany's two largest parties have begun to shrink. The result has been more parties to choose from. But people are also leaving their milieus to become individual actors. And individuals no longer necessarily need a representative, because they can represent themselves. Their stage is the Internet.

Then along came Angela Merkel. Quite some time ago, she managed to transform the CDU into a green-liberal-social democratic amalgam, having largely exorcised conservatism from the party. Her unique brand of politics can in part be explained by the fact that she isn't as wed to her party's traditions to the degree that others -- those who spent their youths defending their conservative worldviews against the left-leaning high school mainstream -- might be. When the refugees began flowing in, Merkel stirred things up for good.

An Odd Phenomenon

Many in Germany no longer recognize the country's party landscape. There are those who have spent their lives voting SPD or Green and thinking the CDU was the epitome of evil -- and who are now passionate supporters of Merkel. There are those who have spent their lives voting for the CDU and who deified Merkel for her power instincts -- and who are now calling for her ouster so that Germany might remain German and Christian.

In shaping her refugee policies, Merkel followed the tenets of humanism and internationalism, both of which are rooted in Christianity but whose political home had thus far been on the left side of the political spectrum. In the campaign ahead of elections this Sunday in Baden-Württemberg, this state of affairs has produced an odd phenomenon: Governor Winfried Kretschmann, of the Green Party, is a passionate adherent of Merkel's policy course in the refugee crisis while Guido Wolf, the lead candidate from Merkel's own CDU, has distanced himself from the chancellor. Voting used to be easier. Particularly now that Merkel appears to be distancing herself from herself and is pursuing more restrictive refugee policies. What is one voting for now when one votes for the CDU?

This is, of course, far from the first time that state politicians have run a campaign in opposition to the federal government. It also isn't the first time that the leaders of the CDU and CSU, despite being paired in a decades-long conservative alliance, have battled it out in public as Merkel and Bavarian Governor Horst Seehofer are doing today. Back in the 1980s, there was little lost love between Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Bavarian Governor Franz Josef Strauss. But Strauss and Kohl were in agreement on the fundamental questions facing their era: nuclear power and defense. By contrast, Merkel and Seehofer are so divided by refugee policy that the CSU is considering challenging Merkel's refugee policies at the Constitutional Court.

It used to be that the two conservative parties at least had a common enemy, and when it came to attacking the Social Democrats, the CDU and CSU were happy to put their differences behind them. But what do the Social Democrats stand for today? Who do they represent? SPD head Sigmar Gabriel, after all, recently said that the state has to do more for Germans, a position that would find broad agreement among supporters of the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AfD). Germany's party landscape has been stood on its head.

Insurance Against the Fringes

Because Merkel has abandoned those on the right wing of the CDU, the AfD has filled the void and has been boosted by the refugee crisis. That, in turn, could spell the end to the CDU's firm grip on the conservative half of Germany's political spectrum. It is a development long since seen on the left, with support for the SPD having stagnated in recent years at around 25 percent or lower.

It used to be that the CDU and the SPD dominated the political landscape. Referred to as "Volksparteien," or "people's parties," they consistently divided up 80 percent of the vote between them and their sheer size served as insurance against the fringes. They were guarantors of consensus and compromise. The business-friendly Free Democrats (FDP) and the environment-oriented Greens were well-meaning additions to the landscape and were easily integrated.

But SPD missteps and the emergence of the far-left Left Party in 2007 fragmented the left half of the spectrum. The AfD is in the process of doing the same now to the right. Other parties on the extremist right wing, of course, have managed to find their way into some state parliaments, but their successes were largely the product of protest votes. They never really had their own electorates to speak of. The AfD, though, does and has profited from the Internet, transforming itself into the voice of online xenophobic trends and channels. Should the party's success prove lasting, Germany will end up with a political spectrum that is closer to the European norm -- but one which is nonetheless uncomfortable given the country's history.

Ahead of Sunday's state election in Baden-Württemberg, pundits are speculating about the creation of a "Germany Coalition," a coalition that would bring together the CDU, SPD and FPD, whose party colors are those of the German flag. It is reminiscent of the "Weimar Coalition" between the wars, that alliance of center-left parties that was forged to defend democracy, but which proved no match for the dark forces on the fringe. Things aren't nearly that bad yet, of course, but the system feels more instable than it has in a long time.

The First Steps

On the whole, it seems as though the republic is changing form. It is a slow, largely organic change -- and one strongly influenced by eastern Germany. Is that good or bad?

It would, of course, be possible to reestablish the kind of dualism seen in the heyday of the CDU and SPD -- via the introduction of a majoritarian system. That would have the advantage of making it easier to form governments, but in a situation like today, many voters would feel as though they were being shut out. That's not an option. Which is why we have to get used to a more varied party system. The disadvantage is that it will become more difficult for future governments to find consensus. The advantage, though, is that no party will be able to impose its own ideology -- pragmatism is the only route to consensus. And the shrunken Volksparteien will have to release their grip on the state and public broadcasters because they no longer represent the country the way they once did.

The United States these days is putting another possible outcome of the crisis of representation on display. Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump is dependent neither on his party's establishment nor on the established media. He is creating his own electorate with the help of the Internet. That is the path of extremely direct democracy.

It isn't difficult to see the black dystopia that may result: Anger, fear, unchallenged claims to truth and conspiracy theories create a mood that elevates those politicians who are best able to manipulate that mood, in part because he or she helped create it. Identity replaces representation, just like in a dictatorship. All checks and balances -- including the party system and the media -- fall away. Democracy falls prey to emotion.

Germany is still far away from such a fate. But the first steps have been taken.
 

vestige

Deceased
From#68:


U.S. Vice President Joe Biden arrived in Israel on March 8 in the wake of another meaningless crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations. Diplomatic circles are agog with the fact that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not only declined an invitation to visit Washington, but leaked his decision to the press before formally informing the White House. To the cognoscenti of U.S.-Israeli relations, this flows from the deep mutual dislike between Netanyahu and President Barack Obama. And from their point of view, that dislike is driving U.S.-Israeli relations.

It is possible that the two leaders dislike each other. The leak may have been a deliberate insult by Netanyahu or just a typical leak, which is as common in Israel as it is in the U.S. But whichever it is, it is not driving U.S.-Israeli relations, and a new president and a new prime minister would be experiencing the same tensions even if they loved each other. The tension is not personal. It comes from fundamental shifts in U.S. and Israeli interests.

This ^^^ is BS.

Obama is a muslim.

Nuff said.


From#69:

Change a few words in this article and you have America today.

bump
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://atimes.com/2016/03/beheading-kim-preemptive-strikes-are-back-and-headed-for-china/

Asia Times Opinion

‘Beheading’ Kim: Preemptive strikes are back and headed for China

By Peter Lee on March 9, 2016
Comments 27

Washington and Seoul’s rancor at North Korea in the wake of its missile tests, illustrated by negotiations on the joint deployment of Thaad (Theater High Altitude Air Defense), has shaken things up in ways that the US undoubtedly finds gratifying. Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) supported a new UN Security Council sanctions resolution and have delivered, at the very least, stern language.

Russia delivered an unprecedented smackdown of Kim Jong-un for his most recent outburst of furious nuclear bloviating:

“We consider it to be absolutely impermissible to make public statements containing threats to deliver some ‘preventive nuclear strikes’ against opponents,” the Russian foreign ministry said Monday in response to North Korea’s threats.

I would say that Kim had more of a point than usual, since the object of his indignation—the 2016 iteration of the annual US-ROK military exercises—contained, in addition to twice as many troops as it usually does, some interesting elements, thoughtfully revealed to the South Korean media and picked up by the Washington Post:

The United States and South Korea started huge military exercises Monday, kicking off drills that will include rehearsing surgical strikes on North Korea’s main nuclear and missile facilities and sending in special forces to carry out “decapitation raids” on the North Korean leadership …

The exercises will revolve around a wartime plan adopted by South Korea and the United States last year, called OPLAN 5015. The plan has not been made public but, according to numerous reports in the South Korean media, it includes a contingency for surgical strikes against North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile facilities, as well as having special forces practice “decapitation” raids to take out the North Korean leadership. The JoongAng Ilbo newspaper reported that Kim Jong-un would be among them.

The joint forces will also run through their new “4D” operational plan, which details the allies’ pre-emptive military operations to detect, disrupt, destroy and defend against North Korea’s nuclear and missile arsenal, the Yonhap News Agency reported. “The focus of the exercises will be on hitting North Korea’s key facilities precisely,” a military official told the wire service.

Kim might have thought his nuclear exhibitions would earn him a place at the table negotiating with the United States at China’s expense (an alternative that appears attractive to a number of analysts who actually know something about North Korea); instead he’s looking at the US murdering him and blowing up his arsenal.

Let’s leave aside the term “surgical strike”—in actual practice usually an indication that post-op the surgeon will be OK, thank you, but no guarantees for the patient, nurses, or the hospital—and focus on the return of preemption as a US government tactic.

Preemption is back, baby!

Preemption got a bad name thanks to President Bush’s abuse of the privilege to invade Iraq absent a plausible imminent threat (required to pretty up a preemptive strike under international law), but the military never gave up on it. And with Asian threats inching into the “imminent” zone thanks to North Korea’s continuing work on miniaturizing warheads and perfecting its missiles, it’s not surprising that preemption has reared its head in the Asian theater.

There are, of course, consequences.

The standard response to an adversary’s announcement it intends to take out the national nuclear deterrent preemptively (as well as the North Korean leadership, something that surely caught Kim Jong-un’s attention) is to say, I’m gonna use ‘em first before you blow ‘em up! And you know what? If he packages it the right way, he’s might even be within the bounds of international law in that he’s preempting a preemptive strike.

But the Russians and Chinese are putting immense public pressure on Kim to swallow the provocation, in my opinion, because his reaction plays into the threat narrative, escalates it, and provides further excuse for the United States to “militarize”—hey, that’s a word I’ve seen in some other context!—the Korean peninsula, particularly by putting Thaad in South Korea.

The PRC is certainly paying attention. North Korea, after all, traditionally serves as a convenient stalking horse for the US military to insert new forces, weapons, doctrines, and policies into the region for tryouts and eventual use against China.

Weapons like Thaad. Doctrines like preemptive strike. And willingness to escalate.
The US posture toward the PRC seems to be evolving toward a strategy reliant on a crippling first strike supported by disabling the PRC’s retaliatory ability. And this impression is supported by the US manifest disinterest in trying to resolve the most recent nuclear contretemps by some sort of engagement with the DPRK in favor of a charge toward Thaad—a high altitude anti-missile/radar combo that will do little to protect the ROK from the North.

The PRC has traditionally relied on the idea that the US would be deterred from confronting China by the awareness that any direct conflict would require massive US strikes against the PRC’s numerous missile, air, anti-missile, and communications capabilities scattered throughout the mainland, triggering escalation to a nuclear crisis, and the threat of PRC nuclear retaliation against the American homeland.

Thaad in South Korea, while a minor factor against DPRK missile attacks, is a key building block in theater missile defense which chips away at the PRC retaliatory credibility.

In the context of conventional deterrence, the PRC response would inevitably be more missiles, more decoys, MIRVing, so on and so forth.

And, if Thaad does go into ROK, it also means the PRC putting a giant bullseye on South Korea as a strategic threat to be blasted as soon as possible in case of a military confrontation with the United States—a point the PRC has undoubtedly made forcefully to the ROK in private discussions.

So, Thaad in South Korea: dangerous and destabilizing.

But I believe to the US military, “dangerous and destabilizing” is a feature not a bug. Because the United States, proud possessor of the biggest, most technologically advanced, and most experienced military in the world, likes it “destabilizing and dangerous” especially since any battles, as usual, will be fought several thousand miles away from the American homeland, albeit on top of 2 billion Asians.

I think the evolving US military strategy is not just, Let’s put Thaad into ROK and give the PRC an excuse to build more strategic missiles, in which case the Thaad gambit in South Korea would just be a manageable if expensive irritant for the PRC.

I think the US is trying to drive regional military postures toward a situation in which the credible threat of an unstoppable, crippling, and unanswerable preemptive US strike is acknowledged as the norm—and the PRC is deterred accordingly.

Instead of the PRC enjoying a strategic advantage by possessing assets close to the battlefield that the US is loath to attack for fear of escalation, the US turns the tables, exploits the fact that the PRC has placed its most important strategic assets within range of US forward-deployed forces, and fast forwards to the endgame before the PRC has the ability to react.

In other words, if Taiwan declares independence, the US doesn’t wait for jaw-jaw, a PRC expeditionary force, wholesale emptying of missile inventories throughout the region (marked by the inevitable failure of somebody’s supposedly invincible missile shield), followed by a nuclear escalation and the end of the world as we know it.

Instead, the day before Taiwan declares independence, the US just blasts the PRC military & command structure with a massive preemptive strike, Taiwan is free, evil destroyed, high fives for everybody.

I wouldn’t be surprised if one reason JAM-GC (the more Army-friendly successor to the notorious AirSea Battle concept for slugging it out with the PRC in the West Pacific) remains classified is because it addresses “blind/suppress/defeat” as pre-emptive/offensive objectives, as opposed to just sitting back, getting pummeled, reacting, and then blowing up the world, which is where ASB scenarios apparently always ended up.

A lot of what the US is doing seems to involve improving its odds of success in a preemptive strike scenario.

Thaad in South Korea, which is based on a high-powered radar that can look deep within the PRC, looks like part of that effort.

There’s quite a bit more:
The proliferation of attack submarines in the West Pacific (there are already two dozen in the vicinity of the PRC, and another new boat will be added each year for the next ten years at a cost of $2.8 billion per, the largest single procurement contract in DoD history; however, Admiral Harris complained that “only 62%!” of his sub requirement was being met, an indication that maybe he really wanted to get two per year);
Improvements in the range of shipborn missiles (the LRASM, actually a ship-mounted stealthy cruise missile with a range of 500 miles is, along with subs, the key priority for Admiral Harris);
The Pentagon’s effort to secure bases close to China, both in the Philippines (8 bases under the new Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement) and by clinging to the unpopular Marine Air Station on Okinawa;
Moving a second carrier into the Pacific (the USS Stennis just did its middle finger sailthrough of the South China Sea, the sailthrough itself much less significant than the demonstration that the US is shifting operationally toward two carrier groups in the West Pacific, albeit one of them the hapless and possibly still radioactive Ronald Reagan “undergoing maintenance” at Yokosuka; wake UP, journos!);
Lots of satellite operations both to locate and target PRC military assets on the ground and threaten the PRC’s own satellites;
And of course encouraging Japan to bulk up its military/ISR capacity at home and also throughout China’s periphery.

Add to that Prompt Global Strike, a program designed to deliver a conventional weapon hypersonically within one hour to anywhere in the world.

And cyber cyber cyber.

With the threat of preemption, the PRC has to think about its own preemption program; in other words, it faces the same “use it or lose it” conundrum we’re currently setting before Kim Jong-un, compounded by the PRC’s formal adherence to an old-fashioned MAD-based “no first use” doctrine. The PRC is supposed to take the first nuclear hit but then get at least one or two ICBM’s onto a US city in retaliation.

However, the US is working to deploy enough conventional goodies, both in terms of bunker busting ordnance against hardened silos and anti-missile batteries, to plausibly degrade the PRC nuclear capability to acceptable levels without itself crossing the nuclear threshold. But, since platforms are dual use, also keep the PRC guessing that maybe a few nukes are on the way.

That means the PRC has to be prepared to Launch On Warning i.e. when it has a suspicion things aren’t going right, because if it waits for trouble to show up, it’s too late. Its targets, in addition to USN ships, will include US bases i.e. Japan, ROK, and the Philippines, which is diplomatically a bit sticky and feeds the scary China/scared neighbors dynamic that is oxygen for the pivot.

And since the US is crowding the West Pacific with military hardware, the PRC is facing a shrinking time window to react.

I believe a widely held opinion within the US military establishment, and for that matter throughout the officer corps of our Asian friends and allies, particularly in Japan and the ROK, is that the PLA sucks i.e. it is filled with untested weapons, systems, officers, and doctrines, burdened by a command-and-control apparatus clogged with risk-averse Commie apparatchiks, and ill-equipped to figure out what’s going on in the half-hour or so after US missiles pop over the horizon, let alone come up with a successful defense or mount a devastating retaliation.

Therefore, I posit that the Pentagon strategy is this: pile as much stuff into the Western Pacific as close to China as possible on any pretext; characterize the PRC as a looming threat no matter what it does or doesn’t do (which shouldn’t be too hard thanks to the ongoing public relations activities of various defense departments and the dedicated steno-work of patriotic journos), and especially if the PRC is seen migrating to an aggressive LOW doctrine that targets local US allies; and let Beijing know the US military is ready to plaster the PRC with a crippling preemptive strike if deemed necessary.

As to what the president and civilian leadership think, bluntly, I don’t think it matters what they think. The China hawks won the policy fight with the removal of Secretary Hagel and Admiral Locklear from the Pentagon and PACOM, an aggressive China strategy has subsequently been baked into US policy in a thousand think tank, defense contractor, and uniformed service ovens, and the region will be eating “Asia Rebalance” cake for the next twenty years.

Best case: PRC deterred from regional adventurism, has to swallow a Taiwanese declaration of independence, and demonstrate to the Asian nations and the world and its own dismayed citizens the CCP’s totally humiliating paper-tigerness.

Second best case: PRC spends itself into the ground trying to keep up with the military buildup on its doorstep and stumbles into a USSR-style crisis.

Most likely case: a lot of expensive, dangerous muddling through by anxious and distracted Asian states that might prefer regional economic integration but have to settle for US-driven security polarization.

Really bad case: Japan and South Korea both go nuclear in response to the heightened threat environment, the US loses the vital leverage over its allies of holding the nuclear umbrella, and becomes a bystander to the Japan/PRC strategic rivalry.

Worst case: a massive war but, hey, mostly if not completely fought 8,000 miles from North America.

That is why, I believe, the PRC (and Russia) are dead-set against Thaad (and why the US is probably pulling out all the stops to get the system into South Korea with the help of its China-hawk allies in the ROK military/spook apparatus before South Korea completes its transformation into an economic appendage of the PRC).

Thaad isn’t just missile defense on China’s doorstep; it’s a big building block in an emerging US preemptive strike strategy.


Peter Lee runs the China Matters blog. He writes on the intersection of US policy with Asian and world affairs.

The opinions expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the view of Asia Times.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/congo/20160310.aspx

Congo: Night Returns To The Heart Of Darkness

March 10, 2016: The UN has announced that joint operations with the Congo army in North and South Kivu provinces will resume. However, the joint operations disagreement is still a source of political friction. For the government, the suspension was a political affront. For UN peacekeepers it was a difficult decision to make but one that had to be made. There is solid evidence that two key Congolese generals commanding forces and operations in the region either participated in, encouraged or condoned war crimes. However, in January the UN decided that protecting civilians in eastern Congo took precedence over putting pressure on the government to reform the military. There is also a possibility that the two generals are not involved in joint operations. If true, then the UN made its point to the government. UN forces in eastern Congo are currently supporting the army operations against the Ugandan ADF rebels and the Rwandan FDLR.

March 8, 2016: The U.S. announced more sanctions against the LRA (Lords Resistance Army) and its leader Joseph Kony. Since early January 2016, the Ugandan LRA rebels have kidnapped 217 people in the CAR (Central African Republic). That is almost twice as many kidnappings and abductions attributed to the LRA in the whole of 2015. It is assumed that many of the abductees have been forced to serve as rebel fighters. The women become supply bearers and sex slaves.

March 7, 2016: Diplomats are trying to help Uganda resolve its post-election impasse. President Museveni claimed he won the February 18 election with over 60 percent of the vote. The opposition (FDC) contends the election was unfair and rigged. The FDC has made four demands. It wants an independent (preferably international) audit and examination of the presidential election ballot count. It wants its leaders to be able to travel around the country without the restrictions currently imposed by Museveni. Currently, FDC presidential candidate Kizza Besigye is being denied freedom of movement. He is essentially under house arrest. The FDC also wants the government to remove all security forces from its party headquarters in Kampala. Finally, it wants the government to release all members of the FDC who have been detained by security forces. The last demand is for release of approximately 300 FDC supporters who were arrested nation-wide.

In CAR fighting over the weekend left at least a dozen people dead. This was mostly about Christian and Moslem groups feuding with each other over past disputes.

March 6, 2016: Over 250,000 Burundians have fled their country since trouble began in April 2015. That was the month Perre Nkurunziza decided to run for a prohibited third term as president. He subsequently passed amendments and legislation to permit him to seek a third term and won it in Burundi’s July 2015 election. However, since then the country has teetered on the brink of civil war.

March 5, 2016: According to the UN since 2002 approximately 30,600 foreign fighters who were operating in Congo have been repatriated to their countries of origin. Most (25,623, of the 30,600) were members of the radical Rwandan Hutu rebel FDLR. The UN estimates FDLR has about 2,000 fighters still in Congo. Former members of the FDLR tell media the figure is more like 4,500.

March 4, 2016: The Congo government conviction of six political activists on charges of attempting to incite revolt has been upheld by an appeals court. However, the activists, who were originally sentenced to two years in jail, will now only serve six months in prison. All of the activists belong to the Struggle for Change (Lucha) coalition. ..........
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
This is priceless......

http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...‘Free-Riders’-Among-America’s-Allies-NY-Times

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/10/w...e-free-riders-among-americas-allies.html?_r=1

Middle East

Obama Criticizes the ‘Free Riders’ Among America’s Allies

By MARK LANDLER
MARCH 10, 2016
Comments 2

WASHINGTON — President Obama believes that Saudi Arabia, one of America’s most important allies in the Middle East, needs to learn how to “share” the region with its archenemy, Iran, and that both countries are guilty of fueling proxy wars in Syria, Iraq and Yemen.

In a series of interviews with The Atlantic magazine published Thursday, Mr. Obama said a number of American allies in the Persian Gulf — as well as in Europe — were “free riders,” eager to drag the United States into grinding sectarian conflicts that sometimes had little to do with American interests. He showed little sympathy for the Saudis, who have been threatened by the nuclear deal Mr. Obama reached with Iran.

The Saudis, Mr. Obama told Jeffrey Goldberg, the magazine’s national correspondent, “need to find an effective way to share the neighborhood and institute some sort of cold peace.” Reflexively backing them against Iran, the president said, “would mean that we have to start coming in and using our military power to settle scores. And that would be in the interest neither of the United States nor of the Middle East.”

Mr. Obama’s frustration with much of the Arab world is not new, but rarely has he been so blunt about it. He placed his comments in the context of his broader struggle to extract the United States from the bloody morass of the Middle East so that the nation can focus on more promising, faster-growing parts of the world, like Asia and Latin America.

“If we’re not talking to them,” he said, referring to young people in those places, “because the only thing we’re doing is figuring out how to destroy or cordon off or control the malicious, nihilistic, violent parts of humanity, then we’re missing the boat.”

Mr. Obama also said his support of the NATO military intervention in Libya had been a “mistake,” driven in part by his erroneous belief that Britain and France would bear more of the burden of the operation. He stoutly defended his refusal not to enforce his own red line against Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, even though Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. argued internally, the magazine reported, that “big nations don’t bluff.”

The president disputed criticism that he should have done more to resist the aggression of President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia in Ukraine. As a neighbor of Russia, Mr. Obama said, Ukraine was always going to matter more to Mr. Putin than to the United States. This meant that in any military confrontation between Moscow and the West, Russia was going to maintain “escalatory dominance” over its former satellite state.

“The fact is that Ukraine, which is a non-NATO country, is going to be vulnerable to military domination by Russia no matter what we do,” he said. “This is an example of where we have to be very clear about what our core interests are and what we are willing to go to war for.”

Mr. Obama, who has spoken regularly to Mr. Goldberg about Israel and Iran, granted him extraordinary access. The portrait that emerges from the interviews is of a president openly contemptuous of Washington’s foreign-policy establishment, which he said was obsessed with preserving presidential credibility, even at the cost of blundering into ill-advised military adventures.

“There’s a playbook in Washington that presidents are supposed to follow,” Mr. Obama said. “And the playbook prescribes responses to different events, and these responses tend to be militarized responses.” This consensus, the president continued, can lead to bad decisions. “In the midst of an international challenge like Syria,” he said, “you are judged harshly if you don’t follow the playbook, even if there are good reasons.”

Although Mr. Obama’s tone was introspective, he engaged in little second-guessing. He dismissed the argument that his failure to enforce the red line in Syria, or his broader reticence about using military force, had emboldened Russia. Mr. Putin, he noted, invaded Georgia in 2008 during the presidency of George W. Bush, even though the United States had more than 100,000 troops deployed in Iraq.

Similarly, the president pushed back on the suggestion that he had not been firm enough in challenging China’s aggression in the South China Sea, where it is building military installations on reefs and islands, some of which are claimed by the Philippines and other neighbors. “I’ve been very explicit in saying that we have more to fear from a weakened, threatened China than a successful, rising China,” Mr. Obama said.

The president refused to box himself in as a foreign-policy thinker. “I suppose you could call me a realist in believing we can’t, at any given moment, relieve all the world’s misery,” he said. But he went on to describe himself as an internationalist and an idealist. Above all, Mr. Obama appeared weary of the constant demands and expectations placed on the United States. “Free riders aggravate me,” he said.

He put France and Britain in that category, at least as far as the Libya operation was concerned. Prime Minister David Cameron of Britain, he said, became distracted by other issues, while President Nicolas Sarkozy of France “wanted to trumpet the flights he was taking in the air campaign, despite the fact that we had wiped out all the air defenses.”

Only on the threat posed by the Islamic State did Mr. Obama express some misgivings. He likened ISIS to the Joker in “The Dark Knight,” the 2008 Batman movie. The Middle East, Mr. Obama said, was like Gotham, a corrupt metropolis controlled by a cartel of thugs. “Then the Joker comes in and lights the whole city on fire,” Mr. Obama said. “ISIL is the Joker,” he added, using the government’s preferred acronym for the Islamic State.

Still, Mr. Obama acknowledged that immediately after the terrorist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, Calif., he did not adequately reassure Americans that he understood the threat, and was confronting it.

“Every president has his strengths and weaknesses,” he said. “And there is no doubt that there are times where I have not been attentive enough to feelings and emotions and politics in communicating what we’re doing and how we’re doing it.”


Related Coverage

European Sympathies Lean Toward Iran in Conflict With Saudi Arabia
JAN. 4, 2016

News Analysis: U.S. in a Bind as Saudi Actions Test a Durable Alliance
JAN. 4, 2016

Obama and Putin Play Diplomatic Poker Over Syria
SEPT. 28, 2015
 
Last edited:

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
I didn't see this posted....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://ca.finance.yahoo.com/news/e...eks-6-8-billion-bank-113251026--business.html

Exclusive: Saudi Arabia seeks $6-8 billion bank loan to shore up state coffers

Reuters
By By Archana Narayanan – Wed, 9 Mar, 2016 6:32 AM EST

DUBAI (Reuters) - Saudi Arabia is seeking a bank loan of between $6 billion and $8 billion, sources familiar with the matter told Reuters, in what would be the first significant foreign borrowing by the kingdom's government for over a decade.

Riyadh has asked lenders to submit proposals to extend it a five-year U.S. dollar loan of that size, with an option to increase it, the sources said, to help plug a record budget deficit caused by low oil prices.

The sources declined to be named because the matter is not public. Calls to the Saudi finance ministry and central bank seeking comment on Wednesday were not answered.

Last week, Reuters reported that Saudi Arabia had asked banks to discuss the idea of an international loan, but details such as the size and lifespan were not specified.

The kingdom's budget deficit reached nearly $100 billion last year. The government is currently bridging the gap by drawing down its massive store of foreign assets and issuing domestic bonds. But the assets will only last a few more years at their current rate of decline, while the bond issues have started to strain liquidity in the banking system.

London-based boutique advisory firm Verus Partners, set up by former Citigroup bankers Mark Aplin and Andrew Elliot, is advising the Saudi government on the loan, the sources said.

The firm has sent requests for proposals to a small group of banks on behalf of the Saudi Ministry of Finance, the sources said. They added that banks participating in the loan would have a better chance of being chosen to arrange an international bond issue that Saudi Arabia may conduct as soon as this year.

A spokesman for Verus Partners was not immediately available to comment.

RATING CUT

Analysts say sovereign borrowing by the six wealthy Gulf Arab oil exporters could total $20 billion or more in 2016 - a big shift from years past, when the region had a surfeit of funds and was lending to the rest of the world.

All of the six states have either launched borrowing programs in response to low oil prices or are laying plans to do so. With money becoming scarcer at home, Gulf companies are also expected to borrow more from abroad.

In mid-February, Standard & Poor's cut Saudi Arabia's long-term sovereign credit rating by two notches to A-minus. The world's other two major rating agencies still have much higher assessments of Riyadh, but last week Moody's Investors Service put Saudi Arabia on review for a possible downgrade.

Nevertheless, bankers said a sovereign loan from Saudi Arabia could attract considerable demand, given the kingdom's wealth; its net foreign assets still total nearly $600 billion, while its public debt levels that are among the world's lowest.

The pricing of the loan is likely to be benchmarked against international loans taken out by the governments of Qatar and Oman in the last few months, according to bankers.

Because of banks' concern about the Gulf region's ability to cope with an era of cheap oil, those two loans took considerable time to arrange and the pricing was raised during that period.

Oman's $1 billion loan was ultimately priced at 120 basis points over the London interbank offered rate (Libor), while Qatar's $5.5 billion loan was priced at 110 bps over, with both concluded in January.

"The indications are that a Saudi deal would have to price higher than that, as the world has changed significantly since those deals," one Middle East-based banker said, referring to the rating agencies' actions.

(Additional reporting by Marwa Rashad in Riyadh and Sandrine Bradley in London; Editing by Andrew Torchia and Pravin Char)
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2016/03/revitalizing_us_nuclear_deterrence_strategy.html

March 10, 2016

Revitalizing U.S. Nuclear Deterrence Strategy

By Kaya Forest and Sierra Rayne
Comments 2

The necessity to ramp up long overdue modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, combined with an escalating disarmament policy shift under the Obama administration, has once again brought the discussion of deterrence to the forefront of military strategy debates.

In the recent spring edition of Air and Space Power Journal, three articles describe the challenges to and outline solutions for the U.S. nuclear posture.

Dr. Keith B. Payne, professor and head of the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, describes how nuclear disarmament, or the delay or abandonment of triad modernization, expressed by reductionists and abolitionists does not hold up to scrutiny.

The nuclear reduction advocates' main claim is that a unilateral arms reduction by the U.S. will lead to other nations following suit. Contrary to these predictions, U.S. reduction in nuclear capacity by over 80% since the end of the Cold War, with further reductions to occur under the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), has not been reflected in the disarmament of any other nuclear power save Russia.

Some have argued that the U.S. and Russia had such large numbers of nuclear weapons to begin with that even a significant reduction still leaves the two powers with overwhelming destructive force, hence deterrence. But since Russia continues to violate the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, even that example of the U.S. leading by example fails to survive a cursory examination.

As Payne points out, the "perceived requirements of national security ultimately trump the constraining effect of international opinion, norms, and law." Consequently, other countries will assess their nuclear posture based not on the American lead, but rather on their own strategic needs. The raison d'état – the primacy of a state's interest over opinions regarding cooperation, morality, or international law – will supersede international peaceful disarmament arguments.

A second major counterargument is that the reduction in U.S. nuclear capacity could very well lead to increased proliferation. As countries whose defense was assured by the extended U.S. nuclear deterrent are forced to live without the American nuclear umbrella, many may chose to acquire nuclear weapons for their own self-defense.

Payne goes on to explain how deterrence is based on the functioning of human perceptions and calculations and as such is affected by factors beyond our ability to predict:


[Deterrence] must be made as effective as possible to prevent war and the escalation of hostilities. This goal likely requires (1) as complete an understanding as is possible of opponents' perceptions and values so as to tailor US deterrence strategies appropriately to the opponent and deterrent goal and (2) a broad spectrum of flexible and resilient US conventional and nuclear capabilities to help the United States deter as effectively as possible across a broad spectrum of contingencies and potential opponents with varying goals, values, perceptions, and modes of decision making.

These objectives are picked up by Major Joshua D. Wiitala, USAF, a staff officer in the United States Strategic Command's J873 section. Wiitala argues that minimal deterrence is insufficient to protect U.S. interests, and instead he introduces the idea of "dual deterrence" as a better framework for understanding the relevance of U.S. nuclear strategy.

Minimal deterrence is one proportional to the threat – forces are scaled to inflict costs on an opponent that exceed any possible gains involved in a first strike. A position of minimum deterrence allows states to use nuclear weapons by deterring a large-scale nuclear attack and to provide for a deterrent against other existential threats. It also sees nuclear weapons as a way to balance the conventional superiority of adversaries.

Wiitala notes, however, that such an approach is insufficient for the needs and geopolitical position of the United States. A more useful position is one of "dual deterrence" involving both existential and escalation deterrence. Existential deterrence involves "a force exclusively postured to deter threats to the sovereignty and survival of the United States through the credible threat of a large-scale counterforce retaliatory capability" and would be reserved for the most extreme scenarios. Escalation deterrence seeks to prevent the limited use of nuclear weapons in otherwise conventional wars – a possibility inadequately addressed by minimal deterrence – and by providing extended deterrence to U.S. allies. The former would consist mainly of the ICBM and SLBM components of the nuclear triad, while the latter would be undertaken by dual-capable bombers and fighters.

The second goal described by Payne above – namely, flexibility in force structure to deal with the varied psychology of adversary states – is further addressed by Jennifer Bradley, an analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy providing support to the United States Strategic Command.

According to Bradley, the U.S. in the twenty-first century faces deterrence challenges with multiple states. Nuclear strategy needs to consider a particular adversary's perception of the costs and benefits from both a course of action as well as that of restraint, the balance of which may lead to deterrence failure if the state believes that the cost of restraint is higher than that incurred through action. This requires understanding "the leadership characteristics, historical and cultural influences, decision-making structures and processes, and national security strategy and doctrine" of an adversary.

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) presented by the Department of Defense in 2010 asserted that the changing strategic environment created by an improved relationship with Russia and the interdependence with China reduced the necessity of American reliance on nuclear weapons. With the increased precision of advanced conventional weapons, said the NPR, the U.S. could target an adversary's strategic locations that were previously susceptible only to nuclear weapons. What the report did not assess, however, was how Russia or China would interpret this change in U.S. deterrence strategy.

The disparity between the conventional military power of the U.S. and Russia has increasingly led Russia to depend on its nuclear forces to deter not only nuclear attack, but also conventional conflict with the U.S, to such a degree that Russia has made modernizing its strategic forces one of the country's highest priorities. With the recent shift in relations between the two countries, Cold War-era rhetoric has resurfaced.

Bradley postulates that the Chinese believe that a lower threshold of "usability of advanced conventional weapons designed to perform a deterrence role actually undermines nuclear deterrence and causes other nations to rely more on their nuclear weapons arsenals," since they are unable to compete with the U.S. conventionally.

Overall, she describes the following problem with the current position:


The US decision to rely less on nuclear weapons to meet its national security needs, instead bridging the gap with advanced conventional capabilities, did not have the desired effect on our adversaries. Instead of inspiring confidence, it reinforced some of their worst fears.

Consequently, the U.S. must reassess the role its nuclear weapons arsenal plays in assuring geopolitical stability among the major powers. It is clear that to meet this goal, the American nuclear arsenal must be modernized and expanded rather than contracted.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/the-rise-of-the-hybrid-warriors-from-ukraine-to-the-middle-east/

Commentary

The Rise of the Hybrid Warriors: From Ukraine to the Middle East

Douglas A. Ollivant
March 9, 2016
Comments 2

The Iraqi Army defenders of Ramadi had held their dusty, stony ground for over a year and become familiar with the increasing adeptness of their opponents waving black flags. At first, these Iraqi Army units simply faced sprayed rifle fire, but then it was well-placed sniper rounds that forced these weary units to keep under cover whenever possible or risk a death that only their comrades — but never the victim — would hear. Tired, beleaguered, and cut off from reinforcements from Baghdad, they nonetheless continued to repulse attack after attack.

The last months witnessed a new weapon — car bombs. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and its predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq, had long been the masters of using car bombs, but almost always against isolated checkpoints or undefended civilians. But an old tactic found a new situation. Car bombs, now parked against outer walls and driven by suicide bombers, were thrown against the Iraqi Army’s defenses in Ramadi.

The defenders were professional soldiers, and the last decade of war had taught them a great deal about the use of concrete barriers to defend against explosives of all kinds. So while the car bombs created a great deal of sound and fury, they availed little.

Then one bright day in May 2015, the defenders awoke to a new sound. Crawling forward slowly toward the heavily barricaded road was a bulldozer followed by several large cargo and dump trucks. The soldiers began to fire as the bulldozer entered the range of their machine guns and rifles, but it was armored by overlapping welded steel plates. The bullets bounced off the advancing earthmover. The defenders lacked one key weapon system — an anti-tank missile that could penetrate the armor of the tracked vehicle.

So while the soldiers kept up a steady volume of fire, they were helpless as the dozer began to remove the concrete barriers that blocked the road between their positions and the row of large armored trucks. One layer of concrete was removed after another until the road was clear.

And so the trucks begin to pour through. While creating vehicle-borne bombs is an ISIL specialty, the technology is actually remarkably simple, as each truck carried in its five-ton bed the same basic formula used two decades ago by Timothy McVeigh at Oklahoma City — ammonium nitrate fertilizer soaked in gasoline. As each truck closed on the defenses, its suicide bomber detonated the payload, shocking beyond reason those who were not killed outright. As truck after truck delivered its lethal payload, black-clad fighters poured from behind the trucks to exploit the newly created hole in the defenses. The survivors fell back and tried to maintain some semblance of order, but it was far too late to have any hope of saving this day. Ramadi had fallen.

— — — — —

The explosion of ISIL onto the international scene in June 2014 informed the world that a new type of force had arrived. In some ways, this should have been less of a surprise. ISIL had seized Fallujah the previous January, and there were also several clear precursors of this type of force. The Israelis had experienced a near-defeat in their fight against the non-state actor Hezbollah years earlier. And only a month after the fall of Mosul, Russian-backed separatist forces in Ukraine would shoot down Malaysian Airlines flight MH17.

None of these actors — ISIL, Hezbollah, or the Ukrainian separatists — can be classified as traditional insurgent groups, guerrillas, or terrorists. All three groups possess capabilities that take them beyond more familiar non-state actors without qualifying them as full-fledged armies. Whether the bulldozers and social media savvy of ISIL, the missiles and electronic warfare of Hezbollah, or the high-altitude air defense of the Ukrainian rebels, all these forces have deployed capabilities traditionally associated with nation-states. The hybrid warriors have merged these capabilities with traditional insurgent tactics in their fight against nation-state forces.

While the debate rages on about the utility of the concepts of “hybrid warfare” and “gray zone conflict,” this article is not about these debates. This article is agnostic as to whether these types of warfare are best called “hybrid wars” or “political warfare.” It is similarly agnostic as to whether the “gray zone” concept is “hopelessly muddled “or “real and identifiable.” These debates, while important, are not what this piece attempts to settle. Rather than discuss the strategies and operations conducted in these ambiguous physical and legal spaces, this paper is concerned with the new actors emerging in said spaces. This essay maintains that there is something interesting and new occurring, as it relates to the actors operating in this space. While calling them “hybrid warriors” when the larger concept of “hybrid warfare” is still deeply contested may be linguistically problematic, there is no necessary linkage between the terms. That these fighters are a “hybrid” of insurgent and state-sponsored strains seems very clear, and therefore appropriate, regardless of distinct and separate debates over the characteristics of the environment.

Hybrid warriors are new (or at least new to us). These non-state hybrid warriors have adopted significant capabilities of an industrial or post-industrial nation-state army that allow them to contest the security forces of nation-states with varying degrees of success. Retaining ties to the population and a devotion to the “propaganda of the deed” that characterizes their insurgent and terrorist cousins, these non-state hybrid warriors present a challenge unfamiliar to most modern security analysts (though those who fought against either America’s 19th-century native tribes or the medieval Knights Templar, might see similarities).

Hybrid warriors specialize in the ambiguity of the “gray zone,” a term this essay will continue to use despite its definitional issues. While they can both administer territory (at the low end of the spectrum) and fight conventional war (at the high end), it is in the spaces in between that they truly excel. Girded by their relative safety from police forces, immunity from international norms (characteristic of all places where the state and rule of law are weak), and the active or passive support of the population, these hybrid warriors enjoy a low degree of risk, at least when compared to open warfare against Western interests. Within their sanctuaries — so long as they survive the occasional airstrike or commando raid — hybrid warriors face few security concerns, save when local armies probe the boundaries of their loosely controlled terrain. And yet — as the United States clearly learned on 9/11 — non-state groups possess a new ability to launch attacks against the integrated state system. These hybrid warriors live among the insurgents and counter-insurgents, terrorists and counter-terrorists, spies, saboteurs, propagandists, organized criminals, and money launderers — but while they may participate in any number of these activities, they are not limited by them.

Hybrid warriors rise to a level of concern because they present a new and more serious challenge to the U.S.-led state-centric system. Making life difficult for hybrid warriors is therefore a U.S. interest, even if a particular group does not directly challenge U.S. interests in their region. Certain groups — ISIL most obviously —have chosen to confront the United States quite directly. But even a group that chooses to avoid confrontation is still problematic from a U.S. perspective. From their sanctuaries, hybrid warriors (to a much greater extent than their less capable insurgent/terrorist cousins) are able to generate threats that can reach members of the state system, if not the United States itself. Arguably, the Native American tribes of early American history meet the definition of hybrid warriors, but since the often violent expansion of the English-speaking settlers across the North American continent — clearing that primitive “gray zone” as they homesteaded and ranched — the United States has not had to deal with a substantive force that refuses to play by understood rules. In the 21st century, similar groups appear to be proliferating.

With these characteristics and definitions in mind, we can start to better flesh out the nature of hybrid warfare today and which groups qualify as hybrid forces under this definition.

Despite the “hybrid” term first emerging from the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, none of the participants in these wars were truly hybrid forces by this article’s definition. In the Iraq case, neither al-Qaeda in Iraq nor the Islamic State in Iraq prior to the U.S. departure in 2011 had moved beyond the status of insurgent terrorist group, limited to bombings, beheadings, and assassinations. Nationalist insurgencies of both Sunni and Shi’a flavors — the 1920 Revolutionary Brigade and the Jaysh al-Mahdi, respectively and most prominently — similarly conducted targeted killings as each resisted the government and occupying forces. Finally, all these groups participated in a sectarian civil war against each other. The resulting wave of violence from terrorism, insurgency, and civil war — not to mention general lawlessness — was indeed chaotic and confusing. But it was “merely” a maelstrom of competing insurgents and terrorists.

Similarly, in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda cells that had planned and executed the 9/11 attacks were simply garden-variety terrorists, if of an unusually competent flavor. The various branches of the Taliban and other Afghan groups — the Quetta Shura Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin did not display any new characteristics, largely behaving like traditional insurgents.

Boko Haram has also achieved recent notoriety for its operations as a Salafist Islamic terrorist group in Nigeria and surrounding African countries. However, while Boko Haram arguably does control territory, it remains an insurgent group of guerrilla fighters. While it is an incredibly capable guerrilla army (at least relative to its opponents in the area), it demonstrates no conventional or special military capabilities. Again, this is not to say that a traditional insurgent force cannot be a significant threat — but that still doesn’t make it a hybrid threat.

So which groups qualify as hybrid forces under this definition? We are left with three who appear at first glance to meet the criteria: Hezbollah, ISIL, and the eastern Ukrainian separatists. In the following sections, we will examine each of these groups and cover one aspect of the organization that demonstrates their nature as a hybrid force: the use of electronic signals intelligence for Hezbollah, the ability to perform complex breaching operations for ISIL, and the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 by the Ukrainian separatists.

Guerrillas Transformed

Hezbollah, or the “Party of God,” remains the most widely acknowledged hybrid force in the world today. As such, it serves as the gold standard for assessing such forces, both as the original archetype and in terms of capability and competence.

Hezbollah’s ascendance would have been hard to predict. At its founding in the early 1980s, the then-nameless organization looked much like a number of local competitors — Hamas, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), to name just a few. Yet while these other forces remained guerrilla insurgent groups, Hezbollah transformed.

Hezbollah has an utterly non-military origin. Founded in 1982 by a group of religious students of Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Bakr al-Sadr (an Iraqi Shia and father-in-law of Muqtada al-Sadr, the founder of the Jaysh al-Mahdi), Hezbollah emerged in the crucible of resistance to the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. The new group quickly made a reputation for itself through a series of suicide bombings in Lebanon against the U.S. Marine barracks and the headquarters of the Israeli Defense Forces and French paratroopers.

But these attacks, while certainly foundational to the group’s early cohesion, were not what made it a hybrid organization. It was not until the early 1990s that the group began to morph and add conventional capabilities to its guerrilla and terrorist roots. Hezbollah was first known to have Katyusha rockets in February 1992, and its artillery units were formed in 1995. Over the coming decade, Hezbollah undertook an organizational transformation:

Hezbollah’s planners opted for a more unorthodox approach, one that combined elements of low-signature guerilla-style warfare with the technology and sophisticated armaments of a conventional army.

This statement is important. Hezbollah’s status as a hybrid force is not an accident, but rather a deliberate choice. Further, Hezbollah has continued to refine its capabilities over time. To the rocket and artillery capability above, Hezbollah has added high-quality combat footage and the ability to intercept the feeds from Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) or “drones” — an advanced electronic warfare capability. Additionally, Hezbollah has upgraded its missile capabilities to include much longer-range missiles, including some with precision guidance systems. It has refined the placement of its bunkers and rockets to a science, using camouflage, the reverse slope of hills, and even pneumatic platforms to raise and lower its rockets out of the ground. Further, Hezbollah has converted most of its communications to fiber-optic cable to frustrate Israeli monitoring and uses spectrum analysis to determine when and how its communications systems are being jammed. The group scans to intercept cellular phone communications and maintains a network of closed-circuit televisions on the southern border of Lebanon.

Hezbollah uses not just technology, but also tactics and techniques in unique ways. During its 2006 war against Israel, Hezbollah effectively used swarming tactics with anti-tank missiles fired in volleys of dozens so that the first few hits would strip the reactive armor from Israeli tanks, leaving bare metal for follow-on missiles.

Hezbollah’s movement into Syria in support of the Assad regime against the uprising has further developed the capabilities of the group. There were those, including this author, who thought that having Hezbollah fighting al-Qaeda-affiliated groups such as Jabhat al-Nusrah and the Islamic State would result in both sides suffering casualties and weakening. Instead, the conflict seems to have strengthened and battle-hardened both groups, further cementing Hezbollah’s capabilities.

While Hezbollah’s missile technologies provide the most famous hybrid capability, perhaps the most interesting example to deal with here is the group’s electronic warfare capabilities. In 2010, Hezbollah Leader Hassan Nusrallah revealed that as early as the mid-1990s, Hezbollah had learned how to tap into Israeli UAV feeds. By looking at these feeds, Hezbollah was able to determine the areas that the Israelis were most interested in and deploy their capabilities in response, as in the case of one famous 1997 ambush that resulted in the deaths of 12 Israeli commandos. Hezbollah has also learned how to use defensive electronic warfare measures, such as running fiber-optic cable between their positions in southern Lebanon. Similarly, Hezbollah deploys dedicated counterintelligence electronic technician units specifically dedicated to discovering and countering Israeli electronic surveillance, including disrupting Israeli UAVs through jamming and/or reprogramming. This is, of course, assisted by Iranian technologies, and one source describes Hezbollah’s front in Lebanon as a “testing ground” for Iranian electronic capabilities. But it is primarily Hezbollah operators who are the users of the equipment, giving them a fairly high-level skill not developed in insurgent or guerrilla organizations.

Guerrillas Meet Deep State

The Islamic State is an interesting hybrid of hybrids. The group dates to the founding of its precursor group, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad in Jordan and Afghanistan in 1999–2000. However, after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 (or slightly before, in anticipation), Zarqawi would move his group to Iraq and finally affiliated with Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda to become al-Qaeda in Iraq in late 2003 or early 2004.

Al-Qaeda in Iraq was not a hybrid organization. AQI and ISI had the traditional core competencies of a terrorist or insurgent group — assassination, small ambushes, bomb emplacement, sniping. However, it developed no significant activities beyond this, save perhaps the very primitive media arm that captured the group’s signature beheadings, first of Nicholas Berg and later of others.

However, after the near-defeat of ISI by the combined forces of the United States (both conventional brigades and the Joint Special Operations Command), the Sunni Sahwa or Awakening groups, and the Shi’a militias, two trends would soon combine to transform this organization. The first, now well documented in the media, but at first only noted by several dedicated intelligence officers, was a significant influx of what the U.S. Army calls “Former Regime Elements” into the ranks of the ISI. These Ba’athists, a mix of military and intelligence officers, and in many cases military intelligence officers, brought a new level of professionalism and tradecraft into the ISI. This trend has not diminished in recent years, and it is now believed that a significant majority of ISIL leadership consists of former Ba’athists with significant military or intelligence training.

Continued.....
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Continued.....

The second trend is obvious — the group moved to Syria and declared itself the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. Moving to Syria accomplished a number of things for the group. First, it put ISIL at the forefront of what was seen in the Sunni Islamic world as the most legitimate war in the region. The Sunni Islamic world was also deeply opposed to the democratic regime in Baghdad, but could not directly oppose it since it enjoyed U.S. sponsorship. But once the rebellion began in Syria, any group that fought against the Assad regime could gain money, weapons, and personnel as the cooperation that the United States had gained from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) against Islamic terrorist groups broke down in the face of GCC desire to generate fighters to oppose the Assad regime. In this environment, ISIL was quickly able to regenerate capability, as its earlier reputation for brutality brought it a disproportionate share of the resources. These resources — and training/experience — allowed ISIL to conduct its lightning sweep into Iraq, through Mosul and Tikrit and towards Baghdad, in the summer of 2014.

ISIL now occupies a similar, though not identical, place in Iraq and Syria as does its hybrid cousin, Hezbollah, in Lebanon. Both have de facto control of territory and at least local superiority to the official government security forces. But while Hezbollah has managed to establish a modus vivendi with the Lebanese Army and police forces, ISIL is in direct conflict with those of Iraq and Syria. This has several causes, but the primary one is the other difference between Hezbollah and ISIL: Hezbollah has no intention of joining the state system itself (though it does have representation with significant influence in the current government), while ISIL— as its very name indicates — does. So while Hezbollah appears perfectly happy to remain a hybrid force based out of Lebanon, ISIL aspires to carve a new state out of Iraq and Syria, eventually expanding it to absorb other Muslim lands ruled by what it views as illegitimate governments. Hezbollah is a hybrid force by choice, but ISIL is hybrid only because it has not yet fully realized its aspirations.

While ISIL has definitely retained its insurgent roots traced back to Zarqawi’s camps in Iran and Kurdistan, it has also generated new capabilities, brought about in no small part by the influx of formally trained Ba’athists. This is a unique feature of ISIL as a hybrid force — the mixture of the Zarqawi wing of pure insurgents and the Ba’athist strain of formally trained former state security forces has created a maelstrom of unique capability.

ISIL has a myriad of hybrid capabilities (its ability to use captured armored vehicles and artillery pieces, for example), but one of the best examples is the breaching capability it displayed in the battle to capture Ramadi, as described in the opening vignette.

As ISIL was kind enough to photo-document for us (a selection are included below), we can see a fairly sophisticated multi-step process. First, they armored and fortified a civilian bulldozer so that it would be immune to small arms fire. They then used this bulldozer to remove a section of the concrete wall protecting the Iraqi units defending Ramadi. Then a series of likewise armored truck bombs, similar in both size and composition to those used by Timothy McVeigh in the Oklahoma City bombing, were sent through the gap in the wall created by the bulldozer. ISIL then used the car bombs to gain superiority over the defenders.

This synchronization — preparing a piece of equipment so it is immune to enemy defenses, using that equipment to breach enemy defenses, and then driving similarly prepared truck bombs through the gap created — is beyond the capability of most insurgent groups. Past car bombs have either simply navigated through the entrance or have used successive car bombs to create improvised holes in the walls. But developing a specialized piece of equipment for a specialized purpose is something different — something that an industrial-age state army does. While this breaching tactic is far from ISIL’s only hybrid capability, it is perhaps the most obviously illustrative.

Remnants of Military Joined by Militias

The fighting in Ukraine has raged for two years. While battle lines seem to have more or less stabilized, the eastern Ukrainian separatist forces remain in legal limbo, not clearly affiliated with any state, though opposing one (Ukraine) and supported by another (Russia — to which some elements may wish to be annexed).

Following the fall of the Yanukovych government in February 2014 and the annexation of Crimea by Russia in March of that year, the two eastern Ukrainian provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk began to see the emergence of militia groups, at first local and eventually knitted together into a coalition. The initial mix of locals — many with military training — was soon transformed by the infusion of former Ukrainian defense officials (for example, Sergey Kusyuk of the Berkut Special Forces took part on fighting in Donetsk) and almost certainly with the assistance of Russian Special Forces (Spetsnaz) and military intelligence (GRU) officers. So while the separatists in these two provinces are technically an insurgency against the central government in Kiev, they also behave more and more like a conventional army without quite crossing that bar. As one CNN reporter put it, “The people we’ve met, the militia, they’re ragtag, a lot of them have old military experience, and that’s mostly ground, street-to-street fighting.”

These forces sound remarkably like the other hybrid forces described earlier, though these rebels — not unlike ISIL —intend to become a state force someday, rather than remaining a hybrid force like Hezbollah.

Recent press reports indicate that the Ukrainian separatists have sophisticated weaponry courtesy of their Russian sponsors, including encrypted radios and unmanned aerial vehicles. However, the capability that best illustrates their status as a hybrid force is that force’s most spectacular error — the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17.

The airliner was shot down by a sophisticated Russian-manufactured missile, the SA-17, commonly known as the Buk 2. This radar-guided missile is capable of engaging aircraft flying at a height of up to 75,000 feet and is generally manned by highly trained technicians.

Now, of course, civilian aircraft know that they will often move into the path of military radar systems as they traverse international airspace, and so they are constantly emitting an IFF (identify friend or foe) transponder code that declares their status as civilian aircraft. The SA-17 — like all such missile systems — is equipped to immediately identify such a code, and identifying this code is among the first tasks that a newly assigned missileer in any national military would be trained in. After all, all states within the international system have an interest in freedom of the skies, as U.S., Russian, and Chinese aircraft all enter each other’s airspace for legitimate civilian purposes on a routine basis, with the permission of each other’s air traffic control systems and all while emitting their IFF codes.

However, the person or persons crewing the SA-17 on July 17, 2014 presumably did not know how to recognize this code or used the SA-17 even though it was unable to detect the code — perhaps the feature was disabled or inoperative (see technical discussion of how this feature might have been disabled here). We can safely assume that no one in Ukraine or Russia had an interest in downing a Malaysian airliner originating in a European city, and the downing was a result of human error. But — and this is the central point — no nation-state would fire that missile without checking the IFF code or otherwise verifying the identity of the aircraft. And no mere insurgent group would be able to operate this complex system. But the hybrid force of Ukrainian separatists has sufficient sophistication to fire the missile and direct it to its target, but insufficient sophistication to realize that they are shooting down a civilian airliner and not a military transport plane.

Future of these Forces

Hybrid forces provide a challenge to the United States for several reasons. First, they exist outside the post-World War II state system of which the United States is both the primary architect and pre-eminent beneficiary. Armed forces that do not belong to a member of the state system are deeply disturbing to this system. While insurgents and guerrillas have been a persistent annoyance to the state system since its inception (and to other political orders before that), the emergence of these super-empowered armed groups metastasizes the problem.

Second, since these groups operate outside the state system, they are not restrained by it. Hezbollah has prominently deployed small formations to Iraq and large forces to Syria. ISIL fights against a wide variety of guerrilla and regular formations throughout Iraq and Syria while under air bombardment from an even wider variety of states.

Third, these forces living in the “gray zone” of conflict serve as the most effective laboratory for further resistance against the forces of the state system. As these hybrid forces continue to operate in the gray zone and interact with the other denizens thereof — terrorists, insurgents, guerrillas, criminal mobs, cyber hackers, traffickers of all kinds — they will no doubt find new and creative ways to challenge the interests of the state system, and particularly the interests of the United States.

Of course, none of these groups perfectly match the archetype or “ideal type” of the hybrid warrior. The Ukrainian rebels have a great deal of state support from Russia, far more than the comparatively limited support Iran gives to Hezbollah. Similarly, ISIL exists as the cutting edge of a constellation of violent Islamist groups facilitated by Saudi ideology and Gulf State “startup” funding. None of these groups are truly independent and are subject to varying degrees of state influence, though they are far from completely controlled by their patrons.

More than one early reader of earlier drafts of this essay pointed out that these hybrid warriors sound like groups that are in between the second and third stages of Mao’s “protracted people’s war.” Thus, what appears to be something new and novel is in fact just a snapshot in time as these groups move toward the third stage of establishing a conventional revolutionary army in the field.

In the case of ISIL and especially the Ukrainian separatists, there may be some truth to this, but the example of Hezbollah points out why this may not be the case. Hezbollah has made a deliberate, strategic decision not to move to the logical next stage, but to instead remain a sub-state hybrid force. Likewise, ISIL and the Ukrainian separatists may also come to see the wisdom of learning to live within the gray zone, a place in which it is difficult for the full powers of a state to be brought against them, and in which they may enjoy a host of informal allies. Other groups are doubtless watching.

As the United States thinks about its interests in the world, it needs to consider both these hybrid threats and those that have yet to emerge. So far our cases are either Arab or Eastern European. In general, sub-Saharan Africa lacks the industrial militaries for insurgent groups to steal, adopt, or borrow from, so this is a region unlikely to generate one of these groups. But one might envision a group in South, Central, or East Asia deciding that it needs to move into this space. East and South Asian armies have the capabilities that a hybrid force might want to adopt as well as an active technology sector that could provide the opportunity to graft on a post-modern capability. Burma, Thailand, Pakistan, or Chechnya might be the cradles of such groups. In all these cases, a restive ethnic or ideological minority might be sufficiently capable of adopting any capabilities that exist locally.

U.S. Response

The United States must deal with these hybrid threats that work inside the gray zone. However, we are immediately confronted with a limitation: These threats emerged inside the gray zone precisely because there is limited state control. The United States can operate in these spaces, should it choose, but the costs quickly become exponentially high — in terms of assets, money, political capital, and casualties. It is difficult to see a U.S. military response absent an explicit causus belli.

It would be a truism to say that the United States should therefore seek to expand state control of these non-state spaces. Yet first, it has thus far demonstrated limited capability to do so; increasing the capability of a weak state to govern its uncontrolled spaces is a Herculean undertaking. Second, even if these weak states could establish control over these spaces, it is far from clear that this would be in the interests of the population of these areas. In general, these ungoverned spaces exist because the government is seen — often accurately — as illiberal, authoritarian, repressive, and illegitimate. Therefore, the indigenous peoples resist the intrusion of the state into these spaces, presenting the United States with a dilemma. It can ignore the non-state space and risk the emergence of a hybrid force there, or it can assist the flawed local government to project control into that space, thereby incentivizing the population to create a resistance force that may well then become hybrid. In short, good answers are scarce.

The hybrid force then presents a very real danger. The examples in this essay have focused on currently existing groups that use almost entirely industrial-era technologies to achieve their hybrid status. However, it is possible to imagine a future hybrid force that uses emerging technology to transform its insurgency into a hybrid force. Capabilities such as nanotechnology, robotics, or autonomous swarming machines could comprise the additional capability of the next generation.

These hybrid warriors are new, capable, and — most critically — dangerous enough to threaten conventional armies in the right situations, as the Israelis so painfully learned in 2006 and the Iraqis have experienced since late 2013. While it is difficult to craft a uniform policy to counter the rise of these hybrid threats, the first step is awareness and monitoring. At the very least, the United States should be watching very closely for the emergence of the next hybrid threat, even if it will find itself with relatively few policy options once that threat is identified. But by being prepared to use the tools that do exist — whether drones, special forces raids, or working through local partners — the United States can better retard the growth of hybrid threats, a very real and present danger to the world order in which the United States has invested so much.

Douglas A. Ollivant is a Managing Partner of Mantid International, as well as a Senior Fellow at New America and a contributor at Al Jazeera America. He worked for the “War Czar” at NSC-Iraq in 2008–9. Mantid International has business interests in southern Iraq as well as U.S. Aerospace and Defense industry clients.

---

2 thoughts on “The Rise of the Hybrid Warriors: From Ukraine to the Middle East”
dbb says:
March 9, 2016 at 7:08 pm

Good article. How to thwart these guys? This is long war stuff, of course. But for starters we should reintroduce Trinquier into our war colleges. (My guess is Guerre Moderne is read in private, maybe even in secret by our officers). Re-reading our FMs on IW, I note the Frenchman is not even mentioned. Legal issue? PC issue? Stomach issue? I’m not sure. PRU successes were not mentioned either–brutally effective program. As for me, these topics would start at the academies, but that is just me.
Log in to Reply

Warlock says:
March 10, 2016 at 9:38 am

So ISIS demonstrates they have people who can weld steel plate and operate construction equipment to move T-walls, and all of the sudden they’re the future of warfare. Bollocks. Nor is it new for revolutionary or insurgent groups to establish shadow governments within territory they control, whether to undermine the official government, gather resources, or simply maintain order. ISIS — and Hezbollah — are following a path the Viet Cong, the PLO, the IRA, and the FARC, and others have trod before them.

Nor does the rise of any particular group automatically present a threat to the U.S. This article basically presents a knee-jerk strategy that makes it America’s responsibility to stabilize the world. At last glance, the only “non-state” patch of earth on the globe is Antarctica, and that by international agreement. Everything else of consequence is claimed by some recognized state. Some of those spaces are contested by non-state groups, and in most cases, U.S. intervention in those conflicts does not advance U.S., or even local interests.

On a technical note, while civilian airliners carry transponders that broadcast their identity to civilian air traffic control, these are not the same as IFF systems, and the implication that an air defense system can automatically interpret these signals to withhold fire is incorrect.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.nknews.org/2016/03/n-korea-counters-doubts-with-miniaturized-bomb-photo/

N.Korea counters doubts with ‘miniaturized’ bomb photo

Photos show Pyongyang is well-aware of skepticism regarding its ability to use nukes

Dave Schmerler
March 10th, 2016
Comments 0

Can North Korea mate a nuclear weapon to a ballistic missile? Pyongyang wants to assure the world that North Korea does indeed have this capability. On March 9, the Rodong Sinmun released a series of images showing three things: one, a compact implosion type device; two, a sketch of the warhead design; three, the ballistic missile systems designated to carry the nuclear warhead. Shortly after the Rodong Sinmun release, a YouTube channel associated with North Korea’s televised media released a video revealing more of Kim’s visit.

From the images shown during the visit, we can assess more about North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and how Pyongyang would like the rest of the world to view its program.

kju-standing-warhead-675x368.jpg

https://www.nknews.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/kju-standing-warhead-675x368.jpg
From the front cover of the Rodong Sinmun, March 9, 2016 | Picture: Rodong Sinmun

The first image on the cover of the Rodong Sinmun shows Kim Jong Un standing behind what is probably a design for an implosion device. While we do not have an exact measurement for this device yet, its design and size are meant to display to the world that North Korea has developed a relatively compact implosion type design that could fit onto a ballistic missile.

We should be cautious when stating how realistic this design might be. The fact that the DPRK’s device bears a striking similarity to other implosion devices, like the one used in the U.S.’s Fat Man bomb (see main image), shows that North Korea is at least capable of producing a replica of what it would aspire to use at the end of a ballistic missile.

During Kim’s visit, there were three tables with displays. (A) One displaying the implosion design, (B) the second table to the left of the dear leader displaying a cylindrical item, (C) with the table to his right displaying a box-like item.

annotated-weapon-675x225.jpg

https://www.nknews.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/annotated-weapon-675x225.jpg
All pictures: KCTV

With (A) clearly being a bomb design, (B) and (C) are still a bit of a mystery. As my colleague Melissa Hanham pointed out, item (B), the cylindrical item, resembles the electronics package described by Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan. Although blurry, it is likely the diagram shown in the visit is illustrating both the warhead and the corresponding electronics package. Item (C) remains something of a mystery.

annotated-design-675x368.jpg

https://www.nknews.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/annotated-design-675x368.jpg
Pictures: KCTV

The second point North Korea is trying to convey with this visit is that it has a re-entry vehicle design in which to place their compact device.

back-end-side-end.jpg

https://www.nknews.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/back-end-side-end.jpg
Pictures: KCTV

Without an exact measurement of both the implosion device and the reentry vehicle, it is difficult to say if the intended bomb design can fit into the vehicle. Eyeballing both, it would seem a good bet that the device fits. The message Pyongyang is clearly conveying is that they do in fact have a miniaturized bomb design, and a warhead designed to carry it.

Returning to the diagram for the purpose of discussing a North Korean nuclear warhead, the picture shows a compact implosion device fitting into a re-entry vehicle of similar design to the one physically there.

kju-screen-kctv.jpg

https://www.nknews.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/kju-screen-kctv.jpg

While the quality of this image is poor, it appears that the diagram has been intentionally blurred out. We can see a cut away of the vehicle (externally green), with the interior (yellow) and what appears to be the implosion device attached to the cylindrical item mentioned earlier. It near impossible to make out what was written on this diagram, but its purpose is clear: to drive home the fact that they can deploy a nuclear warhead on a ballistic missile.

The third thing one can see from the series of photos are the delivery systems that the North intends to use to deploy their nuclear weapons. Three types of ballistic missiles are visible: the KN-08 Mod-1, the KN-08 Mod-2, and the Nodong.

KN-08 MOD-1

kctv-shot.jpg

https://www.nknews.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/kctv-shot.jpg
Picture: KCTV

I will have to admit I was quite surprised to see the Mod-1 again. The Mod-1 was absent from the October 2015 military parade in Pyongyang, suggesting that this version was only a placeholder for the newer Mod-2, which was present in the parade. Appearing on the same TEL with a name plate identifying it at the Hwaseong-13 indicated to me that the Mod-2 was the actual KN-08, however this appears to be incorrect. While its appearance was quite surprising, one of the most interesting photos from the collection released was of the Mod-1 engine.

composite-vernier-mockup.jpg

https://www.nknews.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/composite-vernier-mockup.jpg

There were no known images of the engine for this missile system until now. During the military parades where the Mod-1 had first appeared, any view of its engine had been covered by either part of the TEL’s support structure, or with what appeared to be a covering/plate that was can be seen on the base of the second Mod-1 near the end of the building.

KN-08 MOD-2:

The KN-08 Mod-2 was first seen during last October’s military parade. Appearing on the Mod-1’s TEL with a name plate identifying it with its native designation, Hwaseong-13, the photos from Rodong show 6 Mod-2s on braces.

compo2-675x368.jpg

https://www.nknews.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/compo2-675x368.jpg

With better quality photos we might be able to make out what the markings on the warhead section of the Mod-2 say.However, with its increased warhead size (varying on the actual internal layout), there would likely be more than enough room for the compact device displayed on the cover page.

NODONG

In addition to both KN-08 Mods on display, a row of 4-5 Nodong missiles on braces similar to the ones supporting the Mod-1&2 missiles also appeared. One interesting note from the photo below is that there appear to be two red engine covers near the last Nodong. Until we are able to analyze either more photos released, or a video of KJU’s visit, what these cover will remain a mystery.

compo-23-675x368.jpg

https://www.nknews.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/compo-23-675x368.jpg

TAKEAWAY

After looking at all of the images released, I see an attempt to silence criticism of North Korea’s ability to project their nuclear weapons in the manner they claim they can do. Displaying a compact device, a re-entry vehicle for this device, and the ballistic missile systems they intend to use, they have responded to claims that their nuclear force is not as advanced as they claim it to be.

Although we can learn a lot about their nuclear weapons program from these photos, we are left with equally as many questions. How real was the bomb design they displayed? What are the dimensions of their bomb design and how does it fit with the re-entry vehicle?

How does the newly revealed engine design for the Mod-1 affect range and performance? Will North Korea be content with this response or will we see more pictures or videos released? With all of this in mind, we can conclude that North Korea is very aware of doubt cast on their nuclear weapons program, and they are not content with it.

Main image of Fat Man replica: Wikimedia Commons

Featured Image: Missile Monument Inside A School, Hamhung, North Korea by Eric Lafforgue on 2012-09-11 04:51:18

About the Author

Dave Schmerler is a Research Associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey. He holds a MA in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, Monterey.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.nknews.org/2016/03/responding-to-n-koreas-fourth-nuclear-test-and-its-fifth/

Responding to N.Korea’s fourth nuclear test – and its fifth

Time for South Korea to put possession of nuclear arms and leaving the NPT to a vote

Cheong Seong-chang
March 10th, 2016
Comments 1

“Our great President Kim Il Sung has turned today’s DPRK into the powerful nuclear state that can make the loud blasting sound of the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb for the self-defense of the country’s autonomy and dignity,” the Rodong Sinmun quoted Kim Jong Un as saying on December 10. Nobody at the time saw this as a warning of the nation’s fourth nuclear test in early 2016.

According to Kim Jong Un’s signed document, revealed right after the nuclear test, the order to conduct the first H-bomb test was directed on December 15, 2015, and the final order was given on January 3 to implement the test on January 6. January 6 is two days before Kim Jong Un’s birthday. He pushed ahead with the test despite international opposition. This clearly confirms Kim Jong Un’s intention to expand the nation’s nuclear capacity.

BACKGROUND

Kim Jong Un went ahead with the test, which was to be the greatest achievement ahead of the party congress in May. Kim’s message in the document confirms this intent. “Let the world admire Juche’s nuclear power state, socialist Chosun, the great Workers’ Party of Korea, by opening 2016 with the stirring sound of the hydrogen bomb.”

North Korea succeeded in attracting international attention through the nuclear test in early 2016. North Korean residents seem proud of possessing the “H-bomb.” However, North Korea’s diplomatic isolation has further deepened, and the country’s economy will be affected for some time by the UN Security Council’s subsequent resolution.

It also seems that North Korea implemented the fourth test to ensure the necessary technology to develop a hydrogen bomb. Pyongyang declared that the nuclear test was conducted to “test the H-bomb.” Even though it was North Korea’s fourth nuclear test, it was the first time it has used the term “test.” The bomb itself is believed to have been a boosted fission bomb.

China previously tested a boosted fission bomb in May 1966, after conducting its first nuclear test in October 1964. Thirteen months later, it succeeded in carrying out an H-bomb test in June 1967. It is speculated that North Korea designed the test by downsizing the power of the test under 20kt, considering the small size of the Punggyeri test site. Therefore, North Korea will repeat its H-bomb test with a stronger amplification factor.

THE FIFTH TEST

North Korea clarified that it will carry out its fifth nuclear test with an H-bomb, by saying that the fourth test was the “first H-bomb test.” As the fourth nuclear test’s power was 8 kt, the fifth test is required to multiply the amplification factor 10 times over. North Korea’s third tunnel and newly constructed fourth tunnel are likely to be designed for the H-bomb test.

Considering North Korea’s test records in the past, 2006, 2009, 2013 and 2016, it is likely that it will push ahead the fifth test around 2019 and sixth test around 2022. As many U.S. nuclear technology experts suggest, it is expected that Pyongyang will have at least 20 nuclear weapons by 2020, with 100 weapons maximum. As the cycle of technological development shortens, some experts see North Korea may conduct its fifth test within two years. It is difficult to exclude the possibility of conducting another test before the new administration in the U.S. inaugurates.

It has been a typical cycle; North Korea conducts nuclear test and South Korea and the U.S. adopt “strong” sanctions against North Korea, and then became uninterested in the nuclear problem. Later, North Korea prepares another test to improve its nuclear capacity.

SEOUL’S WAY FORWARD

Therefore, the South Korean president should declare a firm reaction, stating that “South Korea cannot help but consider nuclear armaments for self-defense if North Korea repeatedly carries out its nuclear tests.” South Korea is capable of developing nuclear weapons within 12-18 months and making thousands of weapons if the president decides. Therefore, North Korea’s nuclear superiority will diminish in the short term if South Korea embarks on a nuclear program. North Korea will be more concerned over Seoul’s nuclear armaments than over other limited measures like THAAD, the B-52 bomber, UNSC resolutions and propaganda broadcasts.

If North Korea pushes ahead with the nuclear tests despite warnings from Seoul, South Korea should publicly confirm, via referendum, its intent to acquire nuclear arms. If more than half of voters approve of nuclear armamens as a result of the referendum, it is desirable to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and go ahead with nuclear development. In a recent poll 54 percent of South Koreans agreed with nuclear armament after the fourth nuclear test while 38 percent disagreed. The approval percentage would probably be even higher now.

Article 10 of clause 1 of the NPT recognizes a member country’s right to withdraw from the treaty in an emergency case. This can support South Korea’s withdrawal from the treaty in the case of North Korea’s fifth nuclear test. Seoul doesn’t have reason to carry out a nuclear test and be sanctioned like Pyongyang, though, as it has better-developed nuclear technology than the North. Also, South Korea can prevent damage to the U.S.-ROK alliance by maintaining its ambiguity, like Israel does.

Some of South Korean civil society argue that the U.S.-ROK alliance will fall apart if South Korea arms itself with nuclear power. However, the U.S. forces’ withdrawal from South Korea seems very unlikely, as it would undermine the U.S.’s effort to contain China. It was the Korean Peninsula’s strategic value which made the U.S. endure significant sacrifices during the three-year Korean War, and this is still valid now. South Korea imported $7.8 billion in weaponry from foreign countries, and 90 percent of these were from the U.S. If South Korea states that it will purchase from European countries instead of the U.S. should the alliance fall apart, the U.S. military industrial complex will call for maintaining the alliance. It is excessive to worry about the end of the U.S.-ROK alliance as a result of Seoul’s nuclear armament.

If the unlikely event that the alliance ends, South Korea’s security will be assure through more than 100 nuclear weapons. Of course, it is desirable to maintain the alliance as it is a very important asset, not only for security, but also the nation’s diplomacy.

South Korea’s nuclear possession is one of the possible options, if it is impossible to make North Korea abandon nuclear power. Also, best scenario is denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the establishment of a peace regime on the peninsula through active negotiations within the framework of the Six-Party Talks, rather than South Korea’s nuclear armament. Therefore, the Seoul government should actively try to build a peace regime and resume the Six-Party Talks.

A Korean-language version of this originally appeared at 정세와 정책, published by Sejong Institute in March.

Translation by Ha-young Choi

About the Author

Cheong Seong-chang is a senior researcher at the Sejong Institute in Seoul.
 
Top