WAR 02-03-2024-to-02-09-2024__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

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(330) 01-13-2024-to-01-19-2024__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****​

(331) 01-20-2024-to-01-26-2024__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****​

(332) 01-27-2024-to-02-02-2024__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****​

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Hummmm..................

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Preparing for the 'what if's: AC, Pantex host mass fatality response conference

Amarillo College and Pantex invited Texas Panhandle organizations to their first "How to respond to a Mass Fatality Incident" Conference this week.

www.amarillo.com

NEWS

Preparing for the 'what if's: AC, Pantex host mass fatality response conference​

Brianna Maestas
Amarillo Globe-News
Published 4:09 a.m. CT Feb. 3, 2024 | Updated 4:09 a.m. CT Feb. 3, 2024,

Amarillo College (AC), in collaboration with Pantex, hosted a "How to respond to a Mass Fatality Incident" Conference on Friday, held in the college's West Campus Building A.

According to a news release,a mass fatality event is described as an event when the number of deaths caused either by force of nature, accident or terror, exceeds local authorities' ability to handle the situation, and when assistance from outside a given jurisdiction is necessitated.

AC stated the goal of this conference is to teach participants the basics of mass fatality response while providing them with opportunities to brainstorm collaborative solutions to simulated emergencies.

"In Amarillo, we are kind of a community where we aren't exactly close to anyone, so we are very self sufficient. We are really interdependent on each other to help one another in these types of events, and it is very important that we have these moments for all these different organizations to come together and talk about these things to help further those 'what if' planning processes, so in the event of one of these emergencies, we aren't playing catchup," Jeff Wallick, Director of Safety and Environmental Technology at AC, said.

Prior to the conference, AC and Pantex invited local first responders, hospital administrators, municipal emergency management personnel, public information officers, funeral home directors and more from across the Texas Panhandle to learn about the best course of action for each organization in the event of different mass casualty situations.

"Today's class is focused on mass fatalities, and that could be described with as little as four people or something much larger. A good example would be the Oklahoma City bomb, so when we look at those type of situations, we wanted to bring these folks to this type of training to help them gain the knowledge and help them understand how we can communicate with one another, in the event of those types of emergencies," Terrel Chambers, nuclear weapons training advisor at Pantex, said.

Chambers said that in the conference, the different organizations were able to pull from their personal experiences, utilizing examples from the COVID-19 pandemic and the Perryton tornado disasters, to discuss former unforeseen issues and circumstances within each of their organizations and ways that they addressed those issues.

"When we have a mass fatality situation, it stretches our resources, and so by coming here today, these organizations are learning what to do, who to communicate with, and how to proceed in the event of these situations so that we address these mass fatality events as efficiently and as safely as possible," Chambers said.

According to Wallick, this was the first mass fatality response conference held between the two organizations. With the turnout of approximately 45 organizations and individuals, the two groups are looking forward to hosting similar preventative conference discussions more often.

To learn more about AC or Pantex, visit their official websites or follow them on Facebook.

 

[Housecarl]

Huh.......I made a comment about such a buy a couple of days ago on the Sentinal ICBM thread......

Posted for fair use......

Military May Get Its Own SpaceX Starship Rockets For Dangerous Missions

According to SpaceX, the Pentagon has spoken to the company about procuring its own fleet of Starship rockets for sensitive missions.

www.twz.com

Military May Get Its Own SpaceX Starship Rockets For Dangerous Missions​

According to SpaceX, the Pentagon has spoken to the company about procuring its own fleet of Starship rockets for sensitive missions.

BY OLIVER PARKEN | PUBLISHED FEB 2, 2024 1:44 PM EST

The Pentagon has approached SpaceX regarding the purchase of Starship space launch vehicles for sensitive, high-risk missions, the company has said. At present, the U.S. government relies on non-military contractors to launch payloads for various operations, including satellite launches, and does not have its own space launch vehicles — at least any that are disclosed — which it could deploy in a potential contingency scenario. SpaceX is already working with the Air Force and Space Force on the 'Rocket Cargo' program, which seeks to rapidly deliver cargo, and possible personnel, anywhere on Earth that can support a landing.

Aviation Week was the first to report on the DoD's interest in Starship, following comments made by a SpaceX official at the Space Mobility Conference in Orlando, Florida on January 30.

SpaceX's complete 'Starship' system, as The War Zone has highlighted in the past, comprises a super-heavy rocket booster and spacecraft. Starship — which will be capable of landing vertically — constitutes the largest, and most powerful, rocket ever flown, according to the company, and is reportedly capable of carrying up to 150 metric tons while being fully reusable. Eventually, SpaceX intends for its Starship system to carry crew and cargo to Earth orbit, the Moon, and Mars, but it is still in relatively early flight test development.

"We have had conversations… and it really came down to specific missions, where it's a very specific and sometimes elevated risk or maybe a dangerous use case for the Department of Defense (DoD) where they're asking themselves: Do we need to own it [Starship] as a particular asset… SpaceX, can you accommodate that?" Gary Henry, senior advisor to SpaceX, revealed to audiences at the Space Mobility Conference, Aviation Week reports.

"We've been exploring all kinds of options to kind of deal with those questions," he noted.

While stressing it was possible for the government to buy Starship if it wanted, Henry also said that "from our [SpaceX's] perspective, if you want to fully leverage the commercial attributes of a Starship or any launcher that’s out there operating commercially, you want to buy it as a service."

In addition, Col. Eric Felt, director of space architecture for the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, discussed the potential need for transferring ownership of space launch vehicles to the government in quick order under certain circumstances at the conference.

"If we can buy the commercial service, that's what we're going to do," Felt said. "But there might be some use cases where there needs to be a government-owned, government-operated [launch vehicle] and that transfer can happen on the fly."

How exactly the 'on-demand' ownership transfer of Starship outlined by Felt would work in practice — whereby the government would take over the system for "sensitive and potentially dangerous missions" before returning it to SpaceX — remains unclear, Aviation Week notes. This appears to be something that both SpaceX and government officials are in the process of figuring out; all of which remains hypothetical at this point, given that Starship is still in development.

We have reached out to both the DoD and the company for comment.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Why Ukraine Is Not a Universal Resistance Model - War on the Rocks

Ukrainian national resistance, incontestably lethal and strikingly durable, provides an enticing blueprint for small nations threatened by aggressive

warontherocks.com

WHY UKRAINE IS NOT A UNIVERSAL RESISTANCE MODEL​

BRIAN PETIT
FEBRUARY 1, 2024
COMMENTARY

Ukrainian national resistance, incontestably lethal and strikingly durable, provides an enticing blueprint for small nations threatened by aggressive powers. The rush to learn lessons, mimic actions, and draw conclusions from Ukraine is an established industry. It should be. Ukraine’s response to Russian conquest serves up an innovative and gutsy trove of tactics and methods to adopt for national defense strategies. Two years into a war that many predicted it would lose quickly, Ukraine deserves this respect and study.

But despite this, it would still be a mistake to treat the “Ukraine model of resistance” as a readily applicable model. Before states adopt Ukrainian methods into their own defense plans — and expect similar outcomes — they should look carefully at the key factors that enabled Ukraine to succeed. There are four areas peculiar to the “Ukraine model” that contributed to their success. If policymakers or practitioners look past these factors, this could lead to false assumptions about a state’s readiness to defend and resist. The four areas are mobilization anomaly, national resistance laws, militia management, and railways.

Mobilization Anomaly

Ukraine’s mobilization from peace to war is an anomaly. On the day Russia invaded, two inflexible forces combined to funnel the Ukrainian people into a society-wide mobilization.

The first was Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion announcement, a feverish fatwa that Ukrainians were a non-people, that Ukraine was a false state, and that any notion that Ukraine is separate from Russia was farcical, ahistorical, and criminal. Was there ever so obvious and incendiary a call to arms for a people? Putin, long a master of obfuscation and surly denials, instead opted for the direct, maximalist declaration. The subsequent Russian military invasion on five axes of advance triggered a fight or flight response for every Ukrainian citizen. However inspiring his words sounded to Russian ears, Putin’s declaration made him Ukraine’s chief mobilization officer.

The second force was Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s diktat that men over 18 and under 60 would be prohibited from departing Ukraine and would report for national duty. Zelensky’s writ gave form, direction, and legal casing to a shocked and enraged population.

Taken together, Ukrainian psychological mobilization was in full stride by sunset on Feb. 24. The corporealmobilization was then to follow. To be sure, there remained the difficult details of physics and families to sort out. These wrenching decisions were made en route to territorial defense stations and weapons distribution depots. Ukrainian mobilization was never an if and when question, it was a how and where matter.

While Putin initiated this war with a rebel yell, slow, simmering slides into conflict are more troublesome. Russia used such sleight-of-hand methods successfully in 2008 in Georgia and in 2014 in Crimea. These stuttered starts — staged unrest, subversive riots, diversionary acts, or unattributed acts of terror — are designed to confuse decision-making bodies which in turn defuses mobilization fever. Signals of tension that are not signals of imminent war may well send a fighting-age population to safer shores instead of joining a local defense force. This is not to imply cowardice. Rather, the evidence suggests that the social contract of giving one’s life for their country is not commonplace, especially without a singular and obvious existential threat.

Predicting a population’s will to fight is an inaccurate science. Inside threatened countries, such polls are routinely taken. Even in the previously occupied Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia (a combined population of about 6 million), less than half of respondents say that they would take up arms in the event of an invasion. Astoundingly, these numbers are up as a result of government- and society-wide efforts to psychologically “pre-commit” citizens to national defense. Even so, armed with a Schengen visa, marketable skills, and fluency in Western languages, many European citizens have mobility options that Ukrainians lacked in 2022 and still lack now.

Will such an unambiguous moment occur for states that desire their threatened citizenry to take up arms? It would be unwise to make this assumption. A prudent planner might make the reverse assumption: that a threatened population, with options to fight or flee, may well depart, and leave the fight to the uniformed security forces.

National Resistance Laws and Militia Management

On July 29, 2021, Zelensky signed some of the most aggressive and risky societal defense laws known. Law 5557, “On the Fundamentals of National Resistance,” was paired with Law 5558, an expansion of the territorial forces. These laws clarified how a mobilized society would form and fight. This legislation parsed out roles and responsibilities for domestic security forces, military forces, and citizen-sponsored irregulars. The laws laid broad foundations for chains of command, the authorities to organize and act, and zone and sector management. On the riskier side, the laws gave license and legal operating space for private militias and freelance resistors. Politically, this was and is dangerous: approving fringe movements, private militias, and nongovernment forces to arm and deliver high-end violence. The government of Ukraine took a risk that few states are willing to take. It paid off.

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[Housecarl]

Continued......

Ukraine was able to craft and pass such a national resistance law because they had a seven-year history of waging warfare against Russia by and with the use of pro-state armed groups coupled with official, uniformed security forces. Does any other country have such experience? Few, if any, come to mind. Those countries that do permit such activities, such as Lebanon, hew closer to failed state status. Indeed, Lebanon, like Sudan,Libya, or Iraq, is grappling with control by militias, whereas Ukraine exerts controls of militias. Ukraine is an anomaly in that it has managed an outlaw culture of resistance that is productive resistance — or at least it has so far.

Ukraine’s national resistance laws were born of the 2014 crisis when Russia launched a surprise invasion of Crimea and, months later, occupied portions of the Donbas. To stop Russian annexation on the eastern front, Ukrainian citizen militias filled the security gaps, principally by responding to Russian-backed separatists annexing and occupying towns and cities. Within weeks, the Ukraine government passed a hasty National Guard law that sanctioned this organic rise of pro-state militias. An unholy but effective alliance ensued. Ukrainian militia groups sought the autonomy of being independent and self-styled resistors, warts and all. The Ukrainian government gave it to them, with boundaries. In exchange, the Ukrainian government gained the force-multiplying power of irregulars capable of high-intensity combat. Seven years later in July 2021, Ukraine proposed law 5557, a new law crafted by legislators, ratified by the parliament, signed by the president, and acted upon by the security and civil sectors. This is a rare breed of kill chain.

One week after Ukraine passed the national resistance law, I participated in a forum in Ukraine that aimed to transmit this new law into something more workable, with explanatory policies, organizational roles, and interoperability paths. The purpose was to explore the methods required to employ growing special operationsand resistance-type capabilities. To my surprise, this law was so novel that its implementation flummoxed even the most experienced Ukrainian leaders from the defense, interior, law enforcement, academia, and policy sectors. With sleeves rolled up, the Ukrainian interministry groups waded into how this “resistance system” might look and work. They never completed that homework, as Russia promptly invaded. The law, which took effect on Jan. 1, 2022, was figured out on the barricades. While imperfect, it worked. Ukrainian society would soon explore and exploit every aspect of this law, defying Russian predictions that Ukraine would fracture and fail to mobilize. While the inspirational leadership of Zelensky and his administration deserves much credit, it was this wonky legal structure that provided the blueprint for the whole-of-society mobilization.

States that envision whole-of-society responses to invasion would do well to examine the risk-reward calculation made by the Ukrainian government and expressed by such laws. Some similar models do exist: Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Singapore, and Israel are among them. In line with the “reveal and conceal” stratagem, not all the mobilization measures and triggers are made public. Even with these compartmented caveats, few countries are willing to tolerate, much less incentivize, the use of quasi-official militias and private entities to deliver violence. Few rule-of-law nations have the lived experience of a full-scale invasion, and so it follows that they are less disposed to entertain the untidy use of irregulars. Latvia’s recently proposed lawallowing foreigners to enlist and fight is one step in this direction but falls short of mustering the massive, distributed combat power that Ukraine’s law enabled.

Ukrainian Railways

Strategic depth means little in war until it is materially exploited. Ukraine’s use of the 15,000-mile-longUkrzaliznytsia railway system capitalized on its geographic and infrastructural strengths. Ukraine has a vast and comprehensive train system, a happy vestige of the Soviet system that built this railroad to control, to regulate, and to extract natural and mineral resources. In the face of invasion, Ukraine used its rail system to operate defense, perform civil functions, evacuate populations, and provide resupply. The Kremlin decision not to target this rail system at the outset of the war, so as to preserve the network for its own use, is surely at the top of a long list of regrettable military decisions.

The Russians have since targeted the Ukrzaliznytsia rail system and its supporting infrastructure such as electricity, stations, and rail bridges. Russia did so only after the train system enabled a Ukrainian defensive stand that foiled the Russian plan of a rapid seizure and negotiated capitulation. Ukrzaliznytsia has since attenuated its operations to meet wartime demands. This is a striking case study in infrastructure resiliency. Trains, a 19th-century invention, are outperforming 21st-century weaponry that can easily penetrate interior lines.

Ukraine’s interior depth combined with Russian miscalculations gave Ukraine the space to absorb impacts, adapt, and rebound. Leadership and human capital matter too, as demonstrated by the 230,000 Ukrzaliznytsia employees who, under attack themselves, continue to ensure its arterial functioning. For strategic importance, Ukrzaliznytsia is on par with the nation’s air defense, artillery, and intelligence. Few threatened states possess this considerable interiority combined with a weblike railway system. By comparison, Taiwan, with just 1,150 miles of rail, could fit inside Ukraine 17 times. Moreover, in a future war, would anyone expect Russia (or China) to repeat this strategic blunder? Defense planners should not count on it. This was an error born of hubris, not capability.

Conclusion

While Russia bungled many aspects of this invasion, Ukraine deserves credit for creating a layered, resilient, and whole-of-society defense. Outside of the direct military combat power enabled by Western support, Ukraine’s national resistance system contains unique ingredients that enabled its scale, breadth, and relative orderliness. For the “Ukraine model of resistance” to be appropriately adopted, these four variables deserve close attention. Indeed, they were overlooked once already by the Russians.



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Brian Petit, a retired U.S. Army colonel, teaches and consults on strategy, planning, special operations, and resistance. He is a part-time adjunct for the Joint Special Operations University.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummmm........

Posted for fair use.......

A “Plan Ecuador” is Needed: U.S. Assistance Should Draw Lessons from the Past - War on the Rocks

Latin America and the Caribbean are home to just 9 percent of the global population but account for a third of the world’s homicides. A lethal mix of

warontherocks.com

A “PLAN ECUADOR” IS NEEDED: U.S. ASSISTANCE SHOULD DRAW LESSONS FROM THE PAST​

PAUL J. ANGELO
FEBRUARY 5, 2024
COMMENTARY

Latin America and the Caribbean are home to just 9 percent of the global population but account for a third of the world’s homicides. A lethal mix of drugs, readily available firearms, and unemployed youth is fueling a wave of violence that has taken on epidemic proportions. Ecuador is now ground zero for the region’s gang brutality. Whether Quito succeeds in containing the violence will depend as much on how it manages corruption and political instability as it does on the brute force called upon to suppress organized crime.

On Jan. 9, more than a dozen gunmen rushed a television studio in Guayaquil during a live broadcast, overpowering the unarmed anchors and staff by dangling dynamite in their faces and directing them to the floor through the sights of their rifles. The attackers, who identified themselves as members of the La Firma gang, streamed their raid for more than 20 minutes before authorities cut the feed. The hostage standoff ended with tactical police units storming the studio only a few hours later, making 13 arrests. By the evening, the channel was back on the air for its routine programming.

But for Ecuador, a country long considered one of the most peaceful in South America, it is hardly back to business as usual. The incident, which took place amid simultaneous kidnappings, explosions, and criminal takeovers in hospitals, businesses, and prisons elsewhere in the country, is emblematic of the growing power of Ecuador’s armed gangs.

After noteworthy reductions in homicide rates across the Americas in the last decade, murder is once again on the rise thanks to all-out war among gangs vying for lucrative drug routes. Today, South American cocaine production is at its highest level on record, in part due to more resilient coca plant varieties and a significant drop in coca crop eradication in Colombia, the world’s largest exporter of the drug. And during the COVID-19 pandemic, criminal groups responded to supply chain disruptions, closed borders, and rising global drug use by diversifying their transit hubs. Countries long perceived to be immune from the worst effects of the illicit narcotics trade, including Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Uruguay, have seen violent crime mounting.

But the region’s downward spiral need not be a chronicle of a death foretold. In Ecuador, newfound national resolve and emerging offers of international cooperation can be an effective antidote to expanding gang violence. Indeed, the success of one of South America’s smallest countries in dismantling gangs and the corrupt institutions that protect them could be a promising start in turning the tide on Latin America’s new crime wave.

Ecuador in the Crosshairs

President Daniel Noboa, who after snap elections took office in November with a mandate to curb the country’s rising crime, declared a 60-day state of emergency the day before last month’s sensationalist escalation. But in the hours that followed the widely circulated transmission of the television studio takeover, he went one step further, designating 22 gangs as terrorist organizations to be treated as adversaries in an “internal armed conflict.” The brazen measure — following on the heels of the jailbreak of the country’s most notorious gang leader, José Adolfo “Fito” Macías Villamar of the Los Choneros group — blurs the lines between police and military operations. In effect, Noboa’s move gives free rein to the Ecuadorian military to retake prisons where gangs have revolted and to apply lethal force in subduing some 20,000 members of the country’s gang network.

Historically, Ecuador’s security concerns focused on its shared borders with neighboring Colombia and Peru, where spillover violence from insurgent and paramilitary groups occasionally took place. Yet the country’s recent political volatility, economic shocks and rising unemployment during the COVID-19 pandemic , and an underfunded and corrupt police force opened the door to cocaine traffickers. In recent years, local gangs, Mexican cartels, and even the Albanian mafia all prize the commercial port of Guayaquil as a waypoint for cocaine-laden banana shipments bound for Europe. From Rotterdam to Istanbul, nearly a third of the cocaine seized on the continent originates in Ecuador.

Competition for control of Ecuador’s largest port and surrounding coastal areas has contributed to a soaring homicide rate, up to 8,008 murders in 2023, and nationwide violent crime increased sixfold in just four years. It should come as no surprise that Ecuadorian migrants seeking refuge in the United States surged by 370 percent from 2022 to 2023, and recently Noboa’s foreign minister signaled the government’s intent to secure temporary protected status, or protection from deportation, for undocumented Ecuadorians residing in the United States until the security situation improves.

Across the Andean country, no one is immune from the violence. Last August, days before elections, assailants shot and killed presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio, an outspoken critic of the criminal groups. Separately, the mayor of the country’s third largest city, local officials and political candidates, and popular sports stars and musicians have fallen victim to assassinations by gangs. Just a week after Noboa declared war, assailants gunned down César Suárez, the veteran organized crime prosecutor who was investigating the television studio raid.

Even powerful drug barons who command legions of loyal bodyguards while serving out sentences in Ecuadorian penitentiary facilities are at risk. In October, one of the country’s most prominent criminals, Leandro “El Patrón” Norero, was killed in a prison massacre resulting in 500 deaths. Investigations into the event further revealed the extent of governmental corruption after authorities seized the kingpin’s phone. So far, Ecuador’s attorney general has brought charges against 39 individuals, including judges, prosecutors, prison administrators, and police officers, for collusion with Norero.

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[Housecarl]

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Where drug money and violence exist, so too does the temptation for public officials to accept bribes or succumb to intimidation. Ecuadorian security forces have been especially susceptible, repeatedly pilfering weapons from government arsenals to sell them to criminal groups. In 2021, the U.S. ambassador in Ecuador sounded the alarm over institutional corruption in the police, going as far as revoking U.S. visas from several “narco-generals” from the highest ranks of the country’s law enforcement.

Militarization: A Slippery Slope

As the full picture of public corruption in Ecuador comes into focus, it is up for debate whether Noboa’s instinct to militarize the fight against organized crime will make much of a difference. He is hardly alone among regional leaders, as pervasive police corruption and public demands for hard-handed approaches to crime have resulted in the military’s use in law-and-order missions throughout Latin America. But militarization of public security in isolation has seldom proven a wholly effective or sustainable strategy for reducing the incidence of violent crime.

One of the main reasons why the military is no match for organized crime is the very nature of the threat: Drug gangs, unlike insurgencies and terrorist groups, do not seek to overwhelm and upend governments, but rather to co-opt them. Infiltration is the objective, and the most successful criminal outfits thrive within the existing contours of the state, exerting quiet and undetectable influence over officials’ decision-making in ways that favor impunity for crime.

In places like Brazil and Mexico , the deployment of the military in lieu of police to confront gangs has inadvertently raised the stakes of armed confrontation, encouraging armed groups to strengthen their firepower reserves. The tens of billions of dollars that Mexican cartels make in annual profits from drug trafficking into the United States and the ready availability of firearms in U.S. border states has meant that cartels can often outgun state forces.

Although military responses can be effective in responding to immediate security crises, the persistence of criminal violence prevents governments from sending soldiers back to their barracks and investing in wholesale police reform. States of exception are so routine they are at risk of becoming the steady state.

The increased contact between citizens and soldiers, untrained in policing operations, often leads to escalating human rights abuses, as well. At a time when governments are most desperate to bolster their credibility, they inadvertently expose their most popular institutions — the armed forces — to widespread public criticism over arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial murders.

The suspension of judicial rights and civil liberties in El Salvador by the Nayib Bukele administration is an extreme example, as police and military officials arrested more than 75,000 suspected gang members from early 2022 through 2023 in a purge widely contested by human rights groups. Yet El Salvador’s claim that homicides dropped by nearly 70 percent during the same period helps explain the allure of militarized approaches no matter the erosion of due process of law. The risk of illegal detention and excessive force is even greater when the lines between local gangs, drug traffickers, terrorists, and insurgents becomes blurred, as Noboa’s rhetoric suggests.

The Drug War of Yore: Plan Colombia

Given the transnational reach of criminal networks, whether Ecuador can keep its worst offenders at bay and restore the peace without resorting to permanent militarization depends on how successful authorities are in mobilizing national resources and leveraging international expertise to empower and reform the country’s security forces. Fortunately, Noboa possesses a legislative majority to enable his security ambitions, and several countries have pledged assistance to help Ecuador confront the gangs. On this latter point, Washington, which committed to stepping up its support for the Ecuadorian government, can be an especially effective ally.

From 2000 to 2011, the U.S. government helped another South American country, Colombia, bounce back from wanton drug violence through generous aid aimed at professionalizing the country’s security institutions. Plan Colombia, as the effort was known, entailed U.S. contributions of more than $8 billion directed at improving the mobility, intelligence, and oversight of the military and police to reduce drug-related terror and to dismantle the country’s myriad illegal armed groups.

By many measures, Plan Colombia was effective, with U.S. Ambassador William Brownfield declaring it “the most successful nation-building exercise by the United States in this century.” Even if the bilateral assistance plan failed to stem drug flows in the long run, it dramatically reduced violence, so much so that Noboa’s predecessor, Guillermo Lasso, lobbied Washington to launch a “Plan Ecuador” partnership modeled on the Colombian experience. In the wake of Noboa’s pledge to bring Ecuador’s gangs to justice, the Wall Street Journal’s Editorial Board called for “something like Plan Colombia” in Ecuador.

Yet Ecuador is not Colombia. Bogotá’s principal threats were politically motivated insurgents who operated in the country’s hinterlands. A counterinsurgent footing in Ecuador is unlikely to have the same effect. Ecuador’s gangs are loosely organized, are not geographically rooted, and can opt for greater discretio n than the camouflage-clad rebel armies of the Plan Colombia era.

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[Housecarl]

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Likewise, Colombia is a cocaine production country, whereas Ecuador is primarily a cocaine transit country. Fighting among Colombia’s armed groups is rooted in turf rivalries to harvest drug crops, but in Ecuador, gangs compete for control over port access.

Further, sovereignty sensitivities over U.S.-supported operations in Ecuadorian territory have surfaced repeatedly over the last decade, a factor that did not weigh on policymakers in approving and implementing Plan Colombia. Although the spirit of shared responsibility for the regional drug crisis and the bilateral cooperation mechanisms that underpinned Plan Colombia can be instructive, there are clear limits to drawing inspiration from Ecuador’s northern neighbor.

Lessons Learned: The Mérida Initiative

Instead, as I explore in my forthcoming book, the U.S. and Ecuadorian governments should look to the lessons and pitfalls of another multi-billion-dollar security assistance package, the Mérida Initiative in Mexico. From 2007 to 2021, Washington and Mexico City channeled unprecedented resources to “break the power and impunity of criminal organizations” in response to escalating cartel aggression. Although the framework improved information-sharing and deepened cross-border cooperation, it failed to reduce violence, with Mexico’s homicide rate peaking in 2019. Still, the magnitude of Ecuador’s challenges is akin to those confronted by Mexico, offering clues to how policymakers might structure their approach for stifling crime and corruption in the South American nation .

First, the deliberate targeting of Mexican cartel kingpins tended to exacerbate societal violence rather than reduce it, as existing rivalries resulted in fighting over who should replace leaders who had been killed or arrested. Where groups splintered after a leadership transition, the atomization of illegal armed power made violence patterns less predictable and pacification strategies more difficult. Alternatively, some of the most propitious operations against criminal groups targeted their cash flow, underscoring the supreme importance of financial intelligence for disrupting transactions, seizing assets, and arresting prominent cartel allies.

Second, successful strategies to improve security forces’ effectiveness incorporated the preferences and oversight of Mexican business leaders, who had grown weary of the violence and frustrated with the declining investment climate. In Ciudad Juárez and Monterrey, security taxes shouldered by the local private sector financed reformed police forces, community programs to prevent cartel recruitment, and infrastructure projects to improve citizen safety. In Ecuador, international assistance can be a helpful starting point for revamping agencies and strategies, but whether Quito can sustain progress in the long run will depend on national contributions to the government’s security plan.

Third, the bureaucratic fragmentation of Mexico’s security institutions rendered coordinated action among the military services and between the military and the police unworkable. In its federal system, Mexico has more than 1,800 police forces at three levels of government, but fails to enforce common standards of conduct, training, and pay among them, making the least professional organizations easy prey for drug gangs. Historical distrust between the army and the navy also prevented intelligence sharing across the government. Crime reduction strategies require a united front among security and justice institutions — one enabled by background checks on personnel, routine coordination meetings between state security forces, and integrated operations. This will be especially true for Ecuador, where authorities transitioned to a decentralized policing model in 2012.

Finally, partisan political debate in Mexico derailed successive presidents from implementing robust security strategies, and opposition leaders identified electoral advantages in campaigning against incumbent anti-crime policies and politicians’ ties to the U.S. government at the national and local levels. In the absence of consensus on how to deal with leading threats, security investments rarely carried over from one presidential or mayoral term to the next, stunting even successful measures in the name of political tribalism. In Ecuador, as in Colombia and Mexico, success will be hard to come by if gang violence — or the Noboa administration’s deepening relationship with international benefactors like the United States — acquires an electoral logic.

Conclusion

For the moment, Ecuador’s president has the support of a broad coalition of political currents, both at home and abroad. The National Assembly went as far as issuing a declaration extending amnesty from prosecution to police and military personnel cracking down on the gangs. Even former President Rafael Correa, who oversaw a controversial program that legalized gangs as social organizations, pledged his support, albeit conditionally, for Noboa’s plan of action and called for national unity. Only days later, Correa, whose party represents the largest bloc in the legislature, publicly exchanged personal barbs with Noboa and reminded the president that his backing is far from being a “blank check.”

With the wind in his sails, Noboa should make haste. As the country gears up for another general election in 2025, and as the security situation possibly worsens before it gets better, the goodwill he currently enjoys — and the opportunity to deliver long-needed reforms — may be short lived. By following cartel cash, harnessing the resources of big business, fostering intra-governmental trust, and sustaining legislative consensus, Ecuador stands its best chance at turning the page on runaway crime and proving a model for neighbors struggling to stem regional insecurity.

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Paul J. Angelo, Ph.D., (@pol_ange) is the director of the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University and the author of the forthcoming Council on Foreign Relations book From Peril to Partnership: U.S. Security Assistance and the Bid to Stabilize Colombia and Mexico (Oxford University Press, 2024). He also serves as a foreign area officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve. The views expressed here do not represent those of the U.S. government.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm......

Posted for fair use......

EU member countries push back on Italy’s call for European army

The EU is developing a Rapid Deployment Capability force of up to 5,000 troops from member countries for use in non-permissive environments.

www.defensenews.com

EU member countries push back on Italy’s call for European army​

By Elisabeth Gosselin-Malo
Feb 5, 09:12 AM

MILAN – Amid calls for a common European military to stand up to an aggressive Russia and other potential threats, EU members Slovenia, Spain, Denmark and Poland say the idea is unrealistic and unnecessary.

“The EU should have its own army,” Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani of Italy, a founding member of both the trade bloc and NATO, said in an interview with Italian newspaper La Stampa last month. The official proposed that the fighting force could be involved in peacekeeping missions and preventing conflict.

However, even with war now raging in Europe and a push for stronger defense cooperation across the continent, the proposal hasn’t gained much traction. For starters, there’s little consensus among the 27 nations of the EU on the need for such a force.

“The establishment of this common defense — a necessary framework for the development of a ‘European Army’ – would require a unanimous decision of the Council,” the Spanish Ministry of Defense said in a statement. “If achieving this requirement was almost impossible in 1992, when the EU was composed of 12 member states, a decision by an EU of 27 or more countries in the future, would be very difficult to take – in this context the idea is unrealistic or unaffordable in the near future.”

Furthermore, Europe already has a defense force in NATO, making a separate European-only force unnecessary, according to Denmark, also a member of both organizations.

“NATO is the cornerstone of our collective security, and defense remains a matter of national sovereignty – there is no NATO or EU army, but close defense cooperation between allies and member-states,” the Danish defense ministry said in a statement. “Denmark does not support establishing an EU army.”

This question is also not on the agenda of Slovenia, Aleš Sila, the official responsible for strategic communications at the country’s Ministry of Defense, told Defense News.

In the past, a challenge that has loomed over the EU in regard to successfully achieving the bloc’s priorities has been that member-states tend to implement their defense plans at the national level.

This finding was highlighted in the 2022 Coordinated Annual Review on Defense Report published by the European Defense Agency. The document also found that most EU countries are also part of NATO, and see the military alliance as their primary multilateral orientation.

It is Poland’s view that the two should be seen as complementary rather than as incompatible.

“Poland does not neglect EU actions in the security and defense area – [EU actions] should become complementary to strengthen NATO efforts and contribute to trans-atlantic security,” the Polish ministry of defense said in a statement.

New initiatives, similar roles​

The consensus shared by three of the four member-states was that other initiatives have been established that will play a similar role to that of a European army and provide similar capabilities.

The Slovenian, Spanish and Polish ministries all pointed to the development of the EU’s Rapid Deployment Capability, which by 2025 aims to allow the swift deployment of a modular force of up to 5,000 troops in non-permissive environments.

The first RDC deployment exercise took place in Spain in October, during which nine European countries contributed 2,800 military personnel and equipment. The participating states included Austria, Spain, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Romania.

Additional cooperative measures are also being taken amongst other EU member-states individually, as highlighted by the Polish MoD.

“It is our goal to tighten defense cooperation within EU countries, which was manifested on Jan. 30, when the head of the MoD signed a letter of intent on military redeployment procedures with the ministers of the Netherlands and Germany,” it said,

The document, although different from a common military, will facilitate and accelerate the movement of allied troops across the three countries.

About Elisabeth Gosselin-Malo
Elisabeth Gosselin-Malo is a Europe correspondent for Defense News. She covers a wide range of topics related to military procurement and international security, and specializes in reporting on the aviation sector. She is based in Milan, Italy.

 

[Housecarl]

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Realism: Pakistan And India – OpEd

The ‘Realist’ school of thought rests in the idea that states are only ever bothered about issues that concern them – and therefore are more inclined towards pursuing their self-interest. These ‘National interests’ are a complex blend of historical, geopolitical, and strategic factors that shape...

www.eurasiareview.com

Realism: Pakistan And India – OpEd​

February 9, 2024 0 Comments
By Ayesha Mirza

The ‘Realist’ school of thought rests in the idea that states are only ever bothered about issues that concern them – and therefore are more inclined towards pursuing their self-interest. These ‘National interests’ are a complex blend of historical, geopolitical, and strategic factors that shape their foreign policies. A case in point is the longstanding conflict between India and Pakistan – marked by years of animosity, obdurate struggle over the disputed land of Kashmir, four wars, a multitude of armed escalations, and the competitive purchase of arms here and there.

The Neo-realist framework underpinning the defense policies of the two is a result of the insecurity and perpetual fear instilled by the other – Aparna Pande, in her work, went as far as saying, “Since independence in 1947, Pakistan’s identity and foreign policy have been framed around India.” To make matters worse, the two operate in an International Arena dominated by anarchy, and therefore, have to naturally, put their interests above everything else, if it means securing their future.

The Realist ideology posits that the concept of “anarchy” dominates the global arena, and refers to the absence of an overarching central body overseeing countries, thereby putting in place regulatory mechanisms. With a lack of oversight, countries all over tend to engage in activities that are violent in nature, and unbridled aggression becomes prevalent. Additionally, this nonexistence of an overarching body is exploited by the same countries to advance their interests.

Take Pakistan as an example; in 1988, the country quickly shifted from being a covert nuclear country to an overt one, because India had managed to conduct successful nuclear tests as part of ‘Operation Shakti,’ – the Hindi word for ‘protection.’ Protection against who? India’s decision to declare itself a nuclear power compelled Pakistan to follow suit and demonstrate its nuclear capabilities to the world. This sudden outburst could only be attributed to the surge of insecurity that swept through Pakistan the moment those nuclear bombs underwent tests on the other side of the border. On May 28th and 30th of the same year, nuclear tests code-named “Chagai-I” and “Chagai-II, were carried out in the Chagai district of the Balochistan province in Pakistan. These facts are evidence of how the two neighboring countries in South Asia perceive the other as a consequential threat, and thus, take steps to ensure uptight security for definite survival, in what Realists term a “security dilemma.”

A branch of realism, as a “security dilemma,” unfolds when a state attempting to enhance its security, unintentionally propagates insecurity in the other state. This leads to a vicious cycle of both states trying to bolster their security measures, not being privy to the consequences such measures will bear. Jumping back into India-Pakistan relations, India holds a dominant position in South Asia, with a larger military force and a hefty defense budget of 55.2 billion USD compared to Pakistan’s 7 billion USD. This military “edge” held by India has prompted Pakistan to accelerate its development and production of nuclear warheads and weapons. As T. Powers notes in his book, currently Pakistan possesses an estimated 170 nuclear warheads, surpassing India’s nuclear arsenal in scale.

This ongoing arms race between India and Pakistan has its roots in the security dilemma, where each state is driven by the desire to protect itself against the perceived threat posed by the other. India’s military dominance has created a sense of insecurity in Pakistan, leading it to invest heavily in arms to counterbalance India’s military might, creating perpetual tension with the potential for catastrophic consequences in the event of a conflict. Years of conflict, failed ceasefires, and baseless agreements later, India and Pakistan, are still entrenched in cycles of mistrust and have resorted to external powers to gain strategic advantages.

Talking about national interests, India and Pakistan have been embroiled in a long-standing conflict over Kashmir; fighting 3 wars, yet the territory remains a major point of contention, with neither state willing to relinquish its claim to the region as it goes “against their national interests.” This deadlock increases the likelihood of a full-blown war if tensions were to escalate. While India holds a position of strength in terms of land and population, Pakistan faces a significant disadvantage in sharing a 2,300-kilometer border with India, making it susceptible to simultaneous attacks.

However, to counter this geographical vulnerability, Pakistan benefits greatly from its strategic alliance with China – a rising superpower with a world-class military. Siachen, a former battleground between Indian and Pakistani forces, now could be used to launch a joint attack against India, due to the proximity of Chinese forces along the border. In 2011, the Indian Army issued a warning to its headquarters in Delhi, highlighting the strategic implications of Pakistani troops’ presence in the region near the Chinese border. The warning signaled a cause for concern, particularly since the 1965 war on Kashmir, highlighting the need for India to assess and re-evaluate its strategic priorities in the region, as stated by Ibid in his work. All Pakistan is doing here is pursuing its interests in safeguarding National Security, which naturally does not sit well with India, making the country incapable of adopting a “liberal approach” to International Relations, when it comes to Pakistan, according to Dwividi.

The dynamic of Pakistan, and India is best understood through the world-view of Realism, for both perceive each other as threats, and therefore engage in practices that are marred by a deep-seated sense of mutual mistrust, enabling them to gain an advantage over the other. Since their independence, India and Pakistan have consistently acted in their self-interest, with little regard for the consequences of their action.

 

[Housecarl]

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Baltic nations prepare 600-strong bunker defensive line, with Russian threat in mind - Breaking Defense

The new bunkers, similar to "underground cellars" commonly found in Estonia, are expected to be 35 square metres (115 square feet), hardened to withstand artillery strikes and house up to 10 soldiers.

breakingdefense.com

• GLOBAL, LAND WARFARE

Baltic nations prepare 600-strong bunker defensive line, with Russian threat in mind​

The new bunkers, similar to "underground cellars" commonly found in Estonia, are expected to be 35 square metres (115 square feet), hardened to withstand artillery strikes and house up to 10 soldiers.​

By TIM MARTIN on February 08, 2024 at 12:46 PM

BELFAST — A collection of 600 bunkers are to be built across the borders of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to shore up NATO’s eastern flank and deliver a groundbreaking anti-mobility defensive line aimed at preventing any “quick and far-reaching offensive” launched by Russia.

Based on an agreement between the three Baltic countries last month and aligned to NATO’s new regional defense plans, the estimated €60 million ($65 million) anti-mobility installation project will see a first bunker constructed 2025.

The nations are “already halfway through [the] planning cycle, development and testing of product type bunkers,” said Susan Lilleväli, Estonia’s Undersecretary for Defence Readiness, during a press briefing today.

“We have seen different estimates [around] how quickly Russia can rebuild its military, and we need to use this time wisely,” she said. “We’ve come to conclusion that time to make all the necessary preparations [against an attack] is now.”

A map of the proposed bunker system presented by Estonian officials on Feb. 8, 2024 as defense against Russian invasion. (Screengrab)
Lilleväli’s warning comes on the heels of Kaja Kallas, Estonia’s prime minister, claiming that NATO has around three to five years to prepare for a war with Russia.

The new bunkers, similar to “underground cellars” commonly found in Estonia, are expected to be 35 square metres (115 square feet), hardened to withstand artillery strikes and house up to 10 soldiers. Supporting storage areas are set to be filled with non-explosive ordnance.



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“We are not using or [stockpiling] any explosives or EOD [Explosive Ordnance Device] in peacetime, but they are pre-stocked closely enough to the defensive line,” said Lilleväli.

Next steps of planning and development include the construction of prototype bunkers for testing this year and decisions about the exact locations for the installations. Agreements for the specific position of the sites will depend on future negotiations with private landowners.

“The installations should start” in 2025, said Lilleväli.

Reserves Lt. Col. Kaido Tiitus, advisor to Estonia’s Undersecretary for Defence Readiness, said that warfighting lessons in Ukraine had demonstrated Baltic states “need to find ways” to stop “advances of Russian armored units,” adding that “if we let them run, we might be too late to protect our countries.”


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In addition to halting the FARA competition, service leaders want to end UH-60 V Blackhawk production, postpone moving the Improved Turbine Engine Program into production, and phase out legacy drones.
By ASHLEY ROQUE

He said that a “risk” can be taken when considering how the bunkers will withstand enemy fire because “larger” land based systems besides 120mm mortars and 152mm artillery shells carried by Russian howitzers will “mostly” look to strike aerial targets.

All three of the anti-mobility defensive line signatories also signed a Letter of Intent for procurement of US made M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) equipment last month “aiming to create a framework for the joint use of the weapon system in both peace and wartime,” according to an Estonian Ministry of Defence statement.

 

[Housecarl]

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Houthis, Russians wield same Iranian-supplied drones, DIA studies show

The Waid 1 and 2 drones share distinctive features — wing stabilizers, pitot tubes, fuselages — with Iran’s Shahed-131 and -136, according to the agency.

www.defensenews.com

Unmanned​

Houthis, Russians wield same Iranian-supplied drones, DIA studies show​

By Colin Demarest
Feb 8, 12:10 PM

Houthi rebels based in Yemen are equipped with the same Iranian-sourced attack drones as Russian troops invading Ukraine, according to reports from a U.S. intelligence agency.

Both forces have used unmanned aerial vehicles to attack from afar and modernize their arsenals. Since October, the U.S. Navy has shot down dozens of one-way drones bound for the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, while the Ukrainian military many miles away contends with what has been described as a drone war in Eastern Europe.

The Defense Intelligence Agency this week published a report documenting how Iran arms Houthi militants, highlighting among other weaponry the Waid 1 and 2 drones. The DIA said they share distinctive features — pitot tubes, fuselages, stubby nose cones — with Iran’s Shahed-131 and -136, which have a range of more than 1,000 miles.

Another DIA study published in August said Russia’s Geran-1 and -2, although rebranded, were of Iranian origin for similar reasons. The findings were based on retrieved parts as well as visual comparison of publicly available images. Parades and other military showcases provide analysts a chance to scour foreign firepower.

“The Waid 2 wing stabilizers displayed by the Houthis in Yemen are consistent with the size and shape of the winglets on the Shahed-136 displayed in Iran and debris from the Geran-2 — the Russian name for the Shahed-136 — recovered after Russian attacks in Ukraine,” the DIA assessment stated.

This comparison from a DIA report examines Houthi Waid 1 and Iranian Shahed-131 drones. (U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency)
Asked about the proliferation of Iranian drones among two different forces in two different regions, a DIA spokesperson said all the information the agency has “on this topic is in the report and the accompanying release.” The agency, based at Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling just south of the Capitol, is a principal source of foreign intelligence for military endeavors.

Stateside leadership has expressed increasing concern about Iran’s influence abroad. U.S. and allied forces have interdicted more than 18 Iranian smuggling vessels since 2015, seizing ballistic missile components, UAVs, anti-tank guided missiles, firearms, rockets and more.

Pentagon spokesperson Sabrina Singh on Feb. 6 told reporters that the department has “been very clear that Iran does supply the Houthis, and other [Iranian Revolutionary Guard]-backed militias, with weapons and different capabilities, including UAVs.”

She declined to comment on the specifics of DIA’s assessment.

A one-way drone attack last month that killed three U.S. soldiers at the Tower 22 installation, near al-Tanf garrison and the Syrian border, was blamed on Tehran-backed militants. Washington responded by hitting more than 85 targets linked to the Revolutionary Guard, including command-and-control headquarters, intelligence centers, and drone and ammunition storage sites.

The strikes featured long-range B-1 bombers.

About Colin Demarest
Colin Demarest is a reporter at C4ISRNET, where he covers military networks, cyber and IT. Colin previously covered the Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration — namely Cold War cleanup and nuclear weapons development — for a daily newspaper in South Carolina. Colin is also an award-winning photographer.

 

[Housecarl]

The question we are forgetting to ask: How will we handle this once Iran is nuclear?

Imagine how this situation would be different if Iran had already successfully tested a nuclear device

thehill.com

WAR - Main Persian Gulf Trouble thread

oopsie. Insider Paper @TheInsiderPaper BREAKING: Major fire breaks out at refinery in Isfahan city of Iran View: https://twitter.com/TheInsiderPaper/status/1735929851973116074?s=20

www.timebomb2000.com

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Iran's Calculated Approach to Regional Tensions | OilPrice.com

Iran, cautious of the ramifications on its domestic stability and survival, has avoided direct military conflict with Israel and the United States, despite rising tensions in the Middle East.

oilprice.com

Iran's Calculated Approach to Regional Tensions​

By RFE/RL staff - Feb 09, 2024, 2:00 PM CST

• Iran has refrained from direct military action against Israel and the US, prioritizing its regime's survival amid internal challenges, including civil unrest and economic crises.
• The Iranian leadership, including President Ebrahim Raisi, has emphasized a conciliatory approach, stating Iran will not initiate war but will respond to aggression.
• Experts suggest that Iran's military capabilities, while advanced in areas such as drones and missiles, do not match the conventional and nuclear capabilities of Israel, leading Iran to rely on asymmetric warfare and proxy forces to avoid direct confrontation.

Since Israel launched its war in the Gaza Strip, Iranian-backed militant groups have attacked Israeli and U.S. targets across the Middle East in a show of support for Palestinians.

While Iran has flexed its muscles in the region since the war erupted in October, Tehran has avoided taking direct military action against Israel and its key ally, the United States.

Experts say the Islamic republic sees a direct war against its archfoes as a threat to its fragile domestic stability and its own survival.

Iran has “so much to lose in a short-term war,” said Alex Vatanka, director of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute in Washington. “[It] brings in all sorts of questions about the future of the Islamic republic.”

A Matter of Survival

The possibility of a direct U.S.-Iranian military confrontation increased after a Tehran-backed militia in Iraq killed three American soldiers in a drone strike in Jordan on January 29.

But Tehran has struck a conciliatory tone since the attack, wary of U.S. strikes on Iranian territory.

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi said on February 2 that the country “will not start any war” but will respond strongly if “anyone wants to bully us.”

Raz Zimmt, a senior researcher at the Israel-based Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), said that regime survival is the clerical establishment’s “top objective” and any war with Israel and the United States would be an existential threat to the Islamic republic.

The Iranian establishment has had to contend with multiple domestic crises in recent years, including rising civil unrest and a faltering economy.

The September 2022 death in police custody of Mahsa Amini -- detained for allegedly not properly observing Iran’s strict dress code for women -- sparked months of deadly nationwide protests that posed one of the biggest challenges to the Islamic republic in decades.

The authorities cracked down on the demonstrations, killing hundreds and arresting thousands of protesters.

The clerical establishment has long maintained that it derives its legitimacy from the will of the people. But that claim has been increasingly questioned in recent years.

The parliamentary elections in 2020 and the presidential vote in 2021 saw record-low turnouts, with less than half of eligible voters casting their ballots in both elections.

There are similar concerns about a poor turnout in the upcoming parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections scheduled for next month.

The authorities have also grappled with a worsening economy that has been crippled by international sanctions and government mismanagement, leading to soaring inflation, rising unemployment, and growing poverty.

“Foreign policy decisions are not directly impacted by public opinion,” Zimmt said. “Nonetheless, the regime's need to prevent needless domestic disturbances in Iran undoubtedly shapes its choices.”

Military Prowess

For years, Iranian military officials have bragged about the country’s arsenal of drones and missiles. But experts say Iran lacks the military prowess to challenge Israel and the United States.

“Iran is well aware that Israel has a clear operational and intelligence advantage over it in a direct military conflict, both defensively and offensively,” Zimmt said.

Aside from having a conventionally superior military, Israel also has a nuclear deterrent, said John Krzyzaniak, a research associate at the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.

Israel is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons, with the Washington-based Nuclear Threat Initiative estimating that Israel has around 90 nuclear warheads.

Under decades of sanctions, Iran has invested heavily in developing domestic weapons programs, resulting in cheap and effective drones and missiles.

Iranian officials have boasted that some of its weapons have been developed specifically to hit Israel. For example, officials have claimed that a Fattah ballistic missile can reach Tel Aviv in 400 seconds.

But Vatanka said this is only “psychological warfare against the Israelis” and meant to “enhance the Islamic republic’s image” as the “sole guardian or promoter of the Palestinian cause.”

Krzyzaniak stated that Iran’s missiles can “pose a serious threat” to Israel while its attack drones like the Shahed-136 can “wreak havoc on a civilian population” if fired in large numbers. But he said Israel still maintains military superiority.

That is why, Krzyzaniak said, Iran will continue to rely on unconventional warfare and its asymmetric capabilities.

“A guerrilla warrior never attacks the enemy head on,” he added.

By using the so-called “axis of resistance,” Iran’s loose-knit network of proxies and militant groups who aid it in opposing Israel and the United States, Tehran “reduces the possibility of Iranian casualties and significant assets being damaged” inside the country, according to Zimmt.

This allows Iran to “fight Israel through its regional partners on multiple fronts, albeit with a restricted scope,” he said.

Experts say that Iran’s reluctance to avenge the deaths of at least 10 members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in suspected Israeli strikes in Syria and Lebanon since early December further strengthens the argument that Tehran wants to avoid a war.

Last month, Iran carried out missile strikes on targets in Syria, Iraq, and Pakistan that were widely seen as a warning to Israel and the United States.

But Zimmt said Iran has avoided an escalation that would lead to a war with Israel and the United States.

“For the time being, Iranian concerns about engaging in direct confrontation with Israel seem to outweigh its desire to exact revenge,” he added.

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[Housecarl]

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American Decline and Geopolitical Realism

The West’s reach is dwindling, and its goal of spreading liberalism is failing.

europeanconservative.com

• ESSAY

American Decline and Geopolitical Realism​

The West’s reach is dwindling, and its goal of spreading liberalism is failing.

• Benjamin Sanders
• — February 8, 2024

From the end of the Second World War until early 2022, the geopolitics of our world followed a very similar pattern. The pattern was that borders were sacred, they could not change, and this narrative was enforced by the United Nations and America’s military might. This meant rival ethnicities and religious sects were often forced together into nations they despised—as in the example of Iraq—where different groups have fought continuously since independence in 1932. Any attempt by the Sunnis, Shias, or Kurds to break off has been met by Western condemnation, yet military intervention by the latter exacerbated the chaos.

The problem is that the West’s foreign policy is informed by liberalism, the central pillar being that people should get along. This is why Washington disapproved of Serbia annexing areas of Kosovo populated by Serbs, and why it despised the idea of reshaping the Middle East’s boundaries so that Kurds, Shias and Sunnis could have their own states. Even though such moves make sense from an ethnic and religious perspective—and would certainly make peace more likely—the option is always repudiated. This is because redrawing the maps would entail admitting an obvious truth: that some cultures are incompatible with each other.

One of the standout takeaways from Craig Whitlock’s The Afghanistan Papers was how the West’s foreign policy is so fatally flawed—and just how liberal it really was following 9/11. Funded by taxpayers and handed out by civil servants, billions were spent on idealism rather than realism. They built women’s institutions in areas where women weren’t allowed outside the house and joint community centres for tribes that had blood feuds. What’s more, criticising foreign spending was taboo because the U.S. state department believed that it was the righteous arsenal of a moral crusade. There was almost no local knowledge about the customs, religion, history or law of the concerned regions to inform the judgement of policymakers. These places were considered as fit for liberalism as New England. One might presume that this approach would last throughout this century, but it was not to be.

In early 2022, something happened that shouldn’t have happened—Russia invaded another sovereign country and got away with it. Suddenly international borders, held to be sacred by the UN, had been trampled on by Putin. Again, Ukraine is another example of a state made up of three groups (Ukrainians, Russians and Hungarians) being held together, at least in part, by the American-led international system. Yes, Russia had already annexed Crimea in 2014, but that peninsular has a Russian majority population. Plus, back then Western power was still impressive, and Moscow was cautious enough nine years ago to ensure that invading personnel didn’t wear Russian uniforms. (As a result they became known by locals as the ‘Little Green Men,’ because initially nobody knew who they were.) Fast forward to 2022 and Putin felt no need to hide anything. Not only did he put on a dress rehearsal for the invasion in spring 2021, but he slowly built up his troops in the three months prior to the actual war, without making an effort to hide them.

The reason for this is that the West’s power has declined significantly in the last decade. Beset by an internal culture war, mass immigration and other general symptoms of declining self-belief, the unipolar moment is over and multi-polarity has become the new status quo. America might remain the major superpower thanks to the strength of the dollar and its aircraft carrier groups, but it no longer enjoys the dominance it once did. This is similar to the British Empire’s position in the interwar period, where the Lion could still roar, but there were now more vigorous cubs emerging from the shadows.

Putin’s invasion has of course met endless setbacks and hurdles, with the failure to take Kiev being an embarrassment that won’t be forgotten. However, although a stalemate has ensued and he’s taken the predominantly Russian speaking areas only at great cost, the West still cannot defeat him. Last year, many commentators on social media were adamant that Russia would lose because they’re the bad guys, yet over the last 6 months this mood has gradually changed. Realism is beginning to set in, the same way that the endless spiral of COVID lockdowns had begun to feel increasingly absurd by 2021. The narrative of liberalism dictates that Ukrainians must win and the West must ensure that, but there is no logic to this mindset. Such conflicts are settled by military power, not idealism.

The West is unlikely to reverse Russia’s occupation of the south-east of Ukraine, yet Russia is unlikely to conquer much more either. Realism would dictate a deal along ethno-linguistic lines, and the West’s foreign policy elites are beginning to move towards such an outcome. There is no longer a superpower who can force a one-sided deal—Washington’s aid money is beginning to run out—and so eventually a compromise will be made. The narrative of a total Ukrainian victory was broken by the failure of last summer’s counter offensive, and the West’s position has now changed.

When you consider the amount of time, money, and media coverage given to Ukraine this will come as a surprise to much of the public. Yet if you step back a little and observe a similar crisis, then America’s growing international apathy is no surprise. In relation to Israel’s current struggle, the Biden administration correctly supported Jerusalem following Hamas’ invasion. Yet Washington dragged its heels for two months before reacting to the plight of merchant shipping in the Red Sea, which is being bombarded by Shia Islamists. These Iranian proxies, known as the Houthis, are not the only crisis which received a lacklustre response. The reality is that American forward operating bases—in both Iraq and Syria—have been attacked relentlessly since October 7th. In retaliation America has launched minor airstrikes, which is an unconvincing response that will deter nobody.

This all shows that the West’s reach is dwindling, and its goal of spreading liberalism is accordingly beginning to fail. Military budget cuts, especially in Europe, have now reached such a point that conducting a war is becoming impossible. The idea that a coalition could conduct simultaneous campaigns—as occurred during the war on terror—is now off the cards. For example, Britain can no longer field even a single armoured division, when in the Cold War it stationed four in Germany alone. There is not enough money, not enough troops, not enough equipment, and more importantly not enough competence and willpower to see it through.

You may not have agreed with America appointing itself the world’s policeman. However, it did make the global order relatively stable as compared to most of human history. All it takes is a weak response to Houthi mischief in the Red Sea, and suddenly the world’s trade routes are imperiled. We are now living in that reality. Although the experts may have predicted that a multipolar world would bring diverse opinions and global compromise, the reality is very different. So far we are seeing trade and currency wars, declining birth rates, local conflicts flaring up on multiple continents, and the explosion of mass migration from poorer countries into wealthier ones. What we are witnessing, at least to some degree, is a gradual decline into anarchy on the world stage, a free-for-all royal rumble without a referee. The reality is that a multipolar world, ushered in by Western decline, will not bring balance and stability—it will bring absolute chaos.



Benjamin Sanders is an English literature private tutor who resides in Devon, England. He has written for many conservative publications over the years, with a focus on politics and foreign affairs.