WAR 01-23-2016-to-01-29-2016_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

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http://www.realcleardefense.com/art...ling_despite_us_military_training_108955.html

January 27, 2016

Iraq Forces Struggling Despite U.S. Military Training

By Susannah George

BASMAYA, Iraq — Iraq's 72nd Brigade was slowly moving through a live-fire exercise recently under the watchful eyes of U.S., Spanish and British coalition trainers when things began to go wrong.

One part of the unit moved forward too quickly across the open field of the military base, putting a team of Iraqi engineers in danger of being hit by friendly fire. A coalition trainer noticed the error, radioed to his counterpart embedded with the formation, and the men were shifted to take the engineers out of harm's way.

Such battlefield adaptations are difficult to learn and almost impossible to teach with simulations alone, experts say, and that is one of the problems still plaguing the Iraqi army.

Washington and Baghdad have cast the recent victory over Islamic State group extremists in Ramadi as proof that training efforts are paying off and that the Iraqi military has improved. But analysts and former U.S. trainers say that despite some significant advances, the battle highlighted the troops' lingering shortcomings. And they say that last month's success isn't a model for retaking the much-bigger IS-held city of Mosul.

Just over a year and a half ago, Iraq's military was in tatters.

As Islamic State group militants overran Mosul, the country's second-largest city, more than a third of Iraqi security forces simply melted away. Another 1,700 soldiers were captured and killed. There was rampant corruption in the ranks, with tens of thousands of "ghost soldiers" — nonexistent troops whose pay was pocketed by senior commanders. And the most formidable fighters in Iraq were the recently rearmed Shiite militias, which took the lead in most of the battles against the IS extremists.

The U.S.-led coalition's efforts to train the Iraqi military began in December 2014. Since then, more than 18,000 Iraqi troops have completed courses like the one held at the base in Basmaya.

The victory in the western city of Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province, was the military's first major success without the involvement of Shiite militias. While pockets of extremists still remain on its northern and eastern edges, the center of the city remains under government control weeks later.

In the wake of Ramadi, U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter has announced that he wants the coalition to greatly increase the number of trainers in Iraq. The U.S. recently sent 200 additional special operations troops to Iraq, bringing the total number of coalition troops in the country to more than 3,300.

While praising the victory in Ramadi, analysts also sounded notes of caution in the way the battle was waged.

"This was a tremendous success, but at best a partial success," said Anthony Cordesman, a former adviser to the previous U.S.-led training effort in Iraq and currently a security analyst with the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The victories in Ramadi were "dependent on a unit where it is not yet clear you can replicate more of them," Cordesman said, referring to Iraq's elite counterterrorism force that took the lead in the fight.

The counterterrorism unit, or CTS, is the product of an older, dramatically different training program than the current effort. Iraq's counterterrorism troops were chosen after a grueling series of exams and closelytrained by U.S. Army Special Forces from 2003 to 2011.

The Iraqi troops and armed Sunni tribesmen fresh from coalition training courses largely brought up the rear in Ramadi, holding the territory that the counterterrorism forces cleared with the help of heavy coalition air support. Many Iraqis who fill the ranks of the conventional security forces often joined for lack of other job opportunities, and some show up with little more training than how to assemble a rifle.

That an elite unit was used to clear a city in combination with heavy air support is a testament to the Iraqimilitary's persistent deficiencies, current and former trainers said.

The counterterrorism forces were "used as a conventional battlefield force to take and hold terrain, but that's not what you do with elite forces," said David M. Witty, a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel who worked in Iraq from 2007-08 and again from 2013-14 as an adviser and trainer for the CTS.

"You don't take a Ranger battalion and tell them to clear a city; that's why you have the regular army," he said.

To bring other military units up to the level of the CTS is not something that can be accomplished in a few weeks or even years, Witty said.

The effectiveness of the CTS is the product in part of a long training program, but also one that extended to the battlefield. Today, close support from the coalition largely ends in the classroom.

The current and former military trainers said the kind of battle fought to dislodge IS militants in Ramadi cannot be applied to a large urban center like Mosul, which coalition officials estimated has more than 1 million civilians.

Iraq's forces remain heavily dependent on air support to retake territory, and the skills they are learning are not applicable to the kind of combat they probably will face in Mosul, said two of the coalition trainers at the Basmaya exercise. The trainers spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to talk to the media.

Describing the heavy destruction seen in Ramadi from coalition airstrikes, Witty said it's not a model that can be used in other parts of Iraq.

"There's no future in that. You can do it in a few select cases, but not for long," he said.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/why-did-russian-nuclear-capable-bombers-circumnavigate-japan/

Why Did Russian Nuclear-Capable Bombers Circumnavigate Japan?

Continued Russian bomber flybys near Japanese airspace suggest that the bilateral relationship remains cool.

By Ankit Panda
January 27, 2016

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On Tuesday, January 26, Japan¡¯s Ministry of Defense revealed that the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force had scrambled jets in response to two Russian Tu-95MS ¡°Bear¡± strategic bombers near its air space. According to a map released by the Japanese government, the two Russian bombers approached Japanese airspace from Russia¡¯s Primorsky province, flying over the Sea of Japan, and eventually flew along the perimeter of Japan¡¯s territorial airspace, encompassing the four main Japanese islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku, and Hokkaido, before returning to Russia.

clipular
Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense.

The incident isn¡¯t the first incident involving Russian strategic bombers near Japanese airspace by any means. Moscow regularly conducts such activities and Japan scrambles fighters to ensure that its territorial airspace isn¡¯t violated.

However, the Tu-95¡äs flight path in this instance¡ªalong the perimeter of Japan¡¯s islands¡ªappears more provocative than usual. Generally, Russian bombers fly long-distance runs. For instance, Russian Tu-95s have been known to fly the length of the Ryukyu Island chain before returning to Russian airspace. (I discussed one such incident here at The Diplomat in late 2013.) Last March, Japan intercepted and escorted a Tu-95 over the Korean Strait between South Korea and Kyushu.

In 2014, shortly following Russia¡¯s annexation of Crimea and ensuing isolation from the West, including expulsion from the G8 within which Japan is a member, Russian Tu-95 bomber patrols picked up in intensity in the Asia-Pacific region. As General Herbert ¡°Hawk¡± Carlisle, the commander of the U.S. Pacific Air Force, said at the time, the United States noticed that Russian bombers were coming out to airspace near California and, similar to Tuesday¡¯s incident, circumnavigated Guam. Even though Russia claims these exercises are routine patrols, intended to keep its Tu-95 bombers airworthy¡ªwhich, given problems with Russian military aviation, isn¡¯t entirely an unbelievable reason¡ªthe bomber flybys have a geopolitical messaging purpose.

Consider also that in late 2015, as my colleague Prashanth Parameswaran reported, Japanese officials publicly noted their growing concern about provocations from Moscow. Relations between Japan and Russia have declined since Moscow¡¯s foray into Ukraine, despite Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe¡¯s initial bonhomie with Russian President Vladimir Putin after coming into office in late 2012.

The territorial dispute between Russia and Japan over the sovereignty of the Kuril Islands¡ªa lingering problem since the end of the Second World War¡ªappeared to initially be heading toward resolution, but stalled last year. In fact, Russia moved to directly provoke Japan by announcing its intention to construct military and civilian infrastructure on the Kurils. In 2014¡ªagain, following its invasion of Crimea and G8 expulsion¡ªRussia staged military drills on the Kuril Islands. The two countries ended 2015 with an indefinite postponement of a Putin state visit to Japan over the issue of the Kuril Islands.

In the context of the overall state of Japan-Russia bilateral relations, Tuesday¡¯s circumnavigation of Japan¡¯s main islands can be seen as one more provocation in a string of several over the past years. Incidentally, the incident comes just days after Abe, in an interview with Japan¡¯s Nikkei, said that he wanted to engage Russia again. Abe currently chairs the G7 and said he wanted ¡°constructive engagement of Russia.¡± Japan¡¯s foreign relations remain complicated in its neighborhood and Abe is less-than-enthusiastic about the prospect of Japan bearing out the consequences of the West¡¯s decision to isolate Russia.

Interestingly, as Samuel Ramani recently noted in The Diplomat, Russia¡¯s harsh response to North Korea¡¯s recent nuclear test could presage some positive engagement between Moscow and Tokyo¡ªboth Japan and Russia had a place at the table in the long-stalled Six-Party Talks. Since its isolation from the West, Russia had chosen to engage North Korea, going as far as to invite Kim Jong-un to its commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Second World War (an invitation Kim declined). In November 2015, a Russian military delegation visited Pyongyang as well.

Given Russia¡¯s response to North Korea and Abe¡¯s recent overture to Moscow, a warming of relations between the two countries may have been in the offing. However, given Russia¡¯s decision to stage a highly provocative circumnavigation of Japan by nuclear bombers, it¡¯s more likely than not that the cool bilateral climate that persisted through 2015 is here to stay.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.politico.eu/article/turkeys-erdogan-revolution/

Kemal Erdoðan’s second Turkish revolution

The Turkish leader seems intent on uprooting the Ottoman legacy and restoring Islam’s central role.

By Soner Cagaptay | 1/27/16, 5:30 AM CET

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoðan is all but certain to become the longest serving Turkish leader in modern history, surpassing even Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The founder of modern Turkey ruled the country for 15 years between 1923 and 1938. By the time he finishes his current term, Erdoðan will have run Turkey for 17 years, as prime minister between 2002 and 2014 and as president until 2019.

Erdoðan is often cast as an Ottoman revivalist. His critics suggest he wants to do away with the legacy and policies of Atatürk, who established Turkey as a modern secular republic in the 1920s, and bring back the Ottoman Empire in its place. But Erdoðan’s agenda goes deeper: He wants to rid Turkey not only of the legacy of Atatürk, but also of the late, westernized Ottoman Empire.

Often portrayed as a standalone revolutionary leader, Atatürk is really a product of the Ottoman Empire. He was educated in Ottoman schools and served in the Ottoman military.

The Ottoman pivot to the West that produced Atatürk and other like-minded Westernizers followed a period of painful soul-searching. The Ottomans, the dominant power in Europe in the 16th century, stalled in the face of the emerging strength of the Christian powers in the early 17th century, who first blocked the Ottoman advance into Europe and then dealt them a crushing defeat at the gates of Vienna in 1683.

The Ottomans’ initial response to their sudden loss of superiority over Christian Europeans was denial, embodied by religious fundamentalism, and in the mid-17th century, a religious tide, the little known Kadizadeli movement, swept across the Empire. The movement, led by the Muslim judge Kadýzade Mehmed, was strengthened by its young and committed seminary students known as the Taliban (the word simply means “students” in Arabic and Ottoman Turkish).

In a textbook case of religious fundamentalism, the Kadizadeli Taliban movement asserted that the Empire’s inability to maintain the dominance of “true Islam” over its policies had led to its decline. Kadizadeli-Talibans claimed that, by eliminating its tolerance and open-mindedness, the Ottomans could “rid Islam of accretions”— the ageless recipe for “reform” among countless Islamist movements since, including the Wahhabis and jihadists — and the Empire could be restored to its former glory.

***

So the Ottomans tried fundamentalism. They imposed onerous burdens on Jews and Christians, temporarily dispensing with the religious openness of their social organization. They banned alcohol and tobacco, and persecuted non-orthodox Muslims, such as the Sufis. However, these religious policies — the timeless toolbox of Islamists — failed to restore Ottoman strength. Western powers and Russia crushed the Ottomans even more severely in wars in the 18th century than they did before the rise of the Kadizadeli movement. The Ottomans slowly and painfully realized that religion does not ensure political greatness.

This string of humiliating losses prompted a process of introspection in the 18th century. The Ottoman sultans decided to westernize their state in an effort to catch up with the rising powers of Europe. In the late 18th century, Sultan Selim III, a contemporary of Napoleon, initiated these efforts by westernizing the Ottoman military, and his successors in the 19th century continued to restructure the Empire’s bureaucracy and educational system, giving way to progressive concepts such as women’s education, joining the European concert of nations, and secular courts. Religious matters increasingly fell under the control of the state.

These reforms shaped the environment that produced the father of modern European Turkey in 1923, Kemal Atatürk, an Ottoman military officer from a modest family background, trained in the Empire’s schools under a secular Western curriculum.

When the Empire collapsed at the end of World War I, the Allies occupied the Ottoman Empire. Atatürk first led a successful campaign between 1920 and 1922 to liberate Turkey, then pushed for deep reforms to fully secularize the country. He abolished what remained of the Sharia in the Ottoman court system, instituted a completely secular public education system, and declared full equality between women and men. In a break from the Ottoman approach, he banished religion to the private domain. In foreign policy, Atatürk embraced the notion of Turkey’s European nature even more openly than the Ottomans, pivoting the country away from the Middle East.

That lasted until very recently. After coming to power in 2002, Erdoðan sought to roll back the Kemalist legacy. The AKP elites claimed that Kemalism’s strict separation of religion and state was unnatural and deemed public displays of piety, such as government employees donning the headscarf, completely acceptable. In the foreign policy sphere, they focused on re-engaging the Middle East and cementing Turkey’s status as a regional Sunni power.

But Erdoðan did not stop there. He appears intent on uprooting the Ottoman legacy of Westernization and reinstating Islam to a central role in politics, almost harkening back to the wayward Kadizadeli movement. Alluding to 19th-century Ottoman reforms, Erdoðan recently said, “For 200 years, they tried to tear us away from our history and from our ancestors. They tried to get us to disown our claim.”

***

Erdoðan’s recent policies suggest that this is not mere rhetoric. In December 2014, Turkey’s Higher Education Council, a government regulated body, issued a policy recommendation suggesting that mandatory courses on Islam be taught to all students as young as six in public schools.

The foundations of secular education in Turkey are in grave danger. The number of Imam Hatip Schools — publicly funded schools that follow a religious curriculum — has more than doubled, from 493 in 2010 to 1017 in 2015. As of 2014, students who fail to gain entrance to the country’s small number of prestigious high schools are automatically enrolled in Imam Hatip Schools. Increasingly, good quality secular education is becoming off limits to average Turkish students. Atatürk could not have been raised in today’s Turkish school system.

Erdoðan has also taken worrying positions on gender equality. In November 2014, he claimed, “You cannot make women equal to men. It is against creation…it is against nature.” There is little room for women in politics in Erdoðan’s Turkey. This stands in stark contrast to Atatürk’s Turkey, where 36 percent of academics and 28 percent of judges and prosecutors were women, according to a 2000 report by TUSIAD, a Turkish business think tank based in Istanbul, and government statistics.

And although Turkey still has a secular constitution, the government has made a habit of subjugating freedom of expression to religion. Fazil Say, a renowned Turkish pianist, was sentenced to 10 months in prison in 2013 for “defaming Islam.” His crime was retweeting lines lampooning religious orthodoxy.

Freedoms of expression and media are unfortunately in free-fall in Erdoðan’s Turkey. In 2002 when the AKP came to power, Turkey ranked 99th in press freedom among the 139 countries surveyed by Reporters without Borders. In 2015, the country ranked 149th out of 180 nations surveyed by the same organization.

Finally, Erdoðan has made religion the focus of Turkish foreign policy. This is manifest in its relationship with an array of Islamist groups including Hamas, conservative Syrian rebel factions, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Libya. As a result, Turkey faces newfound threats from Islamist extremism as demonstrated by recent Islamic State (IS) attacks in the country, including a January 12th IS suicide bomber that targeted Istanbul’s old city, the home of the Ottoman sultans. In making Islam the guiding principle of Turkish politics, Erdoðan could soon find himself in competition with radical and violent elements about the definition of “true Islam.”

What will become of Atatürk’s Turkey under Erdoðan?

The closest, though imperfect, analogy is Mao Zedong’s legacy in China. Everything in today’s diehard capitalist Chinese society screams “I hate Mao!” Yet the former leader’s pictures are still plastered all over the country. In essence, the country’s leaders exploit his image as the country’s liberator and a source of legitimacy, but strip the country of his core legacy.

Erdoðan is seeking something similar. His Turkey is as far as it can get from being secular in politics and education, European-minded in foreign policy, and respectful of gender equality in domestic issues. The late Ottoman sultans and Atatürk alike would be shocked if they could visit Erdoðan’s Turkey.

While Erdoðan will continue to chip away at the legacy of Atatürk — still a revered figure of liberation — and the westernizing Ottoman sultans, their statues will continue to adorn town squares, providing the current government a façade of legitimacy.

Soner Cagaptay, Beyer Family fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute, is the author of “Rise of Turkey: the 21st Century’s First Muslim Power” (Potomac Books, 2014).

 

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http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/01/26/the-eight-great-powers-of-2016-iran-joins-the-club/

Published on: January 26, 2016

Taking Stock

The Eight Great Powers of 2016: Iran Joins the Club
Walter Russell Mead & Harry Zieve Cohen

In 2015, movements up and down the rankings had more to do with foreign policy missteps than with any actual achievements.


Overall, 2015 was a year in which most of the great powers saw their ability to control events beyond and sometimes within their boundaries decline. With the exception of Iran, which gained strength during the year thanks to its diplomatic successes and the consequences of Russian intervention in Syria, 2015 was a year in which policy missteps and rates of relative decline had more of an effect on the power rankings than actual achievements and successes. These movements were encouraged and underscored by the collapse of the commodities boom, which has exploded the narrative that U.S. hegemony will imminently be undone by the inexorably rising BRICS without providing clear guidance about what might come next.

The country that fell the most in the power rankings was Germany; its failure to manage the deepening crises in the European Union did not just mean that the EU had another bad year. German leadership is also being called into question in a new way, and while no country is able to compete against Germany for the leading role in the EU, the danger is that German leadership will continue to falter in 2016 and that the EU will increasingly lack the ability to respond to its growing problems.

The most dramatic development in 2015 was that Iran catapulted into the ranks of the great powers, expanding their number to eight. Iran and Saudi Arabia are now engaged in a zero sum, no holds barred struggle to control the Middle East and its massive oil reserves. Falling oil prices create problems for both powers, but the combination of religious hatred and geopolitical competition ensures that both countries will give this competition everything they’ve got. In the end, either one of the two will emerge as the clear winner with a secure place on the list of great powers, or a third country (Turkey? Russia? The United States?) will capitalize on their rivalry and exhaustion to impose an order on the Gulf.

2015 was the year of grudge matches. Aside from India and the United States, the remaining great powers are struggling with each other. Russia tussles with Germany. The Saudis struggle with Iran. Japan confronts China. (India, of course, continues to face off against the second-tier power of Pakistan). In the coming year, these grudge matches, the effects of the commodities bust, and the China slowdown could be the big global stories to watch.

Global Power Rankings for 2016
1. USA
The United States remains at the top of the power ranking as much because other powers are struggling as because of any real gains or successes on its part. 2015 brought plenty of foreign policy missteps, and on the domestic side, the continuing failure American policymakers to find workable solutions to the country’s troubling social and economic problems casts a shadow over the future. Yet the American economy remains dynamic and reliable, churning out new innovations faster than anywhere else and drawing investment from individuals, governments, and businesses around the world. The collapse in oil prices imperils American fracking companies, but the industry has kept fighting and the U.S. is poised to be a major energy exporter when prices eventually rise.

The biggest drag on American power these days is probably the growing perception in the international community that Americans have lost the ability to find and select good presidents. Both Bush and Obama are widely seen as ineffective, and the state of the current presidential race is not inspiring much confidence. World leaders probably would prefer Clinton first, Jeb second—both at least are known quantities. Candidates like Trump, Sanders, and Cruz give foreigners the heebie jeebies; nobody quite understands where they are coming from, what they would do, or why Americans think they have the skills to lead the country. As foreigners begin to pay attention to Trump in particular, their worries are likely to grow, along with their belief that erratic leadership and a dysfunctional political system will cause the United States to underperform in international politics.

In Asia, the United States continued to strengthen its alliances with Japan and India, and President Obama led Pacific countries to a landmark free trade agreement. But the U.S. struggled to respond to China’s aggression in the South China Sea, and has yet to come up with a comprehensive strategy to protect critical digital assets from Chinese hackers. Still, America’s Asia policy was relatively stable and productive compared to its’ Middle East policy, where U.S. power encountered substantial challenges from Russia. The conclusion of the nuclear deal with Iran has strained Washington’s relationships with the Sunni world and with Israel. Saudi Arabia has taken matters into its own hands, further exacerbating regional tensions. None of this bodes well for the American world order and the core strategy of suppressing competition between other great powers that has long been at its heart.

The United States faces other challenges too: the American-supported order in Europe is increasingly fragile, and the United States seems to have allowed itself to become irrelevant to the complex and difficult process of supporting the EU. Although the EU is hardly perfect from the American standpoint, Washington still wants and needs it to succeed. It is likely that the next administration will have to spend more time and energy dealing with Berlin, Brussels, London, Paris, Warsaw, and Rome.

And in America’s own backyard, trouble is stirring. Brazil is in economic and political turmoil, Argentina is struggling to regain its footing under a divided government, and the imploding socialist government in Venezuela is on the verge of possibly violent civil conflict or state failure. In the recent past, the United States has not had to worry much about the stability of regimes in Latin America. That may change this year.

But as much as those hotspots pose challenges to the American order, they also underscore America’s place atop it. The commodities glut has not hurt the United States as much as it has hurt virtually everywhere else. Even with weak leaders, the American constitutional system remains stable and the economy is the envy of the other advanced countries. Compared to a very chaotic world, America’s prospects look reasonably good.

2. China
Thanks to Germany’s problems with crisis-torn Europe, China moved up in the power rankings last year even as the country lost its aura of economic invulnerability. 2015 was not a great year for China. Domestic growth was down, and China’s political influence took a hit. Governments and businesses in Africa, Asia, and Latin America are the paying the price of their heavy bet on continued rapid Chinese economic expansion. Furthermore, the world community no longer is sure that President Xi Jinping’s government can properly calibrate the transition from heavy industry to services and consumption. Global observers are beginning to speculate on how the world might look if China’s slowdown turns into a prolonged, Japan-style stagnation.

Even as its economy slowed, China pursued its long term regional goals. It aggressively built out its artificial island outposts in the South China Sea and made a point of highlighting its growing naval capabilities. Additionally, China continued to strengthen trade alliances in Central Asia and the Middle East, as part of its “One Belt, One Road” strategy.

The consequences haven’t always been what Beijing hoped; indeed, 2015 saw some significant setbacks for Beijing’s regional diplomacy. The victory of the historically pro-independence DPP in Taiwan’s elections early this year testified to the failure of the mainland’s effort to prop up the KMT. Japan and South Korea reached an agreement on the contentious and long-simmering “comfort women” dispute. Tokyo and Seoul only hug when they must, and it’s never good news for China when they do.

As usual, North Korea was a problematic ally. DPRK provocations undermined Beijing’s attempts to pull South Korea away from Japan. The picture of a menacing, out-of-control North Korea, backed by a China that is either too weak to hold it in check or is using the DPRK for its own dark purposes, powerfully reinforces the messages of leaders like Japan’s Shinzo Abe and South Korea’s Park Geun-Hye.

There were a few bright spots. The One Belt One Road strategy is paying dividends as China’s influence expands at Russia’s expense in Central Asia. The end of Iran sanctions opens the way for China to develop new economic and political links with a rising Middle East country even as the commodity crash reduces the cost of the raw materials China’s creaking industrial machine continues to require.

Despite the much ballyhooed ‘pivot to Asia’, President Obama’s response to China’s island building spree has been low key. Given that, Xi doesn’t seem to feel any need to rein in the navy. On the contrary: Xi has sent clear signals that, despite and perhaps to compensate for the slowing economy, he intends on continuing to militarize islands and improve Chinese naval capacity wherever possible.

3. Japan
Despite its lackluster economy, Japan had a good 2015 from a geopolitical point of view. Prime Minister Abe pushed through a remilitarization bill, and has worked hard to rally other countries in the region around his policy of opposition to China. The win by the pro-independence (and pro-Japan) DPP in Taiwan boosts Japan, and so does reconciliation with South Korea. Meanwhile, the Nork nuke tests strengthen hawks internally in Japan, making Abe’s job easier. As with North Korea, China’s aggression only helps Japan—for now. Every time Xi does something that worries Vietnam, South Korea, India, Malaysia, Indonesia or any other regional power, Abe gains.

Economically, Japan’s long term prospects remain strong if uninspiring, and it has weathered the storm of China’s opposition reasonably well. Lots of advanced tech knowledge puts Japan in a strong position for the next century, as does a well-educated workforce. Japan faces its own blue model-like problems: inefficient bureaucracies, large, lumbering corporations and government agencies, and a system premised on manufacturing supremacy. Yet Japan may well maintain some of that manufacturing capacity, given that the industry’s future will involve sophisticated robotics, a Japanese specialty. Still, Japan needs to figure out how to return to sustained growth and it has to manage an aging population and low fertility rates—the same unique culture that gives Japan certain advantages also has some rather counterproductive elements.

Japan continues to build relationships with other regional heavyweights. A Japan–India partnership continued to deepen with Tokyo offering assistance on both military and domestic infrastructure projects to Delhi. As in 2014, Japan leveraged its relationships with India and others to stare down Beijing—no small feat, and one that bodes well for its future. The world continues to underestimate Japan, but 2015 may have seen a turning point: whatever is happening to the demographics and to GDP, for now Japan is a rising power in Asia, and the most powerful prime minister the country has had in many years continues to steer a strong course.

4. Germany
2015 wasn’t a good year for Germany. Yes, Merkel managed to hold the EU together and stave off a Grexit. But her “moral vision” on refugees turned out to be short-sighted and impracticable. And now she faces a real possibility of a Brexit, and the Schengen Agreement may not last out the year.

It is getting harder to hold Europe together, and Germany may not always have the will or the resources for the task. Italy is openly opposed to the German roadmap for Europe; Poland has turned Eurosceptic; the British are preparing for a vote on their exit. Geopolitically, Germany is locked in a fight with Russia over the future of Europe. Germany wants a law-bound, bureaucratic and steady Europe that moves towards an ever-closer union in a close transatlantic alliance. Russia wants something more like the classic European state system of great power competition, and would like to reinsert itself into the heart of European politics.

In one sense, the contest is over whose vision melts the fastest. Will immigration, nationalism, bitterness over the euro debacle and continuing corruption in much of the union erode Germany’s ability to push the union down the old, familiar path? Or will Russia’s economic weakness spawn the kind of domestic dissent that forces Putin to focus his resources inward or forces him from power altogether? Both scenarios are plausible, but timing remains obscure.

The gloom should not be overdone. Europe will continue to be a major power for the foreseeable future, and no country is able to replace Germany as Europe’s leader. But the international environment is getting more difficult, and Germany will struggle to chart a workable course.

5. Russia
Russia’s economy is about the size of Italy’s, far less diversified, and collapsing under the weight of falling oil prices. Yet thanks to Putin’s bombastic machinations, Moscow wields outsize influence in global affairs. By filling the vacuum in Syria and keeping his thumb on Ukraine, Putin ensures Russia’s seat at the table of great powers.

Russia has other important advantages, of course: most of the countries which border it are powerless and pose Moscow no threat, Putin’s government has a virtual monopoly on power at home, and, of course, a large nuclear arsenal makes Russia one of the small group of powers capable of destroying the world. In 2015, analysts were surprised by Russia’s military conventional prowess. The weapons the Kremlin put on display in Syria demonstrated that Russia’s military is no slouch—hardly the Soviet-era dinosaur many expected. This should not be overestimated; the Russian military suffers most of the problems that afflict the country’s institutions. Nevertheless, in Syria Moscow has demonstrated an ability to project power that has not been seen since the Cold War.

A great deal of Russia’s present strength comes from the way Putin has exploited the power vacuum in the Middle East and in Eastern Europe. In a time of cautious Western leaders, Putin is daring and a risk taker. In the long-run, his strategy may well backfire. Russia’s economy can’t withstand low oil prices indefinitely, and economic pain will cause more unrest in the country. China’s New Silk Road strategy would essentially displace Russia as the predominant power in much of Central Asia; it is not clear that Russia has an effective strategy for resisting China’s westward drive. Similarly, Russia faces a grave threat from Sunni jihadis. In Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan in the turbulent Caucasus, simmering discontent with Russian rule is promoting the radicalization of youth. Russia’s intervention in Syria and its cooperation with Shia Iran have also attracted the ire of militant Sunnis.

It’s easy for westerners to list Russia’s problems and conclude that we don’t need a real Russia policy; we just need to kick back in our recliners as we watch the inexorable laws of history crush the Putin regime. But if 2015 taught one lesson about Russia, it’s that the West shouldn’t underestimate Putin’s ability and willingness to create a lot of chaos. Regime survival is a better guide to understanding Putin’s foreign policy than Russian nationalist fervor; if Putin thinks an aggressive and dramatic foreign policy props him up at home, he will look for more opportunities like the seizure of the Crimea and the intervention in Syria.

6. India
India has been the ‘country of the future’ almost as long as Brazil has. Between the country’s democratic government, the high quality of India’s cyber capabilities, the dynamic performance of some of its leading corporations, and the presence of the second-largest English-speaking population in the world, there are lots of reasons to be optimistic about India’s long-term prospects. With China’s economy slowing down, Prime Minister Modi has made no secret of his hopes that India can fill the void and attract investment which is being pulled not only from China, but also from the emerging markets built to feed it. The commodities bust is good for India in other ways: India uses a lot of energy, and imports a lot of raw materials. From 10,000 feet, it all looks good.

The problem is that little else has changed in India to make it more hospitable for foreign investors. Modi’s most ambitious economic reforms remain stalled in India’s Parliament. Corruption remains high, taxes and regulations confusing and often restrictive, and legal barriers to foreign investment are still firmly in place.

As usual, much of India’s geopolitical energy is spent on Pakistan and threats from Islamist militants in the northern states who most Indians believe are funded by Pakistan. After Modi visited Pakistan in the final days of 2015, four gunmen attacked an Indian airbase on the first day of 2016, erasing any hopes that the relationship between these two longtime enemies would improve. In the longer term, there is a question as to whether India’s Muslims will remain largely free of the jihadi madness and whether the militance of Hindu nationalists will call forth a radical response from India’s 150 million Muslims.

Despite its internal problems and the question of Pakistan, India played a bigger role in Asia’s Game of Thrones and on the global stage in 2015 and looks likely to continue to do so this year. Last year saw a raft of agreements for infrastructural and military cooperation with Tokyo and already this year, India announced plans to help Vietnam with a satellite operation. New Delhi also solicited bids from a number of European arms manufacturers in 2015; it’s hoping to make some big military upgrades. Meanwhile, India has been drawing attention from Russia and will benefit from the opening of Iran—in addition to India’s need for oil, there’s a long history of Persia–India trade relations. So even if India does not fill in for China economically in 2016, it is set to play a more decisive role in geopolitics than it has since the collapse of the Mughal empire.

7. Saudi Arabia/Iran
The biggest change in the list of great powers this year is the arrival of a newcomer: Iran, the most powerful Shia country in the world. With its allies in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, Iran had a claim to the title of preeminent power in the Middle East even before the developments of 2015. But as long as Tehran remained isolated by sanctions, its reach and capabilities were limited. The nuclear deal orchestrated by Washington allowed Iran more geopolitical reach: the unfrozen funds alone amount to 20–25% of Iran’s 2014 GDP according to some estimates, and lifting the international sanctions regime will boost the economy even more.

Western inaction in Syria has also been a major boon for Tehran—keeping Iran’s client Assad in power and leaving the road through Damascus to Beirut clear so that Tehran can supply its friends in Hezbollah. Throw in Iran’s growing influence in Iraq, and it’s clear that the balance of sectarian power has been shifting in favor of Shias lately.

Saudi Arabia, which had an economy about 40% larger than Iran’s before sanctions were lifted, has been furiously pumping oil in an effort to keep prices low and Iran’s economy depressed. The Saudis are putting everything they have into the competition, but the Iranians are circling the wagons and empowering their own hardliners—many of whom are bitter about the Iran Deal.

The Saudis are arming rebels in Syria while Iran arms rebels in Saudi-allied Yemen. Sectarian lines are hardening elsewhere too, pulling Sudan over to the Sunni side and leading the Turks and Qataris to make friendly noises toward Saudi Arabia—their old rival. The empowerment of Iran has created some strange bedfellows, with Israel now leaning toward the Sunni camp. How this will all shake out is anyone’s guess, but it certainly won’t involve Sunnis and Shias making up and agreeing to put their differences aside anytime soon.

The competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran is also likely to keep oil prices low. The Saudis can’t afford depressed prices forever, but they have the resources to keep pumping for some time and have demonstrated that they’re willing to make deep sacrifices if doing so will hurt Iran. Yet the more cash Riyadh burns through propping up Iran, the more unstable Saudi Arabia’s political situation could become. The Saudis have historically been ultra-cautious in the world of foreign policy, and the shift to a more active stance is testing their institutional capabilities and political will. If Iranian hardliners push Riyadh to take further risks that would in turn destabilize the region even more.

Saudi Arabia and Iran may not be the greatest of the Great Powers, but the grudge match between them, with its consequences for oil prices and stability in the Middle East, looks set to generate more headlines (and headaches) than any other geopolitical story in 2016. Ultimately, the number of great powers will fall back to seven; the Middle East can only support one significant global player. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia right now seem absolutely determined to prevail, and compromise between them seems unlikely. The prize is considerable; should either side achieve a decisive victory and become dominant across the Middle East, the victorious country would be a formidable global force.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/why-arabs-would-regret-a-toothless-chinese-dragon

Why Arabs would regret a toothless Chinese dragon

Faisal Al Yafai
January 25, 2016 Updated: January 26, 2016 05:33 PM

Xi Jinping has left the Middle East, but the first visit of his presidency to the region has set pundits wondering if the Chinese dragon is preparing to replace the American eagle.

Here's the short answer: it is not. Even if it were, the Arabs will not find a Chinese superpower more to their liking than the US one.

Much as the Middle East dislikes US foreign policy, Chinese foreign policy will bring with it its own problems. In particular, the Chinese policy of "non-interference" in the affairs of other nations, if applied to the Middle East, would not please the Arabs.

Here's why. China has touted its policy of non-interference for decades. On one level, that sounds good – after all, non-interference in the affairs of other nation states is one of the pillars of the global system.

Perhaps a better way of thinking about it would be remaining neutral in the face of threats to allies. And that kind of “neutrality” is emphatically not what the Arabs want.

Neutrality, understood in that way, has two serious problems for the Middle East. It takes no sides in disputes and it entrenches the status quo. Neither of which is what the region needs right now.

Start with the disputes. As China's global power rises, it gains greater leverage over international institutions such as the UN and over individual countries. As trade and cooperation increase between Arab countries and China, there is a natural next step where, having gained significant influence in Beijing, the Arab world will look to China to use its influence around the world in their favour. That's what allies do, they support their allies.

What happens then, if China maintains its policy of strict neutrality? What happens when the Arab world asks China to use its influence at the UN to support the Palestinians – and China says no, on the ground of neutrality?

There isn't even a need to dwell on hypotheticals. Today, China, by supporting the status quo in Syria, is implicitly supporting the regime of Bashar Al Assad. If China had its way, the regime would survive, despite the carnage it has unleashed, simply because it was there in the first place.

This type of strict neutrality is already apparent. The timing of Mr Xi's visit is no accident, flying into the Middle East just after sanctions on Iran are lifted, thereby maintaining strict neutrality between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and with the US.

That isn't what the Arab world seeks. The main criticism the Gulf states have of their ally the US over Iran is that America does not appear willing to recognise their concerns over Iranian meddling. A strictly neutral China would be even worse than a disengaged America.

That leads to the second major problem with neutrality. It freezes the development of regions at a particular moment in time.

Chinese leaders talk a great deal about cooperation and development. The Chinese foreign ministry released its first Arab policy paper ahead of Mr Xi's visit, and the two words appear more than 200 times.

But by development, China means economic rather than political development, even though the two often go hand in hand.

Economic development alone, without political development of the institutions and organisations of political representation, can take place only once a society has reached a settled view of the political compact.

To put it a different way, it is only when a country has a settled view of the relationship between the structures of government and the people that economic development can occur without parallel political development.

In China, there does appear to be, broadly, a settled view, despite occasional voices of dissent.

But in much of the Arab world, political development is ongoing. All of the countries of the Arab Spring had their revolutions because political structures did not reflect the aspirations of the country. Economics played a significant part, but so did representation.

Chinese neutrality in 2011 would have meant siding with Mubarak against Tahrir Square, with Ben Ali against the people in Avenue Habib Bourghuiba. It would have meant the perpetuation of the rule of Muammar Qaddafi and Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Outside of a handful of countries in the region – interestingly, almost all of them monarchies – there is not yet a settled view of political development. Strict neutrality would freeze most of the political development of the Arab republics – the precise reason that led to the uprisings.

All of this is a long way away. America has not left the region and the Chinese footprint is still very small. As China's power rises, it will find – as it is already finding in Africa – that non-interference becomes much harder with stronger ties. Relationships can be built with economics, but they can be defended only with politics.

If, when the moment arrives, China is unwilling to side with its allies, the Arabs will rapidly find a declawed Chinese dragon unwelcome.

falyafai@thenational.ae

On Twitter: @FaisalAlYafai


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After sanctions, Iran must choose one of two paths

Syria's refugee crisis is the first great test of the 21st century. And we are failing it

 

[Housecarl]

Merde.......

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missile-idUSKCN0V52TZ

Business | Wed Jan 27, 2016 9:32pm EST
Related: World, Japan, North Korea, Aerospace & Defense

North Korea may be readying long-range missile launch soon: Kyodo

SEOUL | By Ju-min Park and Jack Kim

North Korea may be preparing to launch a long-range missile as soon as within a week, Japan's Kyodo news agency reported early on Thursday, citing an unnamed Japanese government official.

The official cited signs of possible preparations for a missile launch, based on analysis of satellite imagery of the North's Tongchang-ri missile test site on its west coast.

The report came as U.N. Security Council members discuss fresh sanctions against the North after it conducted its fourth nuclear test on Jan. 6. The North is already under sanctions for its nuclear and missile programs.

North Korea last conducted a long-range rocket launch in late 2012, successfully putting into orbit an object it claimed was a communications satellite, in what experts saw as part of an effort to build an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

South Korean Defence Ministry spokesman Kim Min-seok declined to comment on whether there were pre-launch activities at the site, citing a policy of not discussing intelligence matters. However, he said the North had issued no international warnings on navigation, as it has ahead of previous long-range rocket launches.

South Korea's Yonhap news agency cited a government source as saying there had been steady activity at the missile base, with screens set up at key areas, probably to deter spy satellite surveillance.


Related Coverage
› Japan: monitoring North Korea missile moves with 'great interest'


Much of the site's operation is automated and rails are set up to move rocket components quickly for final assembly and launch, Yonhap quoted the source as saying.

The site was upgraded last year to accommodate the launch of a longer-range rocket, experts have said.

Isolated North Korea says it has a sovereign right to run a space program and its long-range rockets are built to deliver satellites into space.

The North is also seen to be working to miniaturize a nuclear warhead to mount on a missile, but many experts say it is some time away from perfecting the technology.

In Beijing, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on Wednesday agreed on the need for a significant new U.N. security resolution against the North, but there were few signs of progress.

U.S. Navy Admiral Harry Harris, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, said before publication of the Kyodo report that he supported reviewing the possibility of converting a U.S. Aegis missile defense test site in Hawaii into a combat-ready facility to bolster U.S. defenses against ballistic missile attacks, an initiative first reported by Reuters last week.

Harris also told reporters after his speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington that it made sense to put a mobile missile defense system known as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense in South Korea.

That decision must be made jointly by the United States and South Korea, he said.

North Korea said on Jan. 6 it exploded a hydrogen bomb, although the United States and other governments and experts voiced scepticism that it had made such a technological advance.


(Additional reporting by Andrea Shalal in WASHINGTON; Editing by Tony Munroe and Clarence Fernandez)

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.vox.com/2016/1/27/10834882/vanda-felbab-brown-interview

"They are riding a tiger that they cannot control¡±: Pakistan and the future of Afghanistan

Updated by Jennifer Williams on January 27, 2016, 8:30 a.m. ET ª°@jenn_ruth ª¤jennifer@vox.com

This is part three of our three-part series on the war in Afghanistan. Part one explained why 2016 could be a very bad year for the country. Part two discussed the emergence of ISIS in Afghanistan.

2016 is shaping up to be a potentially critical year for Afghanistan. ISIS is rising there, the Taliban is gaining ground, the stability of the Afghan government is deteriorating by the day, and national elections are coming in October. The US, China, Pakistan, and the Afghan government are currently holding talks aimed at bringing the Taliban to the table to try negotiate an end to the war.

Of those countries, it's Pakistan that is the most significant. Pakistan has probably the most influence of anyone over whether those talks will succeed in getting the Taliban to agree to sit down and negotiate a peace agreement with the Afghan government. But there's a lot more going on with the peace talks that are perhaps the country's best or only remaining hope.

To understand how this works and why it matters, I spoke to Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow in the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the Brookings Institution and an expert on Afghanistan. What follows is a transcript of our conversation, lightly edited for clarity and length.

Jennifer Williams: Could you start by just explaining how Pakistan has been involved in the conflict between the Taliban and Afghanistan historically?

Vanda Felbab-Brown: That goes back to the creation of independent Pakistan, with issues having to do with the Pashtun minority in Pakistan, which is also the majority population of Afghanistan, and irredentist claims by Afghan Pashtun politicians, as well as the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States, who at different times supported either Pakistan or Afghanistan and played the two against each other.

Then you have the Taliban emerging in the 1990s, and Pakistan fully supports the Taliban: They help equip it, they provide intelligence, advisers, and during the Taliban era when they ruled country, Pakistan is one of only three countries that recognize the Taliban regime.

They continued supporting the Taliban throughout the past decade, and US-Pakistan relations became very fraught and complicated. It's never been easy. Pakistanis sometimes use the expression that the United States treats Pakistan like a condom: uses it when they need it then discards it when they are finished with it. It's a fairly common saying in Pakistan, especially in the military. So there is a sense of betrayal on the part of the United States, untrustworthiness, that it's an exploitative relationship on the part of the US toward Pakistan.

I should also say that Pakistan has long supported many Islamic extremist groups as part of its asymmetric policy toward India, and some of these groups have now mutated, or they slipped Pakistan's full control.

Even with respect to the Afghan Taliban, there is a lot of support from the Pakistani state intelligence services and military to the Afghan Taliban. At the same time, Pakistan has been under enormous US and international pressure to act against them, and so they will take the occasional action against the Afghan Taliban as well. But those actions are mostly seen as halfhearted, incomplete window dressing.

JW: So what role is Pakistan playing today? I know that they just had the four-party talks and that Pakistan has been insisting that these talks take place in Pakistan. Are they trying to speak for the Taliban?

VFB: I'm not sure that it's a fair characterization that they are speaking for the Taliban. Certainly the Afghan government, including in the latest talks, often insinuates or alleges that Pakistan speaks for the Taliban. But they clearly do not.

The relationship between the Taliban and Pakistan is hardly smooth and perfect. Many members of the Afghan Taliban deeply resent the level of Pakistani interference, even as the group has been supported by Pakistan. There is a lot of Afghan Pashtun nationalism also among the Taliban that deeply resents the influence and attempts at control by the Pakistani state.

Part of the key issue in the relationship is that although Pakistan supports the Afghan Taliban, and although it has historically supported other extremist groups, it does not have perfect control. And arguably, its control is diminishing. And so they posture, they do their double game. They want to appear strong, and so they posture that they have much greater control than they have, but at the same time they deny that they have any nefarious role.

In reality, they are playing both sides against the middle, and they often have much less capacity to control and rein in the extremist groups, including the Afghan Taliban, than many assume. The widespread criticism of Pakistan is one of its duplicity and its nefarious activity and its lack of willingness to act against the Afghan Taliban. Those are true, but they are also coupled with limits to their capacity. They are riding a tiger that they cannot control fully.

So they have been hosting these four-way talks that involve them, the US government, the Afghan government, and the Chinese government. The Afghan government is desperate to achieve some sort of negotiated deal with the Taliban. It feels under tremendous pressure, the military is taking a pounding from the Taliban, and the government lacks legitimacy.

The US has similar views on the notion that the way out of the predicament in Afghanistan is a negotiated deal. The Chinese also like the idea. They have their own influence in Pakistan. China would very much like to say that they finally achieved what the US failed to do over the past decade, that they will bring peace to Afghanistan, and that they will do it by enabling the negotiations.

Pakistan is responsive to China. Their relationship with China is much stronger than their relationship with the United States. They often tell the US that China is their old friend, that China is the country that hasn't betrayed them, unlike the United States. China has promised massive economic development in Pakistan at $40 billion. The Pakistanis often say to the US that the Pakistan-China relationship is "greater than the Himalayas and deeper than the ocean." Very flowery.

JW: What's the relationship like between the Afghan government and Pakistan today?

VFB: The crucial man there really is the Pakistani chief of the army staff Raheel Sharif; no relation to [Prime Minister] Nawaz Sharif. I think that there is sort of goodwill and motivation right now, even on the army staff ¡ª but that is juxtaposed with, again, the limits of control even the chief has. With almost clockwork regularity you have a round of negotiations in Pakistan or you have a meeting between Raheel Sharif and [Afghan President Ashraf] Ghani, and the next day a bomb goes off in Kabul and people die, or the Indian consulate is attacked.

All those ploys are meant to destroy any beginning of a more positive relationship and have been very effective in subverting the process. The same goes on between Pakistan and India. Meanwhile, Ghani is taking an enormously risky strategy with respect to the negotiations. It's vastly unpopular in Afghanistan, and many, many Afghans hate Pakistan and blame it for all of their troubles.

They use Pakistan as the explanation of everything that ever goes wrong in Afghanistan. And the Pakistanis are responsible for a lot, but there's much, much blame and responsibility that lies on Afghan politicians and Afghan people.

So Ghani's outreach and engagement with Pakistan is extremely unpopular. He's spending an extreme amount of political capital, and does not have support from his partner in the government, Abdullah Abdullah, and the northern Tajik factions that hate Pakistan with great vitriol. So the more Pakistan is unable to deliver things like the Haqqani network, reducing or stopping its attacks in Kabul, the more politically impossible for Ghani the process will be.

JW: So what does that mean in terms of the stability of Afghanistan's unity government?

VFB: The unity government is extremely strained. "Unity" it isn't. The Pakistani negotiation angle is just too big for the strain. It might be strategically important. It might be a very significant element in getting any negotiation going, but it's also extremely politically costly, and the longer it doesn't produce anything, the more politically costly and unsustainable it will be.

In October, there are supposed to be parliamentary elections and district elections in Afghanistan, and, more important, this loya jirga [a national assembly of Afghan elders]. And unless there is some sort of major breakthrough by the summer, a lot of the negotiations and political process with both the Taliban and Pakistan will be put on ice, because it will just be politically impossible in the context of the loya jirga and the elections.

So they really have until the summer to make some sort of breakthrough, and then you will have months of morass and extreme political instability in Afghanistan, but it will also not be conducive in any way to improving either the relationship with Pakistan or the negotiations.

JW: How does Pakistan fit into the rise of ISIS in Afghanistan? What's the relationship there? And how might this affect the peace negotiations?

VFB: The rise of ISIS-Khorasan is one of the most interesting developments. It complicates the negotiations for the Taliban. They oppose the negotiations, and they're a big problem for Mullah Mansour and those who want to negotiate. They enable defections, make them easy, and make them costly.

At the same time, it is interesting because ISIS does not have the same linkages to Pakistan that the Afghan Taliban had, even though ISIS includes many defectors from the Taliban. They quite specifically reject what they call the "yoke" that Pakistan has put on the Afghan Taliban, and they call the Afghan Taliban leadership traitors because of the close relationship with Pakistan.

Moreover, ISIS-Khorasan also has quite a few members of various Pakistani extremist groups like Lashkar-e Taiba and members of TTP [Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan]. So there is also a lot of resentment and hostility toward Pakistan.

I think the rise of ISIS might make Pakistan be cooperative to some extent, but on the other hand, I think it will also reinforce in the mind of many Pakistan security controllers that it's important to cultivate the Afghan Taliban as friends against the bigger danger of ISIS.

JW: Now that ISIS-Khorasan has directly targeted Pakistan, the consulate in Jalalabad, do you think Pakistan will take action?

VFB: I think they'll take action against ISIS and groups like Tehrik-e Taliban. I don't think it will produce more resolve to go after the Afghan Taliban. That's my view. Others are hoping that they will finally accept the realities and really believe that they have to fight all of the insurgents, all of the terrorists, and that they cannot differentiate among them. I am not persuaded that that will, in fact, happen.

JW: So what does this all mean for the prospects for peace? Are you hopeful at all?

VFB: I think the peace negotiations are important, but I am skeptical that anything will happen quickly.

I think that if by summer the Taliban has been willing to join the negotiating table, that will be an important breakthrough, but nothing will be agreed. The summer will be very bloody, and then there will be the political [wrangling] associated with the loya jirga and the elections.

In my view, even if the Taliban comes to the negotiating table, we are looking at years of negotiations, and certainly no breakthrough before 2017 and likely much longer.

And so the question is whether we, the United States, are prepared to stand by with Afghanistan for that long and whether the Afghans will have the resolve. So it's really important that the military and the police fight as hard as they can, because the weaker they fight, the more they defect, the more intimidated they are, the more brain drain that flows from Afghanistan, the stronger the Taliban is viewed and the more intransigent they will be in the negotiations. Now the negotiations will be very much about the military battlefield as much as they will about what's happening at the table for a long time.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.......

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http://www.defenseone.com/politics/...ash-carter-crashed-davos/125489/?oref=d-river

What Happened When Ash Carter Crashed Davos

January 27, 2016 By Kevin Baron

The defense secretary's legacy may have been forged in the Alps, connecting economic elites to the Pentagon — and the war on terrorism.

DAVOS, Switzerland — Past the luxury shops, black cars, and pop-up spaces opened on tiny ski-village streets by iconic banks and technology giants, U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter came to the World Economic Forum with dual messages. One for world leaders on this global stage: get into the fight against the Islamic State. And a second for corporate leaders: join forces with the Pentagon and get into the business of fighting for something bigger.

In a way, Carter’s Davos mission encapsulates his probable legacy as President Barack Obama’s final defense secretary. The methodical technologist and government servant who rose through the political-appointee ranks has about one year left to make his mark on the job. Over the past few months, as Secretary of State John Kerry has focused on Iran, Carter has become Obama’s point-man for the war on ISIS. Ordered to “accelerate” the U.S.-led campaign, Carter has since September tried to cadge additional forces and finances from America’s allies. On this European swing, he stopped first in Paris, where attacks in November renewed the continent’s fighting mood. There he laid out his plan to key coalition partners: follow December’s liberation of Ramadi with one-two punch invasions of Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria. He also announced a Brussels conference next month where he expects at least 26 nations to come with additional offerings.

But Carter also wants to put the Pentagon on a firmer footing as a government agency for the new era of terrorism, massive employer of personnel, and driver of technology. His solution: lure the world’s most innovative minds, firms, and business leaders to work with the federal behemoth.

“Some of you may know I’m a technologist myself,” Carter said, with a tint of natural stage charm you might not expect from a nuclear physicist-turned-technocrat in wire-rimmed glasses. The guy got his doctorate in theoretical physics at Oxford in the 1970s, then worked at MIT and Harvard. Eventually, Carter’s career began to swing between science and policy. He served as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, perhaps the most influential strategy post in the Pentagon. He did time in private investment firms and at Goldman Sachs. He then again served as the Pentagon’s chief weapons buyer and acquisitions chief, and rose to the building’s No. 2 job as deputy defense secretary. “And when I started out in this business Klaus, when I began my career — and I never expected to be in defense, but it was a reflex. It was a part of the culture of technology to have a connection to defense. It was also true that most technology of consequence originated in the United States, and much of it in connection with the government.”

Carter, like many defense officials lately, argue the U.S. is losing its technological advantage over its adversaries – especially China and Russia. Perhaps no defense secretary has devoted so much personal attention to reaching out to the private sector. He also needs help turning the Pentagon into a flexible employer for modern careers and families. “So I’m trying to build bridges — one of the reasons I’m here — to the tech, innovative community that are as strong but different as the ones I grew up with.”

The good news, he says, is that people are biting on both of his lines. After receiving the formal go-ahead on the counter-ISIS plan in Paris, Carter was warmly received in Davos. His staff moved figurative mountains to accommodate a late decision to attend the elite conference in the Swiss Alps. Some of his staff bunked six to a room in a hostel, while others in his and Kerry’s traveling party found hotels nearly an hour away. For the effort, Carter landed meetings with Microsoft’s CEO Satya Nadella, Hewlett-Packard CEO Meg Whitman, and others. His name joined the conference’s top (American) billings, like Vice President Joe Biden, Kerry, U2’s Bono, and actor Kevin Spacey.

There was a buildup to get here. Last year, Carter flew more than once to Silicon Valley, where he’s set up the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental office, or DIUX, met with Facebook’s Sheryl Sandberg, venture capitalists, LinkedIn, and others, about everything from recruiting to investing and how medium and smaller businesses could work with the Pentagon. With ISIS raging, his love for tech attention drew attention in some crowds, and drew skeptics.

Related: Flexible Electronics Are the Goal of Pentagon’s First Silicon Valley Partnership

Related: What The Pentagon Has To Do To Recruit Silicon Valley’s Nerds

Related: Pentagon Sends an Engineer and a Navy SEAL to Woo Silicon Valley

But Davos is a step up from Palo Alto. Carter is the first defense secretary to appear here. Klaus Schwab, founder and CEO of the World Economic Forum, invited Carter with reason. He is known here from previous Davos appearances, in other roles, and global security news is just inescapable, driving even economic conversations.

“Of course we all know about the Department of Defense, but actually you are also the CEO of the largest enterprise in the world, ” Schwab said as the two settled in for a one-on-one onstage chat. The introduction immediately put the Pentagon boss in more fitting context to what historically is viewed as the world’s most posh gathering of financiers, bankers, ministers, and economists.

It’s in fact a truly working conference, deep within walls of security that offer few views of alpine scenery. Carter probably could have walked through the convention hall unnoticed. This is a place where CNBC, Bloomberg, and CNN’s Richard Quest broadcast live interviews with heads of state, CEOs of Morgan Stanley and finance ministers of India. Here, Bono’s appearance didn’t even fill the main hall seats by half, but the IMF’s Christine Lagarde, aka the “Darling of Davos,” turns every head when she walks through the room. Rep. Darryl Issa, R-Calif., eyes fixed on his phone, shuffled anonymously past the “Health Bar” serving Green Machines and juices. In 2014, Issa was the wealthiest member of Congress with an estimated net worth over $350 million. U2 has made $500 million the past decade easily, though Forbes declares Bono is apparently not a billionaire, “yet” (after some erroneous Facebook investment reporting). Lagarde’s personal net worth ranges around or below a mere $5 million but she manages the IMF’s coffers, lending out hundreds of millions with the understated mission “to ensure the stability of the international monetary system.” Still, Carter had no problem filling his Davos date book with interested comers. After all, the Defense Department’s budget is more than $600 billion. This year, alone.

Is it business, or is it patriotism?

“One of the things I wanted to do here, was talk to the leaders of major enterprises,” Carter said. “They have the same issues I do. They need to stay ahead in a competitive world of technology and they need to compete for talent. Is there anything they can teach me? We’ll always be different, because we’re the profession of arms. But I still — I would like to learn what the best are thinking and the most innovative people. And by the way, I want them to be part of our enterprise too.”

And there’s the big question. Will Davos fight? After all, is war good for business? Carter’s previous speeches this month in Tampa and Paris asking for counter-ISIS fighters and money use a different language than when he asks for help managing the DOD workforce, pitching corporate executive-colonel job exchanges, or selling America’s big data prowess. But it’s the same ask. He’s asking the men and women wining and dining at Davos to consider getting into the fight. After the Paris attacks of last year, something may be changing.

“These are people who want to make a difference in the world,” Carter said, from the stage. “That’s why they’re here. That’s why they’re in the positions they’re in. One of the ways they can make a difference is by helping us.”

So is it working? The results from the Pentagon’s encampment and tour stops in Silicon Valley aren’t in yet. But after Paris, California, and with Washington and European capitals pushing to step up the war against ISIS and terrorism, here in the Switzerland, it appears Carter was warmly received.

“I think the secretary’s found people in the tech and business community who are just as concerned about America’s security and are just as patriotic as anybody else,” a senior defense official told Defense One.

On stage, Schwab fed softballs to Carter, underscoring to Davos-goers that they, along with the rest of the global economic community, must do their part to fight terrorism.

“Do you see a better pact between business and — and the Defense Department in general?” Schwab asked.How much does the world “really need a coalition between business and defense on a more global level?”

“That’s absolutely necessary, in my judgment,” Carter replied, “because for public officials to protect the public space so that private companies and people can do what they’re supposed to do, I need their help in today’s world, which means I need their understanding. And it can’t be me just telling them what to do, because I don’t have that power. I’ve got to meet them halfway. And so I’m talking to people here about, for example, how to help us counter terrorism.”

Carter recognized the private sector has its own concerns, like privacy and Internet freedom.

“I can’t dictate solutions to that. I’ve got to work with the private sector, and that’s true in logistics. It’s true in personnel management. I’m part of society and I’m most successful when I work with those.”

Schwab prodded, “So defense, in the broadest sense, is not just the job of the Defense Department, it’s the job of all of us?”

Carter replied, “Now, that’s a very wise observation too, Klaus.”

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2016/01/27/the_new_hegemon_in_the_middle_east_111682.html

January 27, 2016

The New Hegemon in the Middle East

By L. Todd Wood

There's a new sheriff in town in the Middle East -- and it's not the United States of America, who just spent trillions of dollars and lost thousands of soldiers in two different wars in the region. The new hegemon in the Levant and the Fertile Crescent is a rising axis of Russian, Iranian, and Syrian power.

Beginning with the Iranian Quds Force commander Gen. Qassem Soleimani's trip to Moscow in July 2015 -- where together with Russian President Vladimir Putin, he planned the Russian and Iranian offensive that has preserved the Assad regime until now -- the Russian-Iranian partnership has blossomed in myriad ways.

Russia has backed the Assad family regime in Syria since the 1970's, when Nikita Khrushchev founded the Russian naval base in the Mediterranean at Tartus on the Syrian coast. It was always highly doubtful that the Kremlin would allow such a long-term ally to be shredded in the maw of the Arab Spring. Therefore it was only natural that the Syrian regime's biggest Shiite benefactor, the Islamic Republic of Iran, would be a natural ally for the Russian Federation.

Russia and Iran is a natural marriage -- each needs the other in different ways. For one, Russia needs money, badly. Iran is about to come into a lot of it, as the Iran nuclear deal is implemented, an agreement that, by the way, Russia helped put in place. Western sanctions over Russia's actions in Ukraine, and the collapse in the price of crude oil, are devastating the Russian federal budget. Iran can help alleviate this lack of cash flow by buying a whole lot of Russian weapons. Already Moscow is shipping Iran the S-300 anti-aircraft missile system, and there is talk of Iran buying tanks from Russia to modernize its armor, which is antiquated and sorely lacking in capability. Analysts predict that if the price of oil stays in the $30 range, Russian foreign currency reserves could be depleted within two years, along with a significant devaluation of the ruble. Russia has also announced it will be assisting Iran with the development of nuclear power facilities in the near future. It is also likely that the Iranians are not driving as hard of a bargain as the Chinese when negotiating pricing with the Kremlin. Iran owes Russia for the coming sanctions relief, and is therefore negotiating from a position of weakness with Russia.

Hezbollah, Iran's proxy terrorist army in Lebanon, is now being armed by Russia as well. Russia has built large weapons depots in Syria and given Hezbollah free access in exchange for intelligence and targeting information for Russian airstrikes originating out of Latakia and other forward operating bases Moscow has constructed near rebel-held areas. For now, Hezbollah is training these weapons on the Syrian opposition; however, at some point, they will look south toward Israel.

Russia and Syria just this month announced that they signed an agreement allowing Russia to enjoy an open-ended military presence in Syria. Also announced were joint air missions where Syrian MIG-29s escorted Russian bombers as they attacked Islamic State positions. The Russian air assault on anti-Assad forces has saved the Assad regime, and therefore Moscow's footprint in the Middle East, for now. This result obviously saves Iran's influence in Syria and Lebanon, therefore allowing Iran to maintain pressure on Israel. After all, Iran's call for the destruction of the Jewish State has never really been repudiated.

Combined with Iranian influence in Baghdad, the axis of Iran, Russia, and Syria controls territory from Persia all the way to the Levant. It truly is a remarkable turn of events. The speed in which the power vacuum was filled after the withdrawal of most American troops from the region is simply stunning.

In a period of years, the Middle East may see a nuclear-armed Iran using this regional hegemony to force its will on the world. Israel could be isolated. America and NATO might have a much tougher time shaping events in this volatile area of the globe without the ability to gain a foothold, being squeezed out by possible territorial control of this new axis.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realclearworld.com/artic...ce_undermining_its_foreign_policy_111684.html

January 27, 2016

Is Europe's Economic Dependence Undermining Its Foreign Policy?

By Hans Kundnani

BERLIN - As Europe struggles to deal with the refugee crisis, it seems like a long time ago that Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras threatened to undermine EU sanctions against Russia. His flirtation with Russian President Vladimir Putin last year was widely seen as a way for Greece to increase its leverage in negotiations with its eurozone partners and the International Monetary Fund, which were reaching a critical stage in the spring. In the end, a deal was struck in the summer that prevented a default and allowed Greece to remain in the single currency, though it is unlikely to do much to solve Greece's deeper economic problems - and Greece remained supportive of European policy toward Russia.

However, as I argue in a new GMF policy brief, the situation of an EU member state seeking external help - or coming under external pressure to undermine an EU policy - is likely to recur in the future. Long-term changes in the structure of global trade are transforming the economic basis of the EU's external relations. In particular, for nearly all EU member states, trade with other member states is decreasing as a share of total trade. Intra-EU exports have declined as a share of the EU's overall exports from 68 percent in 2000 to 63 percent in 2014. This shift away from intra-EU trade raises difficult questions about the future of European integration.

The way eurozone countries decided to respond to the crisis is also exacerbating the trend of increased economic dependence on non-Western powers. In particular, a policy of prolonged and coordinated austerity, as well as constitutional limits on public debt to which eurozone countries have agreed, limit the potential for Europe to generate growth internally. This leaves no alternative to externally fueled growth, making EU member states more dependent on economies outside the EU in different ways. While the eurozone "core" will likely increasingly rely on non-Western powers as export markets, the "periphery" will increasingly rely on them as sources of investment.

Increased dependence gives non-Western powers leverage that can be used to prevent EU member states from taking tough positions or agreeing on common positions with each other or with the United States. In the medium term, China could be an even bigger challenge for Europe than Russia. EU member states have much to gain from trade with, and investment from, China, so it is likely to have increasing leverage over them. The increasing economic dependence of EU member states has already constrained the ability of Europeans to take tough common positions on issues such as human rights. As one official puts it, China has "bought a blocking minority" in the European Council.

In recent years, Europeans have made slow, incremental progress toward develop foreign policy institutions and "strategies." The Lisbon Treaty created a European foreign minister position in the form of the high representative for foreign and security policy. Additionally, the treaty initiated the European External Action Service, which in turn created the institutional basis for a more coherent European foreign policy. The EU is also currently undertaking a review of the EU's global "strategy." However, in these discussions, the growing economic dependence of EU member states on non-Western powers is rarely discussed.

Unless European policymakers go further in connecting internal and external policy, this leverage by non-Western powers could undermine the progress Europeans are making in developing a more coherent foreign policy. At the moment, there is no mechanism for EU member states to collectively reconcile their internal and external interests. For example, after Tsipras threatened to undermine sanctions, the EU had no way to discuss how to balance the need to resolve the euro crisis with the need to uphold the European security order to reconcile member states' interests in each.

The EU has long made trade-offs between the different interests of member states on both internal and external policy. Indeed, such trade-offs are the basis of European integration. But the changing relationship of EU member states with the rest of the world - in particular the increased leverage that non-Western states will have over them - mean that it is now necessary for the EU to go further in connecting its internal and external policy and to make even more complex trade-offs between member states' interests. In short, the EU needs a mechanism through which it can prioritize between internal and external objectives.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news...eep-report/?utm_source=RSS_Feedutm_medium=RSS

N. Korea-Iran nuclear ties probably deep: Report

By Guy Taylor - The Washington Times - Thursday, January 28, 2016

Nuclear cooperation between Iran and North Korea is closer than commonly recognized, according to a new report released Thursday in Washington that highlights a host of unanswered questions about proliferation networks between the two internationally isolated nations.

While the report by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies notes the U.S. government’s official position that there is “no proof” attesting to Tehran’s nuclear cooperation with Pyongyang, it asserts that several companies are “involved in facilitating nuclear-related activities” between the two.

The assertion comes just weeks after the implementation of the Obama administration-backed nuclear accord with Iran and North Korea’s claim to have carried out a successful nuclear weapons test.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, meanwhile, passed a House bill Thursday that calls for significantly ramping up U.S. sanctions against North Korea in response to the Jan. 6 nuclear test.

The committee’s chairman, Sen. Bob Corker, said in a statement Thursday that the test was “a reminder of the failure of current U.S. and international policy to eliminate the threat of North Korea’s nuclear program.”

“This bipartisan bill will tighten the web of sanctions as part of an overall policy to denuclearize North Korea,” the Tennessee Republican said

But the question of Iranian collaboration with Pyongyang still looms — and Thursday’s report by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) raises a fresh challenge to the Obama administration hope that the Iran nuclear deal will facilitate Tehran’s emergence as trusted member of the international community.

The report’s authors, FDD Fellow Ali Alfoneh and former CIA officer Scott Modell, point to the “possibility that Iran is outsourcing aspects of its nuclear weapons program” to North Korea.

They argue that Washington “needs a better understanding of Iranian and North Korean proliferation networks and the impact of U.S. government demarcates, designations, sanctions, and arrests in order to improve the possibility of interdicting illicit materials.”

At the same time, the authors acknowledge that their assertion about actual nuclear collaboration between Pyongyang and Tehran is based mainly on evidence of ballistic missile technology transfers between the two over the past three decades.

“Hard evidence of active nuclear weapons development and production is lacking,” the report states. “However, the activities of the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), for example, suggest a certain depth to DPRK-Iran ballistic missile collaboration.”

“SHIG is similar to most Iranian government entities involved in nuclear- and ballistic missile-related proliferation in that it is constantly adding new front companies,” it states, adding that “many of the entities reported to have been involved in procurement for SHIG rely on North Korean firms and China-based brokers and intermediaries.”

The report also points to companies already sanctioned by the U.S. and the European Union. “These include the Saeng Pil Trading Corporation (SPTC), which appears to have been involved in brokering the sale of the Chinese-origin precision-guided munitions known as Lei Shi,” the authors write. “SPTC’s illicit trade has reportedly included key components for the munitions, including guidance systems.”

In sum, the report claims that “signs of military and scientific cooperation between Iran and North Korea suggest that Pyongyang could have been involved in Tehran’s nuclear and ballistic-missile program, and that state-run trading companies may have assisted in critical aspects of Iran’s illicit nuclear-related activities.”

The document says such factors raise a host of questions for U.S. officials to consider:

“Is the United States monitoring the better-known North Korean trading companies that could be involved with Iranian transactions, such as SPTC? Is Washington tracking the representatives of these companies in countries of the former Soviet Union, where the firms reportedly purchase export-controlled items such as Scud missile components?”

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...ce-of-Westphalia-treaty-merits-scrutiny-today

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/c...ce-of-westphalia-treaty-merits-scrutiny-today

Why the 1648 Peace of Westphalia treaty merits scrutiny today

Alan Philps
January 28, 2016 Updated: January 28, 2016 05:50 PM

When foreign policy experts put their minds to ending the Syrian war, they often reach for the history books and the example of the treaties which ended religious conflicts in Europe in the 17th century. As Syrian peace talks are due to start in Geneva today, with few observers seeing a chance of a breakthrough, it is worth looking at how Europe brought an end to the Thirty Years War in 1648.

The mere mention of that long and bloody conflict is enough to spread alarm and despondency. Is the Arab world really set for a generation of warfare in its heartland? That certainly seems to be the feeling among the tens of thousands of Syrians who are trekking northward to Europe, having despaired of any chance of a speedy return to their homes.

To historians the 1648 Peace of Westphalia was a turning point in Europe’s ability to live with religious diversity. Though religious strife continued in many countries, it was an internal affair, not a cause for invasion and outside interference. The sovereignty of states to manage their own religious affairs was enshrined, paving the way for the creation of modern nation states with the peace kept by a balance of power.

There are some similarities between then and now. The Thirty Years War took place in the heart of Europe, inside the German states – Germany had yet to be unified – just as the focus of today’s war is Damascus, the “beating heart of Arabism”. Due to their strategic location, the German states invited outside intervention, and spread instability far beyond their borders.

The cause of the war was the Protestant reformation in Europe a century earlier, in which fundamentalist sects such as Lutheranism broke the monopoly of the Catholic Church and weakened the great powers. An echo of this can be seen in the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, which put religion at the heart of politics of the wider Middle East and empowered the neglected Shia Muslim minorities of the Arab states.

As today, the Thirty Years War was not purely about religion. It was a set of interlocking political-religious struggles, with the contest for power sharpening and deepening religious differences. It was equally devastating: between 1618 and 1648, the German territories lost 40 per cent of their population, and there were huge tides of refugees.

But the key issue is how it was brought to an end.

Henry Kissinger, the former US secretary of state and a noted proponent of the parallels with the 17th century, offers a simple explanation. “The various Christian groups had been killing each other until they finally decided that they had to live together, but in separate units.” There was no clear winner or loser. The peace was based on “the necessity to come to an arrangement with each other, not on some sort of superior morality”.

There was no quick deal. Under the guidance of Cardinal Mazarin, chief minister to the king of France for 40 years and supreme diplomat of the era, it took five years to agree the peace treaties. France, not surprisingly, came out best, but the outcome was based on the interests of France, not of the Catholic powers.

The Cambridge historian Professor Brendan Simms highlights a key point about the Peace of Westphalia. While the treaties are usually seen as midwife at the birth of the modern sovereign state, in fact the arrangement worked because it was guaranteed by the big powers of the day, France and Sweden. Princes who violated the terms of the peace, for example by supporting their co-religionists in foreign states, could be deposed by the guarantors. So it was an arrangement of “conditional sovereignty”.

What lessons are there for today? The exhaustion with war cited by Dr Kissinger may be keenly felt by the Syrians, but is it enough to stop the fighting? To simplify matters, Saudi Arabia still sees Iranian expansionism as a threat which must be countered.

For their part, the Iranians see ISIL and other Sunni supremacist groups as a mortal threat to Shia communities throughout the Middle East. The argument over who set in motion this infernal spiral will continue. The point is not to adjudicate over who has the moral high ground but to agree that the spiral must end.

Only the most incurable optimist could argue that we have reached this point of exhaustion.

A more reasoned approach would be to look at the outcome of Iran’s elections next month, for a new majlis, or parliament, and the Assembly of Experts, the body that elects the Supreme Leader and which may choose the successor to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, for signs of Iran’s political path. But whatever the results, the likelihood is that the internal struggle for control of the Iranian state is not over yet.

There is also the issue of who would guarantee the new settlement.

The obvious contenders would be the US and Russia, if they can ever be made to agree.

But the modern Middle East, for all its instability, is not the same as the petty princely states of pre-unification Germany that could be pushed around by the big powers. Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey would need to be full partners to any agreement, committed to the new balance of power.

And who would be the latter-day Cardinal Mazarin? Henry Kissinger, architect of the US opening to China – which ultimately led to the collapse of the Soviet Union – may dream of such things, but at age 92 the position is open to others.

Global politics are now more complex than in 1970s and the ability of an American president and a crafty cardinal to remould the world – despite Donald Trump’s slogan “Make America Great Again” – is a thing of the past.

But that does not mean that there is no chance of war exhaustion leading to a new balance of power. The point is to be ready for that moment.

Alan Philps is a commentator on global affairs

On Twitter: @aphilps

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missile-japan-idUSKCN0V70IB

Business | Fri Jan 29, 2016 8:28am EST
Related: World, Japan, North Korea, Aerospace & Defense

Japan puts military on alert for possible North Korean missile test

TOKYO | By Nobuhiro Kubo


Japan has put its military on alert for a possible North Korean ballistic missile launch after indications it is preparing for a test firing, two people with direct knowledge of the order told Reuters on Friday.

"Increased activity at North Korea's missile site suggests that there may be a launch in the next few weeks," said one of the sources, both of whom declined to be identified because they are not authorized to talk to the media.

Tension rose in East Asia this month after North Korea's fourth nuclear test, this time of what it said was a hydrogen bomb.

A missile test coming so soon after the nuclear test would raise concern that North Korea plans to fit nuclear warheads on its missiles, giving it the capability to launch a strike against rival South Korea, Japan and possibly targets as far away as the U.S. West Coast.


Related Coverage
› North Korea missile site activity revives talk of U.S. missile defense in South

Japan's Minister of Defense Gen Nakatani has ordered Aegis destroyers that operate in the Sea of Japan to be ready to target any North Korean projectiles heading for Japan, the sources said.

A Defense Ministry spokesman declined to say whether PAC-3 batteries and the Aegis destroyers had been deployed to respond to any threat from North Korea

Nakatani, asked in a press briefing whether Japan would shoot down any North Korean missile, said: "We will take steps to respond, but I will refrain from revealing specific measures given the nature of the situation."

The advanced Aegis vessels are able to track multiple targets and are armed with SM-3 missiles designed to destroy incoming warheads in space before they re-enter the atmosphere and fall to there targets.

Japan also has Patriot PAC-3 missile batteries around Tokyo and other sites to provide a last line of defense as warheads near the ground.

Rather than a direct attack, however, Japan is more concerned that debris from a missile test could fall on its territory.


(Writing by Tim Kelly; Editing by Robert Birsel)

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-mosque-idUSKCN0V711T

World | Fri Jan 29, 2016 8:21am EST
Related: World, Saudi Arabia

Suicide, shooting attack on Saudi Shi'ite mosque kills four

DUBAI | By Sami Aboudi


A suicide bombing and gun attack on Shi'ite Muslim worshippers killed at least four people in eastern Saudi Arabia on Friday, the interior ministry and witnesses said, extending a spate of attacks on the kingdom's Shi'ite minority.

The assault on the Imam Rida mosque in the Eastern Province town of Mahasen, a mixed Sunni-Shi'ite district in which there is an extension of a compound where state oil company Aramco employees live, also wounded at least 18 people.

There was no early claim of responsibility but it resembled previous attacks by Sunni militants from Islamic State on Shi'ites it considers to be heretics. The oil-producing Eastern Province is home to Saudi Arabia's Shi'ite community.

It came less than a month after Sunni-ruled Saudi Arabia executed 47 people, most of them al Qaeda militants convicted of attacks in the world's biggest oil exporting state since 2003, as well as dissident Shi'ite cleric Nimr al-Nimr.

The Saudi interior ministry said security forces prevented two suicide bombers from entering the mosque, where one blew himself up, killing four people. Security forces exchanged fire with the second man and arrested him.

Witnesses said one suicide bomber blew himself up outside the mosque, causing a power blackout inside. They said worshippers overpowered a second attacker after he opened fire in the mosque where 200 people were performing Friday prayers.

"The explosion happened outside the mosque, at the courtyard of the mosque, while another one entered with a machinegun. There are martyrs and wounded," one witness said in an audio message circulated on social media.

"The young men grabbed his machine gun and beat him up, but he did not die. The police then came and took him away and the wounded were taken in private cars because ambulance cars did not arrive quickly."

Another witness, speaking to Reuters by telephone, said a third attacker was believed to be involved in the attack and that he may have fled or disappeared.

A video recording provided by activists showed a crowd surrounding a man prone on the floor, turning him over and unfastening what they said was a suicide belt around his waist.

Witnesses had earlier said three people died in the attack.

Saudi Arabia has suffered a string of deadly shooting and bomb attacks in recent months, many of them claimed by the ultra-radical Islamic State.

Islamic State is bitterly hostile to Gulf Arab monarchies and is seen to be trying to stoke Sunni-Shi'ite sectarian confrontation within Arabian peninsula states to destabilize and ultimately overthrow their dynasties.

Al Qaeda has warned Saudi Arabia it will pay for the executions of dozens of its members on Jan. 2, saying they were intended to be a new. year's gift to Riyadh's Western allies aimed at consolidating the Saud dynasty.


(Additional reporting by Omar Fahmy in Cairo; Writing by Rania El Gamal; Editing by)

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-crash-suspects-idUSKCN0V712V

World | Fri Jan 29, 2016 7:18am EST
Related: World, Russia, Egypt, Syria

Exclusive: EgyptAir mechanic suspected in Russian plane crash

LONDON


An EgyptAir mechanic whose cousin joined Islamic State in Syria is suspected of planting a bomb on a Russian passenger plane that was blown out of Egypt's skies in late October, according to sources familiar with the matter.

So far Egypt has publicly said it has found no evidence that the MetroJet flight, which crashed in the Sinai Peninsula after takeoff from Sharm el-Sheikh airport, killing all 224 people on board, was brought down by terrorism.

A senior security official at the airline denied that any of its employees had been arrested or were under suspicion, and an Interior Ministry official also said there had been no arrests.

But the sources, who declined to be identified because of the sensitivity of the ongoing investigation, said the mechanic had been detained, along with two airport policemen and a baggage handler suspected of helping him put the bomb on board.

"After learning that one of its members had a relative that worked at the airport, Islamic State delivered a bomb in a handbag to that person," said one of the sources, adding the suspect's cousin joined Islamic State in Syria a year and a half ago.

"He was told to not ask any questions and get the bomb on the plane."

Another source said of the other suspects: "Two policemen are suspected of playing a role by turning a blind eye to the operation at a security checkpoint. But there is a possibility that they were just not doing their jobs properly."

None of the four have been prosecuted so far, the sources told Reuters.

The crash has called into question Egypt's drive to eradicate Islamist militancy and hurt its tourism industry, a cornerstone of the economy. Islamic State's Egypt affiliate is waging an insurgency in parts of the Sinai, although mostly far from the tourist resorts along its Red Sea coast.

Russia and Western countries have long said that they believe the flight was brought down by a bomb smuggled on board. Egypt however has so far publicly said it has not found any evidence of foul play.

Any formal charges or official Egyptian confirmation that a bomb brought down the Airbus A321 could potentially expose Egypt to compensation payments to the families of the victims.

The EgyptAir senior security official said state security police had investigated all workers at Sharm el-Sheikh airport without finding any evidence implicating any of them.

The official said state security traced the family connections of all the employees and they were cleared.

"Any employee who shows sympathy to militants is prevented from going to work in any airport," he told Reuters.

An Interior Ministry source also said no one had been arrested in connection with the crash.

"We are awaiting results of the investigation."

Islamic State's online magazine carried a photo of a Schweppes soft drink can it said was used to make an improvised bomb that brought down the Russian airliner.

The photo showed a can of Schweppes Gold soft drink and what appeared to be a detonator and switch on a blue background, three simple components that if genuine are likely to cause concern for airline safety officials worldwide.


(Editing by Peter Graff)

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missile-usa-southkorea-idUSKCN0V70VP

Business | Fri Jan 29, 2016 8:28am EST
Related: World, South Korea, North Korea, Aerospace & Defense

North Korea missile site activity revives talk of U.S. missile defense in South

SEOUL | By Ju-min Park and Jack Kim


South Korea indicated increased willingness to host an advanced U.S. anti-missile defense on Friday as activity detected at a North Korean missile site revived talk of deploying a system opposed by China and Russia.

U.S. military officials have said the sophisticated system called Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) was needed in South Korea, which faces the threat of an increasingly advanced North Korean missile program.

"If THAAD is deployed by the U.S. military in Korea, it will be helpful for our security and defense," South Korean Defense Ministry spokesman Kim Min-seok said.

Previously, South Korea was reluctant to openly discuss the possibility of the deployment, as it tried to walk a fine line between its closest ally, the United States, and its biggest trade partner, China.

U.S. officials told Reuters on Thursday there was increased activity at a North Korean missile site suggesting preparations for a possible rocket launch as U.N. Security Council members discuss fresh sanctions against North Korea after it conducted its fourth nuclear test on Jan. 6.

The officials cited intelligence suggesting movement of components and propellant at North Korea's Sohae satellite launch facility. A test could take place within a couple of weeks, they said.

The United States maintains 28,500 military personnel in the country, a legacy of the 1950-53 Korean War, which ended in a truce and left the two Koreas in a technical state of war.

China is North Korea's lone major ally. But in recent years South Korea has forged increasingly strong ties with China.

"We believe that any country, when striving for its own security, should also consider other countries' security interests and regional peace and stability," Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying told a briefing when asked about the possibility of deploying THAAD in South Korea.

Kim said there was internal discussion in the U.S. government about deploying the system to its military based in South Korea.

The system has radar that can track multiple ballistic missiles up to 2,000 km (1,200 miles) away, a range which would reach deep into China and Russia.

The THAAD system is built by Lockheed Martin Corp, and costs an estimated 1 trillion won ($885.6 million) apiece. Some THAAD opponents in South Korea propose instead developing an indigenous missile defense system.

Both China and Russia, which are among the five international powers that have sought to negotiate with North Korea to persuade it to abandon its nuclear weapons, have spoken against stationing the THAAD system in South Korea.

North Korea last conducted a long-range rocket launch in late 2012, sending an object it described as a communications satellite into orbit. Western and Asian experts said it was part of an effort to build an ICBM.


(This story has been refile dto fix typos in paragraph 4, 8)

(Additional reporting by Michael Martina in Beijing; Editing by Tony Munroe and Nick Macfie)

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/asia-pivot-does-the-us-need-to-balance-harder/

Asia Pivot: Does the US Need to ‘Rebalance Harder’?

The Obama White House is realistically out of time to articulate a newly integrated vision for the Asia-Pacific region.

By Graham Webster
January 29, 2016

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As U.S. President Barack Obama enters his last year in office, it is increasingly clear that the so-called rebalance to the Asia-Pacific will be his administration’s major mark on U.S. policy toward the region. Four years after the rebalance was announced, however, a Congressionally mandated report found that there remains “consistent confusion about the rebalance strategy and concern about its implementation.”

The report, released this month by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and commissioned by the Department of Defense, found that the confusion was not limited to Asia-Pacific governments or the public, but rather extends throughout the U.S. government. Strikingly, the report points out that “there remains no central U.S. government document that describes the rebalance strategy and its associated elements.”

Since the moment the rebalance was announced, debate has flourished. Was it an unnecessary distraction from crises elsewhere, or an under-funded half-measure? Did it reassure allies and put China on notice, or has the administration over-promised and under-delivered? Whatever one’s views, it seems late in the game for outsiders to justifiably recommend the administration “develop and then articulate a clear and coherent strategy.”

Reading the CSIS report, which was directed by former officials from the Obama and George W. Bush administrations, one encounters a vision of Obama-era Asia policy as incoherent and weak, but not wrong-headed. The core message of the report is that, particularly in the military dimension, the U.S. needs to rebalance harder.

The authors begin from conventional assumptions that U.S. “core interests” in the Asia-Pacific are to “protect the security of the American people and U.S. allies,” to “expand trade and economic opportunity,” and to support “universal democratic norms.” They argue that “managing the rise of the Asia-Pacific will require a mix of engagement, deterrence, and reassurance,” and they explicitly reject “containment” vis-à-vis China.

Some of the report’s recommendations, however, might look like containment from a seat in Beijing or Hainan. Top-line recommendations include “strengthening ally and partner capability, capacity, resilience, and interoperability” and “sustaining and expanding U.S. military presence.” Further recommendations advocate for increased coordination and capacity among allies and partners in maritime Southeast Asia, and for increased U.S. funding to that end. Citing “China’s growing assertiveness,” they argue for increased U.S. surface fleet presence in the region. They advocate “combined operations” in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance with treaty allies in the South and East China Seas.

The report is focused squarely on security concerns, to the almost total exclusion of U.S. economic and values interests cited at the outset, but this should be no surprise for a report commissioned by the Pentagon and required by Congress to address military issues in detail.

It is striking, however, that the report spends so little time imagining potential Chinese responses to the initiatives it advocates. The report does recommend the United States “expand confidence building and crisis management with China,” but it is seemingly unconcerned with the increased insecurity Chinese military and civilian officials might experience if U.S. and allied military efforts are significantly strengthened.

In a sense, this deficiency is a natural result of the conceptual slipperiness universally observed in the rebalance itself. Without what the CSIS authors call a “clear and coherent strategy,” defense experts will do what comes naturally and advocate for enhanced capabilities and effective deterrence. Part of the promise of the rebalance was to better integrate U.S. activities in defense, economic, and diplomatic realms, and in the diverse relationships the United States has with countries in the region.

When Obama announced in November 2011 that “the United States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia-Pacific region,” observers reasonably expected a well-coordinated and -communicated set of priorities and policies.

In reality, it has been unclear how various U.S. initiatives and reactive measures in the region have related to one another, even if they were all framed in administration speeches as part of the same rebalance.

The calls for coherence in the CSIS report and in so many other contexts in recent years are really calls for a story we can tell ourselves about how U.S. policy efforts in the defense, economic, and diplomatic realms fit together and, ultimately, how they cope with the immense change and uncertainty emanating from China today.

The administration is realistically out of time to articulate a newly integrated vision and take actions that make it stick, though the president is required to produce “an overall strategy to promote United States interests in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region” by March 2017. If the Obama administration wants to sharpen its mark on Asia-Pacific policy, it should not punt this mandate to the new administration, but instead produce what so many have been waiting for since 2011.

Graham Webster (@gwbstr) is a researcher, lecturer, and senior fellow of The China Center at Yale Law School. Sign up for his free e-mail brief, U.S.–China Week.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://atimes.com/2016/01/no-prosperity-for-iran-after-nuclear-deal/

Fleeting Chimera: No prosperity for Iran after nuclear deal — Spengler

By David P. Goldman on January 27, 2016 in China, David P. Goldman, Middle East, Spengler

As a matter of arithmetic, Iran is flat broke at the prevailing price of hydrocarbons. Under the P5+1 nuclear deal, Iran will recoup somewhere between $55 and $150 billion of frozen assets, depending on whether one believes the Secretary of the US Treasury or one’s own eyes. The windfall is barely enough to tide Iran over for the next two years.

Iran flag burstP5+1 nuclear diplomacy with Iran went forward on the premise that Iran would trade its strategic ambitions in the region for economic prosperity. The trouble is that prosperity is not a realistic outcome for Iran, which has nothing to gain by abandoning its strategic adventures.

Iran now exports 1.2 million barrels a day of oil. At $30 a barrel, that’s $14 billion year (and perhaps a bit more, given that some Iranian light crude goes at a higher price). Iran also sold (as of 2014) about 9.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas, which might bring in another $4 billion at today’s market prices.

As of 2014, the Iranian government spent $63 billion a year, according to western estimates. No data is available for 2015, and the Iran Central Bank doesn’t publish data past mid-2013. That brought in a bit over $40 billion a year (not counting gas exports). Iran has a $40 billion hole to fill. Unfrozen assets will tide the country over for a couple of years, but won’t solve its problems. This year Iran plans to spend $89 billion, the government announced Dec. 22.

Iran’s government plans to raise taxes across the board, supposedly to decrease dependency on oil in the government budget. But tax revenues for the fiscal year starting March 2016 are estimated at only $28 billion. Even under the assumption that Iran can sell $22 billion worth of oil, the budget gap will rise to about $40 billion, or about 10% of GDP. In nominal dollar terms, Iran’s GDP shrank from $577 billion to $415 billion in 2014, and almost certainly shrank further in 2015.

None of the big projects now under discussion will move the needle far from the empty mark. The long-discussed Iran-Pakistan pipeline might produce revenues of about $3.5 billion a year under ideal conditions, and Iran would pocket a fraction of that.

In December, Iran said that it hoped to increase oil production by 500,000 barrels, earning $22 billion a year, a 50% increase from its present rate. But on Jan. 16, Iran’s oil minister Bijan Zaganeh told an incredulous CNN interviewer that it would boost oil output by 1.6 million barrels a day by the end of 2016. Most experts believe that Iran can’t pump that much oil if it wanted to, and if it did, it couldn’t sell it if it tried.

There are a lot of countries who need to sell more oil, notably Russia. Russia’s oil exports to China now exceed Saudi Arabia’s. China has good reasons to buy more from Russia, given the convergence of Russian and Chinese strategic objectives in Syria and elsewhere. China clearly wants to improve relations with Iran. President Xi Jinping’s Jan. 23 visit to Tehran featured an agreement to increase trade by $600 billion over the next ten years. The question is not whether China wants to trade with Iran, but whether Iran can pay for it. Like Russia, China fears the expansion of radical Sunni Islam in the region, with the potential to spill over into China’s Western province of Xinjiang. There are no Shia Muslims in Russia or China, and Iran’s sponsorship of Shia jihadists is of little concern to the two Asian powers.

http://atimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/chinaoilimp.png

It seems unlikely that China would shift oil purchases away from Russia to Iran in order to help the Tehran regime. China will invest in Iranian extraction, petrochemicals, and infrastructure, but even the most optimistic projections won’t do much for Iran’s finances.

Unless oil prices rise sharply, Iran’s windfall from the P5+1 deal will cover two years’ worth of deficits, with little left over for urgently-needed maintenance of existing oil and gas capacity. That may explain why the Tehran regime has played down the importance of the nuclear agreement with the West. The end of sanctions is unlikely to yield much improvement in ordinary Iranians’ conditions of live, and the government did not want to raise expectations.

Iran’s economy is bad stressed. The official unemployment rate is 11%, but only 37% of the population is considered economically active, an extremely low ratio given the concentration of Iran’s population in working-age brackets. Some social indicators are alarming. The number of marriages has fallen by 20% since 2012. “In Iran, the customary marriage age range is 20-34 for men and 15-29 for women…46% of men and 48% of women in those age ranges remain unmarried,” according to the national statistics agency. So-called “white marriage,” or cohabitation out of wedlock, is so common and controversial that the regime banned a women’s magazine last year for reporting on it.

Economic problems explain part of the falling marriage rate, but the corrosion of traditional values also is a factor. Iranian researchers estimated late in 2015 that one out of eight Iranian women was infected by chlamydia, a common venereal disease that frequently causes infertility. According to the Center for Disease Control, one out of 170 American women carry the infection. The combination of falling marriage rates and epidemic rates of venereal infection point to a society that is losing cohesion. Iran’s theocratic leaders are too prissy to gaze at statues of nudes in Italy, but they are presiding over a disintegration of family values unlike anything in the world.

That is especially disappointing to the regime, which has tried to raise Iran’s fertility rate from just 1.6 children per female by offering incentives to prospective parents and by reducing availability of contraceptives. If anything, Iran’s demographic spiral seems likely to worsen. Iran’s population is already aging faster than any in the world, and the young generation’s rejection of family life points to catastrophic economic problems twenty years from now.

From a financial vantage point, Iran faces something of a Red Queen effect: it needs more money from abroad merely in order to stay in place, that is, to maintain its existing energy infrastructure. The end-of-sanctions bonanza saves Iran from an economic crash after the oil price collapse, but it doesn’t lift the country out of the doldrums.

The opinions expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the view of Asia Times.

Copyright 2015 Asia Times Holdings Limited, a duly registered Hong Kong company. All rights reserved.

 

[vestige]

"Christian Girls Are Only Meant for the Pleasureof Muslim Men"
Started by Dozdoats‎, Yesterday 09:56 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showt...uslim-Men-quot


New ISIS Film - "Kill Them Wherever You Find Them"
Started by Dozdoats‎, Yesterday 10:37 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showt...Find-Them-quot

What are the voices in your head telling you at the moment?

 

[Housecarl]

What are the voices in your head telling you at the moment?

Things are not too far away from going "loud and ugly". The Salafists are going to get their war of civilizations; they are just going to be surprised on how it proceeds is all.

 

[vestige]

Things are not too far away from going "loud and ugly". The Salafists are going to get their war of civilizations; they are just going to be surprised on how it proceeds is all.

In my personal opinion things are already loud and ugly..... across the nation and around the world.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-01-29/us-commandos-expand-anti-isis-war-into-libya

U.S. Commandos Expand Anti-ISIS War into Libya

Elite troops are already laying the foundation for a new front against the Islamic State group’s ambitions.

By Paul D. Shinkman
Jan. 29, 2016, at 12:01 a.m.

U.S. commandos have been operating in Libya for months in an attempt to build an alliance of local militia and political leaders who would contribute to a U.S.-led war, designed to thwart the Islamic State group’s efforts to build a safe haven there should the group be driven from Iraq and Syria.

The extremist network has established footholds around the world but none more important than in Libya, where over the last year it has found a source of income and supplies and a lifeboat if its hub in the Middle East collapses. Its success in exploiting chaos in the tumultuous North African nation has now forced the Obama administration to once again consider war in Libya, after dismantling any semblance of order in 2011 through an air campaign that covered the rebels who ousted and killed former leader Col. Moammar Gadhafi.

Increased rhetoric from Obama’s top military chiefs about operations in Libya indicates a plan for military involvement is on the way, reportedly in the form of ground-based commandos to gather intelligence, rally local forces and call in airstrikes.

When asked Wednesday, Pentagon spokesman Peter Cook declined to offer specifics on current operations, but indicated the military is forging a plan akin to previous attempts to rally local support for U.S. operations.

“I’m not going to tell you exactly what the disposition of our forces are there,” Cook said. “I can acknowledge we’ve had forces on the ground previously.”

They’re there to “get a better sense of who the players are,” he added, “who might be worthy of U.S. support and support from some of our partners going forward” in combating the extremists.

The Islamic State group has made millions off the sale of oil, and it would certainly find plentiful supplies in Libya. The country’s energy sector has historically accounted for 65 percent of its gross domestic product and 95 percent of government revenue, according to U.S. government estimates, all drawing from its 48 billion barrel oil reserves. The sharp decline of this market in 2013 led to massive civil unrest for the majority of the population that received a federal salary off these revenues. A bitter fight among government leaders for control of oil production ensued, as did popular anger over these shortfalls, all providing yet more opportunities for the Islamic State group.

Establishing some form of government in Libya is critical to defeating the Islamic State group in what has become “a complicated picture,” Cook said.

Defense Secretary Ash Carter said Thursday the U.S. supports Libya’s forming a consolidated government and expects the security service it would field would also want to repel the Islamic State group. But the creation of a new government is not a condition for the U.S. launching unilateral strikes.

“We need to protect ourselves,” Carter said, citing the Islamic State group’s goal of attacking Westerners, and adding that its fighters are trying to “consolidate their own footprint” in Libya.

The U.S. has already conducted airstrikes in Libya, including one in November that targeted and killed an Islamic State group leader. The U.N. estimates as many as 3,000 Islamic State group fighters may be operating in Libya.

The Islamic State group is establishing training bases in Libya, Carter said, recruiting foreign fighters to flock there as it did previously in Iraq and Syria, and “trying to take over the reigns of the economy and tax it” as it does in its current strongholds.

“We don’t want to be on a glidescope to a situation like Syria and Iraq. That’s the reason why we’re watching the situation closely. That’s the reason why we’re developing options for what we might do in the future.”

Military sources say the special operations forces, like many before them who have infiltrated Libya, have gleaned valuable information and are prepared to launch operations now.

But they likely cannot produce a clear plan for how the U.S. could further involve itself in fighting in Libya and win.

The U.S.-led air campaign in 2011 that overthrew the Gadhafi government sent Libya into a tailspin. In 2010 it was producing 1.65 million barrels of oil per day. Now it yields a daily average of 400,000. Instability and infighting over who controls the processing facilities combined with the absence of effective governance further worries European neighbors across the Mediterranean Sea.

At the center of these concerns are the hundreds, possibly even thousands, of warring militias roughly divided among those from the oil rich but economically poor east, and the western portions of the country that Gadhafi favored during his dictatorial rule.

The Islamic State group now operates in Libya under the leadership of foreigners, largely from the Arabian Peninsula, according to a New York Times report. It first gained a foothold in the port city of Sirte and controls roughly 150 miles of coastline, touting the hub as a sort of New Raqqa.

In Libya, the Islamic State group could also capitalize on the anxiety of any militia group that believes the U.S. and its Western partners are favoring its enemies. If forced to retreat, extremists could partner with these opposing militias and hide in the vast swathes of ungoverned territory in the arid nation of 700,000 square miles, in which 80 percent of the population live in cities.

“If we pick ‘Militia A’ to hold territory, ‘Militia B’ is going to be pissed off and say, ‘We will ally with anyone so that we can fight with Militia A to take back that territory.’ ‘Anyone’ is probably the Islamic State,” says Alan J. Kuperman, an expert on Libya and professor at the University of Texas at Austin. “The precondition for actually eliminating the Islamic State in Libya would be to unify the competing militias in Libya. Well, good luck, because that’s going to be a multi-year, if not multi-decade challenge.”

Some members of Congress have expressed concern that the Obama administration’s preliminary plans for Libya won’t work and will only endanger these forces, particularly if it mirrors the current strategy in Iraq and Syria of limiting conventional military trainers to bases and sending out only small teams of commandos to strike Islamic State group targets.

“Putting 50 special operations combatants in this targeting task force, it won’t move the needle. Then our allies won’t see that we’re committed,” says Rep. Ryan Zinke. The Montana Republican, a member of the intelligence subgroup of the Armed Forces Committee, served as a commander in the elite Naval Special Warfare Development Group, known commonly as SEAL Team 6. He operated in Libya during his 23-year tenure as well as other hotspots like Iraq.

It’s commonplace for special operators to infiltrate dangerous countries like Libya, either overtly or undercover, and to do what he calls “senior leader reconnaissance” to determine whether those who control fighters inside war zones are willing to cooperate with the U.S.

A small group of American commandos was engaged in such a mission at Libya’s Wattiya airbase in December, before the local militia demanded they leave and the Libyan air force posted pictures of them on its Facebook page.

Now, as a lawmaker, Zinke is concerned the administration may enter into conflict in Libya with an open mandate, as it has in Iraq and Syria, and without a specific plan for what will define victory and how it will then withdraw U.S. involvement.

“What I see happening is disturbing, particularly with the rules of engagement and this administration’s refusal to put a force package in that will move the needle or will aid victory in our lifetime.”

He isn’t the only one with military experience who may believe the plan for Libya must differ from Obama’s ongoing campaign against the Islamic State group.

Administration officials routinely describe the strategy in Iraq and Syria as one to “defeat and ultimately destroy the Islamic State group,” adding that victory could take years, if not decades. They define the U.S. military involvement by its restraint, in favor of prompting regional forces to do more militarily.

Marine Gen. Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, seemed to differ from this slow-and-steady assessment when he first announced the military was considering operations in Libya.

“We’re looking at taking decisive military action against ISIL [in Libya] in conjunction with a legitimate political process,” Dunford told reporters during a recent trip to Paris for talks with U.S. senior military counterparts there.

"It's a pretty complex situation, and we just need to make sure that what we're doing is nested in a political end-state," he said. "Unchecked, I am concerned about the spread of ISIL in Libya.”

Video

Paul D. Shinkman is a national security reporter for U.S. News & World Report. You can follow him on Twitter or reach him at pshinkman@usnews.com

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/inside-russias-would-be-foreign-legion/557120.html

Inside Russia's Would-Be Foreign Legion

By Matthew Bodner
Jan. 28 2016 11:18
Last edited 11:18

Four years ago, 18-year-old Vitaly Danilenko was conscripted into the Russian military after his family returned to Siberia from Alaska. Raised in America, the young conscript spoke very little Russian, and was unable to communicate with his comrades and superiors.

This state of affairs lasted a mere two weeks before Danilenko went AWOL, deserting his post — a violation of Russian law that threatens up to seven years in prison — and going on the run. According to Russian media reports, his family said he fled because of the language barrier.

No one was sure what to do with the young conscript. Russian military service laws, according to one Russian media report from the time, simply did not recognize inability to communicate in Russian as grounds for dismissal. No reports exist of his arrest.

Danilenko's story serves as a cautionary tale to both the Russian military and foreigners who might be interested in joining its ranks and fighting in actual combat — an opportunity highlighted by President Vladimir Putin on Jan. 2, 2015, when he signed an order allowing foreigners to enlist.

According to the Defense Ministry's official guidelines for foreign recruitment, any foreigner between the ages of 18 and 30 can enlist in the Russian military under a five-year contract, provided they can present proof from a Russian institution that they speak Russian, have no criminal record, and can pass a series of professional, psychological and medical exams administered by an official recruiter in Russia.

The change was aimed at formalizing working relationships between the Russian military and citizens of Central Asian and former Soviet nations where Moscow has stationed troops and maintains bases, but does not explicitly deny Americans, or citizens of any nation, from joining.

Despite well-documented instances of brutal hazing in the Russian military and the relatively low levels of pay enjoyed by Russian soldiers, news of Putin's foreign legion fell on receptive ears far beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union.

For the past year, The Moscow Times has received regular emails from readers interested in joining the Russian military and requesting assistance with speaking to a recruiter. In one instance, a reader appeared to believe a Moscow Times reporter was a recruiter for Russian intelligence.


Playing to the Fringe

Broadly speaking, those Westerners interested in joining up appeared to hold relatively anti-establishment views — members of an audience that Russian foreign media outlets like RT deliberately target — or echoed positions championed by politicians such as Donald Trump and Nigel Farage.

In this way, the allure of serving in Putin's military fits within the larger narrative of the Kremlin's success in engaging with and appealing to fringe elements of Western societies — taking advantage of their diverse nature by playing to the margins, where individuals often define themselves in opposition to the majority.

The formation of counter-cultures is a natural, oftentimes harmless process. But it is also one that drives Westerners to join the ranks of the Islamic State — a terrorist organization outlawed in Russia — and in this case, inspire them to seek service in Putin's military.

"Clearly, they [the Kremlin] are going for the fringes everywhere," said Peter Pomerantsev, an expert on Russian media and propaganda efforts. "Especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries, where there's never been a great love for Russia."

And the fringes are growing — as evidenced by the continued success of Trump and like-minded candidates in Europe.

"There has generally been an emasculation of Western culture [and] the White Man is quite a scared being," said Pomerantsev. "That's what Trump is all about. In an emasculated culture where the White Man sees himself to be under threat, I guess Putin is like the last white man standing."

Would You Like to Know More?

But not every interested foreigner is a Trump supporter. Some — like Rachel, an 18-year-old girl from the American Midwest — just considered the opportunity a good way to take a stand against what they see as imperialist U.S. foreign policy.

Rachel turned her attention to Russia's foreign contractor program after striking out with the pro-Russian separatists fighting in eastern Ukraine. She explained that they turned her away "due to my gender and my intermediate level knowledge of the language."

"To me, Russia represented a bulwark against American globalist interests. So, I tried to join the [pro-Russian] rebels in a foolish attempt to fight against this too. But that went belly up. I looked into the Russian military after that … but I was ineligible for that too," Rachel said.

See the Infographic: The Defense Ministry's 10-Step Process to Volunteer for Contract Service in the Russian Army (Source: Defense Ministry)

Rachel is a self-described idealist, who, during the course of the media frenzy surrounding events in Ukraine over the past two years, found herself increasingly sympathetic to the Russian cause, as she saw it, to counter U.S. hegemony.

"I saw my nation's interests, the United States, as malignant and immoral. I believed fervently that every nation has a right to self determination, and the United States seemed to ignore this belief of mine most flagrantly. Today, I find it ironic that I put the Kremlin on a pedestal for that reason," she said.

The Defense Ministry's comparable language requirements have not stemmed interest from those who don't even have intermediate Russian, at least anecdotally.

A former British Royal Air Force serviceman named Mark, who now resides in Australia, said that despite knowing just a handful of Russian phrases, he was "willing to take the oath [of service] for the Russian government and serve it well."

"President Putin is a man with a country that is not going to be bullied by the west or intimidated," Mark said. Though he sent his documents to the Defense Ministry, he has not heard back from them about his chances for recruitment.

A former U.S. soldier named Will, who served in the U.S. army for eight years, explained by email that he missed being a soldier. "I love my country, BUT, I am very upset by the path my government has taken," he said.

"Our founding fathers are rolling in their grave, I miss America and the values it ONCE stood for. The things [the U.S. government] makes our men and women fight for is not why our military was created. We were created for the American people. Putin is for the Russian people and his country, not for the rest of the world," he concluded.

Westerners are far from the only ones seeking to enlist.

"I come from a very poor family," said John from Gambia told The Moscow Times. "I am single and want to help get my parents out of poverty [but] I've been jobless since graduating from high school in 2010. I don't want to remain like this for the rest of my life … and the salary is quite a bit compared to jobs here."

Kristoffer, a 30-year-old Indian who was educated in his nation's military academies before serving in the Indian military, wrote that he wanted to know if he could join the Russian special forces after completing the 5-year foreign contractor stint.

Kristoffer stressed that he didn't feel joining the Russian military would be an act of treason or malice toward his own nation, since "India and Russia are best of friends in world politics and defense exchanges," referring to officer exchange programs between the two militaries.

Since Russia began considering allowing foreigners to apply for combat roles five years ago, an entire online community dedicated to foreigners hoping to join the Russian military has popped up — Russiadefense.net.

Though Russian military leadership may entertain foreigners in their ranks, ordinary conscripts might not. As one soldier on the social networking site VKontakte told The Moscow Times: "Foreigners have no place in the Russian army!"


Contact the author at m.bodner@imedia.ru. Follow the author on Twitter: @mattb0401


See also:

Russian High Ranking Military Chief Gets Jail Term Commuted, Is Fined Instead

Putin Admits Military Presence in Ukraine During Marathon Presser

Putin Orders Russian Military to Act Tough in Syria