WAR 01-20-2017-to-01-26-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

(304) 12-30-2017-to-01-05-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...1-05-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(305) 01-06-2017-to-01-12-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...1-12-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(306) 01-13-2017-to-01-19-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...1-19-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://breakingdefense.com/2018/01/a-tough-national-defense-strategy/

A Tough National Defense Strategy

By MARK CANCIAN
on January 19, 2018 at 9:59 AM
14 Comments

The National Defense Strategy, released this morning, may be the single most important document penned by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis. It encapsulates the Trump Administration’s defense policies in one place for the first time and provides guidance for the 2019 defense budget, to be released in a few weeks. That budget will mark the administration’s first chance to shape the defense budget from the beginning and will set the stage for the rest of the Trump Administration. Mark Cancian, who used to build defense budgets at the Office of Management and Budget and now works for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, got a detailed briefing yesterday at the Pentagon about the NDS. (Hint: Check the last paragraph.) He offers our readers this exclusive look inside the strategy. Read on! The Editor.

The long awaited National Defense Strategy (NDS) bluntly describes a US military that is losing its edge over potential competitors, and urges “increased and sustained investment” for “long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia”. It echoes many long-standing themes from the Republican national security establishment, but with a few dashes of classic Mattis perspectives added in. Those interested in specifics may be disappointed because the unclassified version is only a fraction the length of the classified version that went to the Congress, so there is no discussion of trade-offs, numbers or dollars.

Same Threats, Different Order

The NDS identifies five threats: China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, terrorism. These are the same threats that Secretary Carter described at the end of last administration. This is not surprising since Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Joe Dunford and the military establishment have carried over, even though all the political officials have changed. What’s interesting is that the order has changed.

After 2014, with the Russian takeover of the Crimea and move into the Ukraine, Russia was clearly identified as the top threat. Now it is China, as editor Colin Clark described yesterday. This makes sense from a long-term perspective, as many strategists have pointed out. Russia punches above its weight in military affairs, having a large military establishment left over from the Cold War but a weak economy underneath it. China, on the other hand, has a strong and growing economy that will sustain a powerful and expanding military over time.

To win in this demanding environment, the document repeatedly argues for the need to “field a lethal, resilient, and rapidly adapting joint force.” (“Lethal”, a classic Mattis-ism appears a dozen times in the text.) To do this, it advocates modernization as the highest priority, investing in nuclear forces, space and cyberspace, missile defense and joint lethality.

Expanding force structure is distinctly a lower priority since all the investments cited are for modernization. However, the strategy does note that, “The size of our force matters.” This appears to be a late add by the White House and sounds more like National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster than Mattis.

Also interesting is the identification of three theaters of engagement: the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. This is consistent with what the Obama administration had been doing towards the end, as it was pulled back into Europe by Russian aggression and into the Middle East by ISIS. Although China is clearly the leading threat, there is nothing in the unclassified document about sending a preponderance of combat power to the Pacific. The classified document likely expresses more of a focus on China, but this strategy is clearly backing away from the Obama QDR 2014 notion of withdrawing from Europe and the Middle East in order to focus on the Pacific (“the rebalance”).

The strategy does make some mushy nods to other regions like South America and Africa, but these look like pro forma acknowledgments designed to reassure allies without making major force or policy commitments.

Two Major Conflicts?

A big change is the force sizing construct, the way the strategy calculates how many forces are needed and what kind. The two major conflict construct, which has been a constant in various configurations since the end of the Cold War, is replaced by a “1+” construct: “defeating aggression by a major power…[and] deterring aggression by [another] major power.” Thus, “defeat and deny” in QDR 2014 is now “defeat and deter”, which seems to imply less warfighting capability in a second conflict. This change likely reflects the fact that conflict with a major power like China or Russia would be more demanding than the typical regional conflicts of the past like North Korea or Iran. Although the language in the unclassified document is not clear about who a “major power” is, a senior defense official confirmed that it was China and Russia. The classified version is apparently clearer about the nature and simultaneity of conflicts, describing eight scenarios.

The strategy acknowledges that “during normal day-to-day operations, the Joint Force will sustainably compete in the three key regions”, but these crisis response missions do not appear to be a driver for force sizing; the strategy will “prioritize maintaining the capacity and capabilities for major combat”. To manage these day-to-day operations, the unclassified document has a confusing description of “Dynamic Force Employment” and a “Global Operating Model”, which senior officials say is clearer in the classified version. The intention is to adjust peacetime force deployments to levels that the force can sustain. This is attractive in theory but difficult to do in practice.

There is no discussion of stability operations or counterinsurgency except for one passing mention of “competition spanning the entire spectrum of conflict”. This is a huge change from the Bush years when the 2006 QDR focused mainly on the counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. The challenge here is that the United States may not be able to choose the wars it fights and thus may end up conducting stability operations even if it doesn’t want to. The classified version apparently makes the point that such operations can be conducted by a force designed for high-end combat but with risk. This will likely get pushback from the many experts who argue that stability operations and irregular warfare have their own, unique, demands.

Links And Gaps

Other elements show strong continuity with previous post-Cold War national security strategies. There is a lengthy “hymn to the allies”, extolling their value, the long-standing relationships, and the need for these connections in the future. There is also an extended discussion about the importance of the “resilient, but weakening, Post-WWII international order.”

The strategy calls for “a motivated and highly skilled civilian work force”, which contrasts with customary Republican skepticism about the government workforce. Indeed, much of the personnel rhetoric sounds like Defense Secretary Ash Carter’s “Force of the Future”, with calls for revitalized professional military education, talent management with fellowships and civilian education, and assignments that increase interagency understanding. Missing, not surprisingly, is the customary democratic celebration of diversity.

Missing also is any discussion about sustaining the All Volunteer Force and the supporting establishment underneath the warfighters, which was so prominent in the 2014 QDR. This again likely reflects a Mattis perspective and that of the strategists around him. They focus on warfighting capabilities. Oddly, though, there is no discussion of Guard and reserve forces either. Usually there is at least a nod to the importance of the total force.

No Self-Esteem Building

Gone is the 2014 QDR rhetoric about “the best military in the world”. Instead, the document is blunt that, “the US has no preordained right to victory”. One can see Mattis’s sense of history coming through here.

America Still First

As with the National Security Strategy, there is a strong tone of American exceptionalism (or “America first”): “The Department of Defense will…remain the preeminent military power in the world, ensure the balance of power remains in our favor, and advance an international order that is most conducive to our security and prosperity.” The department will “prevail in conflict and preserve peace through strength.” There is no hint that the United States will accept decline or even a multipolar world.

The NDS lacks the NSS’s extended discussion about trade and economics, though this may reflect the different purposes of the documents: government-wide versus defense specific. The NDS does have one nod in that direction saying that “a dominant Joint Force will preserve access to markets…that will improve our standard of living“.

More To Come…

Tradeoffs, numbers, and dollars are all missing from the document, and that will frustrate a lot of readers. The Congress explicitly directed that the NDS be classified, with an unclassified version, in order to allow a more candid discussion of trade-offs and priorities. The much longer classified version that went to the Congress contains this candid discussion, but the nature of the strategy’s trade-offs—and details of the specific “winners” and “losers”—will be unclear until some of those details begin to leak out.

Numbers and dollars will be contained in the budget documents when they come out in early February. Reportedly, at the end of the administration’s FY 2019 internal budget process, the department received a large increase in expected fiscal 2019 funding and is still working through how it will allocate the money. So we’ll need to wait a few weeks to find out what happens to major programs like the F-35, how many ships the administration plans to buy, and how big the Army will be. Stay tuned.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.defenseone.com/politics/...etition-not-terrorism/145305/?oref=d-topstory

Mattis: Pentagon Shifting Focus to Great Power Competition — ‘Not Terrorism’

The first national defense strategy in 10 years puts on paper what Mattis, McMaster have signaled for months: the U.S. is refocused on China and Russia.

BY KEVIN BARON
EXECUTIVE EDITOR
READ BIO
JANUARY 19, 2018

The Trump administration’s long-awaited National Defense Strategy declares a decisive shift in America’s security priorities, away from the age of ISIS-level terrorism and toward a return to great-power competition with regional giants China and Russia. This shift, Pentagon planners say, will require a “more lethal, resilient, and rapidly innovating” military that can regain the overwhelming advantage the United States once held over those rivals and lesser adversaries such as Iran and North Korea.

The NDS is the military-specific follow-up to the White House’s National Security Strategy, released in December. The 11-page unclassified version released to reporters on Thursday lays out the world’s threats as the Trump administration sees them. Compared to previous administrations’ strategy documents, the new one focuses far more on reacting to those threats, and far less on what American defense leaders want the world to look like afterwards

“Today, America’s military reclaims an era of strategic purpose, alert to the realities of a changing world,” said Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, according to the prepared remarks of his speech on Friday morning. “We will continue to prosecute the campaign against terrorists, but great power competition—not terrorism—is now the primary focus of U.S. national security,”

Anyone who has heard Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster speak in recent months will recognize the national security adviser’s voice in Mattis’s words and the NDS.

Mattis and his team broke down their vision into three bold subheads to show the Pentagon’s priorities: the strategic environment, strengthening alliances, and the never-ending effort to reform Pentagon’s technology and weapons development and buying processes.

The strategy’s attention to alliances will draw praise from foreign political and military leaders who still wonder about the American commitment to global security arrangements. Recall, as U.S. allies do, that Trump in his presidential campaign disparaged alliances and promised an “America First” foreign policy. For much of Trump’s first year, Mattis and leaders like Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Joseph Dunford had to reassure NATO leaders that the U.S. would live up to its treaty obligations to defend the other alliance members.

The document lays out the world’s threats and challenges to the U.S., as military leaders see it. To wit: China’s rapidly modernized its force to beat U.S. weapons and challenge the U.S. economically. Russia wants “to shatter” NATO. The entire international order is “resilient, but weakening,” it warns. North Korea and other rogue states are causing mischief to destabilize their regions. There is a technology race the U.S. is not winning, or not leading as it used to, in many areas. And there is a strategic game the U.S. has not been playing as all this change occurred.

Notably, the document limns Russia’s use of technology to subvert elections in George, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine. It makes no mention of Russian interference in Trump’s own election.

What’s unclear is just how different these views are from the ones Pentagon leaders held last week or last year, before Trump’s team arrived. On Thursday, Pentagon officials called reporters in to speak with Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy & Force Development Elbridge Colby, but he declined to answer any questions about how the strategy would affect the budget; or what new weapons the new strategy would require; or what the shift means for operations across Africa, where the U.S. is involved in daily hot wars. Colby insisted that because Pentagon leaders had gone through the exercise to produce their strategy, it was “already bearing fruit.” He was asked if could provide examples.

“No, I don’t think so,” he replied.

Mattis, in his Friday speech, summarized the summary and noted the attention to big-power competition. He was notably quiet about the spread of violent extremism and terrorism, the things that have largely occupied the Pentagon since 2001. So now we have a strategy. Next, Washington — and its global military partners and the defense industry — will wait to see how this strategy translates into the one document that matters most: the president’s fiscal 2019 budget request.

Kevin Baron is the founding executive editor of Defense One. Baron has lived in Washington for 20 years, covering international affairs, the military, the Pentagon, Congress, and politics for Foreign Policy, National Journal, Stars and Stripes, and the Boston Globe, where he ran investigative ... FULL BIO

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.voanews.com/a/security-...-existent-says-pakistan-official/4215787.html

ASIA

Pakistan: Security, Intelligence Cooperation With US Non-Existent

January 19, 2018 3:11 PM
Ayesha Tanzeem

ISLAMABAD —
Pakistan’s defense minister says his country’s deteriorating relationship with the United States has led to a decline in the security and intelligence cooperation between the two allies to an almost non-existent level.

Cooperation between the two allies increased in the aftermath of the attacks on the United States in September 2001 by al-Qaida terrorists based in Afghanistan. But in a Voice of America interview, Defense Minster Khurram Dastgir said recent harsh and very public criticism from Washington has contributed to a decline in the relationship.

“The kind of language President Trump has been using, what Vice President Pence used a few weeks ago in Bagram in Afghanistan, reduces the freedom of action of Pakistan government,” he said, adding that the level of cooperation depended on the nature of the relationship with the United States. “The more stressful it gets, the lower the cooperation,” he said, describing the current relationship between the two countries as being in a state of “cold peace.”

Additional steps needed

Pakistan and the United States have been increasingly at odds since last August, when the administration of President Donald Trump announced its new South Asia policy.

Trump promised a new, tougher approach toward Pakistan. Washington accuses Islamabad of providing safe havens to Afghan Taliban, who are fighting the Afghan government, as well as U.S. and NATO forces. Pakistan denies the charge, saying it has cleared out all safe havens on its territory after a military operation that began in 2014.

Earlier this month, a State Department official, speaking on background, told reporters that although U.S. officials believe both countries are committed to improving their relationship, Pakistan must take additional steps to address longstanding U.S. concerns about militant groups operating in its territory.

“We believe that there is significant evidence that leadership of the Haqqani Network resides inside Pakistan and is able to plan and execute from Pakistan attacks inside Afghanistan. So the disagreement is much more about those facts than it is on our overarching goals in the strategy. And we need them to address these sanctuaries in order for us to be able to be enabled to succeed in Afghanistan,” the official said.

Limited response

The level of mistrust in some security matters was apparent as early as May 2011, when the United States launched a surprise raid on al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden's secret compound in the Pakistan enclave of Abbottabad, not far from a Pakistani military academy. U.S. officials said at the time Washington did not share plans of the raid with officials in Islamabad out of concern the mission would be compromised.

Previous public comments by Dastgir about a suspension of security and intelligence cooperation with the United States sparked little reaction from U.S. officials in Islamabad, who said they had received no such notification from the Pakistan government.

“This expectation that somehow a notice will be delivered from the Ministry of Defense to the U.S. Embassy that hereby we are stopping intelligence corporation, that’s not going to happen because it didn’t begin with a notice that hereby we are beginning intelligence cooperation,” Dastgir said.

Limited choices

Still, Pakistan continues to allow the United States to use its territory to re-supply its troops in Afghanistan. It’s a card the country’s leadership said it might use if needed but not without serious contemplation about the possible consequences.

The U.S. has limited choices when it comes to supplying its troops in this region. The alternatives require dealing with either Iran or Russia, two countries that have a worse relationship with the U.S. than even Pakistan.

 

[Housecarl]

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Posted for fair use.....
https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-backed-somalia-commandos-kill-4-al-shabab-135155295.html

US-backed Somalia commandos kill 4 al-Shabab extremists

Associated Press
ABDI GULED, Associated Press • January 19, 2018

MOGADISHU, Somalia (AP) — Somali and U.S. commandos stormed a camp for al-Shabab extremist fighters in an overnight raid, killing at least four of the fighters and rescuing dozens of child conscripts, a Somali intelligence official said Friday.

The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to the media, said special forces raided the camp in Jame'o village in Middle Shabelle region. A local commander was among those killed, he said.

A second official confirmed the raid, which was carried out with the support of helicopters that later evacuated the young recruits.

Human Rights Watch earlier in the week accused al-Shabab of the forced recruitment of hundreds of children in recent months. The recruitment of children is a long-standing practice of the al-Qaida-linked group which faces growing military pressure across south and central Somalia.

Thirty boys were rescued in the overnight raid, Somalia's information minister, Abdirahman Omar Osman, told The Associated Press.

"Al-Shabab bas once again demonstrated their barbarity and their complete disregard for human rights," the minister said. "The group uses these indoctrination camps to brainwash young men and force them to conduct attacks and suicide bombings." He said Somalia's military was making "significant progress" in retaking territory from the extremist group.

Also on Friday, the U.S. military said it had carried out an airstrike in Somalia that killed four members of the al-Shabab extremist group.

A statement from the U.S. Africa Command said the strike was carried out Thursday about 50 kilometers (31 miles) northwest of the port city of Kismayo. The statement said no civilians were killed.

The U.S. military carried out more than 30 drone strikes last year in the long-chaotic Horn of Africa nation after President Donald Trump approved expanded military efforts against al-Shabab.

The extremist group was blamed for the October truck bombing in Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, that killed 512 people. Thursday's U.S. airstrike was the first since one early this month that killed two al-Shabab extremists and destroyed a vehicle carrying explosives, "preventing it from being used against the people in Mogadishu."

Last year, Somalia's Somali-American president vowed that his government would drive the extremist group out of the country.

___

Follow the AP's Africa news on Twitter at www.twitter.com/AP_Africa

5 reactions

 

[danielboon]

Turkey/ Syria getting really hot the Turks hit a base with Russians on it not good

 

[danielboon]

Leith Aboufadel
@leithfadel
For the first time during the Syrian war, a foreign air force has bombed the Mennagh Military Airport in northern Russian presence at this airbase is strong.
https://mobile.twitter.com/leithfadel/status/954835302174150656

 

[Housecarl]

Leith Aboufadel
@leithfadel
For the first time during the Syrian war, a foreign air force has bombed the Mennagh Military Airport in northern Russian presence at this airbase is strong.
https://mobile.twitter.com/leithfadel/status/954835302174150656

https://crimesofempire.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/61979884_menagh_air_base_464map.jpg?w=960&h=931

Russian sourced article....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201801201060923848-syria-turkey-minning-airport-kurds-us-weapons/

Turkish Jets Hit Menagh Airbase Used by US to Supply Arms to Kurds - Reports

© AP Photo/ Lefteris Pitarakis
MIDDLE EAST
21:06 20.01.2018(updated 23:27 20.01.2018) Get short URL
Topic: Turkey Starts Operation 'Olive Branch' in Syria (17)
247015

More than 70 Turkish military aircraft have been engaged in Ankara's Olive Branch operation in northern Syria against the Kurdish troop, according to Turkey' General Staff.

The Turkish Air Force attacked the Menagh Military Airbase in northwestern Syria, which the US used for supplying weapons to Kurdish armed forces, the Hurriyet newspaper reported citing military sources.

The newspaper noted that the airfield was among the 113 targets scheduled for the attack during Operation Olive Branch in Syrian Africa.

Commenting on the Olive Branch operation, launched earlier in the day, Turkey' General Staff announced that more than 70 Turkish military aircraft have been engaged in the offensive.

READ MORE: Turkish Jets, Free Syrian Army Launch Offensive on Kurdish-Held Afrin

"The airstrikes were conducted against terrorist targets in seven districts of Afrin, where 108 targets were hit. Seventy two aircraft of the Turkish Air Force engaged in the operation have successfully returned to their bases," the statement said.

As the Rojahat Roj, the Press Secretary of the Kurdish Self-Defense Forces YPG in Afrin, told Sputnik, the Turkish military advance resulted in bombing of about 100 positions in the Afrin area, with no casualties among the YPG forces, but at least sevean civilians wounded. As he specified, the Turkish military and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) wanted to enter Afrin from the territory of the Bilbile district, but YPG forces managed to prevent the move. According to the spokesperson, clashes are ongoing.

READ MORE: SDF Announces Readiness to Defend Kurds From Turkish Offensive in Syrian Afrin

The press service of the authorities of the Afrin canton told Sputnik that at least 10 people were injured in airstrikes.

"According to the recent figures, 10 people were injured, including three people who suffered severe wounds. The list of injured people includes two children," the press service said, adding that local authorities had called on the residents of Afrin to donate blood for the victims of the Turkish airstrikes.

Despite the Ankara's assurances that they have notified Damascus about the operation progress, the latter has refuted these statements, vigorously condemning the move and calling it the infringement on the country's sovereignty.

READ MORE: Damascus Resolutely Condemns Turkish Military Operation in Afrin

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.yahoo.com/news/turkey-air-strikes-hit-syrias-afrin-province-push-154848233.html

Airstrikes pound Syria's Afrin as Turkey launches 'Operation Olive Branch'

By Mert Ozkan and Ellen Francis, Reuters • January 20, 2018

HASSA, Turkey/BEIRUT (Reuters) - Turkey opened a new front in Syria's nearly seven-year-old war on Saturday, launching airstrikes against a U.S.-backed Kurdish militia in Afrin province that raise the prospect of a further strain on relations between Ankara and Washington.

The operation, dubbed "Operation Olive Branch" by Ankara, pits Turkey against Kurdish fighters allied to the United States at a time when ties between Turkey and Washington - NATO allies and members of the coalition against Islamic State - appear dangerously close to a breaking point.

The strikes on the Syrian-Kurdish YPG militia hit some 108 targets, the Turkish military said. On land, the Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army rebels were also helping the operation in Afrin, a senior Turkish official said.

"The weakening of the region with artillery fire is under way. The first stage was carried out by aerial forces of the military and nearly all of the targets were destroyed," Prime Minister Binali Yildirim said.

From Sunday land forces would also carry out "necessary activities", depending on developments, he said.

The YPG said the strikes killed six civilians and three fighters. One of the fighters belonged to the YPG and two were from its all-female affiliate, YPG spokesman Birusk Hasaka said. The attacks also wounded 13 civilians, he said.

"We will defeat this aggression, like we have defeated other such assaults," the group said in a statement.

Differences over Syria policy have complicated Turkey's already difficult relationship with NATO ally the United States, which has backed the YPG, seeing it as an effective partner in the fight against Islamic State.

On Saturday, U.S. reaction to the strikes was cautious.

The Pentagon said the United States urged those involved to focus instead on the fight against Islamic State. A Pentagon official said: "We encourage all parties to avoid escalation and to focus on the most important task of defeating ISIS."

A U.S. State Department official said U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson had spoken to the Russian and Turkish foreign ministers, but gave no details on the calls.

WARPLANES, BUSES

Reuters cameramen in Hassa, near the Syria border, heard the sound of heavy bombardment and saw thick plumes of smoke rising from the Syrian side of the border. The warplanes appeared to be striking from the Turkish side, one of the cameramen said.

Tanks and buses filled with Turkish soldiers and pick-up trucks carrying members of the Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army made their way along a 15-km (nine mile) highway in Turkey towards the border, the cameraman said.

Villages in nearby towns came out to cheer them on, waving Turkish flags. "The best soldiers are our soldiers," some of the villagers shouted in support.

Warplanes pounded parts of Afrin city and villages nearby, while there were skirmishes with Turkish forces and their rebel allies at the edge of Afrin, a YPG official in the area said.

Authorities in the Afrin region say more than a million people live there, many displaced from other parts of Syria.

"Most of the wounded are civilians," said Hevi Mustafa, a top member of the civilian administration that governs Afrin. "There are clashes. There's artillery and shelling. Our units are fiercely responding to this occupation."

The attacks follow weeks of warnings against the YPG in Syria from President Tayyip Erdogan and his ministers. Turkey considers the YPG to be an extension of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has carried out a deadly, three-decade insurgency in Turkey's mainly Kurdish southeast.

Turkey has been particularly outraged by an announcement that the United States planned to train 30,000 personnel in parts of northeast Syria under the control of the YPG-spearheaded Syrian Democratic Forces.

"In a situation like this our expectations from everyone and especially from our allies is that they side with us, not with terrorists," Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said, appearing to refer to Washington.

The attacks could also complicate Turkey's push to improve its relationship with Russia. Moscow, the main backer of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, will demand in the United Nations that Turkey halt the operation, RIA news reported.

The Syrian government, which has threatened to shoot down Turkish planes, condemned the strikes. It called the attacks "brutal Turkish aggression on Afrin which is an intrinsic part of Syrian land", according to state media.

GROWING STRENGTH

The YPG's growing strength across large parts of northern Syria has alarmed Ankara, which fears the creation of an independent Kurdish state on its southern border. Syrian Kurdish leaders say they seek autonomy as part of Syria, not secession.

Turkish officials have said the operation is likely to continue toward Manbij, further east. They also said that thousands of pro-Turkey civilians had escaped the YPG-controlled areas in an attempt to reach Aleppo.

But the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a U.K-based monitoring organization, said it was not true that people were fleeing en masse.

The Pentagon spokesman said the United States recognised Turkey's security concerns about the PKK, noting it was designed by Washington as a foreign terrorist organization.

"We will destroy the terror corridor gradually as we did in Jarabulus and Al-Bab operations, starting from the west," Turkey's Erdogan said, referring to previous operations in Syria to push out Islamic State and check the YPG's advance.

Earlier on Saturday, the military said it hit shelters and hideouts used by the YPG and other Kurdish fighters, saying Kurdish militants had fired on Turkish positions inside Turkey.

But the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces - which the YPG spearheads - accused Turkey of using cross-border shelling as a false pretext to launch its offensive in Syria.

(Additional reporting by Osman Orsal in Hassa; Orhan Coskun, Tulay Karadeniz, Gulsen Solaker and Tuvan Gumrukcu in Ankara; Omer Berberoglu, Ezgi Erkoyun in Istanbul; David Brunnstrom and Arshad Mohammed in Washington; Writing by David Dolan, Editing by William Maclean)

58 reactions

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https://www.yahoo.com/news/turkey-faces-balancing-act-amid-border-offensive-syria-191855273.html

Turkey faces balancing act amid border offensive in Syria

SARAH EL DEEB, Associated Press • January 19, 2018

BEIRUT (AP) — As Turkey threatens a bloody confrontation with a U.S.-backed Kurdish militia in the main Syrian Kurdish enclave in northwestern Syria, it faces the challenge of maintaining its old alliance with Washington and reinforcing a new rapprochement with Moscow.

The move comes as Syria once again finds itself on the precipice of a new conflict, after months of reduced violence and a surge in post-war stabilization plans. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of Syrians in the northwest are fleeing the renewed violence amid a new government offensive in neighboring Idlib, converging on the Turkish border and igniting fears of a new wave of migration.

Turkey's defense minister, Nurettin Canikli, said Friday there was no turning back from launching a ground assault on Syria's Afrin enclave, saying the offensive had "de facto" started with sporadic Turkish military shelling of the area. Over the last week, Turkey has sent troops and tanks to the border and rallied Syrian fighters it has backed for the fight against Afrin's battle-hardened Kurdish fighters, estimated at between 8,000 and 10,000.

The operation could spill into a wider Turkish-Kurdish confrontation inside Turkey. It also threatens to turn into a humanitarian disaster. The Afrin district houses no less than 800,000 civilians, including displaced people from earlier years of the Syrian war.

Turkey has been preparing for a showdown in Afrin for a while. But the recent escalation coincides with U.S. announcements that it is creating a new 30,000-strong Kurdish-led border force to secure the frontiers of Kurdish-controlled areas, including with Turkey and Iraq, to prevent the resurgence of Islamic State militants.

Moscow's green light is necessary for a Turkish operation into Afrin, where Russian military observers have deployed since last year to prevent such a confrontation.

Activists and Kurdish fighters have denied claims in Turkish media that Russian troops have begun a withdrawal.

Russia, Iran and Turkey are interested in limiting the U.S. presence in Syria, and have protested Washington's plans to create the border force, viewed as a U.S. attempt to create a buffer zone where Iranian and Syrian government influence ends.

Ankara's military operations in Syria began in 2016 in large part to curtail the formation of a contiguous territory under Kurdish control along its borders. It successfully severed that territorial continuity when it deployed its troops and proxy Syrian fighters to areas between Kurdish enclaves in eastern and western Syria.

Afrin remained the only Kurdish enclave in northwestern Syria, encircled by Turkey-backed rebels, and Turkey has been preparing an assault for over a year. Turkey claims that Afrin is an operating base for fighters of its own outlawed Kurdish insurgent group, the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, to infiltrate Turkish territories.

In dealing with the conflicts in Afrin and Idlib, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has shown political acumen, juggling national security interests and domestic election concerns, while exerting pressure on Washington and Moscow for his long-term strategic objectives. The threats of an offensive against Kurdish fighters help consolidate nationalist support for Erdogan, who faces a crucial election next year.

With an assault on Afrin, Turkey seeks to further undermine the Kurdish dream of federalized rule in northern Syria. Driving the Kurdish militia out of Afrin would also allow Turkey-backed Syrian fighters supporting its offensive to link Idlib to Syria's largest city, Aleppo.

Turkey deployed troops in November in Idlib to monitor a de-escalation agreement with Russia and Iran, but they were more strategically stationed along the border with Afrin.

The timing reflects Turkey's increased frustration with U.S. support for Kurdish forces in Syria, who are now in control of nearly 25 percent of the country, in areas that straddle the Turkish and Iraqi border.

"Turkey remains a loyal and trusted friend and ally of the U.S. and the West. But that does not mean we will accept being treated as sacrificial animals just because a couple of American generals want to embark on an adventure in the Middle East," Ilnur Cevik, an Erdogan presidential adviser, wrote in the Turkish daily Sabah.

Despite assurances to Turkey from State Secretary Rex Tillerson, who says the Kurdish-led border force has been misrepresented, there doesn't seem to be a major shift in U.S. policy in Syria.

"If anything, he exacerbated it. Erdogan will perceive Tillerson's announcement of longer term U.S. presence in Syria as doubling down on our partnership with (the Kurdish militia), which does not de-escalate the Turks," said Elizabeth Teoman, a Turkey researcher with the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War.

The Trump administration has been urging Turkey not to attack Afrin, asking Turkish officials to avoid unilateral actions, said two U.S. officials, who weren't authorized to discuss diplomatic conversations and demanded anonymity.

The U.S military doesn't have any presence in Afrin, one of the officials said, but a Turkish operation there could have an impact on U.S. operations further east in Syria. The U.S. worries that such an operation could prove to be a distraction from defeating the last vestiges of the Islamic State group, the officials said, adding that the new Kurdish-led border force is nothing new and should not come as a surprise to the Turkish government.

Meanwhile, Turkey has maneuvered to curtail a wide Russian-backed Syrian government military operation in Idlib — the largest remaining insurgent-held area in Syria. The offensive has already caused tens of thousands to flee and has threatened to undermine Erdogan's clout in the region.

Turkey's threatened ground assault in Afrin comes as the Idlib operation has intensified, with the Syrian government positioning rival troops near Turkey's forces there, threatening Turkey-backed Syrian insurgents in the province and creating conditions for a humanitarian disaster.

As the offensive has unfolded, Russian bases in Syria have come under unprecedented drone attacks, sparking tension between Moscow and Turkey amid accusations that such drones would have required assistance from a country possessing satellite navigation technology.

A Syrian Kurdish official, Ilham Ahmed, said the Russians were "bargaining" with Turkey over Afrin in exchange for allowing the government to take Idlib. Russia would prefer handing over Idlib to the Syrian government, instead of Turkey-backed opposition fighters. What to do with al-Qaida-linked group remains a dilemma for all parties, and is a sticking point between the U.S. and Turkey.

Last week, the government offensive in Idlib slowed down amid a counteroffensive from the rebel forces and bad weather. But the airstrikes continued and the number of the province's displaced resident has reached about 215,000 since mid-December.

_______

Associated Press writers Suzan Frazer in Ankara, Turkey, and Josh Lederman in Washington contributed to this report.

12 reactions

 

[Housecarl]

Kabul: Gunmen attack Intercontinental Hotel
Started by NC Susan‎, Yesterday 11:30 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?530529-Kabul-Gunmen-attack-Intercontinental-Hotel

The Four Horsemen - 01/15 to 01/22
Started by Ragnarok‎, 01-15-2018 03:37 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?530292-The-Four-Horsemen-01-15-to-01-22

Sweden Is Preparing For A "Civil War": PM Wants To Deploy Army In No-Go Zones ..
Started by Macgyver‎, 01-19-2018 09:10 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...r-quot-PM-Wants-To-Deploy-Army-In-No-Go-Zones

US destroyer sails near contested reef in South China Sea angering Beijing
Started by Dennis Olson‎, Yesterday 08:29 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...sted-reef-in-South-China-Sea-angering-Beijing

-----

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/turkeys-bluster-afrin-meets-eye/

Turkey’s Bluster on Afrin: More Than Meets the Eye

Aaron Stein
January 19, 2018

The Turkish government has threatened to invade Afrin, a Kurdish-dominated enclave in northwestern Syria. What explains this impending escalation in Syria’s internationalized civil war?

The Turkish threat follows a U.S. announcement that troops in Syria would create a “Border Security Force,” culled from the ranks of its main partner on the ground, the YPG and the group’s allied Arab militias. The announcement prompted a fierce reaction in Turkey, and ultimately culminated in Ankara’s threat to use military force. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan coupled that threat with another against American forces working with the YPG. In a speech at the opening of a power plant in Ankara, Erdogan said:

take down the flags on the terrorists yourselves so that we do not have to hand over those flags to you. Remove your badges from your uniforms of the terrorists so that we are not forced to bury those who act with the terrorists.

The U.S. military walked back its Border Security Force announcement days later, no doubt to try and ease tensions with Ankara. However, it would be a mistake to assume that Ankara’s plans to invade Afrin are solely linked to the name given to repurposed U.S. supported ground forces. Instead, the Turkish threat is the culmination of years of tensions with Washington over Syria policy in general, and divergences over how best to fight the Islamic State, or ISIL. The real issue is that the Trump administration has rolled out a Syria policy that gives the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the YPG dominated umbrella grouping of militias, an open-ended, de facto U.S. security guarantee. This is a problem for Turkey because the YPG is the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), an insurgent group active in Turkey since the early 1980s.

In his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs David Satterfield stated that the Trump administration does not intend to “leave Syria, or to declare victory and go” and that the reasons for staying are “stabilization assistance in the north and northeast, protection of our allies, the Syrian Democratic Forces, who have fought so valiantly against ISIL in the northeast, and to try and work to transform the political structures in that area to a model for the rest of Syria, and capable of being represented in a new Syrian state” and to “counter Iran.” Secretary of State Rex Tillerson echoed these words in his Syria policy speech at the Hoover Institution.

The Turkish government used the Border Security Force announcement as a pretext to justify long-standing military plans, aimed at thwarting what Ankara sees as a serious threat on its border. However, Ankara does not have total freedom of action in Syria. Turkey is constrained by the United States and Russia, two more powerful external actors present in Syria, both of whom have forces deployed in Kurdish dominated areas.

To put all this into context, let’s review the lay of the land.

The Syrian Kurds control northeastern Syria and work with select Arab partners (not without some challenges) to govern cities and towns to the west and east of the Euphrates river. Afrin is located in northwestern Syria and is surrounded on all sides by the Turkish military. The U.S. military has no presence in Afrin. Russia has deployed military police in the enclave and controls the airspace overhead, which makes them the dominant external actor in this part of Syria.

What does all this mean? As the war against ISIL subsides, Washington is focused on securing territory in Syria and preventing a return of the Islamic State. The United States has clearly signaled that it intends to rely on the SDF to patrol and police territory taken from ISIL. The United States intends to continue training the SDF as the force that will patrol the Turkish border, a fact the made clear in a U.S. military statement. In any case, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlu Cavusoglu dismissed the U.S. statement, signaled that military action was still imminent, and indicated that Turkey expects the United States to re-evaluate its support for the SDF.

Turkey’s escalating rhetoric has prompted pushback from the Syrian regime. Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Meqdad, warned that “[t]he Syrian air defenses have restored their full force and they are ready to destroy Turkish aviation targets in Syrian Arab Republic skies.” The regime’s propaganda outlet, Al Masdar News, also wrote that YPG forces have traversed regime territory to reinforce positions in Afrin in preparation for the expected intervention. The regime, however, has demonstrated an inability to defend its borders and often makes threats it cannot carry out. However, the threat could help to give cover to Russia, whose permission Ankara needs to launch a cross-border intervention in a territory where Russian soldiers are present.

The Syrian regime’s threat could give Moscow room to push back against Turkey by claiming that it cannot control the whims of it client — and that the regime is within in rights to take steps to defend itself. Turkey must solve these complicated dynamics before it invades, or risk unintended escalation and a much larger conflict than it is now planning for.

The Turkish government is diligently working to secure Russian permission to conduct air operations in support of the planned cross-border offensive. Turkey’s chief of the General Staff, Hulusi Akar, and the director of its national intelligence agency, Hakan Fidan, travelled to Moscow yesterday, presumably to brief their Russian counterparts on Ankara’s battle plans. Turkey’s hesitance to bash Russia for its position on the Syrian Kurds compared to its public bashing of the United States, is typical. Gonul Tol, writing last month for War on the Rocks, noted that Erdogan is promiscuous in his verbal attacks on the United States for working with Syrian Kurdish forces, but when it comes to Russian meddling with the Kurds, “Ankara is mute.” More broadly, the power dynamics underscore how Turkey is cementing itself as Moscow’s junior partner in Syria and how its interests in the conflict have narrowed, to focus primarily on the Kurdish threat.

A Quadripartite, Anti-Kurdish Partnership or More of the Same?

The broader question is whether powers hostile to the United States — namely Iran, Russia, and the Assad regime — will try to capitalize on Ankara’s poisonous rhetoric and co-opt Turkey to join an alliance of convenience aimed at pushing the United States to withdraw from Syria. In response to the initial Border Security Force announcement, Russia, Turkey, and the Syrian regime issued similar condemnations. It is easy to see why: A prolonged U.S. presence, committed to protecting borders suggests an intent to formalize the current front lines, a process that further could limit Assad’s ambitions to once again rule the entire country.

On the surface, Turkey does share some interests with Russia, Assad, and Iran vis-à-vis the U.S.-SDF partnership, but there is enough to divide them that could limit the formation of an anti-American alliance of convenience.

Turkey and Iran, for example, have an interest in weakening the PKK. The group’s Iranian branch, PJAK, is a minor threat to the Islamic Republic and the two countries have previously worked together on border security. In Syria, the twin threats posed by an empowered SDF and the potential for the Syrian state to break up could theoretically catalyze deeper Iranian-Turkish cooperation to undermine SDF territorial control. The Turkish government, however, often accuses Iran of enabling the PKK when it has an interest in punishing Turkey, so there are natural limits to a broader Turkish-Iranian consensus, built around a joint effort to oust the United States from Syria.

Russia also has an interest in an American withdrawal from Syria to shore up its ally in Damascus while undermining the United States in the Middle East. Further, Moscow would like to weaken NATO by driving a deeper wedge between the United States and Turkey. However, Moscow has also maintained relations with the YPG and may seek to broker a regime —Kurdish rapprochement as part of a broader effort to stabilize the country in the near future. Turkey may be silent about this cooperation, but it is still a reality. Washington has a similar interest in managing regime-SDF tensions and preventing the expansion of the war to new areas, but, of course, Washington differs with Russia on the Assad question.

Russian ties to the YPG may explain Moscow’s hesitation to fully support a Turkish invasion. Moscow’s geopolitical benefits in an open-ended conflict involving a NATO member are easy to understand: Turkey risks getting bogged down in an insurgent conflict it cannot win against a U.S.-backed group, while also assuming responsibility for administering and financing territory in a war-torn state for the foreseeable future. Tempting as this may be, a Turkish presence also risks widening a war Russia is trying to wind down and will certainly complicate future efforts to convince a hostile Assad regime to make concessions to different parties to the conflict. Moscow is a party to the civil war and, presumably wants to wind down its own military operation at some point in the future.

There are also more immediate reasons to doubt the formation of a quadripartite anti-American group in Syria. The Syrian regime’s relationship with Ankara is awful and Damascus has a more immediate interest: defeating the Turkish backed insurgency. Iran shares this goal and both have made clear that they intend expand the war to break the sieges of Fua and Kafrya, two Shiite majority villages. This would further strain previous Russian, Turkish, and Iranian efforts to reach a de-escalation agreement in the area, although the Idlib de-escalation arrangement was rife with contradictions and is likely to collapse all on its own. The Turkish government supported the effort, so it should be expected to react negatively to an Iranian-backed offensive that runs counter to the agreement.The regime should then be expected to want to take back control over its borders with Turkey to prevent the overt supply of weapons to proxy groups committed to toppling Assad. The trajectory of the war signals that it is headed for Turkey’s border with Idlib, whether Ankara invades Afrin or not.

Russia is being pulled in both directions. It operates as part of a coalition that is fighting groups committed to toppling the regime. Moscow is unlikely to be able to convince its partners to make positions that could result in Assad’s death. Washington too, gets a vote and should be expected to resist any effort to marginalize its role in diplomatic talks and to double-down on its presence in Syria to protect its partner on the grounds and, theoretically, to increase U.S. leverage over the other external actors.

The Bigger Picture: A Geopolitical Mess and Turkey’s Place in It

An open-ended military presence in SDF-controlled Syria is a recipe for U.S.-Turkish tensions. Moscow benefits from U.S.-Turkish tensions and has deftly managed to use the broader policy disagreement about Syria to its advantage. However, Russia is also having to balance relations with Turkey and the YPG. If one zooms out, Russia remains in alliance with Damascus, while Turkey continues to pump money and guns to an opposition that is hostile to the Assad regime. Turkey has narrowed the focus of its Syria policy in recent months and is now primarily focused on challenging the YPG. This policy change has de-emphasized Ankara’s previous policy of regime change.

However, there are limits to Turkish actions that prevent Ankara from completely giving up on the anti-Assad opposition. Turkey controls a swathe of territory in Northern Aleppo and is propping up parallel, opposition-run institutions. Turkey’s state building efforts are dependent on the regime’s enemies — and the regime is allied with Iran and Russia. The YPG, too, has deftly managed relations with the various external actors in Syria and now has an American security guarantee east of the Euphrates.

And this is the bigger issue for the U.S.-Turkish relations. Washington has two main military goals, now that ISIL has been territorially defeated: First, hunt down and kill ISIL leaders and hold the territory taken, and second, use the SDF as a bulwark against Iranian expansionism. This approach requires working through local partners — namely the SDF. As long as this is the U.S. policy, tensions with Turkey will remain. In parallel, Ankara’s anti-American rhetoric and authoritarian turn have only deepened American hostility towards its NATO ally. The same is true in Turkey, which views the U.S. support for SDF as a direct security threat.

The “Border Security Force” kerfuffle is a manifestation of U.S. – Turkish disagreement. The two sides will not be able to repair relations in the near term. A Turkish invasion of Afrin may only harden U.S. resolve to stay in Syria. If a quadripartite anti-American collation does take shape, the instinct, again, will be to protect military gains. A U.S. presence will irritate Turkey, exacerbating the current drivers of tension.

Aaron Stein is resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...h-militia-says-attacks-repulsed-idUSKBN1F90RQ

#World News January 20, 2018 / 7:49 AM / Updated 9 minutes ago

Turkish forces push into Syria, Kurdish militia says attacks repulsed

Dominic Evans
4 Min Read

AZAZ, Syria (Reuters) - Turkish ground forces pushed into northern Syria’s Afrin province on Sunday, the army said, after Turkey launched artillery and air strikes on a U.S.-backed Kurdish militia it aims to sweep from its border.

Video

The Syrian-Kurdish YPG militia, supported by the United States but seen as a terrorist organization by Turkey, said it had repulsed the Turkish forces and their allies after fierce clashes.

It marked the second day of fighting after Ankara opened a new front in the nearly seven-year-old Syrian war. Under what the Turkish government has called “Operation Olive Branch”, Turkish air strikes on Saturday pounded YPG positions in Afrin.

Turkey is targeting the U.S.-backed fighters at a time when ties with ally Washington appear close to breaking point.

Turkey sees the YPG as an extension of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) which has carried out a deadly, three-decade insurgency in Turkey’s mainly Kurdish southeast. The United States is backing the YPG in Syria, seeing it as an effective partner in the fight against Islamic State.

“The Olive Branch Operation is going on as planned, and the ground operation has started,” the Turkish army, NATO’s second-largest, said. Prime Minister Binali Yildirim said the operation would create a 30-km (19-mile) “safe zone”, according to broadcaster HaberTurk.

SHELLING, CLASHES

Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army rebel factions had captured a Kurdish village with no resistance and were clearing landmines, a Turkish official said.

The YPG said it had repulsed the Turkish forces.

“All the Turkish military’s ground attacks against Afrin have been repelled so far and they have been forced to retreat,” Nouri Mahmoudi, a YPG official, said. Since the morning, the combatants have exchanged shelling and clashed along several frontlines around Afrin, he said.

The Turkish military said it had hit 153 targets so far, including shelters and hideouts used by Kurdish militants. The YPG has said Turkey’s strikes killed six civilians and three of its fighters and wounded 13 civilians.

The YPG has also accused Turkey of striking civilian districts and a camp for the displaced in Afrin.

Intense Turkish artillery fire and strikes continued to hit some villages, the YPG said. Fierce battles raged to the north and west of Afrin against Turkish forces and their Syrian rebel allies, said Birusk Hasaka, the YPG spokesman in Afrin.

ARTILLERY BOOM

A Reuters reporter on the outskirts of the northern Syrian town of Azaz, under the control of rebels from the Free Syrian Army factions, heard several blasts and saw smoke rising from a hill to the west, where a fighter said the YPG were.

There were no signs of conflict in the town itself, where life appeared to continue as normal with traffic on the muddy, potholed roads and uniformed rebel police at the main roundabouts. Still, Azaz was bleak and the toll from the war was plainly seen in some of its crumbling buildings.

At one of the car repair workshops on the outskirts of the town some men were fixing a gun-loaded vehicle.

“In its second day, #OliveBranchOperation continues to ensure peace and security for our people, protect Syria’s territorial integrity and eliminate all terrorist elements in the region,” Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan’s spokesman Ibrahim Kalin said on Twitter.

“Turkey expects its allies to support its fight against terrorism in all of its forms,” he added, in comments that appeared aimed at Washington.

On Saturday, a Pentagon official said: “We encourage all parties to avoid escalation and to focus on the most important task of defeating ISIS (Islamic State).”

Turkey’s state-run Anadolu news agency reported that four rockets fired from Syria hit the border town of Kilis overnight, damaging houses. Turkish security forces retaliated, it said.

Additional reporting by Ezgi Erkoyun in Istanbul; Orhan Coskun in Ankara and Ellen Francis in Beirut; Writing by David Dolan; Editing by Janet Lawrence

 

[danielboon]

Turkey to hand over Afrin to Syrian army once Kurds defeated

http://m.gulfnews.com/news/mena/tur...kurds-defeated-1.2160467#.WmSXsOlFlFA.twitter

 

[Housecarl]

http://m.gulfnews.com/news/mena/tur...kurds-defeated-1.2160467#.WmSXsOlFlFA.twitter

Yeah right...

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/worl...-three-us-citizens/ar-AAuYLmJ?ocid=spartanntp

Mexican Marines Executed Three U.S. Citizens

Newsweek
Carlos Ballesteros
1 hr ago

Three U.S. siblings found dead in Mexico in 2014 were executed by Mexican marines and a border mayor's paramilitary security team, the country's National Human Rights Commission said Thursday.

Erica Alvarado Salinas, 26, Alex Alvarado, 22, and Jose Angel Alvarado, 21, all American citizens, disappeared in 2014 while visiting their father in El Control, a small town near Matamoros, a Mexican city in the dangerous state of Tamaulipas, across the border from Brownsville, Texas.

Their bodies were found sixteen days later in a field east of Matamoros. They each had been shot in the head, and the bodies were badly decomposed. Jose Guadalupe Castaneda Benitez, 32, a friend from Mexico traveling with the siblings, was also killed.

According to the commission's report, witnesses said the four victims were forced into a vehicle belonging to the security detail of then-Matamoros Mayor Leticia Salazar Vázquez. Human rights investigators were also able to interview several men who reported being arrested the same day the American siblings disappeared. Many of them said they saw the group taken to an empty lot to be beaten and interrogated by the marines.

The commission determined that detention was illegal, as there was no order that would have explained their arrest. So far, state and federal authorities have denied involvement in the death of the victims. In a press release, the commission added that officials, marines, and state and federal police lied in statements to cover up the killings.

Of the arrests made by public servants of the Navy and Hercules Group on Oct. 13, 2014, no record exists, nor were they presented to any authority. There is not even an investigation involving (the victims), much less arrest orders or a complaint against them.

The commission delivered its findings to the Naval Secretariat, the governor of Tamaulipas, the mayor of Matamoros and Mexico’s National Security Commission. The murder case is still open. The government of Tamaulipas said they implemented human rights training for police in Mexico based on the report. They say the case is in the hands of federal prosecutors.

Tamaulipas has faced severe security concerns since the outset of Mexico's war against drug cartels in 2012. Recently, the U.S. State Department issued a “do not travel” advisory this month for Tamaulipas and four other Mexican states, "putting the regions on the same level as war-zones such as Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan," as reported by The Guardian.

As highlighted by the San Antonio Express-News, a United Nations envoy reported in 2016 that “extrajudicial killings and excessive use of force by security officers persist” in Mexico.

“Protective measures remain insufficient and ineffective; impunity and the lack of accountability for violations of the right to life remain a serious challenge, as does the absence of reparations for the victims,” the U.N. report said.

 

[Shacknasty Shagrat]

There is a nice flurry of 8 EAM going out. including one SKYKING.
SS

http://eam.watch/log

 

[Housecarl]

I posted the Strategist articles on last week's WoW thread...HC

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.realcleardefense.com/ar...and_force_structure_for_australia_112932.html

Going Nuclear? The Optimal Posture and Force Structure for Australia

By Adam Cabot
January 22, 2018

In a recent piece published by The Strategist titled "Going Nuclear?," Malcolm Davis discussed the hard choice of Australia potentially requiring nuclear weapons to combat coercion if the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence concept disappeared. This would indeed be a hard pill to swallow from both sides of politics, but in the face of a revisionist power determined to expand influence and hegemony in the region, as discussed by Hugh White in the latest Quarterly Essay “Without America,” " ... nuclear weapons may one day be the only option to adequately deter and defend Australia’s sovereignty."

I will not attempt to discuss the long and difficult road ahead if Australia chose to develop nuclear weapons, but it is worth analyzing the optimal nuclear posture and force structure that would best suit Australia’s geography and geopolitical position.

Each of the nine current nuclear powers is relatively unique in how they deploy their nuclear arsenals in conjunction with the posture they adopt. The U.S., for example, possesses silo-based ICBMs, air dropped gravity bombs (both strategic and non-strategic) air-launched cruise missiles and SLBMs for a survivable second-strike capability. Russia possesses much the same but has a substantially more diverse non-strategic nuclear capability, encompassing various platforms and mobile ICBM launchers in its strategic arsenal.

The states with smaller nuclear arsenals including, France, China, India, Pakistan and Israel each adopt one of three postures according to Vipin Narang. These being, a “catalytic posture” whereby a state that is being threatened attempts to use its nuclear arsenal to compel, or catalyze, third-party intervention on the state’s behalf. An “assured retaliation posture” whereby a state can threaten nuclear retaliation if it suffers a nuclear attack. Lastly, an “asymmetric escalation posture” that enables the first use of nuclear weapons in the event of a conventional attack.

Each posture requires a different force structure that is optimal for the state’s perceived needs but what would work for Australia? It is my opinion that if Australia were ever to consider going down the nuclear path, it would be best suited to an “assured retaliation posture.” This would provide the capability of deterring a nuclear attack and nuclear coercion. Australia’s conventional force would continue to be modified and strengthened, but an “assured retaliation posture” would enable the country to free itself from the potential fear of not being able to counter nuclear blackmail. With an adequately deployed nuclear force suited to the concept of assured retaliation, the strategic nuclear option would be off the table for any future adversary determined to use threats to obtain resources, economic gain, territory or any form of strategic dominance.

This begs the question, what nuclear force structure would best work for Australia that acts to provide an “assured retaliation posture?” This posture requires a nuclear force that is survivable. If an adversary can locate the state’s nuclear weapons, they might be tempted to launch a surprise first-strike attack, eliminating Australia’s ability to respond with a retaliatory strike.

Before we look at survivability, the factor we must address is that of range. Based on Australia’s land mass and geographic position, the only viable option would be missiles in the intercontinental range. Anything with a shorter reach than an ICBM would severely limit the ability to retaliate with a second-strike. If Australia’s missiles cannot reach an adversary determined to threaten a nuclear strike, they are fundamentally useless.

The need for both range and survivability work hand in hand in choosing the country’s best option and eliminating options that would not work. Silo-based ICBMs like that of the U.S. Minuteman IIIs would provide Australia with the range required but would be vulnerable to a disarming counterforce strike as their location is static and can be readily detected. Bombers would require bases or mid-air refueling, are vulnerable to a strike on the ground and would need to penetrate air defenses. Ballistic missile submarines would provide Australia with the range as well as survivability, but the costs would be astronomical, not to mention the immense infrastructure requirements and engineering capability.

This leaves the road or rail-mobile ICBMs as the best option for Australia. Much like the Russian, SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol-M) and Mod 2 (RS-24 Yars), these missiles would have the range to retaliate against targets across the globe and would be more survivable than fixed based nuclear forces. The mobile ICBMs would have the capability of transiting through the remote geography of Australia, reducing their vulnerability and providing the option of launching from any location in the event of a nuclear attack.

As Malcolm Davis rightly points out, “Australia would not consider such a step lightly,” but history has shown that changes in geopolitics can sneak up on nations before they are aware of the dangers they face, Let’s not fall victim to this. Let’s be ready and discuss options now before it is too late.

Adam Cabot has a Masters in International Relations and is currently researching Russian nuclear strategy.

 

[Housecarl]

3rd article in the series....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/bomb-australia-part-3/

The bomb for Australia? (Part 3)

22 Jan 2018|Ramesh Thakur

After the Cold War ended, the existence of nuclear weapons on both sides wasn’t enough to stop the US from expanding NATO’s borders ever eastwards towards Russia’s borders, contrary to the terms on which Moscow thought Germany’s reunification and the admission of a united Germany into NATO had been agreed. Several Western leaders at the highest levels had assured Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO wouldn’t expand even ‘one inch eastward’. In 1999, Russia watched helplessly from the sidelines as its ally, Serbia, was dismembered by NATO warplanes that served as midwives to the birth of an independent Kosovo.

But Moscow didn’t forget the lesson. In 2014, the nuclear equation didn’t stop Russia from reacting militarily to the US-backed Maidan coup in Ukraine—which displaced the pro-Moscow elected president with a westward-looking regime—by invading eastern Ukraine and annexing Crimea. In other words, the more or less constant US–Russia nuclear equation is irrelevant to explaining the shifting geopolitical developments. We have to look elsewhere to understand the rebalancing of US–Russia relations over the past decade and a half.

Closer to home, nuclear weapons didn’t stop Pakistan from occupying the forbidding Kargil Heights on the Indian side of the Line of Control in 1999, or India from waging a limited war to retake it—an effort that cost over 1,000 lives. If Mumbai or Delhi were hit by another major terrorist attack that New Delhi concluded had Pakistan connections, the pressure for some form of retaliation across the border might well prove stronger than the caution about Pakistan having nuclear weapons.

Nor do nuclear weapons buy immunity for North Korea. The biggest elements of caution in attacking it are its formidable conventional capability to hit the heavily populated parts of South Korea, including Seoul, and anxiety about how China would respond. Pyongyang’s present and prospective arsenal of nuclear weapons and its capacity to deploy and use them credibly is a distant third factor in the deterrence calculus.

If we move from historical and contemporary cases to military logic, strategists face a fundamental and unresolvable paradox in ascribing a deterrent role to the bomb. To deter a conventional attack by a more powerful nuclear adversary, each nuclear-armed state must convince its stronger opponent of its ability and will to use nuclear weapons if attacked—for example, by developing tactical nuclear weapons and deploying them on the forward edge of the battlefield. But if the attack does occur, escalating to nuclear weapons will worsen the scale of military devastation even for the side initiating nuclear strikes. Because the stronger party understands that, the existence of nuclear weapons will induce extra caution. But it won’t guarantee immunity for the weaker party.

For example, ASPI’s Andrew Davies believes that, while there is little realistic likelihood of an outright invasion by China, sea-based or air-launched long-range strikes against Australian targets are imaginable. Suppose that were to occur, and suppose further that we had acquired the sort of high-yield nuclear bombs and long-range delivery systems that Hugh White mentions. Would we really threaten China with nuclear retaliation? What if it didn’t find our threat credible and persisted with its strikes. Would we carry out nuclear first strikes against Chinese targets? If we don’t, China will have called our bluff on a non-credible threat. If we do, perhaps to maintain ‘credibility’, we will have entrapped ourselves in a posture of mutual nuclear suicide in the name of national defence. These scenarios, too, need to be thought through to their logical conclusions instead of being left in the realm of elegant abstraction.

And at what financial cost in an ever more competitive fiscal environment? A common but mistaken belief is that nuclear weapons enable defence on the cheap. To the contrary, not only is there no diminution in the need for and costs of full conventional capabilities, but there are additional costs related to the safety and security requirements that cover the full spectrum of nuclear weapons, material, infrastructure, facilities and personnel. And, as Britain and France have discovered, investment in the essentially unusable nuclear deterrent can take funds away from conventional upgrades and expansion that are actually usable.

We’ve made something of a fetish of our belief in the benefits and virtue of a rules-based order. The 2017 foreign policy white paper notes that the leash function of strong rules is ‘becoming more important to Australia as the distribution of power changes in the international system’. After its breakout in 1998, we strongly condemned India for violating the NPT-centred global nuclear order. We have backed international action to contain Iran’s suspected nuclear ambitions in the past, and we continue to demand that North Korea comply with the non-proliferation obligations under the NPT.

Australia, too, is firmly bound by NPT obligations, and for us they’re reinforced by obligations under the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty. It would take us a long time to recover from the stench of hypocrisy if we were to discard treaty obligations as a mere inconvenience when we’ve consistently rejected security arguments by others as justifications for getting the bomb.

Author
Ramesh Thakur is a professor at the Australian National University and co-convenor of the Asia–Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Image courtesy of Pixabay user Ildigo.

 

[Housecarl]

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https://www.yahoo.com/news/uk-not-keeping-russia-threat-head-army-warn-004105706.html

Russia posing most complex challenge since Cold War: UK army chief

AFP • January 22, 2018

London (AFP) - The head of the British army warned Monday that Russia poses the "most complex and capable" security challenge since the end of the Cold War, warning against complacency in a high-profile intervention.

In a rare public speech, Chief of the General Staff Nick Carter said "we cannot afford to sit back" in the face of Russian military strength.

Russia represents "the most complex and capable security challenge we have faced since the Cold War," Carter told an audience at the RUSI military think tank in London.

Carter spent ample time detailing Moscow's military capabilities, which he demonstrated with a Russian-language video he described as "information warfare at its best".

Carter likened the current situation to the run-up to World War I: "We, I think, should be careful of complacency, the parallels with 1914 are stark."

"Our generation has become used to wars of choice since the end of the Cold War. But we may not have a choice about conflict with Russia."

He warned that Russia boasted capabilities that Britain may struggle to match, and could initiate hostilities faster than expected, saying it has already demonstrated its use of superior long-range missiles in Syria.

- Budget questions -

Defence spending is under intense pressure following years of austerity, and a review launched last year has prompted media reports that further cuts are on the way.

"I believe our ability to pre-empt or respond to these threats will be eroded if we don't match up to them now," he said.

Carter would not be drawn on his specific demands, admitting there will be "other priorities" in the broad national security review but describing the current spending as "reassuring".

"We get on and make the most of what we have," he said. "I'm also there to argue for more".

Prime Minister Theresa May's spokesman said Britain was committed to spending two percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defence, in line with the target set by members of the NATO alliance.

"The chief of general staff is saying that we face a range of threats, that we need to make sure we have capabilities required to address them. That's exactly what we're doing as part of the National Security Capability Review" launched last July, he said.

"And we're doing that from a position of strength, where we have a £36 billion ($50 billion, 40.9 billion euros) defence budget, which will rise to almost £40 billion by 2020-21."

Defence minister Gavin Williamson, who took over the role in November, has said the capability review would conclude "shortly".

25 reactions

 

[Housecarl]

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https://www.yahoo.com/news/chinas-top-paper-says-u-forcing-china-accelerate-010847895.html

China's top paper says U.S. forcing China to accelerate South China Sea deployments

Reuters • January 21, 2018

BEIJING (Reuters) - China's top newspaper, decrying Washington as a trouble-maker, said on Monday U.S. moves in the South China Sea like last week's freedom of navigation operation will only cause China to strengthen its deployments in the disputed waterway.

China's foreign ministry said the USS Hopper, a destroyer, came within 12 nautical miles of Huangyan island, which is better known as the Scarborough Shoal and is subject to a rival claim by the Philippines, a historic ally of the United States.

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It was the latest U.S. naval operation challenging extensive Chinese claims in the South China Sea and came even as President Donald Trump's administration seeks Chinese cooperation in dealing with North Korea's missile and nuclear programs.

The ruling Communist Party's official People's Daily said in a commentary that, with the situation generally improving in the South China Sea, it was clear that the United States was the one militarizing the region.

"Against this backdrop of peace and cooperation, a U.S. ship wantonly provoking trouble is singleminded to the point of recklessness," the paper said.

"If the relevant party once more makes trouble out of nothing and causes tensions, then it will only cause China to reach this conclusion: in order to earnestly protect peace in the South China Sea, China must strengthen and speed up the building of its abilities there," it said.

The commentary was published under the pen name "Zhong Sheng", meaning "Voice of China", which is often used to give the paper's view on foreign policy issues.

The widely read Global Times tabloid, published by the People's Daily, said in an editorial on Monday China's control of the South China Sea is only growing and it is well placed to react to U.S. "provocations".

"As China's military size and quality improve, so does its control of the South China Sea," it said. "China is able to send more naval vessels as a response and can take steps like militarizing islands."

The Scarborough Shoal is located within the Philippines' 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone but an international tribunal in 2016 ruled that it is a traditional fishing ground that no one country has sole rights to exploit.

The U.S. military says it carries out "freedom of navigation" operations throughout the world, including in areas claimed by allies, and that they are separate from political considerations.

The Pentagon has not commented directly on the latest patrol but said such operations are routine.

(Reporting by Ben Blanchard; Editing by Paul Tait)

56 reactions

 

[Housecarl]

The Four Horsemen - 01/22 to 01/29
Started by Ragnarok, Yesterday 02:06 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?530613-The-Four-Horsemen-01-22-to-01-29

TSA Issues Emergency Order Scrutinizing Cargo from Five Muslim-Majority Countries
Started by Millwright, Yesterday 08:31 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...ing-Cargo-from-Five-Muslim-Majority-Countries

North Korean officials ransacking farmers' homes to find food for Kim's hungry army, report says
Started by Dennis Olson, Yesterday 12:59 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...o-find-food-for-Kim-s-hungry-army-report-says

'We loot or we die of hunger': food shortages fuel unrest in Venezuela
Started by Cardinal, Yesterday 10:05 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...unger-food-shortages-fuel-unrest-in-Venezuela

Florida: IED detonated at Lake Wales Mall
Started by mzkitty, 01-21-2018 06:04 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?530574-Florida-IED-detonated-at-Lake-Wales-Mall/page2

'Netherlands is our country’: Right-wing Wilders leads march ‘against Islamisation’
Started by Millwright, 01-21-2018 08:14 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...ng-Wilders-leads-march-‘against-Islamisation’

India Tests Ballistic Missile Capable of Reaching China
Started by Millwright, Yesterday 12:19 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...s-Ballistic-Missile-Capable-of-Reaching-China

Sweden: Massive explosion in Malmo. Second bombing today.
Started by mzkitty, 01-21-2018 01:09 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...sive-explosion-in-Malmo.-Second-bombing-today.

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https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/worl...-condemning-turkey/ar-AAv2xuD?ocid=spartanntp

UN Security Council refrains from condemning Turkey

AFP
5 hrs ago

The UN Security Council discussed Turkey's intensifying offensive against Kurdish militias and the worsening humanitarian crisis in Syria on Monday but did not condemn or demand an end to the sensitive Turkish operation.

Already scheduled to hear a report from UN aid chief Mark Lowcock on his recent visit to Syria, at France's request the Security Council also touched on the latest Turkish offensive as well as the Syrian campaign in Idlib and Eastern Ghouta.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has vowed no stepping back to the air and ground offensive seeking to flush out the People's Protection Units (YPG) militia from its enclave of Afrin, despite concern from Ankara's allies and neighbors.

"It was of course part of the conversation," French Ambassador Francois Delattre said of Afrin after the closed-door talks at UN headquarters in New York.

"The call for restraint, I believe, was widely shared during the discussion," he added, saying that France was "attentive to the security of Turkey, its territories and its borders."

US Ambassador Nikki Haley did not attend the meeting in person, a diplomatic source said.

Turkey's operation "Olive Branch" is sensitive as Washington relied on the YPG to oust militants from the Islamic State (IS) jihadist group from their Syrian strongholds and the Kurdish militia now holds much of Syria's north.

Western capitals fear the campaign against the YPG could shift the focus away from eliminating IS after a string of successes in recent months.

"It's vital to keep the unity of the allies in what remains the number one priority, which is the fight against terrorism and against Daesh in particular," Delattre stressed, using another term for the IS militant group.

"The number one party responsible for the humanitarian tragedy in Syria is the Syrian regime," he added. "The number one tragedy happening before our eyes happens in Eastern Ghouta and Idlib."

"If things continue this way, Eastern Ghouta might be the new Aleppo in terms of humanitarian disaster," Delattre added.

Turkey considers the YPG a terror group and the Syrian offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers' Party which has waged a three-decade insurgency against the Turkish state.

Russia and the United States have expressed concern about the operation, which Erdogan said Turkey had discussed in advance with Russia and Moscow was in "agreement."

 

[Housecarl]

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https://apnews.com/dadd178a76c94c21...s-to-help-Indonesia-provide-maritime-security

US says it wants to help Indonesia provide maritime security

By ROBERT BURNS
Today

JAKARTA, Indonesia (AP) — U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis says the Trump administration wants to help Indonesia play a central role in maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Mattis spoke briefly to reporters Tuesday after meeting with his Indonesian counterpart.

His visit to Jakarta reflects one of the key tenets of the broad national security strategy that he publicly unveiled last Friday in Washington — building partnerships and strengthening alliances.

Mattis told reporters Tuesday that the U.S. wants to help Indonesia realize its ambition to become a “maritime fulcrum” in the region. He says that, on that basis, the U.S. wants to work together with Indonesia on countering terrorism in the Asia-Pacific.

 

[Housecarl]

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50 years after key Vietnam battles, Mattis seeks closer ties

By ROBERT BURNS
Yesterday

WASHINGTON (AP) — A half-century after the Tet Offensive punctured American hopes of victory in Vietnam, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis is visiting the former enemy in search of a different kind of win: incremental progress as partners in a part of the world the Pentagon has identified as vital for the United States to compete with China and Russia.

Mattis, a retired general who entered the Marine Corps during Vietnam but did not serve there, arrived in Indonesia on Monday where he’ll spend two days before visiting Hanoi for talks with senior government and military leaders.

By coincidence, Mattis will be in Vietnam just days before the 50th anniversary of the communist offensive on Jan. 30-31, 1968, when North Vietnam attacked an array of key objectives in the South, including the city of Hue, a former imperial capital and cultural icon on the Perfume River. At the time, Mattis was a senior at Columbia High School in Richland, Washington. The following year he joined the Marine Corps Reserves.

The Tet Offensive gave the North an important boost, even though it ultimately was a military failure. It collapsed an air of confidence among U.S. leaders that they would soon win a favorable peace agreement. Looking ahead to 1968, the top U.S. commander in Vietnam at the time, Gen. William Westmoreland, famously declared in a speech in Washington in November 1967 that the war was about to enter a phase “when the end begins to come into view.”

The fighting dragged on for seven more years, fueling U.S. street protests and convulsing American politics, before the North prevailed and the last Americans evacuated in 1975.

The former enemies have gradually set aside their wartime differences, in part out of shared concern about China’s growing military power and more assertive position in the South China Sea. The Trump administration sees Vietnam as a partner in opposing China’s assertion of territorial claims in the South China Sea, including the Spratlys, an island chain where Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei also have claims.

Mattis said he didn’t expect the war to come up in his talks in Vietnam.

“That largely has been made a matter of the past,” he said aboard his flight to Asia.

Despite the passage of time, the legacy of the U.S. war is never far from the surface.

The countries didn’t normalize relations until 1995. It took another two decades before Washington fully lifted a ban on selling deadly weapons to Vietnam. The Vietnamese have largely embraced the new partnership as they’ve sought to diversify diplomatic and security relations in the region, fearing Chinese primacy. Vietnam fought a border war with China in 1979, and bitterness runs deep.

The current crop of top U.S. generals is too young to have served in Vietnam. The last chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to have been a Vietnam veteran was Adm. Mike Mullen, who served aboard a Navy destroyer in 1969 that provided fire support for American and South Vietnamese ground forces near Da Nang. The only secretary of defense to have fought in Vietnam was Chuck Hagel, wounded in 1968. He served as Pentagon chief from 2013-2015.

But the war isn’t a relic of history at the Pentagon. An obscure office, the Defense POW-MIA Accounting Agency, still directs efforts to find and identify remains of Americans killed in Vietnam. Decades of searches still haven’t accounted for more than 1,200 people. An additional 350 are missing in Laos, Cambodia and China, the Pentagon says. Mattis may visit POW-MIA accounting representatives during his visit.

Mattis has shown interest in some of the unfinished business of Vietnam, too. Last month, he approved giving a Medal of Honor to a Marine for valorous actions in a counter-offensive to retake Hue. A Marine gunnery sergeant at the time, John Canley of Oxnard, California, had been awarded the Navy Cross for heroic action, including rescuing wounded Marines from Jan. 31 to Feb. 6, 1968.

Hue and the Tet Offensive remain a powerful symbol of the war for Americans of that generation; an Associated Press photograph by Eddie Adams of a Vietnamese officer executing a Viet Cong suspect on a street in Saigon on the second day of the Tet Offensive was a rallying cry for U.S. war protesters and is still an iconic symbol of the conflict.

Mattis is the latest in a string of Pentagon chiefs who’ve visited Vietnam to expand security ties and address China’s growing military power.

Ash Carter made the last visit in June 2015, marking two decades of relations and announcing the Pentagon would assign a peacekeeping expert to the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi to help the Vietnamese Defense Ministry prepare for its first deployment on a U.N. peacekeeping mission. Leon Panetta and his Vietnamese counterpart exchanged personal items from soldiers lost in the war three years earlier.

Mattis has never been to Vietnam. During the war, he attended what was then known as Central Washington State College, graduating in 1972, and earned his commission as a second lieutenant through the Reserve Officer’s Training Corps. He rose in the ranks through 41 years on active duty, capping his career as the four-star commander of U.S. Central Command. He had been retired three years when President Donald Trump picked him to lead the Pentagon.

 

[Housecarl]

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https://jamestown.org/program/year-review-baltics-steadily-grow-armies/

A Year in Review: Baltics Steadily Grow Their Armies

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 15 Issue: 7
By: Olevs Nikers
January 18, 2018 09:38 PM Age: 4 days

The biggest success for all three Baltic countries—Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia—last year was the arrival of the multinational battalion groups to the region, thus implementing the decisions reached at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 2016 summit in Warsaw (see EDM, February 23, 2017). Furthermore, as of 2018, each of the Baltic States will have finally reached NATO’s mandated minimum of defense spending equaling at least 2 percent of their GDP.

The year 2017 was particularly consequential for Latvia’s military reform agenda. Notably, the authorities adopted policies encouraging stronger public involvement in defense; and terms, including “total defense” and “territorial defense,” took on renewed prominence in Latvian thinking on national security (see EDM, May 2, 2017).

For Latvia, the 2017 defense budget amounted to 1.7 percent of GDP, which allowed for several important procurement and construction projects to be implemented. The largest funding was allocated to the development of the capabilities of the National Armed Forces, including a Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the Mechanized Land Forces, air-defense, military engineering, as well as strengthening the National Guard and Special Task Unit. At the same time, the defense ministry launched the development of indirect fire support capacity (Mod.gov.lv, accessed January 8, 2018). As part of the effort to modernize the army’s mechanized units, Latvia acquired Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked)—or CVR(T)—vehicles from the United Kingdom; and 73 of the 123 purchased armored vehicles have already been delivered. Also in 2017, a bilateral agreement was signed between the Latvian Ministry of Defense and the Austrian Ministry of Defense and Sports on the purchase of M109A5Ö self-propelled Howitzer systems, including the purchase of fire-control and training platforms (Mk.gov.lv, December 29, 2017).

Meanwhile, the New Battle Engineering Development Plan, adopted last year, envisages the development of various mobility and anti-mobility capabilities—that is, capabilities for improving the movement and protection of friendly forces as well as providing support to the civilian population while hindering the advancement of the adversary. Moreover, border-crossing procedures of the Allied forces in the Baltic States were simplified, solving a common issue in the process of international military training in Europe.

In 2017, preparations continued for creating increased readiness units within the National Guard Battalions. These units will excel at various specialty tasks, and work has already begun on developing advanced mine-laying, anti-tank, military engineering, air-defense and sniper capabilities. The first certification of the high-readiness units will take place during the Namejs 2018 military training exercise (La.lv, December 31, 2017).

In January 2017, neighboring Baltic State Lithuania approved a new “National Security Strategy.” Much like the Latvian State Defense concept of 2016, the Lithuanian document explicitly names Russia as a potential national security threat. In addition to efforts to modernize its infrastructure for the rapid and efficient deployment of Allied forces in the country, the 2017 National Security Strategy lists Lithuania’s other priority as increasing its self-defense and mobilization capabilities. Lithuania also plans to conduct more regular exercises each year (Pism.pl, May 9, 2017).

Lithuanian Defense Minister Raimundas Karoblis has noted that he hopes NATO countries will reach an agreement in 2018 on a comprehensive air-defense concept for the Baltic region, thus fixing the “weakest link” in Lithuanian defenses. According to the Lithuanian minister, the problem is political, as the technical details have mostly already been worked out. He, therefore, would like to see air defense be included in NATO’s existing plans for a forward presence in the Baltic countries (Delfi, November 22, 2017).

The northernmost and geographically most exposed Baltic State, Estonia, also pursued important steps to boost its defense posture last year. Notable, Minister of Defense Jüri Luik signed a bill in late 2017 that will open the door to allowing more women to serve than ever before. Up to 108 women will be able to enter conscript service this year (ERR, September 29, 2017). In addition, more attention will be paid to boosting the defensive will of Estonia’s young people by launching a patriotic education program (Leta.lv, December 28, 2017). Indeed, Latvia will similarly be reaching out to school-age youth by creating a voluntary military training program for young people.

According to Martin Herem, the chief of staff of the Estonian Defense Forces, in the event of a possible war, his country is presently ready to mobilize at least 21,000 men by providing them with weapons and ammunition. With such a resistance force under arms, “I am convinced that Estonia would not be occupied in a few days,” he stressed. “Perhaps the opponent would occupy some territory, but it would definitely not be able to occupy the whole country” (ERR, January 3).

Additionally, the Estonian Defense Forces recently received another batch of missiles for the Javelin anti-tank system, procured thanks to funding assistance allocated by the United States to support European security measures. The newer Javelin Block-1 type missiles, which arrived at the beginning of last December, are faster and more powerful than their predecessors, the Block-0 type missiles previously purchased by Estonia (ERR, December 12, 2017).

Also at the end of last year, Tallinn approved the implementation of the “National Defense Development Plan 2017–2026” for the years 2018–2021. It calls for the enhancement of armored maneuver capability, creation of a cyber command, the introduction of a new primary rifle and the construction of new military training areas (ERR, December 28, 2017).

During the next four years, Estonia’s independent defense capability will increase significantly, allowing the country to be able to react immediately if necessary. According to Minister of Defense Margus Tsahkna, “€40 million [$49 million] of the 2017 budget has been set aside for the purchase of ammunition, and from 2018–2021 we will invest an additional €166.5 million [$203.8 million] in ammunition in order to increase the combat capability of the defense forces” (ERR, February 23, 2017).

For the next several years Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia will continue to regard the United States as the main guarantor of security in the Baltic region. That said, going forward, the Baltic States can be expected to seek ever closer cooperation with their European partners, namely Germany, the UK, and the Nordic countries (Pism.pl, May 9, 2017). Illustratively, at the end of 2017, all three Baltic States joined the European Union’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework for security and defense. PESCO is a voluntary agreement between 25 EU Member States to strengthen cooperation within European security and defense matters. The PESCO Member States undertake all necessary efforts to make adequate financial investments in defense, including via equipment purchases, the coordination of defense planning, and improving the availability of forces dealing with crises response operations outside the EU bloc (Mod.gov.lv, Accessed January 8).

The coming year promises to be marked by further growth and development of the Baltic States’ defense sectors. And this will undoubtedly put increased pressure on local policymakers to maintain successful budget spending and accountability to both their own societies as well as their Allies. Preserving trust on all sides will be needed to guarantee the continued and systematic strengthening of the Balts’ defenses.

 

[Housecarl]

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https://jamestown.org/program/revisionist-russia-nuclearized-power-world/

Revisionist Russia Is the Most Nuclearized Power in the World

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 15 Issue: 9
By: Pavel K. Baev
January 22, 2018 05:07 PM Age: 11 hours

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared at last week’s (January 18) special meeting of the United Nations Security Council that Russia had no intention of joining the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (a.k.a. the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty—NWBT). In his opinion, the NWBT “provokes deep contradictions in the international community” (RIA Novosti, January 19). This came as no surprise: Not one of the world’s nuclear powers and none of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) member states support this fledgling treaty, which has nevertheless been approved by many states, including Kazakhstan. Indeed, Astana had called this meeting using its prerogative as the current temporary chair of the UN Security Council. Lavrov confirmed Russia’s commitment to the non-nuclear world ideal but lashed out against the “dangerous tendency” to ignore the interests of nuclear powers and to neglect strategic stability (Mid.ru, January 18). Yet, hidden in the diplomatic language on upholding the international order is Russia’s determination to undermine it from within by corrupting its core rules and norms—as identified in the United States’ new National Defense Strategy (Kommersant, January 20).

Some Russian commentators took pride in the fact that strategic competition driven by revisionist powers, rather than terrorism or other unconventional challenges, is now defined as the main source of threat to US interests, seeing in this a recognition of Russia’s global role (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 18). President Vladimir Putin described the US Strategy as “aggressive,” presenting the deployment of missile defense assets in Romania and Poland as proof positive of this tired propaganda (New Times, December 25). Many new features can be found in the key US security and defense documents that, indeed, deserve attentive analysis in Moscow, instead of the habitual condemnation. Not least, this is because Russia’s massive nuclear modernization is recognized in Washington as a major security issue. The Russian leadership, however, continues to brag about new weapons systems, indicating that it is ready to abandon the 1988 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty but would prefer the US to destroy this remnant of the “golden era” of arms control (Russiancouncil.ru, January 16).

Russia embarked on the hugely expensive program of modernizing all elements of its nuclear arsenal at the start of this decade. That modernization is the main priority of the new 2027 State Armament Program, finalized last December, after many delays (Kommersant, December 18). Not every investment has paid off: the development of a new generation of strategic bombers by the Tupolev bureau is lagging, and some exotic projects, like for instance the rail-mobile Barguzin inter-continental ballistic missile, have been canceled (Ezhednevny Zhurnal, December 4). Eight Borei-class nuclear submarines constitute the most expensive entry in the rearmament effort, and the naval lobby keeps arguing for extending the service life of older strategic platforms (RIA Novosti, December 17; Voenno-Promyshlenny Kuryer, January 19). The Russian leadership seeks to harvest political dividends from this sustained investment, particularly since the monthly patrols by Russia’s aging strategic bombers—carefully intercepted by NATO fighters—yield diminishing attention (Interfax, January 15).

Moscow is seeking greater political uses for its modernized nuclear arsenal; but it has to tread carefully. Notably, the top brass abstained from introducing any battlefield use of nuclear weapons into the scenario of the Zapad 2017 large-scale exercises last September (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 28). The most promising path may be the controversial area of nuclear non-proliferation. And while presenting itself as a staunch upholder of this principle, Russia is spreading its bets widely. In particular, Lavrov condemned the US stance on revising the nuclear agreement with Iran, but also asserted that without US participation, the deal would break down (RBC, January 19). He expressed readiness to work with Washington on resolving the conflicts in the Middle East, but argued that Iran cannot be prevented from defending its interests in Syria and other conflict zones (RIA Novosti, January 19).

A similarly ambivalent stance is taken in the oscillating crisis around North Korea. Russia voted in the UN Security Council for all resolutions enforcing sanctions but has tried to soften them. And it has argued persistently that sanctions were not going to work (Carnegie.ru, January 16; see EDM, January 18). Moscow misses no chance to criticize Washington for relying too much on military pressure but is keen to engage in bilateral consultations on the Korean problem (Newsru.com, January 20). The official position remains that de-nuclearization of the peninsula should be secured, but Moscow is very supportive of the Olympic rapprochement between the two Korean states, which to all intents and purposes amounts to an acknowledgement of the material results of the North Korean nuclear and missile programs (Russiancouncil.ru, January 12).

By every objective measure—the number of strategic and non-strategic warheads or the size of its nuclear arsenal in proportion to the strength of the Armed Forces—Russia is the most nuclearized state in the world. The long experience of developing nuclear projects should have made Moscow aware of the safety risks, but it actually tends to take a relaxed attitude to problems that are seen as falling beyond the level of acceptable risk by Russia’s neighbors. The appearance of a radioactive cloud of Ruthenium-106 over Europe last year was never satisfactorily explained, and Russia opted not to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency to investigate the source (Interfax, January 15). The fire at the uranium and plutonium plant in Seversk, Tomsk region, was only a minor news item last weekend (TASS, January 21). The Russian high command is quite flexible in extending the service of nuclear weapon systems that should have been retired many years ago. But it is in denial of the technical problems with the Bulava missile for the Borei-class submarines, which has a checkered record of trials and was test-fired only once in 2017 and once in 2016.

The experience of deploying thousands of nuclear weapons should have also informed the Russian leadership about the very limited political value of this arsenal. This conclusion, however, is resolutely dismissed; and Moscow seeks to maximize the benefits of its nuclear status. Russia insists on maintaining nuclear parity with the United States, but this old-fashioned bean-counting has little to do with upholding strategic stability and much to do with the propensity to wield nuclear instruments of policy. The desire to perform the Cold War–era role of a nuclear superpower par excellence brings much strain to Russia’s stagnant economy, pushes up the safety risks, and adds to the diminishing stability of the world order.

 

[Housecarl]

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https://www.yahoo.com/gma/reported-...ls-russia-233409484--abc-news-topstories.html

New reported chemical weapons attack in Syria as US calls out Russia

CONOR FINNEGAN
Good Morning America
January 23, 2018

As the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad was accused of another chemical weapons attack, the Trump administration is trying to rally international condemnation of the regime and increase pressure on Russia to rein in its ally.

But more than nine months after President Trump ordered airstrikes on a Syrian air base after it deployed chemical weapons, yet another use of the internationally-banned weapons would be a sign of how intractable the conflict has become and how little influence the U.S. has to shape events in the country.

According to activists and rescue teams, Assad's government launched an attack with suspected poisonous gas that affected at least 20 civilians in a rebel-held suburb near Damascus, the Associated Press reported.

The area, known as eastern Ghouta, is an enclave of rebel support in a part of the country that Assad has long dominated during the country's near seven-year-old war. It has been under siege by the Assad regime for years now, but despite a ceasefire agreed to over the summer, the regime has starved and bombed the area for the past few months. In recent weeks, that bombing campaign escalated, according to monitoring groups.

Amid these latest allegations, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson is in France to launch the "International Partnership Against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons" Tuesday with French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian. The new 29-nation group is meant to increase pressure on the Assad regime for the use of chemical weapons, but especially on Russia for protecting the regime from repercussions at the UN Security Council and elsewhere.

"Let’s be clear: Russia’s unwillingness or inability to restrain the Assad regime is costing innocent Syrian lives. We’ve been firm in our determination to hold parties accountable for the use of chemical weapons, which have killed far too many Syrians," State Department spokesperson Heather Nauert tweeted Monday.

The new partnership will unveil a series of commitments "aimed at strengthening their cooperation in the fight against impunity for those who use or develop chemical weapons," according to the French Foreign Ministry, including collecting, sharing. and publicizing information about chemical attack perpetrators.

"Russia has failed to rid Syria of chemical weapons, and they've been blocking chemical weapons organizations. Enough is enough," Under Secretary of State for Public Affairs Steve Goldstein told reporters Monday.

But less than a week ago in a major policy speech, Tillerson said that the U.S. airstrikes last April on Assad's airbase were meant "to dissuade the Syrian regime from further use or proliferation of chemical weapons." On his flight back to Washington afterwards, he also told ABC News the U.S. and Syria were "very well aligned" in Syria and their end goals there.

"That's why we're disappointed with the Foreign Minister's comments," Goldstein said, a reference to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov today accusing the U.S. of fomenting unrest and instability in Syria and even supporting al Qaeda-linked militants. "The Secretary is very unhappy that Russia has not stepped up to the plate as we would expect them to," Goldstein added.

To critics, Russian intransigence and stalwart support for Assad are a reality that the administration should have seen earlier. "Russia has fooled the U.S. again in Syria," the Washington Post editorial board warned in a recent headline.

Either way, it's unclear how another international group or more public statements from the U.S. will change the situation on the ground, especially as Assad's forces continue to regain territory. As Tillerson said in that speech last week, the regime now controls about half of the country's population and territory, thanks in large part to Russian support.

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.yahoo.com/news/taiwan-president-says-does-not-exclude-possibility-china-075109053.html

Taiwan president says does not exclude possibility of China attack

Reuters • January 22, 2018

TAIPEI (Reuters) - Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen said that she does not exclude the possibility of China attacking the self-ruled island, amid heightened tensions between the two sides including an increasing number of Chinese military drills near Taiwan.

Beijing has taken an increasingly hostile stance toward Taiwan, which it considers a breakaway province, since the election two years ago of Tsai of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party.

China suspects Tsai wants to push for formal independence, a red line for Communist Party leaders in Beijing, though she has said she wants to maintain the status quo and is committed to ensuring peace.

In recent months, China has stepped up military drills around Taiwan, alarming Taipei. China says the exercises are routine, but that it will not tolerate any attempt by the island to declare independence.

"No one can exclude this possibility. We will need to see whether their policymakers are reasonable policymakers or not," Tsai said in an interview on Taiwan television broadcast late on Monday, when asked whether China could attack Taiwan.

"When you consider it (Taiwan-China relationship) from a regional perspective, any reasonable policymaker will have to very carefully deliberate as to whether launching war is an option," Tsai said.

"When our government faces resistance and pressure from China, we will find our method to resist this. This is very important," she added.

"In terms of China circulating around Taiwan or carrying out other military activities, our military is carefully following every action and movement in the scope of its monitoring," Tsai said. "Our military is very confident to face these situations."

China considers proudly democratic Taiwan to be its sacred territory and has never renounced the use of force to bring it under Chinese control.

Taiwan and China have also traded accusations this month about China's opening of new civilian aviation routes close to Taiwan-controlled islands in the Taiwan Strait.

Although China has cut off a formal dialogue mechanism with Taiwan, Tsai acknowledged that both sides currently have a method for communications to avoid misunderstanding.

Taiwan has been pressing for the United States, its main source of arms, to provide more advanced equipment, but has also been trying to bolster its own weapons programs, to avoid what Tsai termed "certain political difficulties" that come with buying weapons overseas in the teeth of Chinese opposition.

Tsai said she believed one day Taiwan would be able to produce its own submarines, an item Taipei has long pressed for to face China's navy.

China's Taiwan Affairs Office did not immediately respond to a request for comment on Tsai's remarks.

(Reporting by Jess Macy Yu; Additional reporting by Ben Blanchard in BEIJING; Editing by Nick Macfie)

2 reactions

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Mid...Iran-strategy-survive-hostilities-with-Turkey

Syria: Can Trump's anti-Iran strategy survive hostilities with Turkey?

A shift in thought - As Russia, Iran, and the US strive to establish facts on the ground to maximize their chances of shaping postwar Syria, Turkey is posing a challenge to a key piece of the Trump administration’s emerging policy.

Scott Peterson
Staff writer | @peterson__scott

Nicholas Blanford
Correspondent

January 22, 2018 London; and Beirut—Turkish tanks rolled into northern Syria Sunday, attacking Syrian Kurdish forces that have been instrumental US allies in the fight against Islamic State militants.

The Turkish offensive is the latest move in a confluence of events that mark a new stage of the seven-year-old Syrian conflict. As the main players strive to establish facts on the ground to maximize their own chances of shaping postwar Syria, Turkey in particular is challenging core components of the Trump administration’s foreign policy.

The short-term catalyst for the clash was a Pentagon declaration last week that the United States now plans to extend indefinitely a military presence in northeast Syria, and build a largely Kurdish force of 30,000 to help achieve its aims. ISIS has been squeezed from most of its territory in Syria, thanks largely to a US-backed Kurdish force, but momentum in the war is favoring President Bashar al-Assad and his Iranian and Russian allies.

The declaration infuriated Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoðan, who called the northern Syria Kurdish forces a “terror army” established by the US. He vowed that the Turkish military would cross into Syria to “strangle” the new US-backed force “before it was born.”

The new force is a key piece for the Trump administration as it rolls out an ambitious, three-pronged Syria policy, which aims to prevent the reemergence of ISIS, help orchestrate a postwar Syria without President Assad, and contain Iranian influence.

How well do you understand the conflict in Syria? Take our quiz.

But analysts note that Russia and Iran have already prevailed in Syria, and the US is acting from a position of relative weakness. And they ask whether the US administration, which has a history of inconsistent messaging on foreign policy, has the capacity and patience to achieve those goals.

The backbone of the new militia would be the umbrella Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the US-backed group that is led by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) that also include some Arab forces. The new militia would deploy on Syria’s northern border with Turkey, its eastern border with Iraq, and along the Euphrates River.

Turkey has long been angry at the overt US support for the YPG over its close affiliation with the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), which has waged a lethal insurgency against Ankara.

In an attempt to defuse the clash with Turkey over the force, US Secretary of Defense James Mattis acknowledged Sunday that Turkey had “legitimate” security concerns. But Turkey's vitriol signals a new low in US-Turkey relations.

At the same time, while Turkish forces advance to create what Ankara calls a 20-mile deep “security zone” in northern Syria, analysts wonder if the Trump administration will be able to see its new Syria policy through to fruition.

“There does seem to be an element of Washington giving up on Turkey and driving forward their position in Syria with an anti-Iran prioritization, but as ever with the Trump administration, the tide seems to turn so quickly, it’s really hard to know how much this new approach is anchored in anything real or sustainable,” says Julien Barnes-Dacey, a senior policy fellow for the European Council on Foreign Relations in Brussels.

'A very weak position'
For years, Washington and its allies, including Turkey and Persian Gulf states, supported anti-Assad rebels in a proxy war. But today, the Americans “are in a very weak position,” and achieving results that press both Damascus and Tehran “would require a much wider and deeper military push than Trump is ever going to be prepared to undertake,” says Mr. Barnes-Dacey.

He also notes an “inherent contradiction” in the policy the US shares with the European Union and the UN that Russia – whose airpower helped ensure Assad's survival – can pressure Assad into compromises at the negotiating table. That can happen only with a joint Russia-Iran push. Yet the declared US anti-Iran approach will likely “kill off any hope” of such an outcome, says Barnes-Dacey.

US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who tried last week to calm the dispute with Turkey, on Wednesday publicly enunciated the emerging US policy. It was anti-ISIS, anti-Assad, and – emphasized for the first time on that battlefield – anti-Iran.

Mr. Tillerson said Iran had “dramatically strengthened” its role in Syria, a status that would be “further” enhanced by any US disengagement, enabling Iran to “continue attacking US interests, our allies and personnel.” The continued US presence, he said, would be aimed at “reducing and expelling malicious Iranian influence."

Whether or not Turkey and the US are aligned on ISIS and Assad, however, Turkey’s reaction is being driven by the prospect of a sustained US presence in Syria, which is “tantamount to a security guarantee” for the Syria’s Kurdish militias, says Aaron Stein, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East in Washington.

Turkey chose to vilify “whatever is left of US-Turkish relations” with its rhetoric and cross-border incursion, while the US was also insensitive by stating it would create a new force in Syria when it already had one in place, says Mr. Stein.

Operation Olive Branch
Turkey on Saturday announced the launch of Operation Olive Branch, with shelling of YPG positions. The ground offensive began on Sunday, and Turkish media on Monday reported that Turkish forces had advanced more than three miles into the Kurdish enclave of Afrin, north of Aleppo. The YPG claimed it had pushed back the offensive.

The aim is to “liberate the area by eliminating the PKK-YPG-linked administration,” according to a Turkish official who commented on condition of anonymity. He said the operation would continue east toward the larger city of Manbij. The SDF units with direct US support are farther east, across the Euphrates River.

“I suppose Washington is trying to keep Afrin entirely separate from the situation east of the Euphrates,” says Frederic Hof, director of the Rafik Hariri Center at the Atlantic Council. “The logic would be that the … SDF is the anti-ISIS coalition ‘partner force,’ and that the partnership in question does not extend to Afrin or any place beyond the anti-ISIS area of operations.”

While the US-Turkish fight over Kurdish control unfolds, the addition of the US anti-Iran strategy stems from a desire by some at the National Security Council to “get tough and put Iran on notice,” says Stein.

“Anybody who knows how Iran operates … knows that this will not put Iran on notice,” he says. “Iran and Russia and the [Syrian] regime have won this war, they will settle this thing on their terms. The US is hanging on for dear life, and trying to alter an outcome that’s probably unalterable.”

That is not stopping Washington from trying. Iran was high on the list of priorities during testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when David Satterfield, acting assistant secretary for Near East affairs, was asked about the continued role of US forces in Syria.

“We are deeply concerned with the activities of Iran, with the ability of Iran to enhance those activities through a greater ability to move materiel into Syria,” said Mr. Satterfield.

Balancing policy aims
Analysts say that if Iranian forces and their allies were to move unopposed into eastern Syria it could trigger a backlash by the Sunni population, which resents the Shiite-flavor of Iran’s military presence.

“The US problem with Iran is that it uses a [Shiite] sectarian agenda to prop up these rickety states like Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere that generates stronger and stronger variants of ISIS and Al Qaeda,” says Andrew Tabler, a Syria expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

The new US policy will try to balance these multiple policy aims in a way that Washington has never achieved throughout the Syrian conflict. Instead, immediate focus on tactical gains – such as using Syrian Kurds as a key component against ISIS, despite the anger of a NATO ally – has often created new dilemmas.

“Successive US administrations have failed to find a means of taking into account Turkey’s very real, and to some extent understandable, objections to support a group so closely linked to the PKK,” says Noah Bonsey, the senior Syria analyst for the International Crisis Group.

At the same time, “a precipitous [US] withdrawal from northeastern Syria could very well pave the way for a new war,” he says, in which the many enemies of the YPG might move against the Kurdish militia.

“The rhetoric probably does overstate what can be achieved, [but] to some extent by maintaining a US presence you diminish the likelihood of that destabilizing scenario, at least temporarily,” says Mr. Bonsey.

 

[danielboon]

duduman prophecy from 1996 RUSSIA AND CHINA STRIKE

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.yahoo.com/news/taiwan-president-says-does-not-exclude-possibility-china-075109053.html

Taiwan president says does not exclude possibility of China attack

Reuters • January 22, 2018

TAIPEI (Reuters) - Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen said that she does not exclude the possibility of China attacking the self-ruled island, amid heightened tensions between the two sides including an increasing number of Chinese military drills near Taiwan.

Beijing has taken an increasingly hostile stance toward Taiwan, which it considers a breakaway province, since the election two years ago of Tsai of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party.

China suspects Tsai wants to push for formal independence, a red line for Communist Party leaders in Beijing, though she has said she wants to maintain the status quo and is committed to ensuring peace.

In recent months, China has stepped up military drills around Taiwan, alarming Taipei. China says the exercises are routine, but that it will not tolerate any attempt by the island to declare independence.

"No one can exclude this possibility. We will need to see whether their policymakers are reasonable policymakers or not," Tsai said in an interview on Taiwan television broadcast late on Monday, when asked whether China could attack Taiwan.

"When you consider it (Taiwan-China relationship) from a regional perspective, any reasonable policymaker will have to very carefully deliberate as to whether launching war is an option," Tsai said.

"When our government faces resistance and pressure from China, we will find our method to resist this. This is very important," she added.

"In terms of China circulating around Taiwan or carrying out other military activities, our military is carefully following every action and movement in the scope of its monitoring," Tsai said. "Our military is very confident to face these situations."

China considers proudly democratic Taiwan to be its sacred territory and has never renounced the use of force to bring it under Chinese control.

Taiwan and China have also traded accusations this month about China's opening of new civilian aviation routes close to Taiwan-controlled islands in the Taiwan Strait.

Although China has cut off a formal dialogue mechanism with Taiwan, Tsai acknowledged that both sides currently have a method for communications to avoid misunderstanding.

Taiwan has been pressing for the United States, its main source of arms, to provide more advanced equipment, but has also been trying to bolster its own weapons programs, to avoid what Tsai termed "certain political difficulties" that come with buying weapons overseas in the teeth of Chinese opposition.

Tsai said she believed one day Taiwan would be able to produce its own submarines, an item Taipei has long pressed for to face China's navy.

China's Taiwan Affairs Office did not immediately respond to a request for comment on Tsai's remarks.

(Reporting by Jess Macy Yu; Additional reporting by Ben Blanchard in BEIJING; Editing by Nick Macfie)

2 reactions

CHINA & RUSSIA STRIKE "I will give you the land with all the people, but you must free Taiwan
of the Americans. Do not fear, we will attack them from behind."

A voice said to me, "Watch where the Russians penetrate America."
I saw these words being written - Alaska, Minnesota, Florida.

"When America goes to war with China, the Russians will strike without warning."
The other two presidents spoke, "We, too, will fight for you."
Each had a place already planned as a point of attack.
All of them shook hands and hugged. Then they all signed a contract.
One of them said, "We're sure that Korea and Cuba will be on our side, too.
Without a doubt, together, we can destroy America."

 

[danielboon]

Heather Nauert
@statedeptspox
Sec Tillerson: There is no denying #Russia has breached its commitment and betrayed the Chemical Weapons Convention & UN Res 2118 by shielding its ally #Syria. Whoever conducted the attacks, Russia ultimately bears responsibility for countless Syrian victims of #ChemicalWeapons.
https://mobile.twitter.com/statedeptspox/status/955851495622217728

 

[danielboon]

Haley, Tillerson call out Russia on Syria's chemical weapons use

https://t.co/v4axQiCmmR?amp=1

 

[Housecarl]

Heather Nauert
@statedeptspox
Sec Tillerson: There is no denying #Russia has breached its commitment and betrayed the Chemical Weapons Convention & UN Res 2118 by shielding its ally #Syria. Whoever conducted the attacks, Russia ultimately bears responsibility for countless Syrian victims of #ChemicalWeapons.
https://mobile.twitter.com/statedeptspox/status/955851495622217728

Merde...Anyone else getting a "bad feeling"?...

 

[danielboon]

N. Korea seeks ability to simultaneously fire multiple nuclear missiles: CIA chief
english.yonhapnews.co.kr
https://t.co/r6UF9OKtZu?amp=1

 

[danielboon]

Merde...Anyone else getting a "bad feeling"?...

Yep this is going to explode in many directions

 

[AlfaMan]

I genuinely wish our government would cut ties completely with Communist China-nationalize any ChiCom owned asset in the US, AND default on the debt we owe Communist China. That communist workers' paradise would implode upon itself in a month.

I also wish we would wholeheartedly recognize the Republic of China on Taiwan as the legitimate leaders of China overall-the communists are usurpers. In 1950 the main thing Formosa (ROC) had to export to generate capital was apples. Literally apples..In 1990 Taiwan was one of the top economies in the world. We need to support the ROC-screw the communist rabble.

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.yahoo.com/news/taiwan-president-says-does-not-exclude-possibility-china-075109053.html

Taiwan president says does not exclude possibility of China attack

Reuters • January 22, 2018

TAIPEI (Reuters) - Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen said that she does not exclude the possibility of China attacking the self-ruled island, amid heightened tensions between the two sides including an increasing number of Chinese military drills near Taiwan.

Beijing has taken an increasingly hostile stance toward Taiwan, which it considers a breakaway province, since the election two years ago of Tsai of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party.

China suspects Tsai wants to push for formal independence, a red line for Communist Party leaders in Beijing, though she has said she wants to maintain the status quo and is committed to ensuring peace.

In recent months, China has stepped up military drills around Taiwan, alarming Taipei. China says the exercises are routine, but that it will not tolerate any attempt by the island to declare independence.

"No one can exclude this possibility. We will need to see whether their policymakers are reasonable policymakers or not," Tsai said in an interview on Taiwan television broadcast late on Monday, when asked whether China could attack Taiwan.

"When you consider it (Taiwan-China relationship) from a regional perspective, any reasonable policymaker will have to very carefully deliberate as to whether launching war is an option," Tsai said.

"When our government faces resistance and pressure from China, we will find our method to resist this. This is very important," she added.

"In terms of China circulating around Taiwan or carrying out other military activities, our military is carefully following every action and movement in the scope of its monitoring," Tsai said. "Our military is very confident to face these situations."

China considers proudly democratic Taiwan to be its sacred territory and has never renounced the use of force to bring it under Chinese control.

Taiwan and China have also traded accusations this month about China's opening of new civilian aviation routes close to Taiwan-controlled islands in the Taiwan Strait.

Although China has cut off a formal dialogue mechanism with Taiwan, Tsai acknowledged that both sides currently have a method for communications to avoid misunderstanding.

Taiwan has been pressing for the United States, its main source of arms, to provide more advanced equipment, but has also been trying to bolster its own weapons programs, to avoid what Tsai termed "certain political difficulties" that come with buying weapons overseas in the teeth of Chinese opposition.

Tsai said she believed one day Taiwan would be able to produce its own submarines, an item Taipei has long pressed for to face China's navy.

China's Taiwan Affairs Office did not immediately respond to a request for comment on Tsai's remarks.

(Reporting by Jess Macy Yu; Additional reporting by Ben Blanchard in BEIJING; Editing by Nick Macfie)

2 reactions

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm......

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/ar...ted-states-should-avoid-military-intervention

Yemen: An Escapable Disaster - Why the United States Should Avoid Military Intervention

by Andrew Byers and Faith Stewart
Journal Article | January 22, 2018 - 11:23pm

Yemen currently faces a multi-dimensional crisis that represents both a national catastrophe embroiling Yemen’s neighbors and a microcosm of the problems existing throughout the greater Middle East. Yemen’s central government has collapsed entirely, resulting in a failed state that has yielded large swathes of territory to non-state actors. A humanitarian crisis has emerged out of the country’s civil war, with a famine affecting millions, a cholera epidemic, and approximately 14,000 civilian deaths. Other powers in the region have intervened, with Saudi Arabia and some of the smaller Gulf states supporting one faction and Iran another. However, rather than bringing about an end to the current crisis, these interventions have only fueled the civil war with endless streams of arms and military operations. Other factions, including a branch of the Islamic State (ISIS) and an Al-Qaeda affiliate, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), have also established strongholds in Yemen through which they control territory and conduct attacks.

Just as Syria’s ongoing civil war and ensuing humanitarian crisis have had global implications, Yemen’s current crisis and internal collapse affect both its immediate neighbors and regional prospects for peace, order, and stability. There are virtually no good options for further outside intervention in Yemen by the United States or other parties. The United States has no significant interests in Yemen, and no prospects for successfully bringing about a peaceful resolution to the current conflicts there or the creation of a stable, post-conflict civil society. The United States and the international community could, and should, help to alleviate some of the civilian suffering inside Yemen—though even purely humanitarian efforts will be made all the more difficult by the ongoing struggle for control of Yemen, much like the situation in Somalia in the early 1990s. However, forcibly establishing a functioning central government and peaceful civil society is well beyond the capacity of any outside power, making the United States’ “least bad” policy option a limited, solely humanitarian effort.

Background and Recent Events
Yemen’s current crisis began in February 2015 when the Houthi-led Supreme Revolutionary Committee forced the resignation of the internationally-recognized government of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. The Houthis are a religious-political movement that took over the government in Sana’a with the support of the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. The Houthis now control most of northern Yemen and are opposed by the Saudi-led military coalition that supports the restoration of Hadi’s government. While the United States has purportedly provided intelligence and logistical support to the Saudi-Hadi coalition, Iran is believed to be aiding the Houthis, providing them with cash, drugs (used for funding), and arms shipments, including anti-tank guided missiles, armed drones, and surface-to-surface missiles smuggled into Yemen by sea.

On November 4, November 30, and again on December 19, the Houthis launched Iranian-supplied ballistic missiles at Saudi Arabia. Although the missiles were either intercepted or had no significant effect, Saudi Arabia has chosen to view the attacks as a declaration of war by the Houthis’ Iranian sponsor. In response to the November 4 launch, Saudi Arabia blockaded all of Yemen’s ports for a week. The blockade exponentially impacted Yemen’s already devastating humanitarian crisis, leaving 900,000 people without access to Red Cross-supplied chlorine tablets intended to combat the cholera crisis. Despite Saudi Arabia’s partial reopening of ports, the effects of the blockade will continue to impact the nation’s civilians.

Recent reports have claimed that Saudi and UAE missile defense systems—Patriot missiles purchased from the United States—have already intercepted more than 100 missiles launched from Yemen since 2015, suggesting that the missile problem may be even larger than previously believed.[1] The Iranian missiles have been the subject of much discussion by the Trump administration in recent months, which some have speculated is intended to shift the domestic and international narrative from the humanitarian aspects of the conflict—and the Saudi blockade of ports—to Iranian arms deliveries.[2]

The ongoing conflict in Yemen has hit civilians especially hard. Already, 8,670 Yemenis (60% civilian) have been killed during the conflict, with nearly 50,000 more injured.[3] According to an October 2017 United Nations report, 13,920 civilian casualties have occurred in the last six months, with more than 5,000 dead.[4] Additionally, the United Nations’ World Food Program estimates that seventeen million Yemenis are at risk of starvation, with only 4.5 million civilians being provided with full rations by humanitarian relief agencies.[5] A cholera epidemic has also emerged, infecting an estimated 900,000 people since April 2017 and killing over 2,000.[6]

Intervention by Saudi Arabia and several other Gulf states has worsened this humanitarian disaster rather than mitigating it. Saudi Arabia has led the military intervention and, following an early November missile attack by the Houthis, closed all of Yemen’s air and sea ports for a week. This effectively eliminated Yemen’s access to foreign aid and severely hampered the capacity of groups like the World Health Organization to bring medicine and other humanitarian relief supplies into the country. Following international intervention on behalf of the millions of Yemenis affected by the blockade, Saudi Arabia reopened those ports controlled by Hadi’s internationally recognized government.[7] Most recently, again after desperate international urging, Saudi Arabia has agreed to allow aid to the rebel-held port of Hudaydah and the Sana’a airport.[8] Further, while the Saudis promised Yemen $227 million in famine relief in 2017,[9] their contribution to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)’s Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan (YHRP) as of November 12, 2017 totals only $58.3 million, leaving Yemen’s food security and agriculture aid at less than half of OCHA’s minimum requirements.[10]

The situation in Yemen is a perfect storm of man-made disasters: a bloody civil war fought by multiple, mutually-antagonistic factions fueled by outside military interventions and geopolitical competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran; the rise of powerful non-state groups, including the Islamic State and an Al-Qaeda franchise; mass displacement of civilians; and starvation and epidemics resulting from the continued conflict. No end to the crisis is in sight, and humanitarian interventions to date have been both minimal and ineffective at alleviating human suffering.

Factions in Yemen

The Houthis and Ali Abdullah Saleh
The Houthi movement was founded in 1992 as a religious-political movement in Northern Yemen to protect Zaidism, a sect of Shi’ism, against Western and Sunni influence. The goals of the group were predominately political, focusing on the advancement of Zaidi rights under the government of President Saleh. While the group has become radicalized since its founding, as recently as 2013, a Houthi spokesperson argued that the group was still part of a political, rather than religious conflict. In the same interview, the spokesperson indicated that the Houthis were not primarily motivated by religion and hoped instead to achieve a civil state with a modern democracy in Yemen.[11]

In 2004, the Houthis participated in the rebellion against then President Ali Abdullah Saleh, on the grounds of self-defense. President Saleh, originally the president of North Yemen, was the first president of a combined North and South Yemen. A moderate politician, Saleh focused on strengthening ties with Western states in order to combat terrorism. Houthi participation in the 2004 rebellion against Saleh was in part due to the perceived increased Western influence over Yemen’s Zaidi and Shi’a populations under Saleh’s leadership. The conflict continued for six years before a ceasefire was called in 2010. However, the Houthis participated in the Yemeni Revolution the following year, reflecting Arab Spring influences. When the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) brokered a peace deal that divided Yemen into six regions, the Houthis rejected the political compromise that followed, arguing that a dialogue imposed by external forces could not be in the best interest of the Yemeni people.[12] Despite a lack of support from the Houthi movement, the peace deal did oversee the transition of the Yemeni presidency from Saleh to Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi.

Due to its rejection of the peace deal, the Houthi movement remained politically active and began to acquire territory in Northern Yemen in 2014. At this point, the Houthis had joined forces with the ousted Saleh and his supporters, forming an alliance of convenience aimed at removing President Hadi from power. Following capture of Sana’a, Yemen’s capital, in late 2014, the Houthis pressured President Hadi into a power-sharing deal, eventually forcing his resignation in early 2015 and dissolving Yemen’s Parliament. Although the group initially negotiated with the former president and other political factions, these negotiations quickly soured and unrest and political divisions were reignited.

By August 2017, fissures emerged in the long-standing alliance between former president Saleh and the Houthis, with speeches made by both groups accusing the other of jeopardizing the movement’s success against Hadi’s government.[13] Since then, disagreements worsened, with fighting breaking out between the Houthis and supporters of Saleh, culminating in the death of Saleh on December 4.[14]

Today the Houthis remain a major faction in Yemen’s civil war. The group continues to press against Sunni and Western influence, arguing that its actions are for the promotion of Zaidi welfare and rights within the state, and receive significant support from Iran.

Iran
Iran, as it has elsewhere, seeks to exploit existing political and religious fissures in the greater Middle East for its own gain in Yemen. Such divisions exist even within the GCC, such as the growing tensions between Qatar and Oman on one side and Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other. Iran has previously capitalized on these divides, steadily expanding its influence abroad while simultaneously destabilizing the region. This has had the effect of creating a geographic corridor of Iranian involvement that bisects the Persian Gulf and Levant, stretching across Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.

Much of Iran’s influence throughout the region has had a concrete military focus, with direct support to various Shi’ite militant groups via Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Al Quds force, which have trained insurgent and paramilitary forces throughout the region and have sometimes operated alongside them. Iran has also deployed Iranian “volunteers” to various conflict zones, and has acted by proxy through Hezbollah. Additionally, it has provided considerable financing and direct military aid to various non-state actors in the region, as demonstrated by its provision of land attack and anti-ship missiles to the Houthis. These anti-ship missiles could become a major threat to shipping that passes through the Suez Canal, while the land attack missiles have been used to target Saudi Arabia, further exacerbating conflict between intervening foreign powers.[15]

Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and Allies: Saudi Arabia, the Smaller Gulf States, and the United States
Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi was Vice President under Saleh from 1994 until 2012. In 2012, Hadi was elected to a two-year transitional presidency following Saleh’s resignation in the wake of the mass protests as part of the Arab Spring of the previous year. As the transitional leader, Hadi was faced with the immense task of addressing factional grievances, while simultaneously combatting the security challenges that were rising within the state. Years of protests and civil war had resulted in a massive rise in violence and lawlessness, and terrorism had grown in its wake. Arguing that he “did not take over a nation,” but rather “a capital where gunshots [were] continuous,” Hadi was also tasked with shifting Yemen’s government to a federal system and drafting a new constitution.[16] These monumental tasks were not accomplished within his initial two-year presidency, and a mandate extended Hadi’s leadership for another year. Following the expiration of the mandate, Hadi remained in power, ostensibly to continue enacting the political reforms that his government had begun. However, in 2014, the Houthi group captured the capital city of Sana’a, forcing Hadi to negotiate with the rebel faction. The following January, President Hadi was pressured into submitting his resignation.

Hadi then turned to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states for support. Fearing Iranian influence through the Houthi movement, Saudi Arabia quickly formed a coalition aimed at returning Hadi to power. The members of the coalition include the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan, and Sudan, with the United States and Great Britain providing intelligence and logistical support. The Saudi-led coalition has bombarded Houthi strongholds in Northern Yemen, making little progress against the rebel faction but placing 70% of Yemen’s civilian population in need of humanitarian aid. The goal of the Saudi coalition is to mitigate Iranian influence by unifying Yemen under Hadi’s rule. However, peace talks in the past two years have failed, with Hadi arguing that the Houthis must surrender completely in order for the talks to succeed and the Houthis refusing to concede without a peace deal in place.

The Islamic State
As the Islamic State has lost territory in Syria and Iraq, it has heightened its focus on Yemen. The group has taken advantage of Yemen’s relative lawlessness to establish a stronghold in central Yemen. The group initially operated throughout both the southern and central regions, but the Saudi coalition has effectively eliminated its presence in the south. However, because the Saudi coalition does not reach into the al Bayda governorate in central Yemen, ISIS has retained its presence and operating capabilities there.

ISIS primarily acts alongside Sunni tribesmen and AQAP against the Shi’ite Houthis and has conducted attacks against Shi’ite mosques in the Houthi-held capital of Sana’a. The organization has also used Yemen’s chaos and lack of governance to recruit and train jihadis without interference. Further, ISIS has used central Yemen as a safe haven in which to plot and carry out anti-Western attacks, much as al-Qaeda did in the failed state of Afghanistan in the 1990s. As the world knows, al-Qaeda’s unhindered growth in Afghanistan ultimately led to the devastating World Trade Center attacks on 9/11/2001, and Yemen is currently providing a similar environment for ISIS and AQAP.

The United States began targeting ISIS’s growing presence in Yemen with its first drone strikes against the branch in mid-October 2017. This followed an ISIS propaganda video showing recruits graduating from a training camp located in central Yemen. The seriousness of ISIS’s growth in Yemen has also been highlighted by unprecedented economic sanctions placed on ISIS and al-Qaeda leaders in the region. The sanctions target AQAP financier Adil Abduh Fari Uthman al-Dhubhani as well as two top ISIS officials, Radwan Muhammad Husayn Ali Qanan and Khalid al-Marfadi. Implemented by a coalition of Arab states and the United States, these sanctions demonstrate a new level of commitment to eliminate terrorist financing in Yemen through the newly established Terrorist Financing Targeting Center.[17] Despite both its losses in other Middle Eastern states and continued counterterrorism efforts by the United States, ISIS remains a prominent threat in Yemen. Many of its supporters have been observed seeking new opportunities for jihad in places like Libya and Yemen in recent months.[18]

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
AQAP remains prominent in Yemen, while also remaining committed to the overarching Al-Qaeda goal of attacking the West. AQAP has been one of Al-Qaeda’s most active franchises, responsible for both the underwear bomber (December 2009) and the failed printer cartridge bomb plot (October 2010), among other operations against Western targets. Moreover, at least one of the terrorists who participated in the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in January 2015 received training from AQAP, and the group claimed responsibility for the entire attack. Just as Osama bin Laden emphasized the importance of alliances with local political regimes during his time in Sudan and Afghanistan, AQAP has successfully ingratiated itself with the local population of Yemen. This approach differs greatly from that of ISIS, which has sought to supplant local governments with its own caliphate. AQAP has worked hard to ally with a number of Yemeni tribes, which has allowed the group to build, maintain, and even expand its territory and sanctuary in Yemen. Due to its success, this approach is likely to be adopted by other Al-Qaeda affiliates throughout the greater Middle East.[19]

AQAP has also maintained its influence in Yemen by joining Yemen’s Popular Resistance (a pro-Hadi group) in a Sunni coalition against the Houthi Shi’ites. While this has allowed AQAP to continue its efforts against Yemen’s Shi’ites, their existence within the ranks of the Yemeni government forces has complicated foreign engagement in the region. The Saudi-led coalition and the United States have supported the pro-Hadi forces, thereby supporting AQAP by proxy. Further, while pro-government leaders are willing to protect the unity of the Popular Resistance forces, they simultaneously work to hide connections with AQAP in order to avoid the international sanctions in place against Al-Qaeda. The alliance between AQAP and pro-Hadi forces exemplifies the fluid lines between friend and enemy that exist in regions where tribalism and religious factionalism reign, and inhibit Western efforts to assert modern political systems.

Yemen’s Tribes
In addition to a civil war and foreign intervention, Yemen is also plagued by a history of tribalism that has consistently inhibited the establishment of a strong central government with popular sovereignty and a sense of national identity. Indeed, some analysts have argued that the locus of Yemen’s troubles is to be found primarily in its tribal structure rather than the presence of groups like ISIS or AQAP, or even the Saudi-Iranian competition.[20] Yemeni tribalism is often suggested as the major reason why Yemen has never had a strong central government that enjoys popular legitimacy. The Ottomans struggled for decades to retain control over Yemen, and despite their efforts to appease local tribesmen, inter-tribal competition ultimately doomed Ottoman rule. Britain likewise attempted to control Yemen, a feat only partially managed through continual negotiations with Yemeni tribes.

Today, there are three main tribal confederations in Yemen that each consist of tribes, clans, and extended families. The Bakhil and the Hashid occupy northern Yemen, while the third largest confederation, the Madhaj, occupies central Yemen. In contrast, southern Yemen is more secularized due to its history with socialism prior to unification with the north. While the Bakhil and the Hashid represent two wings of Zaidism, the Hashid have clashed with the Houthis (also claiming to support Zaidism) after a fallout between its leading clan and then President Saleh. The conflict illustrates that while the tribal confederations are sometimes aligned with the efforts of other political groups in Yemen, they diverge in their goals and aspirations for the future of their homeland.

These tribes represent both a constraint on the creation of a strong central government—Yemen has never really had such a thing—and an impediment to the crafting of a unified civil society. The groups’ divergent interests and goals also serve as a reminder that a simple Western model of governance and society cannot simply be implemented in Yemen. As has been demonstrated in areas like Iraq and Afghanistan, some new model will have to be applied in Yemen—one that addresses the complexity of tribalism within the modern political environment.

Policy Prescriptions
Yemen is, and will likely remain for the foreseeable future, a humanitarian disaster. There are no easy answers to transform war-torn Yemen into a functioning civil society with a unified government capable of building and maintaining the infrastructure necessary to provide basic human services and security on a national scale. This is a conflict that cannot be “won” by either internal factions or intervening powers—including the United States, even if it wished to—without a massive degree of “nation-building” for which the United States has little capacity or interest. Only the Yemenis themselves can resolve their internal differences and attempt to build a cohesive nation-state, though their conflicts are long-running and likely intractable. Further, nation-building’s failures in much of the Middle East has made it an increasingly unappealing option for the international community; this is a prospect well beyond the capacity of the United States, the Saudi coalition, or the United Nations. Regardless of how the current conflict ends—and to be clear, no end is in sight or easily conceivable—mere conflict termination without a concerted and long-lasting stabilization effort would only extend the current humanitarian crisis. As a result, the United States does not have many good policy options.

The United States could increase its military support for Saudi Arabia and the UAE, perhaps leveraging a greater degree of U.S. airpower, special operations, and intelligence capabilities to force the Houthis to agree to a ceasefire or make concessions that could lead to an end to the current round of fighting. However, this outcome would likely produce only a temporary cessation of hostilities or give AQAP and ISIS time to build their strength unchallenged while continuing their attacks and destabilization efforts.

While ending the current military conflict would be a considerable victory—and an absolutely critical step to beginning to address the humanitarian aspects of the crisis—a military victory alone is inadequate. Some sort of power-sharing arrangement that brings Hadi, the Houthis, Saleh’s former supporters, and the major tribal leaders into a coalition government would be required to produce a stable, long-lasting central government for Yemen, but is unlikely. Additionally, a ceasefire that temporarily ends the bulk of the fighting in Yemen but leaves the country divided would only delay Yemen’s recovery, and the unresolved issues could even make future conflicts more likely.

The fissures that emerged in the Houthi-Saleh alliance this year reveal the transitory nature of alliances within the region. This division is also likely to further complicate a potential peace deal in Yemen, as each faction has divergent goals and aims, and escalated violence will only prolong or exacerbate Yemen’s already devastating humanitarian crisis. Additionally, as fractures among allied groups further diminish even the weak governance provided by rebel authorities, AQAP and ISIS will be able to continue their expansion in these newly ungoverned areas. The United States has already launched more than 100 missiles against AQAP this year and launched its first missile strikes against ISIS in Yemen in mid-October. The increasing number of strikes against the two organizations indicates both that the groups wield an unacceptably large amount of influence in the region, and that the United States is looking to intervene against their unchallenged growth.

In recent weeks, with the winding down of anti-ISIS operations in Iraq and Syria, the Trump administration has increasingly focused its attention—and rhetoric—on Yemen, with a particular focus on Iranian arms shipments. It is important that the United States not take on any new military commitments in the region, given that America’s longest war—Afghanistan—remains unresolved, and by some measures is deteriorating; Iraq’s future remains uncertain, as do Kurdish ambitions for an autonomous state; and Syria remains embroiled in a civil war that does not appear to be ending any time soon, not to mention the ongoing geopolitical crisis with North Korea. Aside from these important concerns, the Trump administration must recall the historical baggage of past failures in nation-building in the Middle East. As a result of failed nation-building efforts in the past, no American administration should embrace a long-term, open-ended, nation-building enterprise in the Middle East.

Likewise, Saudi Arabia and its local allies should learn from past American experiences and failures in places like Iraq and Afghanistan and proceed with the understanding that a new, post-conflict Yemeni government must be capable of planning and executing its own national recovery and development efforts, and any government that does not meet this standard should be considered a failure. International aid must be contingent on Yemen successfully making the kinds of changes necessary for the creation of a lasting, unified, fully-functioning civil society and government. In the area of international aid, relationships with Yemen’s neighbors, and Saudi Arabia in particular, should be leveraged to help alleviate the current humanitarian crisis. Restrictions and contingency on aid are necessary, as recent scholarship has demonstrated that foreign aid with no political, military, or economic reform conditions has a poor track record in influencing client governments to make the internal changes necessary to carry out a successful counterinsurgency.[21]

Conclusion
The conflict in Yemen began as a civil war perpetuated by a variety of internal groups attempting to address political, economic, and social grievances. However, foreign intervention has exacerbated the local conflict and transformed it into one with significant regional and global implications. External involvement has only complicated the multidimensional conflict, and the intertwining of modern politics and the region’s historical tribalism makes a cooperative resolution improbable.
With Afghanistan and Iraq as recent examples of the difficulties of fusing tribalism with modernity, the United States cannot hope to achieve significant success in Yemen without committing to a large-scale intervention and nation-building mission. However, such an influx of foreign intervention is likely to aggravate the conflict, rather than resolve it. The United States should not commit itself to such an endeavor.

If Yemen continues on this trajectory, it is likely to be a mirror of Afghanistan and Somalia in the 1990s. Lawlessness and lack of governance will provide both a safe haven for terrorism and a disenfranchised public from which to draw new recruits. Therefore, it is in the best interest of both the United States and the global community to remain involved and invested in the efforts to combat Yemen’s disastrous humanitarian crisis. However, given the lack of politically prudent or advantageous policy options for the United States, it should strenuously avoid military intervention in Yemen. There is little that can be done to bring about an end to Yemen’s civil war or to prevent Saudi and Iranian competition for influence there; direct intervention would prove both disastrous and ineffective. However, the United States can still do some good in Yemen by encouraging the international community to ease the suffering of Yemeni civilians. This would help the most vulnerable members of Yemen’s population and curb opportunities for radicalization and jihadist recruitment among Yemeni displaced persons. Sadly, this is perhaps the only good that the United States can currently do in Yemen.

End Notes
[1] Barbara Opall-Rome, “Raytheon: Patriots intercepted over 100 tactical ballistic missiles since 2015,” DefenseNews, November 14, 2017, https://www.defensenews.com/digital...atriots-intercepted-over-100-tbms-since-2015/.
[2] Colum Lynch and Dan De Luce, “With Saudi Blockade Threatening Famine in Yemen, U.S. Points Finger at Iran,” Foreign Policy, November 22, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/11/22...ng-famine-in-yemen-u-s-points-finger-at-iran/.
[3] “Yemen war: Saudi-led air strike kills 26 at Saada market,” BBC, November 1, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41830119.
[4] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Bulletin Yemen,” Issue 28, October 29, 2017, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefw...ulletin_Issue 28_September 2017_FINAL_ENG.pdf.
[5] United Nations World Food Programme, “#FightingFamine: Update on Northeast Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen,” June 16, 2017, http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ep/wfp292340.pdf.
[6] “WHO warns that more people will die if ports in Yemen do not reopen to humanitarian aid,” November 9, 2017, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2017/yemen-ports-aid/en/.
[7] Bethan McKiernan, “Saudi Arabia lifts blockade on Yemen air and seaports to allow in vital aid,” The Independent, November 22, 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/w...port-lifted-humanitarian-crisis-a8069916.html.
[8] “Yemen war: Saudi coalition to let aid reach rebel-held port,” BBC News, November 22, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42086735.
[9] Jackson Diehl, “No one is paying attention to the worst humanitarian crisis since World War II,” Washington Post, June 25, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opin...d055f8-5767-11e7-ba90-f5875b7d1876_story.html.
[10] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Yemen: Revised Humanitarian Response Plan – Funding Status,” November 12, 2017, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ocha_yemen_funding_status_20171112.pdf.
[11] “Hassan al-Homran, spokesperson for Ansar Allah,” Yemen Post, November 22, 2013, http://yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?SubID=7375.
[12] Mohamed Bin Sallam, “Houthis reject dialogue,” Yemen Times, May 3, 2012, https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/houthis-reject-dialogue.
[13] Nasar al Wasmi, “Yemen War: Cracks emerge in Houthis-Saleh alliance,” The National, August 20, 2017, https://www.thenational.ae/world/yemen-war-cracks-emerge-in-houthis-saleh-alliance-1.621406.
[14] Ali Al-Mujahed and Kareem Fahim, “Yemen’s rebel alliance appears to fracture as clashes leave dozens dead,” Washington Post, December 2, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/worl...c8cb8-d799-11e7-9461-ba77d604373d_story.html; Noah Browning, “The last hours of Yemen's Saleh,” Reuters, December 4, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-.../the-last-hours-of-yemens-saleh-idUSKBN1E20YY.
[15] Anthony H. Cordesman, “Iran, the Gulf, the JCPOA, and American Strategy,” CSIS, August 29, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/iran-gulf-jcpoa-and-american-strategy.
[16] Mohamed Ghobari, “Yemeni president’s term extended, Shi’ite Muslim leader killed,” Reuters, January 21, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...te-muslim-leader-killed-idUSBREA0K13420140121.
[17] Carlo Muñoz, “U.S. ramps up air war against Islamic State in Yemen as fight subsides in Iraq and Syria,” The Washington Times, October 30, 2017, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/oct/30/us-ramps-up-isis-air-war-in-yemen/.
[18] Andrew Byers and Tara Mooney, “ISIS After the Caliphate,” Small Wars Journal, September 2, 2017, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/isis-after-the-caliphate.
[19] Andrew Byers and Tara Mooney, “Al-Qaeda in the Age of ISIS,” Small Wars Journal, July 24, 2017, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/al-qaeda-in-the-age-of-isis.
[20] Asher Orkaby, “Yemen’s Humanitarian Nightmare: The Real Roots of the Conflict,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2017), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/yemen/2017-10-16/yemens-humanitarian-nightmare.
[21] Walter C. Ladwig III, The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships in Counterinsurgency (Cambridge University Press, 2017).

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Tags: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula AQAP Houthis Iran ISIS Islamic State military intervention regional conflict Saudi Arabia tribes yemen
About the Authors

Andrew Byers
Andrew Byers is a military historian who has taught at Duke University and who served as an intelligence and counterterrorism analyst. He is the co-founder of the Counter Extremism Network (www.counterextremismnetwork.com).


Faith Stewart
Faith Stewart is a Middle East analyst with the Counter Extremism Network (www.counterextremismnetwork.com).

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://defenceindepth.co/2018/01/1...-of-military-violence-in-peer-state-conflict/

Current Russian and Chinese ways of warfare: the end (?) of military violence in peer-state conflict

DR ROD THORNTON
January 17, 2018

When it comes to the winning of wars, it might be thought that military organisations today, just as they have always done, would be concentrating their efforts on how best to use kinetic force. Military violence is, after all, what militaries do. But not, it seems, any more – or at least not in regard to peer-state warfare as conducted by the Russian and Chinese militaries. Today, both are making the case that armed forces using actual armed force to win major wars is a little passé. As Timothy Thomas of the US Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office puts it, when it comes to the winning of wars against its state rivals, Russia now – and remarkably – has a ‘General Staff [with a] reliance on non-military methods of thought’. Such a reliance by such a body would appear to be unique in the annals of modern warfare.

As both the Russian and Chinese militaries have realised, peer-state warfare has moved on. Strategic thinking in this realm has undergone a quiet revolution over the last decade or so. New opportunities are now presenting themselves for militaries to ‘win’ wars against their peer-state adversaries in ways that would have been unthinkable until quite recently. In ‘modern conflicts’, as General Andrei Kartapolov, the current commander of Russia’s Western Military District (and former Deputy Head of the General Staff) expressed it, the ‘goal is not the physical destruction of the opponent or state infrastructure but rather the full subordination of its leadership and elites to [the attacker’s] will’. It is this full subordination of will that now equates, in the eyes of the Russian military, to the winning of wars.

Karl von Clausewitz himself was of the same opinion. The goal of warfare, he noted, was indeed to impose your will on the enemy. His logic, however, was that this could only be achieved by first overpowering the enemy’s armed forces in the field. This, by extension, would then lead to the imposition of will on that enemy’s ‘leadership and elites’. Nowadays, though, and given the information warfare and other non-violent means available, the military of one state can totally miss out the intervening variable of an adversary’s armed forces and simply, in terms of imposing its will, move straight on to controlling the adversary’s ‘leadership and elites’. In current logic, military violence – the ability to visit ‘physical destruction’ on a peer-state adversary – and however counter-intuitive it may seem, need no longer play a part in the ‘winning’ of major wars. This is clearly the view expressed by Kartapolov and also by a host of other writers in Russian military journals.

The Chinese military takes the same approach. This was framed back in 1999 by the ‘Two Colonels’ from the PLA in their seminal book, Unrestricted Warfare. They were of the opinion that in warfare ‘the best way to achieve victory is to control, not to kill’. It is this philosophy that underpins the current Chinese ‘Three Warfares’ idea (i.e. media, psychological and legal), which sees Beijing’s ‘wars’ being won without any actual fighting. Indeed, the use of any ‘kinetic engagement’ in such wars is seen as ‘irrational’ because it is simply not needed.

The basic reason behind both of these militaries’ move towards a ‘reliance on non-military methods of thought’ is, of course, weakness. There is, within both the Russian and Chinese armed forces, a sense of inferiority when compared with Western counterparts and, in particular, with the forces of the United States. It is certainly being made clear in Russian military writings that, for the foreseeable future, overt conflict with Western peer-state adversaries has to be avoided. It is being admitted that in such a conflict Russian forces would face inevitable defeat.

The problem, though, for both Russian and Chinese generals, is that despite this position of relative weakness, their militaries still have to be able to create strategic effect against Western adversaries. Their countries see themselves as being involved in long-term competition with such adversaries. From the Kremlin’s point of view, for instance, the Russian military has two primary tasks in regard to NATO and they are both deterrence-related. The first is to prevent any possibility of a NATO act of ‘aggression’ against the homeland (however unlikely this might seem from a Western perspective) and the second is to prevent any interference by NATO wherever Russian forces might intervene abroad (such as currently in Ukraine and Syria). The most efficient way for the Russian military to fulfill both tasks is to make sure that no high-level decisions are ever taken by NATO states to use military force against Russia itself or use it to counter Russian military activities on the international stage (see my recent article here).

The weaknesses perceived by both Russian and Chinese militaries has forced them to think more about the concept of warfighting rather than about how best to deliver kinetic effect. As Russian President Vladimir Putin himself once put it, his military had to use its ‘intellect’ more.

This intellectual effort has led, in the Russian case, to a form of warfare today that is deeply asymmetric and ‘indirect’ in tone. It is summed up in the noun/verb currently being much employed in Russian military circles: ‘neutralisation/neutralise’ (neitralizatsiya/neitralizovat’). As one article in a Russian military journal puts it, ‘the indirect action strategy [against Western adversaries] will draw on, above all, a great variety of forms and methods of non-military techniques and non-military measures, including information warfare to neutralise adversary actions without resorting to weapons’. The word also appears in Russian military doctrine itself: the threat, this document notes, from Russia’s NATO adversaries has to be ‘neutralised’. Indeed, last month Putin also used the same word, saying that the role of the Russian military had to ‘effectively neutralise’ threats to the country.

This neutralisation is designed to be achieved basically through the use of these ‘non-military techniques and non-military measures’ to engender the aforementioned ‘full subordination of leadership and elites to [Russian] will’. In essence, the leadership and elites of adversary states would be intimidated, persuaded, manipulated or inveigled into making decisions that run in Moscow’s favour. This would be done via a host of actions applied by the Russian military in coordination with other organs of state power and employed over a long time-period and working to create both top-down and bottom-up pressures. While the ideal is stated to be – as with the Chinese aspiration – to gain actual ‘control’ [kontrol’] over an opponent’s decision-making, a lesser but still substantial goal is to engender a degree of disunity within an opponent’s ‘leadership and elites’. This is done so that decisions are either never agreed upon or are made too slowly to effectively counter, for instance, Russian or Chinese aggressive military actions.

In the Russian case, while principally targeting those individual states with views distinctly antithetical to Russian interests, a prime outcome is to create a disunity in regard to decision-making vis-à-vis Russia within NATO ranks. Such a disunity would undermine the Alliance’s capacity to threaten/coerce/deter Russia and, in particular, to challenge Russian military activities abroad (including in Ukraine). For of course, if no decision is ever made by NATO to use force against the Russian military then it does not matter how weak that military is in relation to those of the NATO powers. A Russian military left unchallenged is one free to achieve its objectives – to ‘win’ its wars.

There is, however, a paradox here; a paradox of modern strategy. There is a certain understanding in these moves by both the Russian and Chinese militaries away from the use of military violence as a provider of strategic effect and more towards the use of non-military modes of warfare. This understanding is that the effectiveness of such means actually relies for optimal effect on the possession of significant military strength. The non-violent modes of warfare designed to shape and hinder adversary states’ decision-making has to be backed up by an impression of both threat and resolve. Threat and resolve act to produce their own psychological pressure that can influence such decision-making. Both Russia and China are working hard to create proficient, capable and well-equipped military organisations that, while they would still be found wanting against US/NATO military technologies in open warfare, can still be seen to represent a threat. This threat is then magnified by planned displays of resolve through sabre-rattling: the likes of provocative military exercises, intimidatory troop deployments and threats of nuclear weapon first-use. Within any adversary’s leadership and elites dovish elements will be cowed by such activity while the more hawkish will demand action. An incapacitating disunity – both within targeted states within their alliances – is the desired result. Thus military proficiency allied to aggressive signalling can and will reinforce the ability of ‘other means’ to influence or slow down the decision-making of a rival state’s leadership elements.

Thus it appears to be the case that both Russian and China are developing military organisations that will be used – at least in regard to peer-state warfare – more for their bark than their bite. There will be a ‘reliance on non-military modes of thought’. Indeed, they do not need the bite. Both recognise that in warfare today, as Kartopolov put it, ‘the goal is not the physical destruction of the opponent’. Using violence is deemed unnecessary, ‘irrational’. The goal is simply to either ‘neutralise’ or, more ideally, to gain ‘control’ of that opponent’s decision-making processes in order to achieve desired strategic effects. This perhaps represents what passes for ‘victory’ in peer-state warfare today.

 

[danielboon]

Trump to meet Netanyahu, world leaders, at Davos

US President Donald Trump will meet with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Rwandan President Paul Kagame and other world leaders when he attends the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, this week, White House officials said on Tuesday.

Trump will travel on Wednesday to the business forum where he will encourage investment in the United States and cooperation on national
security issues including the fight against Islamic State and North Korea's nuclear activities.
"The president will use his travel to the World Economic Forum to reiterate his commitment to mutually beneficial partnerships and ... to fair and reciprocal international economic systems," White House national security adviser H.R. McMaster said on Tuesday during a briefing.

In addition to meetings with world leaders, Trump will also host a small dinner for European business executives on Thursday night.
"The attendees run companies that have sizeable footprints in the United States. They have invested in our economy, we want them to continue to do so and encourage others to join them," White House economic adviser Gary Cohn said at the briefing. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5075386,00.html

 

[danielboon]

US, British citizens join battle against Turkey in Syria's Afrin -SDF official

US, British and German volunteers who have fought Islamic State with Kurdish-led forces in Syria are in the Afrin region to battle a Turkish assault there, an official with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) said on Wednesday.The Kurdish Afrin region is being targeted in an assault by the Turkish army and Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army groups."There was a desire on the part of the foreign fighters who fought in Raqqa and who are fighting in Deir al-Zor to go to Afrin," senior SDF official Redur Xelil told Reuters.He declined to say when the foreigners had gone to Afrin, but said they numbered in the "tens". "They will wage battles against the Turkish invasion," Xelil said."There are Americans, Britons, Germans, different nationalities from Europe, Asia and America," Xelil said. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,...075577,00.html

 

[danielboon]

Strategic Sentinel@StratSentinel 9 hHá 9 horas
#China has revealed they have two underwater sensors near #Guam and the #SouthChinaSea. The undersea listening devices are likely monitoring the movements of American and other foreign submarines and potentially intercepting their communications.

Chad O'Carroll‏@chadocl 4h4 hours agoNorth Korea warns U.S. military could “disrupt” ongoing inter-Korean talks http://dlvr.it/QCWpLW

Nathan J Hunt‏@ISNJH 10h10 hours ago
Nathan J Hunt Retweeted Yonhap News Agency
South Korean Main opposition party makes call for #DPRK to scrap plans for military parade day before games.

 

[danielboon]

Conflict News @Conflicts 30 sek.
BREAKING: Trump to call Turkey's Erdogan amid concern over Syria offensive, US official says - @i24NEWS_EN

Trump May Increase U.S. Forces in Afghanistan to Nearly 15,000
http://www.breitbart.com/jihad/2018/...eitbart News)

Trump Administration Cedes ‘Legitimate’ Turkish Concerns as Invasion of Syria Continues
http://www.breitbart.com/national-se...eitbart News)

 

[danielboon]

Conflict News @Conflicts 6 hod.
UPDATE: Death toll rises to 41 dead and 80 wounded by twin car explosions in Benghazi, according to medical sources at Al-Galaa Hospital and Benghazi Medical Center. - @alwasatengnews

Al-Masdar News @TheArabSource 5 hod.
Turkish forces capture several areas in northern #Afrin, Syria after fierce battle with YPG - map
https://www.almasdarnews.com/article...attle-ypg-map/

Syria frontlines- @SyriaWarReports · 6 min.
2 US mil. advisers dead after Turkish bombing in #Afrin – source