WAR 01-13-2017-to-01-19-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

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(303) 12-23-2017-to-12-29-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...2-29-2017___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(304) 12-30-2017-to-01-05-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...1-05-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(305) 01-06-2017-to-01-12-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...1-12-2018___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1204647/tightening-the-screws-on-the-inf/

Tightening the Screws on the INF
by ACW Podcast | January 12, 2018 | No Comments

Pod Cast

The Trump Administration is naming names, confirming what Jeffrey has long said ? that the new cruise missile Russia is building in violation of the 1987 INF Treaty is the 9M729, which is known in the US as the SSC-8 Screwdriver.

Aaron and Jeffrey discuss Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty, offering a deep dive on the new ground-launched cruise missile and the RS-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile.

Previous Podcast Episodes about this Topic:
An Era Without Arms Control?
The INF, NATO, and the MSC
The Little Green Men and a New Cruise Missile
Russia and the INF: Don’t Call it a Circumvention
Is Russia Cheating on the INF Treaty? This was the very first Arms Control Wonk Podcast episode!
Support us over at Patreon.com/acwpodcast!
Sponsored Links:
Our sponsor this episode is ActionKit, a powerful suit of online campaigning tools.
https://actionkit.com/wonk
 

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http://www.france24.com/en/20180113-iran-rejects-change-nuclear-deal

13 January 2018 - 09H20

Iran rejects any change to nuclear deal

TEHRAN (AFP) - Iran on Saturday rejected any modification of its nuclear deal with world powers after US President Donald Trump demanded tough new measures to keep the agreement alive.

Iran "will not accept any amendments in this agreement, be it now or in the future, and it will not allow any other issues to be linked to the JCPOA," the foreign ministry said in a statement, using the 2015 deal's technical name.

Trump again waived nuclear-related sanctions on Friday -- as required every few months to stay in the agreement -- but demanded European partners work with the United States to "fix the deal's disastrous flaws, or the United States will withdraw".

He said the new deal should curb Iran's missile programme and include permanent restrictions on Iran's nuclear plants, removing expiration dates due to kick in after a decade.

But Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said the 2015 deal could not be renegotiated.

"JCPOA is not renegotiable: rather than repeating tired rhetoric, US must bring itself into full compliance -- just like Iran," Zarif tweeted immediately after Trump's speech.

The statement from his ministry further criticised new sanctions on 14 individuals announced by the US Treasury on Friday over human rights issues and Iran's missile programme.

In particular, placing judiciary chief Ayatollah Sadegh Larijani on the sanctions list "crossed all red lines of conduct in the international community... and the government of the United States will bear responsibility for all the consequences of this hostile move".

Iran argues that continued US sanctions on non-nuclear areas such as human rights and missile testing have effectively barred Iran from gaining many of the financial benefits expected from the deal.

Zarif has said Trump's aggressive stance on the deal and Iran generally have also violated the commitment to "refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iran" in the accord.
 

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https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...-new-sanctions-draw-iran-threat-idUSKBN1F20FG

#World News January 13, 2018 / 4:13 AM / Updated 2 hours ago

U.S. ultimatum on nuclear deal, new sanctions draw Iran threat

Andrey Ostroukh
5 Min Read

MOSCOW (Reuters) - Iran said on Saturday it would retaliate against new sanctions imposed by the United States after President Donald Trump set an ultimatum to fix “disastrous flaws” in a deal curbing Tehran’s nuclear program.

Trump said on Friday he would waive nuclear sanctions on Iran for the last time to give the United States and European allies a final chance to amend the pact. Washington also imposed sanctions on the head of Iran’s judiciary and others.

Russia - one of the parties to the Iran pact alongside the United States, China, France, Britain, Germany and the European Union - called Trump’s comments “extremely negative.”

The ultimatum puts pressure on Europeans, key backers of the 2015 nuclear deal, to satisfy Trump, who wants the pact strengthened with a separate agreement within 120 days.

While approving the waiver on U.S. sanctions related to the nuclear deal, Washington announced other sanctions against 14 Iranian entities and people, including judiciary head Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani, a close ally of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Describing sanctions against Larijani as “hostile action”, Iran’s Foreign Ministry said the move “crossed all red lines of conduct in the international community and is a violation of international law and will surely be answered by a serious reaction of the Islamic Republic,” state media reported.

It did not specify what any retaliation might involve.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif had earlier said on Twitter that the deal was “not renegotiable” and that Trump’s move “amounts to desperate attempts to undermine a solid multilateral agreement.”

Iran says its nuclear program has only peaceful aims and says it will stick to the accord as long as others respect it. But it has said it would “shred” the deal if Washington quit.

“LAST CHANCE”
Trump, who has sharply criticized the deal reached in Barack Obama’s presidency, had chafed at having to once again waive sanctions on a country he sees as a threat in the Middle East.

“Despite my strong inclination, I have not yet withdrawn the United States from the Iran nuclear deal,” Trump said in a statement, saying the options were to fix “the deal’s disastrous flaws, or the United States will withdraw.”

“This is a last chance,” Trump said, pushing for a separate agreement and saying the United States would not waive sanctions again to keep Iran in the pact without such an agreement.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov called Trump’s remarks ”extremely negative“, RIA state news agency reported. ”Our worst fears are being confirmed,” he said.

The EU said in a statement it had taken note of Trump’s decision and would assess its implications. “It’s going to be complicated to save the deal after this,” said one European diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Britain, France and Germany had called on Trump on Thursday to uphold the pact.

Senior U.S. administration officials told reporters Trump would work with Europeans on a follow-on deal to enshrine triggers that the Iranian government could not exceed related to ballistic missiles.

Republican Senator Bob Corker said “significant progress” had been made on bipartisan congressional legislation to address “flaws in the agreement without violating U.S. commitments.”

CONDITIONS
Trump laid out conditions to keep Washington in the deal. Iran must allow “immediate inspections at all sites requested by international inspectors,” he said, and “sunset” provisions imposing limits on Iran’s nuclear program must not expire.

Trump said U.S. law must tie long-range missile and nuclear weapons programs together, making any missile testing by Iran subject to “severe sanctions.”

The president wants U.S. Congress to modify a law that reviews U.S. participation in the nuclear deal to include “trigger points” that, if violated, would lead to the United States reimposing its sanctions, the official said.

This would not entail negotiations with Iran but would be the result of talks with European allies, the official said.

A decision to withhold a waiver would have effectively ended the deal between Iran and the other international signatories. The other parties to the agreement would have been unlikely to join the United States in reimposing sanctions.

Two EU diplomats said EU foreign ministers would discuss next steps at their next regular meeting on Jan. 22 in Brussels.

Additional reporting by by Andrey Ostroukh in Moscow, Jeff Mason, Doina Chiacu, David Alexander and Arshad Mohammed in Washington, Robin Emmott in Brussels, John Irish in Paris and Parisa Hafezi in Ankara; Writing by Edmund Blair; Editing by Alexander Smith
 

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https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...ned-mercenaries-back-bosnias-serb-separatists

Russian-trained mercenaries back Bosnia's Serb separatists

Security minister confirms report, fuelling fears of destabilisation of the Balkans and a resistance to Nato enlargement

Zurnal published photographs of the militia on the streets of Banja Luka, posing in military fatigues. Photograph: Žurnal

Julian Borger in Washington
Fri 12 Jan 2018 13.23 EST

Russian-trained mercenaries are helping to establish a paramilitary unit serving the Serb separatist leader in Bosnia, it was reported in Sarajevo on Friday.

The report on the Žurnal news site, which was confirmed by the Bosnian security minister, comes at a time of mounting western anxiety about Russian efforts to destabilise the Balkans and resist Nato enlargement in the region.

Serbia deports Russians suspected of plotting Montenegro coup
Read more

On Tuesday, Milorad Dodik, the hardline leader of the Serb half of Bosnia, staged a military parade in Banja Luka in defiance of a ruling by the country’s constitutional court.

The Žurnal report said that a militia called “Serbian Honour” – which it said had been trained in a Russian-funded “humanitarian centre” in Serbia – was in the process of setting up a paramilitary group to be used against Dodik’s opponents.

It published photographs of the militia on the streets of Banja Luka, the administrative centre of the Republika Srpska, a semi-autonomous entity within Bosnia created by the Dayton peace agreement that ended the 1992-95 war. The pictures show the paramilitaries posing in black sweaters and in combat gear.

The report, including a picture of the award ceremony, says one of the group’s leaders, Bojan Stojkoviæ, is a former Serbian paratrooper who had trained in Moscow, and had been awarded a medal by Valeriy Kalyakin, a Russian general.
Dragan Mektiæ, the Bosnian security minister, said intelligence and security services were aware of the presence and activities of the group.

“We have been using this information for a long time, we have collected quite a lot of information about that,” Mektiæ said, adding he could not provide further details as his officials were compiling a full report for the Bosnian prosecutor’s office.

The Zurnal report said the group was recruiting from the Serb criminal underworld to form a new paramilitary unit loyal to Dodik. It quotes a leaked security service document as saying that Dodik’s aides discussed the aims of the new unit with “Serbian Honour” leaders and the goals would include “possible intervention if the opposition seeks to obstruct the functioning of the authorities”.

“For such a president, it is worth to give one’s life”, Stojkoviæ wrote under a picture of Vladimir Putin on his Instagram profile, according to the report.

Under the photo of Dodik, he wrote: “Nobody can do us any harm, we are stronger than destiny”.

The appearance of the paramilitaries in Bosnia comes 15 months after Russian intelligence was implicated in an abortive coup in Montenegro, in which mercenaries planned to storm parliament, assassinate Milo Ðukanoviæ, the country’s pro-western leader, , and prevent it from joining Nato. The plot was foiled and Montenegro became a Nato member in June 2017.

The Bosnian government is also pursuing Nato membership, but the resistance of the Republika Srpska under Dodik is hindering progress.

“This is part of a larger change in the international order, starting with the invasion in Georgia, Syria, Ukraine, the meddling in the US elections,” said Reuf Bajroviæ, Bosnia’s former energy minister, calling the appearance of the paramilitaries in Banja Luka a “watershed moment”.

“The Russians have decided to use their leverage in the Balkans to get the outcome they want: the end of the Dayton accords and the creation of a Serb statelet.”
 

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https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...ew-syrian-force-angering-turkey-idUSKBN1F30OA

#World News January 14, 2018 / 6:48 AM / Updated an hour ago

U.S.-led coalition helps build new Syrian force, angering Turkey

Reuters Staff
4 Min Read

BEIRUT/ISTANBUL (Reuters) - The U.S.-led coalition is working with its Syrian militia allies to set up a new border force of 30,000 personnel, the coalition said on Sunday, a move that has added to Turkish anger over U.S. support for Kurdish-dominated forces in Syria.

A senior Turkish official told Reuters the U.S. training of the new “Border Security Force” is the reason that the U.S. charge d‘affaires was summoned in Ankara on Wednesday. The official did not elaborate.

The force, whose inaugural class is currently being trained, will be deployed at the borders of the area controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) - an alliance of militias in northern and eastern Syria dominated by the Kurdish YPG.

In an email to Reuters, the coalition’s Public Affairs Office confirmed details of the new force reported by The Defense Post. About half the force will be SDF veterans, and recruiting for the other half is underway, the coalition’s Public Affairs Office said.

The force will deploy along the border with Turkey to the north, the Iraqi border to the southeast, and along the Euphrates River Valley, which broadly acts as the dividing line separating the U.S.-backed SDF and Syrian government forces backed by Iran and Russia.

U.S. support for the SDF has put enormous strain on ties with NATO ally Turkey, which views the YPG as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) - a group that has waged a three-decade insurgency in Turkey.

Syria’s main Kurdish groups have emerged as one of the few winners of the Syrian war, and are working to entrench their autonomy over swathes of northern Syria.

Washington opposes those autonomy plans, even as it has backed the SDF, the main partner for the U.S.-led coalition against Islamic State in Syria.

The coalition said the BSF would operate under SDF command and around 230 individuals were currently undergoing training in its inaugural class.

”Efforts are taken to ensure individuals serve in areas close to their homes. Therefore, the ethnic composition of the force will be relative to the areas in which they serve.

“More Kurds will serve in the areas in northern Syria. More Arabs will serve in areas along the Euphrates River Valley and along the border with Iraq to the south,” the coalition’s Public Affairs Office said.

“A NEW MISSION”
“The base of the new force is essentially a realignment of approximately 15,000 members of the SDF to a new mission in the Border Security Force as their actions against ISIS draw to a close,” it said.

“They will be providing border security through professionally securing checkpoints and conducting counter-IED operations,” it said, adding that coalition and SDF forces were still engaging Islamic State pockets in Deir al-Zor province.

IED stands for improvised explosive device.

The United States has about 2,000 troops in Syria fighting Islamic State, and has said it is prepared to stay in the country until it is certain Islamic State is defeated, that stabilization efforts can be sustained, and there is meaningful progress in U.N.-led peace talks on ending the conflict.

The Syrian government in Damascus has declared the United States an illegal occupation force, and its SDF allies as “traitors”. A top Syrian Kurdish politician told Reuters last week the United States appeared in no hurry to leave Syria.

Reporting by Tom Perry in Beirut and Dominic Evans in Istanbul, editing by Louise Heavens
 

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https://geopoliticalfutures.com/turkey-breaks-iran-russia/

Turkey Breaks With Iran and Russia

January 11, 2018
Despite setting up “de-escalation zones” in Syria, the three countries are at odds.

By Jacob L. Shapiro

The “Astana troika” is in danger of breaking up. After meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan, in mid-September, Turkey, Iran and Russia agreed to serve as guarantors of a cease-fire agreement in Syria. Four “de-escalation zones” were established with the goal of a six-month pause (subject to further extension) in fighting between the forces of Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime and anti-government rebels in these zones. The problem with this arrangement is that these countries don’t see eye to eye. Turkey supports the anti-government rebels. Russia and Iran support Assad’s regime. Now the two sides are accusing each other of supporting their favorites rather than keeping the peace.

syria-de-escalation-zones.jpg

https://geopoliticalfutures.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/syria-de-escalation-zones.jpg

On Jan. 9, the Turkish Foreign Ministry summoned the Russian and Iranian ambassadors to express its concerns over the Assad regime’s advances in the Idlib de-escalation zone, the largest, most strategic and most contested of the four zones. The next day, Turkey’s foreign minister pointed the finger at Russia and Iran, insisting that Turkey’s two purported partners needed to do more to stop the Syrian regime and fulfill their duties as guarantors of the cease-fire. The same day, Yeni Safak, a Turkish newspaper known for its strong support of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government, claimed that the Assad regime’s advance was coordinated with the Islamic State, with the tacit support of Russia and Iran. Turkey likes to accuse all its enemies of being in cahoots with IS, but Russia and Iran aren’t supposed to be enemies. That makes the report notable, regardless of its admittedly dubious veracity.

This isn’t the first time Turkey has had cause for concern about the actions of Russia and Iran. On Dec. 20, Reuters reported that the Syrian army, backed by Russian air support, had seized 50 villages in southern Idlib province the previous week. On Dec. 25, Anadolu Agency reported Syrian and Russian airstrikes in both Idlib and Hama provinces. On Jan. 7, TRT reported additional airstrikes in Idlib, and the next day, Anadolu reported that a Turkish military convoy in Idlib had come under fire from unknown assailants. And on Jan. 10, Syria’s state-run news agency SANA reported that Syrian government forces and allies had captured 23 new villages in the Idlib countryside.

Different Points of View
From Turkey’s perspective, the Assad regime, with Russian air support and Iran’s blessing, is attempting to assert its control over territories currently held by anti-Assad regime rebels. The victims of this offensive are civilians and moderate opposition groups that Turkey has pledged to defend.

Russia, for its part, does not accept that the terms of the cease-fire apply to all elements of the opposition. The dominant militia in Idlib is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a jihadist group whose core element is al-Qaida’s Syrian branch. Russia views HTS as a fair target and is encouraging the Assad regime to attack HTS fighters wherever they hold territory. HTS strongholds happen to be in Idlib, so that is where Russia is concentrating its resources. Eliminating jihadists, from Russia’s point of view, is a necessary part of maintaining the de-escalation zones. Furthermore, Russia expected Turkey to put pressure on HTS to give up its arms and disband when its forces entered Idlib province. Turkey has declined to do so, at times even collaborating with HTS on the ground, giving Russia the pretense it needs to support further Assad regime consolidation efforts.

It’s important to keep in mind that none of this was Russia’s preferred outcome. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the defeat of IS and the imminent withdrawal of Russian troops from Syria on Dec. 6, in part because he calculated that conditions were ripe for a political solution to the Syrian civil war. Putin’s political solution and the triumphant recall of Russian troops now seem a distant memory. On Dec. 31, at least two Russian soldiers were killed when Hmeimim air base was shelled, reportedly by jihadist militants. Russia disputed reports that a significant number of its planes were damaged in the attack. Then, on Jan. 6, 13 unmanned aerial vehicles attacked the base at Hmeimim and a logistics center at Tartus. According to Russia’s Ministry of Defense, the attacking UAVs were neutralized. The two attacks have underscored just how far Russia is from being able to pull out its forces, and how vulnerable its forces are to attack.

Russia has since made a point of providing two more details about the Jan. 6 attack. On Jan. 8, the Russian Ministry of Defense said the UAVs were of such sophistication that they “could have been received only from a country with high technological potential on providing satellite navigation and distant control of firing.” In other words: the United States. (The Pentagon has rejected these claims as ludicrous and noted that IS regularly uses primitive UAVs to attack U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces fighters in eastern Syria.) Then, on Jan. 10, the Defense Ministry’s newspaper published a report that said the UAVs had been launched from Muazzara in southwestern Idlib. The report said that this territory was under the control of “moderate opposition” forces backed by the Turkish government and that Russia had sent a formal complaint of its own to high-level Turkish officials exhorting them to ensure Turkey enforced the cease-fire.

Iran Leans Toward Russia
Iran has not made its views known on this particular incident. The presence of Iran’s foreign minister in Moscow on Jan. 10, however, as well as its own military support of Assad’s advances in Idlib, indicate that Iran’s views are more closely aligned with Russia than with Turkey on this matter, which only makes sense. Though Turkey and Iran have some interests in common, they diverge in Syria, despite prior short-term tactical cooperation against Kurdish groups. Iran looks at the Assad regime as integral to its strategy to increase its power. Turkey views Iran as a long-term rival that has amassed an impressive strategic advantage in recent months and needs to be cut back down to size. Turkey also sees that Iran, at least for now, has tied its ambitions to Russia, another long-term Turkish rival.

Nevertheless, the “alliance” among these three countries was built on a mismatch of interests. It’s a perfect example of the old adage that two’s company, three’s a crowd. The more countries you try to cram into an alliance, the more tenuous the alliance becomes. It was one thing to coordinate moves when all sides could agree that defeating the Islamic State was the main priority. But the defeat of IS eliminated the only common ground these countries had in Syria. Turkey’s ideal political solution sees Assad removed and the country stitched back together under Sunni aegis. Iran’s ideal political solution sees Assad restored but dependent on Iran and its proxies for survival. Russia’s ideal political solution is any that makes it appear strong and keeps Assad as a somewhat independent actor, neither dependent on Tehran nor fearful of Ankara’s next move. Something’s got to give.

Now these fissures are coming out into the open, just a week before representatives of Iran, Turkey and Russia are to meet to plan the Sochi Congress on Syria’s Future, scheduled for Jan. 29-30. Even the preparations for this meeting have been tense, with some Syrian opposition groups refusing to attend and Turkey insisting that it will not attend any meeting that includes the YPG, the militia representing Syrian Kurds. Russia reportedly had invited YPG representatives in October but backed off when Turkey objected. Syrian Kurdish officials insisted as recently as two weeks ago that Moscow has promised them an invitation, while Turkey maintains that Russia has agreed not to do so. Russia, for its part, has a history of supporting anti-Turkish Kurdish groups when it’s strategically useful to keep Turkey distracted.

Regardless of who attends the Sochi meeting, Syria’s future will not be decided there, or in Astana or Geneva or Timbuktu. It’s being decided on the ground in Syria right now, and it’s bringing Turkey into conflict, however unwillingly, with its historical rivals. The Astana troika may very well figure out a way to paper over these inconsistencies during the meeting in Sochi, but it’s all a charade. On the ground, the Assad regime has the upper hand and Russia is calling the shots, still very much at war. Iran is biding its time, hoping to capitalize on Russia’s eventual fatigue. Turkey finds itself backed into a corner but without the requisite strength to preserve its interests. It needs to stall, but angry comments to ambassadors won’t stop Assad or Russia, though they will produce nice headlines. Turkey is searching for a way to stop Assad, and if it can’t find one, it will be on the losing end of this breakup.
 

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Posted for fair use.....
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/worl...h-korea/ar-AAuGLX8?li=BBmkt5R&ocid=spartandhp

Military Quietly Prepares for a Last Resort: War With North Korea

The New York Times
By HELENE COOPER, ERIC SCHMITT, THOMAS GIBBONS-NEFF and JOHN ISMAY
4 hrs ago

WASHINGTON — Across the military, officers and troops are quietly preparing for a war they hope will not come.

At Fort Bragg in North Carolina last month, a mix of 48 Apache gunships and Chinook cargo helicopters took off in an exercise that practiced moving troops and equipment under live artillery fire to assault targets. Two days later, in the skies above Nevada, 119 soldiers from the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division parachuted out of C-17 military cargo planes under cover of darkness in an exercise that simulated a foreign invasion.

Next month, at Army posts across the United States, more than 1,000 reserve soldiers will practice how to set up so-called mobilization centers that move military forces overseas in a hurry. And beginning next month with the Winter Olympics in the South Korean town of Pyeongchang, the Pentagon plans to send more Special Operations troops to the Korean Peninsula, an initial step toward what some officials said ultimately could be the formation of a Korea-based task force similar to the types that are fighting in Iraq and Syria. Others said the plan was strictly related to counterterrorism efforts.

In the world of the American military, where contingency planning is a mantra drummed into the psyche of every officer, the moves are ostensibly part of standard Defense Department training and troop rotations. But the scope and timing of the exercises suggest a renewed focus on getting the country’s military prepared for what could be on the horizon with North Korea.

Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and General Joseph F. Dunford Jr., the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, both argue forcefully for using diplomacy to address Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. A war with North Korea, Mr. Mattis said in August, would be “catastrophic.” Still, about two dozen current and former Pentagon officials and senior commanders said in interviews that the exercises largely reflected the military’s response to orders from Mr. Mattis and service chiefs to be ready for any possible military action on the Korean Peninsula.

President Trump’s own words have left senior military leaders and rank-and-file troops convinced that they need to accelerate their contingency planning.

In perhaps the most incendiary exchange, in a September speech at the United Nations, Mr. Trump vowed to “totally destroy North Korea” if it threatened the United States, and derided the rogue nation’s leader, Kim Jong-un, as “Rocket Man.” In response, Mr. Kim said he would deploy the “highest level of hard-line countermeasure in history” against the United States, and described Mr. Trump as a “mentally deranged U.S. dotard.”

Mr. Trump’s rhetoric has since cooled, following a fresh attempt at détente between Pyongyang and Seoul. In an interview last week with The Wall Street Journal, Mr. Trump was quoted as saying, “I probably have a very good relationship with Kim Jong-un,” despite their mutual public insults. But the president said on Sunday that The Journal had misquoted him, and that he had actually said “I’d probably have” a good relationship if he wanted one.

A false alarm in Hawaii on Saturday that set off about 40 minutes of panic after a state emergency response employee mistakenly sent out a text alert warning of an incoming ballistic missile attack underscored Americans’ anxiety about North Korea.

A Conventional Mission
After 16 years of fighting insurgents in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, American commanding generals worry that the military is better prepared for going after stateless groups of militants than it is for its own conventional mission of facing down heavily fortified land powers that have their own formidable militaries and air defenses.

The exercise at Fort Bragg was part of one of the largest air assault exercises in recent years. The practice run at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada used double the number of cargo planes for paratroopers as was used in past exercises.

The Army Reserve exercise planned for next month will breathe new life into mobilization centers that have been largely dormant as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have wound down. And while the military has deployed Special Operations reaction forces to previous large global events, like the 2014 World Cup in Brazil, those units usually numbered around 100 — far fewer than some officials said could be sent for the Olympics in South Korea. Others discounted that possibility.

At a wide-ranging meeting at his headquarters on Jan. 2, Gen. Tony Thomas, the head of the Special Operations Command in Tampa, Fla., warned the 200 civilians and service members in the audience that more Special Forces personnel might have to shift to the Korea theater from the Middle East in May or June, if tensions escalate on the peninsula. The general’s spokesman, Capt. Jason Salata, confirmed the account provided to The New York Times by someone in the audience, but said General Thomas made it clear that no decisions had been made.

The Army chief of staff, Gen. Mark A. Milley, in several recent meetings at the Pentagon, has brought up two historic American military disasters as a warning of where a lack of preparedness can lead.

Military officials said General Milley has cited the ill-fated Battle of the Kasserine Pass during World War II, when unprepared American troops were outfoxed and then pummeled by the forces of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel of Germany. General Milley has also recently mentioned Task Force Smith, the poorly equipped, understrength unit that was mauled by North Korean troops in 1950 during the Korean War.

In meeting after meeting, the officials said, General Milley has likened the two American defeats to what he warns could happen if the military does not get ready for a possible war with North Korea. He has urged senior Army leaders to get units into shape, and fretted about a loss of what he has called muscle memory: how to fight a large land war, including one in which an established adversary is able to bring sophisticated air defenses, tanks, infantry, naval power and even cyberweapons into battle.

Speaking in October at the annual meeting of the Association of the United States Army, General Milley called Pyongyang the biggest threat to American national security, and said that Army officers who lead operational units must prepare to meet that threat.

“Do not wait on orders and printed new regulations and new manuals,” General Milley told the audience. “Put simply, I want you to get ready for what might come, and do not do any tasks that do not directly contribute to increasing combat readiness in your unit.”

His concerns have drifted down to the Army’s rank and file. And troops at bases and posts around the world routinely wonder aloud if they will soon be deployed to the Korean Peninsula.

But unlike the run-up to the Iraq war, when the Pentagon had already begun huge troop movements in 2002 to prepare for the invasion that began in 2003, military officials insist that this is not a case of a war train that has left the station.

“This could be as simple as these guys reading the newspaper,” said Derek Chollet, an assistant secretary of defense during the Obama administration, referring to the rush by military officials to get ready. “You’re not seeing any massive military movements” that would indicate that a decision has been made to go to war, he added.

There have been no travel warnings advising Americans to stay away from South Korea or Japan, and no advisories warning American businesses to be cautious.

It is unlikely that the Pentagon would launch military action on the Korean Peninsula without first warning Americans and others there, military officials said — unless the Trump administration believes that the United States could conduct a one-time airstrike on North Korea that would not bring any retaliation from Pyongyang to nearby Seoul.

Some officials in the White House have argued that such a targeted, limited strike could be launched with minimal, if any, blowback against South Korea — a premise that Mr. Mattis views with skepticism, according to people familiar with his thinking.

But for Mr. Mattis, the planning serves to placate Mr. Trump. Effectively, analysts said, it alerts the president to how seriously the Pentagon views the threat and protects Mr. Mattis from suggestions that he is out of step with Mr. Trump.

“The military’s job is to be fully ready for whatever contingencies might be on the horizon,” said Michèle A. Flournoy, a top Pentagon official in the Obama administration and co-founder of WestExec Advisors, a strategic consultancy in Washington.

“Even if no decision on North Korea has been made and no order has been given,” Ms. Flournoy said, “the need to be ready for the contingency that is top of mind for the president and his national security team would motivate commanders to use planned exercise opportunities to enhance their preparation, just in case.”

Operation Panther Blade
In the case of the 82nd Airborne exercise in Nevada last month, for instance, Army soldiers practiced moving paratroopers on helicopters and flew artillery, fuel and ammunition deep behind what was designated as enemy lines. The maneuvers were aimed at forcing an enemy to fight on different fronts early in combat.

Officials said maneuvers practiced in the exercise, called Panther Blade, could be used anywhere, not just on the Korean Peninsula. “Operation Panther Blade is about building global readiness,” said Lt. Col. Joe Buccino, a public affairs officer with the 82nd Airborne. “An air assault and deep attack of this scale is very complex and requires dynamic synchronization of assets over time and space.”

Another exercise, called Bronze Ram, is being coordinated by the shadowy Joint Special Operations Command, officials said, and mimics other training scenarios that mirror current events.

This year’s exercise, one of many that concentrate on threats from across the world, will focus extensively on underground operations and involve working in chemically contaminated environments that might be present in North Korea. It will also home in on the Special Operations Command’s mission of countering weapons of mass destruction.

Beyond Bronze Ram, highly classified Special Operations exercises in the United States, including those with scenarios to seize unsecured nuclear weapons or conduct clandestine paratrooper drops, have for several months reflected a possible North Korea contingency, military officials said, without providing details, because of operational sensitivity.

Air Force B-1 bombers flying from Guam have been seen regularly over the Korean Peninsula amid the escalating tensions with Pyongyang — running regular training flights with Japanese and South Korean fighter jets that often provoke North Korea’s ire. B-52 bombers based in Louisiana are expected to join the B-1s stationed on Guam later this month, adding to the long-range aerial firepower.

Pentagon officials said last week that three B-2 bombers and their crews had arrived in Guam from their base in Missouri.

But unlike the very public buildup of forces in the run-up to the 1991 Persian Gulf war and the 2003 Iraq war, which sought to pressure President Saddam Hussein of Iraq into a diplomatic settlement, the Pentagon is seeking to avoid making public all its preparations for fear of inadvertently provoking a response by Mr. Kim, North Korea’s leader.

Last week, diplomats from North Korea and South Korea met for the first time in two years in a sign of thawing tensions. On Tuesday, Canada and the United States will host a meeting in Vancouver, British Columbia, of foreign ministers from countries that supported the United Nations-backed effort to repel North Korean forces after the 1950 invasion of South Korea. The ministers are seeking to advance the diplomatic initiative forged by Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson.

It is a balance that Mr. Mattis and senior commanders are trying to strike in showing that the military, on the one hand, is ready to confront any challenge that North Korea presents, even as they strongly back diplomatic initiatives led by Mr. Tillerson to resolve the crisis.

An exchange this month illustrated perfectly the fine line the Pentagon is walking, as an Air Force three-star general caught her colleague emphasizing military prowess perhaps a tad too much, and gently guided him back.

During a briefing with reporters on Capitol Hill, Lt. Gen. Mark C. Nowland was asked whether the Air Force was prepared to take out North Korean air defenses.

“If you’re asking us, are we ready to fight tonight, the answer is, yes, we will,” General Nowland, the Air Force’s top operations officer, responded. “The United States Air Force, if required, when called to do our job, will gain and maintain air supremacy.”

The words were barely out of his mouth when Lt. Gen. VeraLinn Jamieson, the Air Force’s top intelligence officer, interrupted.

“I’ll also add that right now, the Defense Department is in support of Secretary of State Tillerson, who’s got a campaign to be the lead with North Korea in a diplomatic endeavor,” General Jamieson said.

General Nowland quickly acknowledged in a follow-up question that the military was in support of Mr. Tillerson’s diplomatic push.
 

Housecarl

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Suicide attack in Baghdad kills at least 27, wounds 64

Reuters
1 hr ago

BAGHDAD - At least 27 people were killed and 64 wounded in a twin suicide bombing in central Baghdad on Monday, the deadliest attack so far this year in the Iraqi capital, an interior ministry official said.

Two men detonated explosives vests in Aviation Square, a commercial district and gathering point for day laborers seeking work, scores of whom were killed and injured, according to the official.

Iraq declared victory last month over Islamic State (IS) militants who seized control of nearly a third of the country in 2014. However, IS continues to carry out attacks and bombings in Baghdad and different parts of the country.

The German foreign ministry condemned the devastating attack in Baghdad and expressed its condolences to the families of those killed.

The attack in Aviation Square was one of the deadliest in Baghdad since a massive truck bomb killed at least 324 people in the nearby commercial district of Karrada in July 2016.

The Karrada bombing was the deadliest single attack in Iraq since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion that ousted Saddam Hussein.

(Reporting by Maher Chmaytelli and Ahmed Rasheed; Editing by Mark Heinrich)
 

night driver

ESFP adrift in INTJ sea
HC....

@TMGNeff (Thomas Gibbon Neff) is one of the good guys who hangs in an area of twitter I maintain a bare toehold in.
 

Housecarl

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https://macro.economicblogs.org/zer...tens-india-nuclear-war-indian-army-statement/

Pakistan Threatens India With Nuclear War After Indian Army Chief’s Statement

See on Internet Archive

Tyler Durden 18 hours ago Zerohedge

Hawaii’s ballistic missile attack on Saturday turned out to be nothing more than fat-fingered "fake news" by State officials. However, a far more significant threat of nuclear war is growing on the border between India and Pakistan, called the Line of Control (LoC), which continues to be generally ignored by Western media outlets.

Indian Army Chief General Bipin Rawat said Friday his military was ready to call Pakistan’s “nuclear bluff” and carry out aggressive military operations across the border.

"We will call the (nuclear) bluff of Pakistan. If we will have to really confront the Pakistanis, and a task is given to us, we are not going to say we cannot cross the border because they have nuclear weapons. We will have to call their nuclear bluff," Gen. Rawat warned, responding to a question during a press conference on the “possibility of Pakistan using its nuclear weapons in case the situation along the border deteriorates,” said the Hindustan Times.

On Saturday, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Khawaja Asif unleashed a Tweetstorm denouncing Rawat’s comments as “very irresponsible. Amounts to invitation for nuclear encounter. If that is what they desire, they are welcome to test our resolve. The general’s doubt would swiftly be removed, inshallah.”

Khawaja M. Asif

@KhawajaMAsif

“Very irresponsible statement by Indian Army Chief,not befitting his office. Amounts to invitation for nuclear encounter.If that is what they desire,they are welcome to test our resolve.The general's doubt would swiftly be removed, inshallah.”
8:56 AM - Jan 13, 2018
1,066
1,066 Replies
1,729
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“The threatening and irresponsible statement by the Indian Army Chief today is representative of a sinister mindset that has taken hold of India. Pakistan has demonstrated deterrence capability,” he tweeted.

“These are not issues to be taken lightly. There must not be any misadventure based on miscalculation. Pakistan is fully capable of defending itself,” he added.
The spokesperson of Pakistan’s Foreign Office Mohammad Faisal also criticised Gen. Rawat’s comments as very “irresponsible.” Further, the Pakistani army said its nuclear weapons have deterred India from launching another full-scale conventional war, as both nuclear superpowers are playing chicken.

Escalating the war of words, Pakistan army spokesman Asif Ghafoor said on state-run television, “should they wish to test our resolve, they may try and see it for themselves. We have a credible nuclear capability, exclusively meant for threat from east. But we believe it’s a weapon of deterrence, not a choice.”

The Line of Control (LoC) refers to a heavily militarized zone in Jammu and Kashmir, in which it splits some of the India-Pakistani border. In 2017 alone, the Indian Army killed 138 Pakistani troops in tactical and retaliatory operations along the LoC. In the same period, 28 Indian soldiers perished. In late December, we reported on an intense battle between Indian and Pakistani forces leaving 4 Indian troops dead, where it was believed that Pakistan was the aggressor.

line_of_control.jpg

https://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/inline-images/line_of_control.jpg
Map

Both countries have a long history of skirmishes on the LoC, and have even fought multiple wars on the border since India gained independence from British colonial rule in 1947. And as the beat of nuclear war gets louder between India and Pakistan, the LoC is one region which should be carefully monitored as conditions continue to deteriorate in 2018.
 

Housecarl

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https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-s-agenda-behind-inter-korean-talks

China | North Korea

China’s agenda behind inter-Korean talks

By Frances Kitt
15 January 2018
12:32 AEDT

The first two weeks of 2018 have seen a significant thaw in inter-Korean tensions. In the highest-level talks between North and South Korea since December 2015, Pyongyang agreed to send a delegation to the 2018 South Korean Winter Olympics. China welcomed the developments, which it considers, in its own words, ‘the right track of settlement through dialogue and consultation.’

China’s support should not be a surprise. Beijing has played an active role behind the scenes in recent months to push the two Koreas closer to talks. According to North Korea specialist Michael Madden, a secret meeting between a North Korean athletics vice-minister and South Korea took place in China in December, which if true shows Beijing as a facilitator of low-level inter-Korean talks. Before higher-level meeting took place in Panmunjom last week, Chinese and South Korean chief representatives to the now-moribund six-party talks also met for two days in Seoul.

By laying the groundwork for inter-Korean talks, China hopes to achieve three things.

Firstly, it hopes to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula and if possible, engineer a ‘win’ for its long-standing ‘suspension for suspension’ proposal. Under this plan, the US would suspend its joint military exercises with Seoul – which Pyongyang considers preparations for invasion – in exchange for the North suspending its missile tests.

Ratcheting back tensions is important for Beijing’s security as it values North Korea as a buffer state to keep the US army off its border, and fears the instability and refugee influx that regime collapse would bring. From Beijing’s point of view, the temporary suspension of joint drills for the duration of the Winter Olympics, agreed to by US President Donald Trump, is likely to already provide a sense of satisfaction and will be considered a small victory if the North refrains from further missile tests in that period.

But to preserve the ‘suspension’ and turn this into material to stoke Beijing’s propaganda machine in the long-term, China will have to work harder. The US remains unlikely to fully accept the ‘suspension for suspension’ proposal in its entirety, as it continues its approach to simultaneously increase pressure on Pyongyang and keep open the invitation to talks. But given the previous success of South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in in negotiations with the US, Beijing might see space for Trump to potentially be persuaded to suspended the drills for longer next time.

Secondly, Beijing hopes to reassert some leverage over North Korea, taking with one hand and giving with the other. China has used the UN to put pressure on the North, negotiating the terms of new Security Council sanctions resolutions with the US and in 2017 voted in favour of three resolutions (2371, 2375, 2397). China has further shown its annoyance at Pyongyang’s readiness to threaten security in the Asia-Pacific with missile and nuclear tests, by significantly curtailing its trade with the North in line with those UN sanctions. By doing so, Beijing has shown Pyongyang its frustration and geopolitical power.

But China has not completely cut off North Korean trade, much to the annoyance of the US, which continues to ask Beijing to do more. Meanwhile, Beijing has protected Kim Jong-un’s interests in questions about denuclearisation and human rights, notably by choosing not to mention the improvements in inter-Korean talks as a step towards denuclearisation and by trying to stop the Security Council from discussing human rights abuses in North Korea. By doing this, Beijing has shown Pyongyang a residual level of commitment, albeit limited.

At a time when the US is calling for all nations to cut ties with North Korea, China has maintained an open channel of communication with Pyongyang and shown its willingness to talk. Despite a low ebb in relations, Beijing has sought bilateral meetings with Pyongyang. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met his North Korean counterpart, Ri Yong Ho, on the sidelines of an ASEAN meeting in August and in November, Xi Jinping sent a special envoy to Pyongyang for talks with the closest aid of Kim Jong-un. This was significant because it marked the first known visit by a high-ranking Chinese official to North Korea in more than a year. Beijing hopes to shape the terms of North Korea’s denuclearisation in its favour.

Finally, Beijing is motivated by geopolitical reasons. North Korea plays an important role in Sino-US relations and as Zhao Tong from the Carnegie–Tsinghua Centre for Global Policy explains, ‘for China, the US is always the top geostrategic concern’, not Pyongyang. China, locked in a strategic rivalry with the US, ultimately does not want to aid Washington’s agenda in Asia, with disparate world views and disputes on trade, the South China Sea, and Taiwan.

By supporting inter-Korean dialogue, China can drive a wedge in the South Korea-US alliance, increasing tension between Trump and Moon. By supporting Kim Jong-un’s olive branch to the South and Moon’s eagerness to engage, Beijing is also showing support for measures that could ease UN sanctions, also reduce pressure Pyongyang to denuclearise and frustrate Washington’s strategy of ‘strategic strangulation’.

It will be difficult for China to achieve these goals in 2018. It will face headwinds in all of its attempts to find a solution to North Korea’s destabilising behaviour through dialogue and negotiation, to gain leverage over North Korea, and to out-manoeuvre the US. But the longer it can hold back the resumption of South Korea-US military drills, the more successful China will be in each of its other objectives.

Related Content

US FONOPs: Game on again in the South China Sea
 

danielboon

TB Fanatic
Kosovo Serb leader shot dead in northern town

A Kosovan Serb leader, Oliver Ivanovic, who was awaiting trial over the killings of ethnic Albanians during the 1998-99 war, was shot dead outside his party office in the northern town of Mitrovica on Tuesday, a state prosecutor said.


In a protest against the killing, Serbia said it would quit the ongoing round of a European Union-sponsored dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina on the normalisation of relations that was due to take place in Brussels.


"I can confirm that Oliver Ivanovic has died from gun shots. Investigators are on the scene," Shyqyri Syla, a state prosecutor in Mitrovica said. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5071819,00.html
 

danielboon

TB Fanatic
Well then...

...it's a good thing that no giant wars have ever occurred because of a politician was assassinated in that part of the world...
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Reviewing the Nuclear Posture Review
by ACW Podcast | January 16, 2018 | No Comments
https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1204661/reviewing-the-nuclear-posture-review/

Podcast

A draft of the Trump Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review has leaked — and its a doozy.
Aaron and Jeffrey discuss the history of these reviews and recommendations to develop a new sea-launched cruise missile and a variable yield warhead for the Trident D5 submarine launched ballistic missile.
Links of Note:
The Huffpost article that originally leaked the document.
The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review from the Obama administration.
Support us over at Patreon.com/acwpodcast!
Sponsored Links:
Our sponsor this episode is ActionKit, a powerful suit of online campaigning tools.
https://actionkit.com/wonk
 

Housecarl

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https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column/strategic-view/indo-pacific-redrawing-map-counter-china

The 'Indo-Pacific': Redrawing the Map to Counter China

January 12, 2018 | RADM (Ret.) Paul Becker
Comments 2

President Donald Trump, national security advisor H.R. McMaster and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson have begun using the term “Indo-Pacific” in recent months to refer to the region that extends from the west coast of the U.S. to the west coast of India. For decades previously, American leaders had called this swath of the globe the “Asia-Pacific,” or more recently as the “Indo-Asia-Pacific.”

The new turn of phrases is significant, and it calls for strategic communications practices to reinforce this strategic concept.

The shift reflects the Trump administration’s acknowledgement of several key factors: It treats India as a regional power and not just an isolated country on the southern tip of the continent. It emphasizes the contiguous maritime nature of this vast space, which spans two of the world’s three largest oceans, four of the of world’s seven largest economies, and the world’s five most populous countries.

And it serves as an important marker to highlight the multipolar nature of the region and at least verbally offer a counterbalance to Chinese activities in Asia, from military expansionism in the South China Sea to economic development of Indian Ocean logistics bases as part of Beijing’s extensive “Belt and Road Initiative.”

Background
The “Indo-Pacific” region aligns with the U.S. Pacific Command’s area of responsibility under the Department of Defense’s Unified Command Plan. Since World War II, “Asia-Pacific” has been the most commonly used geo-strategic reference by foreign policy and national security practitioners. Emphasizing the primacy of this phrase was the reference in the January 2012 DoD strategic guidance document, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” which said the U.S. would “rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.”

Former U.S. Pacific Commander Admiral Sam Locklear added a prefix, “Indo-Asia-Pacific,” in his 2013 House Armed Services Committee testimony, and his successor, Admiral Harry Harris, continued that practice through 2017.

The most recent term, “Indo-Pacific,” is firmly reflected in the December 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), but its usage is hardly unprecedented. Cartographers have used the term for centuries. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton used “Indo-Pacific” in formal presentations in 2010 and 2011, and it was the term used to describe Australia’s strategic environment in a Defense White Paper written for that country and released in 2013 by a former prime minister and defense minister.

With this context, the Indo-Pacific’s geometric parameters also helps frame a renewed U.S. four-way defense cooperation with India, Japan and Australia known as the “Quadrilateral Dialogue.” The NSS bluntly refers to China (and Russia, for that matter) as a competitor that has emerged to “challenge American power, influence and interests.”

One Voice
Securing interests in the Indo-Pacific will require Washington’s strategic communications to be consistent, coherent and focused.

Consistency requires simple talking points that make Washington’s intentions clear and can be used by all departments and agencies for the duration of the administration. In the past, the U.S. has fallen victim when different government branches deliver varying talking points that often are misinterpreted by competitors as a potential lack of resolve and a political seam to be exploited.

The requirement of coherence includes aligning U.S. policy statements with action. Competitors like Beijing understand best when statements from Washington are mirrored in force presence and posture in the region; one without the other risks failure.

Focused communications involve, for example, rejecting Chinese claims of exclusive jurisdiction or “indisputable sovereign control” over international waters anywhere, including near China. That means strongly rejecting Beijing’s “nine-dash line” that ostensibly draws what it believes to be its territory in the South China Sea. (The same principle goes for any nation’s similar claims, e.g. Russia in the Arctic or Iran for the Straits of Hormuz.)

Instead, we must regularly apply Western terms of art such as “global commons,” and reinforce international paradigms such as rule of law, freedom of navigation, and prescriptions under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone designations. When these norms are violated by coercion or dangerous behaviors, Beijing or any other offender must be swiftly and publicly opposed to demonstrate our resolve.

The Indo-Pacific is the first location specified in the “Strategy in a Regional Context” section of the NSS, signaling its primacy among five other areas, including the Middle East and Europe. Not every nation will admire its placement, terminology and intent. Beijing certainly doesn’t. Seoul, as another example, wouldn’t even include the statement, “a shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific” as part of a joint communique at the end of Trump’s November meeting with South Korean President Moon Jae-in, probably to avoid provoking Beijing.

A name change itself does not equate to a wholesale change of policy, and it is important to consider that a nation’s words ultimately are less important than its actions, in implementing policy. So as actions play out in the future, the U.S. must be prepared to accept friction from those who may choose to challenge a security system that has underwritten peace and prosperity in the region for the past 70-plus years. When American leaders reaffirm their commitments to the Indo-Pacific, it will be important that they stay consistent, coherent and focused.

Asia China India
The Author is Rear Admiral (Ret.) Paul Becker
Rear Admiral Paul Becker, USN (Ret) served 30 years in peace, crisis and combat as a Naval Intelligence Officer. He most recently led the Presidential Transition’s Intelligence Community Landing Team. His Flag Officer assignments include: Director of Intelligence (J2) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii, and International Security Assistance Force Joint Command in Afghanistan. Paul holds an MPA from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and a BS from the U.S.... Read More

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2 Replies to “The ‘Indo-Pacific’: Redrawing the Map to Counter China”

Commodore Anil Jai Singh, IN (Retd)
January 12, 2018 at 5:52 am

The Indo-Pacific, as understood by the USA extends upto the west coast of India and seeks to include India within its ambit as a strategic partner. From a military perspective this is the PACOM’s AoR. From an Indian perspective, the Indo-Pacific should include the entire Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific since the IOR is India’s primary area of responsibility and the Western Pacific a secondary area.

Hence as a US strategic construct, India gets included in the Western Pacific imbroglio including a possible confrontation with China whereas the same is not valid for the western and southern Indian Ocean including the Makran Coast and beyond upto Djibouti. This geographic area is the CENTCOM’s AoR and there is little or no engagement between CENTCOM and the Indian security establishment. Hence as I see it India is part of the US Indo-Pacific but the converse is not so.

Recently there has been much talk of the Quad – USA, Australia, India and Japan . Three of these four are linked through alliances with India the lone one out. Three of these also have a common area of primary concern with India again the odd one out. Three of these , in the present construct have little or no engagement with a large part of the Indian Ocean whereas this is India’s primary area of concern. Infact two of there three do not even have the military capacity to be a force to reckon with in the Indian Ocean.

Hence the entire concept of the Indo-Pacific needs a re-think and it must the include the US across the entire expanse (PACOM and CENTCOM ) and not just a PACOM – centric construct.

Next week New Delhi is hosting the Raisina Dialogue which is the indian equivalent of the Shangrila Dialogue and has the backing of the Indian Foreign Ministry. In all the previous editions and once again this year, Adm Harry Harris is speaking – the CENTCOM biss has never attended which further re-inforces the point I am trying to make.


Maj Gen PK Mallick (Retd)
January 13, 2018 at 10:50 am
I entirely agree with the comments of Commander AJ Singh. I recommend Pentagon should seriously rethink in drawing inter command boundaries. PACOM is too far off for India. Our 70% hydrocarbon comes from our west coast . We have huge trade relations in West Asia/ Middle East. Our diaspora in this region and their remittances give us serious responsibility. But India ia part of PACOM and not Central command responsibility. With such a strong Indian Navy USA is happy to partner with Pak Navy in all dealings in Arab Sea! Indian Navy is out of battle in this region as far as USA is concerned.

I recommend the inter command boundary between Central Command and PACOM should be shfted eastwards to include Myanmar.
 

Housecarl

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https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...s-discreetly-pushes-peace-talks-idUSKBN1F52JC

#World News January 16, 2018 / 11:49 AM / Updated 13 hours ago

Aside from Trump limelight, Davos discreetly pushes peace talks

Tom Miles
3 Min Read

GENEVA (Reuters) - U.S. President Donald Trump will hog the limelight at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos next week, but behind the scenes some of the world’s leading diplomats will be working on some of humanity’s knottiest conflicts.

Trump is expected to arrive on Jan. 25 and make a speech on Jan. 26 at 2 p.m. (1300 GMT). Eight U.S. Secretaries and cabinet members will also be at Davos.

“The U.S. footprint this year will be quite considerable,” WEF president Borge Brende told Reuters.

“What we have heard so far is that he wants to meet with business people from Europe and also from the rest of the world, and he wants to then share with all of the participants his outlook for 2018.”

Trump’s visit has created extra interest because Davos is emblematic of the globalisation that he criticized heavily during his election campaign, and its collaborative ethos is at odds with his “America first” isolationism.

WEF founder Klaus Schwab told a news conference that a theme this year would be the future of global co-operation relating to trade, environment, the fight against terrorism, tax systems and competitiveness.

“In this context, it’s absolutely essential that we have President Trump with us,” he said.

Trump will be just one of a record line-up of political leaders, from Angolan President João Lourenço to Zimbabwe’s Emmerson Mnangagwa.

One invitee who has yet to confirm is Germany’s Angela Merkel.

“She is very much welcome if that is her decision,” said Brende, who stepped down as Norway’s foreign minister late last year to take up his WEF role.

He is beefing up the political ambitions of Davos, a retreat more commonly associated with power-broking by wheeler-dealer billionaires.

Among the hundreds of meetings will be closed-door special “diplomatic sessions” devoted to conflicts and reconciliation, including Syria, Somalia, Venezuela, Israel-Palestine, the Korean peninsula and the Western Balkans.

“I think it would be a lost opportunity with so many leaders at the start of the year if we didn’t also address peace and reconciliation questions in Davos,” Brende said.

Davos attendees include King Abdullah of Jordan, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri, Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Al-Hamdallah and Trump’s adviser and son-in-law, Jared Kushner.

“I hope that there will be at least discussions on the situation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and we will have a lot of key players in that ecosystem in Davos,” Brende said, adding that business leaders from both sides would call for a peace solution at Davos.

The exclusive venue gives key political actors the chance to meet out of the public eye, or to communicate indirectly, he said.

Reporting by Tom Miles
 

Housecarl

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http://www.atimes.com/article/talibans-elite-red-unit-posing-new-threat-afghan-security/

Taliban’s ‘Red Unit’ poses new threat to Afghan security

US and Afghan forces have scored victories against the insurgent 'Special Forces' unit but its emergence shows the Taliban is far from beaten

By Ruchi Kumar January 17, 2018 1:20 PM (UTC+8)

In December, US forces in Afghanistan released footage of an operation they conducted in the Taliban-dominated district of Musa Qala, in Helmand province. The grainy, black and white video showed them targeting a compound and blowing it to smithereens, with everyone inside.

An accompanying press statement declared that the “Taliban’s ‘Red Unit’ commander in Helmand province, Mullah Shah Wali, aka Haji Nasir, was killed in a kinetic strike.” The statement added that “one of Wali’s deputy commanders and three other insurgents were also killed.”

Helmand and Kandahar have proven to be the key provinces in the fight against the Taliban following the first wave of withdrawals of foreign troops, in 2014. Operations are being conducted with increasing frequency via NATO’s Operation Resolute Support in those areas.

The Red Unit
What caught the attention of stakeholders involved in the operation was the reference – the first of its kind – to the Taliban’s clandestine group of highly-trained fighters. An insurgent Special Forces unit, ‘Sira Khitta’ roughly translates from Pashto to ‘Red Group’ or ‘Red Unit.’

The first reference made to the group was perhaps a month prior to the Helmand operation, when reports emerged of Taliban using high-end equipment such as night-vision goggles to conduct a successful attack on an Afghan police post in Farah province. Despite military support, eight under-equipped policemen were killed that evening, shot with laser guns.

Video: Taliban Special Forces Unit
Run time (1:50)
https://youtu.be/BGiMW9MZ-Qc

“The ‘Red Unit’ was formed in early 2016 and has nearly 1,200 fighters in Helmand and Kandahar alone,” an Afghan security official told Asia Times on condition of anonymity. “There are also several hundred operating in Zabul province,” he said, adding that due to the furtive nature of their activities it is very hard for Afghan forces to identify them. “(This group is) so discreet that often their own operatives don’t know each other’s identity.”

Their anonymity also makes it difficult to track the group’s leadership, or its losses in battle. However, Afghan and US forces are confident that their recent joint operations did lead to the death of the Red Unit’s top commanders, thus disabling their operations, if only temporarily. “We don’t know if the replacements have been made and who is currently leading the group,” the official said.

General John Nicholson, the commander of US forces in Afghanistan, also hailed the slaying of the Red Unit commander as a major step forward in the long, drawn-out war in Afghanistan. “Mullah Shah Wali’s death will disrupt the Taliban network, degrade their narcotics trafficking, and hinder their ability to conduct attacks against Afghan forces,” he said, adding that more targeted attacks were planned to “disrupt their communications and deny them safe haven”.

Pakistan connections
Describing the specialized insurgent group the official added that its membership comprised both Afghans and foreign fighters. “From what we understand, they’re trained in Pakistan under the tutelage of retired Pakistani army generals and former ISI operatives,” he said.

Of major concern to regional stakeholders will be the group’s access to sophisticated resources and equipment. Depending on which reports are to be believed, the Red Unit is equipped with everything from night-vision goggles and Russian 82-millimeter rockets, to heavy machine guns and US-made M4 automatic carbines. It is suspected that they also carry themselves around in armored Humvees.

The security official confirmed that the unit is equipped with better weapons than regular Taliban fighters. “They are equipped with sophisticated weapons; that has given them an edge over some of the local forces, especially the Afghan police, who do not have the same resources.” There is no confirmed intelligence on how the insurgents access these weapons, however.

“The night-vision glasses and many of the weapons recovered from fallen insurgents were of Russian make. The Taliban has let it be known that they were purchased from black markets, but it is difficult to buy the latest version of this kind of equipment from the black markets on the other side of the Durand line,” the official said, referring to Pakistan’s famous wholesale arms market.

A Taliban spokesman has claimed the group’s weapons are among the “spoils of the war” stolen from Afghan forces. Interestingly, some of the arms recovered are of Iranian make, according to the official who spoke to Asia Times. This further complicates theories about their supply.

The Red Unit operates like a Special Forces unit, according to military sources. “They often focus on coordinated attacks and operations that are targeted at weakening the authority of provincial powers,” our official source explained, adding that “they often engage in face-to-face combat with Afghan security forces.” The Taliban is usually known for its guerrilla warfare and rarely engages in combat.

“They have not yet been successful in bringing down a whole province,” said the official, although he admits that the unit has caused severe damage to local forces. “We have faced losses in the Afghan army this year. We lost a lot of soldiers to them, but we believe they have also lost their top leadership.”

With the war in Afghanistan in its 17th year, the emergence of the Red Unit indicates the Taliban is far from beaten.
 

Shacknasty Shagrat

Has No Life - Lives on TB
No reliable battle damage assessment, yet.
SS

Yemen's Houthi Rebels Claim Successful Ballistic Missile Attack On Saudi Millitary Base
Profile picture for user Tyler Durden
by Tyler Durden
Wed, 01/17/2018 - 11:30
Yemeni Houthi rebels claim to have struck targets inside Saudi Arabia after launching two ballistic missiles on Tuesday, according to Houthi military media. Some pro-Houthi sources also reported the destruction of a Saudi military base in Najran, which lies in southwest Saudi Arabia near the border with Yemen.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia disputes that the missiles hit their targets, with Saudi state TV Ekhbariya reporting that Saudi missile defense has intercepted one near Jizan Regional Airport, a busy transport hub in southern Saudi Arabia, though it is unclear what happened to the reported second missile.





According to Middle East based Al Masdar News:

First, a short-range ballistic missile was launched at the Jizan Regional Airport, an important transport hub in southern Saudi Arabia. Following this, Yemeni Missile Forces have fired a Qaher M-2 missile, a modern and domestically produced Yemeni surface-to-surface missile based on the Soviet S-75 Dvina design, on a military command center in the Najran province of Saudi Arabia.

According to the Yemeni Armed Forces, both targets hit their intended targets with high precision and to full effect. Saudi state media however, denies that the Jizan airport was hit, and claims the missile was intercepted.

Though at this time it is unclear which version of events are true, Saudi authorities have in the past been caught lying about missile intercept effectiveness, especially the November 4th ballistic missile attack on Riyadh's international airport. A New York Times investigation published in early December suggested that Saudi Arabia's state of the art US-supplied defense system failed to intercept the ballistic missile fired by Yemen's Houthi rebels. The report contradicted the official claims of the Saudi and American governments, which both announced immediately after the incident that the US-supplied Patriot missile defense system had successfully intercepted the Houthi fired Scud.

The analysis, which utilized open-source material in the form of available video and social media photos of the aftermath of the attack, was conducted by a team of missile experts, and shook confidence in the US system. Thus current claims of a successful Houthi missile strike inside Saudi Arabia are indeed plausible.

Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir has consistently blamed Iran for such attacks, referring to the Shia dominated Islamic Republic as the biggest source of danger in the region due to its destabilizing role in Lebanon, Yemen and Syria. Both Saudi and American officials have claimed Iran as the source of the sophisticated missile systems launched from Yemen.

“Iran supplied the Houthis with missiles that have targeted Saudi Arabia,” the Saudi FM told reporters, according to Al Arabiya. “The nuclear deal with Iran needs improvement to prevent Tehran from enriching uranium.”

https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2018...the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero)
 

Shacknasty Shagrat

Has No Life - Lives on TB
A couple points on the Houthi/Iranian attacks.
They have shown that they can launch salvos every 30 or so days. The number of missiles per salvo is increasing and the interval between attacks is decreasing.
The last targets, a cargo/transport hub and a military command center, are more strategic than tactical targets.
SS
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://thehill.com/policy/defense/369092-pentagon-planning-two-new-nuclear-weapons-report

Pentagon planning two new nuclear weapons: report

By Max Greenwood - 01/16/18 08:36 AM EST
128 Comments

The U.S. is planning to develop two new nuclear weapons, including a "low yield" warhead, according to a Wall Street Journal report.

That low-yield warhead would be used with the Trident missile, a rocket deployed on U.S. Navy submarines, according to the Journal.

The Pentagon is also planning to develop a new nuclear-armed cruise missile that would also be deployed at sea. That plan would reintroduce a system to the U.S. nuclear arsenal that was retired in 2010.

The recommendations for the new weapons are laid out in the Pentagon’s Nuclear Posture Review, which was commissioned last year by President Trump.

HuffPost published an unclassified draft copy of the review last week, though the Pentagon has said that the draft is "pre-decisional."

Still, the plans to develop the new nuclear weapons come in response to growing military threats from Russia and China, which the Pentagon says are moving toward an embrace of nuclear weapons in their strategies.

“While the United States has continued to reduce the number and salience of nuclear weapons, others, including Russia and China, have moved in the opposite direction,” a draft of the plan said, according to the Journal.

“The United States must be capable of developing and deploying new capabilities, if necessary, to deter, assure, achieve U.S. objectives if deterrence fails, and hedge against uncertainty,” it added.

At the same time, the U.S. has sought to push back against North Korea's development of its nuclear arsenal and ballistic missiles, leading an international pressure campaign in an effort to force Pyongyang to abandon its plans.

The review pins the cost of the plan to modernize and operate the U.S. nuclear arsenal at 6.4 percent of the Pentagon's budget, at most, according to the Journal. It currently requires 2 to 3 percent.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
A couple points on the Houthi/Iranian attacks.
They have shown that they can launch salvos every 30 or so days. The number of missiles per salvo is increasing and the interval between attacks is decreasing.
The last targets, a cargo/transport hub and a military command center, are more strategic than tactical targets.
SS

That the Saudis can't shut down the Houthi/Iranian missile supply line to that degree also has a lot of implications beyond "just" what you are noting.
 

danielboon

TB Fanatic
Trump says Russia helping North Korea skirt sanctions; Pyongyang getting close on missile

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - U.S. President Donald Trump said on Wednesday Russia is helping North Korea get supplies in violation of international sanctions and that Pyongyang is getting “closer every day” to being able to deliver a long-range missile to the United States. “Russia is not helping us at all with North Korea,” Trump said during an Oval Office interview with Reuters. “What China is helping us with, Russia is denting. In other words, Russia is making up for some of what China is doing.”

With North Korea persisting as the major global challenge facing Trump this year, the president cast doubt during the 53-minute interview on whether talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un would be useful. In the past he has not ruled out direct talks with Kim.

He declined to comment when asked whether he had engaged in any communications at all with Kim, with whom he has exchanged insults and threats, heightening tensions in the region.

“I’d sit down, but I‘m not sure that sitting down will solve the problem,” he said, noting that past negotiations with the North Koreans by his predecessors had failed to rein in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.

“I‘m not sure that talks will lead to anything meaningful. They’ve talked for 25 years and they’ve taken advantage of our presidents, of our previous presidents,” he said.

Trump praised China for its efforts to restrict oil and coal supplies to North Korea but said Beijing could do much more to help constrain Pyongyang.

But he said Russia appears to be filling in the gaps left by the Chinese.

Western European security sources told Reuters in late December that Russian tankers had supplied fuel to North Korea on at least three occasions in recent months by transferring cargoes at sea in violation of international sanctions. Russia has denied breaching North Korea sanctions. North Korea relies on imported fuel to keep its struggling economy functioning. It also requires oil for its intercontinental ballistic missile and nuclear program.

Trump has repeatedly blamed a U.S. investigation into whether Russia meddled in the 2016 presidential election for hindering an improvement in U.S.-Russian relations.

“He can do a lot,” Trump said of Russian President Vladimir Putin. “But unfortunately we don’t have much of a relationship with Russia, and in some cases it’s probable that what China takes back, Russia gives. So the net result is not as good as it could be.” Trump, who has grappled with nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches by North Korea since he took office a year ago, said Pyongyang is steadily advancing in being able to deliver a missile to the United States.

“They’re not there yet, but they’re close. And they get closer every day,” said Trump.

North Korea said after its last intercontinental ballistic missile launch in November that the test had put the U.S. mainland within range. Some experts agreed that based on the missile’s trajectory and distance it had the capability to fly as far as Washington D.C.

They said, however, that North Korea had not yet offered any proof that it had mastered all technical hurdles, including development of a re-entry vehicle needed to deliver a heavy nuclear warhead reliably atop an ICBM, but it was likely that it soon would. Pyongyang could reach that milestone by the end of the year, some intelligence officials said.

Trump said he welcomed talks between North and South Korea over the Winter Olympics to be held in the South next month and said this could be an initial phase in helping defuse the crisis.

He would not say whether the United States has been considering a limited, pre-emptive attack to show the North that the United States means business.

“We’re playing a very, very hard game of poker and you don’t want to reveal your hand,” he said.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...ngyang-getting-close-on-missile-idUSKBN1F62KO
 

danielboon

TB Fanatic
Sweden prepares public for war amid unease about Russia

London: Sweden is preparing to issue a public information manual on what to do in the event of war, as debate in the country grows over how to deal with the threat from Russia.

The brochure due to be sent to 4.7 million households will inform the public how they can take part in "total defence" during a war and secure water, food and heating.


The booklet, with the working title If Crisis or War Comes, will also give guidance on dealing with threats from cyber attacks, terrorism and climate change.

Russia's annexation of Crimea and military support for Ukrainian separatists, along with increased activity and exercises near the Baltic states and Scandinavia, have caused deep unease in Sweden. The neutral country has begun to reverse post-Cold War defence cuts and step up military preparedness as incursions by Russian planes and submarines have sparked public debate over whether to join NATO.

Last September, Sweden held its biggest military exercise in 23 years, with war games involving 19,000 Swedish personnel and allies from Finland, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, France, Norway and the US. Last year it voted to reintroduce conscription and also said it would start negotiations to buy a US-made Patriot missile defence system.

Towns have also been ordered to dust off Cold War-era civil defence contingency plans, including ensuring that bunkers are upgraded and maintained. http://www.smh.com.au/world/sweden-...amid-unease-about-russia-20180117-h0k0r1.html
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://spacenews.com/new-national-d...ght-on-pentagons-thinking-about-war-in-space/

New national defense strategy to shed light on Pentagon’s thinking about war in space

How the military views outer space and cyberspace as battlefronts in future wars are likely topics in the administration's new national defense strategy.

by Sandra Erwin — January 17, 2018

WASHINGTON — Space and cyber warfare moved up the national security priority list during the Obama administration, and are expected to rank even higher under the Trump presidency.

Details on how the military views outer space and cyberspace as battlefronts in future wars should emerge in the national defense strategy that Defense Secretary Jim Mattis is expected to unveil Friday.

The national defense strategy — a forward-looking take on the challenges facing the U.S. military and how it is posturing itself to tackle those threats — is what used to be known as the QDR, or Quadrennial Defense Review. Congress last year determined that the QDR had no real value and asked the Pentagon to provide instead a more candid picture of its global commitments and requirements. The thinking is that lawmakers need to better understand what resources are needed for the military to fulfill those responsibilities.

Andrew Philip Hunter, director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said space and cyber are likely to feature prominently in Secretary Mattis’ first national defense strategy.

In the first year of the Trump administration, space, cyber and missile defense have “really risen on the scope as modernization priorities,” Hunter said Wednesday at a CSIS news conference. Although it is still not clear that the rhetoric about the importance of space and cyber will be matched by policy and funding.

The next Pentagon’s budget could be a show-me moment.

Space and cyber are “new investment categories that are trying to displace, to some extent, existing force structure,” he said. Defense leaders and strategists have said the military needs to invest in modern technology to improve data analysis, intelligence, surveillance and other information-centric capabilities. But most of the Pentagon’s budget today is spent on old-school weapons. This creates a dilemma for the administration as it tries to position the military to win in the so-called “great power competition” against Russia and China.

“In order to dramatically increase investment in space, the Air Force will probably be required to reduce the size of its tactical fighter fleet in order to be able to afford that kind of investment,” Hunter said. “All of the services are being forced to reallocate force structure into the cyber mission in a pretty major way. That’s hard to do.”

Shifting resources away from traditional military systems to emerging areas of warfare like space and cyber will require some heavy political muscle, Hunter said. “That means it has to come from the secretary,” he added. “Left to their own devices, it’s very hard for the services to make that tradeoff. And that’s why, if it’s not articulated in the strategy, if it’s not coming from the secretary, it’s probably not going to happen.”

The new strategy also may begin to answer questions that the space and arms-control communities have been asking for a long time, such as how the military plans to deter attacks as space becomes more militarized,

That is the “big, burning issue that has not been resolved,” said Todd Harrison, director of the Aerospace Security Project and senior fellow at CSIS.

“What are we going to do in space to reestablish or improve a stable deterrent posture?” Harrison asked. “We do not want to fight a war in space. That’s a war that’s not going to go well for anyone,” he insisted. “If you know anything about orbital mechanics and orbital debris, we don’t want it to go there.” Military leaders have made this point as well.

How the Pentagon would deter future enemies from launching attacks in space in unclear, said Harrison. “And we’re at a point now where deterrence is not as clear that it will work in space,” he said. “We’re worried about that. The Department of Defense is worried about that.” He wonders whether this strategy will help reestablish a stable “deterrence posture” in space.

In a leaked draft copy of the soon-to-be-released Nuclear Posture Review, the administration highlights the risks that, if a nuclear crisis erupted, U.S. adversaries would immediately target key strategic space assets such as missile-warning and command-and-control satellites.

“In the nuclear realm, it’s long been understood that if you’re actually getting into a nuclear conflict, that of course both sides are going to try to take out the space assets of the other,” Harrison said. “If you’re at that point, the gloves are off.”

That concern is not new, he noted. But deterrence in space has become more challenging for the United States because the same satellites are used for strategic and tactical missions. Classified communications and intelligence gathering satellites that were created to support a nuclear war routinely are employed in conventional missions.

What the Trump administration has to address, Harrison said, is “how do we architect these systems to do what we need them to do in a nuclear crisis, but also to be resilient to attack in a nonnuclear crisis?”

During the Cold War, only the Soviets posed a credible threat to U.S. space systems. “And we basically had an understanding between the two countries: ‘If you attack our space systems, we’re going to regard that as a prelude of a full-scale nuclear war.” The world today is different, and the U.S. military has become hugely dependent on space, even for low-intensity counterinsurgency operations.

“So why wouldn’t an adversary, even a non-state actor, try to disrupt these systems?” Harrison asked. “And we’ve seen evidence of that, things like jamming our satellite-communications signals in Iraq and Afghanistan,” he said. “It is a much more complicated deterrence problem that we have today. We can’t simply assume that the threat of nuclear retaliation is going to deter someone from interfering with our space systems.”

Deterrence is even more difficult as anonymous cyber attacks can disrupt satellites signals. “You can’t prove it,” said Harrison. “There’s not something blowing up. It’s photons interfering with one another,” he said. “Can we really deter those types of attacks anymore?” And when deterrence fails, “we need architectures in space that can withstand attacks, that are resilient.” Further, “we need a posture that makes us more credible that we can deter these types of actions.”
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://www.hoover.org/research/sinews-empire

The Sinews Of Empire

by Seth Cropsey
Tuesday, January 16, 2018

Modern scholars of politics revel in their complex descriptions of state action. Rather than oversimplifying and reducing the state to a unitary body, they separate its internal components and assess each of their relative strengths. There’s something to this. However, politics are contradictory. Man may create sprawling decision-making bodies, and systems that disperse power at multiple levels. Nevertheless, states are remarkably like people. They feel pride and anger, loyalty and hatred, fear and hope.

States are also structured like people. They have minds, hearts, and amorphous limbs with which to influence the world around them. Moreover, they have sinews, connective links that unite their metaphorical bone and muscle, tie their appendages together, and enable the use of power. Roads and internal thoroughfares are sinews common to every state.

But empires, the titans that shape the international system, derive their power from the seas, and their control over portions of international trade. As such, naval forces are the sinews of great powers. They ensure the free movement of goods between friendly ports, the transit of forces between far-flung bases, and uninterrupted communications between the core, its distant commercial partners, and allies.

Two historical examples help suggest the effect of the sustained cuts to American seapower that began with the Cold War’s end and have continued to today. First, the experience of Habsburg Spain, an empire that neglected consistently to fund its naval forces, and paid the price in its loss to a distinctly inferior power. Second, the experience of the Soviet Union, an empire that saw its naval power grow from 1945 until 1980, followed by an increase in its ability to shape international events.

Spain—Force Decline and Imperial Collapse
Ancient empires controlled a vast amount of the world without sophisticated technology—Macedonian, Roman, and Mongol territorial expansion are examples. But 16th-century Spain is the first modern empire in geographical scale and logistical scope. With its significant holdings in the Southwest Pacific, the Americas, and Europe, the Habsburg-run empire was the first upon which the sun never set.

Spain maintained its imperial power through control of international trade, facilitated by its naval and merchant fleets. The Spanish commercial system was global. Beginning in the Philippines, the Manila galleons would transport Chinese goods from the Western Pacific to Mexico. These would join the gold and silver extracted from Central America and Peru that fueled the Spanish economy. The West Indies Fleet of merchant galleons would bear this treasure and trade from the Caribbean to the Iberian Peninsula, and return via convoy to the Indies to take on another opulent cargo. Spain combined its Atlantic treasure fleet and Pacific galleons with a Mediterranean galley fleet that it used to challenge Ottoman expansion and gain control over still-critical Mediterranean trade flows. Naval superiority in each of these theaters nourished Spanish prosperity.

Despite the importance of maritime trade to the Spanish Empire, Spain’s 16th-century Habsburg monarchs consistently refused to fund Atlantic naval forces, despite the Spanish crown’s 1550s annual income of 2.5 million pesos and 1590s annual income of 14 million pesos. Habsburg claims to the former Duchy of Burgundy drew the Spanish Empire into decades of land wars against France, while Charles V’s position as Holy Roman Emperor entangled him repeatedly in campaigns against Protestant North German princes. Most important, the Dutch Revolt against Philip II in 1568 initiated 80 years of European and colonial warfare, leading to the continual diversion of funds to Spanish ground forces.

The Habsburg monarchs may have considered land campaigns the strategic jewel in their crown. However, setbacks at sea doomed the Spanish Empire, not defeats on land. The Dutch Revolt inaugurated the era of privateering, first with the Northern European-centered “Sea Beggars” who prevented Spain from blockading the newly established Dutch Republic, and later with privateers who harassed Spanish treasure convoys. Elizabethan England also joined the fray. England’s Sea Dogs like Francis Drake, John Hawkins, and Walter Raleigh chewed away at Spain’s New World revenues while bolstering English coffers.

Anglo-Dutch harassment disrupted Spanish revenue flows, thus undermining Spain’s war of attrition against the Netherlands that was centered on laying siege to fortified towns. Moreover, Spain’s lack of sea control in Northern Europe enabled the English resupply of the Dutch rebels, allowing them to sustain their war effort despite distinct material disadvantages. The Spanish Armada was conceived as Philip’s decisive stroke against England and the Netherlands. The 130-ship fleet would sail north from Spain and destroy inferior Anglo-Dutch naval forces in the English Channel. After establishing sea control, it would transport the Duke of Parma’s army from the Netherlands to England. This 55,000-man force of Spanish tercios would knock England out of the war. Parma’s force would then descend upon the now-unsupported Dutch, ending their costly rebellion.

Most accounts of the Spanish Armada’s failure focus on tactical issues. Creative Anglo-Dutch tactics and poor weather felled Spain’s poorly trained and badly led armada. However, the long-term strategic impact of force decline cannot be overstated. Inconsistent funding meant that Spain lacked a modern offensive fleet. It was forced to rely on a small core of hastily constructed galleons, supplemented by outdated armed carracks and hulks, along with light ships. An armada comprised of fighting ships, rather than converted medieval merchantmen, would have stood a better chance to succeed than the fleet that sailed. A more professional and better-trained fleet could likely have managed the poor weather the armada encountered.

Because it refused to match its naval forces to its strategic commitments, Spain suffered a crushing defeat at English hands, from which the Spanish navy and Empire never recovered. Growing Anglo-Dutch naval power wrested control of international trade from Spain, resulting in its ultimate imperial decline and collapse. Great states depend on globe-encircling seapower. Seapower depends on sufficient numbers of good ships, and leadership that is as capable as the fleet’s well-trained crews. None of this is possible without sustained, consistent resources.

Soviet Naval Policy, 1956-1985
Spain’s experience illustrates the peril of failing to match force size and shape with strategic commitments—an issue that lies at the heart of the U.S. Navy’s downsizing. Alternatively, the Soviet experience demonstrates the increasing strategic flexibility and potency that a properly funded, well-equipped navy can provide any great power.

Land powers that seek greater international influence are wont to expand their fleets. The Soviet Union was no exception. It derived its structural military strength from its population and geography—a strength that Soviet military engagements demonstrated even before the Second World War. However, from its founding the USSR lacked major naval forces. Imperial Russia’s 1905 defeat in the Pacific eliminated the core of its naval combat power, while war with Germany in 1914 precluded significant naval expansion. Landward threats consumed Soviet military attention in the interwar period, preventing investments in a navy, and war with Germany once again in 1941 forced the USSR to direct all its military resources to land operations. The “Red Navy” had little effect on the conflict, with 400,000 of its sailors dispatched as infantrymen to the Eastern Front.

Russia entered the Cold War at a maritime disadvantage. Its significant power was trapped in Central and Eastern Europe. Although it could foment revolution and bully regional actors into submission, the Soviet Union lacked tools directly to pressure the United States. The Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrates American naval power’s ability to control escalation. Despite President Kennedy’s diplomatic weakness and strategic miscalculation, the U.S. could use its naval forces to quarantine Cuba, an act that froze the situation and demonstrated Cuba’s isolation from Soviet support in a wider conflict. Khrushchev’s nuclear ploy backfired. By raising the escalatory stakes, he cut off his own flexibility.

Under the thirty-year stewardship of Admiral Sergey Gorshkov, the Soviet Navy was transformed from a coastal force into one that could project global power. Gorshkov understood the geographic constraints that trapped Soviet power projection, namely the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap and Dardanelles, both of which were in Western hands. Just like the Imperial and Nazi German naval services, the Soviet Navy needed to pierce the West’s “far blockade” to operate internationally, and do so without a global network of bases.

Gorshkov constructed a fleet centered on its submarine service. Attack boats and cruiser submarines were intended to pressure American and allied shipping, while SSBN’s (ballistic missile submarines) afforded the USSR second-strike capabilities. Gorshkov combined this subsurface fleet, which reached 260 boats in the early 1980s, with a collection of small surface combatants, light aircraft carriers, and long-range strike aircraft designed to give Soviet forces maritime breathing space closer to home, and show the flag abroad.

The Soviets benefitted from their naval expansion most clearly in the late 1970s and early 1980s in Latin America and Africa. The U.S. policy of détente in the 1970s was intended to decrease American commitments abroad by limiting competition to Central Europe. As such, détente catalyzed a reduction in American naval forces—a reduction concurrent with Gorshkov’s expansion. From the late 1970s onward, Soviet naval power facilitated communist support for anti-American regimes throughout Latin America. In 1981, Soviet surface combatants escorted 63,000 tons of arms shipments to Cuba, which were in turn distributed to various Latin American communist groups. Soviet assistance helped the Sandinistas gain power in Nicaragua in 1979, and sustained the regime throughout the Cold War.

Soviet military aid to Cuba outclassed U.S. assistance to all Latin America tenfold. Such an effort would have been impossible without Soviet ships and submarines operating from Cuban, Peruvian, and Chilean ports. Moreover, the mere presence of Soviet forces on the critical sea-lanes in the Gulf of Mexico gave the USSR greater potential escalatory control. The Soviet navy had a similar effect in Africa. Although the Soviet navy never obtained a permanent African base, the USSR’s maritime presence helped deter more open American intervention in Angola and Somalia.

The Cold War’s conclusion is typically linked to an overextension of Soviet military capabilities, especially as they applied to its economic capacity. However, the Soviet navy was a marginal investment success. It gave the Kremlin significant increased policy flexibility from the mid-1970s onwards. The Cuban Missile Crisis might have played out very differently with Gorshkov’s fleet on patrol in the West Atlantic.

The Vatican is the one land-locked state in the world that wields global influence. The others that suffer from similar geographic position are limited in their aspirations, whether for good or ill. The U.S. remains the world’s most influential nation and is still the world’s greatest seapower. History suggests an inexorable link between consequential influence and seapower.

1 Comment

Shellie Garrett • 2 days ago
Cuba also afforded the USSR a bonus in the power-projection arena, as Cuba was a chief sponsor of "Wars of National Liberation" throughout Africa and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s. Cuba's ability to sponsor these wars collapsed with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/xi-jinping-generals-curiouser-curiouser/

XI JINPING AND HIS GENERALS: CURIOUSER AND CURIOUSER
DEAN CHENG
JANUARY 18, 2018

It was reported this week that Chinese general Fang Fenghui was “transferred to the military prosecution authority on suspicion of offering and accepting bribes.” Fang had reportedly been under investigation since late last year. Gen. Fang had been a senior member of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Central Military Commission – the entity that heads China’s armed forces. Before that, he led the Joint Staff Department – an organization that succeeded the General Staff Department and is effectively in charge of China’s warfighting and war-planning organizations.

Fang’s fall began at the same time that his counterpart Gen. Zhang Yang, former head of the PLA’s Political Work Department (previously the General Political Department), was also placed under investigation. Zhang hanged himself last November.

Fang and Zhang join a growing list of senior PLA officers that have been arrested, expelled from the Party, and imprisoned on corruption charges. These have included Gen. Guo Boxiong and Gen. Xu Caihou, former vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission (and therefore the most senior uniformed officers in the PLA), Gen. Li Jinai (another former head of the General Political Department), and Gen. Liao Xilong (former head of the General Logistics Department). Gen. Du Jincai, head of the Central Military Commission’s Discipline Inspection Commission (and therefore top graft-buster), had also retired, reportedly due to corruption charges as well.

All told, since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, over 100 PLA general officers have reportedly been forcibly retired or placed under investigation. In another sign of the extensiveness of these probes, perhaps 90 percent of the PLA officers that attended last October’s 19th CCP Party Congress were first-time attendees. As long-time China leadership observer Cheng Li noted, this marks an unprecedented turnover in the top ranks of the PLA.

It may be that the PLA is a massively corrupt organization. Having enjoyed nearly a quarter century of double-digit growth in its budget, the military has enjoyed an enormous influx of resources, which means greater opportunities for graft. In this regard, the PLA is not alone — Xi Jinping’s entire first term since 2012 has been marked by a massive, ongoing anti-corruption campaign aimed at both the military and civilian systems.

This large-scale uprooting, however, is also likely to be driven in part by Chinese internal politics. Many of the senior officers that have been summarily fired and imprisoned are linked to Xi Jinping’s predecessors, both Jiang Zemin (who was China’s leader from 1992 to 2002) and Hu Jintao (2002 to 2012). As with Xi’s anti-corruption efforts against various civilian leaders, those targeted appear to be political rivals, although this is not to say they may not also be corrupt.

Intriguingly, some of the most senior officers thus far removed (Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong) were accused by a senior Chinese official of planning a coup. At the 19th Party Congress last October, Liu Shiyu, chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission declared that Xu and Guo, along with Bo Xilai (former Party Secretary for Chongqing), Zhou Yongkang (former member of the Politburo and head of the Ministry of Public Security), and Ling Jihua (former head of the General Office of the Chinese Communist Party) had been plotting “to usurp the party’s leadership and seize state power.” The other person Liu listed was Sun Zhengcai, Party Secretary for Chongqing until this past summer and rumored to be among the short list for future leaders of China.

The fall of Sun, his linkage to Bo Xilai, General Guo and General Xu raises questions about the extent of internal dissension, and how far that dissent might extend within the PLA.

That, in turn, may also overlap with professional considerations. Xi Jinping unveiled a massive overhaul of the Chinese military at the very end of 2015. This represented perhaps the most fundamental reformation of the PLA since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. It included the formal establishment of three new services; a consolidation of seven military regions into five war zones; and an expansion of the Central Military Commission to include 15 departments, subordinate commissions, and offices. At the same time, Xi has redoubled efforts to push the PLA’s doctrine and approach to warfare completely into the 21st century.

Such efforts undoubtedly entailed the disruption of a variety of bureaucratic stove-pipes, as well as cozy relationships, which most likely would have engendered slow-rolling and other forms of organizational resistance. By wielding and openly applying the cudgel of anti-corruption (and publicly breaking senior officers such as former vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission), Xi may well have ensured that his professional efforts to overhaul the PLA would meet with minimal resistance (if not enthusiastic cooperation).

As the PLA continues to push its modernization program towards its first milestone of 2020, it is likely to be much more thorough-going and successful than might have been expected, as a result of high level support and pressure, including the neutering of bureaucratic resistance.

Implications for American Decision-Makers

Coming out of the 19th Party Congress, Xi Jinping has consolidated his public hold on power. The Politburo and its Standing Committee, constituting the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, are now staffed by Xi’s own picks. Yet, the fate of Sun Zhengcai, who became Party Secretary of Chongqing under Xi, and whose program was praised by Xi in 2016, suggests that there is limited certainty under Xi.

For the PLA, this is likely to mean a redoubled focus on implementing military reform and modernization. Whereas lining one’s nest and engaging in political machinations could lead to being cashiered, or worse publicly disgraced, executing the ambitious reform effort is more likely to lead to accolades. Given the extensive reforms that are underway, including further deepening joint interoperability, improving training, and extending civil-military integration, there is plenty of work to occupy the PLA’s officer corps. By 2020, when it is believed that the first phase of these reforms should be completed the PLA will be fielding more ships, naval infantry, and modern fighters. As important, they are likely to be better trained, more integrated, and have the support of a massive industrial and human capital base.

For American and allied planners in the Indo-Pacific region, this means they will be facing a much more capable potential adversary in a few short years.



Dean Cheng is the Senior Research Fellow for Chinese Political and Security Affairs at the Heritage Foundation. Prior to joining Heritage, he worked at the Center for Naval Analysis and SAIC.
 

Housecarl

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Hummm....

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https://mwi.usma.edu/rise-revisionists-russia-china-north-korea-iran/

THE RISE OF THE REVISIONISTS: WHAT TO DO ABOUT RUSSIA, CHINA, NORTH KOREA, AND IRAN?

Alex Gallo | January 18, 2018

In late October 2015, I was an Armed Services Committee staffer responsible for the Asia-Pacific and Middle East policy portfolios. We had just received word that the the Obama Administration conducted the first Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) with the USS Lassen (DDG-82) that passed within twelve nautical miles of the Spratly Islands—including Subi Reef, which China claims.

After running down the stairs to the dungeon-like room in the bottom of the Rayburn House Office Building parking garage, my colleagues and I crowded around a small conference table to receive a briefing on the FONOP. All the usual suspects from DoD and State were there—including their lawyers. They proceeded to tell us about the Lassen’s FONOP, ensuring sufficient ambiguity about its specific purpose and trying with excruciatingly painful intellectual acrobatics to make a distinction between transiting via innocent passage and conducting a FONOP “consistent with innocent passage”—while, at the same time, avoiding any discussion on future FONOPs or how this particular one fit into overall US policy to address China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea. Until the very end.

At the end of this somewhat contentious briefing, one of the State Department briefers made a quip that told us everything we needed to know about US policy at that point. In response to a prickly question from one of my committee staff colleagues about what the United States was going to do about China’s estimated 3,200 acres of land reclamation in the South China Sea—never mind China’s militarization of these man-made “islands,” which include 10,000 foot runways, in an attempt to establish an anti-access area denial (A2AD) zone—the briefer responded: “It’s not like we’re going to go to war [to stop this].” Notwithstanding the fact that the briefer’s maximalist response failed to contemplate various, additional policy options between conducting FONOPs and all-out war, he said what we all knew. It’s not like we were going to “go to war” — it was below our threshold for response.

This briefing, and especially this one quip by the State Department official, revealed to me the challenge to regional order—and international rules and norms—across the globe. In short, many of the challenges we face due to the “rise of the revisionists,” are, perhaps paradoxically, too grave to ignore, yet too costly to resolve. What’s left is, at best, trying to manage out these regional problems and, at worst, leaving them unresolved, which has the effect of neutralizing US power and influence in the eyes of partners and allies in the region.

The result has been parallel power structures rising up across regions. In the absence of decisive and effective US regional power and influence, competition among regional powers opposing the United States’ partners and allies has emerged, often underwritten by Russia and China. And while US global power remains, it becomes less and less relevant over time because of our inability to play a decisive and influential role in effectively resolving regional crises.

The debate over the scope and nature of the challenge presented by revisionist powers—Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran—has been unfolding for a few years now. In a 2014 essay in a Foreign Affairs, “The Return of Geopolitics,” Walter Russell Mead asserted:

So far, the year 2014 has been a tumultuous one, as geopolitical rivalries have stormed back to center stage. Whether it is Russian forces seizing Crimea, China making aggressive claims in its coastal waters . . . or Iran trying to use its alliances with Syria and Hezbollah to dominate the Middle East, old-fashioned power plays are back in international relations.

Mead argued that Russia, China, and Iran did not accept the post-Cold War settlement, and while these “revisionist” actors have not overturned the post-Cold War order, “they have converted an uncontested status quo into a contested one.”

As a rejoinder to Mead’s Foreign Affairs piece, John Ikenberry argued that these actors are not “full-scale revisionist powers”—they are, at best, “part-time spoilers.” In any case, we are just now beginning to see the effects of this challenge.

For example, China is coercively presenting “new,” competing political and economic systems to actors in their region, saying, essentially, “embrace the Chinese way,” or else. Russia has been engaged in a similar effort for years, presenting a similar proposition to other states: “Do not turn towards Western institutions and systems,” or else. North Korea and Iran, for their part, have taken this regional, coercive approach to a whole new level—by holding population centers at risk through conventional weapon systems.

North Korea is doing this with a massive artillery capability, much of it near enough to the border with South Korea that the population in Seoul is well within range. The 12,000 tube artillery guns and 2,300 pieces of multiple-launch rocket artillery under the North Korean People’s Army Artillery Command could result in, according to a reported Pentagon estimate, 20,000 killed each day should war unfold on the Peninsula. No US military capability or system will be able to fundamentally change the reality of the potential death toll on the Korean Peninsula, at this point.

In the Middle East, Iran’s ballistic missile capability plays a similar role, holding at risk key facilities and population centers in the UAE and other Gulf Cooperation Council countries.

Again, the net effect in both cases is to establish a regional context that enhances their interests by operating below our threshold for response—thereby deterring the United States from taking decisive action and degrading our relative influence in the process.

So, what to do about all of this?

The United States should continue to build out our intelligence picture, regional missile defense, and our capabilities to hunt and destroy such conventional systems in these regions. But we should also contemplate new forms of deterrence against “below-threshold” approaches of such regional actors.

We can no longer exclusively rely on the retaliatory model of deterrence because the threat of retaliation does not sufficiently thwart any of these actors from probing the frontiers of Western “defenses” and influence (Russia in Crimea), reclaiming land to prevent freedom of navigation (China in the South China Sea), or holding population centers and other key facilities at risk (North Korea and Iran). These actions continue to fall below our threshold for response.

The result: revisionist states are fundamentally redefining regional power dynamics across the globe that may ultimately rewrite international rules and norms in their favor—de facto, de jure, and through pure force.

And so, as National Security Advisor Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster reportedly contemplates a so-called “bloody nose,” “limited” military response to provocations and recent actions by the North Korean regime, perhaps we are beginning to see a shift towards engaging more decisively within the regional contexts, standing up for US interests, and punishing our adversaries rather than an exclusive focus on avoiding military confrontation. This approach is clearly risky, but so is what we have been doing.

Because if not—if that State Department briefer was right and it’s not like we’re going to go to war to confront our adversaries’ activities early and below our current thresholds for response—then we must either ready ourselves for the inevitable, more costly war in the future or be prepared to accept a new world order.

Alex Gallo is a Senior Associate with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and served as a Professional Staff Member with the House Armed Services Committee and the Deputy Director of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the US government.
 

Housecarl

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https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/bomb-australia-part-1/

The bomb for Australia? (Part 1)

17 Jan 2018|Ramesh Thakur

In this three-part series, I examine the counter-arguments that proponents of Australia obtaining nuclear weapons need to address before the nation contemplates such a move.

A heavyweight trio of Australia’s strategic and defence policy analysts has opened a debate on the possibility of Australia acquiring nuclear weapons. Paul Dibb and Richard Brabin-Smith documented the increased strategic risk to Australia based on a critical assessment of China’s capabilities, motives and intent.

Paul took that further in The Australian, canvassing the idea of investing in capabilities that would reduce the lead time for getting the bomb to give us more options for dealing with growing strategic uncertainty. North Korea’s nuclear advances and diminishing confidence in the dependability of US extended nuclear deterrence add to the sense of strategic unease.

Andrew Davies inferred Hugh White’s support for the idea and implied that both Paul and Hugh had been too coy to take their analyses to the logical conclusion. Hugh has been the preeminent Australian analyst advocating an independent recalibration of our position vis‑à‑vis the China–US tussle for strategic primacy in the Asia–Pacific.

In reply, Hugh politely, gently but firmly rejected the implication that he’s a closet supporter of Australia taking the nuclear weapon path. He neither advocates nor predicts that Australia should or will go nuclear. He professes uncertainty about the role of nuclear weapons in shaping Asia’s emerging strategic landscape, highlights the importance of getting the decisions right on conventional capabilities first, and points to the choices and trade-offs that would then have to be made between the security benefits and risks of a weaponised nuclear capability.

Who will call out the nuclear emperor for being naked? Nuclear weapons haven’t been used since 1945—Hiroshima was the first time and Nagasaki the last. Their very destructiveness makes them qualitatively different in political and moral terms, to the point of rendering them unusable. A calculated use of the bomb is less likely than one resulting from system malfunction, faulty information or rogue launch.

On the other hand, the non-trivial risks of inadvertent use mean that the world’s very existence is hostage to indefinite continuance of the same good fortune that has ensured no use since 1945.

Curiously, Hugh, Paul and Andrew don’t explore the roles that nuclear weapons might play, the functions they would perform, and the circumstances and conditions in which those roles and functions would prove effective. This is a crucial omission. The arguments I canvassed in a review of the illusory gains and lasting insecurities of India’s nuclear weapon acquisition apply with equal force to Australia, albeit with appropriate modifications for our circumstances.

In short, the nuclear equation just does not compute for Australia.

Consistent with the moral taint associated with the bomb, the most common justification for getting or keeping nuclear weapons isn’t that we’d want to use them against anyone else. We’d only want them either to avert nuclear blackmail or to deter an attack. Neither of those arguments holds up against the historical record or in logic.

The belief in the coercive utility of nuclear weapons is widely internalised, owing in no small measure to Japan’s surrender immediately after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Yet the evidence is surprisingly clear that the close chronology is a coincidence. In Japanese decision-makers’ minds, the decisive factor in their unconditional surrender was the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific war against Japan’s essentially undefended northern approaches, and the fear that the Soviets would be the occupying power unless Japan surrendered to the US first. Hiroshima was bombed on 6 August 1945, Nagasaki on 9 August. Moscow broke its neutrality pact to attack Japan on 9 August and Tokyo announced the surrender on 15 August.

There’s been no clear-cut instance since then of a non-nuclear state having been bullied into changing its behaviour by the overt or implicit threat of being bombed by nuclear weapons.

The normative taboo against the most indiscriminately inhumane weapon ever invented is so comprehensive and robust that under no conceivable circumstances will its use against a non-nuclear state compensate for the political costs. That’s why nuclear powers have accepted defeat at the hands of non-nuclear states (for example, Vietnam and Afghanistan) rather than escalate armed conflict to the nuclear level. Non-nuclear Argentina even invaded the Falkland Islands in 1982 despite Britain’s nuclear arsenal.

Australia’s nuclear breakout would also guarantee the collapse of the NPT order and lead to a cascade of proliferation. Each additional entrant into the nuclear club multiplies the risk of inadvertent war geometrically. That threat would vastly exceed the dubious and marginal security gains of possession. The contemporary risks of proliferation to, and use by, irresponsible states in volatile conflict-prone regions, or even by suicide terrorists, outweigh realistic security benefits. A more rational and prudent approach to reducing nuclear risks to Australia would be to actively advocate and pursue the minimisation, reduction and elimination agendas for the short, medium and long terms identified in the Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament—an Australian initiative that was co-chaired by distinguished former Australian and Japanese foreign ministers.

AUTHOR
Ramesh Thakur is a professor at the Australian National University and co-convenor of the Asia–Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Image courtesy of Flickr user Marcin Wichary.

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https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/bomb-australia-part-2/

The bomb for Australia? (Part 2)

19 Jan 2018|Ramesh Thakur

As we consider whether Australia should obtain nuclear weapons, we need to ask who might subject us to nuclear blackmail. In the authoritative statement of China’s strategic vision in President Xi Jinping’s address to the 19th Communist Party Congress on 18 October last year, the three core elements of China’s vision of the new world order were parity in China–US relations; growing Chinese influence in writing the underlying rules and in designing and controlling the governance institutions of the global order; and more assertive Chinese diplomacy in that new international system.

The world therefore should prepare for a surge in Chinese international policy activism. It seems reasonable to conclude that—regardless of who may be at fault in initiating hostilities—the possibility of a future conflict with China can’t be ruled out. At the same time, Paul Dibb and Richard Brabin-Smith argue in their recent ASPI report, Australia’s management of strategic risk in the new era, that ‘it’s difficult to imagine any other major power … attacking Australia’. And there, for ASPI’s Andrew Davies, lies the rub, because ‘China is a nuclear power’.

But it does not follow that Australia must prepare for Chinese military or political use of nuclear weapons. For eight years or so, China has indulged in bellicose rhetoric and engaged in assertive behaviour against several neighbours, stoking their fears about its motives and intentions with growing capabilities. That said, of the nine leaders with fingers on the nuclear button, whose quality of nuclear decision-making is likely to be more responsible than Xi Jinping’s? Certainly not those who boast about the size of their button.

China’s nuclear stockpile is below 300, compared to nearly 7,000 warheads each for Russia and the US. Fan Jishe argues in an APLN policy brief that—notwithstanding its massively growing economy—China has consciously refrained from engaging in a sprint to nuclear parity with Russia and the US because its governing doctrine envisages only one role for nuclear weapons: to prevent nuclear blackmail.

Despite the total transformation in China’s economic fortunes since the 1960s, its nuclear doctrine, acquisitions program, and deployment and employment policies have remained essentially unchanged. It’s the only one of the nine possessor countries to be committed fully to an unequivocal no-first-use policy. Conversely, of the nuclear nine, only the US can be suspected of harbouring designs to shift from mutual vulnerability (the basis of deterrence) to nuclear primacy (which would enable use without fear of nuclear retaliation).

Of course, we can’t simply rely on the word of a potential adversary. But there are two further considerations. On the one hand, the international reputational cost to the next country to use nuclear weapons would be very high for breaking the global taboo. The cost would be even greater for a power that has a firm no-first-use policy. And the costs have been raised still higher by the new UN nuclear ban treaty. The treaty’s primary impact is intended to be normative, not operational, as I argue in the current issue of The Washington Quarterly, through moral stigmatisation and legal prohibition. It specifically prohibits the threat of use, along with banning any actual use of nuclear weapons. Instead of welcoming the treaty as a contribution to our national security, Australia has opposed and rejected it. On the other hand, an Australia reduced to a post-nuclear-attack atomic wasteland would be of no commercial, strategic or any other value to China, so the reputational cost would come with no compensating material or geopolitical gain.

According to a careful statistical analysis of 210 militarised ‘compellent threats’ from 1918 to 2001 by Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann (Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy, 2017), nuclear powers succeeded in just 10 of them, and even then the presence of nuclear weapons may not have been the decisive factor. Non-nuclear states were more successful at coercion than nuclear-armed states (32% of cases versus 20%) and nuclear monopoly gave no more assurance of success. In a different dataset of 348 territorial disputes between 1919 and 1995, possessor and non-possessor states won territorial concessions at almost the same rate (35% and 36%, respectively).

Lacking compellent utility against non-nuclear adversaries, nuclear weapons can’t be used for defence against nuclear-armed rivals either. Their mutual vulnerability to second-strike retaliatory action is so robust for the foreseeable future that any escalation through the nuclear threshold really would amount to mutual national suicide.

The only purpose and role of nuclear weapons, therefore, is mutual deterrence. They are credited with having preserved the long peace among the major powers in the north Atlantic (the argument that holds NATO to have been the world’s most successful peace movement) and deterred attack by the conventionally superior Soviet forces throughout the Cold War. Yet that too is debatable. How do we assess the relative weight and potency of nuclear weapons, West European integration and West European democratisation as explanatory variables in that long peace? No evidence exists to show that either side had the intention to attack the other at any time during the Cold War but was deterred from doing so because of the other side’s nuclear weapons.

AUTHOR
Ramesh Thakur is a professor at the Australian National University and co-convenor of the Asia–Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Image: Wikimedia Commons.
 

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https://www.stripes.com/news/russia-closing-gap-with-nato-top-us-general-in-europe-warns-1.507051

Russia closing gap with NATO, top US general in Europe warns

By JOHN VANDIVER | STARS AND STRIPES
Published: January 17, 2018

STUTTGART Germany — NATO’s military edge over Russia could soon be threatened if allies fail to keep adapting, the alliance’s top general warned on Wednesday.

U.S. Army Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, said Russia’s military modernization efforts are challenging allies in a range of areas such as cybersecurity.

“Because of the modernization they’ve made, while we are dominant, we will not be in five years ... if we are not adapting,” Scaparrotti said during a news conference at NATO headquarters in Brussels.

Scaparrotti, who also serves as head of U.S. European Command, said he and his Russian counterpart, Gen. Valery Gerasimov, have agreed to meet soon in an effort to improve communication and reduce the risks miscalculation. The meeting would be the first face-to-face encounter between the top NATO and Russian commanders since Moscow’s 2014 intervention in Ukraine.

During two days of talks in Brussels, alliance defense chiefs worked on plans to set up two new command headquarters to deal with a more aggressive Russia.

The plans call for dual headquarters to focus on ensuring the faster movement of forces across the Atlantic Ocean and around Europe.

The gathered generals, who included Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Joseph Dunford, will deliver their recommendations to NATO defense ministers for approval in February.

Since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO has built up its forces in Eastern Europe to counter Russia’s forces. But despite those efforts military officials fear the alliance might not be able to mobilize troops on short notice.

Modernization is needed both on land and at sea for NATO contingency operations, Dunford said in Brussels.

“In terms of capabilities: cyber, information warfare and missile defense,” Dunford told the Pentagon’s internal news service.

Despite worries that Russia’s modernization efforts might close the capability gap, the roughly $1 trillion in defense spending by the U.S. and its NATO allies still dwarfs Moscow’s. IHS Jane’s, a defense industry analysis publication, estimated Russia’s defense spending in 2017 at less than $50 billion.

During the meeting of defense chiefs, allies also discussed future plans in Iraq, where NATO could agree in the coming weeks to enhance its training efforts. Iraq’s government and security forces are working to stabilize the country after delivering a string of defeats to the Islamic State.

“The situation in Iraq is changing now. Physically ISIS has been defeated, but this doesn’t mean the ideology has been defeated,” said Gen. Petr Pavel, head of NATO’s military committee.

vandiver.john@stripes.com
Twitter: @john_vandiver

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