INTL 5/18 EU/NATO/CIS/CSTO-SCO| Russia-U.S. nuclear talks/EU economics/The Caucasus, et al

5/10 EU/NATO/CIS/CSTO-SCO|NATO war games hinder U.S.-Russia ties: Putin
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Stratfor Intelligence Guidance: Week of May 17, 2009
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http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE54H34Q20090518

Russia, U.S. seek to reshape ties at nuclear talks
Mon May 18, 2009 12:06pm EDT

By Conor Sweeney

MOSCOW (Reuters) - Vast stockpiles of nuclear weapons amassed during the Cold War could become the catalyst for a thaw in relations this week between the United States and Russia.

U.S. President Barack Obama and Kremlin chief Dmitry Medvedev last month agreed to pursue a deal on cutting nuclear weapons that would replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), which expires in December.

The three days of Moscow talks, starting on Tuesday, will have to deal with disputed technical details about nuclear weapons and coincide with NATO war games in Georgia which have angered Russia.

But diplomats said the discussions should help to narrow differences between the world's two biggest nuclear powers, allowing Obama and Medvedev to declare progress when they meet in Moscow on July 6-8.

"I think there is a will on both sides to agree a deal," said Dmitry Danilov of Moscow's European Security Studies.

The talks will also be a litmus test showing whether the former foes can work together now there is a new president in the White House and after relations sank to a post-Cold War low during last year's war in Georgia.

"Unlike the Bush administration, Obama's negotiating team will be more constructive, there have been signals that they're ready to discuss difficult issues," said Danilov.

Washington and Moscow hope that if they can agree to a successor to START by December, this will strengthen their hand in pushing for an updated Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Obama's administration was credited this month with helping 189 countries agree on the agenda for an overhaul of the treaty.

CUT STOCKPILES

The U.S. team in Moscow is led by Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller and will include officials from the Pentagon and Department of Energy.

Gottemoeller, an expert on Russia who is respected in Moscow, held preliminary talks in Rome last month with Russia's chief negotiator Anatoly Antonov, who heads the Foreign Ministry's department of security and disarmament.

Medvedev and Obama have said the new arms deal should cut stockpiles below those in the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), under which both sides are to cut their arsenals to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by 2012.

Russia has said it wants to link the nuclear talks to U.S. plans to deploy an anti-missile shield in Europe and has pushed for the United States to put a limit on the number of delivery systems -- the rockets or other means that deliver weapons.

The U.S. has said it will take such vehicles into account but has resisted Moscow's demands that warheads taken off missiles and put into storage should be counted.

Diplomats say that while technical issues remain central to a new agreement, the tone of talks is likely to be constructive.

No formal text is expected to be agreed in Moscow this week, said officials familiar with the agenda.

(Editing by Robert Woodward)

© Thomson Reuters 2009. All rights reserved.


Related News
FACTBOX: Who are the world's nuclear powers?
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FACTBOX: What is the Non-Proliferation Treaty?
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FACTBOX: Key facts about U.S.-Russia START I arms deal
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Q+A: Issues in U.S.-Russia nuclear arms talks
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Russia pulls out of Georgia talks -agency report
12:06pm EDT

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http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090515_eu_negative_economic_reports

EU: A Dismal Economic Outlook
May 18, 2009 | 1056 GMT

JOHN THYS/AFP/Getty Images
Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, who chairs the Eurogroup of eurozone finance ministers, at a March 31 meeting of the European Parliament’s Economic Affairs Committee

Summary

The EU statistical office released data May 15 showing significant first-quarter declines in gross domestic product year on year over 2008 for both the eurozone and the European Union as a whole. The grim data suggests that Europe’s already-dismal outlook may have been overly optimistic.

Analysis

Related Link

* EU: Positive Economic Reports

The European Commission’s statistical office, Eurostat, released data May 15 for European gross domestic product (GDP) growth indicating a 2.5 percent quarterly decline in both the 16-member eurozone and the European Union as a whole for the first quarter of 2009. Year-on-year, the first quarter of 2009 saw a 4.6 percent decline in GDP for the eurozone and a 4.4 percent decline EU-wide.

The country data for GDP growth rates in the first quarter of 2009 show that the European Commission’s annual forecast for 2009, published May 4, may have been too optimistic. This is extraordinary considering that the forecast was already quite dire to begin with. In fact, STRATFOR also may have been too optimistic about European economic performance, despite having had a consistently bearish outlook on the European economy. While we pointed out the underlying banking problems besetting Europe before they became apparent in September 2008, we may have understated just how long the recession had been going on.

First, the economic slowdown in Europe did not start with the financial crisis in September 2008. It had already been in effect in some European countries (Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden) from the first quarter of 2008, and was well under way by the second quarter (extending to Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands). This means that the present recession essentially has already been impacting parts of Europe for well more than a year.

In fact, the list of countries experiencing GDP decline in four out of last five quarters (from the first quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009) is very long, and includes Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, the Netherlands, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

The current economic crisis in Europe is further shaping up to be very deep and much more severe than the U.S. recession. The United States experienced a quarterly GDP decline (quarter on quarter) of 1.6 percent in first quarter of 2009, equaling the decline in the fourth quarter of 2008.

In the accompanying chart, countries labeled in green are experiencing a recession of roughly the same intensity as that in the United States (though all these countries in fact are experiencing at least a slightly more severe downturn). The countries labeled in yellow are experiencing an annual downturn at least twice as bad as that of the United States, and potentially even three times as bad. In terms of the first quarter of 2009 GDP growth rates, most notable in this category are Germany (3.8 percent decline) and Italy (2.4 percent decline), the largest and fourth-largest economies in Europe. The countries in red — the Baltic states — are looking at a Great Depression-style, double-digit downturn for 2009.

CHART: Quarterly Percentage Change in European GDP



Therefore, not only is all of Europe essentially going to experience a recession deeper than the one in the United States, but the European economic downturn actually predates the U.S. recession by nearly nine months.

STRATFOR has followed the European recession as it echoes the U.S. recession, pointing out that Europeans are in a heap of trouble unrelated to the financial crisis that first hit in mid-September 2008. The recession has exposed Europe’s underlying banking problems, particularly in emerging Europe and Germany. It unearthed the looming housing crisis on the Continent and struck Europe’s export-dependent economies (with Germany, Sweden and Switzerland the more notable examples), which are reliant on global trade demand. Taking in the new GDP growth figures released for the first quarter of 2009, however, and considering the actual length of the current downturn in Europe, our forecast on Europe — despite the pessimism — might actually have been overly optimistic. And that is saying a lot.

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Turkey: Russia, Air Defense and Ballistic Missile Defense
May 18, 2009 | 1940 GMT

Milos Bicanski/Getty Images
Two fire units of a Patriot missile battery

Summary

Turkey is searching for a new strategic air defense system. The two main contenders appear to be the U.S. Patriot and the Russian S-400 “Triumf,” though just how much real consideration the latter is getting remains open to debate. Regardless, the final decision will be based on more than just some new hardware.

Analysis

Related Special Topic Page

* Ballistic Missile Defense

Related Links

* Russia: The Fundamentals of Russian Air Defense Exports
* United States and Turkey

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan met in Sochi, Russia, on May 16. STRATFOR watched the lead-up to this meeting closely, as it has been following the rise of Turkey, the Russian resurgence and the shifting situation inside the Caucasus.

STRATFOR said before the meeting that the talks in Sochi most likely would center around Turkey’s ongoing dilemma in the Caucasus: whether Turkey can normalize relations with Armenia and sustain relations with Azerbaijan. (Armenia and Turkey have been locked in a tense debate over Armenia’s claim that the Ottoman Empire committed genocide against Armenians in 1915, a claim Turkey denies; meanwhile, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Turkey’s ally, are in an ongoing spat over the Nagorno-Karabakh region.) Russia and Turkey also had a slew of energy issues to discuss, ranging from Russian supplies to Turkish energy transportation and future projects. But STRATFOR began hearing rumors after Erdogan’s meeting with the Americans in Poland just days before his meeting with Putin that Turkey was discussing a larger issue with the Americans and would also bring it up with the Russians. That issue is security arrangements for Turkey amid the ongoing tensions between Washington and Moscow.


Russia and Turkey: Overlapping Spheres of Influence


As NATO’s southeasternmost member, Turkey is geographically distinct from the rest of the European allies. Its territory is only some 250 miles from Baghdad, and when Russian tanks rolled in to the breakaway Georgian enclave of South Ossetia in 2008, they were moving less than 100 miles from Ankara’s borders. To put it simply, Turkey is in a unique position — one which Ankara recognizes and which is part of the reason why Turkey considers balance and independence important.

The Obama administration has gone out of its way to reach out to Ankara and has begun to lay the groundwork for a closer bilateral relationship. This has not gone unnoticed in Moscow, which is also courting Turkish favor.

One of the ways in which this dynamic is playing out is in Turkey’s search for a new strategic air defense system. Still reliant on the U.S. MIM-23 Hawk and 1950s vintage MIM-14 Nike Hercules systems, the Turkish military appears to have focused on two very different alternatives: the U.S. Patriot system (including the Patriot Advanced Capability-3, or PAC-3) and the Russian S-400 “Triumf,” which the Kremlin has yet to export and which is only now being deployed around Moscow.

The choice appears obvious, and it is. The United States is a NATO ally, and with U.S. President Barack Obama’s visit to Turkey earlier this year, Washington appears committed to backing Turkey’s rise and collaborating with Ankara on a wide range of issues, from the Islamic world to Eurasia. NATO allies already field the PAC-3, which has been proven in combat and is in production. The system could be seamlessly integrated into NATO’s larger air defense picture.

The S-400, on the other hand, would leave Ankara beholden to a supplier that it does not have a formally established alliance with (indeed, Turkey is a member of an alliance that Moscow considers one of its primary potential adversaries). The Russian system has been neither deployed to a conflict zone nor proven outside of Russian testing. While no one doubts that it is one of the most capable air defense systems in the world, it is also not clear how much or how fast S-400 production could be expanded.

But there is more at stake than just these two systems. Moscow is attempting to leverage its modern air defense equipment to demonstrate to Ankara that Russia, too, can be a valuable friend.

For Russia, this is more about politics than any real security pact. According to STRATFOR sources in Moscow, Russia really does not have an interest in handing over such a highly guarded system, given the genuine concerns about the security of the technology. Selling S-400 systems to Turkey also could slow the broader deployment of the S-400 with Russian units. But more importantly, many of the S-400’s capabilities are unknown to the United States and NATO. These “unknowns” are critical to the system’s effectiveness. The more the Pentagon learns about how the system works and what its limitations are, the better it will be able to account for and counter them. It would be difficult for Russia to imagine that at least some of the S-400 components that Turkey acquires would not find their way to U.S. military labs, or that U.S. and NATO aircraft would not start conducting exercises with — and learning about — the new equipment.

Russia knows the Turks are aware that Moscow is not serious about the S-400 offer. However, the Russians see political gain in at least offering the system to the Turks, in that it has given Ankara pause before accepting the U.S. proposal. Turkey may be a U.S. ally, but Russia supplies the majority of its energy and has a hand in Turkey’s future in the Caucasus. Ankara does not want to make an enemy out of Moscow, which has been throwing its weight around a lot recently. Also, closer ties with Russia could help Turkey achieve its objective of moving beyond its status as a Western ally and becoming a more independent player. Ankara has been increasingly attempting to show that it is not fully tied to or dependent on Washington, but can make its own choices and entertain multiple associations, and the talks with Russia do give Turkey an air of independence from the United States.

But there is one security understanding Russia is interested in even if it is not able to come to a wider understanding with Turkey: the overall future of ballistic missile defense (BMD). Both the PAC-3 and the S-400 are touted as ballistic missile defense (BMD) capable. In terms of improving Turkey’s domestic capability to defend against attack by ballistic missile, either system could establish a basic defense for Turkish territory. But Turkey is not only a NATO member, it is also in a key geographic position for broader BMD efforts focused on the Middle East. Though boost-phase intercept technology is not yet mature (and will likely see significant budget cuts under Defense Secretary Robert Gates), Turkish territory would also be ideal for a forward-deployed sensor, like the portable X-band radar now positioned in Israel.

Such an arrangement would put a tracking radar much closer to potential launch points, and the radar would be positioned to acquire and track ballistic targets sooner — thus improving the performance of all manner of BMD equipment positioned deeper inside Europe.

There has been much chatter from the United States about expanding its BMD plans to Southeastern Europe or Turkey after the Polish and Czech Republic systems are in place. Russia is firmly against any BMD expansions to Turkey, just as it is against the stations in Central Europe. According to STRATFOR sources, Erdogan discussed with Putin how Turkey is not interested in becoming like Poland — stuck between Moscow and Washington in their ongoing tug-of-war.

Both the United States and Russia are using security deals to help define exactly where Turkey stands within the overall struggle between Washington and Moscow — something Ankara would like to stay out of. But in the short term, Turkey sees the opportunities that being in the middle presents — like better military, energy or regional deals — as the world’s two giants vying for Ankara’s attention.

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Russia pulls out of Georgia talks -agency report
Mon May 18, 2009 12:06pm EDT

MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russia said on Monday it had pulled out of security talks with Georgia, citing the refusal of the Moscow-backed rebel region of Abkhazia to attend.

Delegations from Russia and another Moscow-backed rebel region, South Ossetia, had withdrawn from the talks, Interfax news agency quoted Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin as saying in Geneva.

"To discuss serious questions about security without one of the parties would be a doomed exercise," Karasin was quoted as saying. "South Ossetia has pulled out of the consultations along with us."

The talks between Russia, the separatists and Georgia were due to take place in Geneva on Monday and Tuesday. The discussions are co-chaired by the United Nations, the European Union and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Abkhazia's separatist foreign minister, Sergei Shamba, told Reuters on Saturday Abkhazia would not take part because it had not yet received a draft report on Abkhazia from U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.

Russia and ally Nicaragua recognized Abkhazia and another rebel region, South Ossetia, as independent states last year after a war with Georgia, but the rest of the world still considers the provinces part of Georgia.

Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia broke away from Tbilisi's rule during wars in the 1990s that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moscow has pledged to deploy military bases in both regions.

(Reporting by Guy Faulconbridge; editing by Andrew Dobbie)

© Thomson Reuters 2009. All rights reserved.

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Tuesday, May 19, 2009
Updated at 19 May 2009 1:25 Moscow Time.
The Moscow Times » Issue 4147 » The Russian Front
Cipher in Chief
18 May 2009By Richard Lourie

President Barack Obama's first 100 days and President Dmitry Medvedev's first year in office roughly coincided, and the contrast is striking. Obama has launched a series of swift and significant actions while changing the mood of the country and the tone of its politics. Medvedev has done nothing of the sort and in fact remains something of a cipher. It's not clear who he is, what he stands for and how much power he has.

As commander in chief, Medvedev seemed to demonstrate some power when he ordered troops into Georgia in August, although most people understand that it was Prime Minister Vladimir Putin who was running the show.

Medvedev, it turns out, was operating without the real power of commander in chief, but also without any official symbols on everything from his stationary to the uniform he is required to wear on certain occasions. Post-Soviet Russia had not gotten around to creating new emblems for its commander in chief. But as Kommersant reported on May 8, that situation has now been remedied by the Committee on Heraldry. The new emblem could not have been more tsarist -- against the background of the Russian tricolor is a golden two-headed eagle whose breast bears an image of St. George, patron saint of Russia and Moscow, slaying a dragon. The eagle rests on an ornate baton modeled on those used by field marshals in Russia's Imperial army. There is no reference whatsoever to the Soviet past. More important, there is no reference whatsoever to the Russian future.

Creating continuity is very important for the country's current rulers. Since the Soviet past -- its symbols, practices and mindset -- has been rejected, it was only natural to create links with Russia's pre-Soviet -- that is, tsarist and imperialist -- past. This can make Russia's neighbors nervous.

But the Soviets, whatever else may be said of them, came to power armed with a dynamic vision of a time in which the future was the most important element. They quickly created powerful symbols -- the red star, the hammer and sickle and the flaming torch. Out of their new vision, they created new symbols.

It is in the arena of vision and symbols that Medvedev can play a new and groundbreaking role. He is largely a symbolic figurehead anyway, with no power base to support him and beholden to no particular group. Thus, he can assume the responsibility of creating and disseminating the vision of what 21st-century Russia should look like and what it should represent. He may not have the levers of power, but he does have a bully pulpit.

Since he is already known as the Internet-savvy president, he could, for example, use the web to conduct a national referendum on what Russians really want, a sort of electronic national zemsky sobor (the country's first parliament dating to 1549).

Do Russians want a further and more far-reaching investigation into the Soviet past? Is there a real desire to recapture a lost grandeur and reclaim eastern Ukraine, Crimea and Belarus? Or do Russians just want to make a decent living and live in peace without a grandiose ideology and historic mission?

Since the Internet is interactive, the president can also use it to propagate his own vision of the future. Medvedev's doctrine of the "Four I's" is, apart from sounding too Chinese, a plan for strengthening the country in areas that sorely need it but not a course and a destination. In the dialogue with the nation, a vision will evolve.

The two-headed Russian eagle looks both east and west. It must also look to the past and future.

Richard Lourie is the author of "The Autobiography of Joseph Stalin" and "Sakharov: A Biography."

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Energy and the Russian National Security Strategy
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 95
May 18, 2009 07:12 PM Age: 48 min
Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Home Page, Foreign Policy, Energy, Russia, Featured
By: Roman Kupchinsky

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (L) with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin

On May 12 Russian President Dmitry Medvedev approved the latest version of the "National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation up to 2020" (www.scrf.gov.ru, May 12). The text of the 7,300 word document was posted on the website of the Russian Security Council and is certain to be studied by analysts in the hope of finding clues to Russian behavior in the years to come.

The National Security Strategy doctrine outlines the basic fears and assumptions shared by the current Russian leadership about the state of the world and Russia's place in it. It addresses these concerns within the context of Russian national interests, and by doing so opens a window into the thinking of the political elite on such an important issue as its use of natural resources - above all hydrocarbon reserves - as a foreign policy tool.

During the past decade Russian leaders have frequently rejected charges made by European and American leaders that they are using energy as a weapon of foreign policy. The facts, however, point to a different conclusion. On February 4 Ukrayinska Pravda reported that Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin stated: "Russia enjoys vast energy and mineral resources which serve as a base to develop its economy; as an instrument to implement domestic and foreign policy. The role of the country on international energy markets determines, in many ways, its geopolitical influence."

This thesis was not new, it found its way into the 2003 "Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period of up to 2020" which stated at the outset that: "Russia possesses great energy resources... which is the basis of economic development and the instrument for carrying out internal and external policy" (www.ec.europa.eu, August 28, 2003).

Putin's views were incorporated into the security doctrine in a roundabout but nonetheless blunt manner. Paragraph 9 of the doctrine states: "The change from bloc confrontation to the principles of multi-vector diplomacy and the [natural] resources potential of Russia, along with the pragmatic policies of using them has expanded the possibilities of the Russian Federation to strengthen its influence on the world arena" (www.scrf.gov.ru, May 12). In other words, Russia's energy resources were once again officially acknowledged to be tools of Russian foreign policy, or as some believe, a lever for blackmail. There was apparently no further reason for denying the obvious, and the authors of the security doctrine decided to lay out Russia's cards on the table.

Paragraph 11 lists the geopolitical battlegrounds where Russia believes that the future conflicts over energy will arise - and where, by definition, its national interests lie: "The attention of international politics in the long-term will be concentrated on controlling the sources of energy resources in the Middle East, on the shelf of the Barents Sea and other parts of the Arctic, in the Caspian Basin and in Central Asia" (www.scrf.gov.ru, May 12).

The document portrays a somewhat apocalyptic scenario of future conflicts over energy resources. "In case of a competitive struggle for resources it is not impossible to discount that it might be resolved by a decision to use military might. The existing balance of forces on the borders of the Russian Federation and its allies can be changed." But who will supposedly change the balance? According to the strategy, the United States Ballistic Missile Defense program is allegedly being constructed to destroy the Russian monopoly on gas supplies to Europe and therefore the U.S. remains the main antagonist.

Paragraph 47 continues the linkage between energy and Russian national security: "The sources of danger to national security could become such factors as the crisis of world and regional financial-banking systems, the intensification of the battle over natural resources, among them energy, water and consumer goods" (www.scrf.gov.ru, May 12).

As dramatic as the new Russian National Security Strategy appears, it does not differ substantially from the previous doctrine. Furthermore, Russian security policy appears to be betting heavily on resource nationalism in order to strengthen Russia's "benevolent" control of gas supplies throughout the Central and East European gas markets -the ultimate goal of which is the neutralization of the role played by these countries within NATO, along with the unending struggle to increase the profits for Kremlin-friendly Russian companies.

The lack of new, forward thinking, concepts within the latest Russian National Security Strategy doctrine is its major shortcoming. The latest security strategy appears more calculated to preserve the current Putin-Medvedev-Sechin-Gazprom clique, than to offering genuine answers to Russia's security needs. It is questionable whether the strategy is workable. Some EU member states such as Germany and Italy, have apparently reconciled themselves to the possibility of long-term Russian control over their economic well-being, and are turning a blind eye to any and all of Russia's opaque energy and pipeline deals in order to remain on good terms with the Kremlin -and maintain access to its gas pipelines. If the framers of the Russian security doctrine have determined that the energy Balkanization of Europe is part of their strategy to keep Russia safe and transform it once again into a great power, then they are off to a good start.

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Merkel and Sarkozy Call for Privileged Partnership Angers Turkey
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 92
May 13, 2009 05:32 PM Age: 5 days
Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Home Page, Foreign Policy, Turkey, Europe, Featured
By: Saban Kardas

French President Nicholas Sarkozy (L) with German Chancellor Angela Merkel

German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicholas Sarkozy reignited the debate on Turkey's place within Europe by questioning the wisdom of Turkey seeking full membership of the European Union. Attending a meeting in Berlin, the two leaders emphasized their objection to the EU's enlargement to include Turkey, arguing that any misguided expansion might endanger its operational effectiveness, and that it should stop making empty promises to Turkey. They instead reiterated their support for "privileged partnership" as an alternative framework to regulate Turkish-EU relations (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, May 10).

Sarkozy is known for his frequent objections to Turkey's membership. Before his election in 2007, he spoke against the country's accession and instead proposed an alternative partnership through his Mediterranean Union project. Due to objections from Turkey and other EU member states most notably the UK, Sarkozy dropped the idea, which enabled the creation of the Mediterranean Union as a separate organization -which Turkey also joined (EDM, July 15, 2008).

Although he has since softened his rhetoric and avoided blocking Turkish-EU accession negotiations during the French presidency of the European Union, Sarkozy has remained Turkey's most vocal opponent. For instance, when President Obama tried to promote Turkish-EU accession talks during his recent European trip, Sarkozy immediately dismissed these comments as an unwarranted intervention in European affairs, and led other likeminded states to mobilize resistance against Turkey (Hurriyet, April 7).

Merkel shares similar views on Turkish-EU relations. Nonetheless, her policies have been tempered by the coalition partnership with the Social Democrats, who hold more positive views on the issue. However, Merkel uses electoral considerations and her conservative grassroots' discomfort with Turkey to justify her objections. Referring to the upcoming European elections in June, Merkel said: "It is right that we say to people [during the campaign]... our common position is: a privileged partnership for Turkey, but no full membership" (Hurriyet Daily News, May 11).

Sarkozy does not hide the role electoral politics play in shaping his position on Turkey. Indeed, he has accelerated his objections to Turkish accession ahead of the European election campaign. He is advocating that the EU considers the creation of a common platform with Turkey, perhaps including Russia, to regulate economic and security relations (Hurriyet Daily News, May 6).

Inside the EU, the Franco-German position is countered by the member states more sympathetic to Turkey and the representatives of the EU institutions. Portugal's President Anibal Cavaco Silva, while currently visiting Turkey reiterated his country's support for Turkish accession, noting the many benefits it would bring to the EU (Anadolu Ajansi, May 12). Last week, Finland's Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, also ruled out a privileged partnership, and reaffirmed Helsinki's commitment to bring Turkey into the EU as a full member (Cihan Haber Ajansi, May 8). A statement from the office of the EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn, responded swiftly to the statements by Sarkozy and Merkel, saying that the decisive factor from the commission's perspective was Turkey's fulfilment of the membership criteria (ANKA, May 11).

Although Merkel and Sarkozy's views on Turkey were well known, their recent statements surprised many within Turkish domestic politics. Some Turkish dailies labeled this development, particularly Merkel's remarks, as "shocking" (Milliyet, May 11). Deniz Baykal, the leader of the main opposition party, called their statements "rude, harsh and negative" and argued that since they were made during the ongoing membership talks, they should be taken as a sign of disrespect toward Turkey. Baykal also criticized the government's failure to take action to protest more forcefully against this development (Anadolu Ajansi, May 12).

In reacting to calls to downgrade the Turkish-EU relationship, officials in Ankara have highlighted three points. They have restated Turkey's position that privileged partnership is unacceptable, and maintain that since the EU has initiated membership talks, it must honor this commitment. Shortly after assuming his post last week, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stressed this argument. Noting that he would revitalize the stalled membership process, Davutoglu expressed his discomfort over speculation on privileged partnership. Offering Turkey other alternatives short of full membership would betray Turkey and also undermine the EU's own values, Davutoglu contended (Yeni Safak, May 9). In his reaction to the Merkel-Sarkozy statement, President Abdullah Gul also echoed Davutoglu, arguing that European leaders had agreed on membership negotiations with a unanimous decision, which still legally binds all member states (www.cnnturk.com, May 12).

Turkish officials maintain that European politicians are using the debate about its future membership as a tool calculated to achieve domestic political gains. Gul suggested that the Merkel-Sarkozy remarks reflected "short-term thinking," caused by a lack of strategic vision on the part of some European leaders (Cihan Haber Ajansi, May 12).

Turkish leaders emphasize their commitment to the membership process, and say they will do more to conclude the negotiations successfully. Following a cabinet meeting, the state minister and government spokesman Cemil Cicek, told reporters that the government will take further steps to implement domestic reforms. This will involve preparing a new constitutional amendment package in consultation with the opposition. Cicek added that the government will shortly forward a draft law to parliament, which will reorganize the under-secretariat for the European Union in order to streamline reforms (www.cnnturk.com, May 12).

The Turkish government seeks to counteract objections to membership by reminding the EU of its commitments to the accession process, and by downplaying those objections -attributing them to short-term calculations. The government implicitly believes that if the discussions on Turkey are conducted on the basis of the contractual framework of the accession process, it may de-legitimize European objections to Turkey. However, it fails to appreciate that its track record on domestic reforms is far from satisfactory. Despite promises to revitalize the membership process in 2009, little has been accomplished (EDM, January 12, 20). Although it might be justified in calling on its EU partners to fulfil their promises, the Turkish government must acknowledge that it is time to deliver on domestic reforms.

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Monday, May 18, 2009
EURASIA INSIGHT

MONGOLIA: THE KREMLIN TAKES AIM AT MONGOLIA’S URANIUM RESERVES
5/18/09
A EurasiaNet commentary by Stephen Blank

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to Mongolia indicates that the Kremlin is making a push to restore bilateral relations to a level not seen since the Soviet era. But reality says that it may not be possible for the Russian leader to get what he seeks.

Wedged between Russia and China, Mongolia, though technically independent since 1921, has always had to tread carefully in the realm of foreign policy. Striving to balance the interests of Moscow and Beijing, Mongolian leaders have been dedicated practitioners of "multi-vectored" diplomacy since the Soviet collapse of 1991. Not only has Mongolia cultivated ties with Russia and China, but Ulanbaatar has reached out to other powers, in particular the United States and Japan, as well.

For centuries, Mongolia was an object of geopolitical interest, widely seen as a buffer between two rival empires. But these days -- given the recent discoveries of strategically important raw materials like uranium -- the country is assuming a greater level of global economic importance. At the same time, the global drop in commodity prices has hit Mongolia hard and the country’s economy is now struggling.

Budgetary pressure has prompted Mongolian leaders to seek outside funding. The International Monetary Fund announced in early May that it would provide $229 million to Mongolia to help stabilize the country’s finances. But Ulanbaatar’s needs are greater, and that has created an opening for Russia. Moscow has been particularly active of late in trying to reestablish a strong presence in Mongolia. Back in March, Russia announced an agricultural credit of $300 million, which, in reality, was just one element in a larger stabilization effort. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. That aid can also be seen as a hidden subsidy for the Russian agricultural sector, as much of the money made available to Mongolia was tied to a requirement to purchase Russian products.

Putin’s visit on May 13 aimed to cement a new Russian-Mongolian special relationship in place. The centerpiece of the visit was a deal worth potentially $7 billion, under which the Russian state-controlled railway company agreed to upgrade and expand Mongolia’s rail network. The rail expansion into southern areas of the country would help Mongolia boost exports of uranium, copper, coal and other minerals. The payoff for the Russian railway company includes mining licenses for the Tavan-Tolgoi copper coal mine and the Oyu-Tolgoi cooper-gold mine.

For the Russian state, the payoff was something much larger: a Mongolian promise of close cooperation in developing uranium deposits. Russia is now trying to gain primacy in access to deposits in Mongolia so that it can utilize the uranium mined there for the development of its own nuclear industry. During his visit, Putin expressed a clear desire to move Russia away from an excessive reliance upon gas fired electricity. In effect, Russia wants to corner Mongolia’s uranium market because it intends to build many new nuclear energy plants between now and 2030.

Putin also sought to use his mid-May discussions with his Mongolian counterpart, Sanj Bayar, to get Ulanbaatar to agree to a plan under which the two states would settle trade accounts in their respective national currencies. This would have the net effect of creating additional demand for the Russian currency, and thus help prop up its value on international currency markets. The creation of a ruble-denominated trade bloc has long been a Kremlin goal.

Ironically, Russian businesses have complained about a lack of protections for their investments, alleging that Mongolia has arbitrary taxation policies and a constantly changing regulatory framework. In this area, Russian firms may be getting a taste of their own government’s medicine, as the Kremlin has long been accused by Western firms of changing the economic rules of the game in Russia in order to suit the Kremlin’s political interests. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

While Mongolia is certainly interested in Russian investment, officials in Ulanbaatar know that competition will keep prices at their highest. So, expect Ulanbaatar to do its best to keep ties strong with other neighboring states, including China and Kazakhstan. Last summer, for example, Mongolian officials expressed considerable interest in a highway project that would link Mongolia and Kazakhstan. Of course, China’s economic influence in Mongolia is still far larger than that of Russia.

It may well be that officials in Ulanbaatar want to expand economic ties with Moscow in part because they wish to balance China’s already strong economic presence. In this sense, Mongolia may end up serving a traditional role -- acting as a proving ground, where the strengths and/or weaknesses of Russia’s relationship with China are put to the test.

Editor's Note: Stephen Blank is a professor at the US Army War College. The views expressed this article do not in any way represent the views of the US Army, Defense Department or the US Government.

Posted May 18, 2009 © Eurasianet
http://www.eurasianet.org

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Ankara court rules Gul must stand trial

By Delphine Strauss in Ankara

Published: May 19 2009 03:00 | Last updated: May 19 2009 03:00

A Turkish court fuelled political tensions yesterday by ruling that Abdullah Gul, the president, should stand trial over a party funding case dating back to the ousting of an Islamist government in the 1990s.

The ruling, which can be overturned on appeal, coincides with renewed protests by secularist opponents of the ruling Justice and Development party (AKP), which has roots in political Islam.

Thousands marched in Ankara on Sunday in protest at an investigation that has seen hundreds of people, including many prominent government opponents, questioned over or charged with plotting violent attacks to destabilise the government. The march echoed the mass demonstrations organised in 2007 to protest at Mr Gul's appointment to the presidency.

Yesterday's judgment, which reverses an earlier ruling, says Mr Gul should stand trial and accuses him of aiding the embezzlement of party funds that should have been returned to the Treasury after the constitutional court closed down the overtly Islamist Welfare party in 1997.

Mr Gul was a senior figure in the Welfare party before leaving to help found the AKP. As a parliamentary deputy he enjoyed immunity from prosecution.

His position, as president, under the current constitution is less clear cut, although Hikmet Sami Turk, a former justice minister and constitutional expert, said yesterday that he should enjoy the same immunity as a deputy, and be subject to prosecution only after leaving office.

But the court in Ankara said: "Those who want the right of inviolability to be applied to the president should amend the constitution."

The presidency said yesterday that Mr Gul had previously offered to waive his immunity and answer charges, that he had no involvement in the Welfare party's financial affairs, and that it was "not wellintentioned" to try to present him as a suspect.

The ruling is likely to exacerbate an already bitter debate on the government's attempt to relaunch constitutional reform, necessary to advance Turkey's campaign to join the European Union.

The AKP narrowly avoided being shut down last year after the constitutional court found it guilty of anti-secular activities. Since then its relations with the powerful military have appeared more settled. But the party still inspires deep unease in some sections of society, which suspect it of pursuing an Islamist agenda, despite denials by ministers to the contrary. Additional reporting by Funja Guler

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009

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Azerbaijan: Sending a Message to Turkey
May 19, 2009 | 1740 GMT

DOMINIQUE FAGET/AFP/Getty Images
Turkish President Abdullah Gul at the gas summit in Prague on May 8

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Azerbaijan will increase the price of natural gas for Turkey from $120 to approximately $200-250 per thousand cubic meters (tcm) of gas, APA agency reported on May 19. Negotiations between Ankara and Baku will now move to the issue of volume of natural gas that Turkey can expect from phase two of the Shah Deniz gas field, expected to come online in 2013.

The near doubling of price for natural gas is not the outcome Ankara was hoping for. Azerbaijan has wanted to charge Turkey closer to the price for natural gas that most EU member states pay — around $400 per tcm — but Ankara expected it could use its traditional relationship with Azerbaijan — often described as a “brotherly bond” — to get a “brotherly” discount and keep any price increase to around 30 percent.

However, the recent negotiations between Armenia and Turkey to normalize their relations have irked Azerbaijan to say the least. Azerbaijan fears that if Turkey were to normalize its relations with Armenia (Azerbaijan’s main rival in the region), it would lose a key lever against Yerevan. Azerbaijan wants the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, the breakaway region within its borders it lost de facto control over in 1994 after a war with Armenia, on the table during any negotiations between Turkey and Armenia. Turkey’s refusal to bring up Azerbaijan’s demands to the table during negotiations with Armenia has left Azerbaijan feeling that Turkey is abandoning it.

MAP: Caucasus spread with capitals


But Azerbaijan does have levers of its own. At one point in early April, Azerbaijan threatened that it could cut off natural gas supplies to Turkey if Ankara opened its borders with Armenia before Yerevan and Baku reached an agreement of their own. Furthermore, under the terms of a 1996 deal between Turkey and Azerbaijan, Turkey can import up to 6.6 billion cubic meters of gas per year from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field. However, with the price hike, Baku is sending a message to Turkey that it can play rough with its “big brother.” Furthermore, Azerbaijan is warning Turkey to take notice that as negotiations continue and move on to the expected volume from phase two of Shah Deniz, Azerbaijan could play hardball again and chose to send natural gas instead to Russia.

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Russian, US diplomats launch arms control talks

By VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV – 4 hours ago

MOSCOW (AP) — Russian and U.S. negotiators sat down for difficult nuclear arms control talks Tuesday amid hopes that warming relations could help the two former superpowers reach an agreement seen as essential for global stability.

The negotiating teams led by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller and the chief of Russian Foreign Ministry's security and arms control department, Anatoly Antonov, gathered at a foreign ministry mansion for two days of talks on a replacement for the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

START I expires on Dec. 5, threatening to end formal controls on the size of the world's biggest nuclear arsenals. Between them, the two countries possess more than 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons.

The failure to negotiate a replacement pact would leave Moscow and Washington unable to inspect and verify each other's stockpile of nuclear warheads, eroding mutual trust and undermining security. Failure to strike a deal would also make it more difficult for the U.S. to persuade Iran, North Korea and other countries to curb their own nuclear ambitions.

President Barack Obama's apparent determination to improve ties with Moscow, which plummeted to a post-Cold War low in recent years, paved the way for the rapid launch of talks on a successor deal to START.

Both Russian and U.S. diplomats are hopeful of reaching an agreement before the year's end, but analysts are doubtful of quick progress because of differences on what weapons to cut as well as the divisive legacy of George W. Bush's presidency.

Alexander Pikayev, a top arms control expert at Russia's Institute for World Economy and International Relations, said that the talks starting Tuesday could shape U.S.-Russian relations for years ahead.

"If they manage to strike a deal, it would be a major breakthrough boosting relations in other areas," Pikayev said. "But if the talks drag on and run into a deadlock, it will have a strong negative effect."

While Obama has put Bush's plan for a missile defense in Europe on hold, Russia wants the U.S. to scrap the anti-missile system altogether.

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, still perhaps Russia's strongest political figure, warned last week that Russia would link the arms control talks with the U.S. missile defense plan — something Washington has refused to do.

Retired Maj. Gen. Vladimir Dvorkin, a veteran Cold War arms control negotiator who helped write START, said it's too early to judge how flexible Russia might be in the talks.

"They may say something in the agreement's preamble about taking (the missile defense) into account, or they may take a tough approach and say there will be no agreement until the plan for a missile defense is canceled," Dvorkin said.

START, signed by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and President George H.W. Bush, led each country to cut its nuclear warheads by at least one-quarter, to about 6,000.

Putin and President George W. Bush in 2002 signed the so-called Treaty of Moscow, which called for further cuts to between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally deployed warheads by 2012.

The page-long document relied on comprehensive verification procedures contained in the 700-page START, including onsite inspections and regular exchange of data.

Moscow and Washington have long argued over what weapons should be subject to cuts.

Russia wants to limit missiles, bombers and submarines along with nuclear warheads, just as the original START treaty did. The 2002 agreement only applied to warheads.

Gottemoeller said in a recent interview with Interfax that Obama's team is ready to negotiate cuts in missiles and other so-called delivery vehicles. But Dvorkin said it remains to be seen whether the two sides can agree on how to count the weapons.

There are other points of disagreement hampering progress.

The United States is prepared to count only the warheads ready for launch, while Russia wants to count those in storage as well.

The U.S. also plans to swap nuclear warheads for conventional explosives on some long-range ballistic missiles. Russia opposes the plan because it would be impossible to tell whether a missile launched by the U.S. was carrying a nuclear warhead.

Pikayev said that the parties may end up signing a quick framework deal this year and continue talks on a broader, more comprehensive pact. Even if both sides want a deal, he said, there is no guarantee they can strike one.

"There is a political will to reach the agreement, but there are objective difficulties which are difficult to overcome," he said.

Copyright © 2009 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.
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http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/05/the_caucasus_tinder_box.html

May 19, 2009
The Caucasus Tinder Box
By Kim Zigfeld

The ominous storm clouds of war are gathering once again over tiny, besieged Georgia have shed their first droplets of conflict.

On May 13th, Russia stood alone against the entire Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in order to veto a measure proposed by Greece calling for the extension of the OSCE's monitoring assignment along the troubled border between Ossetia and Georgia, where war broke out last August. Not even Russia's erstwhile allies Belarus and Kazhakhstan would support the Russian demand that the OSCE recognize Russia's annexation of Ossetia following its invasion of Georgia. As Reuters reported: "U.S. and European Union officials regard an OSCE presence in Georgia as crucial to preventing further fighting between separatist and Georgian forces and mistreatment of civilians." Now, because of Russia's unilateral actions, which clearly echo the stony "nyet" plied so often by the USSR on the UN Security Council, that presence will disappear.

A week earlier, the courageous Russian defense expert Pavel Felgenhauer, writing for the Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor, had warned that "the situation in Georgia appears to be deteriorating rapidly." Russia-supported street protests in the capital, Tbilisi, began on April 9th, with opposition forces refusing to discuss any issue with the president other than the terms of his resignation. But they soon fizzled out when Saakashvili refused to be provoked. In early May, apparently frustrated with its inability to muster a political coup against Saakashvili and infuriated by NATO's insistence on going forward with joint military exercises in Georgia despite vehement Russian opposition, the anti-Saakashvili forces tried to instigate a military uprising.

Felgenhauer reports:

The mutiny occurred at a tank base at Mukhrovani, some 30 kilometers east of the capital Tbilisi. The rebels at Mukhrovani were surrounded by Interior Ministry Special units, with army artillery and armor, and Saakashvili arrived at the scene in a theatrical showdown -giving the rebels one hour to surrender, which they did without firing a shot. The rebel officers were arrested, while privates were disarmed. Saakashvili specifically praised the Georgian army artillery officers, who in his words not only surrounded the rebels with guns, but were also prepared to open fire and that their dedication facilitated the early capitulation


Writing in the Moscow Times the amazing Yulia Latynina, heir apparent to the murdered firebrand journalist Anna Politkovskaya, had no hesitation in concluding that the Kremlin was behind the coup attempt:

Before the recent events in Georgia unfolded, we heard warnings all across the Internet that Georgian opposition would take to the streets and that Saakashvili's regime would fall on April 9. Meanwhile, Russia once again mobilized its forces along the South Ossetian border, as it had done in the weeks before the August war. Russian sent its tanks to Tskhinvali and dispatched its ships to patrol the Black Sea waters near Georgia. In short, everything was pointing to an imminent coup. That is what happened in 1978, when Babrak Karmal and the Moscow-backed People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan overthrew the Kabul government. Moscow later installed Karmal as president of Afghanistan. But that scenario seemed unlikely for Georgia. After all, where would the Kremlin find a Georgian version of Karmal? But it did find one -- and not just one but three: Kobaladze, Karkarashvili and Gvaladzeb [the arrested leaders of the coup].


Felgenhauer was equally blunt: "Moscow was already known to have been seeking ways to penetrate the Georgian military to recruit agents that could help establish a pro-Russian regime in Tbilisi." Latynina reminds us that Russia similarly signaled its shutoff of gas flows to Ukraine, furious that Ukraine had supported Georgia in the August war, and points out that the coup was only unsuccessful because of the ham-handed way in which the Kremlin went about it. She writes:

The failed coup certainly looked like something from the "Keystone Cops." The whole affair was rife with incompetence, if not idiocy, but this is no excuse. When plotting a coup, idiocy is an aggravating circumstance and not a mitigating one -- like when an intoxicated driver is guilty of causing a severe accident. It seems that the Kremlin does not understand that Georgia has emerged from chaos to become a full-fledged independent nation. Moscow can't orchestrate a coup in Georgia just by waving its little finger, as it did during the reign of Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia.


Having failed to provoke internal tumult within Georgia, it looks for all the world like Russia is driving out the OSCE observers so there will nobody present to tell the tale when Russian forces once again cross the Georgian border and, this time, move decisively on Tbilisi to oust Saakashvili once and for all. Felgenhauer reminds us that a whole host of anti-Saakashvili Georgian rebels are now in exile in Moscow and "could be used in the future to form a military-backed pro-Russian government." He warns that Russian border guards have been moved to the front lines along the border with Georgia, replacing Ossetians and creating an incendiary situation where "any possible shooting incident on the ceasefire line will directly involve Russian soldiers, and can be used as a pretext for a new military invasion."

U.S. President Barack Obama is scheduled to visit Moscow in July for a summit with Dimitri Medvedev. Hopefully, Russia will not have launched a full-scale invasion of Georgia before then. If it hasn't, Obama must make clear to Medvedev that the NATO alliance will not stand idly by and watch Russia gobble up Georgia the way the USSR gobbled of Czechoslovakia. Senator John Kerry has called for a special free-trade agreement with Georgia to be signed immediately in order to bolster Georgia's war-torn economy, and Obama should expedite that process. Leading Western experts on the region have issued a blunt warning about the risks of Russian aggression. Obama, however has been woefully derelict in publicly putting the Russians on notice, and this may well be seen by the Kremlin as encouragement.

Obama must speak out now, before it is too late and he is left with only military options.
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The Loose Russian Nukes
Posted by Elizabeth Zolotukhina on 05/19/2009 :: Permalink :: Comments

"There can be no doubt about the fact that enough nuclear material to build more than twenty nuclear weapons was lost in the transition from the Soviet Union to Russia," wrote Harvard scholar Graham Allison.

Russian officials appeared to confirm this assertion. In a May 1997 private meeting with members of Congress, General Alexander Lebed, national security advisor to then- Russian President Boris Yeltsin, acknowledged that Moscow could not account for over 100 1-kiloton Soviet suitcase nuclear devices.

Although Moscow attempted to deny the revelation and discredit its source, U.S. government analysts have never succeeded in clarifying the matter.

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, then-President Vladimir Putin told U.S. President George W. Bush that he could not account for the security of Russian nuclear material during his predecessor's administration.

Despite such high-level admissions of likely nuclear leakage, select analysts have dismissed nuclear smuggling as an inconvenient feature of the existing nonproliferation regime rather than a strategic threat in its own right. They point out that total seizures of highly enriched uranium and plutonium between 1992 and 2006 amounted to less than a pound - insufficient to manufacture a bomb.

Nevertheless, disturbing signs point to the existence of a nuclear black market that, like all markets, "is evolving, and becoming more professional, proving itself surprisingly resilient," as Ron Suskind wrote in "The Way of the World: A Story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism."

In Russia, the end of the Cold War created an environment highly conducive to nuclear leakage: a steep decline in government orders for nuclear goods, weakened security controls, economic hardships among the country's weapons scientists and other nuclear workers. The current global financial crisis with its attendant reduction in Russian defense expenditures may recreate these conditions, despite President Dimitry Medvedev's promise to retain Moscow's present level of investment in the defense sector.

Similarly, pressure is evident on the demand side as well. Intelligence and media reports suggest that several states, such as Iran and possibly North Korea, and sub-national groups, including Al Qaeda in the 1990s, have been - or currently are - interested in obtaining stolen nuclear materials. Nor are the final buyers always apparent. For instance, independent apprehensions of nuclear smugglers on the Russian border with Georgia in 2003 and 2006 seem to suggest that purveyors of nuclear material may be communicating with customers in ways not readily apparent to Western intelligence or law enforcement officials. In both cases, the men claimed to have access to additional nuclear material, besides the samples in their possession. The larger cache has remained unaccounted for, as is typical in such seizures.

Given the enormity of the stakes, it stands to reason that improved intelligence collection on the black market should complement the existing risk management systems in Russia and elsewhere. Governments must be held responsible for securing their sensitive nuclear materials--and held accountable if they fail to do so.

Elizabeth Zolotukhina is head editor of the Case Studies Working Group with the Project on National Security Reform. Ms. Zolotukhina received her undergraduate degree from the University of Pittsburgh. Her research interests include nonproliferation and Russia.

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Russia, U.S.: START Talks Begin
May 19, 2009 | 1614 GMT

ALBERTO PIZZOLI/AFP/Getty Images
The Russian Foreign Ministry’s department of security and disarmament chief Anatoly Antonov (R) and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller
Summary

Russia and the United States have launched talks in Moscow on replacing the 1991 START I treaty, which governs the countries’ strategic nuclear weapons. STRATFOR has been expecting the negotiations to begin for some time, but the identity of the negotiators gives some indication of where obstacles will — and will not — be encountered.
Analysis
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U.S. and Russian negotiators began a three-day meeting in Moscow on May 19 to work out a replacement for the 1991 START I treaty, which expires at the end of 2009. START is the document governing strategic nuclear weapons in the two countries, and the nuclear parity the treaty legally establishes serves as the cornerstone of the broader U.S.-Russian relationship.

Normally, nuclear arms talks are tedious affairs that require years to negotiate. They involve representatives from both states’ intelligence, military and diplomatic communities and necessitate seemingly endless discussion of painstaking details about weapon systems, delivery methods, timetables and inspection regimes.

Ironically, this time the devil may not be in the details.

It appears this time around that all of the technical details already have been broadly agreed to and the militaries have either signed off or been sidelined. The instruction from the political leadership on both sides seems to be to get a deal done as soon as possible — probably within mere weeks.

This is evident from the personnel at the table: Anatoly Antonov, chief of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s security and arms control department, and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller. Neither of them has roots in intelligence, the military or even diplomacy. Both are actually old hands at nuclear disarmament issues. Antonov has been a fixture in Russian nuclear treaty teams going back two decades. Gottemoeller has been similarly engaged, but more on the policy formulation side than the negotiation side, first making her mark with the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program in 1991, and later serving in various posts in the Energy Department and National Security Council under former President Bill Clinton and now the State Department for the Obama administration.

They are the sort of people who are brought in to shape the treaty itself once all of the other players have hashed through all the minutiae for ages on end. Normally, the high-profile presence of people like Antonov and Gottemoeller are signs that the process is finishing up, not beginning.

There are really only two possible explanations.

First, that this will be a placeholder agreement that extends START for a year or three, allowing for more detailed talks on updating the 1991 treaty so that it takes into account the changes in technology, such as Russia’s new Topol-M and RS-24 missiles, and political geography — the Soviet Union and empire are long gone — that have occurred in the ensuing 18 years.

Second, the presence of the dealmakers (rather than the nitpickers) could indicate that such updating is not much of a sticking point from the presidential viewpoint, and that there are no serious disputes on either the goal or the process. STRATFOR sources indicate that the preliminary talks have gone as well as any talks between Americans and Russians could. In essence, the treaty revisions may have already been agreed to in principle and all that is required is getting the dealmakers together to write up the final text.

Either way, Antonov and Gottemoeller could very well have a draft document ready for signing when U.S. President Barack Obama arrives in Moscow on July 6. But just because the START extension or revision could be easy to achieve at the negotiating table does not mean that ratification — or even signing — is imminent.

The Kremlin is hoping to arrange for a grand strategic bargain with the United States, of which START is only one piece. Other issues on the Russians’ mind include missile defense, Russian penetration into Ukraine and the Caucasus, NATO expansion, the U.S. military disposition in Central Asia and Russian support for Iran. It is a chaotic relationship, and the Russians are looking to link final sign-off on the least thorny part — the START talks — to the rest of the mess.

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From Times Online
May 20, 2009
US and Russia start hard bargaining over slashing nuclear weapons
Tony Halpin in Moscow

The United States and Russia began the hard bargaining today over a deal to slash their stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

An American negotiating team opened the first round of talks in Moscow with Russian officials about a replacement for the landmark 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START 1), which expires on December 5.

Both sides are under orders to produce results in time for President Obama's first official visit to Moscow in July. He and President Medvedev agreed to replace START with a new treaty when they met in London in April, and to work towards a long-term goal of "a nuclear free world".

The US experts are led by Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller and the Russia team by Anatoly Antonov, the Foreign Ministry's head of security and arms control. The Foreign Ministry said that Russia was seeking "constructive dialogue and . . . practical results" from the two days of talks at a 19th Century mansion outside Moscow.
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Relations between the US and Russia remain difficult, however, despite the Obama administration's efforts to "press the reset button" and the pressure on negotiators to reach a speedy deal.

The Kremlin wants the US to abandon plans for a missile-defence shield in Eastern Europe, which it says threatens Russia's security. It is likely to link agreement on arms reductions to a pledge to scrap the project, which the US insists is aimed at rogue states such as Iran.

President Obama has refused to ditch the shield so far. Instead, he has urged Russia to help make it unnecessary by working with the US to tackle Iran over its suspected nuclear weapons programme.

Tensions also continue over Russia's war with Georgia last August. The US accused Russia of breaching the peace agreement that ended the war after the Kremlin sent troops to take control of border security in Georgia's breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia last month.

Russia announced that it would expand military exercises planned for next month across the North Caucasus region in response to Nato war games currently taking place in Georgia. It said that the large-scale exercises would be "comparable to those held during the Soviet Union".

The START treaty was signed by US President George H W Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. They agreed to reduce nuclear stockpiles to no more than 6,000 warheads each, compared to a Cold War peak of 30,000.

That was followed by the 2002 Moscow Treaty, which limited both sides to a maximum of 2,200 warheads by 2012. Mr Obama and Mr Medvedev have set their negotiators the task of reducing strategic weaponry below this level.

The US currently has 2,200 strategic nuclear warheads deployed and Russia 2,800. Experts believe that they are willing to go down to 1,500 each, although The Times disclosed in February that Mr Obama was ready to seek even more radical cuts to 1,000 warheads each.

Mr Medvedev said during a recent visit to Finland that he wanted the new treaty to "limit the delivery systems of the nuclear warheads and not only the quantity of warheads themselves". He also demanded safeguards against a build up of conventional forces to compensate for a loss of nuclear weapons.

Mr Obama set out his vision of a nuclear-free world in a speech in Prague, Czech Republic, in April. He said that arms reductions should be accompanied by tougher rules to deal with countries that break the existing nuclear non-proliferation framework, such as Iran and North Korea.

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From Times Online
May 20, 2009
US missile shield in Poland and Czech Republic 'won't stop Iran'
Tom Baldwin in Washington

Proposals to build a US missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic will be ineffective in protecting Europe from a possible Iranian attack, a study by American and Russian scientists has concluded.

The report, from the EastWest Institute think tank, may further dampen President Obama's enthusiasm for Bush-era plans for a shield that has caused alarm and annoyance in Moscow.

Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State, said that the administration was still reviewing policy on missile defence which Mr Obama has said must be cost-effective and proven to work.

The report suggested Iran was at least five years away from acquiring long range nuclear missiles but added that, in any case, US interceptors could be easily fooled by decoys and other simple counter-measures.
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The EastWest Institute's findings were reviewed by former US defence secretary William Perry before being presented to both US and Russian governments.

Mr Perry joined former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Schultz, and ex-Senator Sam Nunn at the White house for discussions with Mr Obama on nuclear non-proliferation.

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Russia and US restart nuclear arsenal talks

By Charles Clover and Isabel Gorst in Moscow and Daniel Dombey in Washington

Published: May 19 2009 11:39 | Last updated: May 19 2009 17:53

Russia and the US on Tuesday began talks in Moscow aimed at limiting their nuclear arsenals. The talks may provide the first breakthrough in an effort by both sides to “reset” a badly frayed relationship beset by mistrust.

The negotiations are intended to pave the way towards replacing the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, Start I, which expires in December.
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US officials say a priority is to keep that arms control system – which they claim was neglected by the former Bush administration – alive.

The Obama team says it would be foolhardy to jettison the mechanisms put in place by the 1991 deal for each side to verify the size of the other’s nuclear arsenal. But swift progress will be needed in agreeing and ratifying a new treaty if the measures are not to expire.

Washington wants modest reductions in the two sides’ weapons in the current talks. A bigger cut – including the reduction to 1,000 warheads apiece favoured by Democratic liberals – would wait for another round.

The significance of the talks is more political than military: the outcome will largely determine the success or failure of a summit planned in July in Moscow between Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev, Russian president.

Giving both leaders something to sign at the meeting – or at least the chance to demonstrate progress – will go a long way towards soothing tempers that have flared over Nato manoeuvres in Georgia and this month’s tit-for-tat expulsions of diplomats accused of spying. These incidents had threatened US efforts to “hit the reset button” with Russia, in the words of US vice-president Joe Biden in February.

Andrew Kuchins, head of the Russia programme at CSIS, a Washington-based think-tank, said: “The key for the ‘reset’ . . . with the Russians is that we reach concrete agreements in time for the July summit.”

Differences remain but these should be tackled in the talks on Tuesday by US lead negotiator Rose Gottmuller, the assistant secretary of State, and her counterpart Anatoly Antonov, chief of the Russian foreign ministry’s security and arms control department. The US wants to limit the talks to nuclear warheads alone. Russia wants to limit delivery systems such as ICBMs, in which the US has an advantage.

“We are ready for a constructive dialogue and believe that the optimism expressed by both sides will bring about concrete results,” the Russian foreign ministry told Interfax.

The US faces pressure to link the nuclear arms talks with a retreat from plans to site an anti-missile shield in Poland that Russia says will undermine its own security.

Konstantin Kosachev, head of the Duma’s international affairs committee, said talks could stall if the US went ahead with deployment of the shield in Poland. “If the Americans continue to insist on their right to develop anti-ballistic weaponry, the strategic disarmament will move at a significantly slower pace and could even get stuck,” he told the Vesti-24 television channel.

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009

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* OPINION
* MAY 20, 2009

The Arms-Control Dinosaurs Are Back
Why invite Russia to veto the nuclear progress we've been making on our own?
By MARC A. THIESSEN

When John Bolton served in the State Department during the Bush administration, he often walked the halls of Foggy Bottom wearing his trademark dinosaur ties -- a self-deprecating nod to those who thought his political views somewhat Jurassic. Today other dinosaurs have replaced him. The aging arms controllers who once haggled with Soviet officials are staging a comeback in the Obama administration.

This week in Moscow they'll pick up where they left off nearly two decades ago, sitting across the table from their Russian counterparts negotiating a renewal of the 1991 U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Start). One of the U.S. negotiators, Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, refers to herself as a "Sputnik baby." She told the Washington Post after initial talks in New York earlier this month: "We've all been looking around and chuckling and saying 'We're all over 50.'"

President Barack Obama's goal of "a world without nuclear weapons" notwithstanding, the State Department is reportedly scrambling to staff its arms-control bureau because so many arms-control experts have retired and there's no one coming up in the ranks to replace them. Apparently not many young policy wonks are aware that cutting nuclear deals with Moscow is again the fast track to a high-flying diplomatic career.
[The Arms-Control Dinosaurs Are Back] Martin Kozlowski

The Obama revival of arms control comes at an odd moment. The past eight years have seen the fewest arms-control negotiations in a generation and some of the deepest nuclear weapons reductions in history. Thanks to the work of the Bush administration, the U.S. nuclear stockpile is now one-quarter the size it was at the end of the Cold War -- the lowest level since the Eisenhower administration. When George W. Bush took office, the U.S. had more than 6,000 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Today, that number has been reduced to less than 2,200. The U.S. had originally planned to reach this milestone on Dec. 31, 2012, but instead met its goal this February.

How did the U.S. achieve such dramatic reductions so quickly? Answer: By abandoning traditional arms control. When Mr. Bush took office, he decided not to engage in lengthy, adversarial negotiations with Russia in which both sides kept thousands of weapons they did not need as bargaining chips. He did not establish standing negotiating teams in Geneva with armies of arms-control experts doing battle over every colon and comma. If he had done so, the two sides would probably still be negotiating today.

Instead, Mr. Bush simply announced his intention to reduce the U.S.'s operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by some two-thirds and invited Russia to do the same. President Vladimir Putin accepted his offer. These unilateral reductions were then codified in the 2002 Moscow Treaty, a three-page pact that took just six months to negotiate. By contrast, the Start treaty signed by President George H.W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev -- and now being revived by the Obama team -- is 700-pages long and took nine years to negotiate.

Even as he enacted massive reductions in nuclear weapons, George W. Bush took other actions to reduce nuclear dangers. His administration launched the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which secured more than 600 vulnerable nuclear sites around the world and helped convert 57 nuclear reactors in 32 countries from highly-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium, removing enough weapons-grade material from countries around the world for more than 40 nuclear bombs.

With G-8 leaders, Mr. Bush launched the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction -- a $20 billion international effort to secure and dispose of nuclear and fissile materials and help former weapons scientists find new lines of work. The U.S. and Russia launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, a coalition of 75 nations that is working to stop the illicit spread of nuclear materials. The U.S. and Russia also launched the Bratislava Initiative, which has secured nearly 150 Russian sites containing nuclear warheads and hundreds of metric tons of weapons-quality material.

Despite this record of achievement, the arms controllers see the Bush era as a dark age from which they must rescue the world. They are intent on reviving the antiquated and adversarial approach to arms reductions. As serious negotiations begin, Russia will use these negotiations on arms reductions as leverage to get the U.S. to give up its planned deployment of ballistic missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic. Unlike Ronald Reagan at Reykjavik, it is not clear that Mr. Obama would walk away from a deal to preserve these vital defenses.

In addition to a new Start treaty, the Obama administration also reportedly plans to press the Senate to approve the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a fatally flawed agreement that was rejected by the Senate in 1999 because it would undermine reliability of our nuclear stockpile. Instead of pressing the Senate to act on the CTBT, the administration should be calling on Congress to restore the funding it eliminated last year for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program, which would allow us to develop new warheads without the need for nuclear testing and thus ensure the reliability of America's nuclear deterrent.

Mr. Obama will visit Moscow in July where he and President Dmitry Medvedev will discuss progress on their stated goal to "move beyond Cold War mentalities and chart a fresh start in relations." Bringing back Cold War-era arms-control negotiations is a strange way to do so. In the 21st century, arms-control agreements are as antiquated as cave drawings. We no longer need pieces of parchment and armies of arms-control aficionados to achieve deep reductions in nuclear weapons. This fact is lost on the Sputnik babies now inhabiting the State Department.

Mr. Thiessen served as chief speechwriter to President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In 2002, he traveled to Russia with Mr. Rumsfeld for the negotiations of the Moscow Treaty.

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Geopolitical Diary: U.S.-Russian Engagement and START
May 20, 2009 | 0054 GMT

A new round of nuclear disarmament talks kicked off Tuesday as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller met with Anatoly Antonov, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s security and arms control chief in Moscow. The talks have been anticipated since the U.S. and Russian presidents met in London April 1, and now the pressure is on for some sort of roadmap to be hammered out before they meet again July 8 in Moscow.

Both the Americans and the Russians are hoping to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), or failing that, to extend the treaty until a replacement can be crafted.

For Russia, a lasting replacement for START promises to cement the long-term strategic parity (or at least a semblance of parity) with the United States. Moscow’s immense nuclear arsenal is one of the few ways in which it still can claim, at least quantitatively, essentially equal footing with Washington. Given the limits on Russia’s financial and industrial resources and technical capabilities, the best and most sustainable way to ensure the longevity of this balance is through a treaty like START. For the United States, the structure of the START treaty has been proven to be an effective means of monitoring the status of Russia’s nuclear arsenal as well as maintaining a framework for cooperation in risk reduction and other non-proliferation efforts.

With the ample incentives created by current economic constraints and the high maintenance costs for aging Cold War-era weapons, both states are looking to reduce the size of their nuclear arsenals further. The stability and transparency provided by START’s declaration, inspection and verification regime helps to reduce uncertainty and make those moves possible.

Details of the series of talks have been particularly well guarded. STRATFOR has been monitoring the mood on both sides since the presidents’ April 1 meeting. Russia and the United States seem to be close to some sort of deal, though whether the agreement will be an extension of START or a new treaty is unknown. STRATFOR sources in Moscow say the Russians are considering both options, as the government plans its next steps in the wider U.S.-Russian geopolitical contest.

This is where the issue of timing comes into play. START expires in December. Though both countries share the goal of ultimately crafting a new treaty to replace it, Moscow is considering dragging the negotiations out — essentially politicizing the issue.

Thus far, START has not really been part of the larger contest between Moscow and Washington — unlike the highly contentious topics of NATO expansion to Ukraine and the Caucasus, U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) installations slated for central Europe, U.S. military support for Poland and other American involvement in Russia’s buffer regions. But Russia has only a few ways to bring the United States to the bargaining table on these other issues. START is one of them.

There is an internal discussion under way in the Kremlin concerning how and whether to link the START negotiations to those other topics — especially BMD and military support for Poland. In theory, Russia could agree to an extension of START and then drag out the negotiations on a replacement treaty in order to keep the United States in talks on the other issues. In other words, any agreement on a START replacement would be contingent on Washington striking a deal over BMD and Poland as well.

This might seem like a risky move by the Russians, who need a nuclear arms reduction treaty much more than the Americans do, but Moscow believes that Washington won’t simply drop its talks over START due to Russian posturing. That’s because the nuclear arms talks are the only line of communication still open between the two countries; talks over the other, more contentious issues already have ground to a halt. But so long as the START talks remain, there are the sidelines — where horses can be traded, deals can be forged, and boundaries can be drawn. Without the disarmament talks, Russia and the United States would be in a stalemate.

This is when things can get unpredictable and dangerous. The United States wants to keep Russia, a resurgent adversary, engaged in some sort of discussion in order to keep tabs on its activities. Russia is seeking further gains across a wide spectrum of issues, but the nuclear balance is of fundamental importance for Moscow too. How far one is willing to push the other on this — and the willingness of either player to walk away from the table — will be important as issues play out, far beyond the subject of arms control.