You can grow poppies without any real infrastructure where as you need a compounding lab with trained technicians to make fentanyl.
WAR US to leave troops in Afghanistan beyond May, 9/11 new goal
- Thread starter jward
- Start date
- Status
You can grow poppies without any real infrastructure where as you need a compounding lab with trained technicians to make fentanyl.
NoDandy
Has No Life - Lives on TB
So, are you saying it is easier to cultivate the poppies, than to mfg fentanyl ? Or just the opposite ??
It's easier for a non state low tech actor to grow poppies, however it is cheaper per manufacturing volume, and shipping to make fentanyl. If you're "organized crime" in the industrialized world it makes more sense to go synthetic than be dealing with all the variables of farming.
NoDandy
Has No Life - Lives on TB
Understand. Thanks
Doomer Doug
TB Fanatic
Wow how things change. One of the ONLY things the Taleban got correct back before we wiped them out was they zeroed out the entire poppy trade. We then took over and restarted it, and they crushed it again, and then we restarted it again, and now we actually claim that even though we have absolute air superiority, we can't find the poppy fields to destroy. 
At any rate, in Saigon we had them hanging off the helicopter skids, and this time around, likely a mad dash to get into the last Galaxy pulling out.
We will leave behind a massacre by the taleban of unbelievers numbering in the tens of thousands at a minimum, along with a horde of "our" supporters who will turn into refugees, like in Somalia etc etc
China, well china is going to have to defend that $5 billion copper mine forever I think .
At any rate, in Saigon we had them hanging off the helicopter skids, and this time around, likely a mad dash to get into the last Galaxy pulling out.
We will leave behind a massacre by the taleban of unbelievers numbering in the tens of thousands at a minimum, along with a horde of "our" supporters who will turn into refugees, like in Somalia etc etc
China, well china is going to have to defend that $5 billion copper mine forever I think .
jward
passin' thru
Into Thin Air: Aviation Security Force Assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan
Tobias Switzer
April 23, 2021 Book Reviews
George W. Cully, Adapt or Fail: The USAF’s Role in Reconstituting the Iraqi Air Force, 2004-2007 (Air University Press 2017)
Forrest L. Marion, Flight Risk: The Coalition’s Air Advisory Mission in Afghanistan, 2005-2015 (Naval Institute Press 2019)
After fifteen years of trying, why has the US military been unable to build effective and sustainable air forces for either Iraq or Afghanistan? Reading a pair of recently published histories about the U.S. Air Force’s attempts to build air forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and reflecting on my own experience as an advisor to the Afghan Special Mission Wing, my mind kept drifting back to the Aconcagua mountain in Argentina, a place I visited long ago. Of the Seven Summits, the tallest peak on each continent, the 22,841 foot Aconcagua is considered one of the more straightforward mountains to climb.
Aspirants do not need any specialized technical skills as there are no actual mountaineering obstacles. Reaching the top is a matter of putting one foot in front of the other, yet many fail to reach the summit. Why? The insidious threats of harsh weather and a lack of oxygen are the real barriers to climbing the Aconcagua. Pretentious climbers unacclimated to high-altitude and outfitted with unsuitable gear are practically guaranteed a fiasco.
Just as the Aconcagua has no physical impediments blocking access to the peak, neither were there external obstacles to creating an Iraqi or Afghan air force. Standing on the airfields at either Kandahar or Balad, one can easily imagine the partner nation’s attack aircraft, transports, and helicopters on the ramp, the fuel trucks circulating around the fleet, the aircrews stepping to one plane and maintainers towing another into a hangar for repair. But, in providing unsuitable aircraft and capabilities to the Iraqis and Afghans and sending military personnel who were unprepared to negotiate the alien cultures, I believe that the United States all but guaranteed failure in these two missions.
The theory behind providing air forces to the Iraqis and Afghans makes sense. With transport aircraft, their security forces can shrink distances and time to quickly respond to insurgent attacks and sustain lengthy ground operations through resupply. Airborne reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities can provide the Iraqis and Afghans critical intelligence and enhance tactical awareness during ground force missions. Air forces can also provide strike and casualty evacuation capabilities.
While a partner nation’s air force cannot replace its army or police during counter-insurgencies, it can provide an asymmetric advantage over destabilizing actors, expand the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of its populace, and reduce the need for the US military to use its aviation resources. With such an intoxicating vision of airpower, who would not have wanted expansive air forces for the Afghans and Iraqis?
Building an air force for a partner nation is different than raising its ground forces, though. Considering the technical, financial, and capital-intensive nature of aviation, the up-front investment of time, money, and sweat is much higher and the payoffs come much later if ever. For countries that lack the experience and tacit know-how needed to maintain and operate fleets of complicated military aircraft, building up their aviation capabilities can feel like pouring resources into a funnel; a lot goes in, drops come out.
Historians George Cully and Forrest Marion offer salient clues to explaining the failures of the aviation security force assistance missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cully’s book, Adapt or Fail, gives an excellent account of the organizational changes that the US Air Force undertook to reorient itself towards rebuilding Iraqi aviation capabilities. It is a story of institutional transformation. Those seeking on-the-ground details of an air advisor mission, however, will find those in Marion’s Flight Risk. Drawing on personal experience, extensive interviews, and records, Marion centers his book in Afghanistan to recount the personal challenges that coalition air advisors faced in mentoring, training, and advising Afghan airmen.
Ambitious dreams of creating not just modest capabilities in Iraq and Afghanistan but well-developed air forces went unrealized for two major reasons. First, as Cully details in Adapt or Fail, the U.S. Air Force was not organized, trained, or equipped for the task, resulting in the provision of unsuitable aircraft and capabilities for the Iraqis. The second reason, Marion tells us in Flight Risk, was that the cultural context was inhospitable to the air advisors, who could not adapt to it. Combined, these two reasons made the dreams near-impossible to realize.
In both countries, the role of rapidly growing a partner’s air force amid insurgencies and weakened local governments was thrust upon the U.S. Air Force, but that kind of job was not one of its core missions. Far from it. Not since the Vietnam War had it undertaken the responsibility of creating a partner nation’s air force to the scale of Iraq and Afghanistan and in the middle of raging insurgencies. Although the U.S. Air Force received assistance from other U.S. military branches — predominately the U.S. Army — and coalition forces, it had no idea how to plan and execute large-scale aviation security force assistance missions. With no institutional memory about how to train, advise, assist, and equip partner air forces under precarious circumstances such as those found in Iraq and Afghanistan, and no plans to do so, predictably, the U.S. military failed.
Adapt or Fail provides a four-year look at the U.S. Air Force’s aviation security force assistance mission in Iraq, starting with its commencement in 2004. Cully details the evolution of the Air Force’s organizations responsible for training, advising, assisting, and equipping foreign partners. The Air Force did not have prepared, experienced advisors ready to deploy, nor did the mission have the attention of its general officers and civilian leaders. Aircraft acquisition decisions for Iraq were made haphazardly, Cully notes.
Decisions about the number and type of aircraft to provide to the partner nation and the structure of sustainment and training contracts carry significant weight in determining a mission’s success. The aircraft and equipment will be in use for years — or decades, hopefully — and make valuable contributions to the partner nation’s security. But providing exquisite airplanes and helicopters that the partner nation can’t maintain, fuel, fly, or afford is a curse whose effects ripple forward in time. U.S. military senior leadership and planners should understand when and how these decisions get made and push for airmen with the right information to be at the table. Cully shows what happens when they are not.
Adapt or Fail traces many of these acquisition decisions for Iraq, including an instructive review of the ill-fated Comp Air 7SLX. The United Arab Emirates gifted and modified several of these kit aircraft, meant to be home-built like a weekend project, to the Iraqis to serve as surveillance platforms. Their airworthiness was highly dubious from the beginning, though. Tragically, one of them crashed in 2005, killing four U.S. airmen and one Iraqi pilot. All of the aircraft had known deficiencies and had not been appropriately flight-tested after their modifications. So why did U.S. advisors pilot aircraft in combat that they would never have been allowed to fly at home?
The U.S. and the Iraqi governments were frantic to bring on an aerial surveillance capability to monitor oil pipelines and had tried out several other slapdash aircraft, which also proved unsuitable, Cully reports. 2005 was a desperate time in the counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism fight against the destabilizing elements causing Iraq to slip away. No doubt senses of urgency and duty compelled U.S. airmen to continue to fly Iraqi aircraft known to be unsafe and unreliable.
Unfortunately, Adapt or Fail only takes the reader through to 2007, just as the U.S. Air Force ramped up the Iraqi advisor effort and finally organized itself for the mission. Cully’s book is about that organizational adaptation at the outset, not about the outcome of the aviation security force assistance mission, which continued even after 2011 when U.S. forces and advisors withdrew from Iraq. Air advisors returned in 2015 to help Iraq fight Islamic State. The sequel was no better.
Coming off the near-decade of internal instability, the U.S. government helped the Iraqis into the seats of thirty-six Lockheed Martin F-16 fighters and out of $2.3 billion in a major arms sale in 2011. A $1.9 billion support contract followed in 2016. By the time the United States restarted its air advisor mission in 2015 to help the Iraqis fight Islamic State, it was too late. Plagued with an advanced fighter aircraft that is difficult to maintain in heat and dust and unsuitable for irregular warfare, the Iraqis mostly failed to contribute to the air campaign against Islamic State.
Examples of aircraft mismatches extend to Afghanistan as well. A scathing 2021 Special Inspector for Afghanistan Reconstruction report shows how the U.S. Air Force unwisely purchased twenty G.222 medium-lift transport aircraft for the Afghan air force in 2008. The airplanes proved unsafe, unreliable, and far too challenging for the Afghans to maintain because spare parts were not available. The United States sold the G.222s to an Afghan company for approximately $40,000 in 2014. The total cost of the program? Over $500 million.
These and other acquisitions decisions for Iraq and Afghanistan set up the partner nations and air advisors for failure and demonstrate how unprepared the Department of Defense and the U.S. Air Force were to build air forces for Iraq and Afghanistan. Unsuitable aircraft challenged the air advisors who — doubly cursed — found a barren and inhospitable environment waiting for them.
Tobias Switzer
April 23, 2021 Book Reviews
George W. Cully, Adapt or Fail: The USAF’s Role in Reconstituting the Iraqi Air Force, 2004-2007 (Air University Press 2017)
Forrest L. Marion, Flight Risk: The Coalition’s Air Advisory Mission in Afghanistan, 2005-2015 (Naval Institute Press 2019)
After fifteen years of trying, why has the US military been unable to build effective and sustainable air forces for either Iraq or Afghanistan? Reading a pair of recently published histories about the U.S. Air Force’s attempts to build air forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and reflecting on my own experience as an advisor to the Afghan Special Mission Wing, my mind kept drifting back to the Aconcagua mountain in Argentina, a place I visited long ago. Of the Seven Summits, the tallest peak on each continent, the 22,841 foot Aconcagua is considered one of the more straightforward mountains to climb.
Aspirants do not need any specialized technical skills as there are no actual mountaineering obstacles. Reaching the top is a matter of putting one foot in front of the other, yet many fail to reach the summit. Why? The insidious threats of harsh weather and a lack of oxygen are the real barriers to climbing the Aconcagua. Pretentious climbers unacclimated to high-altitude and outfitted with unsuitable gear are practically guaranteed a fiasco.
Just as the Aconcagua has no physical impediments blocking access to the peak, neither were there external obstacles to creating an Iraqi or Afghan air force. Standing on the airfields at either Kandahar or Balad, one can easily imagine the partner nation’s attack aircraft, transports, and helicopters on the ramp, the fuel trucks circulating around the fleet, the aircrews stepping to one plane and maintainers towing another into a hangar for repair. But, in providing unsuitable aircraft and capabilities to the Iraqis and Afghans and sending military personnel who were unprepared to negotiate the alien cultures, I believe that the United States all but guaranteed failure in these two missions.
The theory behind providing air forces to the Iraqis and Afghans makes sense. With transport aircraft, their security forces can shrink distances and time to quickly respond to insurgent attacks and sustain lengthy ground operations through resupply. Airborne reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities can provide the Iraqis and Afghans critical intelligence and enhance tactical awareness during ground force missions. Air forces can also provide strike and casualty evacuation capabilities.
While a partner nation’s air force cannot replace its army or police during counter-insurgencies, it can provide an asymmetric advantage over destabilizing actors, expand the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of its populace, and reduce the need for the US military to use its aviation resources. With such an intoxicating vision of airpower, who would not have wanted expansive air forces for the Afghans and Iraqis?
Building an air force for a partner nation is different than raising its ground forces, though. Considering the technical, financial, and capital-intensive nature of aviation, the up-front investment of time, money, and sweat is much higher and the payoffs come much later if ever. For countries that lack the experience and tacit know-how needed to maintain and operate fleets of complicated military aircraft, building up their aviation capabilities can feel like pouring resources into a funnel; a lot goes in, drops come out.
Historians George Cully and Forrest Marion offer salient clues to explaining the failures of the aviation security force assistance missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cully’s book, Adapt or Fail, gives an excellent account of the organizational changes that the US Air Force undertook to reorient itself towards rebuilding Iraqi aviation capabilities. It is a story of institutional transformation. Those seeking on-the-ground details of an air advisor mission, however, will find those in Marion’s Flight Risk. Drawing on personal experience, extensive interviews, and records, Marion centers his book in Afghanistan to recount the personal challenges that coalition air advisors faced in mentoring, training, and advising Afghan airmen.
Ambitious dreams of creating not just modest capabilities in Iraq and Afghanistan but well-developed air forces went unrealized for two major reasons. First, as Cully details in Adapt or Fail, the U.S. Air Force was not organized, trained, or equipped for the task, resulting in the provision of unsuitable aircraft and capabilities for the Iraqis. The second reason, Marion tells us in Flight Risk, was that the cultural context was inhospitable to the air advisors, who could not adapt to it. Combined, these two reasons made the dreams near-impossible to realize.
In both countries, the role of rapidly growing a partner’s air force amid insurgencies and weakened local governments was thrust upon the U.S. Air Force, but that kind of job was not one of its core missions. Far from it. Not since the Vietnam War had it undertaken the responsibility of creating a partner nation’s air force to the scale of Iraq and Afghanistan and in the middle of raging insurgencies. Although the U.S. Air Force received assistance from other U.S. military branches — predominately the U.S. Army — and coalition forces, it had no idea how to plan and execute large-scale aviation security force assistance missions. With no institutional memory about how to train, advise, assist, and equip partner air forces under precarious circumstances such as those found in Iraq and Afghanistan, and no plans to do so, predictably, the U.S. military failed.
Adapt or Fail provides a four-year look at the U.S. Air Force’s aviation security force assistance mission in Iraq, starting with its commencement in 2004. Cully details the evolution of the Air Force’s organizations responsible for training, advising, assisting, and equipping foreign partners. The Air Force did not have prepared, experienced advisors ready to deploy, nor did the mission have the attention of its general officers and civilian leaders. Aircraft acquisition decisions for Iraq were made haphazardly, Cully notes.
Decisions about the number and type of aircraft to provide to the partner nation and the structure of sustainment and training contracts carry significant weight in determining a mission’s success. The aircraft and equipment will be in use for years — or decades, hopefully — and make valuable contributions to the partner nation’s security. But providing exquisite airplanes and helicopters that the partner nation can’t maintain, fuel, fly, or afford is a curse whose effects ripple forward in time. U.S. military senior leadership and planners should understand when and how these decisions get made and push for airmen with the right information to be at the table. Cully shows what happens when they are not.
Adapt or Fail traces many of these acquisition decisions for Iraq, including an instructive review of the ill-fated Comp Air 7SLX. The United Arab Emirates gifted and modified several of these kit aircraft, meant to be home-built like a weekend project, to the Iraqis to serve as surveillance platforms. Their airworthiness was highly dubious from the beginning, though. Tragically, one of them crashed in 2005, killing four U.S. airmen and one Iraqi pilot. All of the aircraft had known deficiencies and had not been appropriately flight-tested after their modifications. So why did U.S. advisors pilot aircraft in combat that they would never have been allowed to fly at home?
The U.S. and the Iraqi governments were frantic to bring on an aerial surveillance capability to monitor oil pipelines and had tried out several other slapdash aircraft, which also proved unsuitable, Cully reports. 2005 was a desperate time in the counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism fight against the destabilizing elements causing Iraq to slip away. No doubt senses of urgency and duty compelled U.S. airmen to continue to fly Iraqi aircraft known to be unsafe and unreliable.
Unfortunately, Adapt or Fail only takes the reader through to 2007, just as the U.S. Air Force ramped up the Iraqi advisor effort and finally organized itself for the mission. Cully’s book is about that organizational adaptation at the outset, not about the outcome of the aviation security force assistance mission, which continued even after 2011 when U.S. forces and advisors withdrew from Iraq. Air advisors returned in 2015 to help Iraq fight Islamic State. The sequel was no better.
Coming off the near-decade of internal instability, the U.S. government helped the Iraqis into the seats of thirty-six Lockheed Martin F-16 fighters and out of $2.3 billion in a major arms sale in 2011. A $1.9 billion support contract followed in 2016. By the time the United States restarted its air advisor mission in 2015 to help the Iraqis fight Islamic State, it was too late. Plagued with an advanced fighter aircraft that is difficult to maintain in heat and dust and unsuitable for irregular warfare, the Iraqis mostly failed to contribute to the air campaign against Islamic State.
Examples of aircraft mismatches extend to Afghanistan as well. A scathing 2021 Special Inspector for Afghanistan Reconstruction report shows how the U.S. Air Force unwisely purchased twenty G.222 medium-lift transport aircraft for the Afghan air force in 2008. The airplanes proved unsafe, unreliable, and far too challenging for the Afghans to maintain because spare parts were not available. The United States sold the G.222s to an Afghan company for approximately $40,000 in 2014. The total cost of the program? Over $500 million.
These and other acquisitions decisions for Iraq and Afghanistan set up the partner nations and air advisors for failure and demonstrate how unprepared the Department of Defense and the U.S. Air Force were to build air forces for Iraq and Afghanistan. Unsuitable aircraft challenged the air advisors who — doubly cursed — found a barren and inhospitable environment waiting for them.
jward
passin' thru
continued
In Flight Risk, Marion leverages nearly two years spent with the coalition air advisors in Afghanistan as an official historian during the tumultuous period of 2009-2012. He guides the reader through an insightful decade-long tour of the mission focusing on the interactions between the air advisors and the Afghan airmen. The killing of nine air advisors by an Afghan air force officer in April 2011, the commencement of a two-year high-water period of insider attacks throughout Afghanistan, punctuates the story. That attack and its aftermath dramatically changed the air advisor mission, driving a permanent wedge of security and suspicion between the advisors and the Afghans. Ever since the insider attack, the advisor environment became “cold war, no trust,” as one commander put it to Marion.
Marion’s longer arc allows for a weighing of the evidence. His conclusions ought to lower the ambitions of future policymakers and strategists. Throughout the book, Marion gives exhaustive examples of the air advisors’ quixotic emphasis on professionalizing their Afghan counterparts and instituting a robust centralized command-and-control system. Many advisors sincerely believed, Marion reports, that the idea of professionalization was a culturally neutral concept and an ideal that transcended time and geography when, in actuality, professionalization meant westernizing the Afghans. Over and over again, advisors expressed frustration with the Afghan airmen when they failed to show up for work, shirked their duties, or obstructed change. These behaviors, according to Marion, were due to the prevailing Afghan culture. Even when advisors claimed to understand that they were operating in a different culture, their enduring use of the term “professionalize” showed otherwise.
One fundamental Afghan practice, odious to the air advisors, was the process by which Afghan aircraft and crews were tasked for non-military missions on short notice, secretively, and often directly from generals or political leaders. Frequently, the Afghan aviators I advised at the Special Mission Wing were tasked via calls to their cell phones by leaders in the Ministry of Defense and military, too. Power brokers in the Afghan government didn’t necessarily view the aviation assets, particularly the Mi-17 helicopters, as Afghan but instead saw the aircraft as means to benefit themselves and their tribes. According to Marion, advisors believed that Afghan leaders routinely co-opted crews and aircraft for their own, often illicit, purposes and circumvented advisor-imposed processes with impunity. While we could not blame the Afghans for following orders, even those delivered by cell phone call, the situation was untenable. When the aircraft misuse and overtasking at the Special Mission Wing finally led to an exhausted Afghan crew crashing an Mi-17 on the ramp at Kandahar, our commanding general ordered us to “take away the keys” like a dad punishing an irresponsible teenager.
While I thought that the Afghan crews would be upset with us, they were not. They were happy about the intervention, and everything was good for a while. Then the problems started creeping back in again.
As Marion notes, advisors viewed this issue of command and control as a significant problem and ceaselessly tried to persuade or reason the Afghans into doing things the American way. Marion asks, provocatively, why did we design an air force for Afghans that required a westernized command-and-control system? Shouldn’t advisors and planners have developed an air force considering the rampant corruption in Afghanistan, a problem that American leaders routinely describe as cancerous?
The Afghan air force had fewer than 20 aircraft in 2006, Marion reports, more than they could fly and maintain at the time. But by 2014, that inventory ballooned up to 90 aircraft, numbers well above what air advisors could retain control over. As the coalition air advisors tried to build an expansive and sustainable air force in Afghanistan, the local culture bogged down the effort. Instead, American defense planners created ample opportunity for criminal networks to use the aircraft to facilitate the opium trade. Since 2010, the United States has spent over $8.5 billion to develop the Afghan air force. Making extravagant aviation resources available to the Afghans without accountability may have fueled the very same corruption that stymied the air advisor mission, implies Marion.
While Iraqi culture and society were not quite as distant to the air advisors, building the Iraqi air force was a Sisyphean struggle, too. In trying to surmount a steep language barrier and a complex social structure, air advisors were significantly disadvantaged as the Iraqis were skilled at exploiting American impatience. Knowing that the air advisors were under tremendous pressure, Iraqi airmen were happy to wait until the last minute to see if the Americans would relieve them of their responsibilities such as purchasing services and equipment or planning an operation. The American commander who reestablished the air advisor mission in Iraq in 2015 recounted to me that walking into the Iraqi C-130 hangar was like walking into 2011. All the maintenance records in the file cabinets and all the whiteboards with aircraft status and scheduling information had been left untouched, frozen in time since the air advisors left with the rest of the American forces. The Iraqi air force practiced little of what the U.S. military had taught and trained them to do.
As the only two books written about the U.S. military’s attempts to build air forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, Adapt or Fail and Flight Risk are canonical, by default. Each complements the other and, when read together, provides a fuller picture as to why the United States — after spending such an enormous amount of time and money — fell so short of its aim. Adapt or Fail and Flight Risk also make clear that the blame for the American failure to build air forces in Iraq and Afghanistan does not rest with the partner nations, nor with the unprepared and ill-equipped U.S. Air Force.
Responsibility rests with the policymakers. It rests with those who wasted billions of dollars buying incompatible aircraft for the Iraqi and Afghan air forces and then expected air advisors to carry those loads up the trail. Although the high mountain had a seemingly straightforward path to the top, the thin air subdued the people sent by the U.S. military. The next time the United States decides to build military aviation capabilities for a culturally remote country in the middle of an insurgency, its goals should be kept modest and humble. In those circumstances, the aim should be to reach base camp safely instead of collapsing en route to the summit.
Dedicated to the memory of Lt Col Jerome “Jerry” Klingaman, U.S. Air Force (1934- 2021), who covertly advised the Laotian air force in the 1960s and helped to resurrect U.S. special operations air advising nearly three decades later. The warning — found in his Coyote Rules — that “most of us come to grief because we want too much” remains true today. He will be missed.
Tobias Switzer is a U.S. Air Force combat aviation advisor, foreign area officer, and Olmsted Scholar. He previously advised the Afghan Special Mission Wing as the commander of a special operations advisor team in Kabul from 2017-2018. He is currently a military fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
Correction: A previous version of this article incorrectly stated that the cost of the G.222 program was in excess of $500 billion. The correct figure is in excess of $500 million.
Image: U.S. Air Force (Photo by Master Sgt. Ben Bloker)
Posted for fair use
In Flight Risk, Marion leverages nearly two years spent with the coalition air advisors in Afghanistan as an official historian during the tumultuous period of 2009-2012. He guides the reader through an insightful decade-long tour of the mission focusing on the interactions between the air advisors and the Afghan airmen. The killing of nine air advisors by an Afghan air force officer in April 2011, the commencement of a two-year high-water period of insider attacks throughout Afghanistan, punctuates the story. That attack and its aftermath dramatically changed the air advisor mission, driving a permanent wedge of security and suspicion between the advisors and the Afghans. Ever since the insider attack, the advisor environment became “cold war, no trust,” as one commander put it to Marion.
Marion’s longer arc allows for a weighing of the evidence. His conclusions ought to lower the ambitions of future policymakers and strategists. Throughout the book, Marion gives exhaustive examples of the air advisors’ quixotic emphasis on professionalizing their Afghan counterparts and instituting a robust centralized command-and-control system. Many advisors sincerely believed, Marion reports, that the idea of professionalization was a culturally neutral concept and an ideal that transcended time and geography when, in actuality, professionalization meant westernizing the Afghans. Over and over again, advisors expressed frustration with the Afghan airmen when they failed to show up for work, shirked their duties, or obstructed change. These behaviors, according to Marion, were due to the prevailing Afghan culture. Even when advisors claimed to understand that they were operating in a different culture, their enduring use of the term “professionalize” showed otherwise.
One fundamental Afghan practice, odious to the air advisors, was the process by which Afghan aircraft and crews were tasked for non-military missions on short notice, secretively, and often directly from generals or political leaders. Frequently, the Afghan aviators I advised at the Special Mission Wing were tasked via calls to their cell phones by leaders in the Ministry of Defense and military, too. Power brokers in the Afghan government didn’t necessarily view the aviation assets, particularly the Mi-17 helicopters, as Afghan but instead saw the aircraft as means to benefit themselves and their tribes. According to Marion, advisors believed that Afghan leaders routinely co-opted crews and aircraft for their own, often illicit, purposes and circumvented advisor-imposed processes with impunity. While we could not blame the Afghans for following orders, even those delivered by cell phone call, the situation was untenable. When the aircraft misuse and overtasking at the Special Mission Wing finally led to an exhausted Afghan crew crashing an Mi-17 on the ramp at Kandahar, our commanding general ordered us to “take away the keys” like a dad punishing an irresponsible teenager.
While I thought that the Afghan crews would be upset with us, they were not. They were happy about the intervention, and everything was good for a while. Then the problems started creeping back in again.
As Marion notes, advisors viewed this issue of command and control as a significant problem and ceaselessly tried to persuade or reason the Afghans into doing things the American way. Marion asks, provocatively, why did we design an air force for Afghans that required a westernized command-and-control system? Shouldn’t advisors and planners have developed an air force considering the rampant corruption in Afghanistan, a problem that American leaders routinely describe as cancerous?
The Afghan air force had fewer than 20 aircraft in 2006, Marion reports, more than they could fly and maintain at the time. But by 2014, that inventory ballooned up to 90 aircraft, numbers well above what air advisors could retain control over. As the coalition air advisors tried to build an expansive and sustainable air force in Afghanistan, the local culture bogged down the effort. Instead, American defense planners created ample opportunity for criminal networks to use the aircraft to facilitate the opium trade. Since 2010, the United States has spent over $8.5 billion to develop the Afghan air force. Making extravagant aviation resources available to the Afghans without accountability may have fueled the very same corruption that stymied the air advisor mission, implies Marion.
While Iraqi culture and society were not quite as distant to the air advisors, building the Iraqi air force was a Sisyphean struggle, too. In trying to surmount a steep language barrier and a complex social structure, air advisors were significantly disadvantaged as the Iraqis were skilled at exploiting American impatience. Knowing that the air advisors were under tremendous pressure, Iraqi airmen were happy to wait until the last minute to see if the Americans would relieve them of their responsibilities such as purchasing services and equipment or planning an operation. The American commander who reestablished the air advisor mission in Iraq in 2015 recounted to me that walking into the Iraqi C-130 hangar was like walking into 2011. All the maintenance records in the file cabinets and all the whiteboards with aircraft status and scheduling information had been left untouched, frozen in time since the air advisors left with the rest of the American forces. The Iraqi air force practiced little of what the U.S. military had taught and trained them to do.
As the only two books written about the U.S. military’s attempts to build air forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, Adapt or Fail and Flight Risk are canonical, by default. Each complements the other and, when read together, provides a fuller picture as to why the United States — after spending such an enormous amount of time and money — fell so short of its aim. Adapt or Fail and Flight Risk also make clear that the blame for the American failure to build air forces in Iraq and Afghanistan does not rest with the partner nations, nor with the unprepared and ill-equipped U.S. Air Force.
Responsibility rests with the policymakers. It rests with those who wasted billions of dollars buying incompatible aircraft for the Iraqi and Afghan air forces and then expected air advisors to carry those loads up the trail. Although the high mountain had a seemingly straightforward path to the top, the thin air subdued the people sent by the U.S. military. The next time the United States decides to build military aviation capabilities for a culturally remote country in the middle of an insurgency, its goals should be kept modest and humble. In those circumstances, the aim should be to reach base camp safely instead of collapsing en route to the summit.
Dedicated to the memory of Lt Col Jerome “Jerry” Klingaman, U.S. Air Force (1934- 2021), who covertly advised the Laotian air force in the 1960s and helped to resurrect U.S. special operations air advising nearly three decades later. The warning — found in his Coyote Rules — that “most of us come to grief because we want too much” remains true today. He will be missed.
Tobias Switzer is a U.S. Air Force combat aviation advisor, foreign area officer, and Olmsted Scholar. He previously advised the Afghan Special Mission Wing as the commander of a special operations advisor team in Kabul from 2017-2018. He is currently a military fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
Correction: A previous version of this article incorrectly stated that the cost of the G.222 program was in excess of $500 billion. The correct figure is in excess of $500 million.
Image: U.S. Air Force (Photo by Master Sgt. Ben Bloker)
Posted for fair use
Into Thin Air: Aviation Security Force Assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan - War on the Rocks
George W. Cully, Adapt or Fail: The USAF’s Role in Reconstituting the Iraqi Air Force, 2004-2007 (Air University Press 2017) Forrest L. Marion, Flight
warontherocks.com
jward
passin' thru
ASB News / MILITARY
@ASBMilitary
US State Department issues statement to Americans in Afghanistan that are preparing to leave to do so “ASAP”
ASB News / MILITARY
@ASBMilitary
US State Department issues statement to Americans in Afghanistan that are preparing to leave to do so “ASAP”
Well that's got "minimal CYA" written all over it....Merde....
jward
passin' thru
Thomas Gibbons-Neff
@Tmgneff
“Col. Mohammad Ali Ahmadi, who commands a commando regiment in the south, said that it will be near impossible to rely on the air force after the U.S. withdraws. “We must have the air support of foreigners,” he said.”
@NajimRah
View: https://twitter.com/Tmgneff/status/1387323201596833792?s=20
Thomas Gibbons-Neff
@Tmgneff
“Col. Mohammad Ali Ahmadi, who commands a commando regiment in the south, said that it will be near impossible to rely on the air force after the U.S. withdraws. “We must have the air support of foreigners,” he said.”
@NajimRah
View: https://twitter.com/Tmgneff/status/1387323201596833792?s=20
This is about to get very ugly.....
jward
passin' thru
Phil Stewart
@phildstewart
1h
More than 100 Afghan security force personnel have been killed over the last two weeks amid a surge of Taliban attacks following Washington's announcement it would pull all U.S. troops out by Sept. 11, officials said on Thursday.
jward
passin' thru
White House Says Afghanistan Troop Drawdown Has Officially Begun
by Tyler Durden
Thursday, Apr 29, 2021 - 10:10 PM
Following the earlier this month Biden-ordered full troop exit from Afghanistan slated to be completed by Sept.11 of this year, the White House on Thursday announced the military withdrawal has now officially begun.
While traveling aboard Air Force One, the deputy White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre confirmed to reporters that "A drawdown is underway," but also added the caveat that, "While these actions will initially result in increased forces levels, we remain committed to having all of US military personnel out of Afghanistan by September 11, 2020."
Via Reuters
"The President’s intent is clear, the US military departure from Afghanistan will not be rushed.… It will be delivered and conducted in a safe and responsible manner that ensures the protection of our forces," Jean-Pierre explained.
Previously Pentagon officials have described "increased forces levels" as constituting the security and personnel required to oversee a safe logistical exit from the country that includes a vast amount of military equipment and defense facilities that have accumulated over the course of the two-decade long war and occupation.
CNN details that "Fewer than 100 troops, along with military equipment, have been moved largely by aircraft to execute President Joe Biden’s order to begin the withdrawal process no later than May 1, according to several US defense officials."
"There have been about 2,500 US troops in Afghanistan that are openly acknowledged, plus several hundred additional special operations forces. All of them will depart under the President’s orders," the report adds. NATO at the same time is signaling a full draw down within months.
It's likely these slew of new statements Thursday are intended to seek to assure the Taliban that an exit is indeed in motion. But Saturday could see a proverbial all hell breaking loose given May 1 is the deadline (from the Taliban's perspective) based on the prior Trump admin-Taliban deal that was inked in February 2020.
To protect the exiting US troops, over the past weeks the US has sent additional B-52 bombers to the region to safeguard the pullout, along with the presence in regional waters of the USS Eisenhower aircraft carrier.
Many pundits ultimately see this whole spectacle as just a recipe for continuing to stay far past Biden's anticipated Sept.11 exit, given there's a seeming endless number of ways this could go wrong. So it's worth asking: will we still be seeing similar headlines of "drawdown has begun" a few years from now as the prior pattern has shown when it comes to America's longest ever running war?
www.zerohedge.com
by Tyler Durden
Thursday, Apr 29, 2021 - 10:10 PM
Following the earlier this month Biden-ordered full troop exit from Afghanistan slated to be completed by Sept.11 of this year, the White House on Thursday announced the military withdrawal has now officially begun.
While traveling aboard Air Force One, the deputy White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre confirmed to reporters that "A drawdown is underway," but also added the caveat that, "While these actions will initially result in increased forces levels, we remain committed to having all of US military personnel out of Afghanistan by September 11, 2020."
Via Reuters"The President’s intent is clear, the US military departure from Afghanistan will not be rushed.… It will be delivered and conducted in a safe and responsible manner that ensures the protection of our forces," Jean-Pierre explained.
Previously Pentagon officials have described "increased forces levels" as constituting the security and personnel required to oversee a safe logistical exit from the country that includes a vast amount of military equipment and defense facilities that have accumulated over the course of the two-decade long war and occupation.
CNN details that "Fewer than 100 troops, along with military equipment, have been moved largely by aircraft to execute President Joe Biden’s order to begin the withdrawal process no later than May 1, according to several US defense officials."
"There have been about 2,500 US troops in Afghanistan that are openly acknowledged, plus several hundred additional special operations forces. All of them will depart under the President’s orders," the report adds. NATO at the same time is signaling a full draw down within months.
It's likely these slew of new statements Thursday are intended to seek to assure the Taliban that an exit is indeed in motion. But Saturday could see a proverbial all hell breaking loose given May 1 is the deadline (from the Taliban's perspective) based on the prior Trump admin-Taliban deal that was inked in February 2020.
The Taliban has vowed to strike at any American targets should troops remain in the country after that date. US leaders are now worried that the Taliban could hit hard just as the Pentagon is in the midst of its draw down; and in the medium to longer term it's expected that entire major cities could once again fall to the hardline Islamic fundamentalist group.
To protect the exiting US troops, over the past weeks the US has sent additional B-52 bombers to the region to safeguard the pullout, along with the presence in regional waters of the USS Eisenhower aircraft carrier.
Many pundits ultimately see this whole spectacle as just a recipe for continuing to stay far past Biden's anticipated Sept.11 exit, given there's a seeming endless number of ways this could go wrong. So it's worth asking: will we still be seeing similar headlines of "drawdown has begun" a few years from now as the prior pattern has shown when it comes to America's longest ever running war?
Zerohedge
ZeroHedge - On a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero
www.zerohedge.com
jward
passin' thru
EXPLAINER: What remains as US ends Afghan ‘forever war’
By KATHY GANNON 45 minutes ago
1 of 8
FILE - In this Dec. 23, 2015 file photo, a U.S. service member salutes her fallen comrades during a memorial ceremony for six Airmen killed in a suicide attack, at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan. ter 20 years America is ending its “forever” war in Afghanistan. There’s conflicting views even among U. S. military minds as to whether the time is right. For others there is another lingering question: Was it worth it? (Tech. Sgt. Robert Cloys/U.S. Air Force via AP)
KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — After 20 years, America is ending its “forever war” in Afghanistan.
Announcing a firm withdrawal deadline, President Joe Biden cut through the long debate, even within the U.S. military, over whether the time was right. Starting Saturday, the last remaining 2,500 to 3,5000 American troops will begin leaving, to be fully out by Sept. 11 at the latest.
Another debate will likely go on far longer: Was it worth it?
Since 2001, tens of thousands of Afghans and 2,442 American soldiers have been killed, millions of Afghans driven from their homes, and billions of dollars spent on war and reconstruction. As the departure begins, The Associated Press takes a look at the mission and what it accomplished.
FIGHTING TERROR
In the early days after the Sept. 11, 2001 terror attacks in the U.S., the mission seemed clear: Hunt down and punish the perpetrators.
The U.S. determined that al-Qaida and its leader, Osama bin Laden, had plotted the attack from the safety of Afghanistan, protected by its radical Taliban rulers. At the time the Taliban were a pariah government, under U.N. sanctions and vilified in the West for their rule by a harsh interpretation of Islamic law.
Until 9/11, the U.S. had watched Afghanistan from a distance, occasionally requesting the Taliban to hand over bin Laden and once in 1998 firing a couple of cruise missiles at an al-Qaida base in eastern Afghanistan.
Now America was leading an invasion, dubbed Operation Enduring Freedom, with the mission of removing the Taliban and destroying al-Qaida.
Washington turned to the only allies in Afghanistan it could — a collection of warlords, most of whom were former mujahedeen backed by the U.S. in the 1980s in the fight against the invading Soviet Union. Rallying around the U.S. after 9/11, NATO joined the coalition.
Within weeks of the invasion and aerial bombardment, the U.S.-led coalition had pounded the Taliban into submission and driven them from power. Its leadership fled, its fighters lost control of the entire nation. Al-Qaida as well fled underground, crossing into neighboring Pakistan.
The hunt for bin Laden took 10 years. Finally, he was tracked to his hideout in Pakistan, barely 100 kilometers (60 miles) from Islamabad. A U.S. Navy Seals team went in under cover of darkness and killed him.
But in the interceding decade, America and NATO had been dragged into a dramatically expanded mission. Then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld at first said America was not in Afghanistan to nation-build. That would change.
When the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, it took its eye off Afghanistan. It left it to the former warlords, pre-occupied with wealth and power. The first post-Taliban president, Hamid Karzai, raised the idea of talks with the Taliban to work out a peace, and the crushed militants put out signals they wanted to reach an accommodation.
But American officials blocked any negotiations with the Taliban, convinced the insurgents could be militarily destroyed.
Instead, the militants re-emerged in a long insurgency, and the U.S. found itself pouring in money and manpower to help the Afghan government fight and to rebuild the war-shattered nation. With the flood of billions of dollars, corruption only grew in the U.S.-backed government, only growing worse as the years went on.
Meanwhile, al-Qaida’s ability to strike the U.S. and the West has been severely damaged. But the group has spread in branches in multiple countries fighting in insurgencies.
Biden explained his decision to pull out the last 2,500-3,500 American soldiers from Afghanistan, saying America’s security concerns had evolved.
“Bin Laden is dead, and al-Qaida is degraded in Iraq -- in Afghanistan, he said, arguing that the terror threat has “metastasized” into a global phenomenon, not to be fought with thousands of troops on the ground in one country but with new technology. The U.S., he said, must be freed to fight the 21st century’s more sophisticated challenges, including competition from Russia and China.
For the situation in Afghanistan, he said he didn’t see how continued American military presence would bring a turnaround. “When will it be the right moment to leave? One more year, two more years, ten more years?” he said.
“’Not now” — that’s how we got here.’”
WHAT NOW FOR AFGHANISTAN?
The U.S. and NATO leave behind an Afghanistan that is at least half run directly or indirectly by the Taliban — despite billions poured into training and arming Afghan forces to fight them. Riddled with corruption and tied to regional warlords, the U.S.-backed government is widely distrusted by many Afghans.
Washington and its international allies are putting heavy pressure on the government and the Taliban to reach a peace deal. The hope is that both sides realize military victory is impossible and that peace together is the only way forward.
The best case scenario is some sort of government including the Taliban that can pave the way for a drawing up a new constitutional system for the future, including some form of elections.
The very possible worst case scenario is that peace talks fail, and Afghanistan is plunged into a new chapter of its decades of civil war. That new phase could be more brutal than ever, with not only the Taliban but the country’s other, multiple warlords and armed factions battling it out for power.
The past 20 years since the Taliban were ousted have unquestionably seen gains for the Afghans. But they are fragile and risk being wiped away as the Americans step away — whether frittered away under a new government or crushed by continued war.
Girls are allowed an education, which had been banned under the Taliban. Still, at least 3.6 million children, the majority of them girls, are not in school, according to UNICEF.
Women are working and are in Parliament. Their voices are strong yet still Afghanistan’s Parliament has been unable to pass The Violence Against Women bill because religious conservatives dominate. The Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security has consistently ranked Afghanistan as one of the worst countries in the world to be a woman.
Before the war in 2001, the Taliban had eradicated opium production in Afghanistan, according to United Nations figures. Today, it produces more opium than every other opium-producing country combined, despite the U.S. spending millions to eradicate drug production.
The opium industry in 2019, the latest available figures show, earned between $1.2 billion and $2.1 billion, outstripping the value of the country’s legal exports, according to John Sopko, the U.S. government’s watchdog on Afghan reconstruction. More than $14 million of that went into the coffers of the Taliban, who tax drug movement throughout the country.
Despite billions in U.S. humanitarian and reconstruction aid, more than half the population of 36 million lives under the World Bank-set poverty line of $1.90 a day — and millions more live not much above that level. Unemployment is at 40%. The U.N. and Red Cross say nearly half of all Afghan children face the danger of hunger.
The majority of Afghans hold out little hope for their future according to a 2018 Gallup poll.
“Afghanistan is bordering a failed state status and is sure to enter the category immediately after the withdrawal of the foreign forces absent a better political arrangement,” said Torek Farhadi, a political analyst and former government adviser.
“That is the reality of Afghanistan.”
Posted For Fair Use
apnews.com
By KATHY GANNON 45 minutes ago
1 of 8
FILE - In this Dec. 23, 2015 file photo, a U.S. service member salutes her fallen comrades during a memorial ceremony for six Airmen killed in a suicide attack, at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan. ter 20 years America is ending its “forever” war in Afghanistan. There’s conflicting views even among U. S. military minds as to whether the time is right. For others there is another lingering question: Was it worth it? (Tech. Sgt. Robert Cloys/U.S. Air Force via AP)
KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — After 20 years, America is ending its “forever war” in Afghanistan.
Announcing a firm withdrawal deadline, President Joe Biden cut through the long debate, even within the U.S. military, over whether the time was right. Starting Saturday, the last remaining 2,500 to 3,5000 American troops will begin leaving, to be fully out by Sept. 11 at the latest.
Another debate will likely go on far longer: Was it worth it?
Since 2001, tens of thousands of Afghans and 2,442 American soldiers have been killed, millions of Afghans driven from their homes, and billions of dollars spent on war and reconstruction. As the departure begins, The Associated Press takes a look at the mission and what it accomplished.
FIGHTING TERROR
In the early days after the Sept. 11, 2001 terror attacks in the U.S., the mission seemed clear: Hunt down and punish the perpetrators.
The U.S. determined that al-Qaida and its leader, Osama bin Laden, had plotted the attack from the safety of Afghanistan, protected by its radical Taliban rulers. At the time the Taliban were a pariah government, under U.N. sanctions and vilified in the West for their rule by a harsh interpretation of Islamic law.
Until 9/11, the U.S. had watched Afghanistan from a distance, occasionally requesting the Taliban to hand over bin Laden and once in 1998 firing a couple of cruise missiles at an al-Qaida base in eastern Afghanistan.
Now America was leading an invasion, dubbed Operation Enduring Freedom, with the mission of removing the Taliban and destroying al-Qaida.
Washington turned to the only allies in Afghanistan it could — a collection of warlords, most of whom were former mujahedeen backed by the U.S. in the 1980s in the fight against the invading Soviet Union. Rallying around the U.S. after 9/11, NATO joined the coalition.
Within weeks of the invasion and aerial bombardment, the U.S.-led coalition had pounded the Taliban into submission and driven them from power. Its leadership fled, its fighters lost control of the entire nation. Al-Qaida as well fled underground, crossing into neighboring Pakistan.
The hunt for bin Laden took 10 years. Finally, he was tracked to his hideout in Pakistan, barely 100 kilometers (60 miles) from Islamabad. A U.S. Navy Seals team went in under cover of darkness and killed him.
But in the interceding decade, America and NATO had been dragged into a dramatically expanded mission. Then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld at first said America was not in Afghanistan to nation-build. That would change.
When the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, it took its eye off Afghanistan. It left it to the former warlords, pre-occupied with wealth and power. The first post-Taliban president, Hamid Karzai, raised the idea of talks with the Taliban to work out a peace, and the crushed militants put out signals they wanted to reach an accommodation.
But American officials blocked any negotiations with the Taliban, convinced the insurgents could be militarily destroyed.
Instead, the militants re-emerged in a long insurgency, and the U.S. found itself pouring in money and manpower to help the Afghan government fight and to rebuild the war-shattered nation. With the flood of billions of dollars, corruption only grew in the U.S.-backed government, only growing worse as the years went on.
Meanwhile, al-Qaida’s ability to strike the U.S. and the West has been severely damaged. But the group has spread in branches in multiple countries fighting in insurgencies.
Biden explained his decision to pull out the last 2,500-3,500 American soldiers from Afghanistan, saying America’s security concerns had evolved.
“Bin Laden is dead, and al-Qaida is degraded in Iraq -- in Afghanistan, he said, arguing that the terror threat has “metastasized” into a global phenomenon, not to be fought with thousands of troops on the ground in one country but with new technology. The U.S., he said, must be freed to fight the 21st century’s more sophisticated challenges, including competition from Russia and China.
For the situation in Afghanistan, he said he didn’t see how continued American military presence would bring a turnaround. “When will it be the right moment to leave? One more year, two more years, ten more years?” he said.
“’Not now” — that’s how we got here.’”
WHAT NOW FOR AFGHANISTAN?
The U.S. and NATO leave behind an Afghanistan that is at least half run directly or indirectly by the Taliban — despite billions poured into training and arming Afghan forces to fight them. Riddled with corruption and tied to regional warlords, the U.S.-backed government is widely distrusted by many Afghans.
Washington and its international allies are putting heavy pressure on the government and the Taliban to reach a peace deal. The hope is that both sides realize military victory is impossible and that peace together is the only way forward.
The best case scenario is some sort of government including the Taliban that can pave the way for a drawing up a new constitutional system for the future, including some form of elections.
The very possible worst case scenario is that peace talks fail, and Afghanistan is plunged into a new chapter of its decades of civil war. That new phase could be more brutal than ever, with not only the Taliban but the country’s other, multiple warlords and armed factions battling it out for power.
The past 20 years since the Taliban were ousted have unquestionably seen gains for the Afghans. But they are fragile and risk being wiped away as the Americans step away — whether frittered away under a new government or crushed by continued war.
Girls are allowed an education, which had been banned under the Taliban. Still, at least 3.6 million children, the majority of them girls, are not in school, according to UNICEF.
Women are working and are in Parliament. Their voices are strong yet still Afghanistan’s Parliament has been unable to pass The Violence Against Women bill because religious conservatives dominate. The Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security has consistently ranked Afghanistan as one of the worst countries in the world to be a woman.
Before the war in 2001, the Taliban had eradicated opium production in Afghanistan, according to United Nations figures. Today, it produces more opium than every other opium-producing country combined, despite the U.S. spending millions to eradicate drug production.
The opium industry in 2019, the latest available figures show, earned between $1.2 billion and $2.1 billion, outstripping the value of the country’s legal exports, according to John Sopko, the U.S. government’s watchdog on Afghan reconstruction. More than $14 million of that went into the coffers of the Taliban, who tax drug movement throughout the country.
Despite billions in U.S. humanitarian and reconstruction aid, more than half the population of 36 million lives under the World Bank-set poverty line of $1.90 a day — and millions more live not much above that level. Unemployment is at 40%. The U.N. and Red Cross say nearly half of all Afghan children face the danger of hunger.
The majority of Afghans hold out little hope for their future according to a 2018 Gallup poll.
“Afghanistan is bordering a failed state status and is sure to enter the category immediately after the withdrawal of the foreign forces absent a better political arrangement,” said Torek Farhadi, a political analyst and former government adviser.
“That is the reality of Afghanistan.”
Posted For Fair Use
EXPLAINER: What remains as US ends Afghan 'forever war'
KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — After 20 years, America is ending its “forever war” in Afghanistan. Announcing a firm withdrawal deadline, President Joe Biden cut through the long debate, even within the U.S. military, over whether the time was right.
apnews.com
jward
passin' thru
The Cavell Group
@TCG_CrisisRisks
7m
Al Qaeda promises 'war on all fronts' against America as Biden pulls out of Afghanistan
View: https://twitter.com/TCG_CrisisRisks/status/1388045419872022529?s=20
@TCG_CrisisRisks
7m
Al Qaeda promises 'war on all fronts' against America as Biden pulls out of Afghanistan
View: https://twitter.com/TCG_CrisisRisks/status/1388045419872022529?s=20
jward
passin' thru
Blinken Admits US Afghan Withdrawal Could Result in Taliban Takeover
Secretary of State Antony Blinken listens during a climate change virtual summit on April 22, 2021, in Washington, DC. (Brendan Smialowski /AFP via Getty Images)
By Brian Freeman | Wednesday, 28 April 2021 03:39 PM
An Afghan civil war or Taliban takeover is “certainly a possible scenario” when the United States withdraws all its soldiers from the country by September 11, Secretary of State Antony Blinken admitted to CNN.
He insisted, however, that the US is “not disengaging from Afghanistan” and will continue to be “deeply engaged” in backing the nation, adding that the Biden administration is “planning for every scenario” that could result from the move.
President Joe Biden announced earlier this month that the US would begin pulling out its remaining 2,500 troops by May 1, the date former President Donald Trump set as a full withdrawal, and conclude the action by September 11 - the 20-year anniversary of Al-Qaeda's terrorist attacks, after which then-President George W. Bush invaded the country in a bid to flush out 9/11 mastermind Osama Bin Laden and other key Al Qaeda terrorists, according to the Daily Mail.
Biden's decision, however, appears to be against the advice of top Pentagon officials and some of the president's closest advisers, as well as being criticized by congressmen from both parties.
Blinken addressed these concerns, telling CNN that “neighbors and other countries in the region that have basically been free riders for the last 20 years, as we've been engaged there with our NATO allies and partners who are now going to have to decide, given their interests in a relatively stable Afghanistan, given the influence that they have, whether they're going to try to use that influence in a way that keeps things within the 40-yard line.”
Blinken stressed that "We're remaining deeply engaged in the diplomacy, in support for the Afghan government and its people, development, economic assistance humanitarian assistance, support for the security forces.”
He added that "We have trained over the years more than 300,000 of them so all to that remains and there are different actors are work now who I hope will keep moving this in a more positive than negative direction."
Blinken also insisted that the Biden administration is working to ensure Afghan locals who “put their lives on the line” working with US soldiers and diplomats over the last two decades can apply to be expedited to the United States if they are fearful for their lives after the withdrawal.
"We have had this program in Iraq and also in Afghanistan and we want to make sure that people who put their lives on the line, working with American folks in uniform, working with our diplomats who put, not just themselves in jeopardy, potentially their families as well, can get expedited consideration if they decide that they want to try to come to the United States," he said.
Related Stories:
© 2021 Newsmax. All rights reserved.
Posted for fair use
www.newsmax.com
Secretary of State Antony Blinken listens during a climate change virtual summit on April 22, 2021, in Washington, DC. (Brendan Smialowski /AFP via Getty Images)
By Brian Freeman | Wednesday, 28 April 2021 03:39 PM
An Afghan civil war or Taliban takeover is “certainly a possible scenario” when the United States withdraws all its soldiers from the country by September 11, Secretary of State Antony Blinken admitted to CNN.
He insisted, however, that the US is “not disengaging from Afghanistan” and will continue to be “deeply engaged” in backing the nation, adding that the Biden administration is “planning for every scenario” that could result from the move.
President Joe Biden announced earlier this month that the US would begin pulling out its remaining 2,500 troops by May 1, the date former President Donald Trump set as a full withdrawal, and conclude the action by September 11 - the 20-year anniversary of Al-Qaeda's terrorist attacks, after which then-President George W. Bush invaded the country in a bid to flush out 9/11 mastermind Osama Bin Laden and other key Al Qaeda terrorists, according to the Daily Mail.
Biden's decision, however, appears to be against the advice of top Pentagon officials and some of the president's closest advisers, as well as being criticized by congressmen from both parties.
Blinken addressed these concerns, telling CNN that “neighbors and other countries in the region that have basically been free riders for the last 20 years, as we've been engaged there with our NATO allies and partners who are now going to have to decide, given their interests in a relatively stable Afghanistan, given the influence that they have, whether they're going to try to use that influence in a way that keeps things within the 40-yard line.”
Blinken stressed that "We're remaining deeply engaged in the diplomacy, in support for the Afghan government and its people, development, economic assistance humanitarian assistance, support for the security forces.”
He added that "We have trained over the years more than 300,000 of them so all to that remains and there are different actors are work now who I hope will keep moving this in a more positive than negative direction."
Blinken also insisted that the Biden administration is working to ensure Afghan locals who “put their lives on the line” working with US soldiers and diplomats over the last two decades can apply to be expedited to the United States if they are fearful for their lives after the withdrawal.
"We have had this program in Iraq and also in Afghanistan and we want to make sure that people who put their lives on the line, working with American folks in uniform, working with our diplomats who put, not just themselves in jeopardy, potentially their families as well, can get expedited consideration if they decide that they want to try to come to the United States," he said.
Related Stories:
- US Military Begins Final Departure From Afghanistan
- General Says Afghan Withdrawal Makes Terror Fight Harder
© 2021 Newsmax. All rights reserved.
Posted for fair use
Blinken Admits US Afghan Withdrawal Could Result in Taliban Takeover
An Afghan civil war or Taliban takeover is "certainly a possible scenario" when the United States withdraws all its soldiers from the country by September 11, Secretary of State Antony Blinken admitted to CNN...
www.newsmax.com
Oscar Wilde
Membership Revoked
Blinken Admits US Afghan Withdrawal Could Result in Taliban Takeover
Secretary of State Antony Blinken listens during a climate change virtual summit on April 22, 2021, in Washington, DC. (Brendan Smialowski /AFP via Getty Images)
By Brian Freeman | Wednesday, 28 April 2021 03:39 PM
An Afghan civil war or Taliban takeover is “certainly a possible scenario” when the United States withdraws all its soldiers from the country by September 11, Secretary of State Antony Blinken admitted to CNN.
He insisted, however, that the US is “not disengaging from Afghanistan” and will continue to be “deeply engaged” in backing the nation, adding that the Biden administration is “planning for every scenario” that could result from the move.
President Joe Biden announced earlier this month that the US would begin pulling out its remaining 2,500 troops by May 1, the date former President Donald Trump set as a full withdrawal, and conclude the action by September 11 - the 20-year anniversary of Al-Qaeda's terrorist attacks, after which then-President George W. Bush invaded the country in a bid to flush out 9/11 mastermind Osama Bin Laden and other key Al Qaeda terrorists, according to the Daily Mail.
Biden's decision, however, appears to be against the advice of top Pentagon officials and some of the president's closest advisers, as well as being criticized by congressmen from both parties.
Blinken addressed these concerns, telling CNN that “neighbors and other countries in the region that have basically been free riders for the last 20 years, as we've been engaged there with our NATO allies and partners who are now going to have to decide, given their interests in a relatively stable Afghanistan, given the influence that they have, whether they're going to try to use that influence in a way that keeps things within the 40-yard line.”
Blinken stressed that "We're remaining deeply engaged in the diplomacy, in support for the Afghan government and its people, development, economic assistance humanitarian assistance, support for the security forces.”
He added that "We have trained over the years more than 300,000 of them so all to that remains and there are different actors are work now who I hope will keep moving this in a more positive than negative direction."
Blinken also insisted that the Biden administration is working to ensure Afghan locals who “put their lives on the line” working with US soldiers and diplomats over the last two decades can apply to be expedited to the United States if they are fearful for their lives after the withdrawal.
"We have had this program in Iraq and also in Afghanistan and we want to make sure that people who put their lives on the line, working with American folks in uniform, working with our diplomats who put, not just themselves in jeopardy, potentially their families as well, can get expedited consideration if they decide that they want to try to come to the United States," he said.
Related Stories:
- US Military Begins Final Departure From Afghanistan
- General Says Afghan Withdrawal Makes Terror Fight Harder
© 2021 Newsmax. All rights reserved.
Posted for fair use
Blinken Admits US Afghan Withdrawal Could Result in Taliban Takeover
An Afghan civil war or Taliban takeover is "certainly a possible scenario" when the United States withdraws all its soldiers from the country by September 11, Secretary of State Antony Blinken admitted to CNN...
Man the FUBAR this is going to turn into is going to be EPIC if they're publicly saying this.....
jward
passin' thru
USFOR-A Spokesman Col Sonny Leggett
@USFOR_A
Kandahar Airfield received ineffective indirect fire this afternoon; no injury to personnel or damage to equipment. Gen Miller has been clear about the Coalition's intent to protect the force.
Kandahar Airfield received ineffective indirect fire this afternoon; no injury to personnel or damage to equipment. Gen Miller has been clear about the Coalition's intent to protect the force.
View: https://twitter.com/USFOR_A/status/1388474917495185410?s=20
@USFOR_A
Kandahar Airfield received ineffective indirect fire this afternoon; no injury to personnel or damage to equipment. Gen Miller has been clear about the Coalition's intent to protect the force.
Kandahar Airfield received ineffective indirect fire this afternoon; no injury to personnel or damage to equipment. Gen Miller has been clear about the Coalition's intent to protect the force.
View: https://twitter.com/USFOR_A/status/1388474917495185410?s=20
Posted for fair use......
www.voanews.com
Taliban Overrun Afghan Base, Capture Troops as US, NATO Forces Exit
By Ayaz Gul
Updated May 01, 2021 12:22 PM
ISLAMABAD - Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan attacked and overran a key army base in southeastern Ghazni province Saturday, capturing dozens of soldiers and killing several others.
The latest attack came on a day when the United States and NATO partners formally began withdrawing their militaries from the country after almost 20 years of war.
Two senior provincial council members told VOA the Afghan army had stationed dozens of its forces at the base outside the provincial capital, also named Ghazni, before the pre-dawn insurgent attack.
Local media reports said the ensuing clashes had lasted several hours and killed at least 17 soldiers.
Afghan army chief, Gen. Mohammad Yasin Zia, who is also the acting defense minister, confirmed to reporters in Kabul the fall of the security installation to insurgents, but he shared no further details.
Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said its fighters had also seized heavy and light weaponry besides capturing 25 army personnel and killing “a number of others.”
Separately, Afghan officials Saturday raised the death toll to at least 30 from an overnight truck bombing in Pul-e-Alam, the capital of eastern Logar province. The powerful blast late Friday injured more than 100 others. Almost all the victims were said to be Afghan civilians. The Taliban did not comment on the attack but Afghan authorities blamed the insurgents for plotting the carnage.
Security personnel and residents gather at the site of a car bomb attack in the Pul-e-Alam area of Logar province, Afghanistan, May 1, 2021.
Critics fear the violence in Afghanistan will intensify unless the Taliban and the Afghan government resume their stalled peace talks and reach a power sharing deal before all foreign troops exit the country in the next few months.
The troops were to have departed Afghanistan by May 1 in line with an agreement Washington signed with the Taliban in February 2020 in exchange for a cessation of insurgent attacks on foreign forces and counterterrorism assurances.
However, U.S. President Joe Biden announced last month that the drawdown would start May 1 and conclude by September 11, the 20th anniversary of al-Qaida-plotted attacks on America. Biden cited logistical reasons for missing the deadline.
Taliban spokesman Mujahid said in a statement Saturday that the passing deadline meant “this violation in principle has opened the way for Taliban fighters to take every counteraction it deems appropriate against the occupying [foreign] forces.”
But Mujahid stressed in his statement that insurgent fighters were waiting on the decision of Taliban leadership “in light of the sovereignty, values and higher interests of the country, and will then take action accordingly.”
US base attacked
The U.S. military spokesman in Afghanistan Col. Sonny Leggett tweeted Saturday that the “Kandahar airfield received ineffective indirect fire this afternoon; no injury to personnel or damage to equipment.”
View: https://twitter.com/USFOR_A/status/1388474917495185410?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1388474917495185410%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.voanews.com%2Fsouth-central-asia%2Ftaliban-overrun-afghan-base-capture-troops-us-nato-forces-exit
“U.S. Forces conducted a precision strike this evening, destroying additional rockets aimed at the airfield,” Col. Sonny Leggett said in a subsequent tweet.
Gen. Scott Miller, the commander of U.S. and NATO militaries in the country, had warned last week that if his troops were attacked while carrying out the withdrawal they would respond to defend themselves.
“A return to violence would be one senseless and tragic. But make no mistake, we have the military means to respond forcefully to any type of attacks against the coalition and the military means to support the Afghan security forces,” Miller stressed.
The withdrawal of about 2,500 U.S. and 7,000 NATO troops from Afghanistan, once completed, would mark the end of what has been America’s longest war that cost Washington the lives of more than 2,400 military personnel and more than $2 trillion.
The nearly two decades-long Afghan war is estimated to have killed more than 241,000 people, including civilians, pro-government forces and opposition fighters, according to a new study by the U.S.-based Costs of War Project released last month.
RELATED STORIES
South & Central Asia
US Formally Begins Afghanistan Troop Pullout
Withdrawal of US, NATO troops to be completed by summer’s end after a nearly two decades-long engagement
By VOA News
Sat, 05/01/2021 - 11:15 AM
South & Central Asia
US, NATO Troops Leaving Afghanistan as Fighting Escalates
White House confirms troops, equipment have left the country, the start of the end of America’s longest war
By Jeff Seldin
Thu, 04/29/2021 - 08:35 PM
South & Central Asia
Potential Seen for Regional Power Plays as US Departs From Afghanistan
Despite hopes Afghanistan's neighbors will 'rise to the occasion,' US officials and analysts worry the fallout may not be pretty
By Jeff Seldin
Thu, 04/29/2021 - 06:21 PM
Taliban Overrun Afghan Base, Capture Troops as US, NATO Forces Exit
Meanwhile, officials report dozens killed in Pul-e-Alam bombing; US military says one of its bases also came under attack
www.voanews.com
Taliban Overrun Afghan Base, Capture Troops as US, NATO Forces Exit
By Ayaz Gul
Updated May 01, 2021 12:22 PM
ISLAMABAD - Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan attacked and overran a key army base in southeastern Ghazni province Saturday, capturing dozens of soldiers and killing several others.
The latest attack came on a day when the United States and NATO partners formally began withdrawing their militaries from the country after almost 20 years of war.
Two senior provincial council members told VOA the Afghan army had stationed dozens of its forces at the base outside the provincial capital, also named Ghazni, before the pre-dawn insurgent attack.
Local media reports said the ensuing clashes had lasted several hours and killed at least 17 soldiers.
Afghan army chief, Gen. Mohammad Yasin Zia, who is also the acting defense minister, confirmed to reporters in Kabul the fall of the security installation to insurgents, but he shared no further details.
Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said its fighters had also seized heavy and light weaponry besides capturing 25 army personnel and killing “a number of others.”
Separately, Afghan officials Saturday raised the death toll to at least 30 from an overnight truck bombing in Pul-e-Alam, the capital of eastern Logar province. The powerful blast late Friday injured more than 100 others. Almost all the victims were said to be Afghan civilians. The Taliban did not comment on the attack but Afghan authorities blamed the insurgents for plotting the carnage.
Security personnel and residents gather at the site of a car bomb attack in the Pul-e-Alam area of Logar province, Afghanistan, May 1, 2021.
Critics fear the violence in Afghanistan will intensify unless the Taliban and the Afghan government resume their stalled peace talks and reach a power sharing deal before all foreign troops exit the country in the next few months.
The troops were to have departed Afghanistan by May 1 in line with an agreement Washington signed with the Taliban in February 2020 in exchange for a cessation of insurgent attacks on foreign forces and counterterrorism assurances.
However, U.S. President Joe Biden announced last month that the drawdown would start May 1 and conclude by September 11, the 20th anniversary of al-Qaida-plotted attacks on America. Biden cited logistical reasons for missing the deadline.
Taliban spokesman Mujahid said in a statement Saturday that the passing deadline meant “this violation in principle has opened the way for Taliban fighters to take every counteraction it deems appropriate against the occupying [foreign] forces.”
But Mujahid stressed in his statement that insurgent fighters were waiting on the decision of Taliban leadership “in light of the sovereignty, values and higher interests of the country, and will then take action accordingly.”
US base attacked
The U.S. military spokesman in Afghanistan Col. Sonny Leggett tweeted Saturday that the “Kandahar airfield received ineffective indirect fire this afternoon; no injury to personnel or damage to equipment.”
View: https://twitter.com/USFOR_A/status/1388474917495185410?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1388474917495185410%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.voanews.com%2Fsouth-central-asia%2Ftaliban-overrun-afghan-base-capture-troops-us-nato-forces-exit
“U.S. Forces conducted a precision strike this evening, destroying additional rockets aimed at the airfield,” Col. Sonny Leggett said in a subsequent tweet.
Gen. Scott Miller, the commander of U.S. and NATO militaries in the country, had warned last week that if his troops were attacked while carrying out the withdrawal they would respond to defend themselves.
“A return to violence would be one senseless and tragic. But make no mistake, we have the military means to respond forcefully to any type of attacks against the coalition and the military means to support the Afghan security forces,” Miller stressed.
The withdrawal of about 2,500 U.S. and 7,000 NATO troops from Afghanistan, once completed, would mark the end of what has been America’s longest war that cost Washington the lives of more than 2,400 military personnel and more than $2 trillion.
The nearly two decades-long Afghan war is estimated to have killed more than 241,000 people, including civilians, pro-government forces and opposition fighters, according to a new study by the U.S.-based Costs of War Project released last month.
RELATED STORIES
South & Central Asia
US Formally Begins Afghanistan Troop Pullout
Withdrawal of US, NATO troops to be completed by summer’s end after a nearly two decades-long engagement
By VOA News
Sat, 05/01/2021 - 11:15 AM
South & Central Asia
US, NATO Troops Leaving Afghanistan as Fighting Escalates
White House confirms troops, equipment have left the country, the start of the end of America’s longest war
By Jeff Seldin
Thu, 04/29/2021 - 08:35 PM
South & Central Asia
Potential Seen for Regional Power Plays as US Departs From Afghanistan
Despite hopes Afghanistan's neighbors will 'rise to the occasion,' US officials and analysts worry the fallout may not be pretty
By Jeff Seldin
Thu, 04/29/2021 - 06:21 PM
Plain Jane
Just Plain Jane
Zerohedge
ZeroHedge - On a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero
www.zerohedge.com
Guess Who's Testifying In Congress US Troops Must Stay In Afghanistan Forever?
BY TYLER DURDEN
SATURDAY, MAY 01, 2021 - 11:00 PM
When interventionists and national security deep state hawks need to prolong what's already the longest war in in US history, who're they gonna call?...
"Hillary Clinton and Condoleezza Rice told members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee they're worried about President Biden's plan to withdraw all U.S. troops from Afghanistan, with Rice suggesting the US may need to go back," Axios reports.
The pair's "expert" testimony was given over Zoom and appears to have been kept relatively quiet, given it was a 'closed door' members only call, until Axios learned of it.
Rice of course infamously served as George Bush's National Security Advisor during the initial invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq, and crucially helped make the case for war to the American public, later serving as Bush's Secretary of State through 2009.
Having helped start two failed wars, both of which have long remained deeply unpopular among the American public, naturally Condi Rice as a pre-eminent neocon voice would be consulted as a "stay the course" point of view. It's also deeply revealing that there's no foreign policy space in terms of viewpoint whatsoever between Rice and Clinton - latter who pushed for the US-NATO invasion of Libya and planned covert regime change in Syria against Assad.
Little is known about precisely what Hillary testified, but it's not difficult to imagine. Here are a few key insights via Axios:
- "Condi Rice is like, 'You know, we’re probably gonna have to go back,'" amid a potential surge in terrorism, the member said.
- Rep. Mike McCaul (R-Texas), the top Republican on the committee, told Axios: "With the potential for an Islamic State, coupled with what they're going to do to our contractors in Yemen and Afghanistan is, sadly, it's going to be tragic there and we all see it coming."
- Another member of the committee confirmed both Clinton and Rice raised concerns about the potential fallout from a quick removal of all U.S. troops.
- Both also expressed concerns about protecting U.S. diplomats on the ground following the withdrawal and what the move will mean for the global war on terrorism.
Well of course!...there always needs to be a war going on somehow and somewhere - otherwise how would these warmongering ladies sleep at night?
Hummm......
Posted for fair use.....
Milley: U.S. remaining involved in Afghanistan
TAYLOR MILLARD May 02, 2021 8:01 PM ET
The United States military will remain involved in Afghanistan despite the planned withdrawal from the country. Joint Chiefs of Staff Army General Mark Milley told the Associated Press the plan is still to get all troops out but promised to still help the Afghan government.
Milley is confident the U.S. will have all troops out by September 11th although he noted there was no point in putting a timeline together. Which makes sense given how fluid the situation involving Afghanistan remains 20 years after the U.S. first invaded after September 11, 2001. The Taliban may have been steamrolled to start the war, but it quickly bogged down into a long slog as time went on and the U.S. became involved in Iraq.
It appears the United States is planning for all sorts of possibilities regarding Afghanistan’s future with Milley noting it depends if the Afghani military stays united or falls into factions.
“I think there’s a range of scenarios here, a range of outcomes, a range of possibilities,” he said to the Associated Press and CNN on a plane back to Washington, DC. “On the one hand you get some really dramatic, bad possible outcomes. On the other hand, you get a military that stays together and a government that stays together…We frankly don’t know yet. We have to wait and see how things develop over the summer.”
The question of whether the government stays together is extremely important, particularly if there are still harsh feelings between U.S.-backed president Asraf Ghani and High Council for Reconciliation Chairman Abdullah Abdullah over the 2019 election. Both were able to reach a power-sharing agreement last year, however, it’s not known if they’ll stay united once the U.S. gets its troops out. Abdullah seems hopeful in a resolution and told the AP the U.S and NATO withdrawal means everyone needs to start working together for peaceful solutions.
This partially goes against commentary from AAN which believes the Taliban will become more emboldened. AAN’s Kate Clark agrees a Taliban military victory is unlikely but still believes they’ll try causing more of the populace to suffer until some sort of solution is reached. It’s an understandable belief from Clark especially after a weekend bombing in Pul-e-Alam. The Taliban has been blamed for it by the government but hasn’t taken responsibility. The Taliban did issue a warning on May 1st about the U.S. not adhering to its original troop withdrawal agreement and is believed to have been involved in an attack on an airfield in Kandahar.
There’s no doubt the U.S. needs to remove itself from Afghanistan and, unfortunately, didn’t adhere to the original deadline, although it’s not surprising given the fluidity of Afghanistan’s political situation. Milley’s comments on the U.S. maintaining an outside presence in the region make sense as it behooves all parties in the country to play nice. The only concern is what happens if the Afghani government fractures again. Will the U.S. decide to go back into Afghanistan or try diplomatic means first to calm things down before further violence breaks out? That remains to be seen.
Posted for fair use.....
Milley: U.S. remaining involved in Afghanistan
TAYLOR MILLARD May 02, 2021 8:01 PM ET
The United States military will remain involved in Afghanistan despite the planned withdrawal from the country. Joint Chiefs of Staff Army General Mark Milley told the Associated Press the plan is still to get all troops out but promised to still help the Afghan government.
This may calm some of the worries from Afghanistan Analysts Network that the withdrawal puts the Afghani government at a disadvantage because they won’t have international support to get things done. It’s also worth noting U.S.-based military contractors are still advertising work in Afghanistan. Meaning even with the withdrawal a U.S. presence will still be in Afghanistan.
Milley is confident the U.S. will have all troops out by September 11th although he noted there was no point in putting a timeline together. Which makes sense given how fluid the situation involving Afghanistan remains 20 years after the U.S. first invaded after September 11, 2001. The Taliban may have been steamrolled to start the war, but it quickly bogged down into a long slog as time went on and the U.S. became involved in Iraq.
It appears the United States is planning for all sorts of possibilities regarding Afghanistan’s future with Milley noting it depends if the Afghani military stays united or falls into factions.
“I think there’s a range of scenarios here, a range of outcomes, a range of possibilities,” he said to the Associated Press and CNN on a plane back to Washington, DC. “On the one hand you get some really dramatic, bad possible outcomes. On the other hand, you get a military that stays together and a government that stays together…We frankly don’t know yet. We have to wait and see how things develop over the summer.”
The question of whether the government stays together is extremely important, particularly if there are still harsh feelings between U.S.-backed president Asraf Ghani and High Council for Reconciliation Chairman Abdullah Abdullah over the 2019 election. Both were able to reach a power-sharing agreement last year, however, it’s not known if they’ll stay united once the U.S. gets its troops out. Abdullah seems hopeful in a resolution and told the AP the U.S and NATO withdrawal means everyone needs to start working together for peaceful solutions.
This partially goes against commentary from AAN which believes the Taliban will become more emboldened. AAN’s Kate Clark agrees a Taliban military victory is unlikely but still believes they’ll try causing more of the populace to suffer until some sort of solution is reached. It’s an understandable belief from Clark especially after a weekend bombing in Pul-e-Alam. The Taliban has been blamed for it by the government but hasn’t taken responsibility. The Taliban did issue a warning on May 1st about the U.S. not adhering to its original troop withdrawal agreement and is believed to have been involved in an attack on an airfield in Kandahar.
There’s no doubt the U.S. needs to remove itself from Afghanistan and, unfortunately, didn’t adhere to the original deadline, although it’s not surprising given the fluidity of Afghanistan’s political situation. Milley’s comments on the U.S. maintaining an outside presence in the region make sense as it behooves all parties in the country to play nice. The only concern is what happens if the Afghani government fractures again. Will the U.S. decide to go back into Afghanistan or try diplomatic means first to calm things down before further violence breaks out? That remains to be seen.
November Sierra Batman.........
Posted for fair use.....
www.thenews.com.pk
May 3, 2021
‘Al-Qaeda not completely uprooted in Afghanistan’
KABUL: The Afghan government says that the roots of the al-Qaeda network are still alive in Afghanistan and the group still poses a threat to the country and the world and is collaborating with the Taliban.
But the Taliban has rejected any type of relations with al-Qaeda. The US presence in Afghanistan over the last 20 years was due to the existence of al-Qaeda. US President Joe Biden last month said the US has achieved its objectives in the Afghanistan war.
“Right now, al-Qaeda and Talib are not two different ideologic topics; they are beyond that as they have intermarried within their families,” NDS chief Ahmad Zia Saraj said last week. “Al-Qaeda was not owned by bin Laden,” said Atiqullah Amarkhil, a former military officer. “Al-Qaeda is still active in Afghanistan.”
Posted for fair use.....
‘Al-Qaeda not completely uprooted in Afghanistan’
KABUL: The Afghan government says that the roots of the al-Qaeda network are still alive in Afghanistan and the group still poses a threat to the country and the world and is collaborating with the...
www.thenews.com.pk
May 3, 2021
‘Al-Qaeda not completely uprooted in Afghanistan’
KABUL: The Afghan government says that the roots of the al-Qaeda network are still alive in Afghanistan and the group still poses a threat to the country and the world and is collaborating with the Taliban.
But the Taliban has rejected any type of relations with al-Qaeda. The US presence in Afghanistan over the last 20 years was due to the existence of al-Qaeda. US President Joe Biden last month said the US has achieved its objectives in the Afghanistan war.
“Right now, al-Qaeda and Talib are not two different ideologic topics; they are beyond that as they have intermarried within their families,” NDS chief Ahmad Zia Saraj said last week. “Al-Qaeda was not owned by bin Laden,” said Atiqullah Amarkhil, a former military officer. “Al-Qaeda is still active in Afghanistan.”
Hummm.....
Posted for fair use.....
www.hindustantimes.com
'US withdrawal from Afghanistan could lead to designating Pak as terror sponsor': American scholar
In an opinion piece in National Interest, Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), said Pakistanis often complain that the US is a fair-weather friend and such criticisms are correct as Islamabad has long been America's second choice.
ANI | , Washington
PUBLISHED ON MAY 02, 2021 10:11 PM IST
Following the Inited States' decision to drawdown troops from Afghanistan, Washington will soon no longer need Islamabad, which could lead to efforts within US Congress to help designate Pakistan a state sponsor of terror, said US-based scholar Michael Rubin.
In an opinion piece in National Interest, Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), said Pakistanis often complain that the US is a fair-weather friend and such criticisms are correct as Islamabad has long been America's second choice.
"The United States embraces Pakistan and demands solidarity when Washington needs Islamabad but turns on a dime to punish Pakistan when the US no longer needs it," he wrote.
US President Joe Biden announced last month the decision to withdraw troops from the country starting on that May 1 deadline, with the aim of completely withdrawing from Afghanistan by September 11, which would mark the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks that sparked the war in Afghanistan, the longest conflict in American history.
On Thursday, White House Principal Deputy Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre said that the US has begun pulling out its forces from Afghanistan.
"Last week, the Secretary of Defense approved the request from US Central Command for the temporary deployment of additional military assets into the Centcom AOR [area of responsibility] in order to support a safe and deliberate withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan."
Pakistan, which has been accused of harbouring insurgent sanctuaries, is credited with arranging the US-Taliban talks that culminated in the signing of the agreement on February 29, 2020.
Pakistan has lately stepped up diplomatic efforts to help in advancing the stalled intra-Afghan peace dialogue.
Zalmay Khalilzad, the American chief peace negotiator, told lawmakers in Washington on Tuesday that the US administration had urged Pakistani leaders to exercise their "considerable leverage" over the Taliban to reduce violence and support a negotiated settlement to the conflict.
"Pakistan has a special responsibility given its influence over the Taliban, so we appreciate what Pakistan has done so far," Khalilzad told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
"But we are not there yet, and of course we look forward to working with them to get to a peace agreement between the Taliban and the Afghan government in the coming weeks and months," the US envoy said.
With Biden embracing Trump's policy of unilateral withdrawal, the US will soon no longer need Pakistan, said Rubin.
"Neither the White House nor Congress will be inclined to sweep irritants in bilateral relations--primarily, the sponsorship of terror by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence--under the rug. This could lead rather quickly to efforts within Congress to pressure the State Department to designate Pakistan a state sponsor of terror," he said.
"Diplomats and the State Department's internal Pakistan lobby may dismiss such a notion, but a combination of Pakistani triumphalism amidst the backdrop of US withdrawal and any subsequent Taliban atrocities will ignite public opinion and lead American politicians to take symbolic action. Pakistan should be prepared to join a club putting them alongside Iran, Syria, and North Korea," he added.
Posted for fair use.....
'US withdrawal from Afghanistan could lead to designating Pak as terror sponsor': American scholar
In an opinion piece in National Interest, Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), said Pakistanis often complain that the US is a fair-weather friend and such criticisms are correct as Islamabad has long been America's second choice.
'US withdrawal from Afghanistan could lead to designating Pak as terror sponsor': American scholar
In an opinion piece in National Interest, Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), said Pakistanis often complain that the US is a fair-weather friend and such criticisms are correct as Islamabad has long been America's second choice.
ANI | , Washington
PUBLISHED ON MAY 02, 2021 10:11 PM IST
Following the Inited States' decision to drawdown troops from Afghanistan, Washington will soon no longer need Islamabad, which could lead to efforts within US Congress to help designate Pakistan a state sponsor of terror, said US-based scholar Michael Rubin.
In an opinion piece in National Interest, Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), said Pakistanis often complain that the US is a fair-weather friend and such criticisms are correct as Islamabad has long been America's second choice.
"The United States embraces Pakistan and demands solidarity when Washington needs Islamabad but turns on a dime to punish Pakistan when the US no longer needs it," he wrote.
US President Joe Biden announced last month the decision to withdraw troops from the country starting on that May 1 deadline, with the aim of completely withdrawing from Afghanistan by September 11, which would mark the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks that sparked the war in Afghanistan, the longest conflict in American history.
On Thursday, White House Principal Deputy Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre said that the US has begun pulling out its forces from Afghanistan.
"Last week, the Secretary of Defense approved the request from US Central Command for the temporary deployment of additional military assets into the Centcom AOR [area of responsibility] in order to support a safe and deliberate withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan."
Pakistan, which has been accused of harbouring insurgent sanctuaries, is credited with arranging the US-Taliban talks that culminated in the signing of the agreement on February 29, 2020.
Pakistan has lately stepped up diplomatic efforts to help in advancing the stalled intra-Afghan peace dialogue.
Zalmay Khalilzad, the American chief peace negotiator, told lawmakers in Washington on Tuesday that the US administration had urged Pakistani leaders to exercise their "considerable leverage" over the Taliban to reduce violence and support a negotiated settlement to the conflict.
"Pakistan has a special responsibility given its influence over the Taliban, so we appreciate what Pakistan has done so far," Khalilzad told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
"But we are not there yet, and of course we look forward to working with them to get to a peace agreement between the Taliban and the Afghan government in the coming weeks and months," the US envoy said.
With Biden embracing Trump's policy of unilateral withdrawal, the US will soon no longer need Pakistan, said Rubin.
"Neither the White House nor Congress will be inclined to sweep irritants in bilateral relations--primarily, the sponsorship of terror by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence--under the rug. This could lead rather quickly to efforts within Congress to pressure the State Department to designate Pakistan a state sponsor of terror," he said.
"Diplomats and the State Department's internal Pakistan lobby may dismiss such a notion, but a combination of Pakistani triumphalism amidst the backdrop of US withdrawal and any subsequent Taliban atrocities will ignite public opinion and lead American politicians to take symbolic action. Pakistan should be prepared to join a club putting them alongside Iran, Syria, and North Korea," he added.
Plain Jane
Just Plain Jane
Zerohedge
ZeroHedge - On a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero
www.zerohedge.com
Taliban Declares Open Season On Americans As Weekend Fighting Erupts, Scores Dead & Wounded
BY TYLER DURDEN
MONDAY, MAY 03, 2021 - 11:50 AM
Fierce fighting between US-allied national Afghan forces and the Taliban broke out Saturday into Sunday, the day after the May 1st American pullout deadline set under the Trump administration. It included the Taliban immediately attacking a government base in southwestern Ghazni province.
Afghanistan's defense ministry counted over 100 Taliban insurgents killed over the prior 24 hours in a statement on Sunday, at a moment the US is said to have started the process of withdrawal. The statement counted a further 52 Taliban wounded. Separately an attack on the Ghazni military outpost left at least 17 national soldiers dead and some 25 captured, according to international reports.
Camp Antonik handover ceremony, via Afghan Ministry of DefenseAnd elsewhere in the country "Afghan officials Saturday raised the death toll to at least 30 from an overnight truck bombing in Pul-e-Alam, the capital of eastern Logar province," VOA News reports. Over 100 more were injured, with all or most of the victims being civilians.
Amid the flare-up in fighting the US military said it launched a "precision strike" against Taliban positions in the restive insurgent hotbed of Kandahar.
Meanwhile as expected the Taliban has now declared 'open season' on all remaining American troops following President Biden's new Sept.11 full withdrawal deadline. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid issued the following statement: "As withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan by agreed upon May 1st deadline has passed, this violation in principle has opened the way for [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Mujahidin to take every counteraction it deems appropriate against the occupying forces."
"The Mujahidin of IEA will now await what decision the leadership of Islamic Emirate takes in light of the sovereignty, values and higher interests of the country, and will then take action accordingly, Allah willing."
Zabihullah (..ذبـــــیح الله م )
@Zabehulah_M33
#Clarification As withdrawal of foreign forces from #Afghanistan by agreed upon May 1st deadline has passed, this violation in principle has opened the way for IEA Mujahidin to take every counteraction it deems appropriate against the occupying forces.
But US troops do appear to be drawing down in earnest, while also beefing up security to protect withdrawing forces during the dismantling process. For example on Sunday US forces handed over a Helmand camp to national forces. Senior officers representing both sides attended a handover ceremony on Sunday morning at Camp Antonik as fighting raged elsewhere in the country. The base is home to Afghan Special Forces.
"The Afghan military will intensify anti-terrorism operations and will target strongholds of the terrorists in any area of the southwest of the country (from this base)," a statement said.
Likely this is only the beginning, as indicators suggest Monday...
Thomas Gibbons-Neff
@Tmgneff
Head of provincial council in Helmand warns that Lashkar Gah is under threat of collapse. In two days 18 outposts have fallen in neighboring Nawa district and around the Lash-Kandahar road, he said. From @Taimoornyt
8:26 AM · May 3, 2021
jward
passin' thru
Russia, Central Asian States Worry About Instability in Afghanistan
By Umida Hashimova for The Diplomat
5-6 minutes
Crossroads Asia | Security | Central Asia | South Asia
Military officials in Russia and Central Asia agree to unite efforts as they prepare for a worsening of the situation in Afghanistan.
Credit: Pixabay
The news of a full U.S. withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan by September reinvigorated Russia’s military attention to the Central Asian region. Russia maintains multifaceted military relations with the countries of the region, including under the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance that includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan but not Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan. The recent events motivated the Russian Defense Ministry to make extra arrangements, and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu traveled to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to sign additional agreements to ensure its involvement should instability in Afghanistan envelope the region.
On April 27, in Tajikistan, Shoigu and his Tajik counterpart Sherali Mirzo signed an agreement to establish joint air defense systems that clearly will be directed at a potential threat from Afghanistan.
The same day, Shoigu made a separate trip to Uzbekistan to meet with his counterpart Defense Minister Bahodir Qurbonov to discuss regional security matters and the fight against international terrorism. Following the meeting, it was announced that the ministries of both countries had prepared a Strategic Partnership Program for 2021-2025, the first of its kind. The contents of the document are unknown, but given that Uzbekistan is not a member of CSTO, Moscow most likely has clauses that will smooth its involvement, albeit limited, if the military situation at the Afghanistan border escalates. Any agreement would be limited because according to its 2018 military doctrine, Uzbekistan will not enter into military alliances nor allow foreign military bases in its territory.
While Central Asian countries had begun to embrace Afghanistan as a regional economic partner, including involvement in significant infrastructure projects with Kabul, it seems their defense officials are aligned with Russia’s security concerns in the region. It is clear now that the statement made by the head of the Taliban’s political office in Qatar, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, in September 2020 promising not to attack any of its Central Asian neighbors, is of little real value as reassurance.
While the rhetoric of Central Asian countries increasingly focuses on peace and reconstruction in Afghanistan, Russia’s concerns about the situation and the possible threat to regional stability have also increased. The Russian Defense Ministry regularly brings up the precarious situation on the border between Central Asia and Afghanistan and uses it as a reason for continued cooperation and military exercises with the countries of the region.
For example, Russia’s latest military exercise with Tajikistan concluded on April 23 and was built around the scenario of a joint reaction to a situation on the border with Afghanistan. At the latest military exercise between Russia and Uzbekistan, which took place in December 2020, Russia framed the exercise as a necessary activity given international terrorism posing a serious threat to the region.
Shoigu summarized his concerns about Afghanistan in an interview he recently gave to a Kazakh publication. He doubted the stability of Afghanistan due to the presence of terrorist forces and drug trafficking. He stated that terrorists from other countries, including Islamic State fighters, had been moving through and finding safe haven in Afghanistan and that the production and trafficking of illicit drugs in the country would continue causing instability.
Shoigu’s visits and consequent agreements signed with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan indicate Russia’s concern and lack of trust in the ability of Central Asian states to defend and withstand possible attacks on their borders. Nevertheless, it is unclear how much Central Asian defense establishments trust their own ability to independently assume the responsibilities to protect their borders with Afghanistan. Russia’s assistance would likely be welcomed if there is an escalation at the border with Afghanistan. These arrangements by military officials contrast with optimistic political rhetoric and economic projects that the Central Asian countries have been building on for the past few years.
Posted for fair use
By Umida Hashimova for The Diplomat
5-6 minutes
Crossroads Asia | Security | Central Asia | South Asia
Military officials in Russia and Central Asia agree to unite efforts as they prepare for a worsening of the situation in Afghanistan.
Credit: Pixabay
The news of a full U.S. withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan by September reinvigorated Russia’s military attention to the Central Asian region. Russia maintains multifaceted military relations with the countries of the region, including under the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance that includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan but not Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan. The recent events motivated the Russian Defense Ministry to make extra arrangements, and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu traveled to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to sign additional agreements to ensure its involvement should instability in Afghanistan envelope the region.
On April 27, in Tajikistan, Shoigu and his Tajik counterpart Sherali Mirzo signed an agreement to establish joint air defense systems that clearly will be directed at a potential threat from Afghanistan.
The same day, Shoigu made a separate trip to Uzbekistan to meet with his counterpart Defense Minister Bahodir Qurbonov to discuss regional security matters and the fight against international terrorism. Following the meeting, it was announced that the ministries of both countries had prepared a Strategic Partnership Program for 2021-2025, the first of its kind. The contents of the document are unknown, but given that Uzbekistan is not a member of CSTO, Moscow most likely has clauses that will smooth its involvement, albeit limited, if the military situation at the Afghanistan border escalates. Any agreement would be limited because according to its 2018 military doctrine, Uzbekistan will not enter into military alliances nor allow foreign military bases in its territory.
While Central Asian countries had begun to embrace Afghanistan as a regional economic partner, including involvement in significant infrastructure projects with Kabul, it seems their defense officials are aligned with Russia’s security concerns in the region. It is clear now that the statement made by the head of the Taliban’s political office in Qatar, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, in September 2020 promising not to attack any of its Central Asian neighbors, is of little real value as reassurance.
While the rhetoric of Central Asian countries increasingly focuses on peace and reconstruction in Afghanistan, Russia’s concerns about the situation and the possible threat to regional stability have also increased. The Russian Defense Ministry regularly brings up the precarious situation on the border between Central Asia and Afghanistan and uses it as a reason for continued cooperation and military exercises with the countries of the region.
For example, Russia’s latest military exercise with Tajikistan concluded on April 23 and was built around the scenario of a joint reaction to a situation on the border with Afghanistan. At the latest military exercise between Russia and Uzbekistan, which took place in December 2020, Russia framed the exercise as a necessary activity given international terrorism posing a serious threat to the region.
Shoigu summarized his concerns about Afghanistan in an interview he recently gave to a Kazakh publication. He doubted the stability of Afghanistan due to the presence of terrorist forces and drug trafficking. He stated that terrorists from other countries, including Islamic State fighters, had been moving through and finding safe haven in Afghanistan and that the production and trafficking of illicit drugs in the country would continue causing instability.
Shoigu’s visits and consequent agreements signed with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan indicate Russia’s concern and lack of trust in the ability of Central Asian states to defend and withstand possible attacks on their borders. Nevertheless, it is unclear how much Central Asian defense establishments trust their own ability to independently assume the responsibilities to protect their borders with Afghanistan. Russia’s assistance would likely be welcomed if there is an escalation at the border with Afghanistan. These arrangements by military officials contrast with optimistic political rhetoric and economic projects that the Central Asian countries have been building on for the past few years.
Posted for fair use
Russia, Central Asian States Worry About Instability in Afghanistan
Military officials in Russia and Central Asia agree to unite efforts as they prepare for a worsening of the situation in Afghanistan.
thediplomat.com
Hummm.....
Posted for fair use......
:quality(70)/cloudfront-us-east-1.images.arcpublishing.com/archetype/Q4YZSXL25JAHNOYI56DCRKEDSA.jpg)
www.airforcetimes.com
Commentary
Why Afghanistan is critical to the struggle against China, Russia and Iran
Rep. Michael Waltz
6 hours ago
/cloudfront-us-east-1.images.arcpublishing.com/mco/Q4YZSXL25JAHNOYI56DCRKEDSA.jpg)
A U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III cargo aircraft taxis to its parking spot Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, Sept. 25, 2012. (Capt. Raymond Geoffroy/Air Force)
Last month, President Biden shocked the world by announcing all U.S. forces will withdraw from Afghanistan by Sept. 11 this year.
As a veteran of the war in Afghanistan, I found this news heartbreaking knowing the American bloodshed that had been spilled in combating terrorism and for the millions who are likely to return to life under Taliban rule.
Set aside for a moment that most observers correctly point out an Afghanistan withdrawal will set the stage for similar events that unfolded following then-President Obama’s withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 that provided a path for the Islamic State Group to launch its reign of terror across the Middle East, Europe, and inspire attacks in America.
What gives me even more concern is the strategic foothold we are giving up in the back yard of America’s greatest rivals.
By abandoning Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan, we will no longer have a U.S. airfield in a country that borders China. Many analysts believe that should the United States and China come to blows in the Pacific, a second front will be critical given China’s ability to concentrate its naval and missile assets around Taiwan. Further, the thing the Chinese Communist Party fears the most is an uprising amongst its own people.
As China continues to unleash a genocide on the minority Muslim Uighur population in the western Xijiang region, they fear American intelligence resources supporting their persecuted population from Afghanistan in resisting the oppression from Beijing.
Reagan-era CIA Director Bob Casey famously launched a whisper campaign that convinced the Soviet leadership in Moscow that American intelligence agencies had assets based in Afghanistan supporting dissidents and underground cells of separatists in the Caucuses. This campaign caused the Soviet military to divert divisions away from Eastern Europe to the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Unexplainably, in addition to giving up the only air base in the world located in a country that physically borders China and Russia’s southern border, the Biden administration will also give up a key strategic foothold along Iran’s eastern flank, and along the nuclear-equipped and unstable Pakistan.
Similar to the idea of having an option of a second front in case of hostilities for China, the U.S. air base at Bagram is also a platform that should be maintained in case of hostilities with Iran to maintain options outside of our carriers and Gulf bases, that in most wargames are flooded with Iranian missiles.
Finally, Pakistan’s stability is crucial in ensuring its nuclear weapons stockpile doesn’t fall into the wrong hands. With Pakistan’s population of 215 million compared with Afghanistan’s population of 30 million, the possibility of a failed state has exponentially more dire consequences. Should these terrorists network regain a strong presence in Afghanistan — which they likely will under an emboldened Taliban regime — they will refocus their efforts to achieve their long stated goal of obtaining a nuclear weapon.
In addition to the geo-political aspects of giving up our only base in the region, Afghanistan also sits on a trove of critical minerals — experts estimate up to $1 trillion worth of minerals are buried beneath its ground. Critical minerals such as lithium cobalt and copper will power the economies of the future and stand ready for American companies to extract and process. For the U.S. to take a leap in expanding its footprint in renewable energy, we have to end our reliance on China’s near monopoly on the supply chain.
Once we withdraw, we give up those resources and take a step backwards in America’s pursuit of renewable energy independence.
In his recent address to Congress, President Biden declared the U.S. will “maintain over the horizon the capacity to suppress future threats to the homeland.” But that won’t be so easy.
Bagram Airfield remains our sole strategic key terrain in the backyards of three of our four global competitors — China, Russia, and Iran — and we have no other options in the region.
The governments in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan have shown little willingness to host American bases and the Gulf states are problematic as our aircraft have to fly over Iran or Pakistan.
We will be effectively blind in our abilities to fight back, should terrorists based in Afghanistan successfully launch another attack on our homeland.
Like the Obama administration, President Biden is dealing with the world as it wishes it to be rather than accepting the tough reality of what it is.
The United States cannot give up this key terrain that we have spent so much blood and treasure to fight for and may cost us far more lives if we have to fight without it in the future.
Michael Waltz represents Florida’s 6th District in the U.S. House of Representatives. He is a member of the Armed Services Committee, a Green Beret veteran of the war in Afghanistan, a former White House counterterrorism policy adviser, and a defense policy director for secretaries of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Gates.
Editor’s note: This is an op-ed and as such, the opinions expressed are those of the author. If you would like to respond, or have an editorial of your own you would like to submit, please contact Military Times managing editor Howard Altman, haltman@militarytimes.com.
Posted for fair use......
Why Afghanistan is critical to the struggle against China, Russia and Iran
Withdrawing from Afghanistan will give up a strategic foothold the United States has in the back yard of its greatest rivals, says the author of this commentary.
www.airforcetimes.com
Commentary
Why Afghanistan is critical to the struggle against China, Russia and Iran
Rep. Michael Waltz
6 hours ago
Last month, President Biden shocked the world by announcing all U.S. forces will withdraw from Afghanistan by Sept. 11 this year.
As a veteran of the war in Afghanistan, I found this news heartbreaking knowing the American bloodshed that had been spilled in combating terrorism and for the millions who are likely to return to life under Taliban rule.
Set aside for a moment that most observers correctly point out an Afghanistan withdrawal will set the stage for similar events that unfolded following then-President Obama’s withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 that provided a path for the Islamic State Group to launch its reign of terror across the Middle East, Europe, and inspire attacks in America.
What gives me even more concern is the strategic foothold we are giving up in the back yard of America’s greatest rivals.
By abandoning Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan, we will no longer have a U.S. airfield in a country that borders China. Many analysts believe that should the United States and China come to blows in the Pacific, a second front will be critical given China’s ability to concentrate its naval and missile assets around Taiwan. Further, the thing the Chinese Communist Party fears the most is an uprising amongst its own people.
As China continues to unleash a genocide on the minority Muslim Uighur population in the western Xijiang region, they fear American intelligence resources supporting their persecuted population from Afghanistan in resisting the oppression from Beijing.
Reagan-era CIA Director Bob Casey famously launched a whisper campaign that convinced the Soviet leadership in Moscow that American intelligence agencies had assets based in Afghanistan supporting dissidents and underground cells of separatists in the Caucuses. This campaign caused the Soviet military to divert divisions away from Eastern Europe to the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Unexplainably, in addition to giving up the only air base in the world located in a country that physically borders China and Russia’s southern border, the Biden administration will also give up a key strategic foothold along Iran’s eastern flank, and along the nuclear-equipped and unstable Pakistan.
Similar to the idea of having an option of a second front in case of hostilities for China, the U.S. air base at Bagram is also a platform that should be maintained in case of hostilities with Iran to maintain options outside of our carriers and Gulf bases, that in most wargames are flooded with Iranian missiles.
Finally, Pakistan’s stability is crucial in ensuring its nuclear weapons stockpile doesn’t fall into the wrong hands. With Pakistan’s population of 215 million compared with Afghanistan’s population of 30 million, the possibility of a failed state has exponentially more dire consequences. Should these terrorists network regain a strong presence in Afghanistan — which they likely will under an emboldened Taliban regime — they will refocus their efforts to achieve their long stated goal of obtaining a nuclear weapon.
In addition to the geo-political aspects of giving up our only base in the region, Afghanistan also sits on a trove of critical minerals — experts estimate up to $1 trillion worth of minerals are buried beneath its ground. Critical minerals such as lithium cobalt and copper will power the economies of the future and stand ready for American companies to extract and process. For the U.S. to take a leap in expanding its footprint in renewable energy, we have to end our reliance on China’s near monopoly on the supply chain.
Once we withdraw, we give up those resources and take a step backwards in America’s pursuit of renewable energy independence.
In his recent address to Congress, President Biden declared the U.S. will “maintain over the horizon the capacity to suppress future threats to the homeland.” But that won’t be so easy.
Bagram Airfield remains our sole strategic key terrain in the backyards of three of our four global competitors — China, Russia, and Iran — and we have no other options in the region.
The governments in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan have shown little willingness to host American bases and the Gulf states are problematic as our aircraft have to fly over Iran or Pakistan.
We will be effectively blind in our abilities to fight back, should terrorists based in Afghanistan successfully launch another attack on our homeland.
Like the Obama administration, President Biden is dealing with the world as it wishes it to be rather than accepting the tough reality of what it is.
The United States cannot give up this key terrain that we have spent so much blood and treasure to fight for and may cost us far more lives if we have to fight without it in the future.
Michael Waltz represents Florida’s 6th District in the U.S. House of Representatives. He is a member of the Armed Services Committee, a Green Beret veteran of the war in Afghanistan, a former White House counterterrorism policy adviser, and a defense policy director for secretaries of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Gates.
Editor’s note: This is an op-ed and as such, the opinions expressed are those of the author. If you would like to respond, or have an editorial of your own you would like to submit, please contact Military Times managing editor Howard Altman, haltman@militarytimes.com.
That is one place on this planet that seriously needs to be NUKED into oblivion.
As I've said before, using a nuke would be a waste of resources, particularly when more "targeted" means are available (and haven't been used)....
Plain Jane
Just Plain Jane
Germany scraps Afghan deportation flight – DW – 05/04/2021
Berlin says it is delaying a Tuesday deportation flight to Afghanistan over "logistical" issues. Human rights groups have been calling for them to be ditched permanently.
www.dw.com
Germany scraps deportation flight to Afghanistan
Berlin says it is delaying a Tuesday deportation flight to Afghanistan over "logistical" issues. Human rights groups have been calling for them to be ditched permanently.
The German government has canceled a planned deportation flight to return migrants to Afghanistan, senior officials said on Monday.
A spokeswoman for Interior Minister Horst Seehofer said the "return measure" had been postponed due to "logistical" problems.
International troops officially began withdrawing from Afghanistan on May 1.
Is Germany canceling all deportations to Afghanistan?
Refugee advocate groups have called for the cancelation of all future flights. They said that the deportations had been axed owing to the deteriorating security situation in the country, which was invaded by a US-led NATO alliance in 2001.
Officials quoted by the AFP news agency said that the federal government was concerned about the safety of the police officers accompanying the potential returnees.
The need for increased security measures in Kabul made flights impossible between May 1 and May 6.
Officials told the dpa news agency that Germany would not scrap its policy of allowing deportations to Afghanistan.
What is Germany doing in Afghanistan?
German troops are deployed to the country as part of NATO's Resolute Support mission to train the Afghan National Defense forces.
There are concerns that the NATO pullout could boost the Taliban.
Last month, German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer said Berlin would do all it can to help local Afghans who had assisted Germany's military during the campaign.
A procedure for admitting local Afghan staff who need refuge already exists, although there are a number of disputed cases.
According to the Defense Ministry, 781 people have been approved for residency in Germany since 2013.
German officials are trying to streamline the process to make easier for those Afghans to seek a new life in Germany.
What happened after 9/11?
Shortly after the September 11 terror attacks in 2001, then-US President George W. Bush announced the White House's military response, targeting Islamic fundamentalist groups such as the Taliban.
It was in 2014 when the Obama administration first announced plans to end the US's combat role in the conflict.
President Joe Biden, though, is determined to end what he called "the forever war," and announced last month that the withdrawal of the remaining American forces would be complete by the 20th anniversary of the September 11 attacks.
Members of the US-backed alliance agreed this month to wrap up their 9,600-strong mission in Afghanistan.
The decision — which delayed by several months a deadline agreed by former US President Donald Trump — came despite fears it could allow the Taliban to regain power in the country.
jf/rt (AFP, dpa, Reuters)
jward
passin' thru
This due to things being that much worse, that much more quickly than they planned for...or ... :: shrug ::U.S. Air Force sent more B-52H bombers to support withdraw troops from Afghanistan
NewsAviationPhoto
By Dylan Malyasov
May 5, 2021
Modified date: 7 seconds ago
Photo by Staff Sgt. Greg ErwinThe U.S. Air Force has confirmed that it deployed two additional B-52H Stratofortress strategic bombers to Qatar to protect the orderly and responsible withdrawal of U.S. and coalition forces from Afghanistan.
According to a recent service news release, two additional B-52H Stratofortress aircraft assigned to the 5th Bomb Wing, Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, arrived May 4, 2021, at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar.
A pair of B-52H Stratofortress, joining the four B-52 aircraft that arrived in late April, is deployed to the U. S. Central Command region to protect U.S. and coalition forces as they conduct drawdown operations from Afghanistan.
As BBC previously reported, the U.S. has started formally withdrawing troops from Afghanistan, beginning the end of what President Joe Biden called “the forever war”.
The US and Nato have had a presence in Afghanistan for almost 20 years.
But the withdrawal, which runs until 11 September, comes amid escalating violence, with Afghan security forces on high alert for reprisal attacks.
Photo by Staff Sgt. Greg Erwin
U.S. Air Force sent more B-52H bombers to support withdraw troops from Afghanistan
jward
passin' thru
Taliban captures district in northern Afghanistan; attacks increasing as US pulls out
Text by:
3-4 minutes
Issued on: 05/05/2021 - 14:22
The US formally begins withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan on Saturday Wakil KOHSAR AFP/File
Taliban insurgents captured a district in northern Afghanistan, forcing government troops to retreat to the provincial capital amid a recent surge in violence, officials said on Wednesday.
Fighting has escalated sharply in recent weeks, with Afghan officials saying the Taliban have stepped up their attacks since Washington announced plans last month to pull out all U.S. troops by Sept. 11.
The militants seized the district of Barka in the northern province of Baghlan after hours of fighting with Afghan forces, who retreated to the main city, said Jawed Basharat, a spokesman for the provincial police.
The Taliban suffered heavy losses in the fighting, he added, but a senior security official who sought anonymity said at least 10 security forces were killed and 16 others captured by the Taliban.
The district fell a day after Afghan security forces fought back a major Taliban offensive in the southern province of Helmand.
The Afghan government says it has recorded more than 100 Taliban attacks on security forces and other government installations in 26 of the 34 provinces over the last 24 hours.
The Taliban overran a small outpost on a highway in Baghlan, killing nine Afghan soldiers and wounding several, regional officials said on Tuesday.
Kabul police spokesman Ferdaws Faramarz said one person was killed and three wounded when a roadside bomb hit a vehicle belonging to a health official outside the city.
Another roadside bomb killed a district police commander in the southeastern province of Paktika on Tuesday, officials said.
Although the United States missed a May 1 withdrawal deadline agreed in talks with the Taliban last year, its pull-out has begun.
Critics of President Joe Biden's decision to withdraw say the Islamist militants will try to sweep back into power.
The hardline Islamist group now holds sway over more territory than at any point since its ouster by U.S.-led troops after the attacks of Sept. 11 on the United States in 2001.
Posted for fair use
www.france24.com
Text by:
3-4 minutes
Issued on: 05/05/2021 - 14:22
The US formally begins withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan on Saturday Wakil KOHSAR AFP/File
Taliban insurgents captured a district in northern Afghanistan, forcing government troops to retreat to the provincial capital amid a recent surge in violence, officials said on Wednesday.
Fighting has escalated sharply in recent weeks, with Afghan officials saying the Taliban have stepped up their attacks since Washington announced plans last month to pull out all U.S. troops by Sept. 11.
The militants seized the district of Barka in the northern province of Baghlan after hours of fighting with Afghan forces, who retreated to the main city, said Jawed Basharat, a spokesman for the provincial police.
The Taliban suffered heavy losses in the fighting, he added, but a senior security official who sought anonymity said at least 10 security forces were killed and 16 others captured by the Taliban.
The district fell a day after Afghan security forces fought back a major Taliban offensive in the southern province of Helmand.
The Afghan government says it has recorded more than 100 Taliban attacks on security forces and other government installations in 26 of the 34 provinces over the last 24 hours.
The Taliban overran a small outpost on a highway in Baghlan, killing nine Afghan soldiers and wounding several, regional officials said on Tuesday.
Kabul police spokesman Ferdaws Faramarz said one person was killed and three wounded when a roadside bomb hit a vehicle belonging to a health official outside the city.
Another roadside bomb killed a district police commander in the southeastern province of Paktika on Tuesday, officials said.
Although the United States missed a May 1 withdrawal deadline agreed in talks with the Taliban last year, its pull-out has begun.
Critics of President Joe Biden's decision to withdraw say the Islamist militants will try to sweep back into power.
The hardline Islamist group now holds sway over more territory than at any point since its ouster by U.S.-led troops after the attacks of Sept. 11 on the United States in 2001.
Posted for fair use
Taliban captures district in northern Afghanistan; attacks increasing as US pulls out
Taliban insurgents captured a district in northern Afghanistan, forcing government troops to retreat to the provincial capital amid a recent surge in violence, officials said on Wednesday.
www.france24.com
jward
passin' thru
Kyle Orton
@KyleWOrton
1h
The #Taliban has unleashed a wave of targeted assassinations over the last 36 hours of journalists, provincial officials, and unit commanders, and this is twinned with an ongoing political track to pull apart the government. It is succeeding. A disaster already. #Afghanistan
@KyleWOrton
1h
The #Taliban has unleashed a wave of targeted assassinations over the last 36 hours of journalists, provincial officials, and unit commanders, and this is twinned with an ongoing political track to pull apart the government. It is succeeding. A disaster already. #Afghanistan
Merde.....I missed this one.....
Posted for fair use.....
Taliban’s deputy leader stresses importance of judges in the Islamic emirate
By Thomas Joscelyn | April 23, 2021 | tjoscelyn@gmail.com | @thomasjoscelyn
Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Taliban’s deputy emir, discusses the importance of the group’s judiciary system in a newly-released, 23-minute audio message. Haqqani, a U.N.-designated terrorist who is closely allied with al-Qaeda, addresses “all the religious scholars and teachers,” explaining why the Taliban’s courts are a core part of the Islamic emirate he and his men are building in Afghanistan.
“You have maintained the status and glory of [the] Emirate,” Haqqani tells the Taliban’s judges and religious instructors. “You have taught the religion of Allah (SWT) and the path of the Holy Prophet (may peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) to the people.”
Haqqani says the “respected Sheikh Noorullah” is the “head of all courts and the judiciary” for the Taliban’s Islamic emirate. Noorullah is purportedly “traveling to all the corners of the country, from south to north,” apparently to inspect the group’s judicial system.
The Taliban’s deputy emir calls on the judges to let him know if they “have problems that affect the work of [the] judiciary,” saying they should not be hesitant to contact him and demand resources when necessary. Haqqani wants them to travel throughout Afghanistan to dispense the Taliban’s version of justice.
Haqqani also tells the members of his audience to make sure their legal “works are connected” with the “organs” of the Taliban’s nascent government, saying the various “organs” should reach an “understanding” and coordinate their activities. He also describes these structures as “existing administrations.”
“If the other organ [is] not cooperating, let us know, we will make them cooperative,” Haqqani says, thereby indicating that he has the power within the Taliban’s organization to demand obedience. Haqqani explains that the Taliban’s “military commission” advises its fighters along these same lines in the “seminars and workshops” it holds for the rank and file.
Haqqani claims that how the public perceives the Taliban’s “system” is “based on you judges more than the military committee and the committee of dawa [proselytizing] and guidance and other committees,” a reference to the internal structure of the group’s nascent government. He adds that “His Excellency Sheikh Amir ul Mumineen” (the “Emir of the Faithful”), Haibatullah Akhundzada, has “much confidence” in them.
Sirajuddin Haqqani says the Taliban’s men are “about to go into a system of power,” meaning they will rule.
In an intriguing passage, Haqqani refers to some pending “urgent decisions” that the Taliban’s senior leaders are prepared to make regarding the locations of their courts. These “courts,” which are “built in deserts and villages will be transferred to the office system,” Haqqani tells the judges. It is possible that Haqqani is referring to the necessity of running courts in Afghanistan’s more urbanized provincial capitals and district centers, many of which have remained out of the jihadists’ grip while the U.S. and NATO forces remained in country. Establishing courts in some of these areas will require more effort, given that the population isn’t accustomed to Taliban-style rule.
“I hope you have some plans on this matter because we are about to go into a system of power,” Haqqani says. “You have to be well prepared. I wish successes for you in all your duties.”
Describes “complaints” concerning the Taliban’s court system
Haqqani discusses at length the “hardships” the Taliban’s judges have endured throughout all these years of war. He also encourages them to be careful in how they adjudicate matters, so that they do not earn the disapproval of Afghans.
“Allah has given the honorable judges a status in all systems, where if the system has a good or bad reputation, the main reason is the courts,” Haqqani says. “And because we have to take care of people’s affairs, we need to be very careful and attentive.” He encourages the judges to exercise “good manner” when dealing with the people.
He advises the judges to “make sure” they “listen to people’s complaints and needs patiently,” because if they do “it will be a success for us.” Thus far, this has been difficult to do “because, on the one hand, there is an armed enemy [and] we are at war with them and on the other hand the appropriate security situation was not created.” He mentions the “security risks” facing judges, saying “they cannot eat and sleep comfortably.” The Taliban would appoint judges, only to have some of them imprisoned or killed, making it impossible to operate the sharia court system.
Haqqani is candid with respect to the shortcomings of the Taliban’s courts. He says that during the “previous emirate” — meaning when the Taliban ruled much of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 — most of the people’s complaints centered on the court system and the group’s department of “vice and virtue.” He concedes that there are “a lot of criticisms [of] our courts today.” Although he is reluctant to discuss them openly and “critically,” he does so because “we have to act with caution and accuracy.” Haqqani tells the judges that they “have received complaints” concerning how “the court’s decisions are often delayed,” as well as complaints regarding absentee judges.
Haqqani’s summary of the Taliban’s attempts to operate courts during the past two decades reveals that for all the group’s territorial gains over time, the jihadists still lacked the ability to truly govern. Haqqani clearly anticipates that will change in the coming months. He says Allah has promised them “victory,” and “[t]his future promise is coming.”
He mentions in passing a “draft law” that the Taliban’s judges have been operating under, apparently with the expectation that its courts will play a more prominent role in the future.
Preparing to rule
The Taliban has promoted two major speeches by Haqqani in the past two months. The speeches contain similar themes, Haqqani speaking more as a head of state than as a hunted terrorist.
In March, Haqqani addressed a “great assembly of mujahideen,” congratulating them on their battlefield successes. Much of his talk was clearly intended to prepare the jihadists for the Taliban’s transition from an insurgency to a government. The rise of the Taliban’s first emirate in Afghanistan in the 1990s was plagued by early rivalries and dissent, which Haqqani likely wants to stymie this time around. Haqqani encouraged the fighters to remain humble and obedient, while avoiding internal divisions.
“Officials should try to get the regulations of other commissions, study them carefully and familiarize themselves with them so that they do not clash with other departments,” Haqqani said in his March address. “Whenever a problem arose and we investigated, the fault was in [a] violation of the rules. If we follow the rules and regulations of all institutions, there will be no problems or conflicts.” Haqqani discussed at length the role of the Taliban’s “commissions” in administering the people’s affairs.
“The Islamic Emirate is the home of our faith and our religion, in which we are all united in a sacred bond,” Haqqani said. Haqqani is clearly preparing for the emirate’s rise once again.
Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for FDD's Long War Journal.
Posted for fair use.....
Taliban’s deputy leader stresses importance of judges in the Islamic emirate | FDD's Long War Journal
In a newly released message, Sirajuddin Haqqani discusses the importance of the Taliban's judges in the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Haqqani is preparing his men to rule over more territory in Afghanistan.
www.longwarjournal.org
Taliban’s deputy leader stresses importance of judges in the Islamic emirate
By Thomas Joscelyn | April 23, 2021 | tjoscelyn@gmail.com | @thomasjoscelyn
Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Taliban’s deputy emir, discusses the importance of the group’s judiciary system in a newly-released, 23-minute audio message. Haqqani, a U.N.-designated terrorist who is closely allied with al-Qaeda, addresses “all the religious scholars and teachers,” explaining why the Taliban’s courts are a core part of the Islamic emirate he and his men are building in Afghanistan.
“You have maintained the status and glory of [the] Emirate,” Haqqani tells the Taliban’s judges and religious instructors. “You have taught the religion of Allah (SWT) and the path of the Holy Prophet (may peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) to the people.”
Haqqani says the “respected Sheikh Noorullah” is the “head of all courts and the judiciary” for the Taliban’s Islamic emirate. Noorullah is purportedly “traveling to all the corners of the country, from south to north,” apparently to inspect the group’s judicial system.
The Taliban’s deputy emir calls on the judges to let him know if they “have problems that affect the work of [the] judiciary,” saying they should not be hesitant to contact him and demand resources when necessary. Haqqani wants them to travel throughout Afghanistan to dispense the Taliban’s version of justice.
Haqqani also tells the members of his audience to make sure their legal “works are connected” with the “organs” of the Taliban’s nascent government, saying the various “organs” should reach an “understanding” and coordinate their activities. He also describes these structures as “existing administrations.”
“If the other organ [is] not cooperating, let us know, we will make them cooperative,” Haqqani says, thereby indicating that he has the power within the Taliban’s organization to demand obedience. Haqqani explains that the Taliban’s “military commission” advises its fighters along these same lines in the “seminars and workshops” it holds for the rank and file.
Haqqani claims that how the public perceives the Taliban’s “system” is “based on you judges more than the military committee and the committee of dawa [proselytizing] and guidance and other committees,” a reference to the internal structure of the group’s nascent government. He adds that “His Excellency Sheikh Amir ul Mumineen” (the “Emir of the Faithful”), Haibatullah Akhundzada, has “much confidence” in them.
In an intriguing passage, Haqqani refers to some pending “urgent decisions” that the Taliban’s senior leaders are prepared to make regarding the locations of their courts. These “courts,” which are “built in deserts and villages will be transferred to the office system,” Haqqani tells the judges. It is possible that Haqqani is referring to the necessity of running courts in Afghanistan’s more urbanized provincial capitals and district centers, many of which have remained out of the jihadists’ grip while the U.S. and NATO forces remained in country. Establishing courts in some of these areas will require more effort, given that the population isn’t accustomed to Taliban-style rule.
“I hope you have some plans on this matter because we are about to go into a system of power,” Haqqani says. “You have to be well prepared. I wish successes for you in all your duties.”
Describes “complaints” concerning the Taliban’s court system
Haqqani discusses at length the “hardships” the Taliban’s judges have endured throughout all these years of war. He also encourages them to be careful in how they adjudicate matters, so that they do not earn the disapproval of Afghans.
“Allah has given the honorable judges a status in all systems, where if the system has a good or bad reputation, the main reason is the courts,” Haqqani says. “And because we have to take care of people’s affairs, we need to be very careful and attentive.” He encourages the judges to exercise “good manner” when dealing with the people.
He advises the judges to “make sure” they “listen to people’s complaints and needs patiently,” because if they do “it will be a success for us.” Thus far, this has been difficult to do “because, on the one hand, there is an armed enemy [and] we are at war with them and on the other hand the appropriate security situation was not created.” He mentions the “security risks” facing judges, saying “they cannot eat and sleep comfortably.” The Taliban would appoint judges, only to have some of them imprisoned or killed, making it impossible to operate the sharia court system.
Haqqani is candid with respect to the shortcomings of the Taliban’s courts. He says that during the “previous emirate” — meaning when the Taliban ruled much of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 — most of the people’s complaints centered on the court system and the group’s department of “vice and virtue.” He concedes that there are “a lot of criticisms [of] our courts today.” Although he is reluctant to discuss them openly and “critically,” he does so because “we have to act with caution and accuracy.” Haqqani tells the judges that they “have received complaints” concerning how “the court’s decisions are often delayed,” as well as complaints regarding absentee judges.
Haqqani’s summary of the Taliban’s attempts to operate courts during the past two decades reveals that for all the group’s territorial gains over time, the jihadists still lacked the ability to truly govern. Haqqani clearly anticipates that will change in the coming months. He says Allah has promised them “victory,” and “[t]his future promise is coming.”
He mentions in passing a “draft law” that the Taliban’s judges have been operating under, apparently with the expectation that its courts will play a more prominent role in the future.
Preparing to rule
The Taliban has promoted two major speeches by Haqqani in the past two months. The speeches contain similar themes, Haqqani speaking more as a head of state than as a hunted terrorist.
In March, Haqqani addressed a “great assembly of mujahideen,” congratulating them on their battlefield successes. Much of his talk was clearly intended to prepare the jihadists for the Taliban’s transition from an insurgency to a government. The rise of the Taliban’s first emirate in Afghanistan in the 1990s was plagued by early rivalries and dissent, which Haqqani likely wants to stymie this time around. Haqqani encouraged the fighters to remain humble and obedient, while avoiding internal divisions.
“Officials should try to get the regulations of other commissions, study them carefully and familiarize themselves with them so that they do not clash with other departments,” Haqqani said in his March address. “Whenever a problem arose and we investigated, the fault was in [a] violation of the rules. If we follow the rules and regulations of all institutions, there will be no problems or conflicts.” Haqqani discussed at length the role of the Taliban’s “commissions” in administering the people’s affairs.
“The Islamic Emirate is the home of our faith and our religion, in which we are all united in a sacred bond,” Haqqani said. Haqqani is clearly preparing for the emirate’s rise once again.
Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for FDD's Long War Journal.
Plain Jane
Just Plain Jane
I recall watching a news show that highlighted the judicial system in Afghanistan. The Afghan government never had control over the majority of the country and the Taliban system couldn't operate in established court houses without having American troops attacking so the Taliban simply drove the their judges around on motorcycles. They went from village to village in a circuit. The people themselves seemed to be content with that because a lot of legal matters were simply going unsolved.
jward
passin' thru
Leaving Afghanistan Will Make America Less Safe - War on the Rocks
Bruce Hoffman and Jacob Ware
12-15 minutes
America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan should be cause for rejoicing. But conditions in the country today, and the historical record of past U.S. withdrawals from similar conflicts, suggest that it will only create more problems. By leaving, Washington is vindicating an aphorism attributed to a captured Taliban fighter over a decade ago: “You have the watches. We have the time.”
Proving the Taliban wrong is not a politically unaffordable extravagance. It merely requires retaining a couple of thousand elite special operations, intelligence, and support personnel in Afghanistan. Otherwise, the risk is that this will be the fourth time in as many decades that a U.S. military withdrawal encourages terrorists by showing the weakness of U.S. resolve. When America left Beirut in 1983, Mogadishu a decade later, and Iraq in 2011, the result was more terrorism, not less.
Indeed, no one understood the significance of America’s past retreats better than Osama bin Laden. In a 1997 interview, he recalled how the deaths of 241 U.S. marines in the Beirut barracks bombing had compelled President Ronald Reagan to order a withdrawal from Lebanon within five months. This led to the collapse of the multinational force in Lebanon — of which the Marines were the lynchpin — and plunged Lebanon into further chaos. The main beneficiary was Hizballah, the shadowy terrorist group responsible for the attack. In the decades since, Hizballah’s success influenced other terrorist leaders and groups, including bin Laden and al-Qaeda.
By 1993, the U.S. military was deeply involved in a United Nations mission to restore stability in Somalia and feed starving citizens enmeshed in civil war. But that October, a plan to arrest a local warlord’s paymaster and chief lieutenant went disastrously awry. Fifteen U.S. Army Rangers and three Delta Force commandos were killed in an uncontrolled spiral of urban combat depicted in the book and film Black Hawk Down. In some of the most gripping footage ever broadcast live on television, an injured U.S. Army helicopter pilot was seen being paraded through the streets of Mogadishu by a chanting, gun-wielding mob. President Bill Clinton reacted quickly to the incident. Scrambling to preempt criticism from Congress, the media, and the American public, he set March 31, 1994, as the firm date for the withdrawal of all American forces there — regardless of whether the multinational, U.N.-led humanitarian aid mission had been successfully completed or not.
Members of the al-Qaeda movement had both trained and fought alongside the Somali militiamen that fateful day in Mogadishu. To bin Laden’s thinking, it had taken the deaths of 241 U.S. marines to get the U.S. out of Lebanon in 1983. A decade later, the loss of less than a tenth of that number had prompted an identical reaction. As bin Laden explained in his 1996 declaration of war on the United States:
Some analysts have argued that the situation is different now precisely because of the 9/11 attacks. Washington did not take terrorism sufficiently seriously in the 1990s, but since then, the country has built up a huge counter-terrorism bureaucracy that makes staying in Afghanistan unnecessary. Now Washington can protect the homeland by using enhanced intelligence, special operations forces, and precision-guided, stand-off munitions. With these resources, over-the-horizon military and intelligence assets will be able to quickly identify and address any new threats.
This also was the logic behind the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011. But the disastrous consequences were soon felt with the rise of the Islamic State. Washington was overconfident in its counter-terrorism capabilities and underestimated the new terrorist variant it faced. As with Hizballah in the 1980s and al-Qaeda in the 1990s, the results proved tragic. Once again the desire to disengage when confronted by stubborn, resilient non-state adversaries created conditions ripe for terrorist exploitation. The vacuum in Iraq was rapidly filled by new extremist groups. President Barack Obama’s curt dismissal of the embryonic Islamic State as “a jayvee team” would come to haunt him less than six months later, after the terrorist blitzkrieg that conquered western Iraq and stormed across the border into Syria. The Islamic State soon inspired a series of domestic attacks in multiple Western countries. Within months, it had dragged an international coalition that would eventually involve 83 countries back into maw of Middle Eastern conflict.
Today in Afghanistan, the United States is similarly understating and underestimating the threat posed by the Taliban. If anything, the situation in Afghanistan is more dangerous. When America withdrew from Iraq, there was no single terrorist adversary capable of toppling democratically elected Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki in Baghdad. The Taliban, however, has that potential and makes no secret of its intention to re-impose theocratic rule over Afghanistan. It therefore poses an existential threat to the democratically elected government of President Ashraf Ghani in a way that no contender had in Iraq a decade ago. Moreover, the Taliban’s longstanding, close alliances with al-Qaeda, the Haqqani network, and Pakistan’s Tehrik-i-Taliban endow it with additional attack capabilities that did not exist in Iraq at the time of 2011 U.S. withdrawal.
Against this backdrop, there are two specific risks associated with America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. First, the international terrorist threat that necessitated invading that country following the 9/11 attacks remains. Al-Qaeda is undefeated. Its intimate, longstanding relationship with the Taliban suggests that al-Qaeda will be the beneficiary of the territorial and political gains its Afghan partners are poised to achieve in a post-U.S. Afghanistan. In 2019, in fact, as negotiations with the United States were underway, Taliban leaders reportedly sought to personally reassure Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s son and the al-Qaeda heir apparent, “that the Islamic Emirate would not break its historical ties with al-Qaeda for any price.” Indeed, two al-Qaeda operatives recently praised the Taliban for its support. “Thanks to Afghans for the protection of comrades-in-arms,” a spokesman for the group gushed. Even if the Taliban makes good on its promise to restrain al-Qaeda from attacking the United States and the West from an Afghan base, this does not preclude al-Qaeda from using Afghanistan to destabilize this already highly volatile region. In 2008, a series of coordinated suicide attacks in Mumbai by Lashkar-e-Taiba — another close al-Qaeda ally — brought India and Pakistan to the brink of nuclear war. It is worth recalling, too, that both of al-Qaeda’s most recent new franchises are focused on South Asia generally and on Kashmir specifically.
America’s counter-terror resources are also likely to be stretched particularly thin going forward, making managing the threat from afar even less plausible. Afghanistan is now only one of many terrorist hotspots around the globe, which seem to be multiplying. Security conditions are deteriorating in Mozambique and the Sahel, for instance, while sectarian clashes in Northern Ireland raise fears of “The Troubles” returning. At home, far-right terrorism runs rampant. Even if U.S. intelligence agencies find ways to effectively manage terrorist safe havens without soldiers on the ground, their attention and vigilance will necessarily be spread thin.
The second risk is that withdrawal from Afghanistan will weaken, rather than strengthen, Washington against peer competitors. The United States, rightly or wrongly, is shifting from prioritizing counter-terrorism toward a great-power competition posture. But thinking of the two as zero sum is a mistake. China has prioritized embedding itself in local contexts for years; Russia and Iran have been practicing their irregular warfare strategies in Ukraine, in Yemen, and, most aggressively, in Syria. Indeed, at least one Iran-backed Shiite militia in Iraq has already drawn inspiration from the Taliban’s success. Qais al Khazali, leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq (League of the Righteous), observed just the other day that “the Afghan way is the only way to make [the United States] leave [Iraq].” Every military setback — whether in Lebanon, Somalia, Iraq, or Afghanistan — illuminates a path by which great-power adversaries see they can defeat the United States.
It is no coincidence that Russia has provided support to the Taliban, likely aiming to help sap America’s energy and spirit and encourage America’s withdrawal from the region.
Yet rather than heed present risks or past warnings, President Joe Biden, like President Trump before him, seems more concerned with the political capital to be milked from ending America’s longest war. As in Beirut and Mogadishu, Washington appears largely satisfied that our military personnel will no longer be in harm’s way. But a responsible strategy need not involve gratuitously exposing troops to harm. In fact, the last American combat fatality in Afghanistan was more than a year ago. The current troop level there, approximately 3,500 personnel, accounts for 0.27 percent of America’s active duty forces — hardly a drain on the resources of even a declining superpower. Maintaining this small contingent would have a significant force-multiplying effect. It would provide an immediate trip wire to deal with any serious terrorist threat while also bolstering the Afghan government and improving its security forces.
Moreover, maintaining a limited, elite presence in a country sharing a border with China might well be in America’s strategic interests as the “new cold war” heats up. Simply abandoning Afghanistan will not help the counter-terrorism fight and it is unlikely to help with great-power competition either.
There are no perfect options. But instead of turning its back on Afghanistan, the United States should shift its rhetoric in the “Global War on Terror” away from “winning” and “losing” and toward “managing” and “accepting.” This would facilitate an ongoing but limited troop presence with a clear homeland security, not nation-building, brief.
Keeping a small number of elite troops in Afghanistan, while unlikely to elicit roars of approval at campaign rallies in the 2024 presidential race, would likely keep both the Taliban and al-Qaeda at bay in the country while protecting a forward operating base on China’s and Russia’s doorstep. Withdrawal, by contrast, will be universally seen as defeat. As with bin Laden 25 years ago, it will give a rhetorical victory to terrorists the world over. And it will boost the morale of state adversaries that benefit from the perception of U.S. weakness.
Bruce Hoffman is the senior fellow for counterterrorism & homeland security at the Council on Foreign Relations and a professor at Georgetown University. Jacob Ware is a research associate for counterterrorism at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Image: U.S. Air Force (Photo by Staff Sgt. Kylee Gardner
Posted For fair use
Bruce Hoffman and Jacob Ware
12-15 minutes
America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan should be cause for rejoicing. But conditions in the country today, and the historical record of past U.S. withdrawals from similar conflicts, suggest that it will only create more problems. By leaving, Washington is vindicating an aphorism attributed to a captured Taliban fighter over a decade ago: “You have the watches. We have the time.”
Proving the Taliban wrong is not a politically unaffordable extravagance. It merely requires retaining a couple of thousand elite special operations, intelligence, and support personnel in Afghanistan. Otherwise, the risk is that this will be the fourth time in as many decades that a U.S. military withdrawal encourages terrorists by showing the weakness of U.S. resolve. When America left Beirut in 1983, Mogadishu a decade later, and Iraq in 2011, the result was more terrorism, not less.
Indeed, no one understood the significance of America’s past retreats better than Osama bin Laden. In a 1997 interview, he recalled how the deaths of 241 U.S. marines in the Beirut barracks bombing had compelled President Ronald Reagan to order a withdrawal from Lebanon within five months. This led to the collapse of the multinational force in Lebanon — of which the Marines were the lynchpin — and plunged Lebanon into further chaos. The main beneficiary was Hizballah, the shadowy terrorist group responsible for the attack. In the decades since, Hizballah’s success influenced other terrorist leaders and groups, including bin Laden and al-Qaeda.
By 1993, the U.S. military was deeply involved in a United Nations mission to restore stability in Somalia and feed starving citizens enmeshed in civil war. But that October, a plan to arrest a local warlord’s paymaster and chief lieutenant went disastrously awry. Fifteen U.S. Army Rangers and three Delta Force commandos were killed in an uncontrolled spiral of urban combat depicted in the book and film Black Hawk Down. In some of the most gripping footage ever broadcast live on television, an injured U.S. Army helicopter pilot was seen being paraded through the streets of Mogadishu by a chanting, gun-wielding mob. President Bill Clinton reacted quickly to the incident. Scrambling to preempt criticism from Congress, the media, and the American public, he set March 31, 1994, as the firm date for the withdrawal of all American forces there — regardless of whether the multinational, U.N.-led humanitarian aid mission had been successfully completed or not.
Members of the al-Qaeda movement had both trained and fought alongside the Somali militiamen that fateful day in Mogadishu. To bin Laden’s thinking, it had taken the deaths of 241 U.S. marines to get the U.S. out of Lebanon in 1983. A decade later, the loss of less than a tenth of that number had prompted an identical reaction. As bin Laden explained in his 1996 declaration of war on the United States:
Bin Laden was emboldened to believe that if U.S. foreign policy could be influenced by a score of military deaths in an East African backwater, it could be changed fundamentally by thousands of civilian deaths in the United States itself. Thus, the road to 9/11 started in Beirut, led a decade later to Mogadishu, then wound its way through Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, and Aden before arriving in New York City, Washington, D.C., and a field outside of Shanksville, Pennsylvania. No one could have anticipated the exact chain of events. But the retreats from both Beirut and Mogadishu nonetheless set those events in motion by feeding a dangerous perception of American weakness.
Some analysts have argued that the situation is different now precisely because of the 9/11 attacks. Washington did not take terrorism sufficiently seriously in the 1990s, but since then, the country has built up a huge counter-terrorism bureaucracy that makes staying in Afghanistan unnecessary. Now Washington can protect the homeland by using enhanced intelligence, special operations forces, and precision-guided, stand-off munitions. With these resources, over-the-horizon military and intelligence assets will be able to quickly identify and address any new threats.
This also was the logic behind the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011. But the disastrous consequences were soon felt with the rise of the Islamic State. Washington was overconfident in its counter-terrorism capabilities and underestimated the new terrorist variant it faced. As with Hizballah in the 1980s and al-Qaeda in the 1990s, the results proved tragic. Once again the desire to disengage when confronted by stubborn, resilient non-state adversaries created conditions ripe for terrorist exploitation. The vacuum in Iraq was rapidly filled by new extremist groups. President Barack Obama’s curt dismissal of the embryonic Islamic State as “a jayvee team” would come to haunt him less than six months later, after the terrorist blitzkrieg that conquered western Iraq and stormed across the border into Syria. The Islamic State soon inspired a series of domestic attacks in multiple Western countries. Within months, it had dragged an international coalition that would eventually involve 83 countries back into maw of Middle Eastern conflict.
Today in Afghanistan, the United States is similarly understating and underestimating the threat posed by the Taliban. If anything, the situation in Afghanistan is more dangerous. When America withdrew from Iraq, there was no single terrorist adversary capable of toppling democratically elected Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki in Baghdad. The Taliban, however, has that potential and makes no secret of its intention to re-impose theocratic rule over Afghanistan. It therefore poses an existential threat to the democratically elected government of President Ashraf Ghani in a way that no contender had in Iraq a decade ago. Moreover, the Taliban’s longstanding, close alliances with al-Qaeda, the Haqqani network, and Pakistan’s Tehrik-i-Taliban endow it with additional attack capabilities that did not exist in Iraq at the time of 2011 U.S. withdrawal.
Against this backdrop, there are two specific risks associated with America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. First, the international terrorist threat that necessitated invading that country following the 9/11 attacks remains. Al-Qaeda is undefeated. Its intimate, longstanding relationship with the Taliban suggests that al-Qaeda will be the beneficiary of the territorial and political gains its Afghan partners are poised to achieve in a post-U.S. Afghanistan. In 2019, in fact, as negotiations with the United States were underway, Taliban leaders reportedly sought to personally reassure Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s son and the al-Qaeda heir apparent, “that the Islamic Emirate would not break its historical ties with al-Qaeda for any price.” Indeed, two al-Qaeda operatives recently praised the Taliban for its support. “Thanks to Afghans for the protection of comrades-in-arms,” a spokesman for the group gushed. Even if the Taliban makes good on its promise to restrain al-Qaeda from attacking the United States and the West from an Afghan base, this does not preclude al-Qaeda from using Afghanistan to destabilize this already highly volatile region. In 2008, a series of coordinated suicide attacks in Mumbai by Lashkar-e-Taiba — another close al-Qaeda ally — brought India and Pakistan to the brink of nuclear war. It is worth recalling, too, that both of al-Qaeda’s most recent new franchises are focused on South Asia generally and on Kashmir specifically.
America’s counter-terror resources are also likely to be stretched particularly thin going forward, making managing the threat from afar even less plausible. Afghanistan is now only one of many terrorist hotspots around the globe, which seem to be multiplying. Security conditions are deteriorating in Mozambique and the Sahel, for instance, while sectarian clashes in Northern Ireland raise fears of “The Troubles” returning. At home, far-right terrorism runs rampant. Even if U.S. intelligence agencies find ways to effectively manage terrorist safe havens without soldiers on the ground, their attention and vigilance will necessarily be spread thin.
The second risk is that withdrawal from Afghanistan will weaken, rather than strengthen, Washington against peer competitors. The United States, rightly or wrongly, is shifting from prioritizing counter-terrorism toward a great-power competition posture. But thinking of the two as zero sum is a mistake. China has prioritized embedding itself in local contexts for years; Russia and Iran have been practicing their irregular warfare strategies in Ukraine, in Yemen, and, most aggressively, in Syria. Indeed, at least one Iran-backed Shiite militia in Iraq has already drawn inspiration from the Taliban’s success. Qais al Khazali, leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq (League of the Righteous), observed just the other day that “the Afghan way is the only way to make [the United States] leave [Iraq].” Every military setback — whether in Lebanon, Somalia, Iraq, or Afghanistan — illuminates a path by which great-power adversaries see they can defeat the United States.
It is no coincidence that Russia has provided support to the Taliban, likely aiming to help sap America’s energy and spirit and encourage America’s withdrawal from the region.
Yet rather than heed present risks or past warnings, President Joe Biden, like President Trump before him, seems more concerned with the political capital to be milked from ending America’s longest war. As in Beirut and Mogadishu, Washington appears largely satisfied that our military personnel will no longer be in harm’s way. But a responsible strategy need not involve gratuitously exposing troops to harm. In fact, the last American combat fatality in Afghanistan was more than a year ago. The current troop level there, approximately 3,500 personnel, accounts for 0.27 percent of America’s active duty forces — hardly a drain on the resources of even a declining superpower. Maintaining this small contingent would have a significant force-multiplying effect. It would provide an immediate trip wire to deal with any serious terrorist threat while also bolstering the Afghan government and improving its security forces.
Moreover, maintaining a limited, elite presence in a country sharing a border with China might well be in America’s strategic interests as the “new cold war” heats up. Simply abandoning Afghanistan will not help the counter-terrorism fight and it is unlikely to help with great-power competition either.
There are no perfect options. But instead of turning its back on Afghanistan, the United States should shift its rhetoric in the “Global War on Terror” away from “winning” and “losing” and toward “managing” and “accepting.” This would facilitate an ongoing but limited troop presence with a clear homeland security, not nation-building, brief.
Keeping a small number of elite troops in Afghanistan, while unlikely to elicit roars of approval at campaign rallies in the 2024 presidential race, would likely keep both the Taliban and al-Qaeda at bay in the country while protecting a forward operating base on China’s and Russia’s doorstep. Withdrawal, by contrast, will be universally seen as defeat. As with bin Laden 25 years ago, it will give a rhetorical victory to terrorists the world over. And it will boost the morale of state adversaries that benefit from the perception of U.S. weakness.
Bruce Hoffman is the senior fellow for counterterrorism & homeland security at the Council on Foreign Relations and a professor at Georgetown University. Jacob Ware is a research associate for counterterrorism at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Image: U.S. Air Force (Photo by Staff Sgt. Kylee Gardner
Posted For fair use
Leaving Afghanistan Will Make America Less Safe - War on the Rocks
America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan should be cause for rejoicing. But conditions in the country today, and the historical record of past U.S.
warontherocks.com
Hummm......
Posted for fair use.....
‘Hope’ Has Become the U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan
U.S. military officials remain optimistic, but unspecific, about how the worsening situation in Afghanistan will improve before the full U.S. withdrawal by September.
By Paul D. Shinkman | May 6, 2021
"Hope" may not be a strategy, as the martial cliche goes, but for the U.S. military it's become a substantial part of its plans for withdrawing from Afghanistan.
The Pentagon's most senior officials provided an update for the draw-down effort on Thursday, a month after President Joe Biden's initial orders to end the war in Afghanistan and long enough to begin understanding what the conflict zone will look like without a U.S. military presence: A key inspector general has identified unsustainable rates of casualties and desertions among Western-backed local forces on the ground, the Taliban appears poised to launch even more offensives while the key question of whether it will begin directly attacking Western forces remains unclear, and 200 government troops this week surrendered as the insurgent network claimed it had captured most of the Burka district in the country's northeast.
[ MORE: Opposition Mounts to Biden’s Afghanistan Withdrawal ]
When asked about the real prospects for Kabul in the face of this onslaught, which the U.S. has spent two decades, thousands of lives and billions of dollars working to rebuff, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin had little to say about new strategies.
"We're hopeful the Afghan security forces will play a major role in stopping the Taliban," the former Army general told reporters at the Pentagon, speaking alongside Army Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his former subordinate commander in Afghanistan.
"We hope through our continued support, the Afghan security forces can be effective," Austin continued. "They have pretty significant capability. But we expect this will be a challenge for them."
Austin cited local forces' ability to fight back against a major Taliban offensive in Lashkar Gah in the restive Helmand province earlier this week – the insurgent group's historic stronghold – but there remain scant few other details of success in repelling the enemy's offensive.
And the humanitarian situation in that area is rapidly deteriorating. Doctors Without Borders, also known as Medecins Sans Frontieres or MSF, said in a statement Thursday that hospitals in Lashkar Gah have become overwhelmed.
"Alarmingly, patients and staff say that access routes to the city are blocked, and MSF has seen a decrease in the number of admissions of children and pregnant women," according to the statement. "Some families may be afraid to attempt to reach the hospital due to the conflict, even if their children are very sick. MSF calls on all parties to allow everyone access to medical care."
The circumstances have become emblematic of the broader dangers that await Afghans after a U.S. withdrawal on top of the 20 years of war they have had to endure.
Indeed, many officials have begun worrying privately, and occasionally publicly, whether the U.S. is fated for the same internationally embarrassing scenes of its citizens and closest allies boarding helicopters as the capital city falls to enemy forces as it did in Saigon in 1975.
Milley has pushed back against this fatalism in recent days and offered similar optimism on Thursday.
"It is not a foregone conclusion" that the Taliban wins as soon as the U.S. leaves, Milley said. And he offered other details meant to prop up his assessment: Attrition among Afghan forces has been "average" over the last year or so. He reminded reporters that the U.S. is aware of the rates of troops killed in action, wounded in action and those that have deserted – statistics that Washington and Kabul stopped releasing in recent years amid concerns they bolstered the enemy's cause. Milley would not provide more detail.
And he pointed to an ongoing effort led by the State Department to negotiate a peace with the Taliban.
"That effort has not been closed yet," Milley added.
Though as Milley, Austin and countless other military commanders have testified in recent years – particularly in bolstering arguments for a sustained presence in Afghanistan – diplomatic negotiations have little weight if they aren't backed by credible military strength.
The administration has also begun showing signs that it recognizes the bad optics of the withdrawal, particularly Biden's original pledge to withdraw troops by Sept. 11 – a choice his critics have interpreted as inappropriately co-opting a date held in reverence among Americans. Milley on Thursday for the first time did not mention that specific day, rather citing the plan to withdraw all troops by September. He said he would not offer specific dates for U.S. plans in the future, citing security concerns.
[ READ: Leaving Afghanistan: The End of an Era ]
Whatever other elements of the U.S. withdrawal that aren't left to hope are otherwise relegated to unanswered questions. Chief among them is how the U.S. will be able to continue providing the support it has promised for Afghan forces and the ability to maintain pressure on terror groups from "over the horizon," or without a physical presence in the country.
The Biden administration has yet to unveil any details about planned arrangements with neighboring countries for long-term U.S. basing nearby. Many of those traditional partnerships, notably with Pakistan, have frayed to the point of irreparability during the 20 years of war in Afghanistan.
Milley and Austin on Thursday also said no deals have yet been reached for how to maintain contractor support to the Afghans, the sweeping private-sector arrangements that provide everything from logistical infrastructure to the expertise needed to keep the country's helicopters flying safely. Without 16,000 American and other foreign contractors, U.S. officials have said in recent weeks, Afghanistan's fledgling air force will be grounded.
But Austin made clear, all of that support will leave with the uniformed troops.
"We're going to responsibly retrograde all of our capabilities, and contractors falls within that as well," the secretary said, using the military's technical term for a planned withdrawal. "We're going to account for all the people and resources that are working with us."
Local leaders this week have identified the stark options that lie ahead for the main parties involved.
"The choice is clear," Afghan President Ashraf Ghani wrote on Wednesday. "Coalesce around an unacceptable end state in Afghanistan, or continue the dangerous power-grabbing alternative."
The Taliban already appears to have made its selection.
Posted for fair use.....
‘Hope’ Has Become the U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan
U.S. military officials remain optimistic, but unspecific, about how the worsening situation in Afghanistan will improve before the full U.S. withdrawal by September.
By Paul D. Shinkman | May 6, 2021
"Hope" may not be a strategy, as the martial cliche goes, but for the U.S. military it's become a substantial part of its plans for withdrawing from Afghanistan.
The Pentagon's most senior officials provided an update for the draw-down effort on Thursday, a month after President Joe Biden's initial orders to end the war in Afghanistan and long enough to begin understanding what the conflict zone will look like without a U.S. military presence: A key inspector general has identified unsustainable rates of casualties and desertions among Western-backed local forces on the ground, the Taliban appears poised to launch even more offensives while the key question of whether it will begin directly attacking Western forces remains unclear, and 200 government troops this week surrendered as the insurgent network claimed it had captured most of the Burka district in the country's northeast.
[ MORE: Opposition Mounts to Biden’s Afghanistan Withdrawal ]
When asked about the real prospects for Kabul in the face of this onslaught, which the U.S. has spent two decades, thousands of lives and billions of dollars working to rebuff, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin had little to say about new strategies.
"We're hopeful the Afghan security forces will play a major role in stopping the Taliban," the former Army general told reporters at the Pentagon, speaking alongside Army Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his former subordinate commander in Afghanistan.
"We hope through our continued support, the Afghan security forces can be effective," Austin continued. "They have pretty significant capability. But we expect this will be a challenge for them."
Austin cited local forces' ability to fight back against a major Taliban offensive in Lashkar Gah in the restive Helmand province earlier this week – the insurgent group's historic stronghold – but there remain scant few other details of success in repelling the enemy's offensive.
And the humanitarian situation in that area is rapidly deteriorating. Doctors Without Borders, also known as Medecins Sans Frontieres or MSF, said in a statement Thursday that hospitals in Lashkar Gah have become overwhelmed.
"Alarmingly, patients and staff say that access routes to the city are blocked, and MSF has seen a decrease in the number of admissions of children and pregnant women," according to the statement. "Some families may be afraid to attempt to reach the hospital due to the conflict, even if their children are very sick. MSF calls on all parties to allow everyone access to medical care."
The circumstances have become emblematic of the broader dangers that await Afghans after a U.S. withdrawal on top of the 20 years of war they have had to endure.
Indeed, many officials have begun worrying privately, and occasionally publicly, whether the U.S. is fated for the same internationally embarrassing scenes of its citizens and closest allies boarding helicopters as the capital city falls to enemy forces as it did in Saigon in 1975.
Milley has pushed back against this fatalism in recent days and offered similar optimism on Thursday.
"It is not a foregone conclusion" that the Taliban wins as soon as the U.S. leaves, Milley said. And he offered other details meant to prop up his assessment: Attrition among Afghan forces has been "average" over the last year or so. He reminded reporters that the U.S. is aware of the rates of troops killed in action, wounded in action and those that have deserted – statistics that Washington and Kabul stopped releasing in recent years amid concerns they bolstered the enemy's cause. Milley would not provide more detail.
And he pointed to an ongoing effort led by the State Department to negotiate a peace with the Taliban.
"That effort has not been closed yet," Milley added.
Though as Milley, Austin and countless other military commanders have testified in recent years – particularly in bolstering arguments for a sustained presence in Afghanistan – diplomatic negotiations have little weight if they aren't backed by credible military strength.
The administration has also begun showing signs that it recognizes the bad optics of the withdrawal, particularly Biden's original pledge to withdraw troops by Sept. 11 – a choice his critics have interpreted as inappropriately co-opting a date held in reverence among Americans. Milley on Thursday for the first time did not mention that specific day, rather citing the plan to withdraw all troops by September. He said he would not offer specific dates for U.S. plans in the future, citing security concerns.
[ READ: Leaving Afghanistan: The End of an Era ]
Whatever other elements of the U.S. withdrawal that aren't left to hope are otherwise relegated to unanswered questions. Chief among them is how the U.S. will be able to continue providing the support it has promised for Afghan forces and the ability to maintain pressure on terror groups from "over the horizon," or without a physical presence in the country.
The Biden administration has yet to unveil any details about planned arrangements with neighboring countries for long-term U.S. basing nearby. Many of those traditional partnerships, notably with Pakistan, have frayed to the point of irreparability during the 20 years of war in Afghanistan.
Milley and Austin on Thursday also said no deals have yet been reached for how to maintain contractor support to the Afghans, the sweeping private-sector arrangements that provide everything from logistical infrastructure to the expertise needed to keep the country's helicopters flying safely. Without 16,000 American and other foreign contractors, U.S. officials have said in recent weeks, Afghanistan's fledgling air force will be grounded.
But Austin made clear, all of that support will leave with the uniformed troops.
"We're going to responsibly retrograde all of our capabilities, and contractors falls within that as well," the secretary said, using the military's technical term for a planned withdrawal. "We're going to account for all the people and resources that are working with us."
Local leaders this week have identified the stark options that lie ahead for the main parties involved.
"The choice is clear," Afghan President Ashraf Ghani wrote on Wednesday. "Coalesce around an unacceptable end state in Afghanistan, or continue the dangerous power-grabbing alternative."
The Taliban already appears to have made its selection.
Posted for fair use.....
www.voanews.com
Targeted Killing in Afghanistan Seen as Reminder of Threat to Journalists
May 07, 2021 05:25 PM
RT 3:26
A former TOLO NEWS anchor in Afghanistan was gunned down on Thursday, another reminder of the risks journalists face in the country. VOA’s Azizullah Popal, Hikmat Sorosh and Jalal Mirzad has more from Afghanistan in this report narrated by Bezhan Hamdard.
Produced by: Bezhan Hamdard
Targeted Killing in Afghanistan Seen as Reminder of Threat to Journalists
A former TOLO NEWS anchor in Afghanistan was gunned down on Thursday, another reminder of the risks journalists face in the country. VOA’s Azizullah Popal, Hikmat Sorosh and Jalal Mirzad has more from Afghanistan in this report narrated by Bezhan Hamdard. Produced by: Bezhan Hamdard
www.voanews.com
Targeted Killing in Afghanistan Seen as Reminder of Threat to Journalists
May 07, 2021 05:25 PM
RT 3:26
A former TOLO NEWS anchor in Afghanistan was gunned down on Thursday, another reminder of the risks journalists face in the country. VOA’s Azizullah Popal, Hikmat Sorosh and Jalal Mirzad has more from Afghanistan in this report narrated by Bezhan Hamdard.
Produced by: Bezhan Hamdard
Posted for fair use.....
www.eurasiareview.com
Afghanistan: Has Biden Taken A Wrong Turn? – OpEd
May 7, 2021 Neville Teller 0 Comments
By Neville Teller
On April 14, 2021 President Joe Biden announced that he was abandoning the timetable for withdrawing US troops from Afghanistan that his predecessor, Donald Trump, had agreed with the Taliban. He had decided that the process of withdrawal would continue, but at a slower pace. The new deadline for its completion would be September 11, 2021 – the 20th anniversary of al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attack on the United States.
The Taliban were unimpressed with Biden’s symbolic gesture. They marked their objection to his unilateral abandonment of the earlier agreement with a surge in violence and a car bomb in Logar province which killed nearly 30 people. Then on May 3 at least seven Afghan military personnel were killed when the Taliban set off explosives smuggled through a tunnel that the group had dug into an army outpost in southwestern Farah province. On May 6 they captured the vast Dahla Dam in Arghandab. The Afghan defense ministry says security forces have been responding to attacks by the Taliban in at least six other provinces,
Experts say that the Taliban, despite losses estimated in the tens of thousands, is stronger now than at any point since 2001. With up to 85,000 full-time fighters, it controls twenty percent of the country. It is this continuing power of the Taliban that is behind objections in Washington to Biden’s policy. Former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has warned of “huge consequences” of Biden’s decision to withdraw American troops. Her fear is that the Taliban could take over control of Afghanistan, resulting in a new civil war.
She is not alone. Many foreign policy experts in Washington, both Democrat and Republican, feel that the US should continue to deploy its military – among them Condoleezza Rice, secretary of state under President George W Bush. She too has warned about the risks of withdrawing troops and the consequent threat of terrorism.
A possible expansion of terrorist activity also concerns retired General David Petraeus, who commanded US forces in Afghanistan and later ran the CIA. Petraeus worries the Taliban will continue to gain ground militarily and allow terrorist groups to operate, while the US and NATO will have lost the platform that Afghanistan provides for counter-terrorism campaigns.
“I’m really afraid,” he said, “that we’re going to look back two years from now and regret the decision.”
According to BBC reporters the Taliban see themselves as a government-in-waiting. They have a sophisticated “shadow” structure, with officials in charge of overseeing everyday services in the areas they control. They refer to themselves as the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.”
There is no escaping the truth, painful though it may be. The Taliban – the hardline Islamist organization swiftly identified by US intelligence in the wake of the 9/11 attack as linked to al-Qaeda and shielding its leader, Osama bin Lada – has emerged unvanquished, if not unscathed, from its twenty-year struggle with America and its allies. The group has withstood counter-insurgency operations from three US administrations backed by NATO in a war that has killed more than 6,000 US troops and contractors, over 1,100 NATO soldiers, and an estimated 73,000 Afghan fighters and police officers.
Back in 2001 it took Washington less than a week to determine the source of the deadly terrorist attack it had sustained, and on September 18, 2001 then President George W Bush signed legislation authorizing the use of US forces against the perpetrators. The US launched military operations in Afghanistan on October 7 by way of a series of air strikes against Taliban military sites and terrorist training grounds.
Intensive and sustained efforts by the US, boosted in December 2009 by then President Barack Obama increasing US troop numbers to 100,000, may have weakened, but it failed to deter, the Taliban’s sustained resistance. Their demand was for the withdrawal of all foreign troops. On June 22, 2011 Obama, maintaining “We are starting this drawdown from a position of strength,” announced that 10,000 US troops would be withdrawn by the end of 2011 and an additional 23,000 by the summer of 2012.
From the moment US President Donald Trump took office in 2017, he pledged to put an end to the conflict and achieve Obama’s aim of bringing the American forces back home. It took two years of secret back-channel negotiations before peace talks began on February 25, 2019. Abdul Ghani Barada, the co-founder of the Taliban, was at the table.
This extraordinary arrangement between the world’s leading power and a hardline extremist Islamist movement was greeted with optimism by President Trump. “I really believe the Taliban wants to do something to show we’re not all wasting time,” he said.
The talks appeared successful. Agreement was quickly reached on a draft peace deal involving the withdrawal of US and international troops from Afghanistan, matched by an undertaking by the Taliban to prohibit other jihadist groups operating within the country.
However the agreement was far from watertight, and months of wrangling followed. President Joe Biden took office with many details still unresolved – among them evidence that the Taliban was prepared to break its ongoing ties with al-Qaeda, and that it was actually prepared to enter a political arrangement with the Afghan government led by President Ashraf Ghani.
Who are the Taliban?
The group emerged following a 10-year occupation of the country by the Soviet Union. The USSR had invaded in 1979 in an attempt to keep Afghanistan within its sphere of influence, but a decade of guerilla warfare conducted by Sunni extremists eventually led to Soviet troops withdrawing in February 1989.
A year or so later a new hardline Sunni Islamist group calling itself Taliban (“students” in the Pashto language), began to emerge. They swiftly became a formidable military machine, and towards the end of 1996 they captured the Afghan capital, Kabul. By 1998, the Taliban were in control of almost 90 percent of Afghanistan.
Initial support from some of the population quicky faded as the Taliban imposed hardline Islamist practices, such as amputations for those found guilty of theft, and public executions of adulterers. Television, music and cinema were banned, and girls aged 10 and over were forbidden to attend school. Meanwhile, they continued to wage their two-handed war – against the US presence in the country on the one hand, and the Afghan government on the other. That war persists.
The Taliban are a ruthless extremist terrorist organization hell-bent on securing control of Afghanistan. To achieve their objective they have consistently demanded the evacuation of all foreign troops. Biden is kindly obliging. No wonder experienced voices in Washington and beyond are raising objections.
Neville Teller
Neville Teller's latest book is ""Trump and the Holy Land: 2016-2020". He has written about the Middle East for more than 30 years, has published five books on the subject, and blogs at "A Mid-East Journal". Born in London and a graduate of Oxford University, he is also a long-time dramatist, writer and abridger for BBC radio and for the UK audiobook industry. He was made an MBE in the Queen's Birthday Honours, 2006 "for services to broadcasting and to drama."
Afghanistan: Has Biden Taken A Wrong Turn? – OpEd
On April 14, 2021 President Joe Biden announced that he was abandoning the timetable for withdrawing US troops from Afghanistan that his predecessor, Donald Trump, had agreed with the Taliban. …
www.eurasiareview.com
Afghanistan: Has Biden Taken A Wrong Turn? – OpEd
May 7, 2021 Neville Teller 0 Comments
By Neville Teller
On April 14, 2021 President Joe Biden announced that he was abandoning the timetable for withdrawing US troops from Afghanistan that his predecessor, Donald Trump, had agreed with the Taliban. He had decided that the process of withdrawal would continue, but at a slower pace. The new deadline for its completion would be September 11, 2021 – the 20th anniversary of al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attack on the United States.
The Taliban were unimpressed with Biden’s symbolic gesture. They marked their objection to his unilateral abandonment of the earlier agreement with a surge in violence and a car bomb in Logar province which killed nearly 30 people. Then on May 3 at least seven Afghan military personnel were killed when the Taliban set off explosives smuggled through a tunnel that the group had dug into an army outpost in southwestern Farah province. On May 6 they captured the vast Dahla Dam in Arghandab. The Afghan defense ministry says security forces have been responding to attacks by the Taliban in at least six other provinces,
Experts say that the Taliban, despite losses estimated in the tens of thousands, is stronger now than at any point since 2001. With up to 85,000 full-time fighters, it controls twenty percent of the country. It is this continuing power of the Taliban that is behind objections in Washington to Biden’s policy. Former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has warned of “huge consequences” of Biden’s decision to withdraw American troops. Her fear is that the Taliban could take over control of Afghanistan, resulting in a new civil war.
She is not alone. Many foreign policy experts in Washington, both Democrat and Republican, feel that the US should continue to deploy its military – among them Condoleezza Rice, secretary of state under President George W Bush. She too has warned about the risks of withdrawing troops and the consequent threat of terrorism.
A possible expansion of terrorist activity also concerns retired General David Petraeus, who commanded US forces in Afghanistan and later ran the CIA. Petraeus worries the Taliban will continue to gain ground militarily and allow terrorist groups to operate, while the US and NATO will have lost the platform that Afghanistan provides for counter-terrorism campaigns.
“I’m really afraid,” he said, “that we’re going to look back two years from now and regret the decision.”
According to BBC reporters the Taliban see themselves as a government-in-waiting. They have a sophisticated “shadow” structure, with officials in charge of overseeing everyday services in the areas they control. They refer to themselves as the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.”
There is no escaping the truth, painful though it may be. The Taliban – the hardline Islamist organization swiftly identified by US intelligence in the wake of the 9/11 attack as linked to al-Qaeda and shielding its leader, Osama bin Lada – has emerged unvanquished, if not unscathed, from its twenty-year struggle with America and its allies. The group has withstood counter-insurgency operations from three US administrations backed by NATO in a war that has killed more than 6,000 US troops and contractors, over 1,100 NATO soldiers, and an estimated 73,000 Afghan fighters and police officers.
Back in 2001 it took Washington less than a week to determine the source of the deadly terrorist attack it had sustained, and on September 18, 2001 then President George W Bush signed legislation authorizing the use of US forces against the perpetrators. The US launched military operations in Afghanistan on October 7 by way of a series of air strikes against Taliban military sites and terrorist training grounds.
Intensive and sustained efforts by the US, boosted in December 2009 by then President Barack Obama increasing US troop numbers to 100,000, may have weakened, but it failed to deter, the Taliban’s sustained resistance. Their demand was for the withdrawal of all foreign troops. On June 22, 2011 Obama, maintaining “We are starting this drawdown from a position of strength,” announced that 10,000 US troops would be withdrawn by the end of 2011 and an additional 23,000 by the summer of 2012.
From the moment US President Donald Trump took office in 2017, he pledged to put an end to the conflict and achieve Obama’s aim of bringing the American forces back home. It took two years of secret back-channel negotiations before peace talks began on February 25, 2019. Abdul Ghani Barada, the co-founder of the Taliban, was at the table.
This extraordinary arrangement between the world’s leading power and a hardline extremist Islamist movement was greeted with optimism by President Trump. “I really believe the Taliban wants to do something to show we’re not all wasting time,” he said.
The talks appeared successful. Agreement was quickly reached on a draft peace deal involving the withdrawal of US and international troops from Afghanistan, matched by an undertaking by the Taliban to prohibit other jihadist groups operating within the country.
However the agreement was far from watertight, and months of wrangling followed. President Joe Biden took office with many details still unresolved – among them evidence that the Taliban was prepared to break its ongoing ties with al-Qaeda, and that it was actually prepared to enter a political arrangement with the Afghan government led by President Ashraf Ghani.
Who are the Taliban?
The group emerged following a 10-year occupation of the country by the Soviet Union. The USSR had invaded in 1979 in an attempt to keep Afghanistan within its sphere of influence, but a decade of guerilla warfare conducted by Sunni extremists eventually led to Soviet troops withdrawing in February 1989.
A year or so later a new hardline Sunni Islamist group calling itself Taliban (“students” in the Pashto language), began to emerge. They swiftly became a formidable military machine, and towards the end of 1996 they captured the Afghan capital, Kabul. By 1998, the Taliban were in control of almost 90 percent of Afghanistan.
Initial support from some of the population quicky faded as the Taliban imposed hardline Islamist practices, such as amputations for those found guilty of theft, and public executions of adulterers. Television, music and cinema were banned, and girls aged 10 and over were forbidden to attend school. Meanwhile, they continued to wage their two-handed war – against the US presence in the country on the one hand, and the Afghan government on the other. That war persists.
The Taliban are a ruthless extremist terrorist organization hell-bent on securing control of Afghanistan. To achieve their objective they have consistently demanded the evacuation of all foreign troops. Biden is kindly obliging. No wonder experienced voices in Washington and beyond are raising objections.
Neville Teller
Neville Teller's latest book is ""Trump and the Holy Land: 2016-2020". He has written about the Middle East for more than 30 years, has published five books on the subject, and blogs at "A Mid-East Journal". Born in London and a graduate of Oxford University, he is also a long-time dramatist, writer and abridger for BBC radio and for the UK audiobook industry. He was made an MBE in the Queen's Birthday Honours, 2006 "for services to broadcasting and to drama."
jward
passin' thru
BILAL SARWARY
@bsarwary
#AFG BATTLEFIELD REALITY IN AFGHANISTAN- over the course of last 24 hours, the Afghan government has registered 123 Taliban attacks in 20 provinces and 69 districts across Afghanistan. Rural Afghanistan is on FIRE.
11:11 PM · May 7, 2021·Twitter for iPhone
@bsarwary
#AFG BATTLEFIELD REALITY IN AFGHANISTAN- over the course of last 24 hours, the Afghan government has registered 123 Taliban attacks in 20 provinces and 69 districts across Afghanistan. Rural Afghanistan is on FIRE.
11:11 PM · May 7, 2021·Twitter for iPhone
- Status