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The Chinese Navy’s Destroyer Fleet Will Double by 2025. Then What?
China is about to finish the current phase of destroyer construction. What comes next?
By Rick Joe
July 12, 2020
It seems that every year, English-language focus on the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) increases in depth and scope. This has been reflected in some increasingly detailed and far-ranging predictions for the PLAN’s growth, most often in terms of the number of ships it may field in whatever particular year in the near future. This author is not immune, and has written similar pieces in the past.
As of mid-2020, a number of PLAN surface combatant programs are either drawing to a close or about to shift gear. As various other major navies around the world begin to implement their own surface combatant programs and evaluations of their own future force structure, it is useful to reflect on where the PLAN’s own force balance will be in immediate future once the current phase of construction enters service – and what comes after.
From 20 modern destroyers to 39 (or 40)
As of mid-2020, the PLAN currently fields 20 modern aegis-type* destroyers in its order of battle, supported by another 11 older, non-aegis-type destroyers. These 20 modern aegis-type destroyers are made up of six Type 052Cs, 13 Type 052Ds, and one lead Type 055.
[*Note – the use of the term “aegis-type” is made in reference to the general configuration of various worldwide surface combatants that boast a fixed face or fast refresh rate phased array radar system, with vertical launch systems with at least a medium- to long-range anti-air warfare capability, and a contemporary combat management system. The term does not refer to the capitalized “Aegis warship,” which should more accurately be used to denote warships equipped with Lockheed Martin’s Aegis combat system, such as the Arleigh Burke class, Ticonderoga class, Kongo class or Sejong class, et al.]
Of these 20 aegis-type destroyers, 18 were commissioned within the last seven years. In terms of additional aegis-type destroyers on the horizon, there are currently 11 052D destroyers in various stages of fitting out or sea trials and one 052D at Dalian shipyard expected to be launched later this year – there are also six 055 destroyers in various stages of fitting out or sea trials and one 055 at Dalian expected to be launched simultaneously with the aforementioned 052D as well. At this stage, there are currently no modules for any additional 052Ds and 055s identifiable at the two destroyer building shipyards – Jiangnan and Dalian – and the Chinese language PLA watching community suggests that there will be no immediate additional hulls after the current phase of destroyer construction.
In other words, at the end of 2020, it is likely that the current “phase” of PLAN destroyer construction will end. This construction phase will have produced a grand total of eight 055 destroyers, 25 052D destroyers, and six 052C destroyers (including the two original 052Cs built in the mid 2000s). Of course, this isn’t to say that destroyer production may not resume a few years down the line, perhaps even with an initial restart of 055 or even 052D production that further leads onto a new successor class of destroyer (such as 055A or perhaps 052E) – but more on this later. There have been some rumors that a 26th 052D will also be produced; however, this doesn’t appear to have eventuated.
Returning to current destroyer construction – assuming the 25th 052D and eighth 055 are launched in the second half of this year, and assuming a generous three to four year period for fitting out and sea trials prior to commissioning, with a further one year period for crew work up and optimization – it is likely that the last of the destroyers as part of the current construction phase will be commissioned and combat capable within four to five years.
That is to say, at present the PLAN fields 20 aegis-type destroyers in service; however in four to five years it is likely that the PLAN will field 39 aegis-type destroyers in service (or 40, depending on whether a 26th 052D is built or not).
These additional warships amounts to a near doubling of the number of aegis-type hulls in service. However, the actual combat capability will be more than double the present day force given the more capable nature of 052Ds compared to 052Cs, both of which are in turn even more dwarfed by the much larger 13,000 ton 055s.
Of Destroyers and DESFLOTs
Those 39 aegis-type destroyers will be accompanied by the 11 older non-aegis destroyers for a total of about 50 destroyers. It is unclear how this fleet of destroyers will be organized among the PLAN’s major surface combatant units.
Destroyers are currently organized about evenly between six destroyer flotillas (DESFLOTs) – which are each composed of four to five destroyers and four to five frigates. Thirty 054A frigates – with potentially an additional two to four 054As recently rumored to have been ordered as part of a production restart – currently make up the vast majority of the frigates organized between the six DESFLOTs, and are expected to be supplemented by the upcoming new generation 054B (or perhaps 057) frigates.
With an expected 50-strong destroyer force on the horizon (of which 39 would be modern, aegis types), it is not known if each DESFLOT will see an increase of ship strength or if new DESFLOTs will be raised to absorb the new hulls. It is plausible that some of the older destroyer hulls may be retired within four to five years; however many of these same ship classes have either recently undergone significant midlife upgrades or are due to begin midlife upgrades, nor are they particularly old in terms of service age. Therefore, it is likely that many of these older destroyer classes will continue to be in service until 2030, albeit as second line destroyers. The question fundamentally becomes one of fleet organization.
What Comes Next?
Of course, the completion of the eight 055s and 25 052Ds doesn’t mean the Chinese navy’s destroyer procurement is “complete.” Even before the first picture of the 055 modules at Jiangnan shipyard emerged, it was an accepted consensus that a successor “055A” class destroyer would follow the baseline 055 destroyer. The question was always how many 055s would be built before the first 055A emerged, and it was long suggested that 055A could be expected by the mid-2020s after at least one batch of 055s.
Therefore, one current tentative theory is that the current first batch of eight 055s may be followed up by a smaller batch of 055s within a few years – which could then immediately lead into a construction of improved 055As in the mid 2020s. This would not be dissimilar to how a restarted production of the last four 052Cs immediately segued into large scale production of the 25 052Ds we see today.
But as mentioned in previous articles on future PLAN procurement, the number of 055As that may be built and the composition of the future fleet are not clear. This is largely due to uncertainty over whether a successor to the 7,000 ton weight category destroyer – currently filled by the 052C/D – will emerge.
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Given the ongoing COVID pandemic, one might be tempted to consider whether the end of the current phase of destroyer construction is some sort of cost-cutting measure or related to the pandemic in any way. However, such a suggestion would be hard to entertain given the long lead time nature of naval ship construction. Instead, the imminent end destroyer construction would have been a procurement decision made many years ago.
Large Frigates or Medium Destroyers?
Prior to the 13,000 ton 055, the 7,000 ton 052C and 052D served as the PLAN’s most capable surface combatant in terms of balancing displacement and combat potential, and featured significant advantages in terms of sensors and weapons systems compared to the smaller 4,000 ton 054A frigates. Therefore come 2025, the weight distribution of PLAN blue water capable surface combatants will be divided between the 13,000 ton category, the 7,000 ton category, and the 4,000 ton category.
However, the 055 is likely to be produced in significant numbers going forwards, and more importantly the 054B frigate is expected to feature greater displacement than the 054A as well. The 054B’s ambition will determine how much larger it is than 054A. Many contemporary frigate designs such as FREMM, the FFG(X) FREMM, or Type 26 family, are significantly larger in displacement compared to past medium frigate designs, offering a full displacement of at least 6,000 tons and some such as the Type 26 at 8,000 tons, rivaling or exceeding that of some current destroyers. The greater size of modern frigates is a reflection of seeking greater endurance, greater excess space for future proofing, more flexible propulsion arrangements, and more capable sensors and weapons systems as well.
If the 054B follows this trend, it too may also see a significant displacement jump from the 054A, potentially 1,500 to 2,000 tons. On the other hand, a more conservative 054B may displace only a few hundred more tons. If 054B does see a large displacement jump to reach 5,500-6,000 tons, then it would begin to approach the weight of a 052D destroyer, which will bring into question what role the 7,000 ton category plays in the overall fleet balance.
One option is that the 7,000 ton category may be succeeded by a larger and more future proof design of its own, potentially in the 8,000-9,000 ton weight category. Such a warship would likely have to be a new hull design as the current 052D design should be approaching the limits of what the hull can accommodate. This would result in a revised three tier fleet structure including the 13,000 ton category, a new 8,000-9,000 ton category, and a new 5,500-6,000 ton category for new generation blue water combatants.
Alternatively, there is also an argument for standardizing to a two tier fleet only including the 13,000 ton category and 5,500-6,000 ton category. In the context of manpower and military spending, a two tier fleet could potentially offer benefits resulting from standardization of ship hulls and subsystems. However, the exact cost breakdown of procuring and operating a two tier fleet versus a three tier fleet will likely be dependent on internal strategic assessments of which capabilities and which costs are deemed more acceptable to naval procurement on the national level.
Summary
PLAN surface combatant procurement is at an interesting juncture where the labors of the last decade’s worth of destroyer production are about to bear fruit in the near future. With 39 aegis-type destroyers in service come 2024-25, only the U.S. Navy would field a larger and more capable fleet of surface combatants in that time period.
As the current production phase comes to a close, there will inevitably be speculation as to where PLAN force development may go. There may even be speculation as to whether PLAN destroyer production will cease for a long duration of many years or even decades. However, this author still remembers in the late 2000s where some commentators believed modern PLAN destroyers would not grow significantly beyond the lone pair of 052Cs.
Key upcoming developments that can help guide predictions for the next phase of PLAN surface combatant procurement include:
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The Chinese Navy’s Destroyer Fleet Will Double by 2025. Then What?
China is about to finish the current phase of destroyer construction. What comes next?
thediplomat.com
The Chinese Navy’s Destroyer Fleet Will Double by 2025. Then What?
China is about to finish the current phase of destroyer construction. What comes next?
By Rick Joe
July 12, 2020
It seems that every year, English-language focus on the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) increases in depth and scope. This has been reflected in some increasingly detailed and far-ranging predictions for the PLAN’s growth, most often in terms of the number of ships it may field in whatever particular year in the near future. This author is not immune, and has written similar pieces in the past.
As of mid-2020, a number of PLAN surface combatant programs are either drawing to a close or about to shift gear. As various other major navies around the world begin to implement their own surface combatant programs and evaluations of their own future force structure, it is useful to reflect on where the PLAN’s own force balance will be in immediate future once the current phase of construction enters service – and what comes after.
From 20 modern destroyers to 39 (or 40)
As of mid-2020, the PLAN currently fields 20 modern aegis-type* destroyers in its order of battle, supported by another 11 older, non-aegis-type destroyers. These 20 modern aegis-type destroyers are made up of six Type 052Cs, 13 Type 052Ds, and one lead Type 055.
[*Note – the use of the term “aegis-type” is made in reference to the general configuration of various worldwide surface combatants that boast a fixed face or fast refresh rate phased array radar system, with vertical launch systems with at least a medium- to long-range anti-air warfare capability, and a contemporary combat management system. The term does not refer to the capitalized “Aegis warship,” which should more accurately be used to denote warships equipped with Lockheed Martin’s Aegis combat system, such as the Arleigh Burke class, Ticonderoga class, Kongo class or Sejong class, et al.]
Of these 20 aegis-type destroyers, 18 were commissioned within the last seven years. In terms of additional aegis-type destroyers on the horizon, there are currently 11 052D destroyers in various stages of fitting out or sea trials and one 052D at Dalian shipyard expected to be launched later this year – there are also six 055 destroyers in various stages of fitting out or sea trials and one 055 at Dalian expected to be launched simultaneously with the aforementioned 052D as well. At this stage, there are currently no modules for any additional 052Ds and 055s identifiable at the two destroyer building shipyards – Jiangnan and Dalian – and the Chinese language PLA watching community suggests that there will be no immediate additional hulls after the current phase of destroyer construction.
In other words, at the end of 2020, it is likely that the current “phase” of PLAN destroyer construction will end. This construction phase will have produced a grand total of eight 055 destroyers, 25 052D destroyers, and six 052C destroyers (including the two original 052Cs built in the mid 2000s). Of course, this isn’t to say that destroyer production may not resume a few years down the line, perhaps even with an initial restart of 055 or even 052D production that further leads onto a new successor class of destroyer (such as 055A or perhaps 052E) – but more on this later. There have been some rumors that a 26th 052D will also be produced; however, this doesn’t appear to have eventuated.
Returning to current destroyer construction – assuming the 25th 052D and eighth 055 are launched in the second half of this year, and assuming a generous three to four year period for fitting out and sea trials prior to commissioning, with a further one year period for crew work up and optimization – it is likely that the last of the destroyers as part of the current construction phase will be commissioned and combat capable within four to five years.
That is to say, at present the PLAN fields 20 aegis-type destroyers in service; however in four to five years it is likely that the PLAN will field 39 aegis-type destroyers in service (or 40, depending on whether a 26th 052D is built or not).
These additional warships amounts to a near doubling of the number of aegis-type hulls in service. However, the actual combat capability will be more than double the present day force given the more capable nature of 052Ds compared to 052Cs, both of which are in turn even more dwarfed by the much larger 13,000 ton 055s.
Of Destroyers and DESFLOTs
Those 39 aegis-type destroyers will be accompanied by the 11 older non-aegis destroyers for a total of about 50 destroyers. It is unclear how this fleet of destroyers will be organized among the PLAN’s major surface combatant units.
Destroyers are currently organized about evenly between six destroyer flotillas (DESFLOTs) – which are each composed of four to five destroyers and four to five frigates. Thirty 054A frigates – with potentially an additional two to four 054As recently rumored to have been ordered as part of a production restart – currently make up the vast majority of the frigates organized between the six DESFLOTs, and are expected to be supplemented by the upcoming new generation 054B (or perhaps 057) frigates.
With an expected 50-strong destroyer force on the horizon (of which 39 would be modern, aegis types), it is not known if each DESFLOT will see an increase of ship strength or if new DESFLOTs will be raised to absorb the new hulls. It is plausible that some of the older destroyer hulls may be retired within four to five years; however many of these same ship classes have either recently undergone significant midlife upgrades or are due to begin midlife upgrades, nor are they particularly old in terms of service age. Therefore, it is likely that many of these older destroyer classes will continue to be in service until 2030, albeit as second line destroyers. The question fundamentally becomes one of fleet organization.
What Comes Next?
Of course, the completion of the eight 055s and 25 052Ds doesn’t mean the Chinese navy’s destroyer procurement is “complete.” Even before the first picture of the 055 modules at Jiangnan shipyard emerged, it was an accepted consensus that a successor “055A” class destroyer would follow the baseline 055 destroyer. The question was always how many 055s would be built before the first 055A emerged, and it was long suggested that 055A could be expected by the mid-2020s after at least one batch of 055s.
Therefore, one current tentative theory is that the current first batch of eight 055s may be followed up by a smaller batch of 055s within a few years – which could then immediately lead into a construction of improved 055As in the mid 2020s. This would not be dissimilar to how a restarted production of the last four 052Cs immediately segued into large scale production of the 25 052Ds we see today.
But as mentioned in previous articles on future PLAN procurement, the number of 055As that may be built and the composition of the future fleet are not clear. This is largely due to uncertainty over whether a successor to the 7,000 ton weight category destroyer – currently filled by the 052C/D – will emerge.
ADVERTISEMENT
Given the ongoing COVID pandemic, one might be tempted to consider whether the end of the current phase of destroyer construction is some sort of cost-cutting measure or related to the pandemic in any way. However, such a suggestion would be hard to entertain given the long lead time nature of naval ship construction. Instead, the imminent end destroyer construction would have been a procurement decision made many years ago.
Large Frigates or Medium Destroyers?
Prior to the 13,000 ton 055, the 7,000 ton 052C and 052D served as the PLAN’s most capable surface combatant in terms of balancing displacement and combat potential, and featured significant advantages in terms of sensors and weapons systems compared to the smaller 4,000 ton 054A frigates. Therefore come 2025, the weight distribution of PLAN blue water capable surface combatants will be divided between the 13,000 ton category, the 7,000 ton category, and the 4,000 ton category.
However, the 055 is likely to be produced in significant numbers going forwards, and more importantly the 054B frigate is expected to feature greater displacement than the 054A as well. The 054B’s ambition will determine how much larger it is than 054A. Many contemporary frigate designs such as FREMM, the FFG(X) FREMM, or Type 26 family, are significantly larger in displacement compared to past medium frigate designs, offering a full displacement of at least 6,000 tons and some such as the Type 26 at 8,000 tons, rivaling or exceeding that of some current destroyers. The greater size of modern frigates is a reflection of seeking greater endurance, greater excess space for future proofing, more flexible propulsion arrangements, and more capable sensors and weapons systems as well.
If the 054B follows this trend, it too may also see a significant displacement jump from the 054A, potentially 1,500 to 2,000 tons. On the other hand, a more conservative 054B may displace only a few hundred more tons. If 054B does see a large displacement jump to reach 5,500-6,000 tons, then it would begin to approach the weight of a 052D destroyer, which will bring into question what role the 7,000 ton category plays in the overall fleet balance.
One option is that the 7,000 ton category may be succeeded by a larger and more future proof design of its own, potentially in the 8,000-9,000 ton weight category. Such a warship would likely have to be a new hull design as the current 052D design should be approaching the limits of what the hull can accommodate. This would result in a revised three tier fleet structure including the 13,000 ton category, a new 8,000-9,000 ton category, and a new 5,500-6,000 ton category for new generation blue water combatants.
Alternatively, there is also an argument for standardizing to a two tier fleet only including the 13,000 ton category and 5,500-6,000 ton category. In the context of manpower and military spending, a two tier fleet could potentially offer benefits resulting from standardization of ship hulls and subsystems. However, the exact cost breakdown of procuring and operating a two tier fleet versus a three tier fleet will likely be dependent on internal strategic assessments of which capabilities and which costs are deemed more acceptable to naval procurement on the national level.
Summary
PLAN surface combatant procurement is at an interesting juncture where the labors of the last decade’s worth of destroyer production are about to bear fruit in the near future. With 39 aegis-type destroyers in service come 2024-25, only the U.S. Navy would field a larger and more capable fleet of surface combatants in that time period.
As the current production phase comes to a close, there will inevitably be speculation as to where PLAN force development may go. There may even be speculation as to whether PLAN destroyer production will cease for a long duration of many years or even decades. However, this author still remembers in the late 2000s where some commentators believed modern PLAN destroyers would not grow significantly beyond the lone pair of 052Cs.
Key upcoming developments that can help guide predictions for the next phase of PLAN surface combatant procurement include:
- The key characteristics – especially size – of the next generation frigate, dubbed 054B (but also sometimes called 057).
- Ascertaining when production of 055 destroyers will restart as a guide for when the expected 055A successor will emerge.
- Related to the two above factors – whether a “052E” medium destroyer successor to the 052D weight category will emerge.
GUEST AUTHOR
Rick Joe
VIEW PROFILE
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Barr Warns Company Executives on Pushing Policies at Behest of China; Attorney general criticizes Hollywood and tech giants as Trump administration continues to take aim at Beijing
Thursday, July 16, 2020, 1:35 PM ET
By Aruna Viswanatha and William Mauldin
Wall Street Journal
Attorney General William Barr took aim at a range of American companies and industries for what he described as a willingness to accede to authoritarian demands from the Chinese government, as the Trump administration has stepped up its rhetoric and actions countering Beijing's recent activities .
In a speech Thursday in Michigan, Mr. Barr criticized the Hollywood entertainment industry and Walt Disney Co . as well as tech giants including Alphabet Inc .'s Google and Apple Inc ., saying they are "all too willing to collaborate" with the Chinese Communist Party.
In remarks before an audience of members of the business and university communities at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Museum, Mr. Barr warned executives to be careful of pushing policies at the behest of Chinese authorities, which he said could require registration under a U.S. lobbying law.
"America's corporate leaders might not think of themselves as lobbyists," Mr. Barr said, telling them: "But you should be alert to how you might be used, and how your efforts on behalf of a foreign company or government could implicate the Foreign Agents Registration Act," which requires lobbyists for foreign governments or companies to register such work with the Justice Department.
Many large U.S. companies see much of their growth coming from China, so it is unclear to what degree warnings from the administration or the risk of bad publicity will change their calculus.
"The ultimate ambition of China's rulers isn't to trade with the United States. It is to raid the United States," Mr. Barr said, adding: "If you are an American business leader, appeasing the PRC may bring short-term rewards. But in the end, the PRC's goal is to replace you," referring to the People's Republic of China.
A spokesman for Apple referred to previous statements in which the company had said it was "convinced the best way we can continue to promote openness is to remain engaged even where we may disagree with a country's laws."
A spokeswoman for Google, whose search engine is blocked in China , declined to comment.
A representative for Disney, which previously said the company has "always been fully aware of the laws and regulations in whatever country we operate in, and always adhere to them," couldn't immediately be reached for comment.
The Trump administration has recently targeted a range of Chinese actions, including the country's claims of maritime rights in much of the South China Sea.
This week, the Trump administration came out publicly in opposition to those assertions , a move that supports Vietnam, Malaysia and other countries in the region that have claims there. A U.S. guided-missile destroyer on Tuesday sailed by the Spratly Islands , claimed by China and other countries, in a "freedom of navigation" operation.
Late Tuesday, Mr. Trump used a Rose Garden press conference to announce he had signed legislation allowing for sanctions against people and entities linked to Beijing's new security law on Hong Kong. That night the White House released an executive order aimed at phasing out privileges Hong Kong has enjoyed over mainland China in U.S. law.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said Wednesday the U.S. would decline to issue travel visas to unspecified executives of Chinese technology firms, including Huawei Technologies , that "provide material support to regimes engaging in human rights violations and abuses." Earlier this month, four government departments released a joint memo warning American firms that they risk violating U.S. sanctions or reputational damage if their supply chains or customers are connected with China's Xinjiang region, where academic researchers say more than a million Uighur Muslim minorities have been detained.
In his Thursday remarks, Mr. Barr specifically criticized technology companies for removing apps at the request of the Chinese government, including Apple's removal of the news outlet Quartz's app , after it had covered the Hong Kong democracy protests. Mr. Barr also criticized Disney for giving Chinese government officials a role in managing its Shanghai theme park.
In other recent speeches, the FBI director, Christopher Wray , and Mr. Trump's national security adviser, Robert O'Brien, have laid out what they view as the threats emanating from China in some of the starkest terms yet.
Americans are "the victims of what amounts to Chinese theft on a scale so massive that it represents one of the largest transfers of wealth in human history," Mr. Wray said, speaking at the conservative Hudson Institute last week. He also disclosed that the Federal Bureau of Investigation is opening a new China-related counterintelligence case every 10 hours, with nearly 2,500 such cases under way.
"At this very moment, China is working to compromise American health care organizations, pharmaceutical companies, and academic institutions conducting essential Covid-19 research," Mr. Wray said.
The Justice Department and the FBI have in particular been focused on China's efforts at American universities to fund scientists to essentially moonlight at Chinese universities and set up research projects parallel to those they are conducting in the U.S. with American government funding including the National Institutes of Health .
Last week, for example, the FBI arrested an Ohio State University rheumatology professor on charges of grant fraud and making false statements for allegedly not disclosing his Chinese government funding to the NIH , which awarded him more than $4 million in funding, according to the criminal complaint filed against him.
The professor was arrested in Alaska as he was preparing to board a charter flight to China.
In May, researchers from the Cleveland Clinic and the University of Arkansas were charged in similar cases.
Write to Aruna Viswanatha at Aruna.Viswanatha@wsj.com and William Mauldin at william.mauldin@wsj.com
www.wsj.com
Thursday, July 16, 2020, 1:35 PM ET
By Aruna Viswanatha and William Mauldin
Wall Street Journal
Attorney General William Barr took aim at a range of American companies and industries for what he described as a willingness to accede to authoritarian demands from the Chinese government, as the Trump administration has stepped up its rhetoric and actions countering Beijing's recent activities .
In a speech Thursday in Michigan, Mr. Barr criticized the Hollywood entertainment industry and Walt Disney Co . as well as tech giants including Alphabet Inc .'s Google and Apple Inc ., saying they are "all too willing to collaborate" with the Chinese Communist Party.
In remarks before an audience of members of the business and university communities at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Museum, Mr. Barr warned executives to be careful of pushing policies at the behest of Chinese authorities, which he said could require registration under a U.S. lobbying law.
"America's corporate leaders might not think of themselves as lobbyists," Mr. Barr said, telling them: "But you should be alert to how you might be used, and how your efforts on behalf of a foreign company or government could implicate the Foreign Agents Registration Act," which requires lobbyists for foreign governments or companies to register such work with the Justice Department.
Many large U.S. companies see much of their growth coming from China, so it is unclear to what degree warnings from the administration or the risk of bad publicity will change their calculus.
"The ultimate ambition of China's rulers isn't to trade with the United States. It is to raid the United States," Mr. Barr said, adding: "If you are an American business leader, appeasing the PRC may bring short-term rewards. But in the end, the PRC's goal is to replace you," referring to the People's Republic of China.
A spokesman for Apple referred to previous statements in which the company had said it was "convinced the best way we can continue to promote openness is to remain engaged even where we may disagree with a country's laws."
A spokeswoman for Google, whose search engine is blocked in China , declined to comment.
A representative for Disney, which previously said the company has "always been fully aware of the laws and regulations in whatever country we operate in, and always adhere to them," couldn't immediately be reached for comment.
The Trump administration has recently targeted a range of Chinese actions, including the country's claims of maritime rights in much of the South China Sea.
This week, the Trump administration came out publicly in opposition to those assertions , a move that supports Vietnam, Malaysia and other countries in the region that have claims there. A U.S. guided-missile destroyer on Tuesday sailed by the Spratly Islands , claimed by China and other countries, in a "freedom of navigation" operation.
Late Tuesday, Mr. Trump used a Rose Garden press conference to announce he had signed legislation allowing for sanctions against people and entities linked to Beijing's new security law on Hong Kong. That night the White House released an executive order aimed at phasing out privileges Hong Kong has enjoyed over mainland China in U.S. law.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said Wednesday the U.S. would decline to issue travel visas to unspecified executives of Chinese technology firms, including Huawei Technologies , that "provide material support to regimes engaging in human rights violations and abuses." Earlier this month, four government departments released a joint memo warning American firms that they risk violating U.S. sanctions or reputational damage if their supply chains or customers are connected with China's Xinjiang region, where academic researchers say more than a million Uighur Muslim minorities have been detained.
In his Thursday remarks, Mr. Barr specifically criticized technology companies for removing apps at the request of the Chinese government, including Apple's removal of the news outlet Quartz's app , after it had covered the Hong Kong democracy protests. Mr. Barr also criticized Disney for giving Chinese government officials a role in managing its Shanghai theme park.
In other recent speeches, the FBI director, Christopher Wray , and Mr. Trump's national security adviser, Robert O'Brien, have laid out what they view as the threats emanating from China in some of the starkest terms yet.
Americans are "the victims of what amounts to Chinese theft on a scale so massive that it represents one of the largest transfers of wealth in human history," Mr. Wray said, speaking at the conservative Hudson Institute last week. He also disclosed that the Federal Bureau of Investigation is opening a new China-related counterintelligence case every 10 hours, with nearly 2,500 such cases under way.
"At this very moment, China is working to compromise American health care organizations, pharmaceutical companies, and academic institutions conducting essential Covid-19 research," Mr. Wray said.
The Justice Department and the FBI have in particular been focused on China's efforts at American universities to fund scientists to essentially moonlight at Chinese universities and set up research projects parallel to those they are conducting in the U.S. with American government funding including the National Institutes of Health .
Last week, for example, the FBI arrested an Ohio State University rheumatology professor on charges of grant fraud and making false statements for allegedly not disclosing his Chinese government funding to the NIH , which awarded him more than $4 million in funding, according to the criminal complaint filed against him.
The professor was arrested in Alaska as he was preparing to board a charter flight to China.
In May, researchers from the Cleveland Clinic and the University of Arkansas were charged in similar cases.
Write to Aruna Viswanatha at Aruna.Viswanatha@wsj.com and William Mauldin at william.mauldin@wsj.com
Barr Warns Company Executives on Pushing Policies at Behest of China
The Attorney General took aim at a range of American companies and industries for what he described as a willingness to accede to authoritarian demands from the Chinese government.
www.wsj.com
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#Breaking: #Chinesewarplanes have reportedly flown near the Taiwan Strait mid line during a Taiwan drill. (
@FirstSquawk)
@IntelDoge
#Breaking: #Chinesewarplanes have reportedly flown near the Taiwan Strait mid line during a Taiwan drill. (
@FirstSquawk)
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Hong Kong demands Taiwan officials sign 'one China' document for visa renewal, source says
Taiwanese officials in Hong Kong have been told their visas will not be renewed unless they sign a document supporting Beijing's claim to Taiwan under its "one China" policy, a person with direct knowledge of the matter told Reuters.
www.reuters.com
Hong Kong demands Taiwan officials sign 'one China' document for visa renewal, source says
JULY 17, 2020 / 4:05 AM / UPDATED 8 HOURS AGO Yimou Lee
TAIPEI (Reuters) - Taiwanese officials in Hong Kong have been told their visas will not be renewed unless they sign a document supporting Beijing’s claim to Taiwan under its “one China” policy, a person with direct knowledge of the matter told Reuters.
The move comes after Taipei criticised a new security law imposed on Hong Kong by Beijing, and opened an office in Taipei this month to help people who may want to leave the Asian financial centre.
Several Taiwanese officials at its de facto Hong Kong consulate who were due to renew their visas have been asked by the city’s government to sign the document, a senior Taiwan official with knowledge of the matter told Reuters.
The official said the move was unprecedented and presented an “unnecessary political obstacle” for Taipei-Hong Kong ties.
“They won’t issue the visa if we don’t sign the document,” the official said, declining to be named due to the sensitivity of the matter. “It’s entirely a problem created by them.”
“We will try our best to defend our stance. Our representatives in Hong Kong will hold fast to their position.”
The Hong Kong Immigration Department said it would not comment on individual cases, but added that it acts in accordance with the relevant laws and policies when handling each application.
Taiwan’s China policy-making Mainland Affairs Council urged Hong Kong to return to “existing consensus” to maintain normal exchanges between Taiwan and Hong Kong.
“Hong Kong should follow mutual agreements to ensure the office is free from political interference, and should not establish unnecessary obstacles beyond those agreements,” it said in a statement to Reuters.
Taiwan has 15 Taiwanese staff at its de facto consulate in the city, another person with knowledge of the matter said.
China sees Taiwan as part of “one China” and has never renounced the use of force to bring the island under its control.
China has proposed that Taiwan be brought under Chinese rule under a similar “one country two systems” arrangement it offered to Hong Kong. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen rejects the proposal, which she calls a “failure”.
The source declined to say exactly how many Taiwan officials were asked to sign the paper but said its acting chief, Kao Ming-tsun, had returned to the island late on Thursday after he refused to sign the document upon his visa renewal.
Reuters was not immediately able to reach Kao for comment.
Kao’s return to Taiwan due to the political spat was first reported by Taiwan online publication Up Media.
Taiwan announced this week it will enhance scrutiny over investment from Hong Kong to prevent illicit money from mainland China, days after Reuters reported the move.
Hummm.....
Posted for fair use.....
www.wsj.com
Trump Administration Weighs Troop Cut in South Korea
Options for reducing U.S. military presence in South Korea, coming amid tense talks over cost sharing, follow partial American withdrawal from Germany
Currently, 28,500 U.S. troops are stationed in South Korea. U.S. military helicopters at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, South Korea, in February.
Photo: Hong Ki-won/Associated Press
By
and
Updated July 17, 2020 1:02 pm ET
The Pentagon has presented the White House with options to reduce the American military presence in South Korea as the two countries remain at odds over President Trump’s demand that Seoul greatly increase how much it pays for the U.S. troops stationed in the country, U.S. officials said.
The Pentagon’s Joint Staff has reviewed the structure of U.S. forces in South Korea as part of a broader re-examination of how to reposition and potentially reduce military deployments world-wide, a U.S. military official said.
Trump administration officials declined to spell out contingency plans to shrink the American military presence in South Korea below the current level of 28,500 U.S. troops and said no decision to reduce the force has been made.
The Price of SecurityAfter years of gradual increases, Washingtonwants Seoul to pay much more for the U.S.military presence.South Korean contributionsSources: South Korea's Ministry of National Defense;Statistics Korea
.billion
The disclosure comes as Mr. Trump has unnerved allies by deciding to remove 9,500 of the 34,500 U.S. troops permanently stationed in Germany and as one of the president’s most outspoken advisers has signaled that more troop withdrawals might occur.
“Donald Trump was very clear,” Richard Grenell, the former U.S. ambassador in Germany who pushed for the troop withdrawals in that country told the German newspaper Bild last month.
“We want to bring troops from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, from South Korea, Japan and from Germany,” he said.
Americans “are getting a little bit tired of paying too much for the defense of other countries,” Mr. Grenell added in comments that reverberated in Seoul.
The U.S. and South Korea have been military allies since the Korean War. In 1991, the two countries concluded the first of a series of agreements under which Seoul provides funds and other support to defray the Americans’ cost of keeping troops there.
Mr. Trump, however, has long insisted that South Korea pay more.
Yielding to administration pressure, Seoul agreed to pay $926 million in 2019, an 8.2% increase for a one-year, a stopgap deal. Mr. Trump hailed the development in a tweet, but later demanded a fivefold increase in the payment to $5 billion for the following year.
Less Presence
The U.S. troop presence in South Korea peaked in wartime in the 1950s and stands
at about 28,500 today.
U.S. troop levels in South Korea
400,000
Korean
War
300,000
200,000
100,000
Range
0
1950
’60
’70
’80
’90
2000
’10
Source: Institute for Military History
South Korean President Moon Jae-in made a counteroffer to give Mr. Trump more than $5 billion, but spread over five years, according to a person familiar with the talks.
Under the terms of the South Korean offer, Seoul would boost its payment 13.6% during the first year with annual increases after that of about 7% a year that would be tied to the growth of South Korea’s defense budget. In the fifth year, Seoul would pay the U.S. $1.3 billion.
Senior U.S. officials thought that the issue might be ripe for resolution after Mr. Moon agreed in March to Mr. Trump’s request that it send test kits to help the U.S. deal with the coronavirus pandemic. But instead of embracing the South Korean offer, Mr. Trump raised the stakes by proposing that South Korea pay $1.3 billion for another one-year deal, a person familiar with the talks said.
Mr. Moon rejected that proposal. Cost-sharing agreements generally have lasted up to five years, and Mr. Trump’s proposal would have left South Korea open to new American demands a year later.
National Security Council officials didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment on Mr. Trump’s proposal and the details of the continuing negotiations.
U.S. soldiers participated in a military tactical demonstration at Osan Air Base in Pyeongtaek, South Korea, in 2019.
Photo: jung yeon-je/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
No cost-sharing accord has been in effect since the 2019 deal, known as the Special Measures Agreement, lapsed in December.
“The president has been clear in the expectation that our allies around the world, including South Korea, can and should contribute more,” a senior Trump administration official said.
At the same time, officials said, Mr. Trump has continued to question the rationale for overseas deployments.
“He has made it clear he wants options,” another administration official said.
The White House asked the Pentagon last fall to provide preliminary options for withdrawing troops from around the world, including in the Middle East, Africa, Europe and Asia.
By December, the Pentagon had come up with broad ideas, which also reflected its strategy for competing with China and Russia and its emphasis on rotational forces. In March, the Pentagon refined a number of options and presented them to the White House, including some for South Korea, one of the administration officials said.
U.S. soldiers walking at a shopping zone outside Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, South Korea, in 2019.
Photo: jung yeon-je/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
A U.S. military official declined to say whether Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has informed his South Korea counterpart regarding the U.S. review of troop levels. The fact that the Pentagon developed options for adjusting troop levels was reported in April by the South Korean newspaper Dong-A Ilbo.
Earlier this month, Gen. Robert Abrams, the commander of U.S. forces in South Korea, described reports that the U.S. might withdraw troops from South Korea as wildly speculative, while noting that the Pentagon continuously assesses the U.S. military’s deployments globally.
“No decisions have been made to alter our force posture in South Korea,” added a U.S. Defense official. “But regardless of the outcome of the review, we are confident that we will maintain our ability to address any threat on the Korean Peninsula.”
Mr. Trump’s diplomacy toward South Korea has stirred up debate among American experts, who assert that the president isn’t giving sufficient weight to the role allies can play in helping to safeguard U.S. interests.
From the Archives
Oldest, Most Strategic U.S. Base for Deterring North Korea Shuts Down
You may also like
Up Next
Oldest, Most Strategic U.S. Base for Deterring North Korea Shuts Down
After more than 60 years, the U.S. is closing a military base in Seoul that has kept the region safe from North Korean threats. WSJ explores the historic complex and meets the people who have called it home for years. Video: Clément Bürge. Image composite: Crystal Tai (Originally published Sept. 3, 2019)
“This reflects Trump’s transactional view of alliances,” said Bruce Klingner of the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank. “It is counter to the U.S. post-World War II strategy that sees allies as in our strategic interests. Keeping U.S. troops forward deployed can deter America’s opponents from doing bad things and allow U.S. troops to respond more quickly.”
Congress has been concerned as well.
Legislation passed by the House Armed Services Committee this month that would preclude the Pentagon from reducing troops in South Korea below 28,500 unless the defense secretary certifies that the North Korean threat has eased and the reduction wouldn’t hurt U.S. security. The Senate Armed Services had drafted a similar measure.
SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS
What are the regional implications of removing U.S. troops from South Korea? Join the conversation below.
South Korean officials have said that the country spent about 2.5% of its GDP on defense in 2019. The White House has complained Germany has failed to meet a North Atlantic Treaty Organization goal of spending 2% of its GDP on its military.
Progress in talks over a new U.S.-South Korea cost-sharing agreement seems unlikely in the near future, experts say. In June, the two countries agreed that Seoul would spend about $200 million to pay the salaries of roughly 4,000 South Korean workers, who had been furloughed from their jobs on U.S. bases for months. That development eased the domestic pressure on the South Korea government to reach accord with the U.S.
Paul Choi, the managing director of StratWays Group, a Seoul-based geopolitical-risk advisory, said the matter is distracting the allies from larger issues such as North Korea and China.
“We’re shooting ourselves in the foot,” he said.
—Andrew Jeong in Seoul contributed to this article.
Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com and Gordon Lubold at Gordon.Lubold@wsj.com
Posted for fair use.....
WSJ News Exclusive | Trump Administration Weighs Troop Cut in South Korea
The Pentagon has presented the White House with options to reduce the American military presence in South Korea as the two countries remain at odds over President Trump’s demand that Seoul greatly increase how much it pays for the U.S. troops stationed in the country, U.S. officials said.
www.wsj.com
- WSJ News Exclusive
- National Security
Trump Administration Weighs Troop Cut in South Korea
Options for reducing U.S. military presence in South Korea, coming amid tense talks over cost sharing, follow partial American withdrawal from Germany
Currently, 28,500 U.S. troops are stationed in South Korea. U.S. military helicopters at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, South Korea, in February.
Photo: Hong Ki-won/Associated Press
By
and
Updated July 17, 2020 1:02 pm ET
Share
Text
220
The Pentagon has presented the White House with options to reduce the American military presence in South Korea as the two countries remain at odds over President Trump’s demand that Seoul greatly increase how much it pays for the U.S. troops stationed in the country, U.S. officials said.
The Pentagon’s Joint Staff has reviewed the structure of U.S. forces in South Korea as part of a broader re-examination of how to reposition and potentially reduce military deployments world-wide, a U.S. military official said.
Trump administration officials declined to spell out contingency plans to shrink the American military presence in South Korea below the current level of 28,500 U.S. troops and said no decision to reduce the force has been made.
The Price of SecurityAfter years of gradual increases, Washingtonwants Seoul to pay much more for the U.S.military presence.South Korean contributionsSources: South Korea's Ministry of National Defense;Statistics Korea
.billion
The disclosure comes as Mr. Trump has unnerved allies by deciding to remove 9,500 of the 34,500 U.S. troops permanently stationed in Germany and as one of the president’s most outspoken advisers has signaled that more troop withdrawals might occur.
“Donald Trump was very clear,” Richard Grenell, the former U.S. ambassador in Germany who pushed for the troop withdrawals in that country told the German newspaper Bild last month.
“We want to bring troops from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, from South Korea, Japan and from Germany,” he said.
Americans “are getting a little bit tired of paying too much for the defense of other countries,” Mr. Grenell added in comments that reverberated in Seoul.
The U.S. and South Korea have been military allies since the Korean War. In 1991, the two countries concluded the first of a series of agreements under which Seoul provides funds and other support to defray the Americans’ cost of keeping troops there.
Mr. Trump, however, has long insisted that South Korea pay more.
Yielding to administration pressure, Seoul agreed to pay $926 million in 2019, an 8.2% increase for a one-year, a stopgap deal. Mr. Trump hailed the development in a tweet, but later demanded a fivefold increase in the payment to $5 billion for the following year.
Less Presence
The U.S. troop presence in South Korea peaked in wartime in the 1950s and stands
at about 28,500 today.
U.S. troop levels in South Korea
400,000
Korean
War
300,000
200,000
100,000
Range
0
1950
’60
’70
’80
’90
2000
’10
Source: Institute for Military History
South Korean President Moon Jae-in made a counteroffer to give Mr. Trump more than $5 billion, but spread over five years, according to a person familiar with the talks.
Under the terms of the South Korean offer, Seoul would boost its payment 13.6% during the first year with annual increases after that of about 7% a year that would be tied to the growth of South Korea’s defense budget. In the fifth year, Seoul would pay the U.S. $1.3 billion.
Senior U.S. officials thought that the issue might be ripe for resolution after Mr. Moon agreed in March to Mr. Trump’s request that it send test kits to help the U.S. deal with the coronavirus pandemic. But instead of embracing the South Korean offer, Mr. Trump raised the stakes by proposing that South Korea pay $1.3 billion for another one-year deal, a person familiar with the talks said.
Mr. Moon rejected that proposal. Cost-sharing agreements generally have lasted up to five years, and Mr. Trump’s proposal would have left South Korea open to new American demands a year later.
National Security Council officials didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment on Mr. Trump’s proposal and the details of the continuing negotiations.
U.S. soldiers participated in a military tactical demonstration at Osan Air Base in Pyeongtaek, South Korea, in 2019.
Photo: jung yeon-je/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
No cost-sharing accord has been in effect since the 2019 deal, known as the Special Measures Agreement, lapsed in December.
“The president has been clear in the expectation that our allies around the world, including South Korea, can and should contribute more,” a senior Trump administration official said.
At the same time, officials said, Mr. Trump has continued to question the rationale for overseas deployments.
“He has made it clear he wants options,” another administration official said.
The White House asked the Pentagon last fall to provide preliminary options for withdrawing troops from around the world, including in the Middle East, Africa, Europe and Asia.
By December, the Pentagon had come up with broad ideas, which also reflected its strategy for competing with China and Russia and its emphasis on rotational forces. In March, the Pentagon refined a number of options and presented them to the White House, including some for South Korea, one of the administration officials said.
U.S. soldiers walking at a shopping zone outside Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, South Korea, in 2019.
Photo: jung yeon-je/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
A U.S. military official declined to say whether Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has informed his South Korea counterpart regarding the U.S. review of troop levels. The fact that the Pentagon developed options for adjusting troop levels was reported in April by the South Korean newspaper Dong-A Ilbo.
Earlier this month, Gen. Robert Abrams, the commander of U.S. forces in South Korea, described reports that the U.S. might withdraw troops from South Korea as wildly speculative, while noting that the Pentagon continuously assesses the U.S. military’s deployments globally.
“No decisions have been made to alter our force posture in South Korea,” added a U.S. Defense official. “But regardless of the outcome of the review, we are confident that we will maintain our ability to address any threat on the Korean Peninsula.”
Mr. Trump’s diplomacy toward South Korea has stirred up debate among American experts, who assert that the president isn’t giving sufficient weight to the role allies can play in helping to safeguard U.S. interests.
From the Archives
Oldest, Most Strategic U.S. Base for Deterring North Korea Shuts Down
You may also like
Up Next
Oldest, Most Strategic U.S. Base for Deterring North Korea Shuts Down
After more than 60 years, the U.S. is closing a military base in Seoul that has kept the region safe from North Korean threats. WSJ explores the historic complex and meets the people who have called it home for years. Video: Clément Bürge. Image composite: Crystal Tai (Originally published Sept. 3, 2019)
“This reflects Trump’s transactional view of alliances,” said Bruce Klingner of the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank. “It is counter to the U.S. post-World War II strategy that sees allies as in our strategic interests. Keeping U.S. troops forward deployed can deter America’s opponents from doing bad things and allow U.S. troops to respond more quickly.”
Congress has been concerned as well.
Legislation passed by the House Armed Services Committee this month that would preclude the Pentagon from reducing troops in South Korea below 28,500 unless the defense secretary certifies that the North Korean threat has eased and the reduction wouldn’t hurt U.S. security. The Senate Armed Services had drafted a similar measure.
SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS
What are the regional implications of removing U.S. troops from South Korea? Join the conversation below.
South Korean officials have said that the country spent about 2.5% of its GDP on defense in 2019. The White House has complained Germany has failed to meet a North Atlantic Treaty Organization goal of spending 2% of its GDP on its military.
Progress in talks over a new U.S.-South Korea cost-sharing agreement seems unlikely in the near future, experts say. In June, the two countries agreed that Seoul would spend about $200 million to pay the salaries of roughly 4,000 South Korean workers, who had been furloughed from their jobs on U.S. bases for months. That development eased the domestic pressure on the South Korea government to reach accord with the U.S.
Paul Choi, the managing director of StratWays Group, a Seoul-based geopolitical-risk advisory, said the matter is distracting the allies from larger issues such as North Korea and China.
“We’re shooting ourselves in the foot,” he said.
—Andrew Jeong in Seoul contributed to this article.
Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com and Gordon Lubold at Gordon.Lubold@wsj.com
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Billionaire Dalio Warns US-China Tensions "Could Evolve Into Shooting War", Sees Parallels To '30s Lead Up To World War II
by Tyler Durden
Zero Hedge
Friday, 07/17/2020 - 18:45
In an 8,000-word-plus tome, Ray Dalio, billionaire founder of Bridgewater - the world's largest hedge fund, took to LinkedIn to expand on his previous discussions about what happens next geostrategically, fearing economic tensions between the US and China escalating into armed conflict, drawing parallels between the current situation and the years before World War I and World War II.
"...the United States and China are now in an economic war that could conceivably evolve into a shooting war, and I've never experienced an economic war, I studied a number of past ones to learn what they are like," he wrote.
"Comparisons between the 1930s leading to World War II and today, especially with regard to economic sanctions, are especially interesting and helpful in considering what might be ahead," he added.
During times of great conflict, Dalio writes that there exists a tendency to move to "more autocratic leadership" to bring stability to chaos, concluding that rival powers only enter into wars when they are roughly comparable:
"Smart leaders typically only go into hot wars if there is no choice because the other side pushes them into the position of either fighting or losing by backing down. That is how World War II began."
With sanctions being swapped and the angry rhetoric rising, we suspect Dalio's warnings are more likely than ever.
* * *
Excerpts via LinkedIn:
The Big Cycle of the United States and the Dollar, Part 1
This is Part 1 of a two-part chapter on the US Empire and its path along the archetypical big cycle of dominant powers. It covers the period up through World War II. In Part 2, we will cover from the beginning of the new world order right up to this moment. It will be out on Tuesday, July 21.
To remind you, I did this study so that I could understand how we got to where we are and how to deal with the situations we are facing, but I am no great historian. I’m just a guy with a compulsion to understand how these things work and to bet on what will happen, who has access to great research assistants, fabulous data, incredibly informed experts, lots of insightful written research, and my own experiences. I’m using all of this to try to figure out what’s true and what to do about it. I am not ideological. I am mechanical. I look at reality as a perpetual-motion machine with cause/effect relationships driving developments through time. I am sharing this information with you to take or leave as you like and to have you point out any inaccuracies you think might exist as we try to figure out together what’s true and what to do about it.
This chapter is a continuation of the last chapter in which we started to look at each of the leading reserve currency empires over the last 500 years, starting with the Dutch and British empires.
...
As we delve into the particulars of the last 90 years, it is easy to lose sight of the big arcs, most importantly the three big cycles—i.e., the long-term debt/monetary cycle, the wealth and political gap cycle, and the global geopolitical cycle—as well as the eight major types of power and the 17 major drivers behind them. I will try to keep it simple, emphasizing just the most important developments in just the most influential countries, but if you find that the story starts getting more complicated than you’d like, remember that you can just read the text in bold in order to get the main points without complication.
World affairs and history are complicated because there is a lot going on both within and between relevant countries. Understanding just the most important relevant issues of just the most important countries is challenging because one has to see all of these perspectives accurately and simultaneously. All countries are living out their own stories that transpire on a daily basis, and these stories are woven together to make up the world story. But typically, at any one time, there are only a few leading countries and a limited number of major themes that make up the major story of the changing world order. Since the end of World War I, the most relevant stories have been those of Great Britain, the United States, Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union, and China. I’m not saying that these are the only countries that matter because that isn’t true. But I am saying that the story of the changing world order since World War I can be pretty well told by understanding the main developments within and between these countries. In this chapter I will attempt to briefly tell the stories of these countries and their most important interactions. This is the highlights version of the more complete version of the stories that I will pass to you in Part 2 of this book.
In telling these stories I will try to convey them without bias. I believe that to accurately understand both history and what is happening now, I need to see things through the relevant parties’ eyes, including those of enemies. While there are of course allies and enemies and it is tempting to demonize the enemies, most people and countries are simply pursuing their own interests in the ways they believe are best for them, so I find it productive to try to see things through their eyes and counterproductive to demonize them. If you hear me say things that sound sympathetic to former or existing enemies—like “Hitler built a strong economy before going to war”—please know that it is because I am seeking accuracy and need to be truthful rather than politically correct in conveying my thinking. While I might be wrong and we might not agree, that’s all OK with me as long as I am describing the picture as accurately as I can.
Before I begin recounting the story of the United States I’d like to remind you of the archetypical Big Cycle that I described earlier so you can keep it in mind as you read about how events transpired up to the present. Though a super-oversimplification of the whole thing, in a nutshell it appears to me that the archetypical Big Cycle transpires as follows.
A new world order typically begins after radical changes in how things work within countries (i.e., via some form of revolution) and between countries (typically some form of war). They change in big ways who has wealth and power and the approaches used to get wealth and power. For example in 1945, when the latest world order began, the US and its capitalist and democratic allies squared off against the communist and autocratic approaches of the Soviet Union and its allies. As we saw from studying the Dutch and British empires, capitalism was key to these countries’ successes but also contributed to their failures. It was successful because the pursuit of profit motivated people, and the competitive process of allocating capital and profit making directed resources relatively efficiently to what people wanted enough to pay for. In this system those who allocated efficiently profited, which led to them gaining more resources, while those who couldn’t allocate well died economically.
At the same time, this system of increasing wealth produced widening wealth and opportunity gaps, as well as decadence in the form of people working less and increasingly living on borrowed money. As the wealth and opportunity gaps grew, that produced increasingly widespread views that the system wasn’t fair. When the debt problems and other factors led to bad economic times at the same time as the wealth and values gaps were large, that produced a lot of internal conflict that led to large, revolutionary changes in who had wealth and power and the processes for getting them. Sometimes these big changes were made peacefully, and sometimes they were made violently. When the leading countries suffered from these internal challenges at the same time as rival countries had become strong enough to challenge them, the risks of external wars increased. When these seismic shifts in how wealth and power are distributed occur within countries (i.e., via revolutions) or between countries (typically through wars, though sometimes peacefully), the old world order breaks down and a new world order begins, and the process starts all over again.
To refresh your memory, the chart below shows the relative powers of the leading countries as measured in indices that measure eight different types of power—education, competitiveness, innovation/technology, trade, economic output, military, financial center status, and reserve currency status.
In examining each country’s rise and decline I look at each of the eight measures and convey the highlights of their stories while diving into key moments to understand how they transpired in a more granular way. We will now do that with the United States and China, which as you can see in this chart are currently the leading powers.
The US Empire and the US Dollar
While this section primarily focuses on the story of the US since it overtook the British Empire as the dominant global power during the world wars, we will first take a quick look at the whole arc of its rise and its somewhat recent relative decline. The chart below shows the eight types of power that make up our overall measure of power. In it you can see the story behind the US’s rise and decline since 1700. We start in 1700 because that was just before the emergence of the United States. While the area now occupied by the United States was of course inhabited by native people for thousands of years, the history of the United States as a nation begins with the colonists, who revolted against the colonial power of Great Britain to gain independence in 1776. In the chart you can see the seeds of the US’s rise going back to the early 1800s, starting with rising strengths in education and then in innovation/technology and competitiveness.
These powers and world circumstances allowed the US to create massive productivity growth during the Second Industrial Revolution, which was from around 1870 to the beginning of World War I and then beyond it. These increased strengths were reflected in the US’s increasing shares of global economic output and world trade, as well as growing its financial strength, exemplified in New York becoming the world’s leading financial center, continuing leadership in innovations, and great usage of its financial products. You can see that these measures of the United States’ powers relative to its own history reached their peaks in the 1950s immediately after the Allies won World War II.
At that time, the gap between the US and the rest of the world was at its greatest and the US dollar and the US world order became dominant. Though the United States was clearly the dominant power in the post-World War II period, the Soviet Empire was a rival, though it was never nearly as strong overall. The Soviets and their communist satellite states vied against the much stronger US and US allies and satellite states until Soviet power began to fade under the weight of its growing inefficiency around 1980 and then collapsed in 1989-91. That is about when China began to rise to become a comparable rival power to the US where it is today.
.
As you can see, while the United States’ relative strengths of education, competitiveness, trade, and production have declined significantly and steadily over the last 100 years (to now be around the 50-60th percentile versus other leading powers), its relative strength in innovation and technology, reserve currency status, financial center power, and military have remained at or near the top. At the same time, as we will see when we delve into China’s picture, China has gained on the US in all these areas, has become comparable in many ways, and is advancing considerably faster than the US.
Let’s now drop down from the 40,000-foot level to the 20,000-foot level and pick up our story in 1930 so we can see how the United States evolved to become the dominant world power. While we focus predominantly on the US story, the linkages between economic conditions and political conditions within the United States and between the United States and other countries—most importantly with the UK, Germany, and Japan in the 1930s, with the Soviet Union and Japan from around 1950 until 1990, and with China from around 1980 until now—must be understood because economics and geopolitics within and between countries were and always are intertwined.
...
As a principle:
Protecting one’s wealth in times of war is difficult, as normal economic activities are curtailed, traditionally safe investments are not safe, capital mobility is limited, and high taxes are imposed when people and countries are fighting for their survival. During difficult times of conflict protecting the wealth of those who have wealth is not a priority relative to redistributing wealth to get it to where it is needed most.
That was the case in those war years.
While we won’t cover the actual battles and war moves, the headline is that the Allied victory in 1945 produced a tremendous shift of wealth and power.
World War II was an extremely costly war in lives and money. The numbers are gigantic and extremely imprecise. An estimated 40-75 million people were killed as a result of it, which was 3% of the world’s population, which made it the deadliest war yet. More than half of these losses were Russian (around 25 million) and Chinese (around 20 million). Germany lost around 7 million people—just over half were military deaths and the rest were German civilian deaths, mostly from the Holocaust (and millions more non-Germans were also victims). Britain and the United States each lost around 400,000. The financial cost of the war was both enormous and inestimable, according to most experts, but, based on my research, was in the vicinity of $4-7 trillion in current dollars. What we do know is that on a relative basis the US came out a big winner because the US sold and lent a lot before and during the war, basically all of the fighting took place off of US territory so the US wasn’t physically damaged, and US deaths were comparatively low in relation to those of most other major countries.
In Part 2 of this chapter, we will explore the new world order starting with the US as the dominant power and tell the story that brings us right up to this moment. Then we will turn to China.
Read the full note here...
www.zerohedge.com
by Tyler Durden
Zero Hedge
Friday, 07/17/2020 - 18:45
In an 8,000-word-plus tome, Ray Dalio, billionaire founder of Bridgewater - the world's largest hedge fund, took to LinkedIn to expand on his previous discussions about what happens next geostrategically, fearing economic tensions between the US and China escalating into armed conflict, drawing parallels between the current situation and the years before World War I and World War II.
"...the United States and China are now in an economic war that could conceivably evolve into a shooting war, and I've never experienced an economic war, I studied a number of past ones to learn what they are like," he wrote.
"Comparisons between the 1930s leading to World War II and today, especially with regard to economic sanctions, are especially interesting and helpful in considering what might be ahead," he added.
During times of great conflict, Dalio writes that there exists a tendency to move to "more autocratic leadership" to bring stability to chaos, concluding that rival powers only enter into wars when they are roughly comparable:
"Smart leaders typically only go into hot wars if there is no choice because the other side pushes them into the position of either fighting or losing by backing down. That is how World War II began."
With sanctions being swapped and the angry rhetoric rising, we suspect Dalio's warnings are more likely than ever.
* * *
Excerpts via LinkedIn:
The Big Cycle of the United States and the Dollar, Part 1
This is Part 1 of a two-part chapter on the US Empire and its path along the archetypical big cycle of dominant powers. It covers the period up through World War II. In Part 2, we will cover from the beginning of the new world order right up to this moment. It will be out on Tuesday, July 21.
To remind you, I did this study so that I could understand how we got to where we are and how to deal with the situations we are facing, but I am no great historian. I’m just a guy with a compulsion to understand how these things work and to bet on what will happen, who has access to great research assistants, fabulous data, incredibly informed experts, lots of insightful written research, and my own experiences. I’m using all of this to try to figure out what’s true and what to do about it. I am not ideological. I am mechanical. I look at reality as a perpetual-motion machine with cause/effect relationships driving developments through time. I am sharing this information with you to take or leave as you like and to have you point out any inaccuracies you think might exist as we try to figure out together what’s true and what to do about it.
This chapter is a continuation of the last chapter in which we started to look at each of the leading reserve currency empires over the last 500 years, starting with the Dutch and British empires.
...
As we delve into the particulars of the last 90 years, it is easy to lose sight of the big arcs, most importantly the three big cycles—i.e., the long-term debt/monetary cycle, the wealth and political gap cycle, and the global geopolitical cycle—as well as the eight major types of power and the 17 major drivers behind them. I will try to keep it simple, emphasizing just the most important developments in just the most influential countries, but if you find that the story starts getting more complicated than you’d like, remember that you can just read the text in bold in order to get the main points without complication.
World affairs and history are complicated because there is a lot going on both within and between relevant countries. Understanding just the most important relevant issues of just the most important countries is challenging because one has to see all of these perspectives accurately and simultaneously. All countries are living out their own stories that transpire on a daily basis, and these stories are woven together to make up the world story. But typically, at any one time, there are only a few leading countries and a limited number of major themes that make up the major story of the changing world order. Since the end of World War I, the most relevant stories have been those of Great Britain, the United States, Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union, and China. I’m not saying that these are the only countries that matter because that isn’t true. But I am saying that the story of the changing world order since World War I can be pretty well told by understanding the main developments within and between these countries. In this chapter I will attempt to briefly tell the stories of these countries and their most important interactions. This is the highlights version of the more complete version of the stories that I will pass to you in Part 2 of this book.
In telling these stories I will try to convey them without bias. I believe that to accurately understand both history and what is happening now, I need to see things through the relevant parties’ eyes, including those of enemies. While there are of course allies and enemies and it is tempting to demonize the enemies, most people and countries are simply pursuing their own interests in the ways they believe are best for them, so I find it productive to try to see things through their eyes and counterproductive to demonize them. If you hear me say things that sound sympathetic to former or existing enemies—like “Hitler built a strong economy before going to war”—please know that it is because I am seeking accuracy and need to be truthful rather than politically correct in conveying my thinking. While I might be wrong and we might not agree, that’s all OK with me as long as I am describing the picture as accurately as I can.
Before I begin recounting the story of the United States I’d like to remind you of the archetypical Big Cycle that I described earlier so you can keep it in mind as you read about how events transpired up to the present. Though a super-oversimplification of the whole thing, in a nutshell it appears to me that the archetypical Big Cycle transpires as follows.
A new world order typically begins after radical changes in how things work within countries (i.e., via some form of revolution) and between countries (typically some form of war). They change in big ways who has wealth and power and the approaches used to get wealth and power. For example in 1945, when the latest world order began, the US and its capitalist and democratic allies squared off against the communist and autocratic approaches of the Soviet Union and its allies. As we saw from studying the Dutch and British empires, capitalism was key to these countries’ successes but also contributed to their failures. It was successful because the pursuit of profit motivated people, and the competitive process of allocating capital and profit making directed resources relatively efficiently to what people wanted enough to pay for. In this system those who allocated efficiently profited, which led to them gaining more resources, while those who couldn’t allocate well died economically.
At the same time, this system of increasing wealth produced widening wealth and opportunity gaps, as well as decadence in the form of people working less and increasingly living on borrowed money. As the wealth and opportunity gaps grew, that produced increasingly widespread views that the system wasn’t fair. When the debt problems and other factors led to bad economic times at the same time as the wealth and values gaps were large, that produced a lot of internal conflict that led to large, revolutionary changes in who had wealth and power and the processes for getting them. Sometimes these big changes were made peacefully, and sometimes they were made violently. When the leading countries suffered from these internal challenges at the same time as rival countries had become strong enough to challenge them, the risks of external wars increased. When these seismic shifts in how wealth and power are distributed occur within countries (i.e., via revolutions) or between countries (typically through wars, though sometimes peacefully), the old world order breaks down and a new world order begins, and the process starts all over again.
To refresh your memory, the chart below shows the relative powers of the leading countries as measured in indices that measure eight different types of power—education, competitiveness, innovation/technology, trade, economic output, military, financial center status, and reserve currency status.
In examining each country’s rise and decline I look at each of the eight measures and convey the highlights of their stories while diving into key moments to understand how they transpired in a more granular way. We will now do that with the United States and China, which as you can see in this chart are currently the leading powers.
The US Empire and the US Dollar
While this section primarily focuses on the story of the US since it overtook the British Empire as the dominant global power during the world wars, we will first take a quick look at the whole arc of its rise and its somewhat recent relative decline. The chart below shows the eight types of power that make up our overall measure of power. In it you can see the story behind the US’s rise and decline since 1700. We start in 1700 because that was just before the emergence of the United States. While the area now occupied by the United States was of course inhabited by native people for thousands of years, the history of the United States as a nation begins with the colonists, who revolted against the colonial power of Great Britain to gain independence in 1776. In the chart you can see the seeds of the US’s rise going back to the early 1800s, starting with rising strengths in education and then in innovation/technology and competitiveness.
These powers and world circumstances allowed the US to create massive productivity growth during the Second Industrial Revolution, which was from around 1870 to the beginning of World War I and then beyond it. These increased strengths were reflected in the US’s increasing shares of global economic output and world trade, as well as growing its financial strength, exemplified in New York becoming the world’s leading financial center, continuing leadership in innovations, and great usage of its financial products. You can see that these measures of the United States’ powers relative to its own history reached their peaks in the 1950s immediately after the Allies won World War II.
At that time, the gap between the US and the rest of the world was at its greatest and the US dollar and the US world order became dominant. Though the United States was clearly the dominant power in the post-World War II period, the Soviet Empire was a rival, though it was never nearly as strong overall. The Soviets and their communist satellite states vied against the much stronger US and US allies and satellite states until Soviet power began to fade under the weight of its growing inefficiency around 1980 and then collapsed in 1989-91. That is about when China began to rise to become a comparable rival power to the US where it is today.
.
As you can see, while the United States’ relative strengths of education, competitiveness, trade, and production have declined significantly and steadily over the last 100 years (to now be around the 50-60th percentile versus other leading powers), its relative strength in innovation and technology, reserve currency status, financial center power, and military have remained at or near the top. At the same time, as we will see when we delve into China’s picture, China has gained on the US in all these areas, has become comparable in many ways, and is advancing considerably faster than the US.
Let’s now drop down from the 40,000-foot level to the 20,000-foot level and pick up our story in 1930 so we can see how the United States evolved to become the dominant world power. While we focus predominantly on the US story, the linkages between economic conditions and political conditions within the United States and between the United States and other countries—most importantly with the UK, Germany, and Japan in the 1930s, with the Soviet Union and Japan from around 1950 until 1990, and with China from around 1980 until now—must be understood because economics and geopolitics within and between countries were and always are intertwined.
...
As a principle:
Protecting one’s wealth in times of war is difficult, as normal economic activities are curtailed, traditionally safe investments are not safe, capital mobility is limited, and high taxes are imposed when people and countries are fighting for their survival. During difficult times of conflict protecting the wealth of those who have wealth is not a priority relative to redistributing wealth to get it to where it is needed most.
That was the case in those war years.
While we won’t cover the actual battles and war moves, the headline is that the Allied victory in 1945 produced a tremendous shift of wealth and power.
World War II was an extremely costly war in lives and money. The numbers are gigantic and extremely imprecise. An estimated 40-75 million people were killed as a result of it, which was 3% of the world’s population, which made it the deadliest war yet. More than half of these losses were Russian (around 25 million) and Chinese (around 20 million). Germany lost around 7 million people—just over half were military deaths and the rest were German civilian deaths, mostly from the Holocaust (and millions more non-Germans were also victims). Britain and the United States each lost around 400,000. The financial cost of the war was both enormous and inestimable, according to most experts, but, based on my research, was in the vicinity of $4-7 trillion in current dollars. What we do know is that on a relative basis the US came out a big winner because the US sold and lent a lot before and during the war, basically all of the fighting took place off of US territory so the US wasn’t physically damaged, and US deaths were comparatively low in relation to those of most other major countries.
In Part 2 of this chapter, we will explore the new world order starting with the US as the dominant power and tell the story that brings us right up to this moment. Then we will turn to China.
Read the full note here...
Zerohedge
ZeroHedge - On a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero
www.zerohedge.com
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hmm. uhoh?
Global: MilitaryInfo
@Global_Mil_Info
#BREAKING: KJU has presided over an enlarged Central Military Commission meeting.
View: https://twitter.com/Global_Mil_Info/status/1284599495548973056?s=20
Global: MilitaryInfo
@Global_Mil_Info
#BREAKING: KJU has presided over an enlarged Central Military Commission meeting.
View: https://twitter.com/Global_Mil_Info/status/1284599495548973056?s=20
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jward
passin' thru
Is this in addition to, or the same as, those two from yesterday...
and this fella had an interesting question that I've been wondering bout too....
CrazyHorse227
@1939repeated
·
45m
Replying to
@PACAF
Is there something going on we are not being told? Russia moving forces, Bones moving to DG... two carrier strike groups in the south China sea.... is this just a geopolitical dick waving situation or are we all gearing up for a tussle??
danielboon
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I think the gloves are about to come off
danielboon
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1) The Royal Navy’s brand new £3 billion aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth will be deployed to the #SouthChinaSea to take part in military drills with the #USNavy and #Japan according to reports from the British media. #FreeandopenIndoPacific 
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Indo-Pacific News
@IndoPac_Info
2m
#India - #USA: #USNavy aircraft carrier USS Nimitz #CVN72 is likely to conduct a drill with the #IndianNavy off the coast of the Andaman & Nicobar islands The Nimitz is already in the #Indian ocean
The Nimitz aircraft carrier is coming from the South China sea and was part of war games along with the USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier. Both conducted dual-carrier operations in the #Philippine Sea.
The development is significant given the increased Chinese presence in the Indian ocean. China has its only overseas military base in Djibouti in the horn of Africa. Meanwhile, it looks a significant possibility that Australia may join India, US & Japan for the Malabar exercise
View: https://twitter.com/IndoPac_Info/status/1284935579235307520?s=20
https://wionews.com/india-news/wio
@IndoPac_Info
2m
#India - #USA: #USNavy aircraft carrier USS Nimitz #CVN72 is likely to conduct a drill with the #IndianNavy off the coast of the Andaman & Nicobar islands The Nimitz is already in the #Indian ocean
The Nimitz aircraft carrier is coming from the South China sea and was part of war games along with the USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier. Both conducted dual-carrier operations in the #Philippine Sea.
The development is significant given the increased Chinese presence in the Indian ocean. China has its only overseas military base in Djibouti in the horn of Africa. Meanwhile, it looks a significant possibility that Australia may join India, US & Japan for the Malabar exercise
View: https://twitter.com/IndoPac_Info/status/1284935579235307520?s=20
https://wionews.com/india-news/wio
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Yonhap News Agency
@YonhapNews
12m
(2nd LD) S. Korea's first military satellite launches atop SpaceX rocket
View: https://twitter.com/YonhapNews/status/1285347465298731009?s=20
@YonhapNews
12m
(2nd LD) S. Korea's first military satellite launches atop SpaceX rocket
View: https://twitter.com/YonhapNews/status/1285347465298731009?s=20
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Futures retreat as Sino-U.S. relations sour
Medha Singh
July 22, 2020 / 6:45 AM / Updated 44 minutes ago
(Reuters) - U.S. stock index futures fell on Wednesday as investors shunned risky assets after Washington ordered a shutdown of the Chinese consulate in Houston, escalating tensions between the world’s two largest economies.
In response, China is considering the closure of U.S. consulate in Wuhan, a person with direct knowledge of the matter said.
The news comes after three straight sessions of gains for the S&P 500, driven by optimism about an eventual coronavirus vaccine, further fiscal support for the pandemic-hit economy and a batch of positive second-quarter reports.
The benchmark index is less than 4% below its record closing high hit in February.
As the second-quarter earnings season continues, investors are looking for clues to gauge how long it would take for companies to emerge from the economic damage due to the pandemic.
United Airlines Holdings Inc (UAL.O) warned travel demand would remain suppressed until there was a widely accepted treatment or vaccine for COVID-19, which plunged the carrier to a deep quarterly loss. Its shares fell 0.1% in premarket trading.
Check Point Software Technologies Ltd (CHKP.O) rose 0.4% after reporting a better-than-expected quarterly net profit, boosted by increased demand for network security as more people work remotely.
Investors will also keep an eye out for quarterly results from Tesla Inc (TSLA.O) and Microsoft Corp (MSFT.O) after markets close
.
At 6:18 a.m. ET, Dow e-minis 1YMcv1 were down 142 points, or 0.53%. S&P 500 e-minis EScv1 were down 14.75 points, or 0.45% and Nasdaq 100 e-minis NQcv1 were down 3.25 points, or 0.03%.
Snap Inc (SNAP.N) declined 8.3% as it said a bump in user growth at the start of coronavirus-induced lockdowns petered out sooner than expected, and it forecast fewer current-quarter users than the Wall Street consensus.
President Donald Trump, in a shift in rhetoric and tone, encouraged Americans on Tuesday to wear masks and warned the coronavirus pandemic would get worse before it got better in his first press briefing in months focused on the outbreak.
The United States reported 1,000 deaths from the disease on Tuesday, surpassing the grim milestone for the first time since June 10
.
Reporting by Medha Singh in Bengaluru; Editing by Shounak Dasgupta
uk.reuters.com
Medha Singh
July 22, 2020 / 6:45 AM / Updated 44 minutes ago
(Reuters) - U.S. stock index futures fell on Wednesday as investors shunned risky assets after Washington ordered a shutdown of the Chinese consulate in Houston, escalating tensions between the world’s two largest economies.
In response, China is considering the closure of U.S. consulate in Wuhan, a person with direct knowledge of the matter said.
The news comes after three straight sessions of gains for the S&P 500, driven by optimism about an eventual coronavirus vaccine, further fiscal support for the pandemic-hit economy and a batch of positive second-quarter reports.
The benchmark index is less than 4% below its record closing high hit in February.
As the second-quarter earnings season continues, investors are looking for clues to gauge how long it would take for companies to emerge from the economic damage due to the pandemic.
United Airlines Holdings Inc (UAL.O) warned travel demand would remain suppressed until there was a widely accepted treatment or vaccine for COVID-19, which plunged the carrier to a deep quarterly loss. Its shares fell 0.1% in premarket trading.
Check Point Software Technologies Ltd (CHKP.O) rose 0.4% after reporting a better-than-expected quarterly net profit, boosted by increased demand for network security as more people work remotely.
Investors will also keep an eye out for quarterly results from Tesla Inc (TSLA.O) and Microsoft Corp (MSFT.O) after markets close
.
At 6:18 a.m. ET, Dow e-minis 1YMcv1 were down 142 points, or 0.53%. S&P 500 e-minis EScv1 were down 14.75 points, or 0.45% and Nasdaq 100 e-minis NQcv1 were down 3.25 points, or 0.03%.
Snap Inc (SNAP.N) declined 8.3% as it said a bump in user growth at the start of coronavirus-induced lockdowns petered out sooner than expected, and it forecast fewer current-quarter users than the Wall Street consensus.
President Donald Trump, in a shift in rhetoric and tone, encouraged Americans on Tuesday to wear masks and warned the coronavirus pandemic would get worse before it got better in his first press briefing in months focused on the outbreak.
The United States reported 1,000 deaths from the disease on Tuesday, surpassing the grim milestone for the first time since June 10
.
Reporting by Medha Singh in Bengaluru; Editing by Shounak Dasgupta
Reuters | Breaking International News & Views
Find latest news from every corner of the globe at Reuters.com, your online source for breaking international news coverage.
uk.reuters.com
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Taiwan says China sending planes near island almost daily
Taiwan's foreign minister says China is sending military planes near the island with increasing frequency in what appears to be a stepping up of its threat to use force to bring it under Beijing's control
By The Associated Press
22 July 2020
In this photo taken Febrary. 10, 2020, and released by the Republic of China (ROC) Ministry of National Defense, a Taiwanese Air Force F-16 in foreground flies on the flank of a Chinese People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) H-6 bomber as it passes near Taiwan. (Republic of China (ROC) Ministry of National Defense via AP)undefined The Associated Press
TAIPEI, Taiwan -- China is sending military planes near Taiwan with increasing frequency in what appears to be a stepping up of its threat to use force to take control of the island, Taiwan's foreign minister said Wednesday.
Such flights are more frequent than reported in the media and have become “virtually a daily occurrence,” Joseph Wu told reporters.
Along with Chinese military exercises simulating an attack on Taiwan, the flights by China are causing major concern for Taiwan's government, Wu said.
“What it is doing now is unceasingly preparing to use force to resolve the Taiwan problem,” Wu said.
China claims the self-ruling island democracy as its own territory and threatens to use the People's Liberation Army to bring it under its control. The sides split in a civil war in 1949 when Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists fled to the former Japanese colony as the Communist Party took control in mainland China.
Beijing has cut ties with the island’s government since Taiwan elected independence-leaning President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016 and has sought to isolate it diplomatically while raising the military threat. Despite that, Tsai was reelected this year by a wide margin.
Wu said China appeared to have grown in confidence following its crackdown on opposition voices in the former British colony of Hong Kong, facilitated by the national legislature's passage of a sweeping security law.
“If international society does not give China a sufficiently clear signal, I believe China will take it that international society will not impede it in doing other things," Wu said. “This is what we are extremely worried about."
Wu stressed the need for coordination with allies such as Japan and the U.S., neither of which has official diplomatic ties with Taiwan but which maintain close relations. U.S. law mandates that Washington ensure the island can maintain a credible defense and treat all threats against the island as matters of grave concern.
Support among Taiwanese for political unification with China has long been weak and has fallen further following the crackdown in Hong Kong. That comes as Chinese Communist Party leader and President Xi Jinping pursues an increasingly assertive foreign policy, leading to speculation he may attempt a military confrontation in the region.
abcnews.go.com
Taiwan's foreign minister says China is sending military planes near the island with increasing frequency in what appears to be a stepping up of its threat to use force to bring it under Beijing's control
By The Associated Press
22 July 2020
In this photo taken Febrary. 10, 2020, and released by the Republic of China (ROC) Ministry of National Defense, a Taiwanese Air Force F-16 in foreground flies on the flank of a Chinese People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) H-6 bomber as it passes near Taiwan. (Republic of China (ROC) Ministry of National Defense via AP)undefined The Associated Press
TAIPEI, Taiwan -- China is sending military planes near Taiwan with increasing frequency in what appears to be a stepping up of its threat to use force to take control of the island, Taiwan's foreign minister said Wednesday.
Such flights are more frequent than reported in the media and have become “virtually a daily occurrence,” Joseph Wu told reporters.
Along with Chinese military exercises simulating an attack on Taiwan, the flights by China are causing major concern for Taiwan's government, Wu said.
“What it is doing now is unceasingly preparing to use force to resolve the Taiwan problem,” Wu said.
China claims the self-ruling island democracy as its own territory and threatens to use the People's Liberation Army to bring it under its control. The sides split in a civil war in 1949 when Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists fled to the former Japanese colony as the Communist Party took control in mainland China.
Beijing has cut ties with the island’s government since Taiwan elected independence-leaning President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016 and has sought to isolate it diplomatically while raising the military threat. Despite that, Tsai was reelected this year by a wide margin.
Wu said China appeared to have grown in confidence following its crackdown on opposition voices in the former British colony of Hong Kong, facilitated by the national legislature's passage of a sweeping security law.
“If international society does not give China a sufficiently clear signal, I believe China will take it that international society will not impede it in doing other things," Wu said. “This is what we are extremely worried about."
Wu stressed the need for coordination with allies such as Japan and the U.S., neither of which has official diplomatic ties with Taiwan but which maintain close relations. U.S. law mandates that Washington ensure the island can maintain a credible defense and treat all threats against the island as matters of grave concern.
Support among Taiwanese for political unification with China has long been weak and has fallen further following the crackdown in Hong Kong. That comes as Chinese Communist Party leader and President Xi Jinping pursues an increasingly assertive foreign policy, leading to speculation he may attempt a military confrontation in the region.
Taiwan says China sending planes near island almost daily
Taiwan's foreign minister says China is sending military planes near the island with increasing frequency in what appears to be a stepping up of its threat to use force to bring it under Beijing's control
abcnews.go.com
doctor_fungcool
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China burned documents in Houston embassy today. Here's what the Japanese did prior to WWII
________________________________________________
Japan burnt 8,000 classified documents before the end of WWII.
Japan’s Foreign Ministry burnt about 8,000 files of highly classified documents shortly before the nation’s surrender in World War II on August 15, 1945, according to Japanese diplomatic records declassified today.
It is rare for the destruction of such records by Japanese authorities to be clearly stated in public documents.
In early November in 1945, the Allied Forces’ General Headquarters began questioning senior ministry officials on the condition of the confidential materials.
Minutes of the senior officials’ testimonies showed that the ministry started organising classified documents in late June, 1945, “to respond to a possible US military landing operation” on the Japanese mainland.
Between late July and early August that year, the ministry’s archives division burned documents considered “relatively new and highly classified.
“The ministry’s telegram division disposed of the papers around Aug 10-15 in 1945 and told the GHQ later that about 8,000 files of classified documents were burned immediately before Japan’s surrender.
Asked whether the papers were destroyed by order of bosses, the officials said the ministry held meetings several times to discuss how to handle diplomatic records.
The then vice foreign minister attended one of those meetings, the minutes showed.
The officials also said the ministry did not compile a list of classified documents destroyed and that the materials were burned near a warehouse where they had been stored.
________________________________________________
Japan burnt 8,000 classified documents before the end of WWII.
Japan’s Foreign Ministry burnt about 8,000 files of highly classified documents shortly before the nation’s surrender in World War II on August 15, 1945, according to Japanese diplomatic records declassified today.
It is rare for the destruction of such records by Japanese authorities to be clearly stated in public documents.
In early November in 1945, the Allied Forces’ General Headquarters began questioning senior ministry officials on the condition of the confidential materials.
Minutes of the senior officials’ testimonies showed that the ministry started organising classified documents in late June, 1945, “to respond to a possible US military landing operation” on the Japanese mainland.
Between late July and early August that year, the ministry’s archives division burned documents considered “relatively new and highly classified.
“The ministry’s telegram division disposed of the papers around Aug 10-15 in 1945 and told the GHQ later that about 8,000 files of classified documents were burned immediately before Japan’s surrender.
Asked whether the papers were destroyed by order of bosses, the officials said the ministry held meetings several times to discuss how to handle diplomatic records.
The then vice foreign minister attended one of those meetings, the minutes showed.
The officials also said the ministry did not compile a list of classified documents destroyed and that the materials were burned near a warehouse where they had been stored.
Last edited:
doctor_fungcool
TB Fanatic
A full on war with China will more than likely involve an attack on our GRID.
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If we have that transpire, "the Grid" won't matter much if what it fed is blowing in the wind....
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Posted for fair use.....
China Refuses to Quit on the Philippines
China may have missed a golden opportunity to see the VFA end, but Beijing is still determined to exploit gaps between the U.S. and its ally.
By Derek Grossman
July 22, 2020
President Rodrigo Duterte and President Xi Jinping shake hands prior to their bilateral meetings at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on October 20, 2016.
Credit: King Rodriguez of Philippine Presidential Department
When the Filipino people elected Rodrigo Duterte to become their next president in May 2016, China saw a distinct opportunity to pull the longtime U.S. ally away from Washington and into Beijing’s strategic orbit. Avowedly anti-American, President Duterte on his first trip to Beijing in October 2016 exclaimed that it was “time to say goodbye to Washington” — much to the delight of his host, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and other Chinese leaders.
In subsequent years, China pledged to invest in the Philippines through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and to cooperate on achieving “joint exploration” of disputed waters in the South China Sea. However, Filipino mismanagement of the BRI and the inability of the two sides to see past their sovereignty disputes to conduct joint exploration left question marks hanging over the direction of bilateral ties. Then came an enormous geopolitical boost for China on February 11, 2020. On that day, Duterte decided to terminate the U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The VFA enables, among other things, U.S. troops to freely enter and move around the country in support of a variety of military missions, including to deter and fight China in the South China Sea.
Duterte’s decision was hailed by Beijing as evidence the United States was losing the great power competition with China in the Indo-Pacific. A Chinese state-run media headline exclaimed, “Washington’s divisive intents get cold shoulder,” and another called Duterte’s decision a “severe blow” to the U.S.-Philippines alliance. One of China’s military outlets further argued that Duterte’s announcement underscored a “deep bilateral feud” that, according to Beijing’s hardline tabloid Global Times, would “upset U.S. meddling in the South China Sea.”
The problem for Beijing was what happened on June 2: Duterte and his government decided to postpone VFA termination, breathing new life into the agreement. To be sure, Chinese policymakers privately may never have fully believed the VFA would end. For example, according to Dai Fan, director of the Center for Philippines Studies at Jinan University, “This week’s [June 2] reversal does not surprise us. However, we just did not expect to happen so soon…China still has a long way to go in replacing the U.S. in this region.” Indeed, as I have argued previously, there were many good reasons to be suspicious of the commonly held view that Duterte would never reverse course on VFA termination because of his anti-American stance.
Nevertheless, the reasons cited by Filipino Secretary of Foreign Affairs Teddy Locsin Jr. for the reversal — “heightened superpower competition” and, interrelatedly, the COVID-19 pandemic — must be disconcerting for Beijing. This probably means that since Duterte’s announcement of VFA termination on February 11, Manila has not felt secure with Chinese behavior and therefore needs to keep the United States engaged in the region. As I have contended in these pages, Beijing appears to have missed a monumental opportunity to pull the Philippines away from the U.S. once and for all.
But to its credit, Beijing has refused to quit waging great power competition against the United States in the Philippines. Fortuitously, the 45th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and the Philippines was just a few days after Duterte’s VFA decision, on June 9, and gave Beijing the opportunity to shift the narrative. In a string of articles, including an op-ed from the Chinese ambassador in the Philippines, Beijing touted the vitality of relations. In an exchange between leaders, Xi noted “I attach great importance to the development of China-Philippines ties,” and Duterte added that China was a “close neighbor and a valued friend.”
Most recently, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s announcement on July 13 that the United States would shift South China Sea policy and recognize the legitimacy of maritime counterclaimants’ sea claims, including Manila’s maritime claims settled under an international arbitral tribunal ruling in 2016, led Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi to urgently contact Locsin the next day. According to a Chinese readout, Wang and Locsin in their discussion underscored that “President Rodrigo Duterte made an important political decision to reverse the confrontational policy pursued in previous years,” and that “…the United States does not want to see peace in the South China Sea…” Wang and Locsin further noted that “with its latest ‘statement,’ the U.S. openly reneged on its commitment of not taking sides on disputes over the South China Sea.”
Then, on July 20, the China’s top diplomat in the Philippines, Ambassador Huang Xilian, added, “While China and ASEAN countries [are] working very hard on managing the South China Sea issue, we have to be on high alert that the United States as an external force has also been intensifying its meddling in the South China Sea.”
China’s bottom line has been to reaffirm progress made in bilateral relations since Duterte’s election in an attempt to prevent a further erosion of its position vis-à-vis the United States because of the favorable shift in Washington’s South China Sea policy. Indeed, Chinese concerns are warranted as Filipino Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana on July 14 responded favorably to Pompeo’s speech, emphasizing that Beijing must “abide by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas [UNCLOS].” The day before Pompeo’s statement, on July 12, and in celebration of the four year anniversary of the arbitration ruling, Locsin himself also said the issue was “non-negotiable.”
For its part, the United States is not backing down either. In an op-ed timed to run after Pompeo’s speech, U.S. Ambassador Sung Kim wrote that “Beijing’s harassment of Philippine fisheries and offshore energy development within those areas is unlawful, as are any unilateral PRC [People’s Republic of China] actions to exploit those resources.” Washington is also almost certainly working with Manila to convince it to make its reversal on VFA termination permanent in the coming months.
It remains to be seen how the long-term geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China over the Philippines will play out. But one thing is for certain: China, in spite of Duterte’s VFA reversal, is likely to continue seeing opportunity to disrupt and potentially even divide the U.S.-Philippines alliance. Beijing will only be emboldened to pursue this course with Duterte in office, who has demonstrated not only anti-American, but also pro-China proclivities. Thus, the United States along with its other allies and partners should not expect China to back down anytime between now and the end of Duterte’s tenure in 2022, which is likely to make this period particularly turbulent.
Derek Grossman is a senior defense analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation, an adjunct professor at the University of Southern California, and a regular contributor to The Diplomat. He formerly served as the daily intelligence briefer to the assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs at the Pentagon.
China Refuses to Quit on the Philippines
China may have missed a golden opportunity to see the VFA end, but Beijing is still determined to exploit gaps between the U.S. and its ally.
thediplomat.com
China Refuses to Quit on the Philippines
China may have missed a golden opportunity to see the VFA end, but Beijing is still determined to exploit gaps between the U.S. and its ally.
By Derek Grossman
July 22, 2020
President Rodrigo Duterte and President Xi Jinping shake hands prior to their bilateral meetings at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on October 20, 2016.
Credit: King Rodriguez of Philippine Presidential Department
When the Filipino people elected Rodrigo Duterte to become their next president in May 2016, China saw a distinct opportunity to pull the longtime U.S. ally away from Washington and into Beijing’s strategic orbit. Avowedly anti-American, President Duterte on his first trip to Beijing in October 2016 exclaimed that it was “time to say goodbye to Washington” — much to the delight of his host, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and other Chinese leaders.
In subsequent years, China pledged to invest in the Philippines through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and to cooperate on achieving “joint exploration” of disputed waters in the South China Sea. However, Filipino mismanagement of the BRI and the inability of the two sides to see past their sovereignty disputes to conduct joint exploration left question marks hanging over the direction of bilateral ties. Then came an enormous geopolitical boost for China on February 11, 2020. On that day, Duterte decided to terminate the U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The VFA enables, among other things, U.S. troops to freely enter and move around the country in support of a variety of military missions, including to deter and fight China in the South China Sea.
Duterte’s decision was hailed by Beijing as evidence the United States was losing the great power competition with China in the Indo-Pacific. A Chinese state-run media headline exclaimed, “Washington’s divisive intents get cold shoulder,” and another called Duterte’s decision a “severe blow” to the U.S.-Philippines alliance. One of China’s military outlets further argued that Duterte’s announcement underscored a “deep bilateral feud” that, according to Beijing’s hardline tabloid Global Times, would “upset U.S. meddling in the South China Sea.”
The problem for Beijing was what happened on June 2: Duterte and his government decided to postpone VFA termination, breathing new life into the agreement. To be sure, Chinese policymakers privately may never have fully believed the VFA would end. For example, according to Dai Fan, director of the Center for Philippines Studies at Jinan University, “This week’s [June 2] reversal does not surprise us. However, we just did not expect to happen so soon…China still has a long way to go in replacing the U.S. in this region.” Indeed, as I have argued previously, there were many good reasons to be suspicious of the commonly held view that Duterte would never reverse course on VFA termination because of his anti-American stance.
Nevertheless, the reasons cited by Filipino Secretary of Foreign Affairs Teddy Locsin Jr. for the reversal — “heightened superpower competition” and, interrelatedly, the COVID-19 pandemic — must be disconcerting for Beijing. This probably means that since Duterte’s announcement of VFA termination on February 11, Manila has not felt secure with Chinese behavior and therefore needs to keep the United States engaged in the region. As I have contended in these pages, Beijing appears to have missed a monumental opportunity to pull the Philippines away from the U.S. once and for all.
But to its credit, Beijing has refused to quit waging great power competition against the United States in the Philippines. Fortuitously, the 45th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and the Philippines was just a few days after Duterte’s VFA decision, on June 9, and gave Beijing the opportunity to shift the narrative. In a string of articles, including an op-ed from the Chinese ambassador in the Philippines, Beijing touted the vitality of relations. In an exchange between leaders, Xi noted “I attach great importance to the development of China-Philippines ties,” and Duterte added that China was a “close neighbor and a valued friend.”
Most recently, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s announcement on July 13 that the United States would shift South China Sea policy and recognize the legitimacy of maritime counterclaimants’ sea claims, including Manila’s maritime claims settled under an international arbitral tribunal ruling in 2016, led Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi to urgently contact Locsin the next day. According to a Chinese readout, Wang and Locsin in their discussion underscored that “President Rodrigo Duterte made an important political decision to reverse the confrontational policy pursued in previous years,” and that “…the United States does not want to see peace in the South China Sea…” Wang and Locsin further noted that “with its latest ‘statement,’ the U.S. openly reneged on its commitment of not taking sides on disputes over the South China Sea.”
Then, on July 20, the China’s top diplomat in the Philippines, Ambassador Huang Xilian, added, “While China and ASEAN countries [are] working very hard on managing the South China Sea issue, we have to be on high alert that the United States as an external force has also been intensifying its meddling in the South China Sea.”
China’s bottom line has been to reaffirm progress made in bilateral relations since Duterte’s election in an attempt to prevent a further erosion of its position vis-à-vis the United States because of the favorable shift in Washington’s South China Sea policy. Indeed, Chinese concerns are warranted as Filipino Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana on July 14 responded favorably to Pompeo’s speech, emphasizing that Beijing must “abide by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas [UNCLOS].” The day before Pompeo’s statement, on July 12, and in celebration of the four year anniversary of the arbitration ruling, Locsin himself also said the issue was “non-negotiable.”
For its part, the United States is not backing down either. In an op-ed timed to run after Pompeo’s speech, U.S. Ambassador Sung Kim wrote that “Beijing’s harassment of Philippine fisheries and offshore energy development within those areas is unlawful, as are any unilateral PRC [People’s Republic of China] actions to exploit those resources.” Washington is also almost certainly working with Manila to convince it to make its reversal on VFA termination permanent in the coming months.
It remains to be seen how the long-term geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China over the Philippines will play out. But one thing is for certain: China, in spite of Duterte’s VFA reversal, is likely to continue seeing opportunity to disrupt and potentially even divide the U.S.-Philippines alliance. Beijing will only be emboldened to pursue this course with Duterte in office, who has demonstrated not only anti-American, but also pro-China proclivities. Thus, the United States along with its other allies and partners should not expect China to back down anytime between now and the end of Duterte’s tenure in 2022, which is likely to make this period particularly turbulent.
Derek Grossman is a senior defense analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation, an adjunct professor at the University of Southern California, and a regular contributor to The Diplomat. He formerly served as the daily intelligence briefer to the assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs at the Pentagon.
northern watch
TB Fanatic
House to introduce Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act this week
Republican Congressman Ted Yoho to introduce bill authorizing military force if China invades Taiwan
By Keoni Everington, Taiwan News, Staff Writer
2020/07/20 11:17
TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — U.S. Congressman Ted Yoho (R-FL) on Friday (July 17) announced that he will introduce a bill this week that would authorize the U.S. to use military force if China invades Taiwan.
In an Friday interview with Lou Dobbs on an episode of Fox Business titled "Red Storm Rising," when Dobbs asked Yoho if the U.S. is doing enough to protect allies such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan from China's aggressive military posture in the region, Yoho described the trilateral arrangement between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan as "one of the strongest relationships in national security." However, when it comes to Taiwan, Yoho asserted that the U.S. is not doing enough.
Yoho, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and co-sponsor of the Hong Kong Autonomy Act, said that since the days of Henry Kissinger, the U.S. has maintained a policy of "strategic ambiguity" between Taiwan and China.
Yoho then announced he is introducing a bill in the coming week called the "Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act" that will "lay very clear what our intent is."
The congressman then stated that the law would provide Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) if China invades Taiwan. He said that the AUMF would have a sunset provision of five years that would authorize the commander-in-chief to order military action against China.
He pointed out that going back to the Reagan administration, the U.S. has a policy of providing weapons for Taiwan to defend itself. Yoho then warned that "Xi Jinping has announced that he is ready to draw blood over Taiwan and 'reunify' them. They forgot to ask Taiwan."
Yoho explained that Taiwan has in fact never been part of communist China, "nor do they want to." Indeed, a poll released earlier this month showed that 67 percent of people in Taiwan consider themselves Taiwanese, while 27.7 percent support “maintaining the status quo and moving toward independence,” the highest level reported since 1994, and only 0.7 percent said they would be in favor of immediate unification with China.
The representative called for peaceful negotiations and closed by saying, "we'll see how this pans out."
In response to Yoho's announcement, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) spokesperson Joanne Ou (歐江安) said that the ministry is thankful for "a number of friendly measures passed by the Senate and House in recent years to demonstrate the emphasis placed on the peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait through concrete actions." Ou then added that MOFA will continue to monitor the matter and "maintain close contact with friends in the U.S. Congress and the executive branch to defend Taiwan’s free and democratic lifestyle and jointly promote regional peace, stability, and prosperity."
www.taiwannews.com.tw
Republican Congressman Ted Yoho to introduce bill authorizing military force if China invades Taiwan
By Keoni Everington, Taiwan News, Staff Writer
2020/07/20 11:17
TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — U.S. Congressman Ted Yoho (R-FL) on Friday (July 17) announced that he will introduce a bill this week that would authorize the U.S. to use military force if China invades Taiwan.
In an Friday interview with Lou Dobbs on an episode of Fox Business titled "Red Storm Rising," when Dobbs asked Yoho if the U.S. is doing enough to protect allies such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan from China's aggressive military posture in the region, Yoho described the trilateral arrangement between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan as "one of the strongest relationships in national security." However, when it comes to Taiwan, Yoho asserted that the U.S. is not doing enough.
Yoho, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and co-sponsor of the Hong Kong Autonomy Act, said that since the days of Henry Kissinger, the U.S. has maintained a policy of "strategic ambiguity" between Taiwan and China.
Yoho then announced he is introducing a bill in the coming week called the "Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act" that will "lay very clear what our intent is."
The congressman then stated that the law would provide Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) if China invades Taiwan. He said that the AUMF would have a sunset provision of five years that would authorize the commander-in-chief to order military action against China.
He pointed out that going back to the Reagan administration, the U.S. has a policy of providing weapons for Taiwan to defend itself. Yoho then warned that "Xi Jinping has announced that he is ready to draw blood over Taiwan and 'reunify' them. They forgot to ask Taiwan."
Yoho explained that Taiwan has in fact never been part of communist China, "nor do they want to." Indeed, a poll released earlier this month showed that 67 percent of people in Taiwan consider themselves Taiwanese, while 27.7 percent support “maintaining the status quo and moving toward independence,” the highest level reported since 1994, and only 0.7 percent said they would be in favor of immediate unification with China.
The representative called for peaceful negotiations and closed by saying, "we'll see how this pans out."
In response to Yoho's announcement, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) spokesperson Joanne Ou (歐江安) said that the ministry is thankful for "a number of friendly measures passed by the Senate and House in recent years to demonstrate the emphasis placed on the peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait through concrete actions." Ou then added that MOFA will continue to monitor the matter and "maintain close contact with friends in the U.S. Congress and the executive branch to defend Taiwan’s free and democratic lifestyle and jointly promote regional peace, stability, and prosperity."
House to introduce Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act this week | Taiwan News | 2020-07-20 11:17:00
Republican Congressman Ted Yoho to introduce bill authorizing military force if China invades Taiwan | 2020-07-20 11:17:00
www.taiwannews.com.tw
northern watch
TB Fanatic
China to Expand Naval Fleet With Two New Aircraft Carriers
Liaoning, a Chinese Type 001 aircraft carrier / Getty Images
Jack Beyrer - July 21, 2020 3:20 PM
Free Beacon
Ramping up its shipbuilding efforts, China hopes to add two new domestically produced aircraft carriers to its blue-water fleet, the South China Morning Post reported Saturday.
The advanced Type 002 carrier is in the final stages of development, with Beijing hoping it will be seaworthy by the end of next year. Equipped with "the world's most advanced" Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, the ship will likely measure up with the U.S. Navy's state-of-the-art Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carrier.
Modernizing the People's Liberation Army Navy has long been a key feature of the Xi regime's "Chinese Dream" of a strengthened role in world politics. China aims to have six aircraft battle groups ready for cruise by 2035.
It is essential for defense planning to "step up efforts to build China into a strong maritime country," Chinese president Xi Jinping told the 19th National Party Congress in 2017.
The aggressive posture of China's Navy comes in part to counter Washington's decreasing tolerance for China's repeated violations of international law and territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea.
Beijing has built thousands of acres of artificial islands near shipping chokepoints and continues to display belligerent tendencies toward neighbors such as Taiwan and Vietnam. A special report on Monday from Reuters further outlined developments in China's amphibious military capabilities, which bolster the country's prospects of invading Taiwan.
"We make no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary means," Xi said on the possibility of Taiwanese unification.
Increased global ambitions and hostile regional activity from the CCP have been met with a stark response from Washington in recent weeks. FBI director Christopher Wray, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, multiple senators, and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper have made repudiating China's actions in both internal and foreign affairs a sticking point in public remarks.
Beijing does not pause to engage in "regularly disrespecting the rights of other nations," Esper said Tuesday.
freebeacon.com
Liaoning, a Chinese Type 001 aircraft carrier / Getty Images
Jack Beyrer - July 21, 2020 3:20 PM
Free Beacon
Ramping up its shipbuilding efforts, China hopes to add two new domestically produced aircraft carriers to its blue-water fleet, the South China Morning Post reported Saturday.
The advanced Type 002 carrier is in the final stages of development, with Beijing hoping it will be seaworthy by the end of next year. Equipped with "the world's most advanced" Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, the ship will likely measure up with the U.S. Navy's state-of-the-art Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carrier.
Modernizing the People's Liberation Army Navy has long been a key feature of the Xi regime's "Chinese Dream" of a strengthened role in world politics. China aims to have six aircraft battle groups ready for cruise by 2035.
It is essential for defense planning to "step up efforts to build China into a strong maritime country," Chinese president Xi Jinping told the 19th National Party Congress in 2017.
The aggressive posture of China's Navy comes in part to counter Washington's decreasing tolerance for China's repeated violations of international law and territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea.
Beijing has built thousands of acres of artificial islands near shipping chokepoints and continues to display belligerent tendencies toward neighbors such as Taiwan and Vietnam. A special report on Monday from Reuters further outlined developments in China's amphibious military capabilities, which bolster the country's prospects of invading Taiwan.
"We make no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary means," Xi said on the possibility of Taiwanese unification.
Increased global ambitions and hostile regional activity from the CCP have been met with a stark response from Washington in recent weeks. FBI director Christopher Wray, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, multiple senators, and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper have made repudiating China's actions in both internal and foreign affairs a sticking point in public remarks.
Beijing does not pause to engage in "regularly disrespecting the rights of other nations," Esper said Tuesday.
China to Expand Naval Fleet With Two New Aircraft Carriers
Ramping up its shipbuilding efforts, China hopes to add two new domestically produced aircraft carriers to its blue-water fleet, the South China Morning Post reported Saturday.
freebeacon.com
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Yes, I agree. The question the Chinese are asking is "If they invade Taiwan, what will the US do?
AlfaMan
Has No Life - Lives on TB
House to introduce Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act this week
Republican Congressman Ted Yoho to introduce bill authorizing military force if China invades Taiwan
By Keoni Everington, Taiwan News, Staff Writer
2020/07/20 11:17
TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — U.S. Congressman Ted Yoho (R-FL) on Friday (July 17) announced that he will introduce a bill this week that would authorize the U.S. to use military force if China invades Taiwan.
In an Friday interview with Lou Dobbs on an episode of Fox Business titled "Red Storm Rising," when Dobbs asked Yoho if the U.S. is doing enough to protect allies such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan from China's aggressive military posture in the region, Yoho described the trilateral arrangement between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan as "one of the strongest relationships in national security." However, when it comes to Taiwan, Yoho asserted that the U.S. is not doing enough.
Yoho, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and co-sponsor of the Hong Kong Autonomy Act, said that since the days of Henry Kissinger, the U.S. has maintained a policy of "strategic ambiguity" between Taiwan and China.
Yoho then announced he is introducing a bill in the coming week called the "Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act" that will "lay very clear what our intent is."
The congressman then stated that the law would provide Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) if China invades Taiwan. He said that the AUMF would have a sunset provision of five years that would authorize the commander-in-chief to order military action against China.
He pointed out that going back to the Reagan administration, the U.S. has a policy of providing weapons for Taiwan to defend itself. Yoho then warned that "Xi Jinping has announced that he is ready to draw blood over Taiwan and 'reunify' them. They forgot to ask Taiwan."
Yoho explained that Taiwan has in fact never been part of communist China, "nor do they want to." Indeed, a poll released earlier this month showed that 67 percent of people in Taiwan consider themselves Taiwanese, while 27.7 percent support “maintaining the status quo and moving toward independence,” the highest level reported since 1994, and only 0.7 percent said they would be in favor of immediate unification with China.
The representative called for peaceful negotiations and closed by saying, "we'll see how this pans out."
In response to Yoho's announcement, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) spokesperson Joanne Ou (歐江安) said that the ministry is thankful for "a number of friendly measures passed by the Senate and House in recent years to demonstrate the emphasis placed on the peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait through concrete actions." Ou then added that MOFA will continue to monitor the matter and "maintain close contact with friends in the U.S. Congress and the executive branch to defend Taiwan’s free and democratic lifestyle and jointly promote regional peace, stability, and prosperity."
House to introduce Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act this week | Taiwan News | 2020-07-20 11:17:00
Republican Congressman Ted Yoho to introduce bill authorizing military force if China invades Taiwan | 2020-07-20 11:17:00
It's not a military cooperation treaty nor is it an invocation of NATO article 5-but it's a damn good start! Happy to see this happen.
AlfaMan
Has No Life - Lives on TB
Under President Trump the US will support the ROC. Military equipment and intelligence to start. I still think Taiwan is a silent partner in the Five Eyes intelligence sharing agreement anyway.
If it comes to blows, I'd think the US would provide air support-make the Taiwan strait a lethal gauntlet for the ChiComs to run through. Would we commit troops? Don't know but shutting down chicom China would make a lot of countries happy.
northern watch
TB Fanatic
FBI interviewing Chinese visa holders suspected of hiding military ties - Justice Department
Jonathan Landay
July 23, 2020 / 4:05 PM / Updated 7 minutes ago
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The FBI has interviewed visa holders in more than 25 U.S. cities suspected of hiding their Chinese military memberships, the Justice Department said on Thursday, as part of what experts called the biggest known crackdown on the theft of U.S. know-how in more than 40 years of Sino-U.S. relations.
The Justice Department announcement likely will fuel tensions between the world’s two largest economies that have grown since the Trump administration ordered China to shutter its consulate in Houston, Texas, by Friday.
The administration has intensified charges that China uses cyber operations and espionage to steal U.S. technological, military and other know-how in a strategy to supplant the United States as the world’s leading financial and military power. Beijing denied the allegations.
The FBI recently has interviewed visa holders suspected of having undeclared Chinese military affiliations in more than 25 American cities, the Justice Department said.
“These members of China’s Peoples Liberation Army applied for research visas while hiding their true affiliation with the PLA,” the statement quoted Assistant Attorney General John Demers as saying. “This is another part of the Chinese Communist Party’s plan to take advantage of our open society and exploit academic institutions.”
The Chinese Embassy did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Last month, FBI Director Christopher Wray said almost half of the nearly 5,000 counter-intelligence investigations the bureau is conducting involve China.
Experts called it the largest known crackdown on the theft of American intellectual property since the two nuclear-armed powers began the process that led to the establishment of diplomat relations in 1979.
“This is by far the biggest response by the U.S. to China’s theft of IP (intellectual property) since the opening to China,” said James Mulvenon, an expert on the Chinese military and cyber operations with SOS International, a contractor that supports U.S. government agencies.
The Justice Department said the FBI recently arrested three Chinese nationals for allegedly concealing memberships in the Peoples Liberation Army when applying for visas to conduct research at U.S. academic institutions.
The FBI is seeking to arrest a fourth research visa fraud suspect who sought refuge in the Chinese consulate in San Francisco after being interviewed by the bureau in June, the department said.
U.S. law enforcement cannot enter a foreign embassy or consulate unless invited, and certain top officials such as ambassadors have diplomatic immunity.
Additional reporting by Lisa Lambert; Editing by Chizu Nomiyama and David Gregorio
uk.reuters.com
Jonathan Landay
July 23, 2020 / 4:05 PM / Updated 7 minutes ago
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The FBI has interviewed visa holders in more than 25 U.S. cities suspected of hiding their Chinese military memberships, the Justice Department said on Thursday, as part of what experts called the biggest known crackdown on the theft of U.S. know-how in more than 40 years of Sino-U.S. relations.
The Justice Department announcement likely will fuel tensions between the world’s two largest economies that have grown since the Trump administration ordered China to shutter its consulate in Houston, Texas, by Friday.
The administration has intensified charges that China uses cyber operations and espionage to steal U.S. technological, military and other know-how in a strategy to supplant the United States as the world’s leading financial and military power. Beijing denied the allegations.
The FBI recently has interviewed visa holders suspected of having undeclared Chinese military affiliations in more than 25 American cities, the Justice Department said.
“These members of China’s Peoples Liberation Army applied for research visas while hiding their true affiliation with the PLA,” the statement quoted Assistant Attorney General John Demers as saying. “This is another part of the Chinese Communist Party’s plan to take advantage of our open society and exploit academic institutions.”
The Chinese Embassy did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Last month, FBI Director Christopher Wray said almost half of the nearly 5,000 counter-intelligence investigations the bureau is conducting involve China.
Experts called it the largest known crackdown on the theft of American intellectual property since the two nuclear-armed powers began the process that led to the establishment of diplomat relations in 1979.
“This is by far the biggest response by the U.S. to China’s theft of IP (intellectual property) since the opening to China,” said James Mulvenon, an expert on the Chinese military and cyber operations with SOS International, a contractor that supports U.S. government agencies.
The Justice Department said the FBI recently arrested three Chinese nationals for allegedly concealing memberships in the Peoples Liberation Army when applying for visas to conduct research at U.S. academic institutions.
The FBI is seeking to arrest a fourth research visa fraud suspect who sought refuge in the Chinese consulate in San Francisco after being interviewed by the bureau in June, the department said.
U.S. law enforcement cannot enter a foreign embassy or consulate unless invited, and certain top officials such as ambassadors have diplomatic immunity.
Additional reporting by Lisa Lambert; Editing by Chizu Nomiyama and David Gregorio
Reuters | Breaking International News & Views
Find latest news from every corner of the globe at Reuters.com, your online source for breaking international news coverage.
uk.reuters.com