WAR The Winds of War Blow in Korea and The Far East

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use......

https://www.eurasiareview.com/30042026-north-koreas-nuclear-weapons-and-missile-programs-analysis-2/

North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons And Missile Programs – Analysis​

April 30, 2026 0 Comments

By CRS

By Mary Beth D. Nikitin

Over the past decade, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) has advanced its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, which has raised the threat Pyongyang poses to the U.S. homeland, U.S. allies in East Asia, and U.S. interests. In April 2026, a U.S. defense official testified that “North Korea’s nuclear forces are increasingly capable of targeting the U.S. Homeland, and its missile forces can strike South Korea and Japan with nuclear or conventional warheads.” The 2026 National Defense Strategy stated that these forces are “growing in size and sophistication, and they present a clear and present danger of nuclear attack on the American Homeland.”

U.S. policies and multiple UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions have imposed sanctions and called on North Korea to eliminate its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs in a “complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.” Since 2022, Russian and Chinese policies toward North Korea have shifted. The U.S. Forces Korea commander said in April 2025 that in return for North Korea’s assistance in its war against Ukraine, “Russia is expanding sharing of space, nuclear, and missile-applicable technology, expertise, and materials to the DPRK.”

A trilateral statement of the United States, South Korea, and Japan reiterates their “steadfast commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea.” North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has repeatedly rejected denuclearization negotiations since the most recent talks in 2019 between President Donald J. Trump and Kim broke down. According to the U.S. Intelligence Community’s 2025 Annual Threat Assessment (ATA), Kim Jong-un views nuclear weapons as a “guarantor of regime security” and has “no intention” to renounce them. Congress could examine U.S. policies toward North Korea, including the implementation of sanctions, diplomatic efforts, and changes to U.S. and allied force posture.

Nuclear Doctrine and Plans​

The 2026 ATA stated that North Korea is “committed to expanding its strategic weapons programs, including missiles and nuclear warheads, to solidify its deterrent capability.” North Korean laws and doctrine governing the purpose and employment of nuclear weapons appear to affirm this assessment. A North Korean government report on the 2026 Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party stated that the “DPRK’s position as a nuclear weapons state has been consolidated to be irreversible and permanent,” according to a copy posted by an independent aggregator.

In May 2012, North Korea changed its constitution to describe the country as a “nuclear-armed state.” The following year, the DPRK People’s Assembly adopted a law stipulating that Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons “serve the purpose of deterring and repelling the aggression and attack of the enemy against the DPRK and dealing deadly retaliatory blows.” According to a 2013 law, North Korea’s nuclear weapons “can be used only by a final order of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army [a position held by Kim] to repel invasion or attack from a hostile nuclear weapons state and make retaliatory strikes.” A September 2022 law outlined the conditions under which North Korea would use nuclear weapons, which some analysts say lower the threshold for nuclear use.

In January 2021, the DPRK announced a Five-Year Defense Plan to field new submarines, develop tactical nuclear weapons, deploy multiple warheads on a single missile, and improve the accuracy of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), among other goals. The plan included the development of an ICBM with a range of 15,000 kilometers (9,320 miles) for “preemptive and retaliatory nuclear strike,” as well as ground-based and sea-based solid-fueled ICBMs. In September 2023, Kim announced that Pyongyang would boost nuclear weapons production “exponentially” and diversify nuclear strike options. In August 2025, Kim said the country was pursuing a “rapid expansion of nuclearization.”

Nuclear Testing​

North Korea has tested a nuclear explosive device six times, beginning in 2006, at its Punggye-ri nuclear test site. The underground tests produced increasing estimated yields. North Korea last conducted a nuclear test on September 3, 2017. North Korea characterized its most recently tested nuclear explosive device as a hydrogen bomb (or two-stage thermonuclear warhead) for deployment on an ICBM. In 2018, North Korea announced it had achieved its goals and would no longer conduct nuclear tests, and it dynamited the entrances to two test tunnels. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that North Korea began restoring test tunnels in March 2022. A 2025 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report stated, “North Korea has restored its nuclear test site and is now postured to conduct a seventh nuclear test at a time of its choosing.”

Continued......

 

[Housecarl]

Continued......

Nuclear Material Production ​

North Korea is expanding its capacity to produce fissile material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for nuclear weapons. North Korea produces plutonium at its Yongbyon site. North Korea also operates gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plants. In March 2026, the IAEA reported “ongoing operation of enrichment facilities” at Kangson and Yongbyon and a new building at Yongbyon that is similar to the Kangson facility. In an April 2026 statement to the House Armed Services Committee, the DIA director said that “Pyongyang is also building a probable additional uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon to increase stockpile production.” Fissile material production in large part determines the number and type of nuclear warheads a country is able to build.

Nuclear Warheads ​

According to a 2025 statement by the then DIA director, North Korea aims to continue increasing its stockpile of nuclear warheads and improving their design for multiple delivery systems. Some nongovernmental experts estimate that North Korea has produced enough fissile material for up to 90 warheads but may have assembled approximately 50. In January 2021, Kim said the country was able to “miniaturize, lighten and standardize nuclear weapons and to make them tactical ones.” The 2024 ATA stated, “North Korea also unveiled a purported tactical nuclear warhead and claimed it could be mounted on at least eight delivery systems, including an unmanned underwater vehicle and cruise missiles.”

Ballistic Missiles​

Under Kim Jong-un, North Korea has accelerated the pace of its ballistic missile test launches. A ballistic missile is a projectile powered by a rocket engine until it reaches the peak (or apogee) of its trajectory, at which point it falls back to earth using earth’s gravity. Ballistic missiles can deliver nuclear and conventional payloads at high speed and over great distances. They are categorized as short-range, medium-range, or long-range (i.e., intermediate range and intercontinental) based on the distance from the launch site to the target. North Korea’s inventory comprises both solid-fueled missiles, which offer advantages in maintenance and mobility, and liquid-fueled missiles, which have greater thrust and power than solid propellants.

In developing its ballistic missile forces, North Korea has prioritized capabilities “designed to evade U.S. and regional missile defenses, improve the North’s precision strike capabilities, and put U.S. and allied forces at risk,” according to the 2025 ATA. The DIA director’s April 2026 testimony stated that North Korea’s missile tests “align with Pyongyang’s defense modernization goals of improving deterrence against Washington through the development of a modern solid propellant missile force.” North Korea has tested ballistic missiles in January, March, and April 2026.

Intercontinental and Intermediate Range Missiles​

North Korea has tested ICBMs “capable of reaching the entire [U.S.] Homeland,” according to the 2026 ATA. Between 2022 and 2024, North Korea conducted “more than a dozen ICBM flight tests,” one U.S. official stated in congressional testimony in 2026. In 2025, DIA assessed that the DPRK had “10 or fewer” ICBMs and that it could possess 50 ICBMs by 2035.

The DPRK successfully tested two liquid-fueled, road-mobile ICBMs in 2017: the Hwasong-14 (U.S. designated KN-20) and Hwasong-15 (KN-22). North Korea began test launching the larger Hwasong-17 (KN-28) ICBM in 2022. North Korea tested the Hwasong-18 and Hwasong-19 solid-fueled ICBMs in 2023 and 2024, respectively. In October 2025, North Korea unveiled the solid-fueled Hwasong-20, which the DPRK does not appear to have yet flight tested.

North Korea’s intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) may have the range to target Guam and other U.S. forces in the region. North Korea’s IRBMs include the liquid-fueled Hwasong-12, which North Korea last tested in 2022, and the solid-fueled Hwasong-16, last tested in 2025.

Short- and Medium-Range Missiles​

North Korean SRBMs and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), which may be armed with conventional or nuclear warheads, could target South Korea, Japan, and U.S. forces in the region. According to the 2026 ATA, North Korea is “investing in nuclear-capable systems to deter the U.S., challenge regional missile defenses, and hold targets in South Korea at risk.”

The Hwasong-11A (KN-23) SRBM has the potential to strike locations throughout the Korean Peninsula with either a conventional or nuclear payload and uses a solid propellant. The KN-25 SRBM blurs the line between rocket and missile in that while its design resembles that of a guided artillery rocket, it is reportedly capable of matching the range and destructive effects of an SRBM. In the MRBM category, the Pukguksong-2 (KN-15) is a solid-fueled missile launched from a tracked vehicle, which provides the system mobility and survivability.

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs)​

North Korea’s efforts to develop SLBMs suggest an effort to diversify its ballistic missile forces. The DPRK tested the Pukgugsong-3 (KN-26), an SLBM reportedly designed to carry a nuclear warhead, in 2019. North Korea has since revealed the Pukguksong-4, -5, and -6. Some analysts have questioned whether North Korea’s development of submarines has kept pace with that of its SLBMs.

Missile Technology Development​

In its report on the Ninth Party Congress in February 2026, North Korea committed to “upgrading the conventional weapons possessed by our army” and to “accelerate the deployment of already-developed new-type weapons for action.” The report highlighted weapons technology programs it said were underway, including the development of attack drones, anti-satellite weapons, and SLBMs.

North Korea has tested ballistic missile payloads and warheads that could complicate missile defenses. In 2025, North Korea said it tested a Hwasong-16B IRBM with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) payload and reportedly unveiled a variant of the KN-23 SRBM, the Hwasong-11E, that may be armed with an HGV payload. Such technology could offer greater maneuverability than conventionally armed missiles, though some analysts have said that North Korea’s development of HGVs is at an early stage. Additionally, in April 2026, North Korea tested ballistic missiles armed with cluster munition warheads.

North Korea has prioritized development of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) payloads that would allow a single ballistic missile to carry multiple warheads. North Korea reportedly conducted an unsuccessful test of an MIRV-armed ballistic missile in June 2024. Some observers have stated that North Korea’s tests of what it has called a “newly upgraded” solid rocket motor in 2025 and 2026, one that may be used on the Hwasong-20, could support North Korea’s development of ballistic missiles armed with multiple warheads.

• About the author: Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Specialist in Nonproliferation
• Source: This article was published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).

 

[jward]

Ian Ellis
@ianellisjones

TWZ: The general in charge of keeping the U.S. Marine Corps sustained in a fight dismisses the notion that China poses a near-peer threat to the U.S. It’s far more serious and will make the currently paused conflict with Iran pale by comparison should the two superpowers come to blows, said Lt. Gen. Stephen Sklenka, the USMC Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics.

“There is no threat that looms larger than the People’s Republic of China,” Sklenka said during the 2026 Modern Day Marine Expo in Washington, D.C. “Don’t listen to this garbage about them being a near peer. They’re a peer because they rival us in nearly every single measure of national influence.”

@haltman
@thewarzonewire

 

[jward]

Square profile picture
Visegrád 24
@visegrad24
·
May 1
The U.S. is thinking about using Japanese and South Korean shipyards and designs to quickly expand the size of the U.S. Navy.

A feasibility study worth $1.85 billion on outsourcing elements of warship design and construction to South Korea and Japan has been included in the FY2027 budget.

This initiative would examine adopting or co-producing advanced hulls such as Japan’s stealthy 5,500-ton Mogami-class frigates and South Korea’s 3,600-ton Daegu-class vessels to supplement the U.S. Navy.

Due to Chinese competition, the U.S. needs to vastly expand its navy but faces severe constraints in its domestic shipyard capacity, which has been plagued by labor shortages, aging infrastructure, cost overruns and maintenance backlogs for decades.

The Navy’s shipbuilding plans consistently fall short, with the fleet hovering below 300 ships against goals of 355 or more.

China’s shipbuilding capacity now dwarfs America’s.

China possesses roughly 232 times the shipbuilding tonnage capacity of the U.S. with one Chinese shipyard alone rivaling the combined output of all U.S. naval yards.

In recent years, China has delivered massive annual tonnage through its dual-use commercial-military shipyards, enabling its navy (PLAN) and coast guard (CCG) to surge ahead in hull numbers—now exceeding 370 warships for the PLAN alone, with projections toward 460 by 2030.

In contrast, U.S. output remains minimal, often under 0.1% of global commercial tonnage amid delays on programs like Virginia-class submarines and Constellation-class frigates.

Japan and South Korea stand ready to help bridge this gap significantly.

As the world’s second- and third-largest shipbuilders (South Korea on 28% and Japan at 15% of global output), they excel in efficient, high-quality naval construction.

Their yards deliver warships faster and at lower cost than U.S. facilities, with strong track records in modular building and technology transfer.

Partnering with Tokyo and Seoul would accelerate U.S. fleet expansion but would require legal changes, as the U.S. Navy is legally required to build its vessels in American shipyards, with only minor exceptions.
Image

 

[jward]

Trent Telenko reposted
CSIS Korea Chair
@CSISKoreaChair
13h

"North Korea's 15 to 20 mobile launchers, each armed with one ICBM, could deplete the entire U.S. stockpile of 44 ground-based interceptors deployed in Alaska and California." — @CSIS @VictorDCha, citing @nktpnd.

@DefenseIntel has estimated that North Korea’s nuclear-tipped ICBM arsenal could grow to 50 within the next decade; this means that the United States would need to have at least 200 interceptors to fully protect itself from a potential North Korean attack. Current plans to add next-generation interceptors will increase that number to only 64 by 2035.

Read more in @ForeignAffairs
: https://foreignaffairs.com/north-korea/no

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2051648312466358333

View: https://twitter.com/CSISKoreaChair/status/2051648312466358333?s=20

 

[Housecarl]

BIG DOT if this is legit......

Posted for fair use......

North Korea revises constitution to drop reunification goal - UPI.com

North Korea has revised its constitution to remove all references to reunification with South Korea, a document shared by Seoul's Unification Ministry showed Wednesday.

www.upi.com

World News

May 6, 2026 / 6:08 AM

North Korea revises constitution to drop reunification goal​

By Thomas Maresca

SEOUL, May 6 (UPI) -- North Korea has revised its constitution to remove all references to reunification with South Korea, a document shared by Seoul's Unification Ministry showed Wednesday, formalizing leader Kim Jong Un's push to redefine inter-Korean ties as relations between two separate states.

The document, which was shared at a news conference by the ministry, removes language calling for the "peaceful reunification" of the Korean Peninsula that had been part of the North's constitution since a 1992 revision.

The new version codifies a policy shift Kim first laid out in 2024, when he abandoned Pyongyang's long-standing goal of reunification and defined South Korea as an adversary.

At a March meeting of North Korea's rubber-stamp legislature, where the revision is believed to have been adopted, Kim called for recognizing South Korea as the "most hostile state."

Related​

• North Korean women's soccer team to play in South Korea tournament
• North Korea denies role in crypto hacking cases
• North Korea executions surged during pandemic crackdown, report says

However, the revised constitution did not define South Korea as a "primary foe" or "hostile state," despite Kim's increasingly confrontational rhetoric toward Seoul, Yonhap News Agency reported.

The new constitution also introduces language defining North Korea's territory as bordering China and Russia to the north and South Korea to the south.

It does not specifically address maritime boundary lines, including the de facto maritime border in the Yellow Sea known as the Northern Limit Line. The NLL, which was drawn unilaterally by the U.S.-led United Nations Command after the Korean War, has long been a source of tension between the two Koreas.

The waters around the boundary, which Pyongyang does not recognize, have been the site of multiple naval clashes since the 1950-53 Korean War ended in an armistice, including the 2010 including the North's 2010 torpedo attack on a South Korean warship that left 46 dead.

In January 2024, Kim called the line "illegal" and warned that even the slightest violation of the North's territory would be considered a "war provocation."

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has sought to ease inter-Korean tensions since taking office in June, calling for the resumption of dialogue and making conciliatory gestures such as dismantling border propaganda loudspeakers.

Pyongyang has largely ignored those overtures while continuing to expand its military posture. In April, North Korea conducted several weapons tests, including tactical ballistic missiles with cluster bomb warheads and electronic warfare systems.

The revision also elevates Kim's position as "head of state," further consolidating his authority over state affairs and the country's nuclear forces.

 

[jward]

Mossad Commentary
@MOSSADil
2h

South Korea and the United States are holding high-level defense talks next week focused on transferring wartime operational control of their combined forces.

Officially, this is about command structure, sovereignty, and burden sharing.

But strategically, some may see it as part of a much larger long-term question:
After roughly 70 years of U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula, is Washington slowly preparing allies to stand more on their own?

 

[jward]

Jack Prandelli
@jackprandelli
22h

South Korea is using the Iran war to rewire its entire energy supply chain.

Seoul has passed a special law enabling up to $350 billion of US investment, with $200 billion earmarked for energy.

The flagship: a major LNG export terminal in Louisiana, currently under feasibility review by a Samil PwC and Kim & Chang consortium.

The structure: Korea takes long-term offtake, exports the gas to Asia and Europe, and captures shipbuilding and EPC contracts for Korean industry on the way.

This sits on top of existing commitments to buy $100 billion of US LNG and oil over four years.

On crude, South Korea moved fast.

In March, Seoul locked in a priority supply agreement with the UAE: 24 million barrels guaranteed, with Abu Dhabi pledging no country receives crude before South Korea under the arrangement.

The deal was explicitly framed as a response to Hormuz disruption and Iranian war risk.

KOGAS has also redirected all LNG from its Australian and Canadian equity projects to the domestic market in 2026 reducing exposure to Qatari FM and Gulf shipping risk in the near term.

Then on May 4th, the HMM Namu a bulk carrier operated by South Korea's HMM suffered an explosion and fire at anchor near Hormuz off the UAE.

Trump suggested an Iranian attack.
Seoul's Foreign Ministry said it would wait for a technical inspection before assigning blame.

In parallel, Trump has urged South Korea to join US-led naval operations protecting Hormuz shipping.

Seoul says it will "review its position."

The Namu incident gives political cover for deeper security coordination — and makes the cost of staying neutral more visible.

South Korea is swapping Qatar/Iran-centric exposure for a US–UAE axis.

Upstream investment in US LNG. Priority crude from Abu Dhabi. A potential security role in Hormuz under Washington's umbrella.

Energy security and alliance politics are now the same decision.

 

[auxman]

NEXTA:

North Korea will automatically launch a nuclear strike if Kim Jong Un is killed

Pyongyang has amended its Constitution so that nuclear weapons would be used automatically if the country’s leadership is destroyed or loses control over the military.

This was reported by Yonhap, citing South Korean intelligence.

In the event of Kim Jong Un’s assassination or a strike on the command structure, launching nuclear weapons would no longer require a separate order.

The changes are said to have been adopted amid the war in the Middle East and strikes targeting Iran’s leadership.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2053381119056183789

View: https://twitter.com/i/status/2053381119056183789

 

[jward]

Mossad Commentary
@MOSSADil
1h

TRUMP-XI SUMMIT: HIGH-STAKES TALKS ON TRADE, IRAN & TAIWAN

President Trump’s upcoming Beijing summit with Xi Jinping is shaping up to be one of the most consequential U.S.-China meetings in years.

The U.S. is pushing for:
• Chinese cooperation on Iran and reopening the Strait of Hormuz
• Expanded rare earth exports
• More action against fentanyl precursors
• Major Chinese purchases of American goods
• AI and Ukraine discussions

China wants:
• Stability and predictability on tariffs
• Reduced U.S. investment barriers
• Concessions on Taiwan and arms sales
• Recognition of Beijing’s growing global influence

Meanwhile, Indo-Pacific allies and Taiwan are watching closely, concerned Trump could trade away key security interests to secure broader deals with Beijing.

 

[jward]

foxnews.com

North Korea updates constitution to require automatic nuclear strike if Kim Jong Un is assassinated: report​

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North Korea has updated its constitution to require a retaliatory nuclear strike if leader Kim Jong Un is assassinated, according to a report.

The Telegraph reported the change comes amid heightened global tensions following the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other officials during a recent conflict.
Khamenei was killed in an Israeli strike in Tehran as part of a coordinated U.S.-Israeli military operation earlier this year, Fox News Digital previously reported.

The constitutional revision was approved during a session of North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly, which opened March 22 in Pyongyang, the outlet said.

South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) briefed senior government officials this week on the update, according to the report.

The revised policy outlines procedures for retaliatory action if North Korea’s leadership is incapacitated or killed.
"If the command-and-control system over the state’s nuclear forces is placed in danger by hostile forces’ attacks … a nuclear strike shall be launched automatically and immediately," the updated provision states.

KIM JONG UN CALLS SOUTH KOREA ‘MOST HOSTILE ENEMY,’ SAYS NORTH COULD ‘COMPLETELY DESTROY’ IT

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un delivers a speech at the inauguration ceremony of Saeppyol Street in Pyongyang on Feb. 15, 2026. (KCNA via KNS/AFP)

Reuters previously reported that North Korea revised its constitution to define its territory as bordering South Korea and remove references to reunification, reflecting Kim’s push to formally treat the two Koreas as separate states.
That marked the first time North Korea included a territorial clause in its constitution.
Last month, Kim pledged to further strengthen the country’s nuclear capabilities while maintaining a hard-line stance toward South Korea, which he has called the "most hostile" state.

Kim Jong Un reportedly observed missile test launches in North Korea on Sunday, April 12, 2026. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service)

Kim has also accused the United States of "state terrorism and aggression," and signaled North Korea could take a more active role in opposition to Washington amid rising global tensions.
Fox News Digital's Alex Nitzberg and The Associated Press contributed to this report.

North Korea updates constitution to require automatic nuclear strike if Kim Jong Un is assassinated: report

North Korea's revised constitution reportedly requires an automatic nuclear strike if Kim Jong Un is killed, according to intelligence briefings.

www.foxnews.com

 

[jward]

asiatimes.com
Hard and psychological power shown in South China Sea exercise

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In the Balikatan military exercise, taking place in the Philippines, troops from the Philippines, US, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and France have been getting real combat training – and a lot of it.

It’s conducted with China in mind – even if nobody will say so. That’s the etiquette.

Furthermore, the forces are training in the area that would be part of the “operational area” in the event the People’s Liberation Army moves against Taiwan.

This includes the northern Philippines facing the South China Sea and the Luzon Strait, also known as the Bashi Channel, between Taiwan and the Philippines. The PLA would need to move through this channel to protect its right flank or to conduct operations on the east side of Taiwan.

It’s always best to train where you’ll fight and militaries improve just the way sports teams do. Training with partners is even more helpful – so that you’re not strangers when the time comes to fight for real.

But beyond the operational benefits that come from Balikatan-type exercises, there are psychological and political benefits that are sometimes overlooked.

When militaries exercise together they tend to view each other differently – not least as more equal partners. Along with enhanced confidence in their own and partner capabilities, it tends to thicken political alliances.

Overly imbalanced defense relationships are risky. One side eventually feels put upon and restrained. The other comes to think it’s doing too much – for an ungrateful partner. This weakens a relationship and, if unchecked, can destroy it.

The Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) sent a large contingent to join this year’s Balikatan combat exercises for the first time, and is otherwise rapidly improving its capabilities. It’s a good reminder of how improved operational capabilities brings along psychological and political advantages.

Not long ago the Japan-US defense relationship was dangerously imbalanced – with Japan pathologically dependent on the US military for protection.

When Japan’s amphibious force got its start in late 2011 with a small group of US and Japanese officers quietly pushing things forward, the idea was partly to give Japan a necessary capability.

An island nation with vast maritime territory must be able to conduct amphibious operations along the littorals. Such operations are necessary both for disaster relief and for fighting an enemy invader.

And the effort was also a way to address a fundamental JSDF weakness: the unwillingness and inability of the three JSDF services to operate together. Amphibious capability was a forcing function to get ground and naval forces to cooperate – and, eventually, to work in the Air Self-Defense Force.

But there was more intended than just filling a missing operational capability. All of this built confidence in JSDF – which sometimes seemed to have an inferiority complex towards the US forces. Even Japan’s political class had for years belittled the JSDF and its capabilities.

The American officers also wanted the American military to take Japan seriously. Other than the US Navy, the basic thinking in too many parts of the US military was that the Americans would take care of things and the Japanese could go sit in the corner.

This was causing resentment in JSDF – and contributing to Japan’s political class’s lassitude, if not antagonism about defense.

When the JSDF became able to conduct complex, if rudimentary, amphibious operations, within a couple years its confidence increased. And the political class also saw Japan as able to play a more active role in the nation’s defense – and also alliance operations.

Japan also became less gratingly deferential to the US.

The US side in turn saw Japan as a more useful, and more equal (or at least less unequal) ally.

All in all this led to a political strengthening of the bilateral relationship. Which made it harder for China to split the two politically, for example by China sending “white lobbyists” to Capitol Hill or the Sunday Talk Shows claiming that “Japan expects you Americans to do all the hard work and go die for them.” That would resonate widely.

And it would not be a vote getter in DC.

Conversely, and as importantly, consider the psychological effect of getting things right on one’s adversaries – such as China. A more militarily capable target nation is bad enough. China hates it when its intended victims are better able to defend themselves, and it’s even more irked when intended victims get together to defend themselves. There’s a reason Xi Jinping complains about ‘blocs.’

So from Balikatan and similar exercises, the free nations are enhancing their ability to resist Chinese aggression, but, as importantly, are coming to recognize that they can resist such aggression, and need not submit to inevitable Chinese domination. Maybe next year, Taiwan can be invited.

Colonel Grant Newsham (US Marines – Ret.) is the author of When China Attacks: A Warning to America.

Hard and psychological power shown in South China Sea exercise - Asia Times

In the Balikatan military exercise, taking place in the Philippines, troops from the Philippines, US, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and France

asiatimes.com

 

[jward]

realcleardefense.com

Enlarging China’s Malacca Dilemma​

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In 2003, then-Chinese President Hu Jintao noted China’s “Malacca Dilemma,” which referred to China’s energy and trade vulnerability to the possible closing by a hostile power of the Strait of Malacca—the narrow sea passage between Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia through which most of Chinese energy imports transit.

One analyst calls it China’s “Achilles’ heel.” China is the world’s largest energy consumer, and it is estimated that eighty percent of its oil is imported and ninety percent of all of its trade is seaborne. The current war in Iran with the U.S. blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has served to enlarge China’s Malacca Dilemma by adding to it a Hormuz Dilemma—the Persian Gulf is the source of half of China’s imported oil and a third of its liquefied natural gas. Who controls those two sea lines of communication (SLOC) can wreak havoc on China’s economy and its national security.

The Trump administration recently struck a defense cooperation deal with Indonesia which allows American warplanes greater access to Indonesian airspace and thereby enhances our ability to monitor and, if necessary, control the Strait of Malacca. President Trump also persuaded the British government to shelve plans to hand over the Chagos Islands and the British-US base at Diego Garcia, strategically situated in the center of the Indian Ocean between Hormuz and Malacca, to Mauritius. Malacca and Hormuz are strategic chokepoints. There are others: Bab al-Mandeb between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden which connects with the Indian Ocean; the Suez Canal which connects the Mediterranean and the Red Seas; the Turkish Straits which links the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmara and the Mediterranean Sea; the Strait of Gibraltar which links the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean; the Danish Straits that connects the Baltic and North Seas; the Taiwan Strait which links the East China Sea and South China Sea; the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa; and the Panama Canal which connects the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

The great British geopolitical thinker Sir Halford Mackinder wrote in 1902 that “The unity of the ocean is the simple physical fact underlying the dominant value of sea-power in the modern globe-wide world.” During what Mackinder called the “Columbian epoch” (roughly the late 15th century through much of the 19th century) the seafaring nations and empires politically filled-in the remaining blanks on the map of the world and thereby initiated the period of global geopolitics, which is still with us. British statesmen recognized the importance of the strategic chokepoints noted above, which is why British garrisons and naval forces were stationed at, or regularly accessed, Gibraltar, Malta, Suez, Aden, the South African cape, Colombo, Singapore, and Hong Kong.

The American naval historian and strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan characterized the oceans and seas as a “great highway” or “wide common” that linked the world’s continents. The sea, he wrote, is “the great medium of communications—of commerce,” and the seas and oceans are dotted with “well-worn paths” or “trade routes.” Throughout history, Mahan noted, commerce served both to deter wars but also at times engender conflict. During wartime, Mahan explained, nations with well-positioned and superior naval power can “cut the sinews of the enemy’s power by depriving him of sea-borne commerce.” That is accomplished by controlling strategic chokepoints.

Mahan was among the first strategists to recognize the importance of the Persian Gulf to global politics, and this was well before the discovery of oil in the Middle East. (Interestingly, it was Mahan who first gave the name “Middle East” to the region encompassing the Persian Gulf, the Levant, and the Arabian peninsula). He recognized that geographically, the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz linked the Middle East to the Indian Ocean and ultimately East Asia. Mahan also foresaw the rise of China and its potential threat to U.S. control of the Pacific Ocean.

As Lucas Myers of the Wilson Center’s Asia Program has pointed out, “China’s dependence upon sea lines of communication is largely unavoidable.” He quotes a Chinese national defense strategy document, which states: “At present and for a certain period in the future, the main route of China’s maritime transport is from the South China Sea into the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea through the Strait of Malacca.” The authors of the strategy document could have added the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Myers writes that China fears the consequences of a hostile blockade of the sea lines of communication through the Indian Ocean.

China’s naval build-up is designed to mitigate the Malacca and Hormuz Dilemmas. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has moved from a posture of “near seas defense” to one of “far seas protection” with the ultimate goal of building a strong, capable “blue water navy” that can compete with the U.S. Navy in many locations throughout the globe, including the strategic chokepoints noted above. Perhaps it is not coincidental that the Chinese admiral who set this naval transition on its present course, Liu Huaqing, was known as “China’s Mahan.”

If the Trump administration is going to offset China’s efforts to mitigate its Malacca and Hormuz Dilemmas, it will need to significantly increase the number of warships, greatly enhance our shipbuilding capacity, and continue to strike deals like the one with Indonesia that help facilitate the control of strategic chokepoints in time of war. There may be no better way for the U.S. to deter a Chinese attack on, or blockade of, Taiwan than signaling to China that we have the capability and the will to deprive them of most of their seaborne trade, including especially their energy supplies. The current U.S. blockade of the Strait of Hormuz along with the U.S.-Indonesian defense agreement is a start, but as retired Marine Corps officer Gary Anderson recently wrote in The American Spectator, we need to make good on the threat to China’s trade lifeline and we currently don’t have enough warships nor sufficiently armed Marine Expeditionary Brigades to conduct what he calls “chokepoint warfare.”

Anderson is right. Enabling our naval and Marine units to conduct successful chokepoint warfare will enlarge China’s Malacca Dilemma and, hopefully, avoid a war in the western Pacific that could metastasize into World War III.
Francis P. Sempa writes on geopolitics.
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/05/09/enlarging_chinas_malacca_dilemma_1181754.html

 

[jward]

Shanaka Anslem Perera
@shanaka86

Trump and Xi meet 14 May. Markets are pricing the wrong summit.

On 3 March 2026, the Joint War Committee at Lloyd’s of London expanded its listed war-risk areas under circular JWLA-033. Reuters, S&P Global, Lloyd’s List, and Marsh broker channels converged on additional war-risk premia of 0.8 to 2.5 percent of insured value for many non-United States-flagged transits, roughly fivefold the pre-war baseline of 0.1 to 0.25 percent. For a very large crude carrier valued near 110 million dollars, a 2.5 percent premium implies a 2.75 million dollar surcharge per voyage. That cannot clear at scale without pass-through, sovereign support, or rerouting. Maersk reports approximately 500 million dollars per month in additional operating cost. CMA CGM has rerouted vessels around the Cape. The IEA describes the conflict as creating the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market, with Hormuz flows falling from around 20 million barrels per day before the war to just over 2 in March. UKMTO and the Royal Navy logged 41 incidents between 1 March and 27 April. The DFC stood up a 40 billion dollar maritime reinsurance facility with Chubb, Travelers, Liberty Mutual, Berkshire Hathaway, AIG, Starr, and CNA. The Strait was not closed by missiles. It was commercially impaired by the underwriting layer.

On 2 May, MOFCOM invoked China’s 2021 Blocking Order for the first time, against United States sanctions on Hengli Petrochemical and four Shandong teapot refiners. According to Bloomberg reporting carried by Reuters, with the Reuters caveat that it could not immediately verify the report, Chinese regulators then advised major banks to pause new yuan-denominated lending to the same refiners while leaving existing credit untouched. On 8 May, six days before Trump’s plane lifted off for Beijing, OFAC designated ten entities under Executive Order 13382 for involvement in Iran’s missile and drone procurement networks. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has confirmed warning letters to two unnamed Chinese banks. Any Chinese institution that complies with OFAC risks exposure under the Blocking Order. Any institution that ignores OFAC risks dollar-clearing severance through HSBC, Standard Chartered, Citi, and JPMorgan correspondent channels into Hong Kong. There is no clean compliance path that satisfies both regimes simultaneously.

Four systems are being forced into one diplomatic window: Hormuz passage and maritime insurance, the United States-China sanctions-law conflict, the rare-earth licensing architecture under MOFCOM Notice 61 with the 10 November 2026 cliff, and Iran’s unverifiable succession architecture under Mojtaba Khamenei since 28 February. In the sixty-seven days since his 8 March elevation, the new Supreme Leader has not made a verified public appearance. Markets price these as separate files. CSIS and Brookings frame the meeting around trade, technology, rare earths, Boeing, agriculture, Taiwan, and Iran. The Trump administration enters with the IEEPA tariff lever invalidated 6-3 by the Supreme Court in Learning Resources and the Section 122 substitute struck down on 7 May at the Court of International Trade.

Summits resolve in calendar minutes. Chokepoints resolve in months. The communiqué will be metabolised in one trading session. Hormuz transits, war-risk premia, OFAC tempo, bank lending, rare-earth licences, gold, and basis spreads will play out over thirty to sixty days. The reverse triggers are dated and the thresholds are specified. Do not trade the headline. Trade the verification. The Beijing summit is not the trade. The confirmation gap after Beijing is the trade.

 

[jward]

Taiwan Security Monitor (台灣安全觀測站)
@TaiwanMonitor
1h

Taiwanese military sources this week confirmed earlier reporting that Taiwan plans to forward deploy HIMARS rocket systems to Penghu and Dongyin, within strike range of coastal PLA bases.

Our visualization shows the range of these deployments, with both GMLRS and ATACMS munitions.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2053515702422667761

View: https://twitter.com/TaiwanMonitor/status/2053515702422667761?s=20

 

[jward]

Terror Alarm
@Terror_Alarm
27m

It isn't for Taiwan. It's for the United States.

China equips its J-10C fighter jets with world-beating PL-17 long-range missile. By threatening US support aircraft from far away, China can blind US radar and slash the combat radius of US stealth fighters (F-35/F-22).

Photo: Planespotters

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2054153769177227707

View: https://twitter.com/Terror_Alarm/status/2054153769177227707?s=20

 

[jward]

Jay in Kyiv
@JayinKyiv
1h

CNN: The Russian ship "Major Ursa" that sank in the Mediterranean Sea in December 2024 near the coast of Algeria apparently carried two key components of nuclear reactors intended for North Korea, likely for its submarine industry.

The ship's captain, who was arrested in Spain, revealed that there were "components for two nuclear reactors similar to those used in submarines" on board, but he does not know if it also carried nuclear fuel.

A week after the sinking, the Russian research and espionage ship "Yantar" arrived in the area and stayed above the shipwreck for five days, after which four more explosions were recorded in the area.

It was also reported that the U.S. Air Force twice sent a special aircraft to the area to detect nuclear materials, aiming to collect and analyze radioactive residues. It has not been disclosed whether signs of nuclear contamination were found at the site.

 

[jward]

MAKS 25
@Maks_NAFO_FELLA
4h

️ NATO country may have hit Russian ship to prevent transfer of nuclear technology to North Korea, — CNN.

The cargo ship Ursa Major, which was carrying components for two nuclear reactors, sank under mysterious circumstances in December 2024 off the coast of Spain.

According to the investigation, the 50 × 50 cm hole in the ship’s hull could have been made by a Barracuda torpedo. Only the United States, several NATO allies, Russia and Iran possess such torpedoes.

American nuclear detection aircraft have flown over the sinking site twice in the past year.

In addition, a week after the incident, a Russian spy ship visited the wreckage and caused four more explosions.

Jay in Kyiv
@JayinKyiv
1h

CNN: The Russian ship "Major Ursa" that sank in the Mediterranean Sea in December 2024 near the coast of Algeria apparently carried two key components of nuclear reactors intended for North Korea, likely for its submarine industry.

The ship's captain, who was arrested in Spain, revealed that there were "components for two nuclear reactors similar to those used in submarines" on board, but he does not know if it also carried nuclear fuel.

A week after the sinking, the Russian research and espionage ship "Yantar" arrived in the area and stayed above the shipwreck for five days, after which four more explosions were recorded in the area.

It was also reported that the U.S. Air Force twice sent a special aircraft to the area to detect nuclear materials, aiming to collect and analyze radioactive residues. It has not been disclosed whether signs of nuclear contamination were found at the site.

 

[jward]

cnn.com
A Russian ship sank in mysterious circumstances. It may have been carrying submarine nuclear reactors to North Korea

---

Cartagena, Spain —

A Russian cargo ship likely carrying two nuclear reactors for submarines, possibly destined for North Korea, suffered a series of explosions and sank in unexplained circumstances, about 60 miles off the coast of Spain, a CNN investigation has found.

The extraordinary fate of the Ursa Major has been shrouded in secrecy since it sank on December 23, 2024. But it may mark a rare and high-stakes intervention by a Western military to prevent Russia from sending an upgrade in nuclear technology to a key ally, North Korea, CNN reporting suggests. The ship set sail just two months after Kim Jong Un had sent troops to assist with Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine.

A flurry of recent military activity around its remains has deepened the mystery around its cargo and destination. US nuclear “sniffer” aircraft have flown over the sunken ship twice in the past year, according to public flight data. And its wreckage was also visited a week after it sank by a suspected Russian spy ship which set off four further explosions, according to a source familiar with the Spanish investigation into the incident.

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The Spanish government has said little, only releasing a statement on February 23 after pressure from opposition lawmakers. It confirmed that the ship’s Russian captain had told Spanish investigators the Ursa Major was carrying “components for two nuclear reactors similar to those used in submarines,” and that he was unsure if they were loaded with nuclear fuel.

The series of events which led the Ursa Major to sink to the bottom of the Mediterranean Sea remains unclear. It may have involved the use of a rare type of torpedo to breach the ship’s hull, according to the Spanish investigation, as described by the source familiar with its contents. The incident occurred in the closing days weeks of Joe Biden’s presidency, when the war in Ukraine was peaking in Moscow’s favor, and there was a strong US desire not to directly escalate with Moscow.

The Ursa Major, also known as Sparta 3 and a veteran of Russia’s military campaign in Syria – where it was used to evacuate Russian equipment – docked in the fuel port of Ust-Luga in the Gulf of Finland on December 2, before moving to a container facility in St. Petersburg’s docks. The ship’s public manifest said it was bound for Vladivostok, in Russia’s Far East, when it departed on December 11, carrying two large “manhole covers,” 129 empty shipping containers, and two large Liebherr cranes.

In October that year, its owner, the state-linked Oboronlogistics, said in a statement that their ships had been licensed to carry nuclear material. Time-lapse video footage of the Ursa Major’s loading at Ust-Luga, analyzed by CNN, shows containers being put inside the hull, with a gap left below where the “manhole covers” would later sit.

The ship moved down the French coast, before Portuguese Navy aircraft and vessels tracked it through their waters, according to a statement from the Navy. Two Russian military ships, the Ivan Gren and Aleksandr Otrakovsky, escorted the vessel, and on the morning of December 22, the Portuguese navy dropped the tail, the statement added.

About four hours later, in Spanish waters, the ship slowed dramatically, prompting Spanish rescuers to radio and check if it was in distress, according to the Spanish government investigation, carried out by the local maritime authorities in the southern port of Cartagena. The ship’s crew replied that it was fine.

But about 24 hours later, the ship deviated sharply from its course and, at 11:53 a.m. UTC on December 23, issued an urgent call for help, the investigation said. It had suffered three explosions on its starboard side, likely near its engine room, that killed two crew members. This left the vessel listing and immobile, as social media video of the boat shows.

The 14 surviving crew members evacuated on a lifeboat, and were later picked up by the Salvamar Draco, a Spanish rescue boat. At 7:27 p.m., a Spanish military vessel arrived to assist. But half an hour later, one of the Russian military ships that had escorted the Ursa Major, the Ivan Gren, ordered nearby vessels to keep two nautical miles away, and later asked they return the rescued crew immediately.

The Spanish maritime rescue authorities insisted they must conduct a rescue operation, and sent a helicopter to the ship to check for survivors. Footage seen by CNN shows a rescuer trying to enter the ship’s engine room, but finding it sealed. The Spanish rescuer checks the living quarters for survivors, and peers inside the ships’ containers to see two filled with trash, fishing nets and other equipment, according to the video.

The Ursa Major appeared stable and unlikely to sink soon, according to the source familiar with the investigation. But at 9:50 p.m. the Ivan Gren fired a series of red flares over the scene, and four explosions followed. Four similar seismic signatures were registered at that exact time, in that approximate area, the pattern of which resembled underwater mines or overground quarry blasts, the Spanish National Seismic Network told CNN.

By 11.10 p.m., the Ursa Major was reported sunk, according to the source familiar with the Spanish investigation.

The 14 Russian survivors were brought ashore in the port city of Cartagena, where they were debriefed by Spanish police and investigators. The Russian captain was reluctant to speak about the ship’s alleged contents, fearing for his safety, according to the statement from the Spanish government to opposition lawmakers.

The captain came “under pressure to clarify what he meant by ‘manhole covers,’” the items originally listed on the ship’s manifest, the statement added. “He finally confessed that they were the components of two nuclear reactors similar to those used by submarines. According to his testimony, and without being able to confirm it, they did not contain nuclear fuel.”

The source familiar with the investigation said the Russian captain, named as Igor Anisimov, believed he would be diverted to the North Korean port of Rason to deliver the two reactors. The Spanish investigation analyzes the unlikely choice of a round-the-world boat trip to deliver a cargo of two cranes, 100 empty containers and two large manhole covers, sailing from one Russian port to another, despite the extensive rail network that spans the country. The investigation suggests the cranes were aboard to assist delivery of a sensitive cargo on arrival in Rason.

The ship’s crew was returned to Russia days later. CNN has contacted a man bearing the name and likeness of the Russian captain. He denied involvement with the Ursa Major and said he was retired. Four days after the sinking, the ship’s owner, Oboronlogistics, described it as a “targeted terrorist attack” and said there were three blasts. A 50cm by 50cm (20 inch by 20 inch) hole was found in the vessel’s hull, the damaged metal facing inwards. “The deck of the vessel was strewn with shrapnel,” the company’s statement added.

A week later, according to the source familiar with the investigation, the Russian military returned to the scene. The Yantar – officially a Russian research ship, but accused of espionage and disruption in NATO waters – sat over the Ursa Major’s wreckage for five days, the source said, before four more explosions were detected, possibly targeting the remains of the ship on the seabed.

Maritime tracking data from the trade intelligence firm Kpler shows the Yantar was in the area in January last year, mooring in Egypt then Algeria, and then sending one position ping 20 km (12 miles) from the last position of the Ursa Major on January 15.

Some details of the Spanish investigation into the incident were reported first by the local Cartagena newspaper La Verdad in December, sparking a series of questions from Spanish opposition lawmakers. Lawmaker Juan Antonio Rojas Manrique told CNN: “When someone doesn’t clearly and fully provide the information you request, you at least suspect they are hiding something… of course.”

In its statement to lawmakers, the Spanish government said the remains of the Ursa Major lay at a depth of about 2,500 meters (8,202 feet) and that recovery of its data recorder from that depth “is not possible without significant technical resources and risks.” Experts have questioned why the government considers it too risky, if no radioactive material is involved.

Rojas, a former merchant marine captain, also expressed skepticism, telling CNN: “Nowadays black boxes usually float to the surface with a locator so they can be found in any accident. I think someone has the black box. But we don’t know whether it’s Spain or if the Russians themselves have located it.”

The US military has also shown an interest in the area, twice sending a rare and sophisticated “nuke sniffer” aircraft, known as a WC135-R and based in Nebraska, over the scene of the incident since the Ursa Major sank – once on August 28 last year and again on February 6 this year, according to publicly available flight data.

A spokesman for the 55th Wing base in Offutt, Nebraska, Kris Pierce, confirmed the aircraft’s role usually “supports nuclear debris collection and analysis.” He added: “We cannot provide additional details regarding specific flight routing, mission findings, or any partner-related coordination.” Another WC135-R took a relatively similar flightpath 13 months before the Ursa Major sank, suggesting interest in the area may have pre-dated the sinking, or be routine.

It is unclear if these two rare and costly flights – by aircraft usually flown in secrecy and used to detect nuclear activity in the Russian Arctic or around Iran – found any contamination traces from the Ursa Major’s wreckage. The Spanish government has given no indication that it fears radiation along its southern coast, a popular tourist destination, and no evidence has emerged to that effect.

The claim that North Korea was the likely recipient of the two reactors allegedly aboard the ship comes after the secretive totalitarian regime released images in December 2025 of its first nuclear submarine. The still pictures, which feature leader Kim Jong Un grinning, only show the sealed hull of the vessel, and no evidence there is a functioning nuclear reactor inside.

Mike Plunkett, senior naval platforms analyst for Janes, a defense intelligence company, said it was unlikely the reactors, if new, would have been shipped with fuel in them. “If these reactors have come out of decommissioned submarines, then they will be radioactive, although obviously not as much as if they were fully loaded with fuel,” he said.

Any decision by Russia to transfer this technology to North Korea is not “undertaken lightly and it’s only something that’s ever done between very close allies,” he added, so if true “it’s a major move by Moscow.” He described any such development as “very troubling, potentially, particularly if you’re South Korea.”

The Spanish investigation, as described to CNN, notes the status of North Korea as a Russian strategic ally, and how Pyongyang has openly urged Moscow to share its nuclear technical expertise. It is likely such demands would have increased after at least 10,000 North Korean troops went to Russia in October 2024 to fight Ukraine’s incursion into the Kursk region.

The investigation says it is likely the reactors transported were the VM-4SG model, often found in Russia’s Delta IV class ballistic missile nuclear-powered submarines, but provides limited evidence to support the claim.

CNN has obtained satellite imagery from Vantor of the Ursa Major docked at the east end of the port of Ust-Luga, in the Gulf of Finland, on December 4, 2024. Geolocated timelapse videos, posted to the account of the vessel’s owners, Oboronlogistics, show it being loaded with containers and cranes there.

After the sinking, Russian newspaper Kommersant reported the Ursa Major was carrying port cranes and hatches designed to cover the nuclear reactors of a new icebreaker being built in Vladivostok. The report did not mention the two white objects.

The Spanish investigation also tackles the initial impact that caused the Ursa Major to deviate off course and list, according to the source familiar with the report. The Russian captain told investigators he did not hear any impact or blast on December 22, when his ship suddenly slowed. It was only 24 hours later that three explosions followed near the engine room, killing two crew members, named as Second Mechanic Nikitin and Mechanic Yakovlev, whose bodies were not found.

The investigation proposes the 50cm by 50cm hole in the Ursa Major’s hull would likely have been made by a Barracuda supercavitating torpedo. Only the United States, a few NATO allies, Russia and Iran are believed to have this kind of high-speed torpedo, which fires air ahead of the weapon to reduce the drag of the water. This enables them to reach very high speeds to pierce the hull of their target, with some models, as a result, not using an explosive charge to cause damage.

The source familiar with the investigation said it concluded the use of such a device would fit with the size of the hole in the Ursa Major’s hull, and that it could have made a noiseless impact resulting in the sudden slowing of the boat on December 22.

Other experts consulted by CNN differed in their view. Plunkett, the Janes analyst, suggested a limpet mine was a more likely explanation for the size and location of the hole. “It sounds like a shaped-charge explosive that was placed against the hull by somebody or something,” he said.

The Russian owners of the ship, Orobonlogistics, the Russian, Spanish and British militaries did not reply to a request for comment. The Pentagon declined to comment. Multiple Western security and intelligence officials approached by CNN have described the incident as strange or suggested some of the Spanish investigation’s conclusions were far-fetched, but have not provided an alternative, benign explanation, for the initial blasts that hit the boat, or the acute Russian reaction to its plight.

The secrets of its cargo, and how it came to sink, rest on the sea floor.

CNN’s Nick Paton Walsh and Natalie Wright reported from Cartagena, Pau Mosquera from Madrid, Anna Chernova from Dubai and Zachary Cohen from Washington, DC.

https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/12/world/a-russian-ship-sank-in-mysterious-circumstances-it-may-have-been-carrying-nuclear-reactors-to-north-korea

 

[jward]

Sal Mercogliano (WGOW Shipping) ‍
@mercoglianos
1h

Our old friend Ursa Major is back in the news. According to the ship's captain, they were carrying nuclear reactors for North Korean submarines.

The original allegation was she had material on board for a new construction nuclear powered icebreaker.

The question is why did she sink? My top three reasons are:

1⃣Accident in the engine room led to an explosion and the ship flooded and sank.
2⃣An attack, probably by an unmanned surface vessel, akin to what we have seen in the Black Sea or against the LNG Arctic Metagatz.
3⃣A limpet mine placed on the hull.

 

[jward]

War Radar
@War_Radar2
17h

BREAKING: Japan is considering the biggest military buildup in its modern history.

Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party is discussing a dramatic increase in defense spending to as much as 3–5% of GDP, more than double the current level.

If approved, the new funding could be used to expand Japan’s arsenal with advanced warships, submarines, drones, and next generation fighter jets.

The move comes as U.S. President Donald Trump intensifies pressure on allies to shoulder more of their own defense costs.

A shift to 5% of GDP would place Japan among the world’s highest military spenders and mark a historic transformation of the country’s postwar security policy.

Source: South China Morning Post (SCMP)

 

[Housecarl]

War Radar
@War_Radar2
17h

BREAKING: Japan is considering the biggest military buildup in its modern history.

Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party is discussing a dramatic increase in defense spending to as much as 3–5% of GDP, more than double the current level.

If approved, the new funding could be used to expand Japan’s arsenal with advanced warships, submarines, drones, and next generation fighter jets.

The move comes as U.S. President Donald Trump intensifies pressure on allies to shoulder more of their own defense costs.

A shift to 5% of GDP would place Japan among the world’s highest military spenders and mark a historic transformation of the country’s postwar security policy.

Source: South China Morning Post (SCMP)

This added to Japan starting foreign sales of new military equipment makes that transformation all the more significant.

 

[jward]

Aric Chen
@aricchen
7h

The Call That Said Everything: Why Trump's Post-Beijing Phone Call to Takaichi Should Make Zhongnanhai Nervous

The moment Air Force One lifted off from Chinese soil after Trump's two-day visit to Beijing, the very first foreign leader he picked up the phone to call was Japan's Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. Not a courtesy call. Not a routine readout. A 15-minute, detailed, confidential briefing — delivered in the air, before the wheels had even touched down at home.

The signal could not be clearer.

Trump and Takaichi reaffirmed what Tokyo described as the "unshakable" and "ironclad" Japan–U.S. alliance. They exchanged views on China's economy and security posture. They agreed to keep close communication on the Indo-Pacific. They scheduled their next in-person meeting at the G7 summit in France next month. And crucially, when asked by reporters whether Taiwan came up, Takaichi declined to answer — a silence that speaks louder than any statement.

Read this in context. Days earlier, Xi Jinping reportedly warned Trump in Beijing that Washington and Beijing "could clash" if the Taiwan question were mishandled. Trump told U.S. media afterward that he made no promises to Xi. None. Zero. And then he called Tokyo first.

For Beijing, this sequence is a diplomatic ice bath:

1. The CCP rolled out the red carpet hoping to peel Washington away from its Asian allies. Trump left with no commitments on Taiwan.

2. Before Xi's tea had gone cold, the President of the United States was on the phone with the Japanese leader Beijing has spent months trying to economically intimidate — the same Takaichi whose November 2025 remarks framing a Taiwan contingency as a "survival-threatening situation" for Japan triggered Beijing's retaliation campaign.

3. Tokyo, far from being abandoned, was the first call. Not Seoul. Not Brussels. Not Moscow. Tokyo.

This is how alliances are signaled in the real world — not in communiqués drafted by committees, but in who the President calls, when, and from where.

The message to the Chinese Communist Party is unmistakable: the U.S.–Japan alliance is not a card Washington is willing to trade. Engagement with Beijing does not come at the expense of Tokyo. Economic coercion against Japan will not split the alliance — it will tighten it. And any miscalculation across the Taiwan Strait will be met by an allied front, not a divided one.

To the cadres in Zhongnanhai still nursing fantasies of "decoupling Trump from Tokyo": wake up. The opposite just happened. Your guest of honor flew home and immediately reassured Japan that nothing had changed.

The alliance is solid. The deterrent is intact. The wishful thinking ends here.

Don't act rashly. Don't miscalculate. The free and open Indo-Pacific has more friends than Beijing has patience.

These are my own original opinions (@aricchen). Views are my own — welcome to discuss!

 

[Plain Jane]

South Korea, Japan agree to boost energy cooperation

The South Korean and Japanese leaders, whose nations have not always had good relations, have vowed deeper ties at talks. They reaffirmed stronger security coordination and energy cooperation in challenging times.

www.dw.com

South Korea, Japan agree to boost energy cooperation​

Timothy Jones with Reuters, AP
40 minutes ago40 minutes ago
The South Korean and Japanese leaders, whose nations have not always had good relations, have vowed deeper ties at talks. They reaffirmed stronger security coordination and energy cooperation in challenging times.

South Korean President Lee ‌Jae Myung and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi held a fourth meeting in about six months on Tuesday, with both leaders pledging to continue deepening bilateral ties.

The two countries have long had a turbulent relationship over issues related to Japan's 35-year colonization of the Korean Peninsula before the end of World War II, but ties have recently been on the mend.

Both Lee and Takaichi are relatively new to their jobs, having taken office last year.

What did Lee and Takaichi agree?​

Following the talks in Andong, Lee's hometown, the two leaders said they would step up coordination to stabilize energy supply lines and expand cooperation with other Asian partners.

"Recent instability ‌in supply chains and energy markets stemming from the situation in the Middle East has further underscored the need for close cooperation between our two countries," Lee said in a ‌joint press statement.

Takaichi said they also launched a bilateral initiative that aims to strengthen the resilience of the energy supply.

She said that included enlarging reserves in the Indo-Pacific region and "assessing energy, security through measures such as mutual swap transactions for crude oil, petroleum products and LNG."

The two also reaffirmed their desire for stronger security coordination, including cooperation with the United States, in the face of several shared challenges.

Among other things, both Japan and South Korea feel themselves highly exposed to the threat posed by North Korea's growing nuclear arsenal and by the strategic competition between the US and China.

Both leaders came with delegations to the summit talksImage: Yonhap News/IMAGO

'Shuttle diplomacy' aims to deepen ties​

According to Lee, a pledge was also made to advance their "shuttle diplomacy" framework, which has led to altogether six meetings between the two since Lee took office.

Lee and Takaichi's predecessors already took steps in 2023 to move beyond longstanding historical disputes and expand bilateral cooperation amid an ever more turbulent regional and global security situation.

Edited by: Dmytro Hubenko

 

[jward]

Why Should We Care: Indo-Pacific Pod
@IndoPacPodcast
·

New: Why Should We Care if North Korea's "Little Rocket Man" is Firing Off Missiles Again?

While U.S. attention has been consumed by wars in the Middle East and Europe, North Korea’s Kim Jong Un is expanding his nuclear arsenal, testing missiles from land and sea, and locking in a new strategic partnership with Russia. In this episode, hosts @GordianKnotRay and Jim sit down with Ankit Panda @nktpnd

- Stanton Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, co‑host of the Asia Geopolitics podcast at The Diplomat, and one of the world’s leading experts on North Korea’s nuclear and missile forces - to unpack what’s really going on in Pyongyang and why it matters far beyond the Korean Peninsula.

Ankit explains why North Korea is now America’s “third nuclear adversary,” with intercontinental ballistic missiles that can reach the U.S. homeland and the lowest threshold for nuclear use of any nuclear‑armed state on Earth. He traces how Kim’s testing program shifted from cautious development to high‑tempo nuclear war exercises, including tactical nuclear weapons aimed squarely at U.S. and South Korean forces in the region.

The conversation digs into the deepening Russia-North Korea military partnership, the implications of the new Choe Hyon‑class destroyer and submarine programs, and the stability‑instability paradox that could make conventional clashes more likely as Pyongyang’s deterrent matures. Ankit also lays out his argument for a U.S. policy shift from denuclearization to “stable coexistence,” explains why Washington already treats Kim as a nuclear peer in practice, and warns of the growing risk that South Korea could break from the Non‑Proliferation Treaty and pursue its own bomb.

See links below for full podcast.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2058012456354795648

View: https://twitter.com/IndoPacPodcast/status/2058012456354795648?s=20

 

[jward]

James Jay Carafano reposted
Terence Shen
@Terenceshen

Some people may be overinterpreting the reported “pause” of the $14 billion Taiwan arms package. It is worth remembering that Taiwan already has approximately $29.7 billion in previously approved U.S. arms sales still awaiting delivery.

9:13 PM · May 22, 2026
3,454

 

[jward]

 

[jward]

General Mike Flynn
@GenFlynn

The Chinese Communist Party is the single greatest external threat to the United States of America.

That is not a political statement. It is not an opinion offered for effect. It is the operational reality I lived as Director of DIA and National Security Advisor, and it is the conclusion confirmed by every serious threat assessment produced by the United States Intelligence Community in the years since.

To understand more about this read one my substack below:

https://genflynn.substack.com/p/a-five-year-

pattern-of-aggression

5:57 AM · May 26, 2026
12.8K
Views

 

[jward]

Aric Chen
@aricchen
Xi Went After Japan's PM Takaichi to Trump's Face. It Did Not Go the Way Beijing Planned.

Here's what the most explosive moment of the Trump-Xi Beijing summit actually looked like — and why it matters for every U.S. ally in the Indo-Pacific.

The meeting wasn't supposed to be about Japan.

When Donald Trump landed in Beijing on May 13 for his two-day summit with Xi Jinping, the agenda was trade, Iran, Taiwan, rare earths. American officials had run every pre-summit prep session with their Chinese counterparts. Japan never came up. Not once.

Then Xi made it about Japan.

According to reporting from Yomiuri Shimbun, the Financial Times, Bloomberg, and Japan Times — sourced to people inside the room — Xi Jinping became visibly agitated, raised his voice, and launched into what multiple sources called the single most heated moment of the entire two-day summit. He invoked the post-WWII legal order. He framed Japan's defense buildup as illegitimate. And then he went personal: he told Trump directly that Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi — along with Taiwan's President Lai Ching-te — was a threat to regional peace.

He asked Trump not to support her.

Trump said no.

Per Yomiuri, Trump told Xi that Takaichi is not the kind of leader who deserves that criticism. The FT goes further: Trump defended Japan's right to build up its defenses, citing the threat from North Korea — a response that surgically dismantled Beijing's entire "remilitarization" framing.

Xi raised his voice. Trump didn't blink.

And then — before Air Force One had even leveled off — Trump was already on the phone to Tokyo, reaffirming what Takaichi would later publicly describe as an "ironclad" bilateral alliance.

This matters beyond the drama of the moment.

For months, a narrative has been calcifying across Asia: that Trump will eventually sell out his allies for a trade deal. That Washington under this president cannot be trusted. That Tokyo and Taipei are, ultimately, on their own.

That narrative just collided with a very inconvenient set of facts.

When the political incentives to throw an ally under the bus were at their absolute strongest — inside a bilateral summit, with Beijing's full trade leverage on the table, in Xi Jinping's own house — Trump defended her anyway. Then he picked up the phone.

Beijing's response to the leaks has been equally telling. Spokeswoman Mao Ning issued a non-denial dressed as a denial. But in the same press conference, she confirmed China's months-long freeze on rare-earth exports to Japan — and justified it by accusing Tokyo of pursuing nuclear weapons. A claim supported by zero IAEA findings, zero allied intelligence assessments, and zero public evidence.

When a government has to fabricate the charge before it can justify the punishment, it is not negotiating from strength.

There is also a second-order story here that most headlines have missed entirely: who leaked this, why they leaked it now, and what it signals to every capital from Seoul to Canberra that has been quietly wondering whether the alliance architecture of the Indo-Pacific still holds.

The short answer, based on everything that has now emerged: it held. In the one place that actually counts.

Whether it holds the next time — that is a different question. One that remains genuinely open.

For the full analysis — including the complete breakdown of what was said in the room, Tokyo's response, Beijing's self-incrimination at the Mao Ning press conference, and what this means for the broader Indo-Pacific security picture:

Full story below.

 

[jward]

Clash Report
@clashreport
1h

NEW: South Korea unveiled its first official plan to develop nuclear-powered attack submarines, with the first vessel targeted for launch in the mid-2030s.

The submarines will be built entirely domestically using low-enriched uranium reactors, drawing on the country's shipbuilding and civilian nuclear industries.

The announcement follows U.S. approval granted by President Trump in October 2025.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2059382942225596462

View: https://twitter.com/clashreport/status/2059382942225596462?s=20

 

[jward]

Mark Satter
@marksatter

NEW: The just-released House NDAA would extend, and build upon, prohibitions on moving U.S. troops from Europe and Korea.

It would extend for another year
- 76,000 U.S. troop floor in Europe
- Prohibition on removing more than $500k mil tech from Europe
- Prohibition on giving up SACEUR
- 28,500 troop floor in Korea

12:47 PM · May 26, 2026
9,105
Views

 

[jward]

Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
4m

North Korea fired multiple projectiles into the Yellow Sea today, including at least one close range ballistic missile

Per South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff, the launch from Jongju involved Padasuri-6 antiship cruise missile launchers and heavy multiple rocket launchers.

The missile traveled roughly 50 miles, shorter than the Hwasong-11D tests in April.

Seoul is assessing the data with Tokyo and Washington.

On its own, a short range test is routine for Pyongyang. The timing is what makes it notable.

While the U.S. is consumed by Iran and Russia pounds Kyiv with its showcase missiles, North Korea is adding its own pressure in the Pacific.

Three theaters, three adversaries, one stretched superpower.

The multipolar squeeze is happening right now.

Source: Yonhap
Image

 

[jward]

Royal Intel
@RoyalIntel_
4h

North Korea announced that it tested a lightweight multi-purpose missile system and a tactical multi-launch cruise missile system using artificial intelligence.

The cruise missile uses AI-based terminal guidance, high-precision autonomous navigation, and terrain mapping, and can strike targets up to 100 kilometers away.

Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
4m

North Korea fired multiple projectiles into the Yellow Sea today, including at least one close range ballistic missile

Per South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff, the launch from Jongju involved Padasuri-6 antiship cruise missile launchers and heavy multiple rocket launchers.

The missile traveled roughly 50 miles, shorter than the Hwasong-11D tests in April.

Seoul is assessing the data with Tokyo and Washington.

On its own, a short range test is routine for Pyongyang. The timing is what makes it notable.

While the U.S. is consumed by Iran and Russia pounds Kyiv with its showcase missiles, North Korea is adding its own pressure in the Pacific.

Three theaters, three adversaries, one stretched superpower.

The multipolar squeeze is happening right now.

Source: Yonhap
Image

 

[jward]

NSTRIKE
@NSTRIKE1231
2h

️ ️ Japan has begun the urgent deployment of troops to the island of Hokkaido.

Tokyo is seriously concerned that Russia may open a second front in the Far East and is rapidly strengthening its military presence directly along the Russian border. Moscow has deployed Su-35 fighters and anti-ship missiles on the disputed Kuril Islands. In the spring, Russia also demonstrated Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles near Japan’s coastline.

Despite its pacifist constitution, Japan is now developing its own counterstrike missiles and is doubling its defense budget.

This development reflects a significant shift in Japan’s security policy amid growing tensions with Russia. The rapid reinforcement of Hokkaido and the acceleration of long-range missile programs indicate that Tokyo no longer views Russia solely as a distant threat, but as a direct and immediate security challenge in the region.

 

[jward]

Aric Chen
@aricchen

Beijing's Worst Nightmare: Manila Just Made Japan Its First-Ever Top-Tier Security Partner!

In a powerful demonstration of Indo-Pacific resolve against Beijing's relentless coercion, Japan under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and the Philippines under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. have just elevated their bilateral relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership — Japan's second-highest diplomatic tier, characterized by Japanese officials as "just short of a formal alliance." Crucially, Japan becomes Manila's first-ever Comprehensive Strategic partner — a deliberate signal from the Philippines about which way the regional winds are blowing.

Sealed at the Akasaka State Guest House on May 28 during Marcos' state visit, the upgrade is not symbolic theater — it is a hard-security architecture taking shape in real time. Tokyo and Manila formally launched negotiations on a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), the framework that will allow the two democracies to share classified defense and operational intelligence on Chinese military movements in the East and South China Seas.

They also agreed to convene a "2+2" meeting of foreign and defense ministers at an early date, opened maritime boundary delimitation talks, and pledged to accelerate the transfer of Abukuma-class destroyer escorts to bolster Philippine naval capacity facing Chinese gray-zone aggression.

All of this builds on the Reciprocal Access Agreement that entered force in September 2025 and the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement signed in January — the legal scaffolding of a quasi-alliance now being filled in at unprecedented speed.

The timing is exquisite. Just two weeks earlier, during the Trump-Xi summit in Beijing on May 14–15, Xi Jinping became visibly agitated as he attacked Prime Minister Takaichi by name over Japan's defense buildup, labeling Tokyo's "remilitarization" a threat to regional peace and, according to Yomiuri Shimbun reporting, even urging President Trump not to support Takaichi or Taiwan's President Lai Ching-te. Trump pushed back, defending Takaichi and reaffirming that Japan must adopt a stronger security posture.

Xi's clumsy attempt to drive a wedge between Washington and Tokyo did not just fail — it produced the opposite of what he wanted. Within fourteen days, the Japanese prime minister he tried to undermine signed Tokyo's most ambitious bilateral security pact in Southeast Asian history.

From the Quad and AUKUS to the Japan-Philippines Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, from trilateral US-Japan-Philippines coordination to the trilateral US-Japan-South Korea framework, the free world is no longer reacting to Chinese coercion — it is architecting around it. Every Beijing tantrum produces another agreement. Every threat from Xi produces another signature. Every "red line" produces another red line crossed.

Xi Jinping's "divide and conquer" playbook is not just outdated. It is now actively counterproductive — a self-defeating reflex that delivers his adversaries the unity he most fears. The era of unchecked Chinese assertiveness is not just drawing to a close. It is being closed, deliberately, by the very nations Beijing tried to intimidate.

Original article by me @aricchen
. Views are my own — welcome to discuss!

© 2026 Aric Chen. All rights reserved. Any unauthorized use will be reported under the DMCA.

 

[jward]

EndGameWW3 reposted
Taiwan Security Monitor (台灣安全觀測站)
@TaiwanMonitor
1h

NEW: The China Coast Guard has announced it has conducted "law enforcement patrols" in waters "east of Taiwan Island."

A spokesperson for the CCG said the patrol was: "A necessary action in response to Japan and the Philippines' unilateral announcement that they would begin negotiations on maritime boundary delimitation in waters east of Taiwan Island."

 

[jward]

Aric Chen
@aricchen
3h
Replying to
@FIFI_Egypt

Japan just proposed something called "Operation Supercharge." Co-produce SM-3 interceptors. Co-produce AMRAAMs. Forward-deploy U.S. missiles to a JSDF base.

The U.S. Secretary of War said yes — to all of it.

What it actually meant ↓

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2061437315705078109

View: https://twitter.com/aricchen/status/2061437315705078109?s=20

 

[jward]

Taiwan News
@TaiwanNewsEN
7h

Taiwan reports over 30 Chinese coast guard incursions around Dongsha since last year

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2061375216241242179

View: https://twitter.com/TaiwanNewsEN/status/2061375216241242179?s=20

 

[jward]

Lyle Goldstein
@lylegoldstein
37m

Chinese military news announces that the China Coast Guard will commence enforcement and inspections in the sea area east of Taiwan. CCTV7, Junshi Baodao, 1 June. The report mentions some 'illegal actions' taken by both Japan and also the Philippines. Let's hope this is not the beginning of something really serious ...

 

[Housecarl]

Lyle Goldstein
@lylegoldstein
37m

Chinese military news announces that the China Coast Guard will commence enforcement and inspections in the sea area east of Taiwan. CCTV7, Junshi Baodao, 1 June. The report mentions some 'illegal actions' taken by both Japan and also the Philippines. Let's hope this is not the beginning of something really serious ...

Merde....the Red October quote jumps out reading this....