WAR The Winds of War Blow in Korea and The Far East

Plain Jane

Just Plain Jane

Myanmar’s military government pardons thousands of prisoners ahead of parliament convening​


Updated 6:20 AM EST, March 2, 2026
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BANGKOK (AP) — The head of Myanmar’s military government granted amnesty to thousands of prisoners, mostly political detainees, and activists being prosecuted or in hiding, state-run media reported Monday.

There was no sign former leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who was ousted in the military takeover in 2021 and has been held virtually incommunicado since then, would be freed. However, according to independent online media reports, those freed included former members of her government and her National League for Democracy party, including Myo Aung, a former mayor of the capital, Naypyitaw.

The amnesty, which coincides with Peasants’ Day, a national holiday honoring farmers, comes two weeks before parliament is set to convene for its first session in more than five years, following the recent election that critics said was neither free nor fair.

About a dozen buses carrying prisoners were welcomed outside the gate of the Insein prison in the country’s largest city of Yangon at 11 a.m. by relatives and friends who had been waiting since the announcement earlier Monday.

Tinzar Aung, 30, who was freed from Insein prison, told The Associated Press: “I am very happy. I pray that all those who are still in prison will be released.” She was sentenced in 2022 to seven years in prison under a counterterrorism law, which carries a potential death penalty and was widely used to arrest and imprison political and armed opponents, journalists, and others involved in dissent since the army takeover five years ago.

State-run MRTV television reported that Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, the head of the military government, pardoned 10,162 prisoners, including 7,337 convicted under the counterterrorism law. MRTV also said 12,487 others, who were either being prosecuted under that law or were in hiding, will receive amnesty and have their cases closed, as well as 10 foreigners.

Political Prisoners Network - Myanmar, an independent watchdog group that records human rights violations in Myanmar’s prisons, said in a statement that it has initially counted the release of 324 political prisoners from 10 prisons.

The identities of those released were not immediately available, but online reports said members of university student unions in Yangon were included in the first group freed.

The Democratic Voice of Burma reported that journalist Hmu Yadanar Khet Moh Moh Tun, sentenced to 13 years in prison in May 2023, was also released.


According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, an independent organization that keeps detailed tallies of arrests and casualties linked to the nation’s political conflicts, more than 22,800 political detainees were incarcerated as of Feb. 27. They include the 80-year-old Suu Kyi, who is serving a 27-year sentence after being convicted in what supporters have called politically tinged prosecutions.

Mass amnesties to mark holidays are not unusual in the Southeast Asian nation.

The prisoners’ release began Monday but may take a few days.
 

jward

passin' thru
insiderpaper.com
Japan to deploy counter-strike missiles closer to China


Japan will deploy a batch of long-range, counter-strike missiles in a southwest region near China by the end of March, officials said Monday.

The Ground Self-Defense Force plans to position its Type 12 surface-to-ship missiles, with a reported range of 1,000 kilometres (620 miles), in Kumamoto, Kyushu region, Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara told a regular briefing.

“I have been told that once the necessary preparation has been made, the ministry of defence will brief local residents” about the move, said the top government spokesman.

Japan is attempting to shore up its military capacity as China increases its naval activities in the East China Sea.

It wants to hold its “counter-strike” capacity and use the missiles to hit enemy bases if Japan comes under direct attack.

Japan’s ties with Beijing quickly soured after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi hinted in November that Tokyo could intervene militarily in any attack on self-ruled Taiwan.

China views Taiwan as its territory and has not ruled out taking it by force.

Since Takaichi’s remark, Beijing has imposed economic pressure on Tokyo and discouraged Chinese nationals from visiting Japan.

Local media said Japan’s ground force delivered a launcher for the missiles to Kumamoto overnight without an advance notice to local communities, prompting dozens of opponents to stage a protest in front of a local military base.

Critics of the move say the missiles’ deployment could make the area a target of possible enemy attacks.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Well this isn't going to go over well.....

Posted for fair use......

Russia Sends MiG-31s Armed with Kinzhal Hypersonic Missiles Over Sea of Japan​


Published on: March 19, 2026 at 10:02 PM

Russian Aerospace Forces publicized for the first time the MiG-31 armed with the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic hypersonic missile flying in the Indo-Pacific region.​


Russia’s Ministry of Defense (RuMoD) released footage on Mar. 17, 2026, of its MiG-31I jets carrying the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal hypersonic Air-Launched Ballistic Missiles (ALBM) while flying over the Sea of Japan. Russian and Chinese jets have been flying joint patrols over the region for a few years now, with the last such combined flight reported by Japan and South Korea on Dec. 9, 2025.


These have usually consisted of Russian Tu-95 Bear bombers, A-50 Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, Su-30 fighter jets, together with Chinese J-16 fighter jets and H-6K/N bombers. MiG-31Is with the Kinzhal, however, are absolutely rare.


Russian military aviation analyst Guy Plopsky, who also shared images from the RuMoD video, told us this is at least the first time the ministry has released the video of the MiG-31I and the Kinzhal over this particular region.

View: https://twitter.com/GuyPlopsky/status/2033921424239563127?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E2033921424239563127%7Ctwgr%5E3eabe05ad8f59b8736a3c6348952fe0ad2ce2aa3%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Ftheaviationist.com%2F2026%2F03%2F19%2Frussia-mig-31s-kinzhal-over-sea-of-japan%2F


The Japanese Ministry of Defense’s Joint Staff, meanwhile, did not release any information about possible interceptions targeting this particular formation. In fact, while multiple intercepts were disclosed, no additional details were provided.

However, between Mar. 15 and Mar. 18, the Mod has been tracking a Russian Navy Udaloy-III class destroyer. The ship first proceeded northeast through the waters between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island, heading toward the East China Sea, and then transited through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan.......
 

Plain Jane

Just Plain Jane

President Trump Summit with Chairman Xi Now Scheduled for May 14th and 15th​


March 25, 2026 | Sundance | 25 Comments

This is good news from the standpoint of us wanting to see President Trump continue to make MAGAnomic progress on trade as well as geopolitical alliances.​

It will be a very interesting summit against the backdrop of Venezuela, Iran, oil/gas energy shifts, the previous Alaska summit with Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, the renegotiation of the USMCA and the Chinese auto deal in Canada…

There are a lot of important topics within a Trump-Xi summit.

PRESIDENT TRUMP – “My meeting with the Highly Respected President of China, President Xi Jinping, which was originally postponed due to our Military operation in Iran, has been rescheduled, and will take place in Beijing on May 14th and 15th.”

“First Lady Melania and I will also host President Xi and Madame Peng for a reciprocal visit in Washington, D.C., at a later date, this year. Our Representatives are finalizing preparations for these Historic Visits. I look very much forward to spending time with President Xi in what will be, I am sure, a Monumental Event. Thank you for your attention to this matter!”
~ President DONALD J. TRUMP
 

Plain Jane

Just Plain Jane

Myanmar’s parliament elects ruling general as president, keeping the army in charge​


Updated 5:58 AM EDT, April 3, 2026
Leer en español

BANGKOK (AP) — Myanmar’s parliament on Friday elected Min Aung Hlaing, a general who ousted Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian government in 2021 and kept an iron grip on power for the past five years, as the country’s new president.

The move marks a nominal return to an elected government but is widely considered as an effort to keep the army in power after an election organized by the military that opponents and independent observers deemed neither free nor fair, and as civil war rages.

Transitioning to an elected government is also seen as a way to improve frosty relations with some Southeast Asian neighbors following the military takeover. China and Russia have supported the military administration, while Western powers imposed sanctions.

Min Aung Hlaing won an expected lopsided victory​

Min Aung Hlaing was one of three nominees for the president’s post, but was virtually guaranteed the job as lawmakers from military-backed parties and appointed members from the army hold a commanding majority in parliament.

The vote was held in the newly renovated parliament building in the capital, Naypyitaw, which was damaged in last year’s earthquake.

Aung Lin Dwe, speaker of parliament’s combined upper and lower house, announced that Min Aung Hlaing won 429 out of the 584 votes.

The two runners-up become vice presidents. Nyo Saw, a former general, had served as an adviser to Min Aung Hlaing, and Nan Ni Ni Aye, an ethnic Karen politician from the pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party, will be the country’s first female vice president. All three are expected to be inaugurated next week.

Min Aung Hlaing, who holds the rank of senior general, earlier this week relinquished his post of commander-in-chief because the constitution prohibits the president from simultaneously holding the top military position. A close aide, Gen. Ye Win Oo, took over the powerful job.

Meanwhile, much of the country remains enmeshed in a bloody civil war.


Opposition group says struggle for real change continues​

Nay Phone Latt, a spokesperson for the National Unity Government — Myanmar’s main opposition organization, which views itself as the country’s legitimate government — charged that Min Aung Hlaing is responsible for numerous war crimes, and his easy assumption of the presidency proved that the political change some countries had hoped for will not materialize.

“Myanmar people do not accept it. The revolution will continue with great momentum,” he told The Associated Press..

The 69-year-old Min Aung Hlaing had been the military chief since 2011. Under the military-imposed constitution, he held significant powers even before overthrowing Suu Kyi’s government.

Parliament members were elected in three phases in December and January. Major opposition parties, including Suu Kyi’s former ruling National League for Democracy, were either blocked from running or refused to compete under conditions they deemed unfair. Suu Kyi, 80, is serving a 27-year prison term on charges widely viewed as politically motivated.

Myanmar was under military rule from 1962 to 2016, when Suu Kyi’s party won a landslide election victory. It won an even greater mandate in the 2020 polls, but the army staged a takeover in 2021 before the new parliament could convene.

Peaceful protests against military rule were then put down with deadly force, pushing pro-democracy activists to turn to armed resistance and ally themselves with ethnic minority groups who have been battling for greater autonomy for decades.

Deadly repression birthed ongoing civil war​

Security concerns meant voting in the recent election could be held in only 263 of the country’s 330 townships.

Nearly 8,000 activists and civilians have been killed since the 2021 army takeover, and some 22,872 political detainees are imprisoned, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, an independent group that tracks rights violations.

The military’s major reliance on airstrikes — 1,140 strikes in 2025 alone, according to the U.S.-based Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project — accounts for hundreds of civilian casualties.

“If Min Aung Hlaing thinks that an official civilian title will shield him from prosecution for the many grave violations of international law that he is accused of overseeing as head of the military, that is not how international justice works,” Amnesty International Myanmar researcher Joe Freeman said in statement.

The International Criminal Court in The Hague in 2024 began an investigation into charges of crimes against humanity after the chief prosecutor applied for an arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing over the military’s brutal persecution of the Rohingya minority.


At long-awaited hearings at the International Court of Justice in January this year, Myanmar defended itself against accusations that it was responsible for genocide against the Rohingya. The West African country of Gambia first filed the case in 2019.
 

jward

passin' thru
Duan Dang
@duandang
24m

China has established reserved airspace in the Yellow Sea and East China Sea from 27 March to 06 May.

Updated April 5, 2026 8:16 am ET

TAIPEI—China has taken the unusual step of reserving swaths of offshore airspace without explanation for a period of 40 days, issuing alerts similar to those used to warn aviation authorities of Chinese military exercises, which typically last no more than a few days.

Beijing hasn’t declared any exercises in the area, sparking a new aviation mystery following an unexplained pause in military flights around Taiwan. The airspace reserved in the current alerts is hundreds of miles away from the self-governing island.
 

jward

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The Epoch Times
@EpochTimes
1h

According to a recent investigative report by CNN, satellite imagery analysis, corroborated by letters that Chinese villagers sent to local officials and government documents, revealed that some villages in China’s southwestern Sichuan Province have been demolished over the past three years. In their place stand newly constructed nuclear weapons production facilities and an entirely new road network connecting multiple nuclear bases. This indicates that the Chinese military is undertaking a significant expansion of the nuclear weapons network surrounding Zitong County in Sichuan, according to the report.

The “Third Front Construction” project was the CCP’s wartime preparation strategy implemented during the Cold War. It was initiated by then-CCP leader Mao Zedong in 1964 to counter potential external military strikes by relocating industries into the secluded mountainous regions of western China.

Continue reading in thread.
View: https://twitter.com/EpochTimes/status/2041317875290439858?s=20
 

Plain Jane

Just Plain Jane

Xi Hosts Taiwan Opposition Leader In Rare Meeting: 'We Will Not Become A Chessboard For External Intervention'​

by Tyler Durden
Friday, Apr 10, 2026 - 05:20 PM
All eyes remain fixated on the impending US-Iran talks in Islamabad, but big things are also happening Friday in Beijing, and they have direct impact on another potential global flashpoint: Taiwan.

While Washington potentially gets bogged down in another Middle East quagmire (if talks don't go well and there's no offramp), Chinese leader Xi Jinping has welcomed the leader of Taiwan’s main opposition party for a rare direct meeting in the Chinese capital.

The symbolism of the timing can't be missed, as Xi invited Nationalist Party Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun to China ahead of the planned big mid-May summit with President Trump in which the Chinese leader could continue a push to dilute Washington's support for Taiwan.

1775858725550.jpeg

This is all about steering self-ruled Taiwan into China's orbit, and Beijing asserting political power to do so in the face of the Trump administration, after China has long stated its official policy of reunification to the mainland through political means.

By hosting Cheng, Xi is also presenting himself as a force for stability who can be entrusted with ensuring peace - the WSJ has commented - and we might add with the image of 'Taiwan's willing participation' - at a moment the Middle East is on fire largely as a result of American policy and quickness to result to force and surprise attacks.

Xi and Cheng expressed a desire for a "peaceful" resolution to the many decades-long Taiwan crisis, and posed for photos at the Great Hall of the People. They engaged in public remarks but also held a private, closed-door meeting.

Cheng emphasized in words to reporters that Chinese and Taiwanese officials should work to "transcend political confrontation and mutual hostility." She stated, "Instead, it should become a strait that connects family ties, civilization and hope –
symbol of peace jointly safeguarded by Chinese people on both sides
."

Her rhetoric was tinged with familiar Chinese Communist Party talking points as she heralded China's supposed eradicating of absolute poverty while seeking to achieve the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation".

Among the more notable points were related to 'external intervention' - a not so stealthy reference to American power projection in southeast Asia:

"It is hoped that through the tireless efforts of our two parties, the Taiwan Strait will no longer be a focus of potential conflict, nor will it become a chessboard for external intervention," she said.
Xi and Cheng both agreed that her Kuomintang party is ready to work with Beijing to achieve peace across the Taiwan Strait.

According to a backgrounder:

Cheng is the highest-ranking Taiwanese leader to meet Xi since President Ma Ying-jeou talked with the Chinese leader in Singapore in 2015. They met again in China two years ago when Ma was a private citizen.
Both Cheng and Ma are members of the Kuomintang, the conservative-leaning Taiwanese political party that advocates for greater engagement with China by Taiwan’s self-ruled democratic government.
As for Xi, he held up Taiwan and China's shared history and culture, stating that "people of all ethnic groups, including Taiwanese compatriots," had "jointly written the glorious history of China."
 

jward

passin' thru
SaltyBlackBroadX reposted
Flopping Aces
@FloppingAces
3h

Trump just wrapped his hands around China’s throat and started squeezing ... hard.

While everyone was screaming “chaos” and “no plan,” his team quietly flipped Indonesia, the fourth-largest country on Earth and guardian of the Strait of Malacca.

That narrow little gut-punch of water carries 80% of China’s oil imports.


Now, after a lightning round of beef deals, tariff carve-outs, fossil fuel pacts, critical minerals, nuclear reactor promises, and a shiny new major defense agreement signed at the Pentagon with Pete Hegseth, Indonesia has gone from “neutral” to America’s newest strategic squeeze toy.

All because Jakarta was choking on its own energy crisis... rationing gas, sending bureaucrats home, and staring down 32% tariffs until they bent the knee.

Hormuz was already locked down. Malacca just got grabbed.

China’s entire energy lifeline is now sitting in Trump’s iron fist.

This is a straight-up existential strangulation.

Beijing is about to learn what real leverage feels like.
Sweet dreams, commies. The adults are back in charge.
(article below)
 
Last edited:

Plain Jane

Just Plain Jane
H/T Vox Day


Mainland unveils package of policies, measures to boost ties with Taiwan

Updated: April 12, 2026 11:41 Xinhua

BEIJING, April 12 -- The Chinese mainland on Sunday rolled out a package of 10 policies and measures -- spanning inter-party communication, infrastructure, travel, trade and culture -- aimed at boosting exchanges and cooperation with Taiwan.

The announcement by the Taiwan Work Office of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee followed a meeting earlier this week between Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, and Cheng Li-wun, chairwoman of the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) party, the first such top-level meeting between the two political parties across the Taiwan Strait in a decade.

Invited by the CPC Central Committee and Xi, Cheng led a KMT delegation on a six-day visit to mainland cities including Nanjing, Shanghai and Beijing, which concluded on Sunday.

Atop the 10 initiatives announced by the mainland on Sunday is a proposal to explore a regular communication mechanism between the CPC and the KMT.

The CPC and the KMT will, on the common political foundation of adhering to the 1992 Consensus and opposing "Taiwan independence," take "stronger measures" to promote cross-Strait exchanges, interaction and integration, the CPC's Taiwan work office said in a statement.

The Taiwan question is a scar left over by a full-blown civil war fought between the forces led by the CPC and the KMT about eight decades ago. In 1949, the remnants of the defeated KMT retreated to Taiwan, and the People's Republic of China was founded under the leadership of the CPC.

The unresolved civil war and foreign interference have left the two sides of the Strait in a prolonged state of political confrontation. However, the fact that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory has never changed.

The latest policies and measures, according to the statement, aim to advance the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and enhance the kinship and well-being of compatriots across the Strait.

The statement said that an institutionalized platform will be set up to promote two-way exchanges between young people on both sides of the Strait. The All-China Youth Federation and other relevant mainland institutions will invite 20 youth groups from Taiwan to visit the mainland for exchanges every year.

INFRASTRUCTURE, TRAVEL, TRADE, CULTURE
Efforts will be made to support the coastal areas of Fujian Province -- the mainland region closest to Taiwan -- in sharing water, electricity and gas supplies with the offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu, and to promote construction of sea-crossing bridges linking them, when conditions permit.

The mainland will also move to resume regular direct passenger flights across the Strait, including routes to and from Urumqi, Xi'an, Harbin, Kunming and Lanzhou.

Kinmen will be supported to use a new airport under construction in the nearby mainland city of Xiamen, expected to begin operations by the end of 2026.

A communication mechanism will be set up on the common political foundation of adhering to the 1992 Consensus and opposing "Taiwan independence" to facilitate the entry of Taiwan's agricultural and fishery products that meet the quarantine standards into the mainland.

Efforts will also be made to help Taiwan's agricultural and fishery products gain access to various mainland trade fairs to expand their sales channels.

The mainland will explore building wharves and berths in regions where conditions permit for distant-water fishing vessels from the Taiwan region, and mull providing convenience for the sales of their fish catch on the mainland.

It will also facilitate registration procedures for qualified Taiwan food manufacturers and the entry of their food products into the mainland market.

The mainland will explore the establishment of more trading markets for small-ticket items with Taiwan and support micro, small and medium-sized enterprises from Taiwan to expand business on the mainland.

Mainland cities such as Fuzhou and Xiamen have long established such markets, allowing small businesses from Taiwan to directly sell specialty commodities to mainland buyers.

To boost cultural ties, the mainland will allow qualified TV shows, documentaries and animations from Taiwan to be aired, and permit Taiwan residents to take part in the mainland's fast-growing micro-drama industry.

The mainland will promote the resumption of individual tours for Shanghai and Fujian residents to Taiwan.

A pilot scheme allowing mainland individuals to tour Taiwan was introduced in 2011, but was suspended in 2019 -- a few years after the secessionist Democratic Progressive Party came to power in Taiwan and stepped up plots to seek "Taiwan independence."
 

jward

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John Bulkeley
@bulkeley_john
4h
Replying to
@visionergeo


This is big news because it shows that Japan is not intimidated by China anymore. Japan is increasing its defenses and has one of the best navies in the world. And don't think China hasn't noticed that. Japan sees Taiwan as its front lines, and China had better not cross it.
View: https://twitter.com/bulkeley_john/status/2045240968245399878?s=20
 

jward

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Square profile picture
Institute for the Study of War
@TheStudyofWar
7h

NEW | China & Taiwan Update, April 17, 2026: Taiwan’s opposition Kuomintang (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun reiterated standard PRC rhetoric during her April 10 meeting with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping. The PRC is setting conditions for continued cooperation with the KMT.

The PRC is continuing its multi-domain coercion efforts targeting Taiwan as a means to achieve “peaceful reunification.” The PRC released a ten-point plan to increase cross-strait integration, particularly with Taiwan’s offshore islands Kinmen and Matsu, following the Xi-Cheng meeting.

PRC-Iran Relations: The PRC likely aided Iran’s targeting capabilities during its conflict with the United States and Israel and may be assisting Iran’s efforts to reconstitute some of its air defense capabilities during the current ceasefire. The PRC is likely interested in maintaining the stability of the Iranian regime without provoking US retaliation or jeopardizing its relationship with other Gulf states.

PLA Activity in Taiwan: The PRC has likely practiced clandestine insertions into Taiwanese territory using motorboats and other small craft to avoid detection during PLA exercises. The PRC could use these methods to insert special forces, saboteurs, or civilians who encourage capitulation and undermine Taiwan’s defenses during a conflict. The areas of Taiwan that the PRC has attempted to infiltrate in this manner could be critical to an amphibious invasion (see map below). New Taipei City’s Linkou and Tamsui districts are adjacent to Bali Beach and Tamsui Beach, two of Taiwan’s “red beaches” that have favorable conditions for an amphibious landing. Infiltrating these areas could improve the PLA’s understanding of local terrain, human geography, and military installations, which are critical to planning and executing an amphibious landing.
 

jward

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Faytuks Network
@FaytuksNetwork
1h

Japan’s Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, has confirmed that all “defensive equipment” is now eligible to be transferred or sold to foreign partners. The change marks a significant shift in Japanese policy that has been in place since the end of World War II, originally intended to limit the growth of its defense industry.

:mus: The times they are achangin
:mus:


高市早苗
@takaichi_sanae

Translated from Japanese
Today, we amended the "Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology" and their "Guidelines for Implementation."

Until now, the overseas transfer of domestically produced finished products had been limited to search and rescue, transportation, surveillance, mine countermeasures (so-called "five categories"), but with this amendment, transfers of all defense equipment will in principle become possible.

In an increasingly severe security environment, no single country can now protect its own peace and security alone, and partner countries that support each other in terms of defense equipment are necessary.
In fact, Japan's defense equipment is also supported by various countries through imports from other countries and licensed production.
In this context, voices from partner countries have expressed expectations for the defense equipment that Japan has developed under the concept of "exclusively defense-oriented policy."

Meeting such needs and carrying out transfers of defense equipment will contribute to enhancing the defense capabilities of these countries and, ultimately, to preventing the outbreak of conflicts, thereby contributing to Japan's security.
Additionally, if partner countries possess the same equipment as Japan, they can also mutually share parts and other items, strengthening mutual cooperation.

At the same time, in conducting equipment transfers, we will comply with international export control frameworks and conduct even stricter reviews on a case-by-case basis.
We will also ensure proper management at the recipient's end.
Furthermore, recipients will be limited to countries that commit to use in accordance with the UN Charter.

There is absolutely no change in our commitment to upholding the path and fundamental principles we have followed as a peace-loving nation for over 80 years since the war.
Under the new system, we will strategically promote equipment transfers while making even more rigorous and cautious judgments on whether transfers are permissible.
Rate this translation:

7:55 PM · Apr 20, 2026
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jward

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theuncommondefense.com
Could North Korea’s Drones Wipe Out South Korea’s Tanks?

South Korean K-2 Black Panther tank, February 2025. U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Jason W. Cochran, via Wikipedia

For 75 years, South Korea has been preparing for a Second Korean War. An apocalyptic conflict where hordes of North Korean infantry and tanks storm across the Demilitarized Zone, covered by massive artillery and rocket barrages.

But what if South Korea is preparing to fight the last war – while North Korea is preparing to fight the next one?

North Korea is studying the lessons of the Ukraine War. Not just theoretically, but backed by first-hand experience from 15,000 North Korean soldiers – mainly elite special forces units – who fought for Russia in Ukraine.

One of those lessons will certainly be the vulnerability of armored vehicles to drones. And that’s bad news for South Korea, whose army relies heavily on tanks.

“KPA [Korean People’s Army] units have adapted and adjusted to the new style of warfare in Ukraine,” warned a recent analysis by the Royal United Services Institute, a British think tank.


North Korea is moving away from the Soviet- and Chinese-style tactics from the Cold War, which relied on massed troops, tanks and artillery to blast and bulldoze their way through enemy defenses. Instead, it is moving toward small-unit operations that have become the norm in Ukraine.

“The KPA’s foundational emphasis on offensive maneuver and asymmetric capabilities remains intact – but it is now scaffolded onto low-signature, networked, small-unit operations that differ from the mass maneuver tactics absorbed from Chinese in the Korean War,” said the RUSI report.

Ironically, the face of warfare is changing just as South Korea has built some of the most impressive tank forces in the world. The Republic of Korea Army has more than 2,100 tanks and 3,300 armored troop carriers (by comparison, Britain has around 200 tanks and 1,300 armored troop carriers). Indeed, South Korea has become a major armored vehicle exporter, with its K2 tanks and K9 self-propelled howitzers used by customers ranging from Poland to Vietnam.

Though the mountainous Korean peninsula isn’t ideal tank country, tanks proved useful in the Korean War as mobile artillery and bunker-busters. South Korea’s prime main battle tank – the Hyundai K2 Black Panther – has a special suspension system for operating in hilly terrain.

Today, South Korea “relies heavily on armored maneuver in order to deter and counter a North Korean offensive,” wrote Ju Hyung Kim, president of the Security Management Institute, a South Korean think tank.

Advanced tanks such as the K2 “constitute the core of South Korea’s forward-deployed armored defense north of Seoul. Mechanized divisions and armored brigades are designed to deter North Korea’s advancement in historically important locations, including Kaesong, Cheorwon, and the western corridor toward the Han River, and to execute a rapid counteroffensive maneuver.”

That’s classic doctrine for mechanized warfare since World War II. Yet there were similar expectations of mobile warfare when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Four years later, drones have reduced armored vehicles to playing a minor role at best. Vehicles stay mostly under cover for fear of detection and destruction from omnipresent UAVs. Fitted with anti-drone cages, tanks now resemble porcupines or mobile chicken coops.

Ju Hyung Kim fears that drones – controlled by North Korea’s 200,000 special operations commandos – could devastate South Korean armor as well as U.S. mechanized forces stationed in Korea. “Tank units that execute counterattacks would encounter constant surveillance, especially in altitude bands below 1,000 meters where traditional air defenses are thinnest. Logistics convoys necessary to sustain armored counteroffensive would become objects of tracking and strike operations.”

Like the U.S. Army that it’s modeled on, the Republic of Korea Army has been accustomed to friendly skies. North Korea’s aging air force is no match for South Korea’s air force, especially when backed by U.S. airpower. Why invest in mobile anti-aircraft missiles and cannon when armored units can operate under fighter cover? Better to focus on North Korea’s 3,500 tanks and 22,000 artillery pieces.

But as demonstrated in Ukraine and more recently in the Persian Gulf, high-altitude jet fighters are not meant to stop swarms of low-altitude drones. Intercepting $20,000 Iranian Shahed UAVs with $4 million Patriot missiles is not just economically ruinous, but will exhaust missile stockpiles long before the attacker run out of drones.

At the least, South Korea will have to beef up its air defenses with affordable, mobile counter-drone systems such as lasers and microwave weapons, as well as jammers. Tanks are most effective when they are concentrated, but on a drone-saturated battlefield, they may have to operate dispersed.

However, this doesn’t mean that tanks are doomed to extinction in Korea. One reason why drones have become so overwhelming in the Ukraine War is their sheer numbers. Ukraine alone manufactures 4 million drones per year, a feat made possible by the country’s large number of tech innovators. With an economy that’s around one-fifteenth the size of Ukraine, North Korea would find it difficult to build such quantities even with Russian and Chinese help.

The Korean DMZ is about 160 miles long, or about the one-fifth the length of the frontline in Ukraine, with just a few invasion corridors traversing the rugged terrain. This would let South Korean and American forces concentrate anti-drone defenses, including new weapons such as lasers, microwave emitters, jammers and small interceptor drones.

Perhaps the biggest question is whether drone warfare would actually favor North Korea. What’s striking about the Ukraine War is just how indecisive drone warfare is. Despite launching drones by the millions, Russia has not conquered Ukraine, and Ukraine has not ejected Russia from its soil.

Instead, the conflict has become a stalemate, an endless war of attrition characterized by small units conducting small operations to capture small amounts of ground at heavy cost. On a battlefield where omnipresent drones make maneuver impossible, then the chance for decisive victory is lost.

With a far smaller economy and half the population of the South, the North does not want to fight a long war. Drones may be the future, but they don’t guarantee victory.
 

jward

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:eek:

Faytuks Network
@FaytuksNetwork
17h

US officials say that, due to the Iran War, the US could not "fully execute contingency plans to defend Taiwan from a Chinese invasion if it occurred in the near term" - WSJ
 

jward

passin' thru
Curtis Houck
@CurtisHouck
16h

CBS’s @EdOKeefe: “So, if you’re asking for more time to sort out negotiations with Iran —”

President Trump: “I’m not asking you for more time.”

O’Keefe: “— not me, in general —”

Trump: “I’m not asking it for them.”

O’Keefe: “— if you need more time —

Trump: “No, it’s not more time. I’m just — I’m not asking anybody for more time.”

O’Keefe: “— if you need more time, does that mean Americans should anticipate spending more on gasoline for the foreseeable future”

Trump: “For a little while?”

O’Keefe: “For how long?”

Trump: “And you know what they get for that? You know what they get for that? Iran without a nuclear weapon that’s going to try and blow up one of our cities or blow up the entire Middle East. You want to see what shock would be. And I — I have to be honest.”

O’Keefe: “You're going to [inaudible] your whole year —”

Trump: “The stock market is at an all time high right now. I thought it would have been down 20, 25% when we hit.”

O’Keefe: “You want to drive prices down this year?”

Trump: “Wait a minute. Wait, can I finish my question, wise guy? Stock markets at an all time high right now. I projected, and I’m pretty good at this, that the stock market, Howard, would drop maybe 20% 25%. And I understood that. And I said, hey, it’s bad thing, but I have to do what’s right for the country, even the world, because you can’t have them. You cannot let them have a nuclear weapon. So, the stock market, unlike what a lot of people were predicting, I thought they weren’t necessarily wrong. The stock market today hit an all time high, hit an all time high yesterday, the day before, and it’s staying there. I thought oil would go up to maybe $200 a barrel. And oil is at a very a different number than anyone thought. In fact, this country is much lower because we have all the oil we can use. We’re — we’re actually ships are coming from all over the world to Texas, Louisiana and Alaska. They’re coming from all over the world to get oil from the United States — you know, while this is closed, the Hormuz Strait. So, if you look at what I said, I guess it was right because I said I’d have it 4 to 6 weeks. And in four weeks we have totally defeated their military.”

O’Keefe: “But you —”

Trump: “So, right now, I don’t want to rush it because you guys are, you know, trying to make us look as bad as possible.”

O’Keefe: “— do you —”

Trump: “I don’t want to rush it. I want to take my time. We have plenty of time and I want to get a great deal. I want to get a deal where our nation and the world is safe from lunatics with nuclear weapons.”
 

Macgyver

You also got your last Timebomb. Well that sucks.
Indo-Pacific News - Geo-Politics & Defense News
@IndoPac_Info
Army intelligence analyst charged with selling military secrets to contact in #China for $42,000


An active duty Army soldier and intelligence analyst spent over a year selling sensitive military documents related to the U.S. defense of Taiwan, weapons systems, and missile defense systems to China, federal prosecutors alleged in an indictment unsealed Thursday and obtained by CBS News.

Sergeant Korbein Schultz is accused of using his top secret security clearance to download classified U.S. government records at the behest of an unnamed individual who claimed to live in Hong Kong, allegedly amassing $42,000 in the process.

He was arrested Thursday and charged with six counts including conspiracy and bribery. According to court filings, Schultz was a sergeant and intelligence analyst and assigned to the 506th Infantry Battalion.

The charging documents don't name the Chinese government as the recipient of the information or as perpetrators of the scheme, but much of the military information Schutlz is accused to have passed on relates to that country.

Beginning in June 2022, prosecutors said Schultz and his co-conspirator began communicating online and via encrypted messaging applications. He was instructed to prioritize passing along "original and exclusive documents" to his handler, including information related to Russia's war in Ukraine and the "operabitly of sensitive U.S. military systems and their capabilities," court documents said.

The pair allegedly agreed to enter into a long-term partnership.

By July 2022, investigators alleged Schultz was sending information about High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, the type of systems the U.S. has been sending to Ukraine to use against Russia. He is also accused of transmitting sensitive documents about hypersonic equipment and summaries of U.S. military drills in August 2022.

Court documents detailed a months-long exchange in which the unnamed co-conspirator asked for specific documents and Schutlz complied, selling dozens of sensitive records for thousands of dollars at a time.

Money appeared to be his motivation. In one message, Schultz allegedly told his handler, "I need to get my other BMW back."

"I will just keep sending you an abundance of information," he wrote to the coconspirator, according to prosecutors, later expressing a desire to compare himself to Jason Bourne, the fictional spy created by author Robert Ludlum.

By August of 2023, Schultz — whose job was in part to instruct others on the proper handling of classified information — discussed with his Chinese handler the separate arrests that month of two U.S. Navy sailors accused of transmitting sensitive information to China.

Schultz's co conspirators advised him to be careful, court papers revealed.

And in November 2023, prosecutors alleged the handler asked Schultz to discuss work "for the next year."

The charges come days after Massachusetts Air National Guardsman Jack Texeira pleaded guilty to illegally posting classified military records on an online gaming platform in one of the military's most damaging leak campaigns.

And on Tuesday, an Air Force employee was charged with leaking classified information related to Russia's war in Ukraine to an individual over a foreign dating site.

It was not immediately clear if Schultz had an attorney. His first court appearance will be Friday.

View: https://Twitter.com/i/status/2047803360653267002
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
:eek:

Faytuks Network
@FaytuksNetwork
17h

US officials say that, due to the Iran War, the US could not "fully execute contingency plans to defend Taiwan from a Chinese invasion if it occurred in the near term" - WSJ
What was left out of that summary was the word "conventional"....
 

jward

passin' thru
Under Secretary of State Jacob S. Helberg
@UnderSecE
·
8h
We are working with the Philippines to build a FORWARD DEPLOYED INDUSTRIAL BASE in Luzon — a peaceful platform designed to secure vital supply-chain inputs for American and aligned companies, built with a strong sovereign partner, iterated on as we learn.

Statecraft, at its best, is a product. American products don’t just compete. They enchant and delight. That is the edge this country has. And it’s the foundation of the State Department’s economic statecraft strategy.

Four thousand acres. Roughly one-third the size of Manhattan — the equivalent of everything from Times Square south to the very tip of the island. A hub for industrial cooperation, shared growth and economic security. It is the first of its kind. We are doing new things because we are in new times!
 

jward

passin' thru
Mike Netter
@nettermike
8h

Japan just did what NATO refused to do.

While European allies told Trump to pound sand on the Hormuz Strait, Tokyo is opening its wallet.

The Japanese government is now considering paying — out of its own budget — to harden US military bases in Japan against missile attack.

That's right. Japan is going to pay America to upgrade America's bases.


This comes weeks after Trump told Fox News that "Japan is a better ally than NATO."

He wasn't wrong.

Japan already covers roughly $1.9 billion a year in host-nation support — covering utilities, base labor, and training relocation for the 50,000+ US troops stationed there.

The new five-year cost-sharing agreement is being renegotiated this summer, and Tokyo is coming to the table with offers, not complaints.

Meanwhile, NATO members spent the spring publicly refusing Trump's request for naval support in the Strait of Hormuz.

Prime Minister Takaichi didn't refuse. She didn't make excuses.

She found a way to say yes — within Japan's constitutional limits — and now her government is going further than any other US ally.

This is what an actual alliance looks like.
 

mecoastie

Has No Life - Lives on TB
Mike Netter
@nettermike
8h

Japan just did what NATO refused to do.

While European allies told Trump to pound sand on the Hormuz Strait, Tokyo is opening its wallet.

The Japanese government is now considering paying — out of its own budget — to harden US military bases in Japan against missile attack.

That's right. Japan is going to pay America to upgrade America's bases.


This comes weeks after Trump told Fox News that "Japan is a better ally than NATO."

He wasn't wrong.

Japan already covers roughly $1.9 billion a year in host-nation support — covering utilities, base labor, and training relocation for the 50,000+ US troops stationed there.

The new five-year cost-sharing agreement is being renegotiated this summer, and Tokyo is coming to the table with offers, not complaints.

Meanwhile, NATO members spent the spring publicly refusing Trump's request for naval support in the Strait of Hormuz.

Prime Minister Takaichi didn't refuse. She didn't make excuses.

She found a way to say yes — within Japan's constitutional limits — and now her government is going further than any other US ally.

This is what an actual alliance looks like.
Japan knows that war is coming. They are constrained by their constitution. While they are working to change that they know it wont be fixed in time. They know that we are their protection. They want to give their protection the highest odds to survive and protect them.
 

jward

passin' thru
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
3h

The U.S. and five Latin American nations just issued a rare joint statement against Chinese pressure on Panama...

Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guyana, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States released a coordinated declaration calling out China's "targeted economic pressure" and recent actions affecting Panama-flagged vessels.

The statement frames it as a sovereignty issue and pledges hemispheric solidarity with Panama.

The trigger is the Panama Supreme Court ruling on the Balboa and Cristóbal terminals, two of the most strategically critical port facilities at either end of the Panama Canal.

China is reportedly retaliating against Panama through commercial pressure on Panama-flagged shipping, which carries a huge share of global trade.

The strategic context is much bigger than Panama.

The U.S. has been quietly assembling a coalition to push back on Chinese influence in Latin America for over a year.

Today's statement formalizes that effort with a specific, named adversary and a specific, named flashpoint.

Bolivia signing on is the most surprising piece.

Bolivia has tilted toward Beijing for years on lithium and infrastructure deals.

Their inclusion suggests Washington is making real progress reasserting hemispheric coordination.

The Panama Canal control question has been a Trump fixation since his first term.

China's grip on the Balboa and Cristóbal terminals has been the subtext of every Trump statement about "taking back" the canal.

Today's joint declaration is the diplomatic version of that posture, and it has six countries publicly behind it.

The Iran war exposed how stretched American military capacity is.

The Cuba and Panama moves this week show the administration isn't waiting to recover.

The chokepoint strategy that controls global trade is being asserted everywhere at once, from Hormuz to Malacca to the Caribbean to Central America.

Trump is playing the geopolitical version of speed chess on multiple boards simultaneously.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
I'm putting this here instead of the CCP vs Taiwan thread because this is more far reaching than that situation alone....HC

Posted for fair use......

Is China’s military as strong as it looks?​


John Culver, Jonathan A. Czin, and Ryan Hass



April 28, 2026




  • The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has undergone a dramatic transformation in the 21st century, evolving into a technologically advanced and highly lethal force.
  • Xi Jinping’s sweeping purges of senior officers are aimed less at corruption itself than at ensuring absolute political control of the PLA. His deep incisions in the military mark an unprecedented period of upheaval.
  • Xi appears to be undertaking risky military reforms during a relatively permissive external environment, when immediate conflict pressures are low.
  • For Xi, Taiwan remains a crisis to manage, as he prioritizes long-term economic strength and national development.

Ryan Hass speaks with Jon Czin and John Culver, a top expert on China’s military, about how sweeping leadership purges and rapid military modernization are reshaping the People’s Liberation Army. What do these competing forces mean for the risk of conflict with the United States? And what lessons are China’s military leaders learning from the U.S. war with Iran?




Transcript​





CULVER: If you start to behave as if you think China’s already decided to go to war, then I think war becomes inevitable. We will fall into a very deep deterrence trap. And it will be a highly lethal engagement for both sides, probably without a clear winner.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Continued.....

HASS: Hello, you’re listening to The Beijing Brief from the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings, part of the Brookings Podcast Network. I’m Ryan Hass, director of the China Center. And the Beijing Brief is a biweekly podcast focused on unpacking the forces shaping U.S.-China relations and China’s political, economic, and technological ambitions.
With me today to discuss China’s military is my friend and co-host Jon Czin, as well as our nonresident senior fellow John Culver. Jon, you’re on the hot seat this time around, no longer serving as host, but, instead the source of interrogation. John Culver, it’s really wonderful to have you on the show with us today. I consider you a national treasure. You’ve been studying China roughly as long as I’ve been alive.
CULVER: Gee, thanks Ryan.
CZIN: Only 25 years. Amazing!
[0:59]
HASS: But you’ve also briefed presidents, prime ministers, and so many other leaders over the course of your career. So it’s really wonderful to be able to allow the public to enjoy the pearls of wisdom that previously were only reserved for top leaders.
My goal for our conversation today is to extract as much insight from two Johns who both used to work at the CIA and are experts on the Chinese military. On one hand, China’s military is undergoing a massive buildup. Xi Jinping has stated that China must become world class by its centennial in 2027 with expanding nuclear, maritime, cyber, and space capabilities. And at the same time, the Chinese military has been rocked by purges. I often joke that one of the most dangerous jobs in the world today is to be a Chinese general, because many of them end up in jail or worse.
And so really what I want to try to tease out of both of you is how to reconcile these two competing forces: China’s rapid military buildup and the operatic level purges that exist at the same time. What does this tension tell us about China’s capacity to pursue its ambitions?
But before we get into that, let me just ask both of you how did you get interested in China’s military? What is your origin story here?
[2:12]
CULVER: Yeah, I have the well-worn path I think most experts in our field have of having no background on China other than my grandparents meeting in Beijing in the 1920s. And then in 1984, I answered an ad in the Washington Post for the CIA. And of course it’s a rapid process. Merely two years later or a year-and-a-half later, they invited me to join.
And after the successful interview, I said, what am I doing? Because that wasn’t made clear at all during the interview. Oh, you’re going to be doing China. In fact, you’re going to be the only analyst covering Chinese ground forces, which was at that point, the largest service in the world. It was like 3.5 million troops. I said, well, I better get cracking because I had very just general knowledge of China at that time.
So, luckily it was 1985 and the ‘80s were incredibly formative period for China with reform and opening under previous leader Deng Xiaoping. Of course, the Tiananmen Square crisis in 1989 and then the aftermath. So I was very lucky, you know, to be plunged into this and to have to kind of follow it from the inside as an analyst with access to great information at that time.
Really stood me in good stead. And I just kept getting energized by the content and the people I got to work for and the mission. So I just never had any reason to want to do anything else. I felt like I would’ve paid them to do that job. It was so fun.
[3:42]
HASS: That’s awesome. Jon Czin, how about you?
[3:44]
CZIN: So also similar kind of story. I had known that I had wanted to be an analyst for some time. You know, for background, I grew up in New Jersey and 9/11 happened a week into my freshman year of college. But I was at a small college founded by Quakers. I was a skinny kid. And I realized the contribution I was going to make to my country was probably not to become a sniper for the Marines or to become a Special Forces. Right? Like, that wasn’t going to work out for well for anyone.
But what happened was, you know, as I became more engaged in the world of foreign policy, international relations, I saw an ad in Foreign Affairs, kind of like John seeing the ad in the Washington Post, to become an analyst. I was like, oh, nerd for hire. That is something I am well positioned to do.
So I went to grad school and as I went on in my studies, I realized what I was really interested in was not the Middle East, but really China and about great power politics. I was into great power competition before it was cool, I think. Right? This is in the early 2000s.
And then, I had applied for a job at the Agency, went through the process, walked in the door. I knew I would be covering China. I had no idea what I would actually be doing until I got sworn in at, like, 6:30 in the morning. And then my new manager came in and and grabbed me and told me I’d be covering China’s leadership.
Now, what’s remarkable about that in retrospect is that Xi Jinping had just become vice president two weeks earlier, and heir apparent. Right? So my time covering Chinese politics has almost totally coincided with his own career and rise to the top.
And the reason I ended up following these issues related to the military was, number one, just because, you know, John and our military analysts were kinda the cool kids at the time and doing amazing work. But it was a really interesting moment. I started in 2008 and in that period there was this really interesting split screen in U.S.-China relations.
You know, my friends and family who knew I was interested in China were all asking me about the Beijing Olympics. There were very positive vibes in the relationship. President Bush was going to attend the Olympics. But I walked into an office that was very high strung and very worried about the possibility of a real contingency in the Taiwan Strait.
And John was deeply involved in that effort at the time and has written about it subsequently in Foreign Affairs. And that split screen, you know, the kind of amity on the outside but real sense of danger on the inside, I mean, that was a very formative experience for me as a China hand.
[5:50]
HASS: Well, I want us to get to a conversation around Taiwan and how close we are to the possibility of conflict today. But before we do so, John Culver, can you level set for us what is the People’s Liberation Army? What makes it unique? What should our audience know about it?
[6:05]
CULVER: I think the first thing people should know about the People’s Liberation Army is that it is not the military force of the Chinese state. It is the armed wing of the Communist Party. And that gets very relevant when you look at what Xi’s done to the high command over the last two years.
They’re a force that traditionally was the largest in the world, very backward in terms of equipment, and then moved after 1999 to really change that. It became much more modern and have more capabilities.
So today, 26 years on, you see a highly lethal force, you know, most capable missile forces in the world. And I say that with a pretty good knowledge of what U.S. capabilities are. A force that can present many problems that the U.S. military hasn’t had to deal with since World War II.

Tremendous scale. It’s no longer the largest by a large margin. It’s probably on par numerically. A budget that’s grown exponentially since the 1990s to be second in the world only after the United States, with some interesting accounting to examine. So it’s a force that obviously the Pentagon has to take seriously into PACOM and the policy set.
But then the other side is, I don’t think that war is the plan for Xi Jinping. And, he decides how the PLA is going to be employed because he’s the head of the Party, the chairman of the Central Military Commission. And it pretty much comes down to him — since he fired almost all the other members of the Central Military Commission — when and how it’ll be employed.
And so I think that’s the central tension you see in the Chinese military today, is that he wants options. He wants a military that can really do things if called upon, and he doesn’t have to worry that they’re wholly corrupt or that the military is going to look after and put its own interests above those of Xi Jinping and the Communist Party.
[7:59]
HASS: Jon Czin, John just talked about purges at the top of the Chinese military. Why should my mother living in Orcas Island, Washington, care about the purges? What is their significance?
[8:11]
CZIN: So the significance of the purges is, number one, I think just in terms of understanding what’s going on in China, I think. John and I have looked at this closely, the scope and scale of what’s going on, you really have to reach back to either the period after Tiananmen or really back to the Mao era. Right? Like, this is very tumultuous what’s going on in the military.
And I think what’s impelling it is not that XI is distracted from preparing for some kind of contingency involving Taiwan and, you know, by implication of the United States. It’s because he’s serious about it. He’s willing to make very deep incisions, even to his own political network, to ensure that he has a military that’s capable with fighting the United States. And I think that is the real concern.
So this is not a today or tomorrow problem necessarily. Almost by definition, Xi has a lot of work to do to kind of renovate the high command. But it shows how serious he is. There was this whole debate about is this Xi just being paranoid in a way that’s more kind of clinical than useful in the system. It’s a possibility. But I think what’s really going on here is that it just shows Xi’s sangfroid.
And I think what it means for the long term, you know, less maybe for your mother and more for more for our kids, unfortunately, is that we’re going to be dealing with a military that’s formidable. Right? And that poses the kind of challenges, as John was saying, to the United States military that we’ve not really had to deal with in a long time.
I mean, I think we’ve seen, just in the last few weeks, we’ve had remarkable successes dealing with Iran, but we’ve also been bedeviled by relatively cheap kit, drones and other things. And that is not the PLA. Right? If dealing with Iraq and an insurgency and dealing with Iran is going to be nettlesome for us, I mean, dealing with the PLA is something really we have not dealt with in a long, long time.
[9:53]
HASS: Right. John, do you share that diagnosis of the causes for the purges? Because there’s a lot of speculation in Washington and elsewhere that it relates to corruption or Xi’s desire for control or the possibility of a coup. There’s all kinds of stuff out there. So how do you explain why Xi Jinping is being so aggressive in sort of rooting out his top generals?

[10:17]
CULVER: I’d offer some humility. I’ve been retired from government for six years. I pay attention to developments, but I’m also humbled by the fact that I don’t know from first level sourcing exactly what’s going on.
But, I think for Xi Jinping, he’s really reverting almost to Mao Zedong thought, which is power grows from the barrel of a gun. And the relevant power there isn’t warfare with the United States primarily. It’s keeping the Communist Party in power, and ensuring that the Communist Party doesn’t rot from within.
And I think the more he looked at the problem of corruption in the PLA, which, you know, from the time he started after the 18th Party Congress in late 2012, the first thing he did was go after senior military corruption. He arrested and, or had arrested, and imprisoned the two former most senior uniform military members. And it’s a drum beat that he’s now carried on ever since.
Now, the intensification I think we’ve seen in the last year or two shows that he’s now done with letting PLA processes try and manage this problem. And in a way corruption becomes kind of a broad rubric for a deeper set of issues he has, which is, first of all, it’s not really about fighting a war over Taiwan primarily. It’s about the PLA being absolutely subordinate to him and the Communist Party and absolutely responsive to him. And he’s seen examples where other authoritarian regimes, especially in the Middle East during the Arab Spring era, broke with their political leadership, turned on them. Egypt is a particular case, and there were others. And basically the military in those countries put their own interests above those of the political leadership. And he’s determined to make sure that will not happen.
So in a way, it’s useful for corruption to be a plausible reason why he’s now, as of a study done by CSIS published about a month ago, dismissed 53% of his very most senior generals and admirals, you know, of his four star and three star military leadership.
And he hasn’t replaced them. That’s the really amazing thing, is the Central Military Commission, the political organ under the Communist Party that governs the military, went from seven members down to two, which Xi is the leader, and one vice chairman. And he hasn’t replaced the former members. It’s still a two person committee. And that that’s still true, you know, six months later is just very, very interesting.
And so I would, caution anyone trying to make sense of this to, you know, have some humility that we’re in a very unprecedented era. And if anyone thinks they have high confidence about how this is going to play out, you might want to take that with a grain of salt.
[12:59]
CZIN: Yeah. And I think it’s worth embellishing that last point, right, about having humility about this, because I’m mindful of this, especially after last fall’s Plenum. It’s not just that we don’t know sitting here in Washington what’s going on. I suspect that many of these officers are also unpleasantly surprised by what’s transpired over the last few years.
I referenced the Plenum where, you know, as our colleague Allie Matthias and I wrote about a large swath of Central Committee members were missing. Right? The top 200 or so members of China’s leadership met. And they represent all different parts of the Party apparatus, not just the military.
But I think it’s easy to forget, this is a heavily stovepiped institution. You have people flying in from Chongqing and Ningxia and further reaches of China who don’t have exposure and, you know, day-to-day dealings with the military. And I think even the military itself is very heavily stovepiped. And these guys show up for a major meeting, the big annual confab, and you look around, it’s like, why is the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission missing? Why are a bunch of general officers not in attendance?
And I think that that’s something that’s important to keep in mind is just how secretive the system is. And people don’t know inside the system truly until these things pop.

The other point I want to embellish that John made on corruption is that, you know, in corruption in many ways is a pretext for getting rid of these people, especially because of the way the PLA was for the first part of the century where everybody had their hand in the till and everybody was corrupt. It’s kind of very useful for Xi and the party leadership because then it gives them a reason to get rid of anyone that they wanted to. Right? They’ve got everybody’s permanent record on file.
[14:24]
CULVER: Yeah. It’s more of a rationale than an actual reason.
[14:26]
CZIN: Yeah, and I think insofar as it’s an actual reason, it’s not about corruption per se. Right.? And I just wanted to embellish this point about the Arab Spring. It’s not just about the money and the graft and the skimming off the top, you know, the kind of Jersey style graft and corruption. I’m sure Xi is disgusted by that and doesn’t like it. But it’s a sense that you are doing something that violates the party’s discipline that is inherently disloyal. Right? It’s not about corruption versus loyalty. This is a disloyal act. And it means you have your own set of interests independent of the Party. And I think that more than the actual money and the pettiness of it is really what Xi doesn’t like and what really gives him agita about this dynamic.
There’s one other part of this, too, about the political logic of how Xi has pursued these anti-corruption campaign inside the military. Because when it started, as John said, he went after the former top two officers in the PLA, the guys who had run the system and let it fester for so long, for more than a decade. And going after them was a really risky move. Right? This is like going after made men in the mafia and living to tell about, and he did this as a brand new general secretary. Right? It was pretty brazen and breathtaking the fact that he was willing to do it, but there was a political logic to do it.
We always talk in the China world about, you know, “kill the chicken to scare the monkeys.” You’re going to go after the underlings to send a message to the grandees in the Party. This was just the opposite. Right? This is what we we were jokingly called in one of our Foreign Affairs piece, “killing the monkeys.” Right? You know, so that you scare the bejesus out of everybody else further down the food chain.
I think what’s remarkable now that we’re into Xi’s first term is that Xi started his tenure by going after his enemies and rivals. Now he’s going after his friends and people that he has a real personal relationship and people he personally promoted and handpicked.

Continued......
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Continued.....

So for us as analysts on the outside, and I think probably again for these guys too, it raises a whole host of different analytic questions. Right? It’s the same beast, but it’s taken on a new shape.
[16:16]
HASS: Right. Well, I think that you guys have done a tremendous job of sort of coloring in the emotional state of senior leaders in the Chinese military —
CULVER: — or at least analysts trying to make sense of it.
CZIN: Yeah. We’re not psychoanalysts, we’re just regular analysts —
[16:30]
HASS: — as well as the potential motivations for Xi Jinping to take such aggressive and risky moves within his own military leadership.
I want to flip the script now and look at the other side of this equation, which is Chinese military capabilities. And, John, maybe we can start with you. Where do you see China’s military most capable of threatening U.S. forces? Where do you see the Chinese military as most vulnerable to American military capabilities right now?
[16:57]
CULVER: I mean, we’re talking about a military that hasn’t been in a war since 1979 when it invaded northern Vietnam, which didn’t go great for them. I mean, they seized all the northern provincial capitals of Vietnam and destroyed a lot of economic infrastructure. But they lost 35,000 KIA, killed in action, in two weeks of combat. So, that was a kind of a a warning.
So they’ve had to do instead is study how the U.S. does war. So they built a military that really harvests a lot of the lessons of what they’ve seen us do since Desert Storm and every iteration of combat through the Near East and Middle East over the last few decades.
And so they build a force that’s technically sophisticated, highly lethal in terms of its ability to conduct long range precision strikes and roughly comparable to the United States in cyber capabilities, in counter space capabilities. It’s now a major space fairing power with relay satellite constellations and surveillance satellites that are roughly the same as ours.
So they have capability to see anywhere on the planet. We cannot move major naval forces anywhere close to China without us being under constant surveillance. Which is really striking, because as recently as the mid-1990s, when the Chinese were conducting exercises on the Taiwan Strait, the Clinton administration wanted to send a demonstration of deploying carrier strike groups. And I told the secretary of defense at the time, Bill Perry, you’re going to have to go on TV and tell them you’re doing it because they have no means to detect it otherwise unless you’re within visual range of China.
So today they track us globally. They know where U.S. forces are postured. They have an extremely sophisticated surveillance capacity. I don’t know if you’re as tired as I am about hearing about the latest massive Chinese cyber intrusions of critical U.S. networks.
So they have a capacity to not only wage sophisticated 21st-century warfare, but a capacity to hold at risk things well beyond the physical area of the Taiwan Strait should it come to that. Both in the U.S. domestically, in our telecommunications infrastructure, and then also anywhere in the Western Pacific they could reach with hypersonic, supersonic ballistic and cruise missiles. And they’re building massive inventories of those weapons.
One lesson they already have learned that we seem to be learning now again in Iran is that you go through a lot of expensive stuff very quickly in high intensity technological warfare. And so they are, building deep magazines for all the systems they would need for any potential conflict or crisis with us.
[19:40]
HASS: And where do you both think that they feel most vulnerable to American military capabilities today?
[19:45]
CULVER: I think they’re extremely mindful that they haven’t been to war and going on 50 years, and that everything they think they’ve learned has been from observing us. And it’s not the same thing as doing it yourself.
So, for example, a Taiwan Strait conflict could involve a massive naval blockade. They’ve never done that. It’s harder than it sounds. It’s not as hard as invasion, but it’s pretty darn hard. You have to show an ability to iterate naval and coast guard and ballistic missile fires, to have a very well-engineered surveillance network to be able to spot ships at sea and interdict them or target them as needed.
And then invasion is a whole different scale of problem. Being able to move 150,000 troops in a single wave across a hundred miles at its narrowest of Taiwan Strait, land them, supply them, deal with U.S. Intervention — that’s a huge, multifaceted, command and control problem. Only made kind of more imponderable if you’ve just eviscerated your general officer corps and all the people who were, training and preparing troops for that mission.
[20:49]
HASS: And so how do you think that this nets out? They have annihilated the general officer corps, the top leadership of the Chinese military. Does that affect Xi Jinping’s risk calculus when it comes to Taiwan? Will it impact decisions that he makes about applying pressure or potentially more, using force against Taiwan?
[21:07]
CULVER: It’s a bit of a paradox how Xi Jinping views military preparation given that he’s eviscerated the general officer corps over the last two years. On the one hand it should reassure people and think, you know, I’m reading the tea leaves of our own government, if they thought that, there was a real risk that China was preparing for conflict in the next year or two, I think we would’ve had second thoughts about committing so much force to Iran. I think they actually looked at what Xi had done to the PLA and understood that he’s not planning to initiate conflict.
And I think for Xi Jinping, Taiwan remains a crisis he needs to avoid rather than an opportunity he wants to seize. Because his real eye is on not seizing the island as soon as he thinks the PLA’s ready. It’s actually building toward his other mid-century goals, which is to have the largest economy in the world, to be highly innovative, dominant manufacturing economy. To have China be basically unreliant on the rest of the world, while the rest of the world is highly reliant on China.
So in that scenario, if he’s not looking to go to war with Taiwan, if that remains a crisis he wants to avoid rather than an opportunity he needs to seize, then I think it makes sense then why he thinks he can do what he did to the general officer corps. He’ll have time to rebuild.
He’s also probably a little happy about what’s going on on the island, which is going through a highly polarizing moment. A divided legislature really set against the current President Lai that’s creating really unprecedented kind of partisan division on the island.
[22:42]
HASS: Right. Jon, what do you think?
[22:44]
CZIN: It’s a great question and and it’s one I’ve been getting a lot this year. And the way I’ve started to think about it is that, because of the reasons John articulated at the end, the causal vector runs the other way. Right? Rather than how are the purges shaping Xi’s thinking about Taiwan, I think Xi is probably looking at things macroscopically and thinking, what kind of space do I have to renovate my high command given the current geopolitical condition?
So not a key driver of it, but I think he’s probably sees a pretty permissive environment, that he feels safe because of the political situation on the island where you had the KMT chairman, chairwoman, just come and visit him just a couple weeks ago. President Trump doesn’t seem as personally invested in the security of Taiwan as previous administrations. Right? He doesn’t seem as interested in it.
And so I think, you know, if you’re Xi Jinping and you’re thinking about should I take a sledgehammer in effect and begin demolition and renovation of my high command, now seems like a relatively safe moment to do it. Right? Like, maybe this is just on my mind because I’m going through the process of moving and home renovation, but this is not the kind of thing you do at a moment of insecurity. It’s like when you feel like you’ve got a little bit of cushion. Right?
[23:40]
HASS: Yeah. I’ve I’ve heard you say that you never renovate your roof when it’s raining.
[23:44]
CZIN: Yes, exactly. That’s my, that’s my chengyu 成语. And I think that’s a, big part of what’s going on. It’s not that, again, like I said before, it’s not like he’s distracted from the Taiwan issue set. It’s that he feels like he’s got space. It’s not a today, tomorrow problem. It’s not about the Davidson Window, so-called, and 2027. You know, he’s got time to be patient and see what happens in the next Taiwan election in 2028 and in our own elections. Right? And he’ll also be at the start of his fourth term.
[24:11]
HASS: Right. So, Jon, picking up on that, help us situate ourselves in Xi Jinping’s shoes, thinking macroscopically about China’s overall ambitions and the military’s role in them. How do you explain China’s overall ambitions and the role that the military is expected to play?
[24:25]
CZIN: I think the military is a crucial facet of it. And I think, you know, his predecessors poured a lot of money and resources and time into cultivating the PLA and to getting this modernization underway. But I think because Xi’s own father was a revolutionary commander himself, right, and had grown up in the PLA, and Xi himself had been a mishu 秘书 in the PLA, I think he understands their political importance and their importance to him personally throughout his tenure. And also understands what they mean for China on the world stage. Right?

Continued.....
 

Housecarl

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Continued.....

So there’s often this debate in Washington that’s almost really theological about, you know, China’s place in the world order. What role does it want? You know, I think they are relatively parochial about these things despite some of their more grandiloquent promises and campaigns, like the various global initiatives. Right?
I mean, what we’re talking about, the germ of PLA modernization is that they recognized they didn’t really have the wherewithal or the resources to deal with the U.S. They couldn’t even see them when we would sail into the Taiwan Strait. So they realized we need a military that’s capable of dealing with the U.S. military in a contingency.
But what I think what’s interesting about that is the natural implication of that then is you’re building a military to deal in every facet with the world’s most capable military. The knock on of that is you are in effect designing the world’s most capable military yourself. Right? And so they watch us very closely and they study us very closely.
And that’s one of the things I worry about right now in this current moment with the Iran war going on, is that there is this school of thought in Washington that this is somehow having a deterrent effect on China. Xi’s already deterred. Right? There’s not something pneumatic going on where he’s just winding up and waiting for the right moment to take Taiwan.
But I think they are watching closely. And what I worry about is that they are seeing just how impressive our capabilities are, and they’re diligently taking notes, and that this is going to have a catalytic effect on the PLA’s modernization the same way that the first Persian Gulf War did, right, now that we’re in act three of this.
[26:17]
HASS: John, what lessons do you think the Chinese are taking away from watching us prosecute war in Iran?
[26:22]
CULVER: Well, I, I’ve watched them think about what to learn from war since we executed Desert Storm. And that was a real eye-opener because there were whole kinds of technological capabilities that were unknown to them. So they had a steep learning curve. Frankly, the curve isn’t very steep now; they’ve learned a lot of lessons.
So mostly I I think what they’re taking away is that we have reconfirmed some things that they already believed, and it’s telling them that they’ve made mostly the right procurement options and development options, but they need to do more in certain areas. So the area they’re probably going to latch onto hardest is going to be the expanding role of artificial intelligence in platforms for military use, especially drones.
Now, the situation on the Taiwan Strait, you know, like everything in Asia is dominated by the tyranny of time and distance. It’s unlike the war in Ukraine and even what we’ve been doing in the Strait of Hormuz. So the kind of systems that are capable and even transformative in those other battles are largely irrelevant to the Taiwan Strait, because you have to have platforms, whether they’re sea or air or subsurface drones that have serious range, serious ability to fly or sail or scuttle long distances.
And so that’s going to give them a different set of menu options than I think we’ve been confronting. I mean, one of the benefits they have, as Jon noted, was that the war they’re worried about and the enemy they’re worried about is the United States. And their single-minded focus on the preparation for conflict in their front yard, and then extending out maybe 2,000, 1,500 kilometers in the Western Pacific.
The U.S. has to prepare for contingencies globally. So we may spend, you know, eye-popping mounts, $1.5 trillion in the latest administration budget request. But that doesn’t eclipse what they’re able to invest in, you know, a third or half that amount, because they’re preparing for a single conflict really and a single adversary. And it’s all going to be in close proximity, whereas they’re going to have short logistic lines, they have the world’s dominant manufacturing base, and really dominant defense industrial base.
That’s one troubling note that I have as an American when I look at what we have done or not done in the last 20 years is our relative incapacity to quickly build large amounts of relevant things, especially for a war we’d have to fight on the other side of the planet.
[28:51]
CZIN: If I may, I just wanted to underscore something there. Because there’s really a paradox here of China being the second superpower, right, that gives them an advantage over us in some ways. Whereas we have, like John said, we have these sprawling global responsibilities. China does not. And what that means is when we think about great power competition, I think they actually have a lot more discipline and focus. Right? They don’t have to worry about a wide range of things. They can get up every morning and think backwards about how to reverse engineer against our own advantages. Right? And we don’t really have that as the superpower.
So it’s kind of a paradox because we are still the preeminent force and the preeminent superpower. But those sprawling global responsibilities, our own kind of aspirations, it distracts us a lot of times. Right? And it makes us harder to sustain that position and remain the incumbent superpower.
[29:36]
HASS: So final question for both of you. One of the questions that I receive often when I travel around the United States is are my children going to have to go to war against Chinese military service members? Looking out over the next decade and beyond, because we’ve established that we are in a period of renovation of the Chinese military, on a scale of one to 10, 10 being the most excited or anxious, and 1 being the most relaxed, where do you both fall on the spectrum of likelihood of U.S.-China conflict over the next decade or beyond?
[30:05]
CULVER: I’d probably today peg it at about a 3 because neither the Chinese or the U.S. want to fight this war. And so there’s an inherent constraint on the possibility of conflict. Now, I’m mindful that can change. I mean, the reason why it’s not higher than a three even given uncertainties and the highly lethal nature of advanced technology and conflict, is because the U.S. has long had a stable policy that removes a lot of the potential sparks, especially over Taiwan.
Now, where I have caution and where I’d be, you know, thinking about changing my rating to a higher number is if our policy suddenly changes or if China’s policy suddenly changes. If for some reason Taiwan became much more important as Xi Jinping or any leader’s idea of legacy or his ability to wield power, then I think we could be in a whole new era.
Similarly, if the U.S. no longer maintained its One China policy with discipline, if we start to behave as if Taiwan’s just another country and one that merits our defense, then, you know, that can be true on a moral ground, but I think it we’re getting into treacherous territory in terms of war avoidance.
I’m not telling my grandson, you know, please don’t join the military. Right? But I think that it’s worth watching. And the thing is, we’re in a more, everything that lends stability to this situation over the course of my life and career looking at China has all weakened over the last 10 years.
So, I’m hoping the trend can still be our friend, and a lot of that’s going to be with policy continuity. If you start to behave as if you think China’s already decided to go to war, then I think war becomes inevitable. We will fall into a very deep deterrence trap. And it will be a highly lethal engagement for both sides, probably without a clear winner.
[31:57]
HASS: Right. Zero to 10, what do you think, Jon?
[31:59]
CZIN: I think 3 out of 10 is about right, but I think this is kind of the conundrum for U.S. policymakers, especially, you know, 25 years into a century that has been highly kinetic. This is what I worry about, right, for the defense community and for a lot of policymakers that allows you to defer a lot of those hard decisions about what we need to do to get our act together for an increasingly capable PLA. Right? Because there aren’t things going boom, right, there’s always some kind of crisis in the Middle East or now in Europe or somewhere else that you can and should focus on.
The dynamic that has led throughout throughout my career is a shifting military balance of power that favors China. Right? So what I really worry about is not necessarily about the actual hot war, but just that we wake up one day 10, 15 years from now and find out we’re not the preeminent military superpower because we’ve been so distracted and unfocused for so much of this century. And all of a sudden China really is. And even if there isn’t a conflict, that’s very insidious. Right? And that’s a very dangerous position to find ourselves in down the road. And I think that’s where the trend line is right now.
[32:59]
CULVER: Yeah. I kind worry that political trends here could shift us to a growing sense in the public, if not policymakers, that we can’t fight a war over Taiwan. that either it’s not worth defending or it isn’t a vital American interest. Because then I think, you know, the whole kind of architecture starts to shake.
[33:17]
CZIN: So one last point, I I mentioned earlier that early in Xi’s term there will be another election on Taiwan. And that that’s a potential inflection point for Xi. I think if Xi is dealing with a fourth term of the Democratic Progressive Party —
HASS: — the incumbent party —
CZIN: — the incumbent party in Taiwan, which Beijing views as anathema, I think Xi potentially starts to get very frustrated. Right? And I think he could, reach for some of those higher end, kinetic operation, short of a full-scale invasion or the million man swim. Right? But something like an offshore island seizure seizing some of Taiwan’s islands that are very close into China, or doing something along those lines just to shake the dynamic up.
Because I think as he gets into his fourth term and he gets later into his seventies, he is going to be thinking more about his legacy. And if he feels like the cross-strait dynamic is stuck and not trending in his favor and that they are just, in his own words, handing this down from generation to generation, that’s going to be increasingly unacceptable for him.
And that could be inherently dangerous if he does start to feel that impetus, especially in his old age.
[34:17]
HASS: Well, we’re going to have to leave it there for today. John Culver, Jon Czin, thank you very much for lending your wisdom and your insight into how to read China’s military in its overall strategic plans. The one thing I’ve taken away is that the tumult at the top of the Chinese military is real, but that should not offer any false complacency to anyone who is paying attention to the relationship between the United States and China.
So, for more in-depth analysis from our team, visit the China Center on the Brookings website at Brookings dot edu slash China Center. You can also subscribe to our monthly newsletter at the China Bulletin for the latest updates.
Thank you.
CULVER: Thank you, Ryan.
CZIN: Thanks.
On behalf of the team at the John L. Thornton China Center, thank you for listening to The Beijing Brief. This podcast is produced by the Brookings Podcast Network.
Our thanks to the production team, including supervising producer Ike Blake; senior producer Fred Dews; producer Allie Matthias; audio engineer Gastón Reboredo; and video producers Daniel Morales and Teddy Wansink. Rachel Slattery designed the show’s artwork. Also, thank you to our colleagues in the John L. Thornton China Center, Foreign Policy, and Office of Communications at Brookings for their support.
To learn more about our research, visit us at Brookings dot edu slash ChinaCenter. And to learn more about this podcast, go to Brookings dot edu slash TheBeijingBrief, or wherever you like to get your podcasts.
 

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Toward a Free and Unified Korea—Resolving the Korea Challenge at Its Source​


By Robert Joseph, Nicholas Eberstadt, James Flynn, Hyun-seung Lee, Michael Marshall, David Maxwell & Greg Scarlatoiu


KCNA via KNS


Robert Joseph, Nicholas Eberstadt, James Flynn, Hyun-seung Lee, Michael Marshall, David Maxwell, and Greg Scarlatoiu, Toward a Free and Unified Korea—Resolving the Korea Challenge at Its Source, No. 658, April 27, 2026
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Toward a Free and Unified Korea—Resolving the Korea Challenge at Its Source

Robert Joseph chaired the Free and Unified Korea working group that developed the findings, conclusions and policy recommendations contained in this report. The other members of the working group were Nicholas Eberstadt, James Flynn, Hyun-seung Lee, Michael Marshall, David Maxwell, and Greg Scarlatoiu.

Executive Summary


The division of the Korean Peninsula is one of the most critical unresolved legacies of World War II. What was intended as a temporary administrative line hardened into a permanent geopolitical fault line. More than 70 years after the Korean War, the peninsula remains divided between a thriving South and an impoverished, totalitarian, nuclear-armed regime in the North.

This paper presents the findings and recommendations of the Free and Unified Korea (FAUK) working group. It argues that a free and unified Korea is not a distant or speculative ambition. Rather, it represents the only durable pathway to eliminating the nuclear threat, protecting human rights, and completing the unfinished work of Korean independence.

For three decades, U.S. and international policy toward North Korea has centered narrowly on denuclearization. Yet North Korea’s nuclear arsenal continues to expand rapidly, its missile capabilities have advanced dramatically, and its human rights abuses remain systemic and severe. The underlying national security and humanitarian challenges of the peninsula cannot be resolved without addressing the structural reality of division itself.

Re-establishing unification as the strategic end state of U.S.–ROK policy requires moving beyond the limitations of a denuclearization-first paradigm and adopting a comprehensive framework that incorporates security, human rights, economic integration, and civil society engagement. It also requires preparing responsibly for potential political change on the peninsula and confronting persistent myths that portray unification as either impossible or prohibitively costly.

A unified Korea—democratic, nuclear-free, economically integrated, and grounded in a shared historical identity—would advance long-term U.S. strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific and fulfill the aspirations of the Korean people.

The Unfinished Korea Question


The division of Korea in 1945 was not an expression of Korean self-determination or political choice. It was imposed by the victorious powers at the end of World War II. The dividing line at the 38th parallel was intended as a temporary military demarcation. Instead, it became the defining fracture of modern Korean history.

The Korean independence movement of 1919 was not simply anti-colonial; it was also aspirational. It called for a unified, sovereign nation grounded in universal principles of freedom and equality. Contemporary initiatives such as the modern Korean Dream movement and the civil society coalition Action for Korea United (AKU) draw on that legacy as the basis for a comprehensive national vision for a unified Korea.[1]

On the 80th anniversary of Korea’s 1945 liberation, AKU founder and author of the seminal book, “Korean Dream,” Dr. Hyun Jin Preston Moon noted that the aspirations of the independence movement remained unfulfilled. Korea was liberated, but not unified—independent, but not whole.[2]

The consequences of division remain profound. The peninsula continues to host one of the most dangerous security environments in the world, combining nuclear weapons, unresolved military confrontation, and a system of political repression unmatched in scale.

The result is a divided and dangerous peninsula that continues to include:


  • A nuclear-armed regime in Pyongyang;
  • An unresolved armistice in place of peace;
  • A persistent risk of regional escalation;
  • Systematic crimes against humanity in the North.

For the United States, the Korea question is not peripheral. It was the first armed conflict of the Cold War. The U.S.–ROK alliance that emerged from it has become a cornerstone of regional stability. But the conflict itself remains structurally unresolved.

Why Denuclearization Alone Has Failed


For over 30 years, U.S. and international diplomacy have focused overwhelmingly on the “denuclearization” of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. It has been the highest priority and often the only priority. Agreements were reached, violated, renegotiated, and abandoned. Yet throughout this period Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities continued to expand at an accelerating rate.

Underlying this approach was the belief that the magnitude and urgency of the nuclear threat required placing denuclearization above all other concerns. Issues such as human rights, internal political change, and the long-term future of the Korean Peninsula were treated as secondary matters to be addressed later.

The record of the past three decades demonstrates the failure of the denuclearization first policy. Negotiations that focus narrowly on nuclear weapons cannot succeed when the weapons themselves are central to the regime’s survival strategy. For the Kim regime, nuclear weapons provide deterrence, coercive leverage, domestic legitimacy, and international recognition.

As a result, denuclearization negotiations have repeatedly failed because they attempt to separate the nuclear issue from the nature of the regime that possesses the weapons. The regime’s political structure and its nuclear arsenal are inseparable.

The 2023 report, “National Strategy for Countering North Korea,” published by the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP), similarly concluded that the current policy framework has been fundamentally misaligned with the strategic realities of the peninsula. It argued that the focus on arms control and negotiations has obscured the deeper issue: the persistence of a totalitarian regime that prioritizes regime survival above economic development, human rights, or international stability.[3]

The lesson is clear. Durable denuclearization will not occur unless the political structure that generates the nuclear threat changes. A comprehensive strategy must therefore address the broader question of the peninsula’s future.

Unification is not an alternative to security policy and denuclearization. It is the completion of it.

The Korean Dream: Historical and Cultural Foundations


A sustainable unification strategy must incorporate both geopolitical and cultural dimensions. The Korean Dream framework situates unification within Korea’s founding ethos of Hongik Ingan, often translated as “living for the greater benefit of humanity.”

This ideal, embedded in Korea’s origin narrative, has historically served as a unifying moral compass across regional, political, and ideological divides. It parallels universal principles articulated in democratic founding documents and reflects Korea’s long civilizational continuity.

The appropriate framework therefore presents unification not as absorption or conquest, but as the fulfillment of an interrupted national mission. It emphasizes shared heritage across North, South, and the global Korean diaspora and envisions a unified Korea rooted in democratic values and civic participation.

This cultural grounding is essential. Unification framed solely as a security imperative cannot generate the broad societal support necessary for long-term success. Framed instead as historical completion and national renewal, it becomes a project capable of mobilizing citizens across generations.

Civil society plays a central role in implementing this vision, transforming principles into practice. Broad-based coalitions such as Action for Korea United demonstrate how grassroots engagement can revitalize unification discourse even amid public apathy. Government policy can create enabling conditions, but lasting legitimacy must come from society itself. For this reason, unification must ultimately be Korean-led and civil society-grounded.


Confronting the Myths That Impede Unification


A series of persistent myths has discouraged serious strategic planning for Korean unification.


Myth 1: Unification Will Trigger War


Critics argue that pursuing unification risks regime collapse, civil war, and uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons. Yet the current system itself carries substantial instability risks. A brittle totalitarian dictatorship armed with nuclear weapons and governed by opaque succession dynamics cannot be considered a stable long-term equilibrium.

Responsible planning to move toward unification reduces risk by preparing for potential contingencies. Avoiding planning simply increases the dangers associated with sudden change.


Myth 2: China Will Never Allow It


Another common but dubious claim is that China would categorically oppose Korean unification under a democratic government. While Beijing’s interests must be considered, permanent acceptance of a destabilizing buffer state is not the only strategic option.

A carefully managed transition accompanied by diplomatic engagement and clear deterrence considerations could address many of China’s concerns while preserving the broader stability of the region.


Myth 3: A Unified Korea Would Drift from the United States


Some analysts suggest that Korean nationalism could lead a unified Korea to distance itself from the United States. In reality, a Korea that achieves unity with sustained international support is likely to value those alliances that helped secure its sovereignty. Simply put, there is no feasible security alternative to the U.S.-led alliance system if a unified Korea is to flourish and thrive. Without active involvement and deep integration in the U.S.-led international security architecture, a unified Korea cannot succeed, economically or politically.

Shared achievement tends to strengthen, rather than weaken, strategic partnerships.


Myth 4: Unification Is Too Expensive


Economic fears are among the most powerful obstacles to public support for unification. Comparisons to German reunification often dominate public debate. However, South Korea today is one of the world’s most advanced economies, with private wealth estimated at roughly $10 trillion. Global capital markets contain tens of trillions of dollars seeking productive investment opportunities.

With careful institutional design, infrastructure investment, and international participation, the reconstruction of North Korea can generate substantial economic returns rather than unsustainable fiscal burdens.


Myth 5: North Koreans Will Not Accept Freedom


Some assume that North Korean society is too isolated or politically conditioned to adapt to democratic institutions. Yet the experience of defectors and escapees demonstrates remarkable adaptability, resilience, and entrepreneurial energy once individuals are exposed to open societies.

Modern history repeatedly shows that populations long subject to authoritarian rule can rapidly embrace political and economic freedom when given the opportunity.


National Security Imperatives[4]


From a national security perspective, the persistence of the Kim regime presents enduring risks not only for the Korean Peninsula but for the broader Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

North Korea’s military posture, combined with its nuclear and missile capabilities, create the constant possibility of miscalculation or escalation. At the same time, the regime’s internal fragility raises concerns about instability and the security of its weapons of mass destruction.

Security experts such as David Maxwell have emphasized that long-term stability on the peninsula will ultimately depend on internal transformation within North Korea. Efforts to expand information access, support North Korean civil society networks, and encourage internal change can help create the conditions for peaceful transformation.

Preparing for political change is therefore a central national security requirement. Such preparation should include contingency planning for stabilizing the peninsula in the event of regime collapse, securing nuclear, chemical and biological materials, and coordinating closely with allies.

A unified Korea would eliminate one of the world’s most dangerous nuclear flashpoints while strengthening the strategic architecture of the Indo-Pacific.

Continued.....
 

Housecarl

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Continued......

Economic Transformation as Strategic Opportunity[5]


The economic case for unification is frequently misunderstood. North Korea’s poverty reflects catastrophic policy choices rather than inherent economic incapacity. Decades of isolation, centralized planning, and military prioritization have produced widespread deprivation despite the population’s high literacy rates and strong cultural emphasis on education.


Economic analyses by scholars such as Nicholas Eberstadt emphasize that North Korea’s economic failure is primarily the result of systemic policy mismanagement rather than a lack of human potential or natural resources. The North’s labor force, natural resources, and geographic position represent significant latent economic assets. North Koreans are Koreans, but their talent, drive and enterprise are shackled. Their potential is widely underestimated today, just as that of South Koreans before the ROK’s economic takeoff.


The reconstruction of North Korea should therefore be understood not as a purely humanitarian project but as a long-term development opportunity. Infrastructure modernization, energy grid revitalization, and integration into regional supply chains could generate substantial economic growth.


For the United States and its allies, a unified Korea would strengthen trusted supply chains in semiconductors, batteries, shipbuilding, and advanced manufacturing. It would reduce vulnerability to economic coercion and expand opportunities for regional economic cooperation.


Unification should therefore be understood not as the transfer of wealth from South to North, but as a process of strategic economic integration that benefits all Koreans.


Human Rights and Strategic Legitimacy[6]


Human rights concerns in North Korea have too often been subordinated to short-term diplomatic priorities, particularly nuclear negotiations. Systematic repression is not incidental—it is central to its structure and a pillar of the regime’s survival.


Human rights advocates such as Greg Scarlatoiu have emphasized that raising awareness of the regime’s abuses is essential both morally and strategically. Expanding information access, documenting crimes against humanity, and supporting the voices of North Korean defectors help undermine the regime’s monopoly on information.


Elevating human rights within policy planning strengthens internal awareness within North Korea while aligning international policy with democratic values.


Supporting North Korean voices abroad, promoting information flows into the country, and ensuring accountability for crimes against humanity can reinforce both moral credibility and long-term strategic effectiveness.


Policy Actions for U.S. and Allied Decision-Makers


Given the strategic, economic, and moral case for unification, the Free and Unified Korea working group recommends that policymakers take the following steps:


  1. Officially define unification as the strategic end state.

U.S. and ROK policy documents should explicitly identify a free and unified Korea as the primary objective, ideally with Japan’s support, building on the 2023 Camp David trilateral agreement.[vii]


  1. Integrate human rights into security strategy.

Human rights advocacy should be incorporated into broader policy planning rather than treated as a separate and secondary diplomatic track.


  1. Establish a joint transition planning mechanism.

The United States and South Korea should create a standing body responsible for contingency planning related to WMD security, humanitarian response, and economic integration.


  1. Strengthen civil society engagement.

Governments should provide support to Korean-led civic initiatives that promote dialogue and preparation for unification.


  1. Counter myths through public diplomacy.

Public diplomacy initiatives should address misconceptions about unification by highlighting updated economic modeling and strategic analysis.


  1. Engage regional stakeholders.

Diplomatic channels should be maintained with China and other regional actors to reduce misunderstanding and manage potential transition scenarios.


  1. Prepare financial architecture.

International financial institutions should begin contingency planning to identify mechanisms that can facilitate investment and reconstruction in a unified Korea.


Conclusion: From Crisis Management to Resolution


For decades, U.S. policy has focused on managing the Korean challenge—deterring conflict, maintaining alliance cohesion, and responding to periodic crises. But management is not resolution. The structural anomaly of division remains. The nuclear threat continues to expand. The human rights crisis continues. These conditions represent not a stable equilibrium but a continuing source of strategic risk.


A free and unified Korea offers a path toward durable peace, regional stability, and the fulfillment of the Korean people’s longstanding aspiration for unity and freedom. The Korea question remains unfinished. It is time to approach it not merely as a recurring crisis to be managed and contained, but as a historic challenge to be resolved.



Nicholas Eberstadt, Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), Senior Advisor to the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), and a Founding Director of Staff HRNK, the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.


James P. Flynn, International President of the Global Peace Foundation (GPF), leading initiatives across more than 20 countries to advance values-based peacebuilding and ethical leadership development.


Robert Joseph, former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Senior Scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy and a member of the Board of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.


Hyun-seung Lee is a North Korean escapee, former Special Forces soldier, and lead strategist at the Global Peace Foundation, and founder of the North Korean Young Leaders Assembly.


Michael Marshall, Editor-in-Chief Emeritus of United Press International.


David Maxwell, Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy, retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel. He has spent more than 30 years in Asia as a practitioner and specializes in North Korea and East Asian Security Affairs, and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare.


Greg Scarlatoiu, President and CEO of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), President of the International Council on Korean Studies (ICKS), and a Visiting Professor at Yonsei University.


This article appeared originally at National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP).


Notes:


[1] Action for Korea United, https://aku.kr/sub/business_1.php.


[2] Moon, Hyun Jin Preston, Korean Dream: A Vision for a Unified Korea, Centennial ed. (New York: Morgan James Publishing, 2020), https://koreandream.org/.


[3] Robert Joseph, et al., “A National Strategy for Countering North Korea,” Information Series, No. 545 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, January 23, 2023), https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Joseph-et-al-Analysis.pdf.


[4] David Maxwell, Reviewing American north Korean Policy-three decades of failure, UPI, March 26, 2026, Reviewing American north Korean Policy- three decades of failure - Original Research - Korea Regional Review - UPI.com.


[5] Nicholas Eberstadt, The Economics of Korean Re-unification: Thinking the Unthinkable? (AEI Foreign & Defense Policy Working Paper 2024-03), American Enterprise Institute, June 2024, https://aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Eberstadt-Working-Paper-6.11.24.pdf.


[6] Greg Scarlatoiu, The Power of Information: Telling Three Stories to the North Korean People, The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), August 2022, The Power of Information: Telling Three Stories to the North Korean People.


[7] The White House, The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States, August 18, 2023, Camp David Principles | The White House.


The National Institute for Public Policy’s Information Series is a periodic publication focusing on contemporary strategic issues affecting U.S. foreign and defense policy. It is a forum for promoting critical thinking on the evolving international security environment and how the dynamic geostrategic landscape affects U.S. national security. Contributors are recognized experts in the field of national security. National Institute for Public Policy would like to thank the Sarah Scaife Foundation for the generous support that made this Information Series possible.


The views in this Information Series are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as official U.S. Government policy, the official policy of the National Institute for Public Policy, or any of its sponsors. For additional information about this publication or other publications by the National Institute Press, contact: Editor, National Institute Press, 12150 Monument Dr., Suite 125, Fairfax, VA 22033, (703) 293- 9181, www.nipp.org. For access to previous issues of the National Institute Press Information Series, please visit http://www.nipp.org/national-institutepress/informationseries/.
 

jward

passin' thru
Shanaka Anslem Perera ⚡
@shanaka86
·
58m
JUST IN: Japan just placed the first order for the post-human economy. Not a policy paper. Not a committee report. An actual deployment of Chinese-made humanoid robots to handle baggage at the busiest airport in the world's third-largest economy, starting next month.

On April 27, Japan Airlines and GMO AI and Robotics announced that Unitree G1 humanoid robots will begin a demonstration trial on the tarmac at Tokyo's Haneda Airport in May 2026. The robots stand 132 centimeters tall, weigh 35 kilograms, cost $13,500, and were manufactured in Hangzhou, China. They will be tested pushing cargo containers onto conveyor belts, moving luggage, and coordinating with human handlers. Two units go first. GMO Internet Group has formally designated 2026 as the "First Year of Humanoids." The trial runs through 2028 with plans for permanent integration if successful.

Everyone is covering this as a technology story. It is a dependency story. And the dependency runs in the opposite direction from every assumption the market holds about the US-China technology war.

Japan invented industrial robotics. Fanuc, Yaskawa, Kawasaki. For four decades, Japanese factories exported automation to the world. Now Japan is importing humanoid labor from China because its domestic humanoid industry has not scaled fast enough to meet the demographic emergency. The Unitree G1 was designed in Hangzhou, trained using Nvidia Isaac Simulator, and costs less than five months of a Japanese ground handler's annual salary. The country that built the global robotics industry is now a customer of China's.

The numbers are structural. Japan recorded 42.7 million inbound tourists in 2025 and 7 million in the first two months of 2026. Haneda processes over 60 million passengers annually. Ground handling staff shortages have hit 20%. Japan may need 6.5 million foreign workers by 2040, but political pressure to limit immigration is mounting. The country is caught between a demographic wall and a political wall, and the only passage between them is a 132-centimeter robot from Hangzhou.

Mo Gawdat said labor arbitrage disappears when you can hire a robot for less than a human. Japan just converted that thesis into a procurement decision. A Unitree G1 costs $13,500. A Haneda ground handler earns $35,000 to $45,000 per year before benefits. The robot runs approximately two hours per charge, but it does not age, emigrate, or quit. Japan is not adopting humanoids because they are better. It is adopting them because it has run out of humans.

Here is the dependency inversion nobody is pricing. In March 2026, the US Senate introduced a bipartisan bill banning Chinese-made robots from government use. Japan, America's most critical Pacific ally, is importing those same robots for airport infrastructure. The chips are Nvidia. The bodies are built in Hangzhou. This is not hypothetical. In April 2025, Beijing restricted rare earth magnet exports and Musk confirmed the restrictions delayed Tesla Optimus production. If Beijing applies the same lever to humanoid exports, Japan's demographic solution becomes a supply-chain crisis overnight.

The first humanoid robot will push its first cargo container at Haneda in May. It costs less than a used Toyota. It was made by a country America is trying to contain. And it will do a job no Japanese citizen is willing to do anymore. That is not a technology trial. That is the future of labor arriving at gate 23.
View: https://twitter.com/shanaka86/status/2049450063051759890?s=20
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use......

China says Japan must be blocked from possessing nuclear weapons​


4 hours ago

China has called for Japan to be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons at a nuclear disarmament conference currently underway in New York.

The review conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or NPT, began on Monday at the United Nations headquarters.

On Wednesday, the head of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's Arms Control Department, Sun Xiaobo, noted that senior government officials from a certain country have publicly expressed their intention to possess nuclear weapons.

Sun claimed that Japan is pushing to revise its pacifist Constitution and review its Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

He added that Japan's acquisition of nuclear weapons must be resolutely prevented.

Japan's ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Ichikawa Tomiko, rebutted the claim, saying that the Japanese government adheres to its policy of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

She said that as the only country to have suffered atomic bombings in war, Japan will continue to work closely with the international community toward realizing a world without nuclear weapons.

China then countered again, saying that Japan has long stockpiled vast quantities of plutonium far exceeding civilian needs.

Ichikawa denied this, saying there are no issues related to nuclear non-proliferation.
 
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